IIAC Releases 2Q09 Equity Issuance & Trading Report

August 10th, 2009

The Investment Industry Association of Canada has released its New Issues & Trading Equity Report for the Second Quarter.

Preferred shares are not highlighted in the text, but the table shows $2.8-billion in deals for the second quarter, down from the $4.4-billion of 1Q09, but with a YTD total 88.4% in excess of 1H08.

August 7, 2009

August 7th, 2009

The Credit Suisse bonus pool is doing well:

Credit Suisse Group AG, the largest Swiss bank by market value, told bankers a pool of toxic bonds and mortgages set aside as part of their compensation gained 17 percent since January, a person familiar with the matter said.

About 2,000 bankers were told of the return, based on a $5 billion fund of bad mortgages and bonds, the person said, declining to be identified because the matter is private.

When the mechanism was announced on December 18, I commented:

If I am correct – with the support of the BoE – and bank assets have, in general, been written down to far below fundamental value, this is a clever way for the executives to (a) earn brownie points, and (b) give themselves enormous bonuses.

The Globe and Mail had a host of adulatory articles about the MFC Dividend Cut today, by Tara Perkins, Steve Ladurantaye and Andrew Willis, all praising Guloien’s forthright and incisive action in repairing the battered balance sheet. None of them mentioned the pending charge of about $500-million due to changing assumptions or speculated as to whether tough times might cause a decrease to the marketting budget, but the Perkins story did add some colour regarding the hurried changing of the capital rules last fall:

On Sept. 30, the head of Canada’s regulator, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, wrote an e-mail to various OSFI officials. “D’Alessandro just called and asked that we try to meet next week with the company to discuss capital,” Julie Dickson wrote, noting that the meeting would replace one that had been arranged for November. Mr. D’Alessandro wanted to discuss the capital requirements for the variable-annuity, or segregated funds, business, other e-mails show.

Discussions took place in October in which he laid out why he felt the rules were too onerous, and OSFI officials had a flurry of internal discussions. On Oct. 28, the rules were changed.

OSFI consulted with more than one insurer that month, but the changes were most important to Manulife.

Federal lobbyist records show that Mr. D’Alessandro also met with Prime Minister Stephen Harper on Nov. 6 to discuss “financial institutions.” It is not known what was discussed at the meeting with Mr. D’Alessandro.

On Nov. 18, Finance Minister Jim Flaherty received a memorandum from OSFI updating him on Manulife.

“In short, while Manulife’s results have been very good historically, the recent downturn in equity markets has had a significant impact on its capital levels,” the memorandum stated.

The arbitrary rule change was highlighted in my opinion piece OSFI and the Third Pillar. Lynx-eyed analysts at Credit Suisse AG and CIBC World Markets, however, noticed that dividend cuts are not a Good Thing and downgraded the common.

Citigroup is considering selling its energy trading unit:

— Citigroup Inc. may give up control of its Phibro LLC energy-trading business to outside investors, a person familiar with the matter said, as the bank faces what may be a $100 million payday for the unit’s chief, Andrew Hall.

Billionaire investor Warren Buffett also held talks with New York-based Citigroup about buying the business, and those negotiations have now ended, according to the person, who declined to be identified because the discussions are private.

Hall’s payout, which will be determined at the end of this year based on Phibro’s profits, may raise concern among lawmakers and regulators who are scrutinizing Citigroup’s compensation practices after a $45 billion government bailout last year.

On the one hand, I think is good news because I am in favour of a separation of banking & trading – with the strict proviso that this be accomplished by transparent nudges to capital rules, so that any regulated entity may determine whether it is primarily a banker or trader and have its regulatory capital calculated in an appropriate manner.

Even the whisper of this story is bad news, however. Citigroup isn’t examining the issue based on things like risk and reward – that’s too old fashioned for the new era. It appears that the basis for the decision will be cosmetic appeal: it’s a disgrace. I am, however, please to see that they have the moral character to resist the temptation to unleash an army of lawyers and accountants on Philbro, desperately seeking an uncrossed t in the regulatory requirements so they can pretend to be shocked and cancel the contract. There is still some integrity, at least, left in the world.

Today’s fascinating question is: Are Ken Lewis & Mom Boucher related, or what?


