October 21, 2009

October 21st, 2009

The SEC has released statements regarding the Dark Pool debate discussed yesterday.

Chairman Schapiro says:

Transparency is a cornerstone of the U.S. securities market. That is why I asked the staff earlier this year to begin a comprehensive review of dark pools, as well as other types of dark liquidity.

We should never underestimate or take for granted the wide spectrum of benefits that come from transparency. In particular, transparency plays a vital role in promoting public confidence in the honesty and integrity of financial markets.

Although dark liquidity always has existed in one form or another in the equity markets, the Commission must assure that the public markets and non-public trading venues operate within a balanced regulatory framework. This means that as markets evolve, the Commission must continually seek to preserve the essential role of the public markets in promoting efficient price discovery and investor confidence.

Commissioner Aguilar says:

With this responsibility in mind, I turn to the proposals before us today. As our proposing release notes, some dark pools share order information selectively with certain market participants. This concerns me, because it may create two-tiered access to information that is neither fair nor transparent. That’s why, today, I support proposing rules to require that actionable indications of interest be publicly displayed as quotations and to lower the volume threshold that triggers an ATS’s order display and execution access obligations.

I also, however, recognize the interest of large institutional investors, such as the pension funds and mutual funds that represent many individual investors, to be able to trade large blocks of securities without tipping their hand and allowing other traders to take advantage of them. For that reason, I support the staff’s proposal to balance this interest with the general goal of improved price discovery by providing a limited exception to display requirements for orders of substantial size, i.e., those orders of $200,000 or more.

Commissioner Paredes says:

Markets are complex systems comprised of numerous components and features that must work together to ensure a well-functioning “whole.” I am concerned that by taking steps now to regulate particular aspects of market structure, the Commission will frustrate its ability to undertake a more constructive comprehensive review of market structure. I am concerned that considering particular features of dark pools in isolation increases the risk of unintended adverse consequences and will not yield the best results for our markets. The release acknowledges that, in the relatively near term, the Commission is expected to consider a concept release covering numerous aspects of market structure. As an initial step in considering reforms that may be warranted, perhaps the dark pool issues before the Commission today should be deferred and instead addressed in the concept release.

The demand for non-displayed liquidity presumably will continue, despite any regulatory changes that may be adopted. If the regulatory regime significantly impinges dark pools, what type of trading activity might replace current dark pool trading? Where might current non-displayed trading interest go? To foreign markets? As I already suggested, it may not be correct to presume that it becomes displayed.

I suggest that the most likely sink for non-displayed trading interest will be private equity. We have certainly seen how, for instance, a decline in dealer trading profits due to TRACE has led to increased private issuance and the explosion of the CDS market … why shouldn’t the same mechanism apply to equities?

Canadian bond investors will appreciate that the beloved regulators have protected them to such an extent that on-line offerings of corporate bonds to retail are … somewhat skimpy.

Back to the usual grind today, with PerpetualDiscounts down 5bp and FixedResets losing 9bp. PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.05%, equivalent to 8.47% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates are now yielding a little under 6.0%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 250bp, a continued widening from the 240bp reported on October 14.

Volume was quite strong today, with 52 index-included issues trading 10,000 shares while still falling short of the volume highlights table, while the six top issues were all FixedResets trading more than 50,000 shares. On the other hand, the market showed its thinness with blocks of HSB.PR.E and CM.PR.M changing hands at well below the closing bid. Market impact costs will always kill the cowboys in the end!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3844 % 1,465.2
FixedFloater 6.20 % 4.31 % 46,046 18.45 1 -1.1268 % 2,514.3
Floater 2.66 % 3.11 % 99,500 19.46 3 0.3844 % 1,830.4
OpRet 4.89 % -6.79 % 117,222 0.09 15 0.1260 % 2,283.9
SplitShare 6.44 % 6.48 % 521,857 3.95 2 0.0222 % 2,054.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1260 % 2,088.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.92 % 5.95 % 143,575 13.90 11 -0.0294 % 1,845.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.97 % 6.05 % 216,762 13.85 63 -0.0507 % 1,734.4
FixedReset 5.52 % 4.26 % 470,345 4.02 41 -0.0872 % 2,105.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.Y FixedReset -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.23
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-21
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-21
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.55
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-21
Maturity Price : 17.35
Evaluated at bid price : 17.35
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-21
Maturity Price : 12.75
Evaluated at bid price : 12.75
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-21
Maturity Price : 21.24
Evaluated at bid price : 21.24
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 92,256 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 66,210 RBC crossed 35,000 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.25
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 59,103 Nesbitt crossed 17,000 at 27.55; RBC crossed 15,600 at 27.56.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.53
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 58,710 Scotia bought 10,000 from RBC at 27.50; then another 20,000 from Nesbitt at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 57,396 Desjardins bought 30,000 from Scotia at 27.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 51,640 RBC bought two blocks from Scotia: 15,000 at 27.40 and 12,500 at 27.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
There were 52 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

OSFI to Address Insurer's Double Leverage?

