S&P Recognizes Implicit MMF Guarantees When Assessing Banks

July 6th, 2008

I hadn’t been aware of this when I wrote my opinion piece A Collateral Proposal

The Federal Reserve discloses a “memo to file” on a meeting June 8, 2004, with S&P about Basel II:

Standard & Poor’s proprietary capital model is the primary driver for assessing capital, but regulatory capital is also taken into consideration. Standard & Poor’s already incorporates an operational risk capital charge into its capital assessment of trust and custody banks by deducting a certain basis point amount from capital for the amount of assets under custody (AUC) and assets under management (AUM).

With regard to assets under management, Standard & Poor’s methodology requires banks to hold more capital for money market funds than for equities and fixed income pooled funds, as it is the investor who takes the market risk for the latter two asset classes. The bank, on the other hand, provides an implicit guarantee with money market funds. This is because a bank will step in and support its sponsored money market funds if they are in danger of “breaking the buck”.

Assiduous readers will remember that the proposal to incorporate the implicit credit guarantee banks give to their branded Money Market Funds has been supported in principal by Ian de Verteuil of BMO-CM – although his proposal differs somewhat in specifics.

July 4, 2008

July 4th, 2008

Maple bonds aren’t selling well this year:

Four banks outside Canada raised just C$500 million ($492 million) selling Maple bonds, or foreign debt denominated in Canadian dollars, according to Bloomberg data. That compares with C$20.6 billion from 55 issues in the first half of 2007.

“Investors are having a preference for well-known, well- understood companies, and they have a home-market bias,” said Chris Seip, head of Canadian debt capital markets at RBC Capital Markets in Toronto.

By contrast, bond sales by Canadian governments rose 19 percent in the first half of the year, to C$40.5 billion. Corporate bond sales rose 1.4 percent to C$45.3 billion, according to Bloomberg data.

Speaking of “home market bias”, I suspect that FTU.PR.A (US Financial 15 Split) is ripe for another downgrade … it was downgraded to Pfd-3 when asset coverage was 1.4+:1 … asset coverage is just under 1.1:1 as of June 30.

My notes from yesterday attracted some comment on Financial Webring Forum:

To quote Preferred Share High Priest Hymas from his Prefblog of yesterday:

Let’s see: 250bp over long corporates, 10-year high and short-lived…

Need I say more?

Let’s hope people don’t come to their senses too fast

Well, I like flattery as much as anybody else … but remember my feelings about market timing! I may think that this episode is overblown, I may be able to show it’s a ten-year high, I may think that in the past spikes such as the current episode have been short-lived … but I don’t know anything. Markets teach you to be humble and not to get too greedy! So … well, if you’ve been looking for an entry point, now seems to be a good time! But don’t over-allocate (my rule of thumb is a maximum of 50% of the fixed income portion of your portfolio can go into prefs), don’t get greedy and don’t mortgage the house.

And FWF participant has a very good idea:

I’ve also been trying to swap ‘weak pairs’ of perpetuals that I already owned before the slide to book those losses. I may as well make a positive out of a negative.

This is smart thinking. ‘Weak Pairs’ were discussed in an article I published last year. They can even be extremely weak pairs … that is, it’s also reasonable to do this with PerpetualDiscounts from the same issuer as long as the coupon isn’t all that much different … maybe I’m being too fussy, but the more similar the elements of a swap, the better it is for a retail investor who doesn’t trade very much and doesn’t want to spend a lot of time on analysis.

Look …. say you own one of the RY low coupon issues and you’re sitting on a capital loss. Swapping it into another RY low coupon issue and crystallizing that loss for tax purposes is good business, as long as you don’t give up yield after paying commission. In this market, you might even be able to pick up a few basis points, if you show some discipline and watch the market.

As long as the coupons aren’t too different, and the issuer is the same, overall investment characteristics of the issues will be almost identical and (when following this particular example and swapping RY issues) then you can take advantage of the fact that the ex-dates are identical and trade off current yield rather than YTM. Just make absolutely sure when you do this that ex-Dates are identical! Some issuers have different dates for different issues.

Anyway … the markets. I’ve got some good news, some bad news and then some good news.

