S&P Announces TXPR Index Revision

July 10th, 2009

Standard & Poor’s has announced (although not yet on their official index news page):

the following index changes as a result of the semi-annual S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index Review. These changes will be effective at the open on Monday, July 20, 2009

TXPR Revision 2009/7
Additions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
DBRS
Rating
Last
Index
Action
BMO.PR.P FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BCE.PR.F Scraps
(FixFloat)
Pfd-3(high) Deleted
July 2008
BAM.PR.P FixedReset Pfd-2(low)  
CCS.PR.D Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3  
CIU.PR.B FixedReset Pfd-2(high)  
FTS.PR.E Scraps
(OpRet)
Pfd-3(high) Deleted
Jan. 2009
HSB.PR.E FixedReset Pfd-2(high)  
IAG.PR.C FixedReset Pfd-2(high)  
MFC.PR.E FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
MFC.PR.D FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.R FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.X FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.G FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
WN.PR.E Scraps
(PerpDis)
Pfd-3  
WN.PR.C Scraps
(PerpDis)
Pfd-3  

TXPR Revision 2009/7
Deletions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
DBRS
Rating
Last
Index
Action
BMO.PR.L PerpDis Pfd-1(low) Added
Jan. 2009
BCE.PR.C Scraps
(FixFloat)
Pfd-3(high)  
BAM.PR.O OpRet Pfd-2(low) Added
Jan. 2009
FTS.PR.C Scraps
(OpRet)
Pfd-3(high) Added
Jan. 2009
MFC.PR.B PerpDis Pfd-1(low)  
MFC.PR.C PerpDis Pfd-1(low)  
NSI.PR.D Scraps
(OpRet)
Pfd-2(low) Added
Jan. 2009
POW.PR.C PerpDis Pfd-2(high) Added
July 2007
RY.PR.B PerpDis Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.W PerpDis Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.S FixedReset Pfd-1(low) Added
July 2008
TCA.PR.Y PerpDis Pfd-2(low)  
WN.PR.A PerpDis Pfd-3  
"Deletions" without a listed "Prior Action" are Originals

The net effect of these changes (counting solely by issue count, not by the undisclosed index weight; and counting HIMIPref™ "Scraps" issues according to their bracketted ‘would be’ subindex) are:

TXPR
Net Changes by Issue
July 2009
Category Adds Deletions Net
Class
FixedReset 11 1 +10
FixFloat 1 1 0
OpRet 1 3 -2
PerpDis 2 8 -6
Credit
Pfd-1(low) 6 6 0
Pfd-2(high) 3 1 +2
Pfd-2(low) 1 3 -2
Pfd-3(high) 2 2 0
Pfd-3 3 1 +2

All in all – and bearing in mind that I am not looking at the (unavailable) weightings, only at the issue counts – it looks like the index is increasingly dominated by the FixedReset structure, and that credit quality has declined marginally.

Thank you S&P! I LOVE indices that are easy to beat! The churning helps a lot, too … keep it going!

July 9, 2009

July 9th, 2009

Bradford & Bingley is defaulting on its sub-debt:

— Bradford & Bingley Plc’s failure to pay interest on some of its subordinated bonds will trigger settlement of credit-default swaps linked to about $414 million of the nationalized mortgage lender’s debt.

Dealers and investors agreed today that the Bingley, England-based company’s decision not to pay interest on 125 million pounds ($202 million) of 6.625 percent subordinated bonds maturing 2023 was a “credit event,” the International Swaps and Derivatives Association said on its Web site.

The ruling will prompt an auction to settle credit swap contracts even though the U.K. government changed the terms of the bank’s nationalization in February, allowing it to miss coupon payments without that constituting a default. Bradford & Bingley said in May it didn’t intend to pay interest on the notes, which form part of the bank’s so-called lower Tier 2 capital.

This shows the authorities’ determination to make holders of capital paper suffer, a major factor in the DBRS revision of its rating methodology.

The more I think about the recent MLI Tier 1 Issue, the less I understand it. I have updated my discussion of the issue with some questions sent to MFC’s Investor Relations department.

