Reminder: FixedReset Seminar, May 28

May 22nd, 2009

Just a reminder about the next seminar in the series on the theory and practice of preferred share investing.

These seminars are aimed at active and potential preferred share investors who wish to review relative valuation techniques in preferred share analysis.

All seminars will be presented by James Hymas, who has written extensively on the subject of preferred share investment and has been referred to as a "top expert" on the subject.

Questions are encouraged throughout the seminars, as well as in informal discussion at the end of the session.

Each seminar is two hours in length; coffee and tea will be served. The cost of attendance is $100, but a discount of $50 will be given to participants who have an annual subscription to PrefLetter with at least one issue remaining at the time of the seminar.

All seminars will be video-recorded for future distribution. Please note the slight change of venue: same hotel, different conference room.

Advance registration and payment may be performed on-line.

Thursday, May 28

Preferred Share – Fixed-Reset Issues:
Theory & Practice

"FixedReset Issues" are popular with investors who:

  • wish to obtain tax-advantaged income
  • want protection against future inflation

These issues are characterized by:

  • Mostly issued by financial institutions
  • Exchange Dates occur every five years
  • Dividends are fixed until the first Exchange Date
  • On every Exchange Date:
    • Company may redeem the issue at par
    • Rate until next exchange date is reset to 5-Year Canada bonds plus a spread
    • Issue may be exchanged to Floating Rate issues, paying 3-month Treasury Bills plus a spread, reset quarterly
  • Issues are perpetual

This seminar will review the theory of FixedReset Preferred evaluation, including:

  • Credit Quality
  • Embedded calls
  • Exchange Options
  • The importance of ex-Dividend dates
  • Investment characteristics relative to Straight Perpetuals

Examples of relative valuation in current markets will be supplied and discussed.

Attendence is limited; a reservation will avoid disappointment.

Location: Days Hotel & Conference Center, (at Carlton & College, downtown Toronto) College Room (see map).

Time: May 28, 2009, 6pm-8pm.

Reservations: Please visit the PrefLetter Seminar Page.

FDIC Targets Brokered Deposits, Growth

May 21st, 2009

I missed this when it came out.

The FDIC has released a rule increasing the complexity of deposit insurance premium calculations:

The final rule adds a new financial measure to the financial ratios method. This new financial measure, the adjusted brokered deposit ratio, will measure the extent to which brokered deposits are funding rapid asset growth. The adjusted brokered deposit ratio will affect only those established Risk Category I institutions whose total gross
assets are more than 40 percent greater than they were four years previously, after adjusting for mergers and acquisitions, rather than 20 percent greater as proposed in the NPR, and
whose brokered deposits (less reciprocal deposits) make up more than 10 percent of domestic deposits. Generally speaking, the greater an institution’s asset growth and the greater its percentage of brokered deposits, the greater will be the increase in its initial base assessment rate. Small changes in asset growth rate or brokered deposits as a percentage of domestic deposits will lead to small changes in assessment rates.

The Canadian approach is not nearly so nuanced since our bankers are ever so smart. In fact, they’re all equally smart, with the vast majority of assets in the system paying into the CDIC fund at the same rate, which is considered desirable. Not so in the States:

A commenting bank argued that:

Arbitrarily establishing targets for percentages of institutions that fall into a given assessment rate is inconsistent with not only the governing statute but the whole concept of risk-based pricing….

The FDIC disagrees with the commenting bank. The purpose of the new large bank method is to create an assessment system for large Risk Category I institutions that will respond more timely to changing risk profiles, will improve the accuracy of initial assessment rates, relative risk rankings, and will create a greater parity between small and large Risk Category I institutions.

Imagine that! Rewards for being better than the competition, even if only by a little bit! It’s a good thing we don’t have that sort of nonsense in Canada – it can lead to bonuses.

