Archive for December, 2007

December 12, 2007

Wednesday, December 12th, 2007

James Hamilton of Econbrowser took a look at yesterday’s market action and got confused:

the January fed funds futures contract, which historically has proven to be an excellent predictor of the monthly average fed funds rate. This had been trading at 4.18% prior to the meeting. Since the FOMC is not scheduled to meet again until January 29/30, one might have read this as implying a 30% chance of having seen a 50-basis-point cut from yesterday’s meeting:

But here’s the curious thing: as of this writing, the price of that contract still has not budged more than half a basis point from where it stood at the close of trading last Friday. Fed funds futures traders seem not to have been surprised in the least by the outcome of Tuesday’s meeting.

If that’s the case, then why did the stock market appear to be so shocked that the Fed only cut its target yesterday by 25 basis points?Here’s the official Econbrowser answer– Beats me!

Fitch has placed a monoline insurer on Watch Negative:

This action follows completion of the updated assessment by Fitch of SCA’s exposure to structured finance collateralized debt obligations (SF CDOs) backed by subprime mortgage collateral, as well as SCA’s exposure to residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). This review indicates that SCA’s capital adequacy under Fitch’s Matrix financial guaranty capital model currently falls below guidelines for an ‘AAA’ IFS rating by more than $2 billion, due to sharp downgrades by Fitch in a number of SCA’s insured SF CDO exposures. Fitch originally announced it was conducting a review of all ‘AAA’ rated financial guarantors’ exposures to subprime-exposed insured transactions on Nov. 5, 2007.

If within the next 4-6 weeks, SCA is able to obtain firm capital commitments, and/or put in place reinsurance or other risk mitigation measures in order to meet capital guidelines, Fitch would expect to affirm SCA’s ratings with a Stable Rating Outlook. If SCA is unable to meet capital guidelines in the noted timeframe, Fitch would expect to downgrade SCA’s ratings. Based on the result of our updated capital analysis, Fitch would expect the IFS rating to be downgraded to the ‘AA’ rating category, assuming little change to the company’s current capital position. Fitch understands that SCA is actively working to address its current capital shortfall.

So, in other words, Security Capital has to get $2-billion in equity in the next 4-6 weeks or they’re basically out of business. When your business consists of renting out your credit rating, it can’t have any dents in it.

What’s a monoline insurer, you ask? Well, S&P has the answer!

Monoline insurer—An insurer that writes only financial guaranty insurance.

Multiline insurer—An insurer that writes many types of property and casualty insurance.

Today’s big news was the Central Bank USD Term Repo Extravaganza:

The Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and three other central banks moved in concert to alleviate a credit squeeze threatening global growth, in the biggest act of international economic cooperation since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

For example, the Swiss:

In addition to its Swiss franc open market operations, the Swiss National Bank will offer a US dollar repo transaction on 17 December 2007. The maximum amount offered will be USD 4 billion. The USD repo transaction against SNB-eligible collateral will be conducted in the form of a variable rate tender auction and will provide funds for 28 days, with settlement on 20 December 2007. This measure is intended to facilitate the US dollar funding of SNB counterparties in the Swiss repo system.

… the Canadians

As part of its continuing provision of liquidity in support of the efficient functioning of financial markets, the Bank of Canada announced today that it will enter into term purchase and resale agreements (term PRA) extending over the calendar year-end as follows:

Amount Transaction and Settlement Maturity
$2 billion 13 December 2007 10 January 2008
Minimum of $1 billion 18 December 2007 4 January 2008

… the Britons

The Bank of England has already scheduled long-term repo open market operations (OMOs) on 18 December and 15 January. In those operations reserves will, as usual, be offered at 3, 6, 9 and 12-month maturities against the Bank’s published list of eligible collateral. But the total amount of reserves offered at the 3-month maturity will be expanded and the range of collateral accepted for funds advanced at this maturity will be widened.