S&P should be revising the TXPR index soon – but I still don’t see any announcement on their index news page. The last revision was announced 2009-1-9, while last summer’s revision was announced 2009-7-11 (which included the addition of a called issue, FAL.PR.H, which was later quietly dropped).

The Credit Crunch isn’t over yet, as evidenced by Fun ‘n’ Games regarding the pricing of senior debt of CIT, a TARP beneficiary. CIT has, for all intents and purposes, been locked out of the bond market for well over a year and has been downgraded to just above, or below, junk status by the ratings agencies (depending on which ones you listen to; Fitch has them at single B). They were able to issue a short-term TALF-eligible securitization in early June; 2Q09 results will be announced on July 23.

The Boston Fed has released another Policy Briefing (they’ve been busy this week!), this one regarding A Proposal to Help Distressed Homeowners: A Government Payment-Sharing Plan:

This public policy brief presents a proposal, originally posted on the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in January of this year, designed to help homeowners who are unable to afford mortgage payments on their principal residence because they have suffered a significant income disruption and because the balance owed on their mortgage exceeds the value of their home. These homeowners represent a subset of the population of distressed homeowners, but according to our research they face an elevated risk of default and are unlikely to be helped by current foreclosure-reduction programs. The plan is a government payment-sharing arrangement that works with the homeowner’s existing mortgage and provides a significant reduction in the homeowner’s monthly mortgage payment. The plan does not involve principal reduction. Two options are presented; both are designed to help people with negative equity and a significant income disruption, such as job loss. In one version, the assistance comes in the form of a government loan, which must be repaid when the borrower returns to financial health. The second version features government grants that do not have to be repaid. In either case, the homeowner must provide evidence of negative equity in the home and of job loss or other significant income disruption. The costs of the plan are moderate, and the benefits should help not only the participating homeowners but also the housing industry, the financial markets, and the economy more broadly.

Another strong day for preferreds, with FixedResets outperforming yet again. I’m finding the yields on those things increasingly difficult to believe! When will it end?

PerpetualDiscounts closed to yield 6.30%, equivalent to 8.82% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long corporates now yield 6.4%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now 242bp, tightening in a little from the 250bp they recorded June 30.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.1047 % 1,154.8
FixedFloater 7.06 % 5.44 % 37,286 16.41 1 0.2604 % 2,136.3
Floater 3.30 % 3.86 % 76,735 17.75 3 -1.1047 % 1,442.7
OpRet 4.99 % -3.46 % 123,150 0.09 15 0.1074 % 2,213.4
SplitShare 6.11 % 5.30 % 80,170 4.17 4 0.6606 % 1,918.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1074 % 2,024.0
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1619 % 1,755.8
Perpetual-Discount 6.31 % 6.30 % 157,000 13.46 71 0.1619 % 1,617.1
FixedReset 5.57 % 4.32 % 498,531 4.29 40 0.2948 % 2,061.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -2.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-09
Maturity Price : 10.25
Evaluated at bid price : 10.25
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-09
Maturity Price : 10.26
Evaluated at bid price : 10.26
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.61
Bid-YTW : 7.63 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.90
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-09
Maturity Price : 18.20
Evaluated at bid price : 18.20
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.87
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-09
Maturity Price : 15.51
Evaluated at bid price : 15.51
Bid-YTW : 7.74 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-09
Maturity Price : 18.89
Evaluated at bid price : 18.89
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
CGI.PR.B SplitShare 1.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-03-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.91
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 412,350 RBC crossed 84,800 at 28.00, then three more blocks of 100,000 each at the same price. Nice tickets!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.96
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare 261,515 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 7.30 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 150,965 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 27.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.80
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 123,110 Desjardins crossed 15,700 at 27.61, then 84,300 at 27.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.65
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 111,235 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 17.90; TD crossed 48,100 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-09
Maturity Price : 17.87
Evaluated at bid price : 17.87
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 66,890 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 21.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.20
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
There were 47 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BNA.PR.A to be Redeemed

July 9th, 2009

BAM Split Corp – which today settled its new BNA.PR.D issuehas announced:

the Company has delivered a notice of early redemption to CDS Clearing and Depository Services Inc. (“CDS”) to inform them that the Company will redeem all of the outstanding Class A Preferred Shares, other than the Class A Preferred Shares owned by BAM Investments Corp. (“BAM Investments”), on July 27, 2009, at an early redemption price of $25.25 per share plus accrued and unpaid dividends.