October 21st, 2009

Mark White, who seems to have become OSFI’s chief public apologist, delivered a speech to the Osgoode Hall Financial Regulatory Reform Conference.

Assiduous Readers will remember my complaints about insurers’ double-leverage and lack of disclosure thereof. In the best news I’ve had all week, there seems to be recognition by OSFI that this is a problem:

Second, recent events, such as those at AIG, have shown that holding company strength is important to their regulated subsidiaries. This is particularly true where the holding company is the primary issuer of capital or is required to raise debt.

OSFI regulates both non-operating insurers acting as holding companies, and entities that are formed as holding companies under applicable financial institution legislation. Currently, this only affects the life insurance industry. OSFI is considering updating its current regulatory guidance for these entities.

For example, OSFI’s Minimum Continuing Capital and Surplus Requirements (MCCSR) tests could be used to evaluate a financial group’s consolidated riskbased capital – and an ACM like-test could be used to evaluate leverage.

It’s my guess that this is happening under Treasury’s resolve to look at consolidated capital – but the intellectual dishonesty of OSFI is such that no acknowledgement is made of any external source of ideas.

They are also considering changes in the MCCSR requirements as it applies to seg funds:

Currently, segregated fund guarantees are the only area where Canadian insurers use such models to determine capital requirements. The recent financial turmoil has shown flaws with internal capital models, and segregated fund models are no exception. Particularly as both traditional life insurance risks and non-diversifiable market risks are concerns when dealing with segregated fund guarantees.

OSFI is conducting a fundamental review of internally-modeled capital requirements for segregated fund guarantees. We hope to present the results to the MCCSR Advisory Committee early in 2010, and to use this as a cornerstone for our ongoing work.

It’s nice to know they’re actually going to spend some time thinking about it rather than just taking dictation from well-connected companies … but OSFI has blown its credibility as an enforcer; all credit analysis must be performed with the assumption that in times of trouble, the rules will be changed so it doesn’t look like trouble any more.

Update, 2009-12-26: I’m sure I’ve mentioned this before, but I do not fully understand Mr. White’s assertion that OSFI regulates both non-operating insurers acting as holding companies, and entities that are formed as holding companies under applicable financial institution legislation. Currently, this only affects the life insurance industry.

Both Fairfax Financial (FFH) and E-L Financial (ELF) are holding companies that own P&C insurers. However, it is possible that they are not “formed as holding companies under applicable financial institution legislation.”

Tussle in UK over Banks May Influence Future Regulation

October 21st, 2009

Mervyn King of the Bank of England has inserted himself into the bank regulation debate:

Bank of England Governor Mervyn King opened a rift with Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s government by signaling the biggest banks could be broken up to prevent taxpayers having to shoulder the cost of future bailouts.

King’s suggestion to separate investment banks from operations that take deposits from consumers and manage payment systems was ruled out by Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling as recently as yesterday.

“The key issue is not one of breaking up banks but of financing the economy,” Angela Knight, chief executive officer of the British Bankers’ Association, said in an e-mail. “Big businesses may want big banks which offer a range of products and services while individuals may look to something smaller. Large universal banks are the way forward.”

The G-20, whose finance chiefs meet in two weeks for talks in Darling’s native Scotland, is focusing on pushing banks to raise capital and restrain pay rather than devising an international approach to curbing the size of banks. Darling is writing laws to make banks write a “living will” that enables a quick wind-down of institutions that fail.

King said yesterday that, while global efforts to bail out banks had prevented economic disaster, they had created “possibly the biggest moral hazard in history.” He said that it is “hard to see why” proposals such as those made by Volcker to separate proprietary trading from retail banking are “impractical.”

“What does seem impractical are the current arrangements,” King said. “Anyone who proposed giving government guarantees to retail depositors and other creditors and then suggested that such funding could be used to finance highly risky and speculative activities would be thought rather unworldly. But that is where we are now.”

Brown, Darling and other ministers have repeatedly said such a split would have failed to prevent the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. or Northern Rock Plc.

King’s remarks put him somewhat at odds with the US Treasury, which wants separation based on size, not function.

Assiduous Readers will remember that I prefer separation of function based on parallel regulation, in which institutions that consider themselves banks would be, by differentiation of risk-weighting, encouraged to buy-and-hold long term assets. Institutions opting to be regulated as brokers would be discouraged from buy-and-hold investing. I greatly prefer this to be done by means of risk-weighting than by flat prohibitions, because sharp lines between asset classes and investment styles increase systemic cliff risk.

Note that I similarly believe that Canadian banks’ insurance operations should be penalized via risk-weighting; Canada’s current policy on bank-owned insurers is just plain dumb.

It was buy-and-hold arbitrage that brought down the dealers; it was excessive funding risk, combined with poor credit quality that brought down Northern Rock.

