Miscellaneous News

Obama and the Credit Rating Agencies

My attention was caught by a throwaway line on Bloomberg:

Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama said regulation of Wall Street needs to “catch up” with changes in financial markets, and investors can’t expect taxpayers to bail them out in bad times.

Obama said the role of ratings services must be examined as part of any revamping of the way markets are monitored and regulated, and he suggested that he doesn’t favor having the government stepping in to rescue failing firms.

The role of ratings services?

So I looked at his Economic Platform:

Improve Transparency in the Market

Investigate Potential Conflict of Interest between Credit Rating Agencies and Financial Institutions: Credit agencies are paid by the issuers of securities, not by the buyers of securities, which creates a potential conflict of interest in favor of issuing strong securities ratings. This problem was illustrated in the subprime market crisis in which credit rating agencies strongly rated subprime mortgage securities even as there were significant indications of large numbers of foreclosures and a weakening housing market. Barack Obama supports an immediate investigation into the ratings agencies and their relationships to securities’ issuers, similar to the investigation the EU has recently announced.

The European Union Kangaroo Court has been previously discussed on PrefBlog.

We can only hope that – in both the Obama campaign and the EU – that these public utterances are made merely for populist appeal and signify nothing. But it’s not a good sign.

I was actually more offended by another line from the Obama Economic Platform (emphasis added):

Obama’s STOP FRAUD Act provides the first federal definition of mortgage fraud, increases funding for federal and state law enforcement programs, creates new criminal penalties for mortgage professionals found guilty of fraud, and requires industry insiders to report suspicious activity.

Yay! Even more Informers and Secret Policemen! The west’s moral fibre is going to hell. But when I start ranting about this stuff, people usually just treat me kindly, so I’ll shut up now.

Market Action

September 15, 2008

You guys all think I’m going to talk about the Lehman bankruptcy, the scramble for funding by AIG and, given the devil-take-hindmost nature of short attacks on Large Complex Financial Institutions recently, Merrill’s determination not to be hindmost. But I ain’t, except to note in passing that Merrill’s days have been numbered ever since I quit my Operations Assistant Supervisor position with them in a huff about 20 years ago. Serves ’em right.

All that stuff has been discussed to death; I have no particular insights or comments. Accrued Interest‘s post sounds a little shell-shocked. The Fed turned on the tap full force as the Fed Funds market seemed to lock up:

The Federal Reserve added $70 billion in reserves to the banking system, the most since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, to keep bank borrowing costs low after the bankruptcy of Leman Brothers Holdings Inc.

Fed funds traded as high as 6 percent, or 4 percentage points above the central bank’s target rate for overnight loans between banks, according to ICAP Plc, the world’s largest inter- dealer broker. The margin is the greatest since Bloomberg began tracking the data in 1998. The rate dropped to as low as 1.75 percent after the Fed added the temporary reserves.

“If the fed funds rate closes high today, I would be really worried as it would mean that there really is no money out there to be lent,” said Stan Jonas, who trades interest- rate derivatives at Axiom Management Partners LLC in New York.

I’m not too sure about that ‘no money available’ line. I suspect that it’s unwillingness rather than inability that drove the spike … but there will doubtless be more data and commentary in the near future.

There’s a good review piece on VoxEU titled Transmission of liquidity shocks: Evidence from the 2007 subprime crisis:

The results of a very pronounced interaction between market and funding liquidity are consistent with the emergence of re-enforcing liquidity spirals during the crisis period. On the one side of this liquidity spiral, financial institutions were exposed to refinancing needs in the form of issuing ABCP, a situation where market illiquidity in complex structured products led to funding illiquidity. In this regard, the results also show that increased correlations between the ABCP and Libor spreads reduced the possibilities of funding from the interbank money market, thus highlighting systemic risks. On the other side of this spiral, many European banks that had large exposures to US asset-backed securities had difficulties accessing wholesale funding, inducing subsequent market illiquidity in different market segments. Due to the major importance of the interbank money market, central banks in turn intervened by reducing interest rates and providing additional liquidity to the markets in order to reduce pressures.

