November 9, 2009

November 9th, 2009

The G-20 discussed a Tobin tax:

Group of 20 governments split on whether to tax financial trading as part of a broader strategy to ensure the global economy’s expansion is less crisis-prone.

U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown told a meeting of finance chiefs in St. Andrews, Scotland today that such a levy could prevent excessive risk taking and fund future bank rescues, adding momentum to a debate begun by France. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said a “day-by-day” tax on speculation is “not something we’re prepared to support.”

Clearly a lunatic view. Or populist. Or … perhaps even pre-emptive, to spike the guns of the French! Because after all, even the speaker states:

Brown, who didn’t say whether he’d ultimately endorse such a levy, said any policy would need to be implemented by all financial centers including those in the Middle East, Asia and Switzerland.

There’s nothing wrong in principal with taxing the financial sector in order to pay for bail-outs – but a Tobin tax will kill liquidity and encourage buy-and-hold carry trades – which are precisely the trades that killed the brokerages and banks in the first place. Much better is a beefed-up deposit insurance scheme – which has been proposed by Treasury in connection with the multi-nationals.

Mind you, in Canada we can’t even fund the deposit insurance we have properly. There’s a capital tax on banks, but the government blows it on useless garbage.

BIS has published the Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Governors: Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations, which is the missing reference in Julie Dickson’s recent speech.

The Financial Post ran an article regarding Canadian Alternative Trading Systems, Men of Shadows.

The Canadian preferred share market edged up today, with PerpetualDiscounts ahead by 3bp on the day while FixedResets were up 8bp. Volume dropped off again, with FixedResets dominating what little action there was.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.2354 % 1,487.3
FixedFloater 6.30 % 4.39 % 46,962 18.31 1 6.2847 % 2,471.3
Floater 2.62 % 3.10 % 93,245 19.46 3 1.2354 % 1,858.0
OpRet 4.80 % -10.25 % 118,584 0.09 14 0.1804 % 2,305.3
SplitShare 6.34 % 6.40 % 396,198 3.90 2 -0.1964 % 2,085.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1804 % 2,108.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.88 % 5.76 % 73,800 1.16 4 0.2183 % 1,863.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.92 % 5.96 % 189,333 13.92 70 0.0251 % 1,751.2
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.09 % 399,234 3.97 41 0.0753 % 2,121.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 24.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 18.85
Evaluated at bid price : 18.85
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 12.75
Evaluated at bid price : 12.75
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 12.81
Evaluated at bid price : 12.81
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 6.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 212,425 TD crossed 200,000 at 27.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.03
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 87,000 RBC crossed 30,900 at 27.30 and 36,800 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 45,845 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 37,945 RBC crossed 34,700 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
PWF.PR.D OpRet 34,425 TD bought 25,000 from Nesbitt at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-12-09
Maturity Price : 25.60
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : -24.61 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 30,927 Nesbitt bought 17,200 from RBC at 27.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.22
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

November 6, 2009

November 6th, 2009

Another good day for preferreds, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 17bp and FixedResets picking up 24bp. Volume remained subdued.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.9566 % 1,469.1
FixedFloater 6.70 % 4.73 % 46,608 17.87 1 0.0617 % 2,325.2
Floater 2.65 % 3.15 % 94,539 19.34 3 -0.9566 % 1,835.3
OpRet 4.81 % -10.68 % 118,237 0.09 14 -0.0410 % 2,301.2
SplitShare 6.33 % 6.40 % 411,654 3.91 2 0.1530 % 2,089.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0410 % 2,104.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.89 % 5.75 % 72,650 1.17 4 -0.1387 % 1,859.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.92 % 5.96 % 190,998 13.93 70 0.1722 % 1,750.8
FixedReset 5.51 % 4.09 % 403,947 3.98 41 0.2437 % 2,119.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 12.57
Evaluated at bid price : 12.57
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 12.60
Evaluated at bid price : 12.60
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 19.92
Evaluated at bid price : 19.92
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 24.45
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 21.62
Evaluated at bid price : 21.62
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 23.45
Evaluated at bid price : 23.61
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 19.58
Evaluated at bid price : 19.58
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 2.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 154,900 RBC crossed 143,900 at 20.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 19.92
Evaluated at bid price : 19.92
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 71,785 TD crossed 55,000 at 19.79.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 19.84
Evaluated at bid price : 19.84
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 68,215 Desjardins bought 22,100 from RBC at 27.41 and two blocks of 13,800 and 14,500 from National, both at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 53,785 Nesbitt crossed two blocks at 18.55: 28,700 and 20,450 shares.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-06
Maturity Price : 18.68
Evaluated at bid price : 18.68
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 50,980 Nesbitt bought 19,400 from Macquarie at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Premium 43,003 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MFC: S&P Places Ratings on Watch-Negative