October 20, 2009

October 21st, 2009

Here’s a scary thought from Comrade Peace Prize:

Obama administration advisers said U.S. banks bailed out with taxpayer funds have responsibility to support the president’s effort to overhaul the rules for Wall Street and avoid future financial crises.

White House officials say they are frustrated that major financial firms are fighting President Barack Obama on the regulatory overhaul after taxpayer bailouts helped firms restore profits and near-record compensation for executives.

“The American people have a right to be frustrated and angry,” Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said on CNN’s “State of the Union” yesterday. Banks receiving aid are “literally going and fighting the very type of regulations and reforms that are necessary to prevent, again, a crisis like this happening.”

After reading the promise that this legislation will tame the business cycle, do you have to read any more? I wouldn’t link to a blog that made that claim … but this is the White House Chief of Staff who’s being quoted!

I haven’t studied the legislation in any detail – but if the best supporting argument they can come up with is ‘You guys screwed up last time, therefore this is right” then it must be pretty bogus.

The SEC is proposing to restrict dark pool trading:

The commission will propose lowering the amount of daily volume in a company’s shares that can be executed in private on any of the networks to 0.25 percent from 5 percent at a hearing tomorrow in Washington, said the people, who declined to be identified because the discussions weren’t public. John Nester, an SEC spokesman, declined to comment.

The rule change may curtail the number of transactions on dark pools, off-exchange platforms run by firms such as Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Getco LLC that have drawn scrutiny from Democratic Senators Ted Kaufman of Delaware and Charles Schumer of New York. The systems usually shut down trading in a security when they approach the current 5 percent limit.

I’m not sufficiently familiar with dark pools to have a definite opinion on the matter, but my knee-jerk reaction is that this is simply the established exchanges using the current ‘Regulation = Good’ hysteria to advance their interests. The OSC has highlighted a CSA / IIROC Request for Comments on the topic. Interestingly, support for giving the regulators a blank cheque is waning:

A poll conducted for Public Strategies and Politico found that 32 percent of voters support new regulations, while 68 percent say better enforcement of existing regulations is the best approach.

The top pollster for the survey, David Iannelli, said a previous poll conducted in December during the height of the Wall Street meltdown found that 67 percent of those surveyed believed more regulations were needed.

The poll can be found at www.pstrategies.com.

State Street is alleged to have been naughty:

The case was originally filed under seal by whistleblowers – “Associates Against FX Insider Trading,” who alleged that State Street added a secret and substantial mark-up to the price of interbank foreign currency trades. The interbank rate is the price at which major banks buy and sell foreign currency.

Subsequently, Brown launched an independent investigation into the allegations.

Brown’s investigation revealed that State Street was indeed overcharging the two funds. Despite being contractually obligated to charge the interbank rate at the precise time of the trade, State Street consistently charged at or near the highest rate of the day, even if the interbank rate was lower at the time of trade.

So my question is: who was authorizing the FX trades on the pension fund side? who was checking the trades on the pension fund side? Have they been fired? If nobody was checking and portfolio managers are executing really cool trades without nailing down the FX conversion, has the CEO been fired? This isn’t “the latest example of how clever financial traders violate laws and rip off the public trust”; given that it’s been happening routinely for eight years, its just the latest example of brain-dead portfolio managment.

Red letter day today, as PerpetualDiscounts were up … a whole half bp! FixedResets gained 7bp; there wasn’t much price volatility, but volume was good, with the volume highlights table being entirely FixedResets.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4053 % 1,459.5
FixedFloater 6.13 % 4.25 % 47,651 18.53 1 -2.9524 % 2,543.0
Floater 2.67 % 3.11 % 100,218 19.47 3 -0.4053 % 1,823.4
OpRet 4.90 % -7.84 % 113,770 0.09 15 0.0334 % 2,281.0
SplitShare 6.44 % 6.51 % 541,050 3.95 2 -0.3759 % 2,054.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0334 % 2,085.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.92 % 5.93 % 143,593 13.92 11 0.2583 % 1,846.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.97 % 6.03 % 218,758 13.85 63 0.0056 % 1,735.3
FixedReset 5.51 % 4.23 % 451,062 4.02 41 0.0700 % 2,107.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -2.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-20
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.75
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-20
Maturity Price : 19.81
Evaluated at bid price : 19.81
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-20
Maturity Price : 12.62
Evaluated at bid price : 12.62
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-20
Maturity Price : 19.61
Evaluated at bid price : 19.61
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-20
Maturity Price : 24.69
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-20
Maturity Price : 22.75
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-20
Maturity Price : 19.02
Evaluated at bid price : 19.02
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 63,173 TD crossed two blocks of 13,600 and one of 13,000, all at 27.76.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.80
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 60,015 RBC crossed blocks of 20,000 and 25,000 shares, both at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 53,478 Desjardins bought 37,300 from CIBC at 27.28.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.28
Bid-YTW : 4.32 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 48,694 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 46,602 Scotia bought 10,000 from RBC at 27.99.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.80
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 39,525 TD crossed 20,000 at 27.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.17
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Potential for Buy-Backs and Unscheduled Exchanges

October 20th, 2009

Preferred Share buybacks are a perennial topic of interest on PrefBlog and were most recently discussed on the post Split-Share Buy-Backs? WFS.PR.A & FIG.PR.A Examined.