The analysis presented here suggests that innovation, such as structured credit products and banks’ increased ability to move risk off their balance sheets as well as augmented interconnectedness of large complex banks, made market and funding liquidity pressures readily turn into issues of insolvency.

The full paper, on which the column is based, is available from the IMF. It makes an interesting point not highlighted in the column:

Finally, increased correlations between returns of differing asset classes due to algorithmic trading, such as by quantitative hedge funds, has heightened the vulnerability with regard to the transmission of illiquidity.

Which is kind of interesting. The great strength of a quantitative approach is that it allows the quick relative valuation of two assets (whether that relative valuation achieved so quickly is any good or not is another question entirely!) and the great strength of algorithmic trading is that it allows the quick execution of a quantitatively derived plan. Stock market “circuit breakers” were introduced in the wake of the the realization that portfolio insurance had exacerbated the crash of 1987; it is hard to tell how circuit breakers might be implemented across markets, but doubtless some regulator will be jumping up soon to tell us.

The source paper references a fascinating MIT paper by Khandani & Lo, What Happened to the Quants in August 2007?, which has the abstract:

During the week of August 6, 2007, a number of high-profile and highly successful quantitative long/short equity hedge funds experienced unprecedented losses. Based on empirical results from TASS hedge-fund data as well as the simulated performance of a specific long/short equity strategy, we hypothesize that the losses were initiated by the rapid unwinding of one or more sizable quantitative equity market-neutral portfolios. Given the speed and price impact with which this occurred, it was likely the result of a sudden liquidation by a multi-strategy fund or proprietary-trading desk, possibly due to margin calls or a risk reduction. These initial losses then put pressure on a broader set of long/short and long-only equity portfolios, causing further losses on August 9th by triggering stop-loss and de-leveraging policies. A significant rebound of these strategies occurred on August 10th, which is also consistent with the sudden liquidation hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that the quantitative nature of the losing strategies was incidental, and the main driver of the losses in August 2007 was the firesale liquidation of similar portfolios that happened to be quantitatively constructed. The fact that the source of dislocation in long/short equity portfolios seems to lie elsewhere – apparently in a completely unrelated set of markets and instruments – suggests that systemic risk in the hedge-fund industry may have increased in recent years.

This paper looks like it has a good chance of being interesting enough to highlight … I’m working through it!

Following a press release regarding its holdings, there has been some press commentary on SunLife’s exposure to Lehman:

RBC Capital Markets analyst Andre-Philippe Hardy said he expects Sun Life to take a pre-tax charge of $167-million, assuming a 50 per cent recovery rate on Lehman exposure.

Most unpleasant, but they earn about $500-million per quarter. So, unless this relatively small exposure (about 0.3% of their investments) is a precursor of Bad Things to Come, this is a non-event for credit. They’ve got $5.2-billion in equities on the books as of June 30 … their mark-to-market losses for today alone will be comparable to their Lehman exposure.

A gory day for PerpetualDiscounts – the worst since July 16, in fact, the infamous nadir of the market – but not as bad as for stocks. Names that will be familiar in the Price Changes section below (hint: they’re all negative) include:

Brookfield Properties dropped 16 percent to C$18.99, the most since August 1993. Brookfield was cut to “market perform” by BMO Capital Markets analyst Karine MacIndoe, who said that the company may face “what is likely to be an accelerated deterioration of fundamentals” in its “core Manhattan market.”

Parent company Brookfield Asset Management Inc. slid 11 percent to C$28.49, the most since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S.

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, which accounted for two-thirds of total Canadian writedowns, fell the most since July 24, losing 4.8 percent to C$61.11. CIBC Chief Executive Officer Richard Nesbitt said at a conference that his bank expects a loss of about C$25 million from Lehman.