BNA.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™. It is currently a member of the SplitShare subindex.

BNA.PR.D Settles Firm on Good Volume; Asset Coverage to Increase

July 9th, 2009

BNA.PR.D, the 5-year split share refunding BNA.PR.A announced June 18 settled today, trading 261,515 shares in a range of 24.89-03 before closing at 24.99-25.

BAM Split also announced:

Concurrently with the completion of the offering, BAM Investments has agreed to transfer 7,000,000 BAM Shares to the Company in exchange for additional Capital Shares of the Company. On or about July 27, 2009, BAM Investments will convert its existing holdings of Class A Preferred Shares, Class AA Preferred Shares, Series 1 and Class AAA Preferred Shares, Series 1 of the Company (collectively, the “Preferred Shares”) into Capital Shares and the Company will consolidate the existing Capital Shares held by BAM Investments so that an equal number of Preferred Shares and Capital Shares will be outstanding.

BNA.PR.D will be tracked by HIMIPref™. It has been added to the HIMIPref™ SplitShares Index.

BNA.PR.D SplitShare YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 7.30 %

Update: Prospectus (via SEDAR) to the rescue! The transactions with BAM Investments are fully disclosed in the prospectus, which provides a pro-forma statement of the capitalization changes:

The capitalization of the Company at March 31, 2009, and at such date as adjusted to give effect to the issue and sale of the Series 4 Preferred Shares offered hereby, the redemption of the Class A Preferred Shares, the conversion of BAM Investments’ Preferred Shares to Capital Shares, and the acquisition of an additional 7,000,000 BAM Shares is set forth in the table below.

Item As of 3/31 Pro-Forma
as at 3/31
Class A Preferred Shares $125,000,000 $ —
Class AA Preferred Shares Series 1 $ 79,727,500 $ 51,905,000
Cl AA Series 2 $ 33,700,000 $ —
Series 3 $200,000,000 $190,920,000
Cl AA Series 4 $ — $125,000,000
Class AAA Preferred Shares Series 1 $ 37,116,800 $ —
Class A Voting Shares $ 100 $ 100
Capital Shares $123,872,500 $371,945,500
Retained Earnings $210,664,000 $209,464,000
Total Prefs $475,544,300 $367,825,000
Total Equity $334,536,600 $581,409,401
Asset Coverage 1.7+:1 2.6-:1

This is very good news for holders of BNA.PR.B & BNA.PR.C, who are seeng their credit quality increase dramatically for free.

Update, 2009-7-10: DBRS has announced:

To increase the level of protection to the Class AA Preferred Shares, BAM Investments will convert its existing Non-Rated Preferred Shares, Class A Preferred Shares and Class AA Preferred Shares to Capital Shares following the issuance of the Series 4 Preferred Shares. In addition, BAM will transfer seven million additional BAM Shares into the Portfolio in exchange for Capital Shares, which will increase the amount of Company assets and further increase the downside protection available for the Class AA Preferred Shares.

After giving effect to the foregoing changes, the downside protection available to the Class AA Preferred Shares will be approximately 62%, based on the market value of the BAM Shares as of July 8, 2009. The dividend coverage ratio will be approximately 1.6 times.

The rating assigned to the Series 4 Preferred Shares is an indication of the probability that the Company will make timely payments of dividends and ultimately repay principal by the Final Maturity. The Pfd-2 (low) ratings are primarily based on the downside protection and dividend coverage available to the Class AA Preferred Shares.

The main constraints to the rating are the following:
(1) The downside protection available to holders of the Class AA Preferred Shares depends solely on the market value of the BAM Shares held in the Portfolio, which will fluctuate over time.
(2) There is a lack of diversification as the Portfolio is entirely made up of BAM Shares.
(3) Changes in the dividend policy of BAM may result in reductions in Class AA Preferred Shares dividend coverage.
(4) The BAM Shares pay dividends in U.S. dollars, so the Company is exposed to foreign currency risk relating to the Canadian-U.S. exchange rate.

