BBO.PR.A Announces Rights Offering

July 9th, 2008

The marvellously named “Big Bank Big Oil Split Corp” has announced:

that it has received all necessary approvals for its previously announced rights offering (the “Rights Offering”).

Under the Rights Offering holders of class A capital shares (“Capital Shares”) at the close of business on July 17, 2008 will receive rights (“Rights”) to purchase Combined Units on the basis of one Right for each Capital Share held. Two Rights will entitle the holder to purchase a Combined Unit, consisting of one Capital Share, one class A preferred share (“Preferred Share”) and one Warrant for a subscription price of $26.38 per Combined Unit. Each Warrant may be used to purchase one Capital Share and one Preferred Share. Rights may be exercised at any time up to the expiry of the Rights at 4:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on August 13, 2008.

Holders of Rights who exercise all of their Rights may also subscribe for additional Combined Units that may be available as a result of unexercised Rights. Rightsholders may exercise their Rights through the broker or dealer which holds their Rights.

The Rights will be listed and posted for trading on the TSX under the symbol BBO.RT. Holders of Rights should contact the broker or dealer who holds their Rights on their behalf to exercise their Rights. A prospectus describing the Rights Offering is expected to be mailed to Capital Shareholders on or around July 23, 2008.

So, the issue might get bigger – a good thing, since there are less than 1.9-million shares outstanding with a $10.00 par value. Asset coverage is just under 2.6:1 as of July 3, according to Claymore Investments.

BBO.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

MFC.PR.A / MFC.PR.B / MFC.PR.C : DBRS says "Trend Positive"

July 8th, 2008

DBRS has announced:

today changed the trend on its ratings of the Debt and Preferred Shares of Manulife Financial Corporation (Manulife or the Company) and its related entities to Positive from Stable. The trends on the Claims Paying Ability of The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company and the Short-Term Limited Recourse Notes of Maritime Life Canadian Funding remain stable.

The positive trend reflects the Company’s strong earnings performance since the acquisition of John Hancock Financial Services (JHFS) in 2004, advantageous strategic positions in selected diverse products and geographic market segments, consistency in being among the first to introduce new and innovative products tempered by effective risk and expense management controls and the most conservative capitalization of its peer group. Diversification and strong earnings in the absence of any meaningful financial leverage allow Manulife to stand out among its peers from the perspective of creditworthiness. The resolution of the current turmoil in the capital markets, provided that Manulife continues to cope favourably, is expected to precipitate an upgrade in the Company’s credit ratings.

Following its successful integration of JHFS, Manulife has become one of the five largest life insurance and wealth management organizations in North America and one of the top 10 in the world, enjoying excellent geographic and product diversification, notably in such attractive markets as U.S. long-term care, U.S. variable annuities, and Asian wealth accumulation products, which leverage off the Company’s North American successes. Distribution networks are similarly well-diversified, the broadening and deepening of which is the key to the Company’s continuing success. Like most life insurance concerns, the Company is increasingly focused on growing its wealth management and payout businesses, which are well-aligned with demographic trends, but it retains leading positions in the sale of new life insurance protection products in both Canada and the United States, where profit margins tend to be more generous and cash flows more stable, despite the expected new business strain.

Excellent risk-management practices and strong independent governance has helped the Company to maintain stable profitability. The Company’s large block of in-force policies provides a stable core to earnings as conservative reserving practices pay off over time through the release of excess provisions for adverse deviation and consistently favourable experience gains. Unlike several of its U.S. peers, a high-quality asset portfolio has limited the Company’s exposure to the recent softness in credit markets related to asset-backed securities and the U.S. housing markets.

The issues continue to be rated P-1 by S&P on their national scale.

All three issues are tracked by HIMIPref™. MFC.PR.A is part of the Operating Retractible index; the others are part of the PerpetualDiscount index.

Perhaps this is not, strictly, sufficiently newsworthy to be worth a post … but gracious heavens, we could all use a little bit of good news around now!

July 8, 2008

July 8th, 2008

Bradford & Bingley, a small UK mortgage bank with a market cap of about $400-million seems to be in trouble:

Bradford & Bingley dropped as much as 26 percent, the largest decline since it sold shares to the public in 2000, and was down 8 pence to 34 pence at 11:30 a.m. The shares fell 16 percent yesterday and 18 percent July 4, bringing this year’s decline to 88 percent and valuing the bank at 212 million pounds ($419 million).