The good news BCE issues rocketted today on the BCE announcement that financing has been arranged.

The bad news is that PerpetualDiscounts got hammered again.

The good news is that the markets will be closed for the weekend.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.28% 2.86% 44,832 0.08 1 -0.1179% 1,118.4
Fixed-Floater 4.65% 4.36% 68,098 16.40 6 +7.7461% 1,091.5
Floater 4.02% 4.03% 52,442 17.37 3 +2.5946% 916.8
Op. Retract 4.94% 3.01% 176,996 2.64 17 -0.1576% 1,049.2
Split-Share 5.32% 6.09% 65,072 4.16 14 -0.2670% 1,037.8
Interest Bearing 6.11% 0.30% 45,157 1.99 3 +0.3381% 1,126.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.96% 5.89% 64,718 10.98 4 -0.1284% 1,006.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.12% 6.18% 249,371 13.65 67 -0.6236% 860.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -4.3005% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.16% based on a bid of 18.47 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount -3.4868% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.64% based on a bid of 20.76 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -3.4673% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 19.21 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -3.0263% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.33% based on a bid of 22.11 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.4038% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.33% based on a bid of 20.30 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -2.3976% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of June 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 9.77 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 a t 10.00.
PWF.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -2.3849% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.28% based on a bid of 23.33 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.J OpRet -2.2689% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.42% based on a bid of 23.26 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.H (5.20% to 2012-3-30), BAM.PR.I (5.55% to 2013-12-30) and BAM.PR.O (6.50% to 2013-6-30).
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -2.1067% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.41% based on a bid of 20.91 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.8667% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.17% based on a bid of 18.40 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.8639% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.39% based on a bid of 21.06 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.7176% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.32% based on a bid of 20.60 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.6894% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.29% based on a bid of 18.04 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.4674% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.64% based on a bid of 18.13 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.3895% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.60% based on a bid of 21.29 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.3041% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.13% based on a bid of 18.92 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.2973% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.19% based on a bid of 18.26 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.1260% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.20% based on a bid of 18.44 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.1200% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 18.54 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -1.0726% Asset coverage of just under 3.6:1 as of May 30 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.44% based on a bid of 20.29 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.03% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.C (7.33% to 2019-1-10).
NA.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.0661% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.41% based on a bid of 23.20 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat +6.6228%  
BCE.PR.A FixFloat +7.1741%  
BCE.PR.C FixFloat +7.1741%  
BCE.PR.I FixFloat +7.6923%  
BAM.PR.K Floater +8.0497%  
BCE.PR.G FixFloat +8.5650%  
BCE.PR.R FixFloat +9.2444%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TCA.PR.Y PerpetualDiscount 103,839 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 48.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.75% based on a bid of 48.20 and a limitMaturity.
FAL.PR.B Scraps (Would be FixFloat, but there are volume concerns) 150,037 Desjardins crossed 150,000 in two tranches at 24.80.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 80,011 RBC crossed 71,100 at 18.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.16% based on a bid of 18.47 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 77,711 RBC crossed 71,100 at 19.20. Gee, I wonder if this trade is somehow related to the cross of MFC.PR.C? Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 19.21 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 51,695 Anonymous – maybe not the same anonymous – bought three tranches of 10,000 shares each from RBC, at 17.90, 17.90 & 17.92. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.57% based on a bid of 17.95 and a limitMaturity.

There were sixteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: June, 2008

July 4th, 2008

Trading started off slowly in June, but two bursts of activity from June 10-13 (when spreads started widening) and June 27-30 brought portfolio turnover up to about 65%.

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may the thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2008-6-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 0.9% (0) 5.02% 4.48
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.3% (0) 5.54% 2.38
PerpetualDiscount 94.4% (-4.4) 6.35% 13.43
Scraps 0% N/A N/A
Cash 4.8% (+4.4) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 6.03% 12.67
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from May month-end.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2008-6-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 36.6% (-40.2)
Pfd-1(low) 40.2% (+29.0)
Pfd-2(high) 7.9% (+7.0)
Pfd-2 0.4% (0)
Pfd-2(low) 10.3% (-0.2)
Cash 4.8% (+4.4)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from May month-end.