Ken Lewis
CEO
Bank of America

Mom Boucher
President
Hells Angels, Montreal

This question came to mind during the PrefBlog Sloppy Investment Thinking Awards Ceremony, which honoured Richard X. Bove of Rochdale Securities:

Mr. Bove notes that on Dec. 29 – when the new information concerning Merrill Lynch’s losses were disclosed to Bank of America’s management – that the bank’s stock was selling at $12.94 per share, whereas today the combined banks’ stock is trading close to $17 a share.

“Thus, one cannot argue that shareholders have been harmed by the bank’s decision that this was not a material reason to put off the merger,” he said in the note to clients.

The award is made with the assumption that the published extract has not distorted the main argument, which is akin to suggesting that blowing 90% of your paycheque on beer and prostitutes doesn’t do you any financial harm, since you’ve still got 10% left.

PerpetualDiscounts continued their winning ways of the week, up almost 45bp and leaving FixedResets in the dust again. These results were aided by superb performance from POW, which announced earnings today … no disaster, but held back by sub-par results from PWF (which owns GWO). Volume continued to be quite strong.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3229 % 1,259.2
FixedFloater 6.68 % 4.91 % 46,931 17.40 1 1.6240 % 2,297.6
Floater 3.62 % 3.63 % 70,348 18.21 2 0.3229 % 1,573.1
OpRet 4.89 % -4.23 % 138,235 0.09 15 0.0539 % 2,259.5
SplitShare 5.75 % 6.57 % 95,565 4.11 3 -0.2401 % 2,018.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0539 % 2,066.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.55 % 83,377 14.20 4 0.4012 % 1,857.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.87 % 5.89 % 174,751 14.02 67 0.4469 % 1,749.8
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.02 % 536,459 4.16 40 0.0665 % 2,100.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
NA.PR.N FixedReset -1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 24.43
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 20.83
Evaluated at bid price : 20.83
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 10.95
Evaluated at bid price : 10.95
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 22.62
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 23.37
Evaluated at bid price : 23.68
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.95
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 18.72
Evaluated at bid price : 18.72
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 17.45
Evaluated at bid price : 17.45
Bid-YTW : 6.92 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 45.75
Evaluated at bid price : 48.35
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.27
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 17.43
Evaluated at bid price : 17.43
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 22.93
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 21.73
Evaluated at bid price : 22.12
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 21.39
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 46,500 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 19.82
Evaluated at bid price : 19.82
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 37,345 Nesbitt crossed 10,000 at 20.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 32,639 TD bought 11,300 from National at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 31,830 RBC crossed 17,900 at 24.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 24.15
Evaluated at bid price : 24.53
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 30,675 RBC bought 19,800 from anonymous at 20.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 20.89
Evaluated at bid price : 20.89
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 29,091 TD bought 14,000 from RBC at 27.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.79
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
There were 50 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Fed Funds Futures & the Expectations Hypothesis

August 7th, 2009

Econbrowser‘s James Hamilton has announced:

Do current fed funds futures prices signal a belief by market participants that the Fed may begin raising interest rates early next year? My latest research paper suggests not.

The expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates posits that an investor could expect to receive the same return from buying a 6-month T-bill as from rolling over two 3-month T-bills. Although this is an appealing hypothesis, it has been consistently rejected by empirical researchers, including Campbell and Shiller (1991), Evans and Lewis (1994), Bekaert, Hodrick and Marshall (1997), and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) among many others. What that literature has shown is that when the 6-month yield is higher than the 3-month, on average you’d do better with it than with rolling over the 3-months. Typically the term structure slopes up, and typically you earn a higher return from longer term securities.

In a new paper coauthored with Hitotsubashi University Professor Tatsuyoshi Okimoto, we show that arbitrage should force the predictable excess returns on bonds of longer maturities to show up as predictable gains from taking the long position in fed funds futures contracts. The average upward slope to the term structure of interest rates should imply an average upward slope to the interest rates associated with fed funds contracts of increasing maturity. One might then want to adjust these futures rates to obtain an unbiased market expectation, as suggested in a recent paper by Piazzesi and Swanson.

August 6, 2009

August 6th, 2009

DBRS has published a new study Canadian Private Pension Plans – Are They Losing or Cruising?.

The SEC has extended the comment period for the short-selling proposals.