Note that a “downside protection” of 62% is equivalent to asset coverage of 2.6+:1.

July 8, 2009

July 8th, 2009

The New York Fed has announced:

RBC Capital Markets Corporation has been added to the list of primary dealers, effective July 8, 2009.

… and note …

Primary dealers are banks and securities broker-dealers that trade in U.S. Government securities with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

.
Bloomberg reports:

RBC is the first Canadian firm to join the Fed’s network since CIBC Wood Gundy in 1996. The first Canadian primary dealer was Nesbitt Burns, which was given the designation in 1995. Nesbitt Burns was renamed BMO Nesbitt Burns in 2000 and abandoned its dealership in 2002. CIBC left in February 2007, before the start of the financial crisis which led to the flight-to-quality in U.S. government securities. Royal Bank of Canada is the nation’s largest lender.

The International Monetary Fund has released its Global Financial Stability Report – Market Update, July 2009:

Financial conditions have improved, as unprecedented policy intervention has reduced the risk of systemic collapse and expectations of economic recovery have risen. Nonetheless, vulnerabilities remain and complacency must be avoided. The financial sector continues to be dependent on significant public support, resulting in an unparalleled transfer of risk from the private to the public sector. At the same time, however, work will need to begin on exit strategies from the various financial, monetary, and fiscal support policies in order to address market uncertainty. Medium-term policies need to ensure that steps taken to normalize policies and markets are consistent with establishing a lasting framework of sound financial regulation, sustainable fiscal balances, and the maintenance of price stability.

I am glad to hear that, in the opinion of the quasi-regulators at the IMF, that there is a continued need for quasi-regulators.

On July 3 I remarked on the idiocy of solemn discussions about “What Should be the World’s Reserve Currency?”. There’s a guy in China who has a better grasp of affairs than his political masters:

Huang Xinyuan, who sells mining equipment and pesticides to customers across China’s border with Vietnam, says he no longer wants payment in U.S. dollars and prefers the yuan.

Sales using the greenback at Guangxi Jinbei Group, where Huang is vice president, dropped to 30 percent of contracts in 2008 from 87 percent in 2007. The yuan, which has gained 21 percent since it was allowed to strengthen against the dollar starting in 2005, offers greater stability, he said.

That’s how reserve currency status gets decided … what people will take. Anyone who was in an Eastern Bloc country in the ’80’s, or even ’90’s, furtively exchanging greenbacks for local currency at prices bearing no relationship to the official market, knows that.

There are consultations progressing between private equity players and the FDIC regarding the failed bank buy-out rules discussed on PrefBlog on July 3.

Treasury has announced that the Legacy Securities Public-Private Investment Program and the Legacy Loan Program are moving forward. Of highest importance, of course, is making sure the lolly is distributed to appropriate parties:

Collectively, the nine pre-qualified PPIP fund managers have established 10 unique relationships with leading small-, veteran-, minority-, and women-owned financial services businesses, located in five different states, pursuant to the Legacy Securities PPIP. Moreover, as Treasury previously announced, small-, veteran-, minority-, and women-owned businesses will continue to have the opportunity to partner with selected fund managers following pre-qualification.

