IMF Releases September "Finance & Development"

September 10th, 2009

The International Monetary Fund has released the September 2009 edition of Finance & Development, with articles:

  • Sustaining a Global Recovery
  • What’s In and Out in Global Money
  • Rebuilding the Financial Architecture
  • Looking Ahead
  • Growth after the Crisis
  • The Future of Reserve Currencies
  • Overhauling the System
  • Anticipating the Next Crisis
  • Faces of the Crisis
  • Dial Growth

This is not the most heavyweight or technical of journals, but provides good reviews of the global situation – say, about on the level of the Economist.

September 9, 2009

September 9th, 2009

As far as I can make out, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners is reviewing their blind faith in credit ratings while trying to make it look like the agencies’ fault:

State insurance regulators scheduled a hearing to review the role of credit rating firms and whether changes are necessary after the companies gave top ratings to mortgage-linked securities that plunged in value.

Representatives of ratings firms, insurance companies and pension funds will be invited to testify at the Sept. 24 hearing, acting New York Insurance Superintendent James Wrynn said today in an e-mailed statement. Wrynn and Michael McRaith of Illinois lead a group appointed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to evaluate watchdogs’ reliance on the firms.

“The hearing will examine the role of these credit rating agencies in the insurance regulatory system and what changes may be needed in light of the financial crisis,” Wrynn’s office said in the statement.

NAIC was last mentioned on PrefBlog on June 26 in connection with the hallowed practice of rating-shopping; whereby investors choose the most optimistic agency they can find, so that they can blame them for over-optimism if things don’t work out. To update that story, here’s the NAIC staff report on RealPoint.

A quiet day, price-wise, for the major sub-indices, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 9bp total return, while FixedResets were down 2bp. This brings the yield on PerpetualDiscounts down to 5.74%, equivalent to 8.04% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates yield a smidgen under 6.0%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 205bp, a slight (and possibly completely technical) narrowing from the 210bp recorded on September 2.

Volume continued to be OK.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.1314 % 1,449.1
FixedFloater 5.73 % 3.99 % 59,824 18.60 1 0.7427 % 2,681.7
Floater 2.52 % 2.10 % 30,512 22.13 4 1.1314 % 1,810.4
OpRet 4.87 % -11.94 % 134,320 0.09 15 -0.0485 % 2,276.9
SplitShare 6.44 % 6.65 % 1,067,651 4.06 2 0.0444 % 2,053.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0485 % 2,082.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.78 % 5.66 % 151,484 2.86 12 -0.0759 % 1,876.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.69 % 5.74 % 196,737 14.28 59 0.0908 % 1,804.8
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.08 % 465,825 4.10 40 -0.0185 % 2,105.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-09
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 6.40 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-09
Maturity Price : 19.21
Evaluated at bid price : 19.21
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-09
Maturity Price : 22.84
Evaluated at bid price : 23.86
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-09
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-09
Maturity Price : 19.95
Evaluated at bid price : 19.95
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-09
Maturity Price : 12.45
Evaluated at bid price : 12.45
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-09
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-09
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 2.10 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-10-09
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.56
Bid-YTW : -15.07 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-09
Maturity Price : 18.85
Evaluated at bid price : 18.85
Bid-YTW : 2.10 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater 242,610 Nesbitt crossed 240,000 at 12.35. Nice ticket!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-09
Maturity Price : 12.45
Evaluated at bid price : 12.45
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 225,900 Desjardins crossed 165,000 at 27.80, then another 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.81
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 78,370 Desjardins bought 67,900 from Commission Direct at 27.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.75
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 56,370 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 27.85, then bought 14,100 from National at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.84
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 43,330 Nesbitt crossed 10,000 at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.80
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 37,400 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
There were 50 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Boston Fed Publishes 1H09 Research Review

September 9th, 2009

The Boston Fed has published its Research Review, Jan. ’09 – Jun ’09 with abstracts, summaries and a few charts from their recent publications.