The BoE is monetizing debt like there’s no tomorrow:

The Bank of England expanded its bond purchase program beyond its original limit in an effort to spur lending and fight a recession that’s deeper than previously anticipated.

Bond yields plunged after the Monetary Policy Committee, led by Governor Mervyn King, kept the key interest rate at 0.5 percent and increased its purchase program by 50 billion pounds ($84 billion) to 175 billion pounds.

The Bank of England’s tone on the economy was less optimistic. It said in a statement that the recession “appears to have been deeper than previously thought.”

“While some recovery in output growth is in prospect, the margin of spare capacity in the economy is likely to continue to grow for some while yet, bearing down on inflation in the medium term,” the bank said.

PerpetualDiscounts continued to roar ahead today, shrugging off the woes of the equity market sparked by the slashing of the MFC common dividend. Somewhat surprisingly, the MFC PerpetualDiscounts were little affected, although one of the two FixedReset issues and the OpRet issue made it into the unpleasant part of the price movement table; both FixedResets were in the volume table.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2312 % 1,255.2
FixedFloater 6.79 % 5.01 % 45,277 17.27 1 3.2903 % 2,260.9
Floater 3.63 % 3.66 % 123,419 18.14 2 0.2312 % 1,568.1
OpRet 4.89 % -6.25 % 139,872 0.09 15 -0.2586 % 2,258.3
SplitShare 5.74 % 6.45 % 98,232 4.12 3 0.4113 % 2,022.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2586 % 2,065.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.79 % 5.57 % 83,187 14.18 4 -0.1317 % 1,849.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.89 % 5.94 % 173,149 13.97 67 0.5696 % 1,742.1
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.05 % 541,017 4.17 40 -0.1265 % 2,099.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet -3.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.79
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-09-05
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : -41.98 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.61
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 19.97
Evaluated at bid price : 19.97
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 45.66
Evaluated at bid price : 48.00
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.37
Evaluated at bid price : 20.37
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 22.51
Evaluated at bid price : 23.34
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 17.20
Evaluated at bid price : 17.20
Bid-YTW : 7.02 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.14
Evaluated at bid price : 20.14
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 24.18
Evaluated at bid price : 24.56
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 19.23
Evaluated at bid price : 19.23
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 17.11
Evaluated at bid price : 17.11
Bid-YTW : 7.06 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.90
Evaluated at bid price : 20.90
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 23.33
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.18
Evaluated at bid price : 21.18
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 19.11
Evaluated at bid price : 19.11
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 22.10
Evaluated at bid price : 22.24
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.90
Evaluated at bid price : 20.90
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 3.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.01
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 84,635 TD crossed 25,000 at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.61
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 68,955 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 19.73
Evaluated at bid price : 19.73
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 43,200 RBC crossed 40,000 at 20.09.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 41,072 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.71
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 36,945 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 26,625 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 22.39
Evaluated at bid price : 22.55
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
There were 41 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MFC 2Q09 Results: Common Dividend Slashed

August 6th, 2009

Manulife Financial announced today:

its decision to reduce the Company’s quarterly common share dividend by 50% from $0.26 to $0.13 per share, payable on and after September 21, 2009 to shareholders of record at the close of business on August 18, 2009. The revised dividend will preserve approximately $800 million for MFC on an annualized basis as part of the Company’s strategic focus on building fortress levels of capital.

Preferred share dividends were, of course, not affected. Preferred Dividends must be paid in full for as long as the common shareholders are getting even a nickel.

MFC is also offering discounted common shares to participants in its common share DRIP. Sadly, this DRIP is not open to preferred shareholders; there are only three such plans that offer discounted common to preferred shareholders, and one of them is iffy.

Manulife common performed badly on news of the dividend cut. It’s my guess that the cut has been on their to-do list for some time; doing it now means the stock price will be hurt, but doing it at the peak of gloominess earlier would have had it slaughtered.

The new release stated:

Manulife Financial Corporation (“MFC”) today reported shareholders’ net income of $1,774 million for the second quarter ended June 30, 2009, compared to $1,008 million in the second quarter of 2008. Fully diluted earnings per share was $1.09 compared to $0.66 in 2008.