Continued good volume today, without much price action. FixedResets were actually down, albeit by such a marginal amount as to be meaningless. The median Yield-to-Worst on OperatingRetractibles continues to be negative.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6857 % 1,167.7
FixedFloater 7.08 % 5.46 % 37,010 16.38 1 0.0000 % 2,130.7
Floater 3.26 % 3.78 % 77,290 17.91 3 -0.6857 % 1,458.8
OpRet 4.99 % -3.61 % 123,599 0.09 15 -0.3393 % 2,211.1
SplitShare 5.72 % 4.73 % 74,184 4.18 3 0.1805 % 1,905.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3393 % 2,021.8
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0053 % 1,753.0
Perpetual-Discount 6.32 % 6.32 % 159,127 13.46 71 0.0053 % 1,614.5
FixedReset 5.59 % 4.31 % 480,094 4.29 40 -0.0210 % 2,055.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -2.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.98
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -2.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 15.29
Evaluated at bid price : 15.29
Bid-YTW : 7.86 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet -2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.43
Bid-YTW : 6.91 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 15.32
Evaluated at bid price : 15.32
Bid-YTW : 7.84 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 20.89
Evaluated at bid price : 20.89
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.60
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 10.45
Evaluated at bid price : 10.45
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 18.61
Evaluated at bid price : 18.61
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.79
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 2.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 20.20
Evaluated at bid price : 20.20
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 92,430 TD crossed 64,000 at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.98
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 92,350 RBC crossed three blocks: 20,000, then 10,000 then 42,400, all at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.69
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 55,050 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 49,606 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 19.01
Evaluated at bid price : 19.01
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 42,424 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 40,178 RBC sold 19,000 to anonymous at 25.42.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-08
Maturity Price : 25.20
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
There were 46 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

July 7, 2009

July 7th, 2009

Treasury is going to avoid voting its shares in companies that received TARP funds:

On many resolutions offered by investors — from demanding pro- environment policies to allowing domestic partner benefits to reining in executive bonuses — the Treasury plans to ask that its ballots be counted in the same proportion as the votes of other stockholders so it won’t impact the results.

An investment manager could probably go to jail for that! But Dealbreaker, bless its heart, sees the truth:

As Kenny Lewis can attest to, when it comes to the stuff that really matters, backroom waterboarding is a far more compelling tool than shareholder votes.

The Lewis affair was discussed on April 24: Lewis’ BofA was basically forced by Treasury to buy Merrill, despite “staggering deterioration” of Merrill’s balance sheet.

Looks like there will be increased regulatory control over oil & gas speculation. There is, naturally, considerable doubt as to whether speculation is harmful.

California’s having a little difficulty getting its IOUs accepted:

A group of the biggest U.S. banks said they would stop accepting California’s IOUs on Friday, adding pressure on the state to close its $26.3 billion annual budget gap.

Amid the budget deadlock, Fitch Ratings on Monday dropped California’s bond rating to BBB, down from A minus, the latest in a series of ratings downgrades for the state.

The group of banks included Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., Wells Fargo & Co. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., among others. The banks had previously committed to accepting state IOUs as payment. California plans to issue more than $3 billion of IOUs in July.

BIS has released a working paper by Naohiko Baba and Frank Packer titled From turmoil to crisis: dislocations in the FX swap market before and after the failure of Lehman Brothers:

This paper investigates dislocations in the foreign exchange (FX) swap market between the US dollar and three major European currencies. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, deviations from covered interest parity (CIP) were negatively associated with the creditworthiness of US financial institutions (as well as that of European institutions), consistent with the deepening of a dollar liquidity problem into a global phenomenon. US dollar term funding auctions by the ECB, SNB, and BoE, as well as the US Federal Reserve commitment to provide unlimited dollar swap lines are found to have ameliorated the FX swap market dislocations.

The Ontario Securities Commission has released its 2009 Annual Report. To my mind, the most interesting sentence was:

The OSC, Quebec’s Autorité des marchés financiers and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) are reviewing complaints received in connection with the organization, sale or distribution of non-bank sponsored ABCP products.

Not much price action today, but the PerpetualDiscount and FixedReset sectors both posted gains, with yields on FixedResets continuing what seems like an inexorable march downwards.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1648 % 1,175.8
FixedFloater 7.08 % 5.46 % 37,415 16.37 1 0.0651 % 2,130.7
Floater 3.24 % 3.75 % 80,252 17.99 3 0.1648 % 1,468.9
OpRet 4.97 % -4.67 % 125,348 0.09 15 0.1123 % 2,218.6
SplitShare 5.73 % 6.35 % 70,025 4.18 3 0.2412 % 1,902.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1123 % 2,028.7
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0817 % 1,752.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.31 % 6.34 % 160,984 13.43 71 0.0817 % 1,614.4
FixedReset 5.58 % 4.34 % 478,925 4.30 40 0.1380 % 2,056.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.87
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 15.57
Evaluated at bid price : 15.57
Bid-YTW : 7.71 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 22.81
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 19.41
Evaluated at bid price : 19.41
Bid-YTW : 6.48 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 10.55
Evaluated at bid price : 10.55
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 88,977 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 83,191 National Bank crossed 20,000 at 27.21.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.21
Bid-YTW : 4.55 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 82,463 RBC crossed 10,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 69,261 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.16.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 25.05
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 56,838 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 56,480 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 18.06
Evaluated at bid price : 18.06
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
There were 52 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