Now, Assiduous Reader PL writes in and says:

Just wondered if companies are allowed to buy back their preferred shares the same way they buy common shares? I am analyzing SLF.PR.A for example. With the redemption at 25 buying as many as you could at around 20 would make sense if you were allowed to and planned to redeem it. Thanks.

There are two items of interest in the prospectus for SLF.PR.A, which may be found on SEDAR, with an issue date of February 17, 2005:

Conversion into a New Series of Preferred Shares

SLF, at any time by resolution of the Board of Directors of SLF, may constitute a separate series of Class A Shares (‘‘New Preferred Shares’’) having rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to them (other than any option or right to convert into Common Shares) which would qualify such New Preferred Shares as Tier 1 capital of SLF under the then current capital adequacy guidelines established by the Superintendent. In such event, SLF, with any necessary prior consent of the Superintendent, may give registered holders of the Class A Preferred Shares Series 1 notice that they have the right, pursuant to the terms of the Class A Preferred Shares Series 1, at their option, to convert their Class A Preferred Shares Series 1 on the date specified in the notice into fully-paid and non-assessable New Preferred Shares on a share for share basis. SLF will give notice of any option to convert to registered holders not more than 60 days and not less than 30 days prior to the conversion date. See ‘‘Insurance Act Restrictions’’. SLF will ensure that such New Preferred Shares will not, if issued, be or be deemed to be ‘‘short-term preferred shares’’ within the meaning of the Income Tax Act (Canada).

Purchase for Cancellation

Subject to the provisions of the Insurance Act, the prior consent of the Superintendent and the provisions described below under ‘‘Restrictions on Dividends and Retirement of Shares’’, SLF may at any time purchase for cancellation any Class A Preferred Share Series 1 at any price.

So the short answer to AR PL’s question is “yes”.

But under what circumstances would they do this? The funds represent cheap money – cheap Tier 1 money at that. In the ordinary course of business, there would be no reason for them to buy these things back: even if they didn’t need the money now, they’re going to figure that it’s really nice to have it anyway, since it’s cheap and replacing it a few years down the road will not only entail a probably higher coupon, but issuance costs as well.

However, there is the occasional redemption announcement that takes place when the issues are trading below par. The most famous of these announcement was the abortive Teachers’ bid for BCE, in which the preferreds were planned to be redeemed since the take-over was intended to proceed by Plan of Arrangement, to which the Preferred Shareholders voting as a class were allowed veto power under the Corporations Act, which they certainly would have exercised if they hadn’t been given a sweetener under the deal, even considering the dim-bulb nature of many of these holders.

There were a few scattered redemptions of floaters that traded below par in the 1990s (notably TD.PR.D and BNS.PR.A) but these were nowhere near the $20 level at the time of the announcement. While I’m sure holders did not object to the redemption, they didn’t make out like bandits either.

The other extract from the prospectus that I have highlighted is the potential for exchange into a new series of shares … a client asked me about this in connection with TD.PR.O just last week and that prospectus has similar language.

The first thing to note is that the exchange is optional for both parties. SLF doesn’t have to create the new series; holders don’t have to exchange. All I can imagine to justify the clause is a potential smoothing of the way for a redemption and new issue to be done simultaneously.

Say, for instance, straight perpetuals suddenly trade to yield 4% and SLF.PR.A trades at $26 (not the $29.69 implied by the $1.1875 dividend due to the potential for call). What Sun Life could do – for instance – is send preferred shareholders an envelope with two notices in it: the first advises that the issue will be called at par on November 1 and the second advises that they can exchange into a new issue of SLF preferreds paying $1.05 (a nickel in excess of market rates), provided that they do it on October 31.

Presto, SLF achieves its desire of reducing their cost of funds and don’t have to pay $0.75 per share issuance expenses either. I would not consider this a coercive exchange offer, because it has always been understood that the issue could be called at par; it’s not like other offers we’ve seen lately where the company says something like: do this, because we’re going to cancel the dividend.

Having the exchange clause in the prospectus might make this process simpler and less costly should SLF ever wish to do this … but I’m not a securities lawyer. Those among you who ARE securities lawyers – or fancy their legal skills – are invited to come up with better explanations in the comments.

Update: See also Repurchase of Preferred Shares by Issuer, which references the GWO.PR.E / GWO.PR.X Normal Course Issuer Bid.