The quarter’s earnings were primarily driven by the significant increase in global equity markets which resulted in non-cash gains of $2,622 million, of which $2,379 million related to segregated fund guarantees. Partially offsetting these gains were the impact of lower corporate bond rates and, to a lesser extent, the continued pressure on credit. The decline in interest rates and other fixed income related items resulted in non-cash charges of $1,116 million, primarily as a result of the lower investment returns assumed in the valuation of policy liabilities. In addition, credit impairments totaled $109 million, other than temporary impairments (“OTTI”) on equity investments were $53 million and actuarial related charges for downgrades amounted to $106 million. During the quarter the Company increased its tax related provisions on leveraged lease investments by $139 million and reported net charges for changes in actuarial methods and assumptions of $87 million. Excluding the aforementioned items, earnings for the quarter totaled $776 million compared to $745 million a year ago.

We expect to complete our annual review of all actuarial assumptions in the third quarter, and our current expectation is that the updated assumptions will result in a material charge to earnings that will likely be recorded next quarter. Although we have not completed our assessment nor have we reached any conclusions, the preliminary information indicates that the possible change in assumptions with respect to policyholder behavior for segregated fund guarantee products may result in a charge not to exceed $500 million.

Exposures:

MFC Exposures
Tangible Holdco Equity*
CAD Millions
16,784
Other Tier 1 30.1%
Stock Leverage 58%**
Bond Leverage 890% ***
Seg Fund Leverage 1,061%
Effect of +1% Interest Rates 8.0%
Effect of -10% Equity Market 11.3%
Tangible Holdco Equity is Common Shares (16,250) plus Contributed Surplus (169) plus Retained Earnings (12,693) plus Non-Controlling interest in subsidiaries (209) less Accumulated other Comprehensive Loss (2,914) less Goodwill (7,608) and Intangibles (2,015) = 16,784.
Other Tier 1 = Liabilities for preferred shares and capital instruments (3,634) + Preferred Shares (1,419) = 5,053 / THE
Stock Leverage is Stocks on the balance sheet (9,688) divided by Tangible Holdco Equity. MFC has substantial derivative investments, but does not disclose the notional values of these positions, making this estimate rather unreliable.
Bond Leverage is bonds on the balance sheet (83,725) + mortgages (31,379) + Private Placements (24,701) + Policy Loans (7,090) + Bank Loans (2,458) = 149,353 divided by Tangible Holdco Equity. MFC has substantial derivative investments, but does not disclose the notional values of these positions, making this estimate rather unreliable.
Equity effect = 1,900 / THE
Interest rate effect = 1,336 / THE; note that a decrease in interest rates will cost them money. This figure is taken from the 2008 Annual Report since they couldn’t be bothered to disclose it in 2Q09, despite all their blather about “de-risking”.
Sources: Financial Supplement, Slides and 2008 Annual Report.

Despite including this post in the “Regulatory Capital” category of PrefBlog, I will not discuss MCCSR. This figure is useless for analytical purposes, since:

  • Corresponding US calculations are not disclosed
  • As preferred share investors we are interested in the publicly issued preferred shares, at the holdco level

As noted by DBRS:

The incurrence of debt at the holding company to provide equity capital to operating subsidiaries constitutes double leverage, the use of which should be conservative. The analysis of double leverage requires a review of the unconsolidated financial statements of the holding company, which are generally not in the public domain.

Update, 2009-8-7: DBRS has commented:

that today’s decision by Manulife Financial Corporation’s (Manulife or the Company) Board of Directors to reduce its dividend rate by 50% is expected to preserve close to $800 million annually in shareholder capital. This is the latest in a recent line of actions taken by the Company to build and preserve capital following the adverse impact of weakening equity markets and falling interest rates on its actuarial reserves and reported earnings. While DBRS regards this dividend reduction as extraordinary for a Canadian financial institution, the decision is nevertheless prudent in the context of the current operating and market environment. There are no implications for the Company’s ratings at this time. However, DBRS recognizes that further large losses without a corresponding build-up in common equity capital would likely lead to downward pressure on the ratings.