Update: Inspired by a thread on Financial Webring Forum, I will post a link to Across the Curve‘s closing commentary for today. The Canadian Market saw massive steepening, but not as much action as the US; two year yield down 28bp to 2.82%; five year down 21bp to 3.09%; ten year down 15bp to 3.60%; thirty-year down 8bp to 4.05%. Bets on an easing run rampant!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30.
The Fixed-Reset index was added effective 2008-9-5 at that day’s closing value of 1,119.4 for the Fixed-Floater index.
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 4.63% 4.67% 67,806 15.92 6 -0.7416% 1,104.2
Floater 4.41% 4.41% 47,451 16.62 2 -0.2373% 906.1
Op. Retract 4.96% 4.34% 124,632 3.31 14 -0.2642% 1,053.0
Split-Share 5.39% 6.12% 48,769 4.37 14 -0.9792% 1,036.5
Interest Bearing 6.43% 7.22% 51,633 5.18 2 -0.1048% 1,097.9
Perpetual-Premium 6.22% 5.99% 56,654 2.20 1 -0.5151% 997.4
Perpetual-Discount 6.03% 6.10% 183,186 13.74 70 -0.5709% 884.0
Fixed-Reset 5.07% 4.92% 1,410,445 14.14 9 -0.1897% 1,118.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
WFS.PR.A SplitShare -4.5643% I guess on a day like today, something with the name “World Financial … ” is just about an automatic sell! Asset coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of September 4, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.51% based on a bid of 9.20 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.8361% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.08% based on a bid of 17.13 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.6549% Asset coverage of 3.2+:1 as of August 29 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.71% based on a bid of 16.50 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (7.02% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (8.92% to 2016-3-25). Note that, given 2.4 shares of BAM.A per BNA preferred and a price of 28.49 on BAM.A (see above), asset coverage is now 2.7+:1.
BCE.PR.Z FixFloater -2.4280%  
W.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.0348% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.65% based on a bid of 21.48 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.9334% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.12% based on a bid of 18.26 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.9284% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 21.36 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -1.8913% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.19% based on a bid of 16.60 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount -1.8047% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.60% based on a bid of 21.22 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.6632% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.24% based on a bid of 23.65 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.5663% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.10% based on a bid of 24.51 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.4768% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 18.68 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.4400% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.25% based on a bid of 18.48 and a limitMaturity.
LBS.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.3672% Asset coverage of just under 2.1:1 as of September 11, according to Brompton Group. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 10.10 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00.
CM.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.3274% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.56% based on a bid of 22.30 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.3203% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 23.17 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.3186% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.04% based on a bid of 18.71 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.2640% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.52% based on a bid of 21.09 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.A SplitShare -1.2395% See BNA.PR.C, above.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.2308% Asset coverage of just under 1.9:1 as of August 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 9.63 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.1740% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.60% based on a bid of 18.52 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.0929% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.06% based on a bid of 19.91 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.0835% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.16% based on a bid of 24.65 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.0521% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.08% based on a bid of 20.69 and a limitMaturity.
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -1.0081% Asset coverage of 2.1+:1 as of September 4, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.61% based on a bid of 9.82 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
PWF.PR.J OpRet -1.0066% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.34% based on a bid of 25.57 and a softMaturity 2013-7-30 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BCE.PR.T Scraps (Would be FixFloat but there are volume concerns) 154,220 Desjardins crossed 144,900 at 24.70.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 104,140 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 50,000, both at 18.88. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 18.86 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 86,125 Scotia bought 17,600 from anonymous at 25.05, then another 14,500 from a possibly different anonymous at the same price, and finally 12,000 from Nesbitt at 25.04.
CM.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 60,182 CIBC crossed 50,000 at 22.40. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.56% based on a bid of 22.30 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.A FixedReset 52,660  
CM.PR.K FixedReset 48,750  

There were seventeen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Issue Comments

RPQ.PR.A / RPB.PR.A / RPA.PR.A / PRF.PR.A Hit by Lehman Bankruptcy

There was a host of temporary trading halts and related announcements from CC&L Group today regarding their structured-note-derivative-preferreds.