The total size of reserves offered in the operations on 18 December and on 15 January will be raised from £2.85 billion to £11.35 billion, of which £10bn will be offered at the 3-month maturity.

… the Europeans

The Governing Council of the ECB has decided to take joint action with the Federal Reserve by offering US dollar funding to Eurosystem counterparties.

The Eurosystem shall conduct two US dollar liquidity-providing operations, in connection with the US dollar Term Auction Facility, against ECB-eligible collateral for a maturity of 28 and 35 days. The submission of bids will take place on 17 and 20 December 2007 for settlement on 20 and 27 December 2007, respectively. The operational details can be obtained from the ECB’s website (www.ecb.europa.eu). The US dollars will be provided by the Federal Reserve to the ECB, up to $20 billion, by means of a temporary reciprocal currency arrangement (swap line).

It is reminded that the Governing Council previously decided on 8 November 2007 to renew at maturity the two supplementary longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) that were allotted in August and September 2007. As an additional measure, the Governing Council decided on 13 November to lengthen the maturity of the main refinancing operation settling on 19 December 2007 to two weeks, thereby maturing on 4 January 2008 instead of 28 December 2007.

… all supported by the Fed:

Actions taken by the Federal Reserve include the establishment of a temporary Term Auction Facility (approved by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) and the establishment of foreign exchange swap lines with the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank (approved by the Federal Open Market Committee). 

Under the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program, the Federal Reserve will auction term funds to depository institutions against the wide variety of collateral that can be used to secure loans at the discount window.  All depository institutions that are judged to be in generally sound financial condition by their local Reserve Bank and that are eligible to borrow under the primary credit discount window program will be eligible to participate in TAF auctions.  All advances must be fully collateralized.  By allowing the Federal Reserve to inject term funds through a broader range of counterparties and against a broader range of collateral than open market operations, this facility could help promote the efficient dissemination of liquidity when the unsecured interbank markets are under stress.

Each TAF auction will be for a fixed amount, with the rate determined by the auction process (subject to a minimum bid rate).  The first TAF auction of $20 billion is scheduled for Monday, December 17, with settlement on Thursday, December 20; this auction will provide 28-day term funds, maturing Thursday, January 17, 2008.  The second auction of up to $20 billion is scheduled for Thursday, December 20, with settlement on Thursday, December 27; this auction will provide 35-day funds, maturing Thursday, January 31, 2008.  The third and fourth auctions will be held on January 14 and 28, with settlement on the following Thursdays.  The amounts of those auctions will be determined in January.  The Federal Reserve may conduct additional auctions in subsequent months, depending in part on evolving market conditions.

If this doesn’t tame the TED Spread, now at its widest levels since the crash of ’87, ain’t nuthin’ gonna do it! Initial reactions are favourable and Naked Capitalism has the news that LIBOR fell immediately:

Laurent Fransolet at Barclays Capital said Libor rates could be fixed lower in the days ahead by as much as 20 basis points.
The biggest impact will likely be seen in sterling rates, where higher fixings have had “the strongest, most direct” effect, and the most limited in the euro zone.
But it will take time for the recent market carnage to heal.
“While this would still be way above pre-crisis levels, we suspect it will be difficult for the market to fully recover in the near term. After all, the ABCP market in the U.S. is about 30 percent smaller than at its peak and that of the euro area has almost halved, making the combined shrinkage more than $500 billion over the past five months,” he wrote in a note.
If Libor rates do fall Thursday, it will be the first downward move in three-month euro Libor for over a month. 
But who’s fault is all this, anyway? The debate continues.        

On a more local scale, readers who share my fascination with the continuing David Berry saga will doubtless be interested in the actual Berry notice of motion that was heard by RS on December 10. I am advised that factums, etc., submitted to the hearing panel are TOP SECRET. Next time you hear a regulator blather about transparency and disclosure, remember this.

I am unable to determine how the MUH.PR.A Shareholders Meeting acted regarding the proposed term extension. I hope to have definitive information tomorrow.