Since the FDIC is not Canadian, they address criticism, allowing investors and observers to take an informed view of the desirability of changes:

The FDIC received many comments arguing that brokered deposits should not increase assessment rates for Risk Category I institutions and that the brokered deposit provisions in the NPR do not account for the use to which institutions put these deposits. The FDIC is not persuaded by the arguments. Recent data show that institutions with a combination of brokered deposit reliance and robust asset growth tend to have a greater concentration in higher risk assets. In addition, there is a statistically significant correlation between the adjusted brokered deposit ratio, on the one hand, and the probability that an institution will be downgraded to a CAMELS rating of 3, 4, or 5 within a year, on the other, independent of the other measures of asset quality contained in the financial ratios method.

May 21, 2009

May 21st, 2009

The Bank of Canada has released a working paper by Hajime Tomura, Heterogeneous Beliefs and Housing-Market Boom-Bust Cycles in a Small Open Economy:

This paper introduces heterogeneous beliefs among households in a small open economy model for the Canadian economy. The model suggests that simultaneous boom-bust cycles in house prices, output, investment, consumption and hours worked emerge when credit-constrained mortgage borrowers expect that future house prices will rise and this expectation is neither shared by savers nor realized ex-post. With sticky prices and a standard monetary policy rule, the model shows that the nominal policy interest rate and the CPI inflation rate decline during housing booms and rise as house prices fall. These results replicate the stylized features of housing-market boom-bust cycles in industrialized countries. Policy experiments demonstrate that stronger policy responses to inflation amplify housing-market boom-bust cycles. Also, higher loan-to-value ratios amplify housing-market boom-bust cycles by encouraging speculative housing investments by mortgage borrowers during housing booms and increasing liquidation of housing collateral during housing busts.

OSFI has released a new Corporate Brochure. The Bank for International Settlements has released Principles for sound stress testing practices and supervision.

DBRS has downgraded ABN AMRO:

ABN AMRO Bank’s outstanding trust preferred securities have been downgraded from BBB to BB. The trend on these securities is Negative. Considering the significant cyclical and company-specific headwinds that RBS faces, DBRS sees an elevated risk of nonpayment of preferred dividends (which DBRS defines as a default on these instruments) which would likely entail a nonpayment of dividends on these securities.

Volume continued at its elevated levels but the market’s ascent was checked; PerpetualDiscounts only just barely managed to squeak out a gain, while FixedResets were slightly negative. But how ’bout them Floaters, eh? Up 17.2% on the month-to-date.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 3.3315 % 1,175.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 3.3315 % 1,900.7
Floater 3.20 % 3.88 % 86,137 17.63 3 3.3315 % 1,468.3
OpRet 5.04 % 3.75 % 129,970 2.59 15 0.0847 % 2,158.1
SplitShare 5.92 % 5.61 % 56,181 4.24 3 0.2490 % 1,830.3
Interest-Bearing 5.99 % 6.70 % 26,838 0.59 1 0.0999 % 1,991.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0242 % 1,710.0
Perpetual-Discount 6.39 % 6.43 % 159,106 13.29 71 0.0242 % 1,574.9
FixedReset 5.72 % 4.84 % 496,432 4.49 37 -0.0924 % 1,983.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -3.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 6.60 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 17.82
Evaluated at bid price : 17.82
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 25.56
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 18.74
Evaluated at bid price : 18.74
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 19.38
Evaluated at bid price : 19.38
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 18.17
Evaluated at bid price : 18.17
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 17.89
Evaluated at bid price : 17.89
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 10.15
Evaluated at bid price : 10.15
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 16.83
Evaluated at bid price : 16.83
Bid-YTW : 6.97 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 23.01
Evaluated at bid price : 23.16
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 19.35
Evaluated at bid price : 19.35
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 15.07
Evaluated at bid price : 15.07
Bid-YTW : 8.05 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 8.26 % Zooming up in the draft of the BAM floaters! Traded 5,200 shares in a range of 15.75-16.96 before closing at 16.51-49, 1×7.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 16.51
Evaluated at bid price : 16.51
Bid-YTW : 2.40 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 176,909 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 117,605 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 24.93.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 24.84
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 86,785 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-21
Maturity Price : 17.82
Evaluated at bid price : 17.82
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 64,202 RBC crossed 13,600 at 26.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.46
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 59,504 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.12
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 56,707 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
There were 48 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Bank of Canada Releases Spring 2009 Review