Lehman’s bankruptcy announcement constitutes a credit event and brings them all a little bit closer to the brink … I will leave my Assiduous Readers to judge whether they are dangerously close to the brink or not, I’m not taking a view.

Credit Event Countdown
Ticker
(links to
Press
Release)
Positions Credit
Events
Remaining
Maturity
RPQ.PR.A 125 5.4 2011-6-30
RPB.PR.A 127 4.3 2012-3-23
RPA.PR.A 142 6.5 2009-12-31
PRF.PR.A 141 9.5 2009-06-30

Connor, Clark & Lunn will host a conference call to discuss the implications of recent events on Tuesday September 16, 2008 at 9:00 AM EST. The conference call number is (416) 644-3415 or 1 (800) 733-7571 and the replay number is (416) 640-1917 or 1 (877) 289-8525. The pass code is 21283536#.

The previous post on these issues was RPA.PR.A / RPB.PR.A / RPQ.PR.A Hit by FannieFreddieFiasco. There is no prior PrefBlog post for PRF.PR.A.

None of these issues is tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

ACO.PR.A: Negative Yield-to-Worst; Positive Yield-to-Issuer-Best

I recently had a contest about ACO.PR.A which has been won by Assiduous Reader adrian2.

The question was:

So: here’s the question … how might a rational investor reason that paying $27.00 for this issue has enough chance of at least a half-way decent return to make it worth while? This investor knows that the yield to worst is negative and that he’s taking a chance … why might he buy it anyway?

ACO.PR.A closed at 26.62-75 on Friday, so the situation isn’t quite as dramatic as it was when the bid was $27.00. However, the portfolio of possibilities for this issue on Friday, according to HIMIPref™ was:

Call 2008-12-31 YTM: -1.78 % [Restricted: -0.54 %] (Prob: 40.10 %)
Call 2009-12-31 YTM: 2.35 % [Restricted: 2.35 %] (Prob: 1.01 %)
Soft Maturity 2011-11-30 YTM: 3.68 % [Restricted: 3.68 %] (Prob: 58.89 %)

So the YTW was -1.78%.

Why would an investor pay such a rich price for the issue? Well, there was a hint of the answer buried in my article about retractible preferreds and bonds:

One may sometimes make a reasonable argument that YTW is not the most appropriate method of calculating yields. Say, for instance, that a company has the ability to issue preferreds that pay $1.25 p.a. and has an issue outstanding that pays $1.40 and is currently callable at $26.00, with this price declining by $0.25 annually for the next four years. If the issue is trading above $26.00, the YTW scenario will almost certainly be an immediate call. However, since the company can save $0.25 by delaying redemption, the net cost to the company of leaving the shares outstanding for another year is the dividend less the saving, or $1.15 (during the declining call-price period). Since this is less than the rate it would pay on a new issue, the company may well prefer to wait.

The question of what to believe is a complex question—complex enough, in fact, that I am currently devoting a great deal of time to researching the matter. Most investors will be well advised to rely on YTW.

In other words, Atco (the issuer of ACO.PR.A) may look at the issue on 2008-12-1 and say – ‘well, this issue pays $1.4375 annually, or 5.75% of par (as dividends, which costs more than interest) … we’d better redeem.’

But according to the redemption schedule, they can save $0.50 off the redemption price every year by waiting! If we were going to analyze this precisely, we would look at the situation from their point of view as a loan of $26.00 which amortizes down to a $25.00 balloon payment on 2010-12-1 (the first date they can redeem at $25.00) via quarterly blended payments that include principal. But from a back-of-an-envelope, conceptual perspective, we can say that it’s a loan of $25.50 with an cost of $1.4375 dividend LESS the decrease of $0.50 in redemption price, for an all-in cost of $0.9375 … which comes to about 3.67%, a financing cost calculated to bring smiles to the most hardened CFO, even if it as expensive dividends.