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

The slight decline in credit quality is the result of a move from banks to insurers; in overall terms that do not reflect specific trades, a May month-end position of 7% BMO and 32% RY issues became 8% POW (Pfd-2(high)), 11% GWO (Pfd-1(low)) and 18% PWF (Pfd-1(low)).

The first trade I will examine comprises the largest single piece of the series of trades – unfortunately, it would have been better to delay:

Post Mortem: sale RY.PR.C, purchase GWO.PR.G
Date RY.PR.C GWO.PR.G
May 30
(bid)
$20.52
(yield: 5.65%)
$23.28
(yield: 5.58%)
Trade, 6/18
Price
Including
Commission
$19.33 $21.31
June 30
(bid)
$19.60
(yield: 5.95%)
$21.13
(yield: 6.20%)

Unfortunately, sometimes you’re just going to be too soon – particularly when you are trading on random noise … sometimes the random noise gets louder than usual, sometimes (in the worst case scenario) the so-called noise turns out to be a trend. HIMIPref™ simply plays the odds: with enough trades, actual results will reflect the statistics. At time of writing, RY.PR.C is bid at $19.05, while GWO.PR.G is bid at $20.84, so the trade results have improved since month-end – although it’s still underwater.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2008-6-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.5% (-0.3)
$50,000 – $100,000 0.7% (-10.8)
$100,000 – $200,000 47.2% (+19.1)
$200,000 – $300,000 29.0% (+5.9)
>$300,000 18.0% (-18.3)
Cash 4.4% (+4.4)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from May month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on CPD as of May month end. It is interesting to note:

  • MAPF credit quality is superior
  • MAPF liquidity is superior
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • But … MAPF is more exposed to PerpetualDiscounts

This last factor hurt performance in June and will be discussed when the performance is posted.

BCE / Teachers' : A Giant Step Closer

July 4th, 2008

BCE has announced:

BCE today announced the company has entered into a final agreement with a company formed by an investor group led by Teachers’ Private Capital, the private investment arm of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, Providence Equity Partners Inc., Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC, and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity.

As a result of the execution of the final agreement, amending the definitive agreement dated June 29, 2007:

  • The purchase price will remain $42.75 per common share;
  • The Purchaser and the Lenders have delivered fully negotiated and executed credit documents for the purpose of funding the transaction, including an executed credit agreement and other key financing documents;
  • The reverse break fee payable by the Purchaser in the circumstances contemplated by the definitive agreement has been increased to $1.2 billion;
  • Closing will occur on or before December 11, 2008; and
  • Prior to closing, the company will not pay dividends on its common shares but will continue to pay dividends on its preferred shares.

Well, the deal hasn’t closed until the money’s in the bank … but at this point I have to say that a successful closing looks pretty likely. It’s interesting that the break fee increased; presumably, that’s the concession won by BCE in exchange for cancelling the common dividend.

BCE has the following preferred shares outstanding: BCE.PR.A, BCE.PR.C, BCE.PR.D, BCE.PR.E, BCE.PR.F, BCE.PR.G, BCE.PR.H, BCE.PR.I, BCE.PR.R, BCE.PR.S, BCE.PR.T, BCE.PR.Y & BCE.PR.Z

The last dedicated PrefBlog entry in this saga was BCE / Teachers’ Deal : Chattering Classes Humiliated

July 3, 2008

July 3rd, 2008

The Penn National Gaming takeover has failed:

Penn National Gaming Inc. said Fortress Investment Group LLC and Centerbridge Partners LP scrapped their $6.1 billion plan to buy the racetrack and casino company as the credit markets collapsed.

Penn is the largest leveraged buyout agreement, including debt, to fall apart since J.C. Flowers & Co. backed out of an accord last year to purchase SLM Corp., also known as Sallie Mae, for $25.3 billion.

Penn said it will receive $225 million to terminate the takeover and a $1.25 billion interest-free loan.

“This transaction represents the company’s best alternative to the uncertainty of litigation,” Penn said.