FTN.PR.A, FFN.PR.A, FTU.PR.A: Semi-Annual Financials

August 6th, 2009
Quadravest
SplitShare
Corporations
Ticker Income
Coverage
1H09
Asset
Coverage
2009-7-31
Last
PrefBlog
Mention
FTN.PR.A 1.2+:1 1.8+:1 Capital
Unit
Dividend
Reinstated
FFN.PR.A 1.0+:1 1.6-:1 Downgraded
Pfd-5(high)
FTU.PR.A 0.1+:1* 0.6+:1** Preferred
Dividend
Suspended
* For income coverage purposes, the full accumulated dividend is counted, regardless of whether this was actually paid or merely cumulated
** For asset coverage purposes, the cumulated but unpaid dividend is considered a prior claim on assets. The cumulated amount was 17.5 cents per share; which may be considered as belonging to the preferred shareholders in addition to the stated NAV.

As a fascinating aside, the FTN.PR.A financials show a recovery of $20,000 in service fees; sadly, this unusual item is not explained in the note.

L.PR.A: DBRS Revises Trend to "Stable"

August 5th, 2009

DBRS has announced that it:

has today confirmed Loblaw Companies Limited’s (Loblaw or the Company) long-term debt ratings at BBB and its Cumulative Redeemable Second Preferred Shares, Series A rating at Pfd-3, and revised the trends to Stable from Negative.

DBRS believes that the management changes and strategic initiatives made in early 2008 have proved successful in stabilizing the business. Loblaw has been able to keep market share almost level and deliver reasonable revenue growth while improving margins for a full year now. The performance over the past year has led to a significant improvement in key credit metrics – lease-adjusted gross debt-to-EBITDAR for the 52 weeks ending June 20, 2009 is now 2.8 times (x) (compared with 3.1x for 2008, and 3.7x for the 52 weeks ending June 14, 2008), a level that is well within the BBB rating category for Loblaw. With solid performance for four quarters in a row, DBRS is prepared to revise the trend on its long-term ratings for Loblaw to Stable from Negative.

DBRS is prepared to take this action despite the fact that operating performance and credit metrics may actually moderate over the near term due to the effects of food price deflation, a weak economic environment, and intense competition. We believe a more stable Canadian food retailing sector, combined with the initiatives taken by Loblaw over the past year and a half to address its internal problems, have strengthened the Company and positioned it to withstand a more challenging environment within the current rating category. DBRS also acknowledges that Loblaw’s intention to increase its capital budget for the remainder of the year (to $1 billion from previous guidance of $750 million) will use much of the free cash flow that could have been used to reduce net debt further.

L.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when a bond issue offered a pricing clue last May.

L.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™. It is relegated to the “Scraps” index on credit concerns.

August 5, 2009

August 5th, 2009

Goldman Sachs is making tons of money:

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. made more than $100 million in trading revenue on a record 46 separate days during the second quarter, or 71 percent of the time, breaking the previous high of 34 days in the prior three months.

Trading losses occurred on two days during the months of April, May and June, down from eight in the first quarter, the New York-based bank said today in a filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The company made at least $50 million on 58 of the 65 trading days during the quarter, or 89 percent of the time.

Banks such as Goldman Sachs are benefiting from lower borrowing costs after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in October started guaranteeing bank debt issues that mature within three years. Goldman Sachs said in today’s filing it had $25.1 billion of debt guaranteed by the FDIC under the agency’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. The bank sold about $30 billion of the FDIC-backed securities between November and March, according to company filings.

There will be howls of outrage when they announce their bonuses next year! How much of this is due to the skill and salesmanship of their traders and sales desks and how much is due to the fact that smiley-boy has a big whack of capital behind him? You can bet that the politics of envy will be a major political theme in the coming year.

However, we must be fair. Particularly with respect to Flash Orders. It is only fair that large, politically connected companies be protected from that horrible competition stuff. Competition, you know, leads to bonuses:

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s move to ban so-called flash orders may help NYSE Euronext take back market share of U.S. stock trading at the expense of three-year-old rival Direct Edge Holdings LLC.

The debate regarding position limits in commodity futures is getting interesting:

John Hyland, chief investment officer for the world’s largest exchange-traded fund in natural gas, said assertions his company helped drive up energy prices were “self-serving statistical gibberish.”

Hyland’s Alameda, California-based U.S. Commodity Funds LLC owns a family of exchange-traded funds that invest in oil, gasoline, heating oil and natural gas. One of them, the United States Natural Gas Fund, has grown 11-fold since the start of the year, to 347.4 million shares outstanding.