These calculations will be incorporated into the next release of HIMIPref™ – yes, I am working on it, albeit slowly – as “Yield to Issuer Best”. To select YTIB from the table of possibilities, I will be determining the disparity of each redemption option from the yield curve – that is, cash flows for the instrument will be discounted by the self-consistent yield curve to arrive at a net present value for each option. The lowest NPV will determine the YTIB. I do not know, at this point, how influential in the valuation YTIB will be relative to YTW … but hey, it’s worth looking at!

Incidentally, ACO.PR.A was added to the TXPR index in the last rebalancing, despite what might be considered to be relatively low average trading value (HIMIPref™ indicates $18,374 worth of shares daily, TMXMoney calculated 1,600 shares (the difference doesn’t bother me; HIMIPref™ is an adjusted exponential moving average; I believe that TMXMoney is an unadjusted rolling average, virtually guaranteed to show a higher result). A large part of ACO.PR.A’s current price may well be buying from indexers.

The following graphs regarding ACO.PR.A have been prepared and uploaded:

PrefLetter

September, 2008, PrefLetter Released

The September, 2008, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the September, 2008, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the October, 2008, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close October 10 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on October 14 (October 13 is Thanksgiving).

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

The winner of the Win a PrefLetter Contest was Assiduous Reader adrian2, who must have done all kinds of work to dig up an old post regarding BMO.PR.G. I will review the situation regarding ACO.PR.A in the near future. Congratulations adrian2!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Market Action

September 12, 2008

Treasury has released FAQs regarding the FNM/FRE Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement.

Naked Capitalism reprints an article in the Financial Times claiming that a consortium including BofA is looking at Lehman. Who knows? We could be having yet another Sunday Special!

Moody’s has cut Washington Mutual’s senior unsecured rating to junk:

Moody’s Investors Service downgraded the long-term deposit and issuer ratings of Washington Mutual Bank to Baa3 from Baa2. The bank’s financial strength rating was downgraded to D+ from C-, base line credit assessment (BCA) to Ba1 from Baa2, and short term rating to Prime-3 from Prime-2. Washington Mutual Inc.’s senior unsecured rating was downgraded to Ba2 from Baa3. The rating action concludes the review that was initiated on July 22, 2008. The outlook is negative.

Moody’s also expects WaMu to report future quarters of large losses. This could exacerbate negative market sentiment and lead to franchise impairment.

Washington Mutual Inc.’s preferred stock was downgraded to B2 from Ba2, reflecting Moody’s view that the risk of a suspension of dividends on these instruments has risen materially.

The Auction Rate Securities shakedown in the States continues, with Fidelity close to a $300-million buy-back:

Fidelity Investments is close to a settlement with New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo to buy back $300 million in auction-rate securities, according to a person familiar with the negotiations.

If there was misrepresentation of the product, or if clients were given grossly unsuitable advice, then somebody should be losing their license. After public hearings. If there was no such fraudulent misrepresentation, if the only problem was that investments didn’t work out as hoped, then nobody should be doing anything. Attorney General Andrew Cuomo would be well advised to look back at his schoolbooks, under “Rule of Law”. This whole business of negotiated settlements in regulatory matters is an affront to civilized values.

Hard on the heels of my speculation yesterday that the BoE was preparing the ground for a more punitive rate for its liquidity operations comes the news that the Fed’s discount window is working overtime:

Borrowing from the Fed’s discount window hit record levels in six of the past eight weeks, and reached $23.5 billion as of Sept. 10, Fed data show. By comparison, lending averaged just $779 million a week in the three months after New York Fed President Timothy Geithner urged banks to use the program.

The increasing use of the funds risks delaying banks’ disposal of nonperforming assets and capital raising. It also may make it tough to restore the rate on the loans to the historical 1 percentage point premium over overnight funds, analysts said. The Fed has lowered the rate nine times since August 2007.

The data comes from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1. Bloomberg has a neat graph:

Nine times in twelve months! There is even some speculation that that the next move move might be a loosening:

Inflation looks likely to ebb, thanks to falling commodity prices and contained labor costs. The U.S. economy, meanwhile, may be set to take another lurch down as consumer spending gives way and the credit crunch intensifies with the plunge in Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s shares.