November 6th, 2009

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • Manulife Financial Corp.’s (TSX/NYSE: MFC) operating performance is below expectations.
  • MFC’s risk tolerance remains high and the majority of its
    equity-linked liabilities remain unhedged. Also, earnings and capitalization are highly sensitive to volatile equity markets and changes in interest rates.

  • MFC’s planned reorganization will reduce its cash flow diversification.
  • We are placing our ‘AA-‘ counterparty credit rating on MFC on CreditWatch with negative implications because we expect to restore standard notching following the reorganization.
  • We are revising the outlook on our ‘AA+’ financial strength ratings on MFC’s subsidiaries to negative from stable.

Under its current organizational structure, MFC has two major cash flow streams consisting of MLI and its U.S. subsidiaries held under John Hancock Financial Services Inc. (John Hancock Financial). Its U.S. subsidiaries are currently organized in two columns with each providing approximately one quarter of the group’s operating performance. This organizational diversification is important to support the nonstandard two-notch differential between the counterparty credit ratings on MFC and the higher financial strength ratings on its core subsidiaries. Following the planned reorganization, MLI will be the only major direct source of earnings and cash flow for MFC. But, more importantly, the U.S. half of total earnings will be channeled through a single U.S. insurance company and, therefore, be subject to the dividend restrictions of a single U.S. insurance regulator instead of two. Although the eorganization results in many benefits to Manulife, including increased capital and operational efficiency, it is our opinion that the reduced diversification increases the potential for lower cash flows to MFC during severe or extreme stress events and is more in line with standard notching.

The target date for completion of the reorganization is year-end 2009. When completed, we expect to lower the ratings on MFC by one notch. This would restore a standard three-notch differential between the ratings on MFC and the higher financial strength ratings of its core ubsidiaries.

Meanwhile, Manulife CEO Daniel “Cowboy” Guloien thinks his luck will change:

But on a conference call with analysts Thursday, Mr. Guloien made it clear that he thinks he’s developed a strategy that will strengthen the company’s capital levels and still allow shareholders to benefit if stock markets go up. And he’s sticking to it – no matter what S&P says. “I could look like a hero [by taking] a huge one-time charge and say, ‘We’ve put it behind us.’ And I think that would mollify rating agencies and other people who are concerned about downside risk,” he said.

“I happen to believe that the shareholders who have suffered a great deal by seeing unhedged positions cost [the company] in terms of the market downdraft have a right to earn that back in the market updraft.

“And I’m not prepared to put their interest behind me because a rating agency has a view on an unhedged position.”

MFC has the following preferred shares outstanding: MFC.PR.A (OpRet), MFC.PR.B & MFC.PR.C (PerpetualDiscount), MFC.PR.D & MFC.PR.E (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™.