May 21st, 2009

The Bank of Canada has released the Spring 2009 Review with the following feature articles:

The concept of Price Level Targetting is explained in the first article:

Despite its recent successes in terms of macrostabilization, several authors have highlighted some shortcomings in the infl ation-targeting (IT) framework. Most notably, uncertainty on the price level grows with the planning horizon, since central banks with infl ation targets accommodate shocks to the price level, taking the post-shock level as given and aiming to stabilize infl ation from this level. In fact, the price level is unbounded at very distant horizons. Price-level targeting (PT) mitigates this uncertainty by committing central banks to restore the price level to a preannounced target following shocks. PT is frequently described as a departure from IT’s prescription for letting “bygones be bygones.”

Frankly, I didn’t find this issue particularly satisfying; there are necessarily many assumptions embedded in the papers. There is the prospect of lowering the term risk premium (flattening the yield curve) with Price Level Targetting, but on the other hand it’s asking rather a lot from the Central Bank, which will have to overcompensate for transient shocks rather than concentrating on getting things back to normal.

May 20, 2009

May 20th, 2009

BofA was able to raise significant equity capital yesterday:

Bank of America Corp., the biggest U.S. bank by assets, said it raised about $13.5 billion in a sale of common stock as part of an effort to boost capital and weather an extended recession.

The bank issued 1.25 billion shares at an average price of $10.77 each, according to a statement today. The Charlotte, North Carolina-based company plans to boost common equity capital by $17 billion through the sale of stock and by converting preferred shares mostly held by institutional investors, Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lewis said May 7.

Bank of America expects to add $10 billion more in capital through asset sales and at least $7 billion from improved pretax profits, the company said on May 7. Those numbers may change as the bank considers options to achieve its $33.9 billion target, spokesman Jerry Dubrowski said.

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Fund in the States is having about as much fun as other guarantors:

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.’s deficit tripled to $33.5 billion in the past six months as more companies canceled retirement plans amid the U.S. recession, according to the head of the government-owned corporation.

About $11 billion is for “completed and probable terminations,” and $7 billion is from an increase in interest rates that boosted liabilities, Vince Snowbarger, the acting PBGC director, said in written testimony to be delivered tomorrow to the Senate Special Committee on Aging.

The potential for General Motors Corp. and Chrysler LLC to end their plans has left the PBGC facing the prospect of adding 900,000 current and future beneficiaries. The PBGC, which pays retirement income to almost 44 million Americans, estimates that $77 billion of the automotive industry’s pensions are underfunded, with about $42 billion of that not funded at all.

There’s a report by internal audit of the fund that claims former PBGC director Millard was, at least, sloppy in separating his various activities – with the Placement Agent scandal still being whipped up, the response could be draconian.

Looks like the SEC is losing the jurisdictional catfight with the Fed:

The Obama administration may call for stripping the Securities and Exchange Commission of some of its powers under a regulatory reorganization that could be unveiled as soon as next week, people familiar with the matter said.

The proposal, still being drafted, is likely to give the Federal Reserve more authority to supervise financial firms deemed too big to fail. The Fed may inherit some SEC functions, with others going to other agencies, the people said. On the table: giving oversight of mutual funds to a bank regulator or a new agency to police consumer-finance products, two people said.

The politicians have to assign blame and shuffle responsibilities in order to make it clear that nothing was their fault.

The Obama administrations shameful conduct in the Chrysler bankruptcy is having some repercussions:

Hedge fund manager George Schultze says he may avoid lending to any more unionized companies after being burned by President Barack Obama in Chrysler LLC’s bankruptcy.

Obama put Chrysler under court protection on April 30 after lenders balked at a proposal giving them about 29 cents on the dollar for their $6.9 billion in debt. The investors said the president’s plan favored a union retiree medical fund whose claims ranked behind them for repayment. It was offered a 55 percent equity stake in the automaker.

Pacific Investment Management Co., Barclays Capital and Fridson Investment Advisors have joined Schultze Asset Management LLC in saying lenders may be unwilling to back unionized companies with underfunded pension and medical obligations, such as airlines and auto-industry suppliers, because Chrysler’s creditors failed to block Obama’s move.