The fund ran out of new shares on July 7 and is seeking permission from the Securities and Exchange Commission to sell a billion more.

The $4.8 billion natural gas fund has at times owned almost 20 percent of the open interest in the near-month natural gas contract on the New York Mercantile Exchange, plus hundreds of thousands of natural gas swaps on the InterContinental Exchange.

Hyland said government-imposed caps would splinter large exchange-traded funds like his into smaller funds, reducing liquidity they provide to the futures market.

[CFTC Chairman Gary] Gensler said in the hearings last week that there is a consensus that position limits are needed in derivatives markets, leaving regulators to answer three questions: What should the limits be, who will set and monitor the rules, and who needs to be exempt?

“Position limits on financial contracts will decrease liquidity, increase transaction costs and increase volatility associated with expiration — all without achieving any of the reforms that the commission seeks,” said [John] Arnold, the founder of $5 billion energy hedge fund Centaurus Advisors LLC in Houston.

It depends a lot on what, precisely, is meant by “Exchange Traded Fund”. If it’s a straight pass-through, with one-share being equal to one barrel of oil, or one cubic meter of natural gas, or whatever, then I have no problems with it being exempt from the position limits. However, if it is indeed a straight pass-through, than this makes a mockery of the notion that it provides liquidity. You do not provide liquidity by taking a position, you suck it up. You do not provide liquidity by holding a position. You only provide liquidity by taking discretionary market action to offset actions of other market participants … and if you do that, you’re not an exchange-traded fund, you’re just another speculator and you should be subject to position limits.

Another rip-roaring day for PerpetualDiscounts, which gained just over 84bp in total return (BMO went ex-dividend) to bring the weighted median YTW below 6% for the first time since September 12, 2008, just before Lehman’s bankruptcy. Very good volume today and FixedReset issues made it back to their accustomed (well, accustomed in the last six months, anyway) dominance of the volume highlights table.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.99%, equivalent to 8.40% interest at the standard conversion factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield 6.1%, so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread is now about 230bp, a widening from the 215bp estimate of July 31 and July 29.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6047 % 1,252.3
FixedFloater 7.02 % 5.20 % 42,513 17.01 1 1.3072 % 2,188.9
Floater 3.64 % 3.67 % 71,438 18.12 2 0.6047 % 1,564.5
OpRet 4.88 % -4.14 % 139,113 0.09 15 0.2772 % 2,264.2
SplitShare 5.76 % 6.45 % 97,712 4.12 3 0.9449 % 2,014.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2772 % 2,070.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.58 % 78,203 13.92 4 0.3505 % 1,852.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.93 % 5.99 % 173,449 13.89 67 0.8442 % 1,732.2
FixedReset 5.49 % 4.03 % 548,833 4.17 40 0.1093 % 2,101.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 20.10
Evaluated at bid price : 20.10
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 21.02
Evaluated at bid price : 21.02
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 19.77
Evaluated at bid price : 19.77
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 20.61
Evaluated at bid price : 20.61
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-09-04
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.74
Bid-YTW : -26.92 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 24.46
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 20.85
Evaluated at bid price : 20.85
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 21.62
Evaluated at bid price : 21.62
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 24.68
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 20.50
Evaluated at bid price : 20.50
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.45
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 19.04
Evaluated at bid price : 19.04
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 18.75
Evaluated at bid price : 18.75
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.50
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 20.14
Evaluated at bid price : 20.14
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 24.44
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 21.10
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 24.39
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.37
Evaluated at bid price : 23.09
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 19.36
Evaluated at bid price : 19.36
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 19.83
Evaluated at bid price : 19.83
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 24.46
Evaluated at bid price : 24.68
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 18.78
Evaluated at bid price : 18.78
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 17.01
Evaluated at bid price : 17.01
Bid-YTW : 7.10 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 16.90
Evaluated at bid price : 16.90
Bid-YTW : 7.14 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 18.42
Evaluated at bid price : 18.42
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 2.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-07-19
Maturity Price : 26.25
Evaluated at bid price : 26.66
Bid-YTW : 2.79 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 2.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.51
Bid-YTW : 8.57 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 19.85
Evaluated at bid price : 19.85
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 2.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.77
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 109,703 Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 27.80 and 40,000 at 27.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.80
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
ACO.PR.A OpRet 102,553 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-09-04
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : -5.86 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 68,050 RBC crossed blocks of 40,000 and 10,000 shares, both at 19.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 19.76
Evaluated at bid price : 19.76
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 64,100 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.77
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 64,030 RBC crossed 50,000 at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.02
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 61,581 RBC crossed 50,200 at 19.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-05
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
There were 54 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