Bradford & Bingley has been hurt by the seizure in credit markets because it depends on capital markets for about 52 of its funding. Leicester, England-based Alliance & Leicester Plc, which gets about 59 percent from wholesale markets, declined as much as 10 percent today in London and traded at 226.25 pence at 11:20 a.m.

As a warning to those who might put too high an emphasis on the (very important) Tier 1 ratio and Total Capital ratio … as of Dec. 31/2007 they had GBP 1.4-billion in Tier 1 Capital, Tier 1 Ratio of 8.6%, Total Capital Ratio of 15.1%. You can’t put all your trust in one number!

Meanwhile, OFHEO says that, contrary to yesterday‘s speculation, Fannie & Freddie don’t need capital:

Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, whose shares have tumbled more than 60 percent this year, have enough capital to survive a slump in the housing market and meet new accounting rules, their regulator said.

“An accounting principle should not drive a capital decision by a regulator,” Lockhart later told reporters at a mortgage conference in Arlington, Virginia, today sponsored by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

However, there’s lots of bad news to go ’round! IndyMac is looking fairly ill:

IndyMac Bancorp Inc., the California- based lender that is firing half its employees, is facing “elevated levels of deposit withdrawals” after U.S. Senator Charles Schumer said the bank may be on the brink of failure.

Because it doesn’t have enough capital to meet the “well capitalized” threshold set by regulators, IndyMac said it can’t fund its lending with deposits acquired through independent brokers. IndyMac’s request for a waiver from the FDIC to allow for brokered deposits hasn’t been approved, the company said.

Naked Capitalism has more details.

Remember my table of CM issues on June 26? And the table of PWF issues yesterday, that Assiduous Reader prefhound noted was the last cum-dividend day? Well, here’s the table again, now that the dividend has gone ex:

PWF Perpetuals
Issue Dividend Quote Pre-Tax
Bid-YTW
PWF.PR.K 1.2375 19.51-99 6.36%
PWF.PR.L 1.275 20.00-28 6.39%
PWF.PR.F 1.3125 20.25-49 6.50%
PWF.PR.E 1.375 21.64-75 6.37%
PWF.PR.H 1.4375 23.05-49 6.53%
PWF.PR.G 1.475 24.15-18 6.11%
PWF.PR.I 1.50 24.62-88 6.10%

I said it yesterday … I’ll say it again: Negative Convexity? Negative Schmonvexity! It just doesn’t make any sense!

I hate to say it … but it was yet another bad day for PerpetualDiscounts! This is the ninth consecutive loss; the last gaining day was June 24; the cumulative loss since then is 3.73%.