Whether or not the rhetoric influences yield spreads and whether those yield spreads influence conduct is something we’ll just have to wait and see.

Anne Sibert pens a provocative thesis on VoxEU, Why did the bankers behave so badly?:

Greedy bankers are getting most of the blame for the current financial crisis. This column explains bankers did behave badly for mainly three reasons. They committed cognitive errors involving biases towards their own prior beliefs; too many male bankers high on testosterone took too much risk, and a flawed compensation structure rewarded perceived short-term competency rather than long-run results.

In a fascinating and innovative study, Coates and Herbert (2008) advance the notion that steroid feedback loops may help explain why male bankers behave irrationally when caught up in bubbles. These authors took samples of testosterone levels of 17 male traders on a typical London trading floor (which had 260 traders, only four of whom were female). They found that testosterone was significantly higher on days when traders made more than their daily one-month average profit and that higher levels of testosterone also led to greater profitability – presumably because of greater confidence and risk taking. The authors hypothesise that if raised testosterone were to persist for several weeks the elevated appetite for risk taking might have important behavioural consequences and that there might be cognitive implications as well; testosterone, they say, has receptors throughout the areas of the brain that neuro-economic research has identified as contributing to irrational financial decisions.

Well, I don’t know what’s up with the Toronto Stock Exchange. There was a problem last Friday retrieving prices that were available and today there’s a problem with availability. So I’m using an approximate, late-in-day-update to prepare today’s report. I did update the details for SLF.PR.F, though, since that one’s important.

It was another really good day for the preferred share market – and here’s a landmark for you: BAM floaters are now trading in the double digits! The low close of 6.40-69 was reached on 2008-12-18 on volume of 27,351 shares.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.39% (pre-tax bid-YTW), equivalent to 8.95% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates are now at 7.0%, having returned 4.63% Month-to-date and 9.29% Year-to-Date, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 195bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 3.8730 % 1,137.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 3.8730 % 1,839.4
Floater 3.31 % 3.89 % 84,880 17.60 3 3.8730 % 1,420.9
OpRet 5.05 % 3.99 % 130,283 3.63 15 0.1167 % 2,156.2
SplitShare 5.94 % 5.48 % 52,349 4.24 3 0.4845 % 1,825.7
Interest-Bearing 5.99 % 6.84 % 27,930 0.60 1 0.1000 % 1,989.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5059 % 1,709.6
Perpetual-Discount 6.40 % 6.39 % 159,029 13.29 71 0.5059 % 1,574.5
FixedReset 5.72 % 4.83 % 497,301 4.50 37 0.4306 % 1,985.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 17.64
Evaluated at bid price : 17.64
Bid-YTW : 6.39 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 16.76
Evaluated at bid price : 16.76
Bid-YTW : 7.00 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 15.11
Evaluated at bid price : 15.11
Bid-YTW : 8.03 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 16.94
Evaluated at bid price : 16.94
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 23.58
Evaluated at bid price : 23.76
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 21.22
Evaluated at bid price : 21.22
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 6.61 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 16.69
Evaluated at bid price : 16.69
Bid-YTW : 7.23 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 24.33
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 15.25
Evaluated at bid price : 15.25
Bid-YTW : 2.60 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 20.71
Evaluated at bid price : 20.71
Bid-YTW : 6.39 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.93 % Asset coverage of 1.8-:1 as of April 30, according to the company. Went ex-Dividend today … I wonder if anybody noticed.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.62
Bid-YTW : 11.66 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 2.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 17.25
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 6.64 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 21.91
Evaluated at bid price : 22.17
Bid-YTW : 6.63 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 18.60
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 2.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 18.87
Evaluated at bid price : 18.87
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 18.50
Evaluated at bid price : 18.50
Bid-YTW : 7.28 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 5.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 10.20
Evaluated at bid price : 10.20
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 6.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 10.22
Evaluated at bid price : 10.22
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 727,983 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.79
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 93,700 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 18.75
Evaluated at bid price : 18.75
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 57,300 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.35
Bid-YTW : 7.11 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 56,205 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 19.10
Evaluated at bid price : 19.10
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 49,900 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-20
Maturity Price : 20.70
Evaluated at bid price : 20.70
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 47,340 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
There were 45 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

SLF.PR.F Rockets to Hefty Premium on Heavy Volume

May 20th, 2009

SLF.PR.F, the 6.00%+379 FixedReset announced on May 8 settled today.