August 4, 2009

August 5th, 2009

The Bank for International Settlements has released a paper by Fabio Panetta, Thomas Faeh, Giuseppe Grande, Corrinne Ho, Michael King, Aviram Levy, Federico M Signoretti, Marco Taboga and Andrea Zaghini, An assessment of financial sector rescue programmes:

We analyse the wide array of rescue programmes adopted in several countries, following Lehman Brothers’ default in September 2008, in order to support banks and other financial institutions. We first provide an overview of the programmes, comparing their characteristics, magnitudes and participation rates across countries. We then consider the effects of the programmes on banks’ risk and valuation, looking at the behaviour of CDS premia and stock prices. We then proceed to analyse the issuance of government guaranteed bonds by banks, examining their impact on banks’ funding and highlighting undesired effects and distortions. Finally, we briefly review the recent evolution of bank lending to the private sector. We draw policy implications, in particular as regards the way of mitigating the distortions implied by such programmes and the need for an exit strategy

Paul Krugman wrote a piece in the New York Times titled Rewarding Bad Actors, which dealt in part with High Frequency Trading:

It’s hard to imagine a better illustration than high-frequency trading. The stock market is supposed to allocate capital to its most productive uses, for example by helping companies with good ideas raise money. But it’s hard to see how traders who place their orders one-thirtieth of a second faster than anyone else do anything to improve that social function.

And there’s a good case that such activities are actually harmful. For example, high-frequency trading probably degrades the stock market’s function, because it’s a kind of tax on investors who lack access to those superfast computers — which means that the money Goldman spends on those computers has a negative effect on national wealth. As the great Stanford economist Kenneth Arrow put it in 1973, speculation based on private information imposes a “double social loss”: it uses up resources and undermines markets.

Far be it from me to dismiss the thoughts of a Nobel-winning economist, but I fail to see his point here – at the very least, it needs elucidation.

Mr. Krugman implies that there is a lower limit to trading reaction speed, below which improvements in reaction time have deleterious effects on national wealth. I don’t see how you would go about defining such a thing. It should also be noted that High Frequency Trading does not necessarily have anything to do with Flash Orders; HFT is simply a method of arbitrage. If, for instance, there is a huge seller of SLF.PR.A, and I can arbitrage that by selling SLF.PR.E to buy it, surely this is a Good Thing for capital markets, and the faster the better? HFT deepens the markets by converting supply and demand for one particular financial instrument into supply and demand for related financial instruments; deepening the market and providing better liquidity for those who want it.

From the point of view of the original seller of SLF.PR.A, I’m doing him a favour … instead of taking trading costs of ten cents per share, he’s only spending nine cents. My nine-cent reward for executing the near-arbitrage (it’s not pure arbitrage since the two issues are not interconvertible) serves as a carrot for my competition … if they can do it faster, stronger, better, the original seller’s cost will drop to eight cents – and they’ll get to keep it all while I go back to the drawing board in an effort to make it seven cents.

But it looks like Flash Orders will be banned. I must say, I’m disappointed with the press coverage of the issue: I haven’t seen an interview anywhere with a supporter (or at least a user) of Flash Orders, willing to stand up on his hind legs and say ‘Flash Orders are Good because …’. But that’s modern journalism for you … all they do nowadays is copy things down from press releases and occasionally call the number at the bottom so they can claim they’ve got an exclusive.