And today I received an eMail from a reader gazing with lust in his eyes at the BCE issues! Said it before, I’ll say it again: BCE prefs are a speculation on the success of the Teachers’ deal. They are only a fixed income investment by courtesy, at this point.

Further, I noted yesterday that the US TruPS market was being hit by a CDO buyers’ strike. This could also, indirectly, make financing the BCE LBO more difficult:

Defaults on leveraged-buyout loans may rise as firms struggle to refinance about $500 billion of debt used to fund the takeovers, the Bank for International Settlements said.

Companies bought by private-equity firms worldwide must repay the high-risk, high-yield loans and bonds by 2010, the Basel, Switzerland-based bank said in a report today, citing Fitch Ratings data. They may find it hard to raise the cash because of a slump in demand for collateralized debt obligations that pool the loans, BIS said.

Investors are shunning structured debt instruments such as CDOs, the main buyers of leveraged loans, after the credit-market seizure caused by the U.S. subprime mortgage collapse, the BIS said. The ability of LBO firms to refinance may be crimped further as banks tighten lending criteria after reporting $402 billion of credit losses and asset writedowns.

The BIS report, Private Equity and Leveraged Finance Markets, is available online.

BIS has also published a report on the rating of structured finance: Ratings in Structured Finance: What Went Wrong and What Can Be Done to Address Shortcomings? which has been briefly discussed on PrefBlog.

In news that is certain to inflame the Internuts, the Fed has announced:

The Federal Reserve said the portfolio of Bear Stearns Cos. assets it accepted as part of the firm’s takeover by JPMorgan Chase & Co. is now worth $28.9 billion, down from the $30 billion estimated in March.

The central bank cut the “fair value” of the assets by 3.7 percent as of June 26, the Fed said today in Washington. The Fed loaned $28.8 billion last week to a company it formed to purchase the investments, which as of mid-March included debt backed by mortgages and other items JPMorgan deemed too risky to take on.

The Fed gave the fair-value estimate of Maiden Lane LLC’s holdings as part of its weekly report on its balance sheet today.

Details are posted with the July 3 H.4.1 Release.

Yet another thoroughly appalling day in what has become (as far as I can tell) a self-feeding panic. Today’s pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.14% is equivalent to 8.60% interest (at a conversion factor of 1.4x), which is now 250bp over long corporates. And it’s not too hard to get that 6.14% average from a big-name bank, either!

On the bright side, that 250bp represents a 10-year high and the previous high was very short-lived. We shall see!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.27% 2.40% 45,221 0.08 1 0.1180% 1,119.7
Fixed-Floater 5.01% 4.82% 65,307 15.86 6 -0.3459% 1,013.1
Floater 4.12% 4.13% 51,841 17.18 3 -1.1900% 893.6
Op. Retract 4.93% 3.05% 181,615 2.52 17 -0.1824% 1,050.9
Split-Share 5.31% 5.94% 65,987 4.17 14 +0.2282% 1,040.6
Interest Bearing 6.13% 4.22% 45,510 2.00 3 -0.2003% 1,123.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.95% 5.87% 63,877 8.31 4 -0.0200% 1,008.2
Perpetual-Discount 6.08% 6.14% 251,633 13.70 67 -0.6762% 866.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -3.3283% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 19.17 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.K Floater -3.0890% Closed at 18.51-20.19, 2×5 on volume of 420 shares.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -2.6480% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 18.75 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -2.3077% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.50% based on a bid of 21.59 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.R FixFloat -2.2589%  
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -2.2500% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.96% based on a bid of 19.55 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -2.1855% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.18% based on a bid of 18.35 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.1257% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.53% based on a bid of 20.72 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -2.0274% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.59% based on a bid of 17.88 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.9072% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.14% based on a bid of 19.03 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.9000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.29% based on a bid of 19.62 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.8957% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.33% based on a bid of 20.70 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.8767% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.18% based on a bid of 18.30 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.6940% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.07% based on a bid of 18.57 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.5960% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.75% based on a bid of 19.73 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.5957% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 18.50 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.5320% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 18.64 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -1.3015%  
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.2858% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 23.80 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.H (5.21% to 2012-3-30), BAM.PR.I (5.55% to 2013-12-30) and BAM.PR.O (6.40% to 2013-6-30).
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.2732% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.14% based on a bid of 18.61 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.2483% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.27% based on a bid of 21.36 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -1.1852% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.84% based on a bid of 22.51 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.0667% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.16% based on a bid of 18.55 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.0633% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 19.54 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.0132% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.82% based on a bid of 22.47 and a limitMaturity. 29bp through the Royals?
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +1.2821% Asset coverage of just under 3.6:1 as of May 30 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.33% based on a bid of 19.75 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.03% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (8.25% to 2016-3-25).
BNA.PR.B SplitShare +1.8877% See above.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +2.2495% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.28% based on a bid of 20.00 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 390,050 Desjardins crossed 68,500 at 21.00, then Nesbitt crossed 309,200 in three tranches at 20.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.77% based on a bid of 20.84 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount 87,943 National Bank crossed 82,000 at 23.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.79% based on a bid of 23.06 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 55,830 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 21.80. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.12% based on a bid of 21.75 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 39,375 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.59% based on a bid of 17.88 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 34,300 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 18.70. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.14% based on a bid of 18.61 and a limitMaturity.