Sun Life Financial announced:

the successful completion of a Canadian public offering of $250 million of Class A Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Shares Series 6R (the “Series 6R Shares”) at a price of $25.00 per share and yielding 6.00 per cent annually. The offering, initially for $200 million of Series 6R Shares, was increased to $250 million following exercise by the underwriting syndicate, co-led by TD Securities Inc. and BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., of an option to purchase an additional $50 million of Series 6R Shares.

The Series 6R Shares were issued under a prospectus supplement dated May 8, 2009, which was issued pursuant to a short form base shelf prospectus dated April 1, 2009. Copies of those documents are available on the SEDAR website for Sun Life Financial Inc. at www.sedar.com. The Series 6R Shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol SLF.PR.F.

So the greenshoe was fully exercised.

Vital statistics after the first day’s trading are:

SLF.PR.F FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.79
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %

It will be most interesting to learn whether the rapturous reception accorded SLF.PR.F will coax a few more issues out of the woodwork!

SLF.PR.F has been added to the FixedReset HIMIPref™ subindex.

May 19, 2009

May 19th, 2009

The Bank for International Settlements has released its report on OTC derivatives market activity in the second half of 2008:

Facing significant price drops, markets for commodity and equity derivatives recorded volumes which were 66.5% and 36.2% lower, respectively. Against a background of severely strained credit markets combined with efforts to improve multilateral netting of offsetting contracts, credit default swap (CDS) volumes decreased by 26.9%. Foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives markets recorded their first significant downturns. Amounts outstanding of foreign exchange contracts fell by 21.0%, while amounts outstanding of
interest rate contracts slid by 8.6%.

Gross market values, which measure the cost of replacing all existing contracts, represent a better measure of market risk than notional amounts. Despite the drop in amounts outstanding, significant price movements resulted in notably higher gross market values, which increased by 66.5% to $33.9 trillion at the end of December 2008 (Graph 1, right-hand panel). The higher market values were also reflected in gross credit exposures, which grew 29.7% to $5.0 trillion.

In the second half of 2008 the market for OTC interest rate derivatives declined for the first time, after recording an above average rate of growth in the first half of the year. Notional amounts of these instruments fell to $418.7 trillion at the end of December 2008, 8.6% lower than six months before (Graph 2 and Table 3). Despite the decrease in notional amounts outstanding, declining interest rates resulted in a notable 98.9% increase in the gross market value of interest rate derivatives, to $18.4 trillion.

Their statement Gross market values, which measure the cost of replacing all existing contracts, represent a better measure of market risk than notional amounts. is incorrect. If I short a bond future, the market value at time of execution is zero, but I have full market exposure and counterparty risk to the extent that I might win money that doesn’t get paid. If the market moves in my favour, that increases my counterparty risk but doesn’t affect my market exposure.

There are straws in the wind that the too-big-to-fail problem will not be addressed by fixing extant rules, but by adding another layer of new rules that will grant politicians more discretionary power:

Neel Kashkari, former administrator of the $700 billion U.S. bank-rescue program, said firms deemed too big to fail have an unfair advantage over smaller rivals because they can more cheaply raise money in the debt markets.

Kashkari, who left government May 1, said in a speech last night that some officials have discussed the possibility of a “debt tax” or “systemic tax” on those institutions, without saying if he supported that approach.

“If you have some huge, global institution that is systemically important, too big to fail, too interconnected to fail, in a sense it will always be able to issue debt cheaper,” said Kashkari, 35, at the San Francisco campus of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School. “People who buy that debt believe that the government is standing behind it.”