EPP Name and Ticker Change to CZP

November 6th, 2009

EPCOR Power L.P. (TSX: EP.UN) (the Partnership) and EPCOR Power Equity Ltd. (TSX: EPP.PR.A, EPP.PR.B) have announced:

changes to their respective company names. The change in names follows Capital Power Corporation’s (TSX: CPX) (Capital Power) acquisition of EPCOR Utilities Inc.’s power generation assets and operations effective July 1, 2009 when it assumed the role of manager and operator of the Partnership’s assets. The following table summarizes the previous and new names and associated Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) ticker symbols:

Previous Names New Names
EPCOR Power L.P. (EP.UN) Capital Power Income L.P. (CPA.UN)
EPCOR Power Equity Ltd.

  • •Series 1 (EPP.PR.A)
  • •Series 2 (EPP.PR.B)
CPI Preferred Equity Ltd.

  • •Series 1 (CZP.PR.A)
  • •Series 2 (CZP.PR.B)

EPCOR Power L.P.’s units and the preferred shares (Series 1 and 2) issued by EPCOR Power Equity Ltd. will continue to trade on the TSX with the new ticker symbols expected to take effect on or about November 9, 2009.

MFC 3Q09 Results

November 5th, 2009

Manulife Financial has released its 3Q09 results and – as they warned in the 2Q09 release – results were severely impacted by changes in actuarial assumptions:

the Company completed its annual review of all actuarial assumptions in the third quarter. This resulted in a charge to earnings of $783 million, including $469 million due to changes in assumptions of policyholder behaviour for segregated fund guarantee products (a charge that was within the Company’s previously communicated expectations of less than $500 million). The remainder of the charge included assumption changes related to morbidity and other policyholder behaviour, partially offset by assumption changes related to mortality, expenses and investment related items.

The morbidity charge comes as something of a shock, and details are a little skanty:

Driven by increases due to impact from higher projected net long-term care claims costs. Partially offsetting these increases were reductions from mortality releases in Japan and the Reinsurance Division.

They make particular note of the potential for being regulated at the holdco level:

In Canada, OSFI has announced that it (i) will be proposing a method for evaluating stand-alone capital adequacy for operating life insurance companies, such as MLI, (ii) is considering updating its regulatory guidance for non-operating insurance companies acting as holding companies, such as MFC, and (iii) is reviewing the use of internally-modeled capital requirements for segregated fund guarantees. The outcome of these initiatives is uncertain and could have a material adverse impact on the Company or on its position relative to that of other Canadian and international financial institutions with which it competes for business and capital.

They disclose their market risk sensitivity as:

The interest scenario we have adopted uses the structure of the prescribed scenario that currently produces the highest policy liability, which is a gradual decline in market interest rates from current market levels to lower assumed ultimate reinvestment rates over 20 years, with additional prudence introduced through use of lower ultimate reinvestment rates than the maximum levels permitted. The decrease in sensitivity to public equity market values reflects the impact of significantly improved equity markets in 2009, which has both reduced the liability for existing segregated fund guarantees and reduced the sensitivity of this liability to changes in equity market levels. Additional sensitivity reduction resulted from the increase in the amount of business that is hedged. Sensitivity to other non fixed income assets has increased from 2008 due to additional acquisitions of non fixed income assets in 2009 in support of the Company’s long-term investment strategy and the inclusion of the impact of future income taxes.

“Non Fixed Income Assets” are described as:

Other non fixed income assets include commercial real estate, timber and agricultural real estate, oil and gas, and private equities

Private equity, I’m convinced, is a way to dress up equities as bonds, valuing them on the basis of discounted cash flows since they don’t have a publicly quoted market price. Somewhere in the world, for some company, somehow, that masquerade is going to blow up some day. However, MFC is less than forthcoming on just how these investments – and their risks – are valued.

The fact that they will experience a loss due to interest decreases implies that their assets have lower duration than their liabilities.