San Francisco Fed President Janet Yellen left open the possibility of a rate cut in comments to reporters after a Sept. 4 speech in Salt Lake City. “There is some chance” of easing credit “if things start going seriously wrong,” she said.

Well … in and of itself, Yellen’s comment doesn’t mean anything. Of course there’s always the possibility of easing. There is also the possibility of … well, just about anything!

Including Lehman’s survival! They have reportedly received some serious bids for their Asset Management business:

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. received bids for its asset-management unit from private-equity firms including Bain Capital LLC and Clayton Dubilier & Rice Inc., as the investment bank seeks offers for the entire firm.

The bids value the unit, which includes the Neuberger Berman fund-management business, private-equity funds and a brokerage firm serving wealthy individuals, at about $5 billion, according to people familiar with the auction who asked not to be named because the process is private.

A very good day for the PerpetualDiscount sector on decent volume.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30.
The Fixed-Reset index was added effective 2008-9-5 at that day’s closing value of 1,119.4 for the Fixed-Floater index.
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 4.60% 4.62% 65,314 15.99 6 +0.0270% 1,112.5
Floater 4.40% 4.40% 47,807 16.65 2 -0.1245% 908.3
Op. Retract 4.94% 4.21% 126,651 3.08 14 -0.0328% 1,055.8
Split-Share 5.34% 5.82% 48,684 4.38 14 +0.0620% 1,046.7
Interest Bearing 6.42% 7.19% 51,097 5.19 2 -0.1568% 1,099.0
Perpetual-Premium 6.19% 5.73% 56,778 2.21 1 -0.4339% 1,002.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.99% 6.06% 183,803 13.62 70 +0.4551% 889.0
Fixed-Reset 5.06% 4.89% 1,425,073 14.16 9 +0.0600% 1,120.7
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.1662% Asset coverage of 3.2+:1 as of August 29 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.34% based on a bid of 16.95 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.33% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (8.85% to 2016-3-25).
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.0080% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.13% based on a bid of 24.05 and a limitMaturity.
W.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.0348% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.65% based on a bid of 21.48 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.0565% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.0818% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.70% based on a bid of 23.36 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.1856% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.89% based on a bid of 19.63 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.3904% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.96% based on a bid of 18.96 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.4106% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.99% based on a bid of 20.13 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.5347% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.12% based on a bid of 20.51 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.5821% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.00% based on a bid of 18.62 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.8468% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.16% based on a bid of 18.75 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount +2.0452% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.96% based on a bid of 18.96 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +2.4404% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.88% based on a bid of 17.63 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TD.PR.A FixedReset 908,645 New issue settled today.
TD.PR.M OpRet 107,700 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.94% based on a bid of 26.04 and a softMaturity 2013-10-30 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 88,725 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.76% based on a bid of 19.85 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.K FixedReset 84,315 New issue settled Wednesday.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 62,400 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.99% based on a bid of 19.90 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-six other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Issue Comments

TD.PR.A Settles: Above Par on High Volume

TD Bank has announced:

that a group of underwriters led by TD Securities Inc. has exercised the option to purchase an additional 2 million non-cumulative 5-Year Reset Preferred Shares, Series AA (the “Series AA Shares”) carrying a face value of $25.00 per share. This brings the total issue announced on September 2, 2008, and expected to close September 12, 2008, to 10 million shares and gross proceeds raised under the offering to $250 million. TDBFG has filed in Canada a prospectus supplement to its January 11, 2007 short form base shelf
prospectus in respect of this issue.

Details of this issue were reported when the issue was announced on September 2.

So – another greenshoe fully exercised for a fixed-reset issue! They’re clearly easy to sell, despite various reservations.

TD.PR.A traded 908,645 shares today in a range of 25.00-15, closing at 25.10-12, 10×6. It has been added to the HIMIPref™ database and Fixed-Reset Index.