“Debt Tax”? “Systemic Tax”? Presumably this is much the same idea as existing deposit insurance, except that the degree of protection received in exchange for premia will not be spelled out. It is very simple to address the TBTF problem and systemic risk problem by adjusting extant rules:

  • End the practice of risk-weighting bank debt according to the credit of the sovereign
  • Impose an upwards adjustment to Risk-Weighted Assets based on size of the bank

Here’s a scary proposal: inflation targetting of 6%:

What the U.S. economy may need is a dose of good old-fashioned inflation.

So say economists including Gregory Mankiw, former White House adviser, and Kenneth Rogoff, who was chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. They argue that a looser rein on inflation would make it easier for debt-strapped consumers and governments to meet their obligations. It might also help the economy by encouraging Americans to spend now rather than later when prices go up.

“I’m advocating 6 percent inflation for at least a couple of years,” says Rogoff, 56, who’s now a professor at Harvard University. “It would ameliorate the debt bomb and help us work through the deleveraging process.”

Another strong day in the preferred market, with volume returning to elevated levels after the long weekend.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7334 % 1,095.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7334 % 1,770.8
Floater 3.44 % 4.11 % 84,806 17.14 3 0.7334 % 1,368.0
OpRet 5.05 % 4.09 % 131,756 2.59 15 0.0584 % 2,153.7
SplitShare 5.91 % 6.79 % 51,931 4.25 3 0.4672 % 1,816.9
Interest-Bearing 6.00 % 6.98 % 29,066 0.60 1 0.0000 % 1,987.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3545 % 1,701.0
Perpetual-Discount 6.43 % 6.49 % 157,719 13.19 71 0.3545 % 1,566.6
FixedReset 5.74 % 4.88 % 490,761 4.47 36 0.1770 % 1,976.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater -4.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 15.06
Evaluated at bid price : 15.06
Bid-YTW : 2.63 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 21.06
Evaluated at bid price : 21.06
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 22.02
Evaluated at bid price : 22.02
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 22.43
Evaluated at bid price : 22.55
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 24.47
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 24.30
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 14.76
Evaluated at bid price : 14.76
Bid-YTW : 8.22 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 21.89
Evaluated at bid price : 22.24
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 17.78
Evaluated at bid price : 17.78
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 21.63
Evaluated at bid price : 21.63
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 19.85
Evaluated at bid price : 19.85
Bid-YTW : 6.54 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 2.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 23.08
Evaluated at bid price : 23.33
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 14.96
Evaluated at bid price : 14.96
Bid-YTW : 8.11 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 21.27
Evaluated at bid price : 21.27
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 3.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 16.50
Evaluated at bid price : 16.50
Bid-YTW : 7.31 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 3.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 20.38
Evaluated at bid price : 20.38
Bid-YTW : 6.49 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 4.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 9.61
Evaluated at bid price : 9.61
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 6.15 % Quite real, as the issue traded 23,920 shares in a range of 9.25-84 before closing at 9.67-85, 5×5.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 9.67
Evaluated at bid price : 9.67
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 48,948 Nesbitt crossed 13,500 at 26.40, then another 15,000 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.54
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 42,593 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 21.06
Evaluated at bid price : 21.06
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 31,665 RBC crossed 10,700 at 26.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 30,945 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 18.19
Evaluated at bid price : 18.19
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 29,400 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-19
Maturity Price : 18.12
Evaluated at bid price : 18.12
Bid-YTW : 6.25 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 29,290 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Video of Floating Rate Seminar Now Available

May 18th, 2009

The April 30 Seminar on Floating Rate issues (the HIMIPref™ indices Ratchet, FixedFloater and Floater, but not FixedReset) has been described before, and now, as promised, the video is on-line.

You may subscribe for a week via the PrefLetter Website; you will receive a password that remains valid for one week’s access to the seminar page.

This page contains Flash Video of the seminar (if you can watch YouTube, you can watch the video), or you may download the seminar to your own machine in QuickTime format.

In addition to the video, there are a host of links to articles I have written regarding various elements of the seminar and to the slides used in the seminar.