October 19, 2009

October 19th, 2009

CIT has amended its restructuring plan:

The amended terms of the restructuring plan include, among others:

  • A comprehensive cash sweep mechanism to accelerate the repayment of the new notes;
  • The shortening of maturities by six months for all new notes and junior credit facilities;
  • An increased amount of equity offered to subordinated debt holders reflecting agreements with holders of the majority of its senior and subordinated debt;
  • The inclusion of the notes maturing after 2018 that had previously not been solicited as part of the exchange offer or plan of reorganization;
  • An increase in the coupon on Series B Notes, to 9% from 7%, being issued by CIT Delaware Funding; and
  • Provided preferred stock holders contingent value rights in the plan of reorganization, and modified the allocation of common stock in the recapitalization after the exchange offers, as part of an agreement with the United States Department of Treasury.

CreditSights has condemned the amendments to the CIT restructuring:

CIT “has done very little to meaningfully enhance the offer” to the majority of senior unsecured bondholders of the holding company, said Adam Steer, an analyst at CreditSights Inc. in New York.

Under the revised terms, maturities on new notes issued in exchange for existing bonds will be shortened by six months, CIT said Oct. 16. The New York-based company will also boost the amount of equity offered to subordinated debt holders and include notes due after 2018 that previously weren’t part of the exchange offer or reorganization plan that was announced Oct. 1.

CreditSights continues to question why holders of longer- dated senior unsecured bonds would prefer the exchange over the prepackaged bankruptcy offer, Steer said.

And Carl Icahn says he can give the company a better deal:

Billionaire investor Carl Icahn offered CIT Group Inc. a $6 billion loan as an alternative to what he called an “incompetent and unconscionable” proposal by the board of directors to avert collapse.

Icahn, who said he is CIT’s largest creditor, offered to underwrite a loan to the New York-based company that he said would save as much as $150 million in fees compared with the bank’s proposed financing.

Bondholders should reject any offer less than 90 cents on the dollar, according to analysts at Egan-Jones Ratings Co. in Haverford, Pennsylvania.

“Forget Icahn, forget the exchange,” the analysts said in a report today. “Neither Icahn’s offer nor the revised exchange (which reduces maturities by six months) provides the best value to creditors.”

“Icahn’s letter is in line with our view that the best way of maintaining value is by running off CIT’s book and gracefully winding down the portfolio over time,” said Adam Steer, an analyst at CreditSights Inc. in New York. “The proposed change or prepack plan does not leave the company with a lot of hope for running the company viably.”

Same old same old for the preferred share market today, as PerpetualDiscounts lost 22bp while FixedResets gained 5bp. Volume was off a bit, but still entirely respectable; almost all FixedResets.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5598 % 1,465.5
FixedFloater 5.95 % 4.09 % 45,636 18.74 1 -2.9708 % 2,620.3
Floater 2.66 % 3.09 % 101,497 19.50 3 -0.5598 % 1,830.8
OpRet 4.90 % -3.39 % 115,618 0.09 15 0.1236 % 2,280.3
SplitShare 6.41 % 6.50 % 562,270 3.96 2 0.0221 % 2,062.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1236 % 2,085.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.94 % 5.98 % 143,555 13.85 11 -0.0148 % 1,841.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.97 % 6.03 % 219,987 13.84 63 -0.2207 % 1,735.2
FixedReset 5.52 % 4.24 % 462,482 4.03 41 0.0537 % 2,105.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -2.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.29
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 19.46
Evaluated at bid price : 19.46
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -2.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 17.57
Evaluated at bid price : 17.57
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
TRI.PR.B Floater -1.77 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 18.86
Evaluated at bid price : 18.86
Bid-YTW : 2.10 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 21.43
Evaluated at bid price : 21.43
Bid-YTW : 5.90 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 22.37
Evaluated at bid price : 22.95
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 22.48
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 17.21
Evaluated at bid price : 17.21
Bid-YTW : 6.96 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 19.78
Evaluated at bid price : 19.78
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 18.27
Evaluated at bid price : 18.27
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 20.64
Evaluated at bid price : 20.64
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 18.75
Evaluated at bid price : 18.75
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 23.92
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.12
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 22.70
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 57,985 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 18.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-19
Maturity Price : 18.60
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 54,075 RBC crossed 25,000 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 4.32 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 53,999 RBC crossed 32,000 at 27.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.14
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 48,719 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 27.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.85
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 37,058 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 4.50 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 36,600 RBC crossed 20,000 at 27.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.55
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

OSFI Does Banks Another Favour

October 19th, 2009

The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions has announced:

Deposit-taking institutions and life insurance companies are required to deduct, from tier 1 capital, identified intangible assets in excess of 5% of gross tier 1 capital. The requirement applies to identified intangible assets purchased directly or acquired in conjunction with or arising from the acquisition of a business. These include, but are not limited to, trademarks, core deposit intangibles, mortgage servicing rights, purchased credit card relationships, and distribution channels. Identified intangible assets include those related to consolidated subsidiaries, subsidiaries deconsolidated for regulatory capital purposes, and the proportional share in joint ventures subject to proportional consolidation.