Various leverage factors may be calculated as:

MFC Leverage
Item 3Q09 2Q09 4Q08
Tangible
Common
Equity
15,275 16,575 16,482
Bond Exposure 147,056 149,353 149,733
Bond Leverage 963% 978% 908%
Reported Bond Sensitivity 2,000 * 1,300
Bond Sensitivity / Equity 13.1% * 7.9%
Equity Exposure 10,437 9,688 8,240
Equity Leverage 68% 58% 50%
Reported Equity Sensitivity 1,300 * 1,500
Equity Sensitivity / Equity 8.5% * 9.1%
“Non-Fixed Income” Exposure 11,510 12,181 12,259
“Non-Fixed Income” Leverage 75.3% 73.5% 74.4
Reported “Non-Fixed Income” Sensitivity 700 * 600
“Non-Fixed Income” Sensitivity / Equity 4.6% * 3.6%
Tangible Common Equity is Common Shareholders’ Equity including all elements of Other Comprehensive Income less goodwill less intangibles
Bond Exposure is Securities-Bonds plus all elements of Loans
Bond Leverage is Bond Exposure divided by Tangible Common Equity
Reported Bond Sensitivity is the midpoint of the reported effect on earnings of an adverse 100bp move in interest rates, for AFS and HFT bonds taken together.
Equity Exposure is Securities-Stocks
“Non-Fixed Income” Exposure is Real Estate plus Other Investments

I confess that I’m a bit perplexed at their sensitivity reporting. I have taken the sensitivities above from the table “Sensitivity of Policy Liabilities to Changes in Asset Related Assumptions” but in the section headed “Net Income Sensitivity to Interest Rate and Market Price Risk” they state:

The potential impact on net income attributed to shareholders as a result of a change in policy liabilities for a one per cent increase in government, swap and corporate rates at all maturities across all markets was estimated to be a gain of approximately $1,600 million as at September 30, 2009 (December 31, 2008 – approximately $1,100 million) and for a one per cent decrease in government, swap and corporate rates at all maturities across all markets was estimated to be a charge of approximately $2,000 million as at September 30, 2009 (December 31, 2008 –approximately $1,300 million).

… which are the same numbers. Taken literally, this would mean that changes in policy liabilities flow straight through to the bottom line, which would make sense only if their assets were comprised of 100% cash.

The earnings release quotes Chief Financial Officer Michael W. Bell as saying:

As a result of the decline in interest rates and changes in lapse assumptions, our interest rate sensitivity has increased.

Later on, just after the table showing the sensitivities, the release states:

The increase in the sensitivity to changes in market interest rates is primarily due to the impact of the current lower market interest rates on liabilities with minimum interest guarantees and changes in lapse assumptions.

I get the “minimum interest guarantee” part, but am a little fogged by the “changes in lapse assumptions”. I can only assume that they are assuming that this means they are assuming they will get fewer gifts in future from policyholders terminating agreements that are in the policyholders’ favour, but this is not spelt out – and neither is the breakdown between the two major components of the sensitivity.

Their presentation slides include the remark:

Changes in interest rates impact the actuarial valuation of in-force policies by changing the future returns assumed on the investment of net future cash flows

By and large, I’d guess they’re making long-term guarantees backed by short-term investments … the banks’ “maturity transformation” in reverse – and, what’s more, making this a big bet.

November 5, 2009

November 5th, 2009

Lord Turner of the UK Financial Services Authority made a speech on Nov. 2 to the Turner Review Conference titled Large systemically important banks: addressing the too-big-to-fail problem:

Clearly we can and must reduce the probability of failure of large systemically important banks (Slide 6) and our key lever to achieve that is the capital and liquidity requirements we impose. In the past, as I have shown, we actually allowed larger banks to operate with slightly lower capital requirements: we need to reverse that approach. We are committed to higher capital across the whole banking system, but there is also a strong case for demanding higher still capital standards from our largest systemically important banks.

That could mean more quantity of capital in total, or a higher quality capital, a higher proportion of equity rather than debt. One of the defining characteristics of the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem has been our unwillingness, for fear of systemic consequences, to impose any losses on debt capital, even though it is meant to be there to absorb losses. This clearly creates a moral hazard danger for the future. One obvious solution is therefore to accept that debt capital has little or no role in the required capital of large systemically important banks, addressing the moral hazard problem by increasing the commitment of equity, the element in the capital structure which investors clearly recognise will suffer loss in any rescue.