Issue Comments

RF.PR.A: 2.7-million Warrants Sold

C. A. Bancorp has announced:

the Corporation has closed a public offering today (the “Offering”). The Corporation offered units (the “Units”) at a price of $10.00 per Unit. Each Unit consists of one Class A Share and one warrant (a “Warrant”) to purchase a Series 1, Preferred Share (a “Preferred Share”).

At the closing, the Corporation issued 2,700,000 Units for aggregate gross proceeds of $27,000,000. The gross proceeds consisted of $23,181,260 in cash and $3,818,740 in publicly listed Canadian common shares and investment grade securities received under the exchange option of the Offering.

The agents for the Offering have been granted an over-allotment option to purchase up to 405,500 Units at any time during the next 30 days.

The securities forming a Unit will trade together on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) under the symbol RF.UN as a Unit and cannot be transferred except as part of a Unit and the Warrants may not be exercised for the first 30 days after the date hereof. Thereafter, the Class A Shares and the Warrants will trade separately on the TSX under the symbols RF.A and RF.WT, respectively.

Each Warrant will entitle the holder to purchase one Preferred Share at a subscription price of $23.75 at any time on or before 4:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on September 30, 2011.

The Manager uses the maturity value of the aggregate number of Preferred Shares issued and outstanding and compares that value to the tangible net book value of the aggregate number of Class A Shares issued and outstanding as a measure of the debt (the Preferred Shares) to equity (the Class A Shares) ratio of the Corporation (the “Leverage Ratio”). As at June 30, 2008, the Leverage Ratio was 8.8 to 1.

The Offering caused the debt to equity ratio or the Leverage Ratio of the Corporation to decrease. As at the date hereof, the Leverage Ratio is approximately 1.2 to 1.

As previously reported on PrefBlog, there was a 2-million unit minimum on the offering.

RF.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™

Issue Comments

PFD.PR.A to Vote on Various Proposals

The nice thing about holding Charterhouse Preferred Share Index Corporation is that you get invited to a lot of meetings.

JovFunds Management has announced:

Charterhouse Preferred Share Index Corporation (“Charterhouse”), Fairway Diversified Income and Growth Trust (“Fairway Diversified”), Deans Knight Income and Growth Fund (“Deans Knight”) and Long Reserve Life Resource Fund (“Long Reserve”)(collectively, the “Funds”) announce that they will hold special meetings of the shareholders of Charterhouse and unitholders of Fairway Diversified, Deans Knight and Long Reserve (collectively, the “Securityholders”) on October 20, 2008. JovFunds Management Inc. (“JovFunds”) is the manager of each of these products.

At the meetings, Securityholders will be asked to consider and vote on various proposals relating to the Funds in order to be consistent across the Funds and with market practices, and to improve administrative and operational efficiencies that will be fully described in the management information circulars to be provided to Securityholders in advance of the meetings. Securityholders of record on September 19, 2008, will be entitled to receive notice of and vote at the meetings.

I have seen more informative press releases! The result of the August meeting has been discussed on PrefBlog.

PFD.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

PrefLetter

September PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

The markets have closed and the September edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share; the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

PrefLetter is being expanded commencing this month! Two additional classes of recommendation will be included::

  • Fixed-Reset: My disdain for Fixed-Reset issues as currently priced is well known, but some people like them! Clearly, some of these issues will be better investment choices than others. Now that the asset class has been added to HIMIPref™, a recommendation from this class of preferred share will be included with the other recommendations.
  • Short-Term: I do not usually recommend short-term issues for preferred share portfolios, due in part to the fact that the relatively low level of price volatility gives little opportunity for trading; also due to the idea that the recommendations are for long-term buy-and-hold investors. However, there is public demand for short-term issues. While I will not create a specific asset class for these issues, I will henceforth recommend at least one issue from the combined OpRet / SplitShare indices that would otherwise be ineligible for recommendation due to shortness of term. Note that by “short-term”, I generally mean (as is usual in the bond world) “less than five years”.

There is still time to enter the contest to win a PrefLetter!

The September issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”!