This access is priced at $100 + tax, with a 50% discount to those with an active year-long subscription to PrefLetter.

TRACE and Corporate Bond Market Transparency

May 16th, 2009

This seems to be a hot topic, so I’ll post a reference to Transparency and the Corporate Bond Market by Hendrik Bessembinder and William Maxwell of the universities of Utah and Arizona, respectively n.b.: link updated 2011-4-30. Old link no longer works:

The introduction of TRACE to the bond
market provides a rare opportunity to assess the effects of a substantial increase in transparency.

While over-the-counter corporate bond trades tend to be large, they also tend to be infrequent. Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) report that individual bond issues did not trade on 48 percent of days in their 2003 sample, and that the average number of daily trades in an issue, conditional on trading, is just 2.4 Corporate bonds trade infrequently even compared to other bonds. Although Table 1 shows that they comprise about 20 percent of outstanding U.S. bonds, corporate bonds account for only about 2.5 to 3.0 percent of trading activity in U.S. bonds in recent years, as shown in Table 3.

That execution costs for bonds decline with trade size may reflect in part that asymmetric information regarding issuing firm fundamentals is relatively unimportant for bond valuation. It could also reflect the absence of an inexpensive centralized system for processing small bond transactions. Or the higher execution costs for small bond trades could reflect the extraction of rents by better-informed bond dealers from relatively uninformed retail bond traders.

Well-functioning security markets provide investors with liquidity. However, the term “liquidity” is a broad and somewhat elusive concept, used to describe multiple properties of trading in security markets. For example, Kyle (1985) notes that liquidity can include “tightness,” which is the cost of completing a buy and sell transaction in a short period of time, “depth,” which the size of the buy or sell order required to move market prices by a given amount, and “resiliency,” which is the speed with which prices recover from a random shock in buy or sell orders. Alternately, practitioners sometimes use the word liquidity to describe the ease of transacting.

Empirical evidence on the introduction of transaction reporting in corporate bonds has been the subject of countless articles in the trade press and at least three articles published in refereed academic journals: Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006), Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), and Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007). Although the three studies use notably different samples and research designs, all three conclude that the increased transparency associated with TRACE transaction reporting is associated with a substantial decline in investors’ trading costs.

Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006) also examine how transparency affects the competitive environment of the dealer market. They hypothesize that in an opaque market the largest dealers enjoy an informational advantage, but that this informational advantage is mitigated in a transparent market. Consistent with this reasoning, they report that in their sample the concentration ratio of trades completed by the largest 12 dealers falls from 56 percent pre-TRACE to 44 percent post-TRACE.

Market participants with whom we spoke, including both dealers and the traders at investment firms who are their customers, were nearly unanimous in the view that trading is more difficult after the introduction of TRACE. Whereas it may have previously been possible to complete a sizeable bond purchase with a single phone call to a dealer who held sufficient quantities of the bond in inventory, the post-TRACE environment may involve communications with multiple dealers, and delays as the dealers search for counterparties. A bond trader with a major insurance company told us that there is less liquidity, in that market makers carried less “product,” and it has become more difficult to locate bonds for purchase in the post-TRACE environment. A bond trader for a major investment company responded to the publication of Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) by sending the authors an unsolicited e-mail stating: “I want to be able to execute a trade even if a bond dealer does not have a simultaneous counterparty lined up…. [T]oo much price transparency reduces dealers’ willingness to commit capital…. [T]he focus on the bid-ask spread is too narrow, and a case of being penny-wise and pound-foolish.”

One way to circumvent TRACE, which applies to publicly-issued bonds, is for a firm to issue privately placed bonds (sometimes referred to as Rule 144a securities, for the section of the Securities Act of 1933 that provides exemption from registration requirements). … In 2001, before TRACE, “144a for life” bonds were 7.3 percent of dollar volume and 9.6 percent of issues. The percentage of dollar volume in “144a for life” bonds jumped to 27.8 percent in 2003, the first full year after TRACE initiation, and grew to 39.8 percent in 2004, before declining to 16.9 percent in 2006.