Accrued Interest has serious doubts about whether Washington Mutual can survive (he previously posted about selling his position, and poses the interesting thought:

WaMu is also likely to test whether a large bank can operate with a below-investment grade bond rating. Many investors, myself included, always assumed that banks were likely to do whatever it took to maintain a high credit rating, because cost of funds is so important to their basic business model. While WaMu does not currently have a junk rating, the cost of any new debt will be at junk-type levels. If WaMu can operate while paying junk-type levels on its debt, that will change many perceptions about banks and the value of a rating.

I note that Moody’s downgraded Washington Mutual Bank:

Moody’s Investors Service downgraded by two notches the long-term ratings of Washington Mutual, Inc. (senior to Baa2 from A3) and its subsidiaries including the lead thrift Washington Mutual Bank (financial strength rating to C- from C+ and long-term deposits to Baa1 from A2). The short-term rating at the thrift was lowered to Prime-2 from Prime-1. Washington Mutual, Inc.’s short-term rating remains unchanged at Prime-2. Moody’s placed a stable rating outlook on all Washington Mutual (WaMu) entities.

Baa2 isn’t exactly a great rating for a bank. Fitch took them to A- (Long Term Issuer Default Rating), noting:

The actions announced today are consistent with prudent management during a difficult business environment. Fitch’s Negative Outlook is meant to signal the continuing uncertainty that surrounds this unusual environment and its ultimate impact on WM’s ability to weather through with sustained financial flexibility commensurate with an ‘A-‘ IDR. No doubt, completion of the capital raising efforts together with the dividend reduction is a meaningful positive contributor to WM’s flexibility over the near to intermediate term.

The rating incorporates the expectation for further, meaningful asset quality deterioration in the residential mortgage portfolio and moderate softening in other consumer exposures, including credit card. These factors will result in notable earnings pressure over the near term, with moderate net losses possible. However, substantial or sustained losses (excluding the GW writedown) would likely translate into a further ratings downgrade.

But, why worry about a financial melt-down when you can have a real one?

“Attacking the regulator, taking [it] out of the process, is going to make the problem worse,” deputy Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff said Tuesday, responding to Harper’s assertion that the nuclear watchdog’s legislative authority should take a back seat to the urgent need for radioisotopes.”

There will be no nuclear accident,” Harper answered in the Commons. “What there will be … is a growing crisis in the medical system here in Canada and around the world if the Liberal party continues to support the regulator obstructing this reactor from coming back on line.”

Harper’s take-over of the nuclear regulatory function makes me feel all warm and fuzzy. I’m positively glowing!

An active day in the preferred market, but PerpetualDiscounts fell for the first time since November 27.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.01% 5.00% 93,741 15.49 2 -0.0205% 1,048.3
Fixed-Floater 4.83% 4.94% 93,839 15.58 8 -0.2182% 1,031.3
Floater 5.93% 5.94% 101,722 14.03 2 -4.2273% 813.2
Op. Retract 4.88% 3.66% 82,185 3.63 16 +0.0230% 1,033.4
Split-Share 5.30% 6.12% 102,013 4.06 15 -0.0095% 1,027.2
Interest Bearing 6.26% 6.60% 68,373 3.70 4 +0.0256% 1,062.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.79% 4.58% 83,495 5.03 11 +0.2549% 1,017.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.47% 5.52% 371,708 14.39 55 -0.1713% 928.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -5.4084%  
BAM.PR.B Floater -3.0842%  
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.5375% Asset coverage of 3.7+:1 as of November 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.77% based on a bid of 18.82 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.14% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (6.67% to 2016-3-25).
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.5982% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.64% based on a bid of 21.55 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.3478% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 22.69 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat -1.2677%  
BCE.PR.R FixFloat -1.0242%  
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.0115% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.70% based on a bid of 21.53 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
GWO.PR.F PerpetualPremium 191,715 TD crossed 183,700 at 26.45. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.92% based on a bid of 26.01 and a call 2012-10-30 at 25.00.
IQW.PR.C Scraps (Would be OpRet but there are credit concerns) 165,665 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 129.00% based on a bid of 20.50 and a softMaturity 2008-2-29 at 25.00 AND on getting all the coupons. Could be a good equity substitute.
CM.PR.R OpRet 152,400 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.80, then another 50,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.53% based on a bid of 25.79 and a softMaturity 2013-4-29 at 25.00.
PIC.PR.A SplitShare 235,959 RBC crossed 200,000 at 15.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.04% based on a bid of 15.00 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 124,419 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 20.42 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 101,325 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.48% based on a bid of 18.40 and a limitMaturity.