YPG 4-Year Bond Issue comes with 6.50% Coupon

July 7th, 2009

Last week, YPG announced:

an offering by YPG Holdings Inc. (the “Company”) of Medium Term Notes for gross proceeds of $90 million. The net proceeds from the issuance of the Notes will be used for general corporate purposes, to repay indebtedness outstanding under the Company’s commercial paper program and to repay an amount of $50 million under its term credit facility. This offering is scheduled to close on or about July 3, 2009.

Pursuant to this offering, the Company will issue $90 million of 6.85% Series 8 Notes (compounded semi-annually), which will be dated July 3, 2009, will mature on December 3, 2013 and will be issued at a price of $100.00.

The Series 8 Notes will be guaranteed by Yellow Pages Income Fund (TSX: YLO.UN), YPG Trust, YPG LP, Yellow Pages Group Co., Trader Corporation, YPG (USA) Holdings, Inc., Yellow Pages Group, LLC and YPG Directories, LLC. The Notes have been assigned a rating of BBB (high) with a stable trend by DBRS Limited and a rating of BBB- with a stable outlook from Standard & Poor’s Rating Service.

… and now they have announced:

an offering by YPG Holdings Inc. (the “Company”) of Medium Term Notes Series 9 and an additional offering of Medium Term Notes Series 8 for combined gross proceeds of $165 million. All of the net proceeds from the issuance of the Series 9 Notes and Series 8 Notes will be used to repay indebtedness outstanding under the Company’s term credit facility. Both offerings are scheduled to close on or about July 10, 2009.

Pursuant to these offerings, the Company will issue $130 million of 6.50% Series 9 Notes (compounded semi-annually), which will be dated July 10, 2009, will mature on July 10, 2013 and will be issued at a price of $100.00. The Company will also increase the size of its $90 million offering of 6.85% Series 8 Notes, which were issued on July 3, 2009, by issuing a further $35 million of 6.85% Series 8 Notes (compounded semi-annually). The Series 8 Notes mature on December 3, 2013.

The Series 9 Notes and the Series 8 Notes will be guaranteed by Yellow Pages Income Fund (TSX: YLO.UN), YPG Trust, YPG LP, Yellow Pages Group Co., Trader Corporation, YPG (USA) Holdings, Inc., Yellow Pages Group, LLC and YPG Directories, LLC. The Series 9 Notes and Series 8 Notes have been assigned a rating of BBB (high) with a stable trend by DBRS Limited and a rating of BBB- with a stable outlook from Standard & Poor’s Rating Service.

YPG is certainly showing that it can access the bond market and is chipping away steadily at its bank debt (as noted in mid-June); it’s certainly encouraging, but a 10-year issue would increase confidence in YPG.PR.B given the term structure of their debt.

July 6, 2009

July 6th, 2009

Willem Buiter wants to clamp down on CDS trading:

CDS provide an example. Just as short selling equity is potentially efficiency enhancing but naked short selling is just gambling, so insuring credit default risk is potentially efficiency enhancing when the buyer has an insurable interest and the writer of the CDS is sufficiently capitalised. Current arrangements permit ‘naked’ CDS buying (buying CDS on a security in excess of the face value of your holdings of that security).

I would not follow George Soros and ban CDS outright. I would require that any writer of CDS or other forms of credit risk insurance be properly capitalised and post additional collateral immediately when his creditworthiness is adversely affected. In addition, I would stipulate that it is only possible to buy CDS when you have an insurable interest in the security it is written on, and that you cannot make good, following default on a security, any claim under a CDS written on that security unless you can present to the writer of the CDS an amount of that security with the same face value as your claim.