There were nineteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

GFV.PR.A: Normal Course Issuer Bid

July 3rd, 2008

Global 45 Split Corp. has announced:

acceptance by the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) of the Company’s Notice of Intention to make a Normal Course Issuer Bid for its Preferred Shares and Class A Shares (collectively, the “Shares”).

Under this normal course issuer bid, the Company may purchase, from time to time, if it is considered advisable, up to 135,258 Preferred Shares and 135,258 Class A Shares, representing approximately 10% of the public float of the Shares, which is the same number as the Company’s issued and outstanding Shares, being 1,352,582 Preferred Shares and 1,352,582 Class A Shares as of the date hereof.

Under its previous normal course issuer bid, which commenced on July 5, 2007 and which expires on July 4, 2008, the Company has purchased and cancelled a total of 12,900 Preferred Shares and 12,900 Class A Shares at an average price of $10.5257 per Preferred Share and $14.7213 per Class A Share.

So … they did buy back some of their issue with the last bid, which plays a large role in my decision to post about the current bid. But don’t get too excited … according to First Asset, NAV as of June 26 was $22.14, while the TSX shows last trades of $12.25 for the capital units and $10.06 for the preferreds.

GFV.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

HPF.PR.A & HPF.PR.B: Massive Retraction

July 3rd, 2008

Lawrence Asset Management has announced:

that 680,998 HI PREFS Series 1 Shares (TSX: HPF.PR.A) and 207,662 HI PREFS Series 2 Shares (TSX: HPF.PR.B) were submitted for the annual redemption on June 30, 2008. Subsequent to the annual redemption there are 410,956 Series 1 Shares issued and outstanding and 800,792 Series 2 Shares issued and outstanding.

The redemption proceeds will be paid to Series 1 and Series 2 shareholders who participated in the annual redemption on or before July 15, 2008. Series 1 shareholders will receive redemption proceeds of $25.00 per Series 1 Share submitted for redemption and Series 2 shareholders will receive redemption proceeds of $11.11 per Series 2 Share submitted for redemption.

This is very curious. The prospectus states:

The Series 1 Shares, Series 2 Shares and Equity Shares are offered separately, but will be issued only on the basis that there will be an equal number of Series 1 Shares, Series 2 Shares and Equity Shares issued.

… but note the word “issued”. The section titled “Redemption” is more forthcoming:

In the event that any Series 1 Shares, Series 2 Shares or Equity Shares are tendered for redemption on a Redemption Date, the Company will purchase in the market for cancellation Series 1 Shares, Series 2 Shares and/or Equity Shares, as applicable, (or if the Equity Shares are not traded on a public market, redeem Equity Shares at an amount per share equal to the greater of the Net Asset Value per Equity Share and $3.54) in order that, to the extent practicable, the ratio of outstanding securities of each class remains constant.

… but note the phrase “to the extent practicable”.

Want to figure this one out? Why not try listening to the conference call previously mocked on PrefBlog?