Long corporates still yield about 6.1% … the perpetualDiscount weighted mean pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.25% dividend is equivalent (with a 1.4x factor) to 8.75% … spread to long corporates is now 265bp.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.29% 2.40% 46,532 0.08 1 -0.4304% 1,119.7
Fixed-Floater 4.64% 4.36% 72,010 16.39 6 +0.2803% 1,093.8
Floater 4.02% 4.04% 51,785 17.36 3 -0.1192% 916.7
Op. Retract 4.96% 3.55% 168,148 2.55 17 -0.1875% 1,046.0
Split-Share 5.36% 6.32% 65,302 4.13 14 -0.6337% 1,029.7
Interest Bearing 6.15% 5.31% 45,169 2.27 3 -0.2688% 1,119.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.99% 5.89% 65,389 11.00 4 -0.0149% 1,006.2
Perpetual-Discount 6.20% 6.25% 245,331 13.56 67 -0.3472% 851.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -4.21% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.58% based on a bid of 19.11 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.I OpRet -2.9600% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.21% based on a bid of 24.26 and a softMaturity 2013-12-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.H (5.23% to 2012-3-30), BAM.PR.J (6.59% to 2018-3-30) and BAM.PR.O (6.77% to 2013-6-30).
PWF.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -2.8214% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.53% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.6293% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.45% based on a bid of 22.59 and a limitMaturity.
W.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -2.3894% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.37% based on a bid of 22.06 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -2.2040% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.48% based on a bid of 19.08 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.1142% Asset coverage of 3.2+:1 as of June 30 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.17% based on a bid of 18.52 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.14% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (8.46% to 2016-3-25).
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -2.1000% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of June 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.70% based on a bid of 9.79 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1.
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -1.9348% Asset coverage of just under 1.5:1 as of July 3, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.10% based on a bid of 9.63 and a hardMaturity 2011-12-15 at 10.00.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.7204% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.22% based on a bid of 18.28 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.7178% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.49% based on a bid of 16.02 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.6429% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.25% based on a bid of 17.96 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.5872% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.50% based on a bid of 20.25 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.4963%  
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.2884% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.04% based on a bid of 19.92 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.1369% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.74% based on a bid of 20.87 and a limitMaturity.
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.0575% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.43% based on a bid of 21.52 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.0000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.37% based on a bid of 19.80 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.0995% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 19.31 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount +1.2195% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.65% based on a bid of 20.75 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.5925% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 18.50 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +4.0897% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.37% based on a bid of 21.64 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BAM.PR.H OpRet 57,721 CIBC crossed 25,000 at 25.50, then another 25,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.23% based on a bid of 25.50 and a softMaturity 2012-3-30. For comparables, see above.
PWF.PR.J OpRet 53,619 CIBC crossed 50,000 at 25.55. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.22% based on a bid of 25.50 and a softMaturity 2013-7-30 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat 35,500  
BCE.PR.I FixFloat 32,260 CIBC crossed 24,900 at 24.30
BAM.PR.I OpRet 30,766 CIBC bought 20,000 from Anonymous at 25.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.21% based on a bid of 24.26 and a softMaturity 2013-12-30 at 25.00. For comparables, see above.

There were twenty-two other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

SEC Releases Credit Rating Agency Review Report

July 8th, 2008

The SEC has found smoking guns for conflict of interest at the CRAs:

The SEC report describes an e-mail in which an analyst refers to the market for collateralized debt obligations as a “monster.”

“Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters,” said the e-mail, which was sent Dec. 15, 2006, to another analyst at the same firm.

“I am trying to ascertain whether we can determine at this point if we will suffer any loss of business because of our decision and if so how much,” said a 2004 e-mail an analyst sent to a senior business manager. The SEC said it found no evidence such considerations affected “rating methodology or models.”

In another internal communication, two analysts at a rating company discussed whether they should grade an offering.

“One analyst expressed concern that her firm’s model did not capture `half’ of the deal’s risk, but that `it could be structured by cows and we would rate it,”’ the SEC said.

It’s hard to tell how seriously to take this report. What kind of reply was received by the analyst who asked about loss of business? Was he told it was none of his business? Was he ripped a new one? Was he told he’d damn well better rate the puppy triple-A? The full press release is available as is the full report, with the following “remedial action” notes:

  • The Staff has recommended that each examined NRSRO evaluate, both at this time and on a periodic basis, whether it has sufficient staff and resources to manage its volume of business and meet its obligations under the Section 15E of the Exchange Act and the rules applicable to NRSROs. Each examined NRSRO stated that it will implement the Staff’s recommendation.
  • The Staff has recommended that each NRSRO examined conduct a review of its current disclosures relating to processes and methodologies for rating RMBS and CDOs to assess whether it is fully disclosing its ratings methodologies in compliance with Section 15E of the Exchange Act and the rules applicable to NRSROs. Further, the Staff has recommended that each NRSRO examined review whether its policies governing the timing of disclosure of a significant change to a process or methodology are reasonably designed to comply with these requirements. Each examined NRSRO stated that it will implement the Staff’s recommendations.
  • The Staff has recommended that each NRSRO examined conduct a review to determine whether its written policies and procedures used to determine credit ratings for RMBS and CDOs are fully documented in accordance with the requirements of Rule 17g-2. Each examined NRSRO stated that it will implement the Staff’s recommendation.
  • The Staff has recommended that each NRSRO examined conduct a review of its current policies and practices for documenting the credit ratings process and the identities of RMBS and CDO ratings analysts and committee members to review whether they are reasonably designed to ensure compliance with Rule 17g-2 and to address weaknesses in the policies or in adherence to existing policies that result in gaps in documentation of significant steps and participants in the credit ratings process. Each examined NRSRO stated that it will implement the Staff’s recommendations.
  • The Staff has recommended that each NRSRO examined conduct a review to determine if adequate resources are devoted to surveillance of outstanding RMBS and CDO ratings. This review should include, for example, whether the rating agency maintains adequate staffing and has adequate expertise dedicated to performing ongoing surveillance. The Staff has also recommended that the NRSROs ensure that they have comprehensive written surveillance procedures. Finally, the Staff has recommended that all appropriate surveillance records be maintained. Each examined NRSRO stated that it will implement the Staff’s recommendations.
  • The Staff recommended that each NRSRO examined review its practices, policies and procedures for mitigating and managing the “issuer pays” conflict of interest. In particular, the Staff recommended that each NRSRO examined consider and implement steps that would insulate or prevent the possibility that considerations of market share and other business interests could influence ratings or ratings criteria. Each examined NRSRO stated that it would implement the Staff’s recommendations.
  • The Staff has recommended that each NRSRO examined conduct a review of its policies and procedures for managing the securities ownership conflict of interest to determine whether these policies are reasonably designed to ensure that their employees’ personal trading is appropriate and comply with the requirements of Rule 17g-5. Each examined NRSRO stated that it will implement the Staff’s recommendation.
  • The Staff has recommended that two of the NRSROs examined review whether their internal audit functions, particularly in the RMBS and CDO ratings areas, are adequate and whether they provide for proper management follow-up. Both of these NRSROs stated that it will implement the Staff’s recommendation.