Or, to create a role for contingent capital, debt capital which will without doubt convert to equity if the equity ratio falls below a predefined level – effectively defining in advance the terms of a debt-to-equity swap.

These capital regime reforms are now being considered by the Basel Committee and the FSB, and will themselves make a very major contribution to addressing the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem. Essentially, such measures amount to a tax on size or on other measures of systemic importance. If despite them, large and complex banks remain competitive, that is fine because they will be safer: if in response banks choose to remain smaller and simpler, that is fine also.

… but as Anousha Sakoui of the Financial Times reports in An experiment in the role of contingent capital:

“The FSA is no doubt rubbing its hands in a satisfied manner but there is a question over whether the ECNs will fly commercially,” said one regulatory specialist. “Investors are already nervous about bank exposure and this will not make them any less nervous. It is a silver bullet for regulators, but only if the market agrees.”

“ECN” [Enhanced Capital Note] is the nerd nomenclature for contingent capital. I have argued, most recently in the post Lloyds Contingent Capital Poorly Structured, that rational, non-coerced, buyers will demand a coupon so high that rational sellers won’t want to pay it … which is why it’s so important to get it into the indices – passive investors will buy ANYTHING, as long as you promise not to make them think about it.

John Palmer, head of OSFI from 1994-2001, has been appointed to the MFC board of directors. His successor, Nicholas Le Pan, is a director of CIBC. His predecessor, Michael Mackenzie, was on the board of ING Canada.

PerpetualDiscounts put in a solid day’s work today, gaining 24bp, while FixedResets lost 7bp. Strength in the BAM OperatingRetractibles more than offset a decline by GWO.PR.X, which was called for redemption. Volume continued to be on the lightish side.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2677 % 1,483.3
FixedFloater 6.70 % 4.73 % 47,039 17.87 1 0.1235 % 2,323.8
Floater 2.63 % 3.11 % 93,683 19.43 3 0.2677 % 1,853.1
OpRet 4.81 % -7.31 % 118,588 0.09 14 0.1532 % 2,302.1
SplitShare 6.34 % 6.46 % 414,785 3.91 2 0.5716 % 2,086.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1532 % 2,105.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.88 % 5.77 % 72,931 1.17 4 -0.0345 % 1,862.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.93 % 5.97 % 190,257 13.92 70 0.2365 % 1,747.8
FixedReset 5.52 % 4.16 % 408,875 3.98 41 -0.0737 % 2,114.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.M FixedReset -2.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.40
Bid-YTW : 4.59 %
GWO.PR.X OpRet -2.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.67
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.03
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-05
Maturity Price : 17.92
Evaluated at bid price : 17.92
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-05
Maturity Price : 19.79
Evaluated at bid price : 19.79
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-05
Maturity Price : 17.74
Evaluated at bid price : 17.74
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.61
Bid-YTW : 7.84 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-05
Maturity Price : 19.13
Evaluated at bid price : 19.13
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 2.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-05
Maturity Price : 20.15
Evaluated at bid price : 20.15
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 71,850 Macquarie (who?) sold a block of 40,000 to Scotia at 26.55, and a block of 16,200 to RBC at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.48
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 62,257 Nesbitt crossed 49,200 at 18.53.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-05
Maturity Price : 18.62
Evaluated at bid price : 18.62
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 46,412 Macquarie sold blocks of 18,900 to Nesbitt and 20,000 to RBC, both at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.53
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 45,120 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 19.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-05
Maturity Price : 19.45
Evaluated at bid price : 19.45
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 39,406 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 36,329 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-05
Maturity Price : 17.74
Evaluated at bid price : 17.74
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

GWO.PR.X Called for Redemption

November 5th, 2009

Great-West Lifeco has announced:

that it intends to redeem all of its outstanding Series E First Preferred Shares on December 31, 2009. The redemption price will be $26.00 for each Series E First Preferred Share plus an amount equal to all declared and unpaid dividends, less any tax required to be deducted and withheld by the Corporation. The paid-up capital of the Series E First Preferred Shares is $22.78 per share.