The reference to George Soros links to a column by Ed Hammond:

George Soros, the billionaire financier, this week called for the scrapping of CDS contracts. He used the example of the bankruptcy of General Motors as a reason for outlawing these contracts. This, he said, was because it was in the interest of some bondholders to see the company go under as they were also in possession of CDS contracts, which paid out on the carmaker’s default.

… which is just the old debt-decoupling problem that has so many people (not me!) so upset.

I fail to understand Mr. Buiter’s equation of naked-shorting (protection buying) with gambling. The exposure to the shorting party is the same; there may well be risk to the counterparty that is not disclosed in a naked short; and this potential counter-party risk may well be destabilizing and therefore Bad; but I don’t understand why it should be deprecated as gambling and thus distinguished from the price-discovery process assisted by shorting.

I do try to stay away from politics in this blog – except where they explicitly impinge on the financial world, but this Toronto Star article is too good to pass by: Green Bins: A wasted effort:

The City of Toronto boasts that its green bin program diverts a third of our garbage and turns it into “black gold” compost. But a Star investigation shows that the program – although nobly conceived – is a sham.

There are two problems. First, the city’s claim of how much waste the program diverts from landfill is inflated. Second, some of the compost that is being produced will kill your plants because of its high salt content, according to laboratory tests.

The Star’s headline is incorrect: the Green Bin programme is serving its purpose perfectly. It is enabling earnest feel-gooders to feel good about themselves. If the purpose was actually to accomplish something useful, we’d just incinerate it all. But that’s regulation for you!

UK CMBS are not feeling very happy:

Investor Simon Halabi’s real-estate companies failed to remedy a default on 1.15 billion pounds ($1.9 billion) of commercial mortgage bonds at a time when, according to Fitch Ratings, “pretty much” all such European deals would breach loan-to-value conditions if they were tested.

“With capital values having fallen on average by 43 percent, pretty much any loan that has a loan-to-value covenant if tested today would be in breach,” said Andrew Currie, head of Europe commercial mortgage-backed securities at Fitch Ratings in London. Most servicers of commercial mortgage bonds haven’t tested these conditions, “storing up trouble” for the future, he said before today’s announcement.

White Tower is the largest commercial mortgage bond sold by a single borrower to default this year in Britain, which is Europe’s largest market and accounts for about 50 percent of issuance, according to Fitch. Banks that financed a real-estate buying spree at the top of the market are weighed down with about 230 billion pounds of commercial property loans, data compiled by De Montford University show, making them unwilling to refinance existing deals when they come due.

FixedResets continued to roar ahead (as well as hogging up all the spots on the volume highlights table) and are now more than two points through perpetuals, a price that sounds really, really extreme. At current spreads, of course, redemption at first call looks more likely than not, but there is still a significant amount of extension risk in the structure … we will see how it turns out. My bet? It ends in tears.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.1675 % 1,173.8
FixedFloater 7.08 % 5.47 % 37,463 16.36 1 -0.0651 % 2,129.4
Floater 3.25 % 3.74 % 81,288 18.00 3 -1.1675 % 1,466.4
OpRet 4.97 % -3.96 % 120,673 0.09 15 0.1047 % 2,216.1
SplitShare 5.75 % 6.51 % 70,056 4.18 3 0.1208 % 1,897.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1047 % 2,026.4
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0829 % 1,751.5
Perpetual-Discount 6.31 % 6.35 % 160,007 13.41 71 0.0829 % 1,613.1
FixedReset 5.59 % 4.30 % 475,321 4.30 40 0.3999 % 2,053.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 10.43
Evaluated at bid price : 10.43
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.02
Bid-YTW : 7.33 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 15.75
Evaluated at bid price : 15.75
Bid-YTW : 7.62 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 20.15
Evaluated at bid price : 20.15
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 10.57
Evaluated at bid price : 10.57
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.85
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 25.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 18.04
Evaluated at bid price : 18.04
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 21.76
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 19.19
Evaluated at bid price : 19.19
Bid-YTW : 6.55 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 24.98
Evaluated at bid price : 25.03
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.85
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 4.63 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.28
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 81,799 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 4.85 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 50,257 RBC crossed 13,800 at 27.24.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 46,006 RBC bought 10,400 from anonymous at 27.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.25
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 44,964 RBC crossed 17,800 at 26.24.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.04
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 39,079 RBC crossed 10,000 at 25.59.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 38,392 RBC crossed 17,900 at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.28
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MFC: Innovative Tier 1 Capital Issue