Article titles are:

  • Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis
  • Reducing Foreclosures
  • Reviving Mortgage Securitization: Lessons from the Brady Plan
  • Why Are (Some) Consumers (Finally) Writing Fewer Checks?
  • Another Hidden Cost of Incentives: The Detrimental Effect on Norm Enforcement
  • Has Overweight Become the New Normal? Evidence of a Generational Shift in Body Weight Norms
  • Empirical Estimates of Changing Inflation Dynamics
  • Geographic Variations in a Model of Physician Treatment Choice with Social Interactions
  • The Optimal Level of Deposit Insurance Coverage

Three of these papers were discussed on PrefBlog following their release; links are provided to the PrefBlog post.

TD Issues IT1C: CaTS 6.631% 99-Year Notes with Reset

September 9th, 2009

TD has announced:

an issue of $750,000,000 TD Capital Trust IV Notes – Series 3 due June 30, 2108 (“TD CaTS IV – Series 3 Notes”). The TD CaTS IV – Series 3 Notes are subordinated, unsecured debt obligations of the Trust and are expected to qualify as Tier 1 Capital of TDBFG. Any Tier 1 Capital raised by TDBFG over the 15% regulatory limit will temporarily be counted as Tier 2B Capital. The expected closing date is September 15, 2009.

From the date of issue to, but excluding, June 30, 2021, interest on the TD CaTS IV – Series 3 Notes is payable semi-annually at a rate of 6.631% per year. Starting on June 30, 2021, and on every fifth anniversary thereafter until June 30, 2106, the interest rate on the TD CaTS IV – Series 3 Notes will reset as described in the prospectus.

On or after December 31, 2014, the Trust may, at its option and subject to certain conditions, redeem the TD CaTS IV – Series 3 Notes, in whole or in part.

In certain circumstances, the TD CaTS IV – Series 3 Notes and interest thereon may be automatically exchanged for, or paid by the issuance of, non-cumulative Class A first preferred shares of TDBFG.

The TD CaTS IV – Series 3 Notes will not be listed on any stock exchange.

The Trust and TDBFG intend to file a prospectus supplement with the securities regulators in each of the provinces and territories of Canada with respect to the offering of the TD CaTS IV – Series 3 Notes.

The prospectus supplement is not yet available. It is of interest that the 6.631% coupon is equivalent to 4.74% dividend, which may – possibly – be a clue as to the level of possible high quality FixedReset preferreds. Note that the initial 6.631% rate on the CaTS IV is set for 12 years, although there is a five-year call.

September 8, 2009

September 8th, 2009

The G-20 summit resulted in a communique of little interest. As always, the interesting parts were not official:

Curtailing bankers’ pay and bonuses has been seen as key by some countries as the current payment culture, considered as having encouraged risky behavior, was blamed for fueling the financial crisis.

Alistair Darling, Britain’s chancellor of the exchequer, or finance minister, and host of the G-20 meeting, said that there must be no more cases in which “people are being rewarded for reckless behavior.” Heading into the talks in the British capital, European countries had pushed for the G-20, which represents 80 percent of the world’s economic output, to enforce an official cap on individual payouts as well as collective bonus pots at financial firms.

Britain supported the general effort to rein in bonuses, but not the cap, while the United States was more intent on pushing its proposal for a global accord to force banks to hold more capital reserves.

During the talks, the G-20 agreed to give the Financial Stability Board, an international body established at the London summit of G-20 leaders in April, the task of drawing up practical proposals on which the leaders meeting in Pittsburgh on Sept. 24 and 25 could agree.

Treasury’s proposals for capital reserves have been previously reported.

I mentioned the latest lawsuit against the CRAs on September 3. Jim Hamilton’s World of Securities Regulation has a better summary of the legal issues:

The court also rejected the defense that the ratings were non-actionable opinions. The investors alleged actionable misrepresentations, said Judge Scheindlin, because they alleged that the rating agencies did not genuinely or reasonably believe that the ratings they assigned to the asset-backed securities were accurate and had a basis in fact. Similarly, disclaimers in the information memorandum that the credit rating was an opinion and not a guarantee or a recommendation to buy were unavailing and insufficient to protect the agencies from liability for promulgating alleged misleading ratings.