Section 3064 of the CICA Handbook, Goodwill and Intangible Assets, requires that computer software that is an integral part of the related hardware (such as the operating system) is to be treated as property, plant and equipment, while software that is not an integral part of the related hardware is to be treated as an intangible asset. Section 3064 is effective for fiscal years beginning on or after October 1, 2008.

This advisory confirms that, pending a future review of the treatment of intangible assets:

  • computer software now classified as an intangible asset solely due to the requirements of CICA Handbook Section 3064 is not included in the definition of identified intangible assets under the CAR and MCCSR guidelines for deposit taking institutions and life insurance companies.
  • property and casualty insurers and cooperative credit associations are not required to include computer software in the amount of intangible assets deducted from capital.

RBC has disclosed:

On November 1, 2008, we adopted Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Handbook section 3064, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets . As a result of adopting Section 3064, we have reclassified $805 million of software from Premises and equipment to Other intangibles on our Consolidated Balance Sheets and corresponding depreciation of $53 million from Non-interest expense – Equipment to Non-interest expense – Amortization of other intangibles on our Consolidated Statements of Income. Amounts for prior periods have also been reclassified.

They already have a goodwill deduction from Tier 1 capital, so if the accounting change had been passed through by OSFI, this would have resulted in an additional deduction of about $750-million, about 2% of their current $31,324-million total.

Bank Software & Tier 1 Capital
CAD Millions
Bank Software
Classification
Changed
Tier 1
Capital
Percentage
RY 750 31,324 2.4%
TD 557 (?) 21,219 2.6%
CM 650 (?) 14,194 4.6%
BNS 791 (?) 23,062 3.4%
BMO 510 20,090 2.5%
NA Guess!
Numbers are estimates, and highest reasonable estimate of impact is reported here

BoC Research: Monetary Policy and FX-Driven Inflation

October 16th, 2009

The Bank of Canada has released Working Paper 2009-29 by Stephen Murchison titled Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Monetary Policy: How Strong is the Link?:

Several authors have presented reduced-form evidence suggesting that the degree of exchange rate pass-through to the consumer price index has declined in Canada since the early 1980s and is currently close to zero. Taylor (2000) suggests that this phenomenon, which has been observed for several other countries, may be due to a change in the behaviour of inflation. Specifically, moving from a high to a low-inflation environment has reduced the expected persistence of cost changes and, by consequence, the degree of pass-through to prices. This paper extends his argument, suggesting that this change in persistence is due to a change in the parameters of the central bank’s policy rule. Evidence is presented for Canada indicating that policy has responded more aggressively to inflation deviations over the low pass-through period relative to the high pass-through period. We test the quantitative importance of this change in policy for exchange rate pass-through by varying the parameters of a simple monetary policy rule embedded in an open economy, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Results suggest that increases in the aggressiveness of policy consistent with that observed for Canada are sufficient to effectively eliminate measured pass-through. However, this conclusion depends critically on the inclusion of price-mark-up shocks in the model. When these are excluded, a more modest decline to pass-through is predicted.

He uses a model incorporating a Taylor Rule for policy rates and finds:

Overall, we find that for reasonable changes to the policy rule, large changes in estimated pass-through can be generated. Specifically, parameter values of between 1.6 and 2.1 on the deviation of in‡ation from target (in a Taylor rule) are sufficient cient to drive estimated pass-through to zero.

The author concludes, in part:

In particular, small changes in policy can have a profound effect on the correlation between prices and the exchange rate in the presence of mark-up shocks and this is largely responsible for the result. When mark-up shocks are excluded from the model or when pass-through is defined in terms of the response of prices to a deterministic exchange-rate shock, we conclude that more aggressive monetary policy in Canada has likely reduced pass-through by about 50 per cent relative to its level prior to 1984.

October 16, 2009

October 16th, 2009

The New York Times considers the sale of Philbro to be a public policy success:

Bankers will surely say “we told you so.” Citigroup’s sale of its profitable energy trading unit Phibro is exactly the kind of unintended consequence that the nation’s financiers warned us would happen when the Obama administration set out to limit their pay.

We see it as a public policy success. Phibro is a high-risk, high-reward hedge fund. It has no place on the books of one of the nation’s too-big-to-fail banks. If a policy to cap bankers’ pay forces all banks to get rid of their hedge funds, it will be a winning policy.

I’m a simple kind of guy. I figure, if the real problem is highly leveraged hedge funds within banks, then the regulators should concentrate their attention on highly leverage hedge funds within banks. But I guess that kind of fuzzy thinking is getting a little old fashioned in these modern times.