There were forty-eight other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

EN.PR.A Price Reset

Wednesday, December 12th, 2007

In line with the previously noted redemption of EN.PR.A, and the subdivision afterwards:

Immediately following the redemption of the ROC Preferred Shares and upon the completion of the reorganization, in order to maintain the ratio of Capital Yield Shares to ROC Preferred Shares of two-to-one, the Company will subdivide the remaining 650,131 ROC Preferred Shares such that there will be approximately 1.82 ROC Preferred Shares outstanding following the subdivision for every ROC Preferred Share outstanding immediately prior to the subdivision resulting in a total of 1,183,343 ROC Preferred Shares outstanding after the subdivision. ROC Preferred Shares are currently redeemable for a cash amount equal to the lesser of (i) $25.00 and (ii) Unit Value. After the subdivision, the outstanding ROC Preferred Shares will be redeemable for a cash amount equal to the lesser of (i) $13.74 and (ii) Unit Value and will be entitled to, effective December 16, 2007, quarterly fixed distributions of $0.1718. On an annualized basis, the new fixed distribution would represent a yield of 5.00% on the redemption price of $13.74.

… the TSE has reset the price to 13.324. They closed today at 12.77-20.99 (!) on zero volume.

Update, 2007-12-13: The HIMIPref™ database has been adjusted to reflect the change. A reorgDataEntry has been processed to reflect a change in securityCode from A43140 to A43141 at a rate of 182 new for 100 old.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : July 2004

Wednesday, December 12th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2004-07-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,344.4 1 2.00 2.50% 21.0 65M 2.52%
FixedFloater 2,199.4 8 2.00 2.31% 19.7 66M 5.26%
Floater 1,949.3 6 2.00 0.00% 0.1 54M 2.91%
OpRet 1,741.1 22 1.46 3.77% 3.8 113M 4.80%
SplitShare 1,776.9 14 1.79 4.06% 3.6 56M 5.25%
Interest-Bearing 2,140.3 10 2.00 5.47% 0.7 110M 7.26%
Perpetual-Premium 1,362.0 31 1.61 5.08% 5.8 159M 5.55%
Perpetual-Discount 1,572.2 1 2.00 5.48% 14.5 135M 5.52%

Index Constitution, 2004-07-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2004-07-30, Post-rebalancing

December 11, 2007

Tuesday, December 11th, 2007

The Fed cut rates by 25bp, to 4.25%.

Many were disappointed it wasn’t 50bp.

Stocks tanked.

But bonds benefitted from asset reallocation, even in Canada.

‘Nuff said?