Also, the rating agencies received fees in excess of their normal fees for rating the securities, noted the court, fees that increased in tandem with the growth of the structured investment vehicle. Unknown to investors, the compensation of the rating agencies was contingent on the receipt of high ratings for the notes.

While conceding that the investors were sophisticated, the court found that the market at large, including sophisticated investors, have come to rely on the independence of rating agencies because of their NRSRO status and, as here, their access to non-public information that even sophisticated investors cannot obtain. Thus, the court concluded that the investors stated their reasonable reliance on the alleged false ratings.

Congress has struck a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission:

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission this month will begin probing how the U.S. financial system came perilously close to collapse in the fall of 2008, leading to the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression.

Congress ordered the 10-person commission to examine 22 causes of the debacle, “from A to V” as Angelides puts it. They range from things that were done, like mortgage fraud, to things mostly left undone, like over-the-counter derivatives regulation.

Armed with subpoena power to bring witnesses and spring documents, the panel is supposed to find out what caused the collapse of major financial institutions, like Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, from August 2007 to April 2009 — as well as those that would have failed without government aid, like American International Group Inc.

The first public meeting is set for September 17, with the group to issue a report to Congress by December 2010.

Consumer credit in the States is under pressure:

Consumer credit fell by a record $21.6 billion, or 10 percent at an annual rate, to $2.5 trillion, according to a Federal Reserve report released today in Washington. Credit dropped by $15.5 billion in June, more than previously estimated. Credit fell for a sixth month, the longest series of declines since 1991.

The credit crunch, stagnant incomes and declines in household wealth are casting doubt on the strength of the economic recovery. The arrival of the government’s “cash for clunkers” program in late July wasn’t enough to keep credit that covers car loans from plummeting by a record amount, as consumers delayed other purchases.

There wasn’t much direction in the preferred market today, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 8bp and FixedResets as close to flat as makes no difference. Volume was relatively light, with FixedResets gaining most of the places on the highlights table.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0971 % 1,432.9
FixedFloater 5.77 % 4.03 % 60,111 18.55 1 0.2127 % 2,662.0
Floater 2.55 % 2.13 % 30,486 22.05 4 0.0971 % 1,790.1
OpRet 4.87 % -10.36 % 136,129 0.09 15 -0.0562 % 2,278.0
SplitShare 6.44 % 6.48 % 1,105,495 4.07 2 0.3119 % 2,053.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0562 % 2,083.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.65 % 151,238 6.16 12 -0.3224 % 1,877.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.70 % 5.76 % 199,226 14.23 59 0.0789 % 1,803.2
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.09 % 471,470 4.10 40 0.0028 % 2,106.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Premium -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-08
Maturity Price : 24.51
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : -14.41 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-08
Maturity Price : 19.76
Evaluated at bid price : 19.76
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-08
Maturity Price : 24.81
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.43
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Premium -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.03
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-08
Maturity Price : 22.63
Evaluated at bid price : 22.81
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-08
Maturity Price : 19.71
Evaluated at bid price : 19.71
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-08
Maturity Price : 22.97
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Premium 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 0.09 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 79,664 National crossed two blocks of 15,000 shares each, both at 27.85; RBC bought 19,700 from Scotia at 27.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.83
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 61,501 RBC bought 36,600 from Scotia at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-08
Maturity Price : 24.78
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 59,132 RBC bought 15,500 from anonymouse at 27.70, then crossed 23,200 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.65
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
GWO.PR.E OpRet 57,765 RBC crossed 54,500 at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : -14.79 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 52,457 Desjardins bought 29,500 from anonymous at 27.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.64
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 37,450 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.82
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BSC.PR.A: Partial Call for Redemption

September 8th, 2009

BNS Split Corp. II has announced:

it has called 149,946 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on September 22, 2009 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) as a result of the special annual retraction of 598,092 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on September 21, 2009 will have approximately 7.722% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $20.83 per share.