A rip-roaring day for PerpetualDiscounts, with FixedResets doing quite well but trailing badly and shut out of the volume tables.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 2.0893 % 1,244.8
FixedFloater 7.11 % 5.28 % 42,111 16.90 1 0.3279 % 2,160.6
Floater 3.66 % 3.68 % 72,454 18.10 2 2.0893 % 1,555.1
OpRet 4.89 % -6.03 % 141,272 0.10 15 0.3218 % 2,257.9
SplitShare 5.82 % 6.63 % 97,262 4.12 3 0.4891 % 1,995.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3218 % 2,064.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.58 % 76,837 13.86 4 -0.1885 % 1,845.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.97 % 6.04 % 171,813 13.82 67 0.8545 % 1,717.7
FixedReset 5.49 % 4.04 % 556,396 4.15 40 0.2404 % 2,099.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.15
Evaluated at bid price : 22.43
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 19.06
Evaluated at bid price : 19.06
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 24.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.89
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 24.39
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.39
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 18.51
Evaluated at bid price : 18.51
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 18.98
Evaluated at bid price : 18.98
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.78
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 16.70
Evaluated at bid price : 16.70
Bid-YTW : 7.23 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 19.02
Evaluated at bid price : 19.02
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.99
Evaluated at bid price : 20.99
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.02
Evaluated at bid price : 20.02
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 10.70
Evaluated at bid price : 10.70
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 19.46
Evaluated at bid price : 19.46
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 17.65
Evaluated at bid price : 17.65
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.80
Evaluated at bid price : 20.80
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 24.21
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.64
Evaluated at bid price : 22.78
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 18.80
Evaluated at bid price : 18.80
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 24.19
Evaluated at bid price : 24.48
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.60
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.05
Bid-YTW : 8.93 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 23.38
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.61
Evaluated at bid price : 21.61
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 19.88
Evaluated at bid price : 19.88
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 2.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.07
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 2.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.76
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 2.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.96
Evaluated at bid price : 22.35
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 19.79
Evaluated at bid price : 19.79
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 10.80
Evaluated at bid price : 10.80
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.47
Evaluated at bid price : 21.77
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 182,531 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 19.88
Evaluated at bid price : 19.88
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 50,395 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 44,318 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 10.70
Evaluated at bid price : 10.70
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 39,083 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 19.65
Evaluated at bid price : 19.65
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 33,803 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.64
Evaluated at bid price : 22.78
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 33,097 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.11
Evaluated at bid price : 20.11
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
There were 44 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Treasury to Increase TIPS Issuance

August 5th, 2009

The US Department of the Treasury has announced:

The balance of our financing requirements will be met with weekly bills; monthly 52-week bills; monthly 2-year, 3-year, 5-year, and 7-year notes; the September and October 10-year note and 30-year bond reopenings; and the October 5-year and 10-year TIPS reopenings.

Currently we believe our existing suite of nominal securities is sufficient to address our borrowing needs; however, market participants should expect auction sizes to continue to rise in a gradual manner over the medium term. In addition, to increase our flexibility, issuance of Treasury inflation-indexed securities will also increase gradually.

Nevertheless, Treasury will continue to monitor projected financing needs and make adjustments to the auction calendar, if necessary. These include, but are not limited to, the reintroduction or establishment of other benchmark securities or other changes to the auction calendar for existing nominal and inflation-indexed securities.

Treasury is committed to issuing TIPS in a regular and predictable manner across the yield curve. These securities are an important part of our overall debt management strategy, and market participants can expect issuance to gradually increase in FY 2010.

Additionally, to potentially improve liquidity in the TIPS program and better capture the premium associated with inflation protection, Treasury will consider replacing 20-year TIPS with 30-year TIPS.

Any potential changes to the TIPS program will be announced at the November 2009 refunding.

Across the Curve comments that in typical market fashion, this announcement resulted in an increase to TIPS prices:

TIPS bonds are besting their nominal rivals. In announcing that it would tinker with TIPS issuance the Treasury averred that increased offerings would not occur until 2010.

The widening of breakevens represents the howls of the shorts who had planned for an increase in issuance at this instant. Thirty year breakevens have moved to 227 basis points from 220 late yesterday.

The Wall Street Journal reports that increases to TIPS sizes is due to pressure from China:

China, the largest holder of U.S. government debt, is among investors that have indicated to the Treasury that they want to buy more of the securities, which offer protection against rising inflation, the people said.

Officials from the U.S. and China discussed TIPS issuance at high-level talks in Washington last week.

China is getting assertive! They roiled the market a while ago when they decreased their holdings of Agencies and now they’re demanding inflation protection. Well, he who pays the piper … I have always thought that America’s fiscal profligacy will not reverse until it sinks in on Joe Sixpack’s political thoughts that the rate he pays on his mortgage is set in Beijing.