A formal notice and instructions for the redemption of the Series E First Preferred Shares will be sent to shareholders in accordance with the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attached to the Series E First Preferred Shares.

There’s a shocker! They closed last night at 26.60-63, so some players have found out the hard way that purchasing issues with a negative yield-to-worst is playing with fire.

As of August 18, GWO.PR.X was held in CPD with a weight of 3.82%; as of June 30, it was held in DPS.UN with a weight on August 18 (assuming that it was not sold in the interim) of 0.8%; and as of September 30 it was in the BMO-CM “50” index to the tune of 4.42%.

This is a monster issue, by the way, with the TSX reporting 22.09-million shares outstanding. Holders should also take note that the difference between the redemption price of 26.00 and the paid-up capital of 22.78 is a deemed dividend, while the capital gain or loss is determined by the difference between the holder’s ACB and the 22.78 figure … but check with your personal tax advisor before taking action on the basis of tax commentary from a portfolio manager!

GWO.PR.X was last mentioned on PrefBlog in the post Potential for Buy-Backs and Unscheduled Exchanges. GWO.PR.X is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is currently included in the Operating Retractible subindex.

SLF 3Q09 Results

November 5th, 2009

Sun Life Financial has released its 3Q09 results and – as they warned in the 2Q09 release – results were severely impacted by changes in actuarial assumptions:

Sun Life Financial Inc.2 reported a net loss attributable to common shareholders of $140 million for the quarter ended September 30, 2009, compared with a net loss of $396 million in the third quarter of 2008. Net losses in the third quarter of 2009 were impacted by the implementation of equity- and interest rate-related actuarial assumption updates of $513 million and reserve increases of $194 million for downgrades on the Company’s investment portfolio. These decreases were partially offset by reserve releases of $161 million as a result of favourable equity markets. Results in the third quarter of 2008 were impacted primarily by asset impairments and credit-related losses and a steep decline in equity markets. Results last year also included earnings of $31 million or $0.06 per share from the Company’s 37% ownership interest in CI Financial, which the Company sold in the fourth quarter of 2008.

They make particular note of the potential for being regulated at the holdco level:

In Canada, OSFI has proposed a method for evaluating stand-alone capital adequacy and is considering updating its current regulatory guidance for insurance holding companies. While the impacts on the life insurance sector are not known, it remains probable that increased regulation (including at the holding company level) will lead to higher levels of required capital and liquidity and limits on levels of financial leverage, which could result in lower returns on capital for shareholders.

They disclose their market risk sensitivity as:

the impact of an immediate 10% drop across all equity markets would be an estimated decrease in net income in the range of $125 million to $175 million.

an immediate 1% parallel decrease in interest rates would result in an estimated decrease in net income in the range of $325 million to $400 million. The increase in sensitivity to a downward movement in interest rates from the second quarter of 2009 is primarily due to the implementation of equity- and interest rate-related assumption updates.

The fact that they will experience a loss due to interest decreases implies that their assets have lower duration than their liabilities.

Various leverage factors may be calculated as:

SLF Leverage
Item 3Q09 2Q09 4Q08
Tangible
Common
Equity
8,272 8,678 8,332
Bond Exposure 81,188 81,565 81,376
Bond Leverage 981% 940% 977%
Reported Bond Sensitivity ??? ??? ???
Bond Sensitivity / Equity ??? ??? ???
Equity Exposure 4,710 4,612 4,458
Equity Leverage 57% 53% 54%
Reported Equity Sensitivity 150 237.5 312.5
Equity Sensitivity / Equity 2% 3% 4%
Tangible Common Equity is Common Shareholders’ Equity less goodwill less intangibles
Bond Exposure is Bonds-Held-for-Trading plus Bonds-Available-for-Sale plus Mortgages and Corporate Loans
Bond Leverage is Bond Exposure divided by Tangible Common Equity
Reported Bond Sensitivity is the midpoint of the reported effect on earnings of an adverse 100bp move in interest rates, for AFS and HFT bonds taken together.
Equity Exposure is Stocks-Held-For-Trading plus Stocks-Available-for-Sale