Holders of Preferred Shares that are on record for dividends but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including September 22, 2009.

Payment of the amount due to holders of Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on September 22, 2009. From and after September 22, 2009 the holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any right in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

BSC.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was upgraded to Pfd-3(high) by DBRS. BSC.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

BIS to Grant Most of Treasury's Wish List

September 8th, 2009

Treasury announced a bank capitalization wish-list last week prior to the G-20 London meeting.

Now, the Bank for International Settlements has announced that most negotiation points will be granted. All this has obviously been orchestrated and was agreed long before the G-20 ministers got on their planes to London:

The Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision reached agreement on the following key measures to strengthen the regulation of the banking sector:

  • •Raise the quality, consistency and transparency of the Tier 1 capital base. The predominant form of Tier 1 capital must be common shares and retained earnings. Appropriate principles will be developed for non-joint stock companies to ensure they hold comparable levels of high quality Tier 1 capital. Moreover, deductions and prudential filters will be harmonised internationally and generally applied at the level of common equity or its equivalent in the case of non-joint stock companies. Finally, all components of the capital base will be fully disclosed.
  • •Introduce a leverage ratio as a supplementary measure to the Basel II risk-based framework with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment based on appropriate review and calibration. To ensure comparability, the details of the leverage ratio will be harmonised internationally, fully adjusting for differences in accounting.
  • •Introduce a minimum global standard for funding liquidity that includes a stressed liquidity coverage ratio requirement, underpinned by a longer-term structural liquidity ratio.
  • •Introduce a framework for countercyclical capital buffers above the minimum requirement. The framework will include capital conservation measures such as constraints on capital distributions. The Basel Committee will review an appropriate set of indicators, such as earnings and credit-based variables, as a way to condition the build up and release of capital buffers. In addition, the Committee will promote more forward-looking provisions based on expected losses.
  • •Issue recommendations to reduce the systemic risk associated with the resolution of cross-border banks.

The Committee will also assess the need for a capital surcharge to mitigate the risk of systemic banks.

The Basel Committee will issue concrete proposals on these measures by the end of this year. It will carry out an impact assessment at the beginning of next year, with calibration of the new requirements to be completed by end-2010. Appropriate implementation standards will be developed to ensure a phase-in of these new measures that does not impede the recovery of the real economy. Government injections will be grandfathered.

The interesting parts are the elements that are on Treasury’s wish list but are not incorporated into this announcement:

Core Principle #1: Capital requirements should be designed to protect the stability of the financial system (as well as the solvency of individual banking firms).

This one is addressed, a little, through the non-bulletted committment to “assess the need for a capital surcharge to mitigate the risk of systemic banks.” I am glad to see that BIS is leaning towards PrefBlog’s recommendation, rather than Geithner’s. What does Geithner know, anyway?

Core Principle #2: Capital requirements for all banking firms should be higher, and capital requirements for Tier 1 FHCs should be higher than capital requirements for other banking firms.

See above for increased emphasis on systemic banks – note that there is nothing in the BIS release that indicates agreement on a need to segregate “Tier 1 FHC’s” from other banks.

Core Principle #3: The regulatory capital framework should put greater emphasis on higher quality forms of capital.

This is addressed in the first bulletted point. It seems to me that to avoid confusion – and, perhaps, to ensure that the “Third Pillar” of the investment community is encouraged to follow this emphasis – they will need to define a new capital ratio, the “Tangible Common Equity Ratio” or something.

Core Principle #4: Risk-based capital requirements should be a function of the relative risk of a banking firm’s exposures, and risk-based capital ratios should better reflect a banking firm’s current financial condition.

This was just ‘let’s do it better next time’ boiler-plate; while not particularly significant, it is interesting none-the-less that the issue is not mentioned by BIS.

Core Principle #5: The procyclicality of the regulatory capital and accounting regimes should be reduced and consideration should be given to introducing countercyclical elements into the regulatory capital regime.