Their fund page states:

On June 30, 2008, HI PREFS has its annual redemption feature. To listen to the replay of a conference call hosted by the Manager discussing the upcoming redemption please call 416-695-5800 / 1-800-408-3053, passcode 3262786.

Calling either number provided and tapping in the passcode results in a message that the passcode is invalid.

I’ve asked it before … I’ll ask it again: Is there anything about this issue that is not wierd?

Thank heavens that HPF.PR.A is finally out of the HIMIPref™ index. I never liked it … it was there only because volume was sufficient and DBRS insists it’s still investment grade despite the dividend default. With roughly two-thirds of the issue now having retracted, I can only hope that it continues to be eliminated from consideration due to volume concerns.

Update: See also entries for HPF.PR.A and HPF.PR.B

BIS Releases Report on Credit Rating Agencies

July 3rd, 2008

The Bank for International Settlements has announced the release of a report, Ratings in structured finance: what went wrong and what can be done to address shortcomings?, from a study group chaired by Nigel Jenkinson Executive Director, Financial Stability of the Bank of England.

In sharp contrast to the IOSCO Report on CRAs, this report actually contains and addresses industry criticism of the report’s recommendations.

The recommendations are:

  • Investment fund trustees and managers should review their internal procedures and guidelines concerning how ratings information on SF products is used in their investment mandates and decisions.
  • Rating reports should be presented in a way that facilitates comparisons of risk within and across classes of different SF products.
  • Rating agencies should provide clearer information on the frequency of rating updates.
  • More user-friendly access to CRA SF models and their documentation should be provided. Rating models made available by CRAs should facilitate the conducting of “what if?” analysis or stress tests by users on key model parameters.
  • CRAs should document the sensitivity of SF tranche ratings to changes in their central assumptions regarding default rates, recovery rates and correlations.
  • CRAs should clearly and regularly disclose to investors their economic assumptions underlying the rating of SF products.
  • Limited historical data on underlying asset pools should be clearly disclosed as adding to model risk, as should any adjustment made to mitigate this risk.
  • CRAs should monitor more intensively the performance of the various agents involved in the securitisation process,
  • CRAs should periodically consider the wider systemic implications of a rapid growth of similar instruments or vehicles, or of new business undertaken by existing vehicles, for the continued robustness of their original ratings criteria
  • CRAs should consider how to incorporate additional information on the risk properties of SF products into the rating framework.

Everybody liked the first recommendation. It’s motherhood, after all … and the organizations that have ignored it in the past will ignore it in the future.

It is felt that providing information on what events would spark a review would be useful; but providing a schedule of future reviews would just lead to information overload.

The CRAs objected to disclosure of limited historical data, apparently fearing that this would lead to a box-ticking exercise amongst investors – such investors would ignore the possibility of structural breaks compromising the utility of historical data when it did exist.

The more intensive monitoring of agents in the securitization process was thought to be rather ambitious. That’s the regulators’ job!

Systemic implications are rather problematic – CRAs fear that it will become their responsibility to prick asset bubbles.

A separate rating scale was felt to be costly and cosmetic. A separate volatility indicator was thought to be genuinely useful.

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: June 2008

July 3rd, 2008
HIMI Index Changes, June 30, 2008
Issue From To Because
FAL.PR.B FixFloat Scraps Volume
POW.PR.C PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
BNS.PR.O PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
PWF.PR.H PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
BMO.PR.L PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
CU.PR.B PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
NA.PR.M PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
TD.PR.R PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
PWF.PR.G PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
HPF.PR.A SplitShare Scraps Volume
ACO.PR.A Scraps OpRet Volume
TRI.PR.B Scraps Floater Volume
CU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during June 2008
Issue Action Index Because
BAM.PR.O Add OpRet New Issue
L.PR.A Add Scraps New Issue

Issues in the PerpetualPremium Index are looking awfully lonely!

Research: Credit Stratification

July 2nd, 2008

Sometimes, one big bank is as good as another – at least, according to the market prices of their preferred shares. Right now, they’re not. I review the issue in an article published in Canadian Moneysaver. Look for the research link!