MAPF Performance: June, 2008

July 8th, 2008

The fund experienced disappointing returns in June, as the market didn’t just collapse, it collapsed without retaining a normal degree of internal consistency.

Returns to June 30, 2008
Period MAPF Index
One Month -6.37% -3.43%
Three Months -4.38% -2.09%
One Year -4.38% -4.35%
Two Years (annualized) +0.32% -2.34%
Three Years (annualized) +1.71% -0.67%
Four Years (annualized) +3.68% +1.08%
Five Years (annualized) +6.82% +1.70%
Six Years (annualized) +6.87% +2.72%
Seven Years (annualized) +8.05% +2.79%
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Sustainable
Income
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 0.4665
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 0.4995
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 0.5288
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 0.5216
June, 2008 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% $0.5287
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions.
“Portfolio YTW” includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
“Securities YTW” divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.

So, despite the poor price performance in June, we must remember that we are fixed-income investors. The expected annual income per unit (these are shown gross of fees and expenses) continues to show an upward path … and it is the income that makes the asset class worthwhile.

I should emphasize, however, that the fund does not explicitly seek to maximize this number. Yield on the portfolio will be given up when it is possible to exchange it for something else that is attractive: credit quality, say, or retractibility. Over the very long term, however, it is the prime objective of fixed income management to maximize the income received from a given amount of capital.

When we look at the MAPF Portfolio Composition for May, 2008, we see that the fund was invested almost entirely in PerpetualDiscounts; this overall analysis is unchanged in the portfolio composition for June. Given the sharp decline in the market in June, it should therefore come as no surprise that the the fund underperformed, but even so … PerpetualDiscounts declined 5.31% in June, so there is a further source.

I have made some data available with this post:

When we look at the June performance of the PerpetualDiscount Index as of May 30, the first thing we notice is that the non-financials did relatively well:

PerpetualDiscount
June Performance
by Industry
Industry Mean Return
(Equal Weight)
[BAM=Financial]
Mean Return
(Equal Weight)
[BAM=Non-Financial]
Financial -6.20% -6.16%
Non-Financial -0.35% -1.88%

BAM is perceived as a financial, but is classified as an “Industrial” by the TSX. Whichever way you slice it, financials did extremely poorly relative to non-financials, and this factor alone is enough to explain the underperformance of MAPF relative to the PerpetualDiscount index – the fund has a position in BAM.PR.N, but the other elements of its PerpetualDiscount exposure is unequivocally financial.

The remainder of the analysis will examine only the financials.

I have previously noted that the more deeply discounted perpetuals underperformed in the period 5/30 to 6/13. The following chart shows that this effect persisted through monthend:

A regression of the May 30 Price against June return for the issues rated Pfd-1 shows that the effect is significant: 28% of the variation is explained by the equation:

Return = -19.77% + 0.65*Price %

Thus, the expected return for a Pfd-1 financial issue in June with a May 30 price of $20 would be -6.77%, while an initial price of $25 would predict a June return of -3.52%. Surprisingly, this effect only hits the Pfd-1 issues … a similar regression for the Pfd-1(low) issues produced no result, while there are not enough data to examine in the Pfd-2(high) and Pfd-2(low) grades.