Addressed by the fourth bulletted point.

Core Principle #6: Banking firms should be subject to a simple, non-risk-based leverage constraint.

Addressed by the second bulletted point. This is probably the single most important committment to improvement in the release.

Core Principle #7: Banking firms should be subject to a conservative, explicit liquidity standard.

Addressed by the third bulletted point. I am disappointed to see that the favoured treatment for paper issued by other banks in the risk-weighting process is not being addressed.

Core Principle #8: Stricter capital requirements for the banking system should not result in the re-emergence of an under-regulated non-bank financial sector that poses a threat to financial stability.

I’m glad to see that this principle is not addressed in the BIS release – it is the only Treasury proposal with which I have serious philosophical problems.

I don’t like the second bullet of the last bit of the BIS release:

The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision endorsed the following principles to guide supervisors in the transition to a higher level and quality of capital in the banking system:

  • •Building on the framework for countercyclical capital buffers, supervisors should require banks to strengthen their capital base through a combination of capital conservation measures, including actions to limit excessive dividend payments, share buybacks and compensation.
  • •Compensation should be aligned with prudent risk-taking and long-term, sustainable performance, building on the Financial Stability Board (FSB) sound compensation principles.
  • •Banks will be required to move expeditiously to raise the level and quality of capital to the new standards, but in a manner that promotes stability of national banking systems and the broader economy.
  • Supervisors will ensure that the capital plans for the banks in their jurisdiction are consistent with these principles.

Compensation is none of the regulator’s damn business. If they want to regulate risk, they can regulate risk, no problem; but micro-management will only lead to problems. Unfortunately, the regulators have won the public relations war and diverted attention from their own inadequacy towards the memes of “sloppy credit raters” and “greedy bankers”.

New Issue: YPG FixedReset 6.75%+417

September 8th, 2009

Issue: YPG Holdings Inc. Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 3

Size: 6-million shares (=$150-million) + greenshoe 0.9-million shares ($22.5-million)

Dividend: 6.75% (= $1.6875) p.a. until first Exchange Eate, then resets to 5-Year Canadas +417bp. First Dividend payable 2009-12-29 for $0.44846, assuming closing 2009-9-23. Dividends are cumulative.

Exchange Dates: 2014-9-30 and every five years thereafter.

Exchangeable: Every Exchange Date, to and from Series 4 Floaters, which pay 3-month bills +417bp, reset quarterly.

Redeemable: Every Exchange Date at 25.00. Series 4 are also redeemable at $25.50 at all other times.

Retraction: None.

Closing: 2009-9-23

Update: I have been advised that the deal size has been increased to 7.5-million shares (=$187.5-million) + greenshoe 1.125-million shares (=$28.125-million).

September 4, 2009

September 4th, 2009

There are fears of a new wave of bank failures triggered by commercial real estate loans:

Capmark Financial Group Inc.’s possible collapse may signal a new wave of real estate losses for banks — this one tied to business property — that could push the year’s tally of failures past 100.

Capmark, ranked among the largest U.S. commercial real estate lenders by Moody’s Investors Service, posted a $1.6 billion quarterly loss on Sept. 2 and said it might go bankrupt.

Assets originated by Capmark that are no longer collecting interest more than doubled to 7.6 percent of total assets as of June 30 from the end of 2008, after accounting for reserves, the company said. Capmark posted losses in North America, Asia and European units during the quarter and raised the provision for bad loans to $345.8 million from $10.4 million.

The company struck a deal with Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and Leucadia National Corp. to sell its loan servicing and mortgage units for as much as $490 million.

Capmark today had its debt rating cut by Moody’s to C because the asset sale and declining value of its remaining units increase the odds that creditors won’t get paid.

However, to make us all feel better about the long weekend, three banks were closed today: one tiny one:

As of June 30, 2009, First Bank of Kansas City had total assets of $16 million and total deposits of approximately $15 million.

The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $6 million.

a larger one:

As of August 3, 2009, InBank had total assets of $212 million and total deposits of approximately $199 million.