A very active day in the preferred market, but with no major trends. The poor old BAM floaters finally caught a bid!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.99% 4.98% 94,740 15.49 2 -0.0817% 1,048.5
Fixed-Floater 4.82% 4.92% 93,864 15.61 8 +0.2844% 1,033.6
Floater 5.59% 5.69% 96,390 14.25 2 0.6526% 849.1
Op. Retract 4.87% 4.00% 81,251 3.68 16 +0.0733% 1,033.2
Split-Share 5.30% 6.25% 99,770 4.08 15 +0.0854% 1,027.3
Interest Bearing 6.26% 6.59% 68,952 3.49 4 +0.1298% 1,062.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.80% 5.33% 83,032 5.84 11 +0.0240% 1,014.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.46% 5.51% 368,938 14.61 55 +0.0586% 930.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.2452% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 23.00 and a limitMaturity.
PIC.PR.A SplitShare -1.1170% Asset coverage of just under 1.7:1 as of December 6, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.91% based on a bid of 15.05 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-01 at 15.00.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.0566% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 23.41 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.0177% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.44% based on a bid of 18.86 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat +1.2840%  
BCE.PR.R FixFloat +1.3704%  
BAM.PR.B Floater +1.2840%  
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.8993% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.29% based on a bid of 21.46 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BCE.PR.R FixFloat 144,480  
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 143,409 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.58% based on a bid of 20.47 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.T FixFloat 139,490  
WN.PR.A Scraps (would be PerpetualDiscount but there are credit concerns) 135,915 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.88% based on a bid of 18.57 and a limitMaturity. Compare with Dec. 5 quotations and current values for WN.PR.C (7.51%), WN.PR.D (7.33%) & WN.PR.E (7.43%).
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 128,005 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.45% based on a bid of 18.83 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 124,160 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 21.34 and a limitMaturity.
IQW.PR.C Scraps (would be OpRet but there are credit concerns) 123,700 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 136.24% (annualized!) based on a bid of 20.25 and a softMaturity 2008-2-29 at 25.00. Somebody trying an arbitrage despite the dividend suspension? The common is at a mere $2.45 at the close today … the floor conversion price is $2.00 … but I still say an attractive package can be put together if you guard against soaring common prices with call options!
MIC.PR.A PerpetualPremium 101,100 Will be redeemed December 31.
GWO.PR.F PerpetualPremium 100,651 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.00% based on a bid of 25.92 and a call 2012-10-30 at 25.00.

There were fifty-three other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

ABK.PR.C to be Redeemed on Schedule in March 2008

Tuesday, December 11th, 2007

Allbanc Split Corp has announced:

that its Board of Directors has approved a proposal to reorganize the Company. The reorganization will permit holders of Class A Capital Shares to extend their investment in the Company beyond the redemption date of March 10, 2008 for up to an additional 5 years. The Class A Preferred Shares will be redeemed on the same terms originally contemplated in their share provisions. Holders of Class A Capital Shares who do not wish to extend their investment and all holders of Class A Preferred Shares will have their shares redeemed on March 10, 2008.

The reorganization will involve (i) the extension of the originally scheduled redemption date, (ii) a special retraction right to enable holders of Class A Capital Shares to retract their shares as originally contemplated should they not wish to extend their investment and (iii) the creation of a new class of shares to be known as the Class B Preferred Shares in order to provide continuing leverage for the Class A Capital Shares. The reorganization will be subject to receipt of all necessary regulatory approvals.

A special meeting of holders of Class A Capital Shares has been called and will be held on January 25, 2008 to consider and vote upon the reorganization. Details of the proposed reorganization will be outlined in an information circular to be prepared and delivered to holders of Class A Capital Shares in connection with the special meeting.

So – the pondering that commenced October 25 has resulted in a proposed term-extension for the Capital Shares, but not for the preferreds – given that the NAVPU is $196.93 as of December 6, giving asset coverage of 3.23:1, they should be able to issue a larger amount of preferreds while maintaining asset coverage in the 2.2:1 area.

ABK.PR.C is tracked by HIMIPref™ with the securityCode A33000. It is not included in the SplitShare index due to volume concerns.