Also consistent with a shift towards alternative asset classes, the credit default swap market experienced phenomenal growth in recent years relative to bonds. Table 6 reports on outstanding notional principal in these credit default swaps, which grew from $919 billion in 2001 to $34.4 trillion in 2006. One dealer suggested to us that, prior to TRACE introduction, ten times as much capital was allocated to corporate bond trading than to credit default swaps, but that the ratio has now been reversed.

To the extent that the shift to
privately placed bonds and bank loans was initiated by corporate borrowers, and in response to
TRACE, it suggests that the net costs of TRACE may exceed the benefits….Alternately, the shift to private markets could simply reflect agency issues if issuers failed to fully anticipate the potential effect of illiquidity on issue prices and underwriters and lenders persuaded corporations to issue private securities that could be traded more profitably.

A number of industry participants told us that bond dealers have either reduced expenditures for research regarding bond valuation, or have stopped providing the research to customers, instead using it for proprietary trading. A trader for a major market-making firm noted that the easiest way to cut expenses in the wake of lower bid-ask spreads was to reduce the number of analysts on the payroll. Some bond dealers, including Citibank, no longer provide external research on the corporate bond market.

The primary complaint against TRACE, which is heard both from dealer firms and from their customers (the bond traders at investment houses and insurance companies), is that trading is more difficult as dealers are reluctant to carry inventory and no longer share the results of their research. In essence, the cost of trading corporate bonds decreased, but so did the quality and quantity of the services formerly provided by bond dealers.

May 15, 2009

May 15th, 2009

Those contemplating reverse mortgages would do well to incorporate the new OSFI advisory into their planning … the rules for qualification for optimal capital treatment will indubitably influence the packages offered by banks, notably:

  • initial loan-to-value of less than 40%
  • Ongoing loan-to-value of less than 60%

I regret that it is not possible for me to prepare the market report. There is a difficulty recovering prices from the TSX.

Update, 2009-5-16: Well, it took a little while, but eventually the TSX’s little computer that could spit out the data: Volume was down sharply in pre-holiday trading (which is always something of a mystery to me) but PerpetualDiscounts had a good up-day while FixedResets were flattish.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.8220 % 1,087.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.8220 % 1,757.9
Floater 3.47 % 4.31 % 82,081 16.75 3 1.8220 % 1,358.0
OpRet 5.05 % 4.17 % 131,130 2.60 15 0.1594 % 2,152.5
SplitShare 5.94 % 6.58 % 52,551 4.26 3 0.2968 % 1,808.5
Interest-Bearing 6.00 % 6.85 % 29,428 0.61 1 -0.4975 % 1,987.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2010 % 1,695.0
Perpetual-Discount 6.45 % 6.53 % 156,319 13.16 71 0.2010 % 1,561.0
FixedReset 5.75 % 4.91 % 493,807 4.48 36 -0.0210 % 1,973.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 18.51
Evaluated at bid price : 18.51
Bid-YTW : 6.40 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.63
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 16.02
Evaluated at bid price : 16.02
Bid-YTW : 7.53 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 16.88
Evaluated at bid price : 16.88
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 21.15
Evaluated at bid price : 21.15
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 18.91
Evaluated at bid price : 18.91
Bid-YTW : 6.82 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 21.57
Evaluated at bid price : 21.57
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 20.15
Evaluated at bid price : 20.15
Bid-YTW : 6.59 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.70
Bid-YTW : 7.63 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 23.48
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 15.75
Evaluated at bid price : 15.75
Bid-YTW : 2.52 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 9.11
Evaluated at bid price : 9.11
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 9.23
Evaluated at bid price : 9.23
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 159,150 Scotia crossed 150,000 at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.65
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
CM.PR.A OpRet 44,950 Nesbitt bought 28,200 from Desjardins at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : -8.64 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 31,871 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.09
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 20,542 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 19.87
Evaluated at bid price : 19.87
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 18,700 RBC bought 11,000 from CIBC at 18.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-15
Maturity Price : 18.10
Evaluated at bid price : 18.10
Bid-YTW : 6.25 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 18,175 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.40
Bid-YTW : 5.25 %
There were 21 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.