Investments can be a really dirty business:

A fund associated with TPG is exploiting an unintended wrinkle in the $650 billion market for CDOs by asking holders of the riskiest portions to allow asset sales in exchange for millions of dollars in fees. While equity holders have the right to decide which assets the CDOs sell because they’re first in line for losses, they may no longer have the incentive to ensure that assets are sold at fair value because their investments have been wiped out by the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.

TPG Credit, a Minneapolis-based firm founded by former Cargill Inc. executive Rory O’Neill and associated with private equity firm TPG, has offered in the past week to buy $470.8 million of bank trust preferred securities from seven different CDOs for 5 cents on the dollar, according to trustee reports obtained by Bloomberg News. TPG Credit will pay holders of so- called equity portions another $23.5 million in fees to allow the sales, the documents say.

The slide continued today, with PerpetualDiscounts down 17bp and FixedResets losing 6bp, on slightly lower volume dominated by FixedResets.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5403 % 1,473.7
FixedFloater 5.77 % 3.93 % 44,014 18.95 1 -0.4752 % 2,700.6
Floater 2.64 % 3.09 % 105,538 19.51 3 0.5403 % 1,841.1
OpRet 4.91 % -3.23 % 117,258 0.12 15 0.0283 % 2,277.4
SplitShare 6.41 % 6.50 % 581,172 3.96 2 0.2439 % 2,061.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0283 % 2,082.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.94 % 5.96 % 145,307 13.88 11 -0.1069 % 1,841.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.95 % 6.03 % 221,657 13.87 63 -0.1668 % 1,739.0
FixedReset 5.52 % 4.21 % 469,007 4.04 41 -0.0573 % 2,104.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset -1.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-16
Maturity Price : 25.26
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.77 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-16
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.83
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-16
Maturity Price : 20.01
Evaluated at bid price : 20.01
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-16
Maturity Price : 18.55
Evaluated at bid price : 18.55
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-16
Maturity Price : 17.42
Evaluated at bid price : 17.42
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-16
Maturity Price : 24.18
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-16
Maturity Price : 19.76
Evaluated at bid price : 19.76
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-16
Maturity Price : 23.61
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.20
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-16
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 2.06 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-16
Maturity Price : 19.90
Evaluated at bid price : 19.90
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.X FixedReset 65,695 RBC crossed 35,000 at 27.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 59,595 Desjardins crossed 15,400 at 27.58 and bought 32,000 from National at 27.62.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.42
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 53,178 Desjardins crossed 27,400 at 27.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.84
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 48,260 RBC crossed 41,400 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 48,200 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-16
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.83
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 45,180 RBC crossed 35,000 at 27.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.65
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

The US Dollar Shortage & Policy Response

October 16th, 2009

The Bank for International Settlements has released a paper by Patrick McGuire and Goetz von Peter titled The US dollar shortage in global banking and the international policy response:

Among the policy responses to the global financial crisis, the international provision of US dollars via central bank swap lines stands out. This paper studies the build-up of stresses on banks’ balance sheets that led to this coordinated policy response. Using the BIS international banking statistics, we reconstruct the worldwide consolidated balance sheets of the major national banking systems. This allows us to investigate the structure of banks’ global operations across their offices in various countries, shedding light on how their international asset positions are funded across currencies and counterparties. The analysis first highlights why a country’s “national balance sheet”, a residency-based measure, can be a misleading guide to where the vulnerabilities faced by that country’s national banking system (or residents) lie. It then focuses on banking systems’ consolidated balance sheets, and shows how the growth (since 2000) in European and Japanese banks’ US dollar assets produced structural US dollar funding requirements, setting the stage for the dollar shortage when interbank and swap markets became impaired.

The swap lines arranged by the Fed (reported on PrefBlog on 2008-9-29) have been a topic of great fascination for me as the details have been explained; most recently in the BIS Quarterly Review of March 2009.

We find that, since 2000, the Japanese and the major European banking systems took on increasingly large net (assets minus liabilities) on-balance sheet positions in foreign currencies, particularly in US dollars. While the associated currency exposures were presumably hedged off-balance sheet, the build-up of net foreign currency positions exposed these banks to foreign currency funding risk, or the risk that their funding positions (FX swaps) could not be rolled over.

This yields a lower-bound estimate of banks’ US dollar funding gap – the amount of short-term US dollar funding banks require – measured here as the net amount of US dollars channelled to non-banks. By this estimate, European banks’ need for short-term US dollar funding was substantial at the onset of the crisis, at least $1.0–1.2 trillion by mid-2007.

Events during the crisis led to severe disruptions in banks’ sources of short-term funding. Interbank markets seized up, and dislocations in FX swap markets made it even more expensive to obtain US dollars via swaps. Banks’ funding pressures were compounded by instability in non-bank sources of funds as well, notably dollar money market funds and dollar-holding central banks. The market stress meant that the effective maturity of banks’ US dollar funding shortened just as that of their US dollar assets lengthened, since many assets became difficult to sell in illiquid markets.