I don’t understand their interest rate senstivity figure for 3Q09. The 3Q09 Earnings Release states:

The estimated impact of an immediate parallel increase of 1% in interest rates as at September 30, 2009, across the yield curve in all markets, would be an increase in net income in the range of $150 million to $200 million. Conversely, an immediate 1% parallel decrease in interest rates would result in an estimated decrease in net income in the range of $325 million to $400 million. The increase in sensitivity to a downward movement in interest rates from the second quarter of 2009 is primarily due to the implementation of equity- and interest rate-related assumption updates.

While the 2Q09 Report to Shareholders states:

For held-for-trading assets and other financial assets supporting actuarial liabilities, the Company is exposed to interest rate risk when the cash flows from assets and the policy obligations they support are significantly mismatched, as this may result in the need to either sell assets to meet policy payments and expenses or reinvest excess asset cash flows under unfavourable interest environments. The estimated impact on the Company’s policyholder obligations of an immediate parallel increase of 1% in interest rates as at June 30, 2009, across the yield curve in all markets, would be an increase in net income in the range of $100 to $150. Conversely, an immediate 1% parallel decrease in interest rates would result in an estimated decrease in net income in the range of $200 to $275.

Bonds designated as available-for-sale generally do not support actuarial liabilities. Changes in fair value of available-for-sale bonds are recorded to OCI. For the Company’s available-for-sale bonds, an immediate 1% parallel increase in interest rates at June 30, 2009, across the yield curve in all markets, would result in an estimated after-tax decrease in OCI in the range of $325 to $375. Conversely, an immediate 1% parallel decrease in interest rates would result in an estimated after-tax increase in OCI in the range of $325 to $375.

Adding the AFS and HFT bond figures for 2Q09 results in an estimate of $525 to $650, which is greater than the estimate in the 3Q09 release, whereas the commentary implies it should be less. It is probable that the 3Q09 figure reflects only AFS bonds, but I’ll wait until the 3Q09 report is available before updating the table.

Just to confuse matters, the 4Q08 earnings release states:

The estimated impact from these obligations of an immediate parallel increase of 1% in interest rates as at December 31, 2008, across the yield curve in all markets, would be an increase in net income in the range of $100 to $150 million. Conversely, an immediate 1% parallel decrease in interest rates would result in an estimated decrease in net income in the range of $150 to $200 million.

YPG.PR.A & YPG.PR.B: Issuer Bid is Real

November 5th, 2009

YPG Holdings has released its 3Q09 financials with some information of interest to holders of the captioned issues. According to the Management Discussion & Analysis:

On June 9, 2009, YPG Holdings Inc. received approval from the Toronto Stock Exchange on its notice of intention to make a normal course issuer bid for its preferred shares Series 1 and 2 through the facilities of the Toronto Stock Exchange from June 11, 2009 to June 10, 2010, in accordance with applicable regulations of the Toronto Stock Exchange. Under its normal course issuer bid, the Fund intends to purchase for cancellation up to 1,200,000 and 800,000 of its series of preferred shares outstanding on June 9, 2009. These figures represent 10% of the public float of each series of preferred shares outstanding on June 9, 2009. Since June 11, 2009, 39,500 Preferred Shares Series 1 and 328,632 Preferred Shares series 2 were repurchased at average prices of $22.71 and $17.87, respectively. The total cost of repurchasing preferred shares in the second and third quarters of 2009 amounted to $6.8 million, including brokerage fees.