Many thanks to the Assiduous Reader who brought this news release to my attention!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : June, 2004

Tuesday, December 11th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2004-06-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,344.9 1 2.00 2.53% 21.0 79M 2.54%
FixedFloater 2,163.1 8 2.00 2.44% 19.5 76M 5.31%
Floater 1,956.4 6 2.00 0.00% 0.1 65M 2.89%
OpRet 1,717.8 22 1.46 3.95% 3.8 124M 4.85%
SplitShare 1,756.1 15 1.80 4.34% 3.7 73M 5.31%
Interest-Bearing 2,112.2 10 2.00 5.46% 0.8 125M 7.36%
Perpetual-Premium 1,332.6 26 1.54 5.39% 6.1 174M 5.65%
Perpetual-Discount 1,539.0 6 2.00 5.61% 14.4 143M 5.62%

Index Constitution, 2004-06-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2004-06-30, Post-rebalancing

Welcome, Omega Preferred Equity!

Tuesday, December 11th, 2007

I issued a press release today:

Hymas Investment Management Welcomes a Preferred Share Competitor

TORONTO, Dec. 11 /CNW/ – James Hymas, president of Hymas Investment Management Inc., welcomed the announcement of Canada’s second actively managed mutual fund concentrated on preferred shares.

“Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has, since its inception in March, 2001, shown the value of active management in the preferred share marketplace. While the new Omega Preferred Equity Fund has a mandate allowing for investment in a wide variety of asset classes, the fund sponsor has announced the intention to concentrate on preferred shares. I will be watching them build their performance track-record with keen interest,” he said.

Mr. Hymas commenced his fixed income portfolio management career in 1992, with Greydanus, Boeckh & Associates Inc. At the time of the firm’s sale in 1999, he was Chief Operating Officer, with portfolio management responsibilities for the firm’s $1.7-billion under management. Since founding Hymas Investment Management Inc. in 2000, he has devoted himself to developing analytical frameworks for the analysis of Canadian preferred shares; he writes a daily blog providing news of interest to preferred share investors at http://www.prefblog.com/.

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund is available to accredited investors across Canada. Full documentation is available through the Hymas Investment Management website at http://www.himivest.com/.

The statements and analyses in this press release are based on material believed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. (“HIMI”) to be reliable, but cannot be guaranteed to be accurate or complete. The views expressed herein should not be construed as constituting investment, legal or tax advice to any investor, nor as an offer or solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any of the securities mentioned herein. Such views are provided for information purposes only, and neither HIMI nor any of its directors, officers or shareholders accept any liability for investment decisions which are based upon the information contained or views expressed herein. Particular investments and investing strategies should be evaluated relative to each investor’s individual financial situation, investment objectives and risk tolerances, among other factors, and this evaluation should be made by the investor in conjunction with his or her investment and other appropriate advisors. HIMI and its directors, officers and shareholders may from time to time hold long or short positions in the securities discussed in this press release, either on their own behalf or on behalf or individual client accounts or investment funds managed by HIMI.

For further information: James Hymas, (416) 604-4204, jiHymas@himivest.com

It’s always nice to have some company! Hopefully, National Bank’s massive publicity budget will grow the space a little!

December 10, 2007

Monday, December 10th, 2007

My quotation from the Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust prospectus on December 7 was well received, with both Econbrowser and Calculated Risk kind enough to credit me in their posts. My interest was more regarding the investor in the conduits being concerned the cash flows from the pool were being reduced; these two commenters are more interested in Treasury involvement.

It seems that the legal structure for these investments is a REMIC – real estate mortgage investment conduit, which has to be brain-dead in order to qualify for advantageous tax treatment. Without some assurance from the IRS that The Plan would not disqualify the conduit, there would be no plan – however, some such assurance is expected shortly; no great surprise since Paulson runs Treasury and Treasury runs IRS.

Calculated Risk also provides commentary on the involvement of FHA & FHASecure in The Plan.

Meanwhile, reverberations about the entire sub-prime fiasco continue, with UBSWashington Mutual and MBIA announcing major equity infusions today. Meanwhile, Bank of America is winding up an Enhanced Money Market Fund that broke the buck on SIV paper, SocGen is consolidating a SIV onto its books and good old