The price/return relationship for Pfd-1 issues is not just unexpected, it is ludicrous – as I have been harping on since mid-month. I will stress again that my expectations are not based on mere observations of historical relationships – these expectations are at the heart of fixed-income theory.

When selecting a fixed income portfolio, one always bears three scenarios (at least!) in mind – rates generally rise, rates generally fall, rates are essentially flat. More sophisticated analysis is, in many ways, simply an elaboration of these basic assumptions about the future. So, when we compare a low-coupon, low-price PerpetualDiscount to a high-coupon high-price PerpetualDiscount, we come up with the following implications of each scenario (for more information, see my article Perpetual Hockey Sticks):

  • If rates go up, the price of each instrument will decline by approximately the same percentage.
  • If rates go down, we expect the low-coupon, low-price issue to increase in price more, since it has more room to increase before the holder has to worry about his capital gains being called away.
  • If rates remain the same, the higher yielding issue will have a better return. Since the two issues are equal in first scenario, and the low-coupon issue wins in the second, we expect the high-coupon, high-price issue to have the better return in this scenario

Or, to put it another way, investors should demand a higher yield on the high-coupon issues, in order to compensate for the possibility that they might lose out on capital gains if rates decline and the issuer calls the issue for redemption.

As is always the case in preferred share analysis, there is never enough data to show many perfect illustrations of various points – there are just too many cross currents, in terms of credit quality, issuer, coupon, redemption terms … the list is endless. However, there are two issuers of Pfd-1 quality with PerpetualDiscount issues outstanding that cover a broad enough range of coupons to be interesting: CM and RY. The following charts show the May 30 and June 30 yields, plotted against their coupon. It should be noted that if there was no convexity effect (which I would consider the limiting case) the plots should always be flat; a normal convexity effect should show that yield increases as the coupon gets larger, as compensation for the decreased room for capital gains before the holder has to worry about a call.

Clearly, the curve change from “normal” at the end of May to “abnormal” at the end of June. Please note that I have deliberately not referred to the June relationship as “inverted” … while normal yield curves can invert (when short rates are higher than long rates), this is an economically reasonable relationship under the correct economic conditions. There are no conditions in which high-coupon perpetual discounts should yield less than low-coupon perpetual discounts, in the absence of special, issue-specific factors, as I noted on June 27:

  • A big difference in term to call
  • A big difference in liquidity
  • A big difference in other terms of the issue (e.g., voting rights, restrictive covenants, etc.)

None of these features is applicable to the CM and RY issues.

Well … despite the fact that the changes in relationships are impossible, they happened anyway. Markets have a way of doing that, just to remind us that we don’t know everything! So why did all this happen?

I suspect that:

  • The overall decline in PerpetualDiscounts is due – at least in part – to the Bank of Canada June 10 decision to keep the overnight rate constant. There are many who imagine that there is only one interest rate … if the Government of Canada overnight rate is flat-to-increasing, they think, the same must apply to long term corporate rates. Therefore, they sell, in expectation of future price declines, which become (for a while, anyway, in a small enough market) a self-fulfilling prophecy
  • The huge difference in returns between financial and non-financial perpetualDiscounts implies that Fear of Banks is a major factor. It is my feeling that such fears are misplaced. While Canadian banks are certainly not unscathed by the credit crunch, they’re not exposed to the full force of leveraged positions in sub-prime paper either! I do not feel that the actual chance of default by any of Canada’s banks has increased in any kind of material way.
  • The abnormal coupon-yield relationship points to retail. Selling something because the price is down, rather than on an objective evaluation of risk/return, is never a winning strategy, but one can always count on retail to do the wrong thing.
  • The fact that this effect is most pronounced in the Pfd-1 issues (and barely visible in Pfd-1(low)) points to not just retail, but small-time retail at that. If one can only hold one or two preferreds (due to constraints of portfolio size), it only makes sense to hold tip-top quality – I’ve made that recommendation myself. If these small holders are eager to dump (a portion of) their preferreds, they don’t have a lot of choice as to which ones

What does it all mean? June was a bad month. The fund is overweighted in high quality, low-coupon, financial PerpetualDiscounts and this was precisely the wrong spot to be. HIMIPref™ is a statistically based system and will not work well every time. However, trading continues, based on expected incremental returns and I have every expectation that good results from this trading will become visible in terms of fund return as the market normalizes.