July 6th, 2009

Manulife Financial has announced:

that Manulife Financial Capital Trust II (the “Trust”), a trust wholly-owned by The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company (“MLI”), will issue $1 billion of Manulife Financial Capital Trust II Notes – Series 1 due December 31, 2108 (“MaCS II – Series 1”). The MaCS II – Series 1 are expected to qualify as Tier 1 capital of MLI for regulatory purposes. The Trust intends to file a final prospectus with the Canadian securities regulators as soon as possible.

Interest on the MaCS II – Series 1 is payable semi-annually. From the date of issue to but excluding December 31, 2019, the rate of interest on the MaCS II – Series 1 will be fixed at 7.405% per annum. Starting on December 31, 2019, and on every fifth anniversary after such date, the rate of interest on the MaCS II – Series 1 will be reset as described in the prospectus filed by the Trust and MLI.
On or after December 31, 2014, the Trust may, at its option and subject to certain conditions, redeem the MaCS II – Series 1, in whole or in part.

In certain circumstances, the MaCS II – Series 1 or interest thereon may be automatically exchanged or paid by the issuance of non-cumulative Class 1 Preferred Shares of MLI.

The transaction is expected to close on July 10, 2009. An amount equivalent to the net proceeds will be used by Manulife Financial Corporation (“MFC”) to acquire liquid assets for possible future retirement of amounts outstanding under MFC’s credit facility or for general corporate purposes. The offering is not expected to initially result in an increase to MLI’s reported MCCSR ratio (Minimum Continuing Capital and Surplus Requirements for Life Insurance Companies).

The use of proceeds is not entirely clear to me, but no prospectus is yet available. MLI has “Adjusted Net Tier 1 Capital” of a little under $13.6-billion as of 1Q09, according to OSFI, and these notes, according to the press release, will add to this total. But the offering is not expected to increase MLI’s MCCSR, and proceeds may be used to pay of MFC’s debt.

So how will the money flow from MLI to its parent MFC? Share buyback? Redemption of bonds? Enormous dividend? It must be out of Tier 1 Capital somehow, but it’s just not clear.

Be that as it may, the yield of 7.405% seems about right. MFC’s preferreds are trading to yield around 6.4% (the perps) or 4.85%-5.35% for the fixed Resets. The reset mechanism of this new issue is not specified in the press release, but can probably be expected to be similar to FixedResets (check the prospectus!).

Most importantly, however, these notes are Tier 1 Capital of the operating subsidiary, not the parent, which is worth a notch or two in credit quality all by itself. DBRS rates MLI‘s prefs at Pfd-1 and sub-debt at AA(low), compared to MFC’s Pfd-1(low) and senior debt (MTNs) at AA(low).

Update 2009-7-7: From the Preliminary Prospectus (via SEDAR):

The gross proceeds to the Trust from the Offering of $

Boston Fed Paper on Mortgage Renegotiation and Securitization

July 6th, 2009

The Boston Fed has released a new Public Policy Discussion Paper by Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen, Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? The Myth of Securitization:

We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment-reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securitization: servicers renegotiate similarly small fractions of loans that they hold in their portfolios. Our results are robust to different definitions of renegotiation, including the one most likely to be affected by securitization, and to different definitions of delinquency. Our results are strongest in subsamples in which unobserved heterogeneity between portfolio and securitized loans is likely to be small, and for subprime loans. We use a theoretical model to show that redefault risk, the possibility that a borrower will still default despite costly renegotiation, and self-cure risk, the possibility that a seriously delinquent borrower will
become current without renegotiation, make renegotiation unattractive to investors.

This follows the earlier Boston Fed paper, Reducing Foreclosures, which argued that it was income shocks and housing price declines, not high payment-to-income ratios at origination, that were the driving force in the foreclosure boom.