As of the second quarter, the amount repurchased – in the three weeks or so between NCIB approval and quarter end – the amount was derisory:

As at June 30, 2009, the Fund purchased for cancellation 8,800 Series 1 shares of the Fund for a total cash consideration of $0.2 million including brokerage fees at an average price of $22.47 per Series 1 share and 12,600 Series 2 shares of the Fund for a total cash consideration of $0.2 million including brokerage fees at an average price of $17.43 per Series 2 share.

YPG recorded a third quarter loss on goodwill writedown, but for a company like YPG – which is, basically, all goodwill – balance sheet values are of limited utility. It is operating cash flow that’s important; this was down, but not by more than one would expect in a vicious recession.

YPG.PR.A and YPG.PR.B were last mentioned on PrefBlog in connection with YPG’s issuance of 5-Year MTNs. YPG.PR.A and YPG.PR.B are both tracked by HIMIPref™ but are relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns.

Contingent Capital: UK Authorities Attempting to Debase Bond Indices

November 4th, 2009

One thing that has irritated me for a long time has been the inclusion of Innovative Tier 1 Capital (IT1C) in the major bond indices. Those things aren’t even bonds! IT1C is simply preferred shares dressed up as bonds – this doesn’t degrade their utility as an investment vehicle and can make them quite attractive for non-taxable portfolios … but it doesn’t make them bonds.

However, Scotia stuck them in the index when the DEX indices were still the Scotia Capital indices, which I always presumed was just a way to make them easier to sell. There is never any shortage of pig-ignorant portfolio managers who neither know nor care about the specific risks of particular investments; the dirty part about this is that since institutional clients generally know even less and benchmark against “the index”, portfolio managers must make the choice: not buy them, and risk underperforming for 9 years out of ten; or buy them and pretend that, yes, they really are bonds.

I have previously pointed out that the lack of first-loss protection means that the Lloyds notes are not bonds. They may have merit as investments, certainly, but they are not bond investments.

Now Duncan Kerr of eFinancial News reports that UK government and regulatory authorities are teaming up to pull exactly the same trick with ludicrous index inclusions in a column titled Investor threat remains to Lloyds’ contingent capital plans:

Some of the UK’s biggest fixed-income investors are already frustrated about Lloyds’ lack of clarity over its plans, and some are even threatening to block the inclusion of the new capital securities on widely-used bond indices.

The UK Treasury and Financial Services Authority have been pushing hard for Lloyds’ new contingent capital bonds to be included on the main indices, which would make them more attractive to fixed-income investors.

However, according to analysts some of the UK’s biggest bond investors are arguing that the new securities should not be classed as debt and therefore cannot be included on the main traded indices, which could severely dent investor demand.

>“The Treasury and FSA have been pushing very hard for contingent capital to be in the indices, clearly because it is more attractive when it is part of a tradable index. And if it is more attractive, the more is sold to investors and the less the Treasury will have to buy of this new instrument,” the [anonymous] banks analyst said.

One factor exacerbating this crisis has been the lack of trust in the authorities: when the BoE lent money on good collateral to Northern Rock, they felt they should do so covertly, in contrast to prior practice … doubtless feeling that their word that the instution was solvent but illiquid would be doubted. How much of the current crisis would have been averted if a man with the gravitas of J.P.Morgan had simply asked his right man “Are they solvent?” and reliquified freely on an affirmative answer, as happened in the Panic of 1907? The reliquification and word of J.P.Morgan that it was indeed reliquification was good enough to stem the panic … but nowadays, that sort of statement from the authorities is regarded as just another lie. Well done with the record of integrity, guys!

And now we have the UK authorities trying to pretend that these notes are actual bonds and should be in the bond indices, right up there with 10-year Gilts. It’s a disgrace.

And so the seeds of the next disaster are sown: we’ve seen what happens when the myth that Money Market Funds are risk-free gets punctured, even by just a little bit … should the authorities be successful in weaving the myth that Contingent Capital = Bonds, we will learn the effect of an overnight drop in bond funds due to mandatory conversion to over-priced common.