July 7, 2008

July 7th, 2008

VoxEU has put together a book comprised of selected columns about the sub-prime crisis.

The GSEs got whacked today, on reports that they may need to raise $75-billion:

Freddie Mac fell $2.59 to $11.91 after earlier dropping as low as $10.28. Fannie Mae declined $3.04 to $15.74 and earlier fell to $14.65.

The new FAS 140 rule that seeks to stop companies keeping assets in off-balance sheet entities may force Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to bring mortgages back onto their books, requiring them to put up capital, Lehman analysts led by Bruce Harting wrote in a note to clients today.

Fannie Mae would need to add $46 billion of capital and Freddie Mac would need about $29 billion, the Lehman analysts wrote.

The companies will probably get an exemption from the rule because it would be “very difficult” for them to raise that amount of capital, the analysts said.

“The provision discussed by Lehman could have an effect on our ability to serve the housing mission,” Freddie Mac spokeswoman Sharon McHale said. “We would hope FASB would take into account our mission” when it writes the final rule, McHale said.

Yields on agency mortgage securities relative to U.S. Treasuries rose to the highest since March 13 on concern that banks may need to sell off the debt.

Bank of America Corp., the second-largest U.S. bank, may sell mortgage assets after buying Countrywide Financial Corp., Kenneth Hackel, the managing director of fixed-income strategy at RBS Greenwich Capital Markets in Greenwich, Connecticut, said in a note to clients.

The difference between yields on the Bloomberg index for Fannie Mae’s current-coupon, 30-year fixed-rate mortgage bonds and 10-year government notes widened 7 basis points, to 204 basis points. The spread has climbed 18 basis points since June 18.

Note that Accrued Interest comments that he does not believe that the sell-off and Lehman’s analysis are related.

Remember my table of CM issues on June 26? Well, here’s a table of PWF issues, just to make sure you’re thoroughly confused.

PWF Perpetuals
Issue Dividend Quote Pre-Tax
Bid-YTW
PWF.PR.K 1.2375 19.70-99 6.42%
PWF.PR.L 1.275 20.30-44 6.42%
PWF.PR.F 1.3125 20.91-24 6.41%
PWF.PR.E 1.375 21.12-50 6.66%
PWF.PR.H 1.4375 23.06-99 6.36%
PWF.PR.G 1.475 24.45-70 6.15%
PWF.PR.I 1.50 25.00-09 6.15%

Negative Convexity? Negative Schmonvexity! It just doesn’t make any sense!

Update: Assiduous Reader prefhound points out in the comments that PWF goes ex-dividend tomorrow … so be careful when comparing! … end update