The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $66 million.

… and a larger one still:

As of August 28, 2009, Vantus Bank had total assets of $458 million and total deposits of approximately $368 million.

The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $168 million.

Update: Another one just trickled in:

Platinum Community Bank, as of August 29, 2009, had total assets of $345.6 million and total deposits of $305.0 million.

Platinum Community Bank is the 88th FDIC-insured institution to fail this year and the 15th in Illinois. The last bank to be closed in the state was Inbank, Oak Forest, earlier today. The FDIC estimates the cost of the failure to its Deposit Insurance Fund to be approximately $114.3 million.

Update: Holy smokes, long weekend and the FDIC’s working overtime!

As of July 24, 2009, First State Bank had total assets of $105 million and total deposits of approximately $95 million.

The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $47 million.

Even better, the recent slide in the preferred share market took a break today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 7bp and FixedResets gaining 5bp … little movement on little volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0324 % 1,431.5
FixedFloater 5.78 % 4.04 % 59,425 18.54 1 1.0747 % 2,656.3
Floater 2.55 % 2.14 % 31,649 22.02 4 0.0324 % 1,788.4
OpRet 4.86 % -11.90 % 126,021 0.09 15 0.0230 % 2,279.3
SplitShare 6.46 % 6.56 % 1,122,419 4.08 2 0.4701 % 2,046.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0230 % 2,084.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.61 % 150,680 2.58 12 0.1648 % 1,883.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.70 % 5.76 % 198,355 14.25 59 0.0697 % 1,801.8
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.08 % 476,122 4.11 40 0.0471 % 2,105.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-04
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-04
Maturity Price : 20.36
Evaluated at bid price : 20.36
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-04
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-04
Maturity Price : 21.91
Evaluated at bid price : 22.03
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium 2.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-10-04
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.77
Bid-YTW : -28.63 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 4.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-04
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 216,070 RBC crossed 100,000 at 28.00; National crossed 50,000 and sold 40,000 to Nesbitt at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.92
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Premium 119,255 RBC crossed 65,000 at 25.20; Desjardins crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-04
Maturity Price : 24.82
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 44,750 RBC crossed 38,700 at 27.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.55
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 36,600 RBC crossed 25,000 at 27.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.85
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 34,062 RBC bought 10,000 from TD at 20.74.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-09-04
Maturity Price : 20.66
Evaluated at bid price : 20.66
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 30,555 Nesbitt bought 16,300 from National at 27.84.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.82
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

RPQ.PR.A: Preferred Dividend Remains Suspended

September 4th, 2009

Connor Clark & Lunn Capital Markets have announced:

Connor Clark & Lunn ROC Pref Corp. ( the “Company”) announced today that the preferred share dividend will remain suspended and will not resume for the quarter ending September 30th 2009. Connor, Clark & Lunn Capital Markets Inc. (the “Manager”) and Connor Clark & Lunn Investment Management Ltd. ( the “Investment Manager”) have taken this action in order to have the funds available for potential use, if necessary, as part of a restructuring plan for the Company that the Manager and Investment Manager are currently working on in conjunction with the independent members of the Board of Directors.

Given the events of the credit market over the past year and the credit events that have occurred in the underlying portfolio, the Manager and Investment Manager believe that a restructuring may be necessary in order to preserve the maximum value available to preferred shareholders. The funds that would have been used to pay the dividend will remain in the Company.

The Company expects to be in a position to announce a restructuring plan during the fourth quarter of 2009, but if it is not able to do so then the decision whether to pay the dividend will be reviewed on a quarterly basis.

Note that this structured investment has no capital units; the “preferred” is considered by some (e.g., S&P, the TSX and the issuer) to be appropriate since there is subordination in the underlying investment.

RPQ.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was downgraded to P-2(high)/Watch Negative by S&P.

RPQ.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Update: Due to an error on my part, this post originally referred to PRF.PR.A. In fact, the issue referred to is RPQ.PR.A