Consider a bank that seeks to diversify internationally, or expand its presence in a specific market abroad. This bank will have to finance a particular portfolio of loans and securities, some of which are denominated in foreign currencies (eg a German bank’s investment in US dollar-denominated structured finance products). The bank can finance these foreign currency positions in several ways:

  • 1. The bank can borrow domestic currency, and convert it in a straight FX spot transaction to purchase the foreign asset in that currency.
  • 2. It can also use FX swaps to convert its domestic currency liabilities into foreign currency and purchase the foreign assets.
  • 3. Alternatively, the bank can borrow foreign currency, either from the interbank market, from non-bank market participants or from central banks.

The first option produces no subsequent foreign currency needs, but exposes the bank to currency risk, as the on-balance sheet mismatch between foreign currency assets and domestic currency liabilities remains unhedged. Our working assumption is that banks employ FX swaps and forwards to hedge any on-balance sheet currency mismatch.

So in other words, it’s just another wrinkle on the same old story: borrow short + lend long = funding risk. But it’s a good wrinkle!

Why is funding risk in foreign currencies of special interest? Banks also face the risks inherent in transforming maturities in their domestic currency market, of course. However, in a purelydomestic banking context, the central bank can act as lender of last resort and provide sufficient liquidity to eliminate a domestic funding shortage; doing so is both time-honoured practice (Bagehot (1873), Goodhart (1995)) as well as optimal policy (Allen and Gale (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2006)). By contrast, central banks cannot create foreign currencies; their ability to meet banks’ demand for foreign currencies is constrained by the exchange rate regime or limited to available FX reserves (Chang and Velasco (2000, 2001), Obstfeld et al (2009)). Banks’ foreign currency requirements may therefore have to be met from international sources (Fischer (1999), Mishkin (1999)).

It gets better:

The origins of the US dollar shortage during the crisis are linked to the expansion since 2000 in banks’ international balance sheets. The outstanding stock of banks’ foreign claims grew from $10 trillion at the beginning of 2000 to $34 trillion by end-2007, a significant expansion even when scaled by global economic activity (Figure 1, left panel).For example, Swiss banks’ foreign claims jumped from roughly five times Swiss nominal GDP in 2000 to more than seven times in mid-2007 (Table 1). Dutch, French, German and UK banks’ foreign claims expanded considerably as well. In contrast, Canadian, Japanese and US banks’ foreign claims grew in absolute terms over the same period, but did not significantly outpace the growth in domestic or world GDP (Figure 1, right Panel).


This is the Right Panel.
Click for the whole thing

The lack of foreign funding pressure might be a more precise indication of why Canadian banks were resilient during the crisis.

Then Bad Things happened:

European banks’ funding difficulties were compounded by instability in the non-bank sources of funds as well. Money market funds, facing large redemptions following the failure of Lehman Brothers, withdrew from bank-issued paper, threatening a wholesale run on banks (Baba et al (2009)). Less abruptly, a portion of the US dollar foreign exchange reserves that central banks had placed with commercial banks was withdrawn during the course of the crisis. In particular, some monetary authorities in emerging markets reportedly withdrew placements in support of their own banking systems in need of US dollars.

Market conditions during the crisis have made it difficult for banks to respond to these funding pressures by reducing their US dollar assets. While European banks held a sizeable share of their net US dollar investments as (liquid) US government securities (Figure 5, bottom right panel), other claims on non-bank entities – such as structured finance products – have been harder to sell into illiquid markets without realising large losses. Other factors also hampered deleveraging of US dollar assets: banks brought off-balance sheet vehicles back onto their balance sheets and prearranged credit commitments were drawn.

But … Fed to the rescue!

On 13 October 2008, the swap lines between the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, the ECB and the Swiss National Bank became unlimited to accommodate any quantity of US dollar funding demanded. The swap lines provided these central banks with ammunition beyond their existing foreign exchange reserves (Obstfeld et al (2009)), which in mid-2007 amounted to $294 billion for the euro area, Switzerland and the United Kingdom combined, an order of magnitude smaller than our lower-bound estimate of the US dollar funding gap.

In providing US dollars on a global scale, the Federal Reserve effectively engaged in international lending of last resort. The swap network can be understood as a mechanism by which the Federal Reserve extends loans, collateralised by foreign currencies, to other central banks, which in turn make these funds available through US dollar auctions in their respective jurisdictions.33 This made US dollar liquidity accessible to commercial banks around the world, including those that have no US subsidiaries or insufficient eligible collateral to borrow directly from the Federal Reserve System.

The authors conclude, in part:

What pushed the system to the brink was not cross-currency funding per se, but rather too many large banks employing funding strategies in the same direction, the funding equivalent of a “crowded trade”. Only when examined at the aggregate level can such vulnerabilities be identified. By quantifying the US dollar overhang on non-US banks’ global balance sheets, this paper contributes to a better understanding of why the extraordinary international policy response was necessary.

and why it took the form of a global network of central bank swap lines.