The market got thumped again, on average volume with a notable paucity of block-trades. What can I say? It looks retail-driven … but it’s pretty depressing anyway. But with long corporates still hanging around 6.10% and PerpetualDiscounts now yielding 6.23% … tax-advantage? We don’t need no stinking tax advantage! But for those who do, AND who have an interest-equivalency factor of 1.4x, that’s +262bp. Wow.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.26% -2.84% 48,438 0.08 1 +0.5507% 1,124.6
Fixed-Floater 4.65% 4.37% 69,099 16.38 6 -0.0744% 1,090.7
Floater 4.01% 4.03% 51,798 17.37 3 +0.1129% 917.8
Op. Retract 4.95% 3.23% 171,246 2.57 17 -0.1189% 1,048.0
Split-Share 5.33% 6.16% 64,470 4.14 14 -0.1482% 1,036.2
Interest Bearing 6.14% 4.61% 45,395 1.99 3 -0.4336% 1,122.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.96% 5.90% 65,155 10.97 4 -0.0497% 1,006.4
Perpetual-Discount 6.17% 6.23% 247,246 13.58 67 -0.7016% 854.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -4.48% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.66% based on a bid of 21.12 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -4.2025% Asset coverage of 3.2+:1 as of June 30 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.89% based on a bid of 18.92 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.16% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.C (8.46% to 2016-3-25).
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -3.7611% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.35% based on a bid of 21.75 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -2.9397% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.96% based on a bid of 19.15 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -2.3233% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.97% based on a bid of 20.18 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -2.0159% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.48% based on a bid of 16.04 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -1.8295% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.98% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.7614% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.91% based on a bid of 17.29 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.7094% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.50% based on a bid of 20.70 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount -1.5797% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.91% based on a bid of 20.56 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.5102% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.15% based on a bid of 18.26 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.4799% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.23% based on a bid of 18.64 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.4563% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.42% based on a bid of 20.30 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.2531% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.42% based on a bid of 19.70 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount -1.2524% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.73% based on a bid of 20.50 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.2520% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.15% based on a bid of 24.45 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.2042% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.22% based on a bid of 18.05 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.1949% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.20% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.1573% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.36% based on a bid of 23.06 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.1572% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.61% based on a bid of 20.50 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount -1.1038% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.87% based on a bid of 22.40 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.0638% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.76% based on a bid of 23.25 and a optionCertainty 2013-6-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.H (5.22% to 2012-3-30), BAM.PR.I (5.56% to 2013-12-30) and BAM.PR.J (6.52% to 2018-3-30).
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.0147% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.33% based on a bid of 19.51 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +2.3541% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of June 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 10.00 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 32,004 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.20% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualDiscount 22,961 CIBC crossed 12,300 at 24.38. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.80% based on a bid of 24.17 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 22,905 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.07% based on a bid of 18.60 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 21,850 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.20% based on a bid of 18.45 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 20,120 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.87% based on a bid of 24.51 and a limitMaturity.

There were nineteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Central Banks and the Eligibility Premium

July 7th, 2008

For reasons that will become clear to Assiduous Readers in the near future, I’m doing a little reading on the “Eligibility Premium”.

This was defined, in ECB Occasional Paper #49, BindSeil & Papadia, August 2006 as:

the interest rate differential between eligible [as collateral for central bank loans] and ineligible assets, dubbed the “eligibility premium”.

… with the conclusion …

The three estimates above consistently indicate that the eligibility premium deriving from being eligible as collateral for Eurosystem operations is, as a maximum, in the order of magnitude of a few basis points only. However, again, the following caveats to these estimates should be highlighted: In times of financial tensions, the eligibility premium will be much higher. One may view ample collateral availability as an insurance against the consequences of financial instability.

  • In times of financial tensions, the eligibility premium will be much higher. One may view ample collateral availability as an insurance against the consequences of financial instability.
  • For lower-rated banks (e.g. banks with a BBB rating), the value of the eligibility feature is likely to be systematically higher.
  • The low eligibility premium in the euro area is also the result of the ample availability of collateral. If availability were to decrease or demand increase, the premium would increase as well.

As remarked by Michael Reuther of Commerzbank in June 2008:

In a liquidity stress situation only central bank eligible collateral can be seen as really liquid.

It was to capture a suddenly much larger eligibility premium that Congress pressured the Fed to add Student Loans to the eligibility list – and the Fed responded on May 2. It’s hard to say how much the eligibility premium was in this case, but 35bp is a possibility:

The Lincoln, Nebraska-based student-loan provider issued three-year bonds rated AAA that priced to yield 70 basis points more than the three-month London interbank offered rate, said a person familiar with today’s sale, who declined to be identified because the terms aren’t public. That’s a narrower spread than the 105 basis points Nelnet was charged last month, and the 100 basis points the company offered on March 31.

I seem to remember – but cannot find – a Bloomberg story specifically mentioning that spreads between eligible and non-eligible assets had skyrocketted at the height of the crisis.

All this is related to the matter of the Real Bills Doctrine.

AO.PR.A & AO.PR.B to be Delisted

July 7th, 2008

The TSX has announced that it:

has determined to delist the Common Shares of Algo Group Inc. (Symbol: AO), as well as the Convertible Redeemable Retractable Third Preferred Shares Series I (Symbol: AO.PR.A) and 6% Cumulative Redeemable Convertible Second Preferred Shares Series I (Symbol: AO.PR.B) at the close of market on August 6, 2008 for failure to meet the continued listing requirements of TSX. The Securities of the Company are currently halted due to the imposition of a Cease Trade Order. In addition, the Securities have been suspended from trading by TSX effective immediately. The Company will now be subject to the requirements of Section 501 of The TSX Company Manual.

The review was previously reported on PrefBlog. Neither issue is tracked by HIMIPref™.

Index Performance: June 2008

July 7th, 2008

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for June, 2008, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
June 2008
Three Months
to
June 30, 2008
Ratchet +0.38% +2.68%
FixFloat -0.41% -1.02%
Floater -3.09% +6.39%
OpRet -0.32% +0.53%
SplitShare -2.02% +1.31%
Interest +0.91% +2.72%
PerpetualPremium -1.38% -0.57%
PerpetualDiscount -5.31% -3.90%
Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD -4.26% -2.90%
DPS.UN -3.53% -2.20%
Index
BMO-CM 50 -3.43% -2.09%

Claymore has published NAV data for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to June, 2008
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
March 31, 2008 17.60      
April 30 17.60     0.00%
May 30 17.85 0.00   +1.42%
June 25 17.01 0.2097 -3.53% -4.26%
June 30, 2008 16.88   -0.76%
Quarterly Return -2.90%

The DPS.UN NAV for June 25 has been published so we may calculate the June returns (approximately!) for this closed end fund:

DPS.UN NAV Return, June-ish 2008
Date NAV Distribution Return for period
May 28 $20.89   +0.87%
May 30 N/A   +0.11%
June 25 $20.33   -2.79%
June 30 N/A   -0.76%
Estimated June Return -3.53%
CPD had a NAV of $17.83 on May 28 and $17.85 on May 30. The estimated May end-of-month stub period return for CPD was therefore +0.11%, which is applied to DPS.UN as described above.
CPD had a NAV of $17.01 on June 25 and $16.88 on June 30. The estimated June end-of-month stub period return for CPD was therefore -0.76%, which is applied to DPS.UN as described above.

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for April and May:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-June-ish, 2008
April-ish +0.39%
May-ish +0.98%
June-ish -3.53%
Three-months-ish -2.20%

New Issue: TD Fixed-Reset, 5.10%+168

July 7th, 2008

TD Bank has announced:

that it has entered into an agreement with a group of underwriters led by TD Securities Inc. for an issue of 10 million non-cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares, Series Y (the “Series Y Shares”), carrying a face value of $25.00 per share, to raise gross proceeds of $250 million. TD intends to file in Canada a prospectus supplement to its January 11, 2007 base shelf prospectus in respect of this issue.

TD has also granted the underwriters an option to purchase, on the same terms, up to an additional 2 million Series Y Shares. This option is exercisable in whole or in part by the underwriters at any time up to two business days prior to closing. The maximum gross proceeds raised under the offering will be $300 million should this option be exercised in full.

The Series Y Shares will yield 5.10% annually, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of TD, for the initial period ending October 31, 2013. Thereafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years at a level of 168 basis points over the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield.

Holders of the Series Y Shares will have the right to convert their shares into non-cumulative Floating Rate Class A Preferred Shares, Series Z (the “Series Z Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on October 31, 2013, and on October 31 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series Z Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of TD, equal to the three-month Government of Canada
Treasury Bill yield plus 168 basis points.

The issue is anticipated to qualify as Tier 1 capital for TD and the expected closing date is July 16, 2008.

So … now there are seven of these Fixed-Reset Thingies. This joins the previous TD deal with this structure, which was 5.00%+160, now trading as TD.PR.S

Issue: The Toronto-Dominion Bank Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares, Series Y

Size: 10-million shares @ $25 (= $250-million), greenshoe of 2-million shares (=$50-million) exercisable up to two business days before closing.

Ratings: DBRS, Pfd-1; S&P: P-1(low); Moody’s: Aa2

Exchange Dates: October 31, 2013 and every five years thereafter.

Dividend: 5.10% until first exchange date, then 5-Year Canadas +168bp

Exchangeable: On every exchange date to series Z, which pay 90-day T-bills +168bp, calculated quarterly

Redemption: Every Exchange Date at 25.00. Series Z are redeemable every exchange date at $25.00 and at $25.50 at all other times.

Closing: July 16, 2008

Boy … these things sure seem popular, eh? And I will admit, so far my disdain has been thrown back in my face. But I still don’t like ’em.

Update, 2013-9-26: Trades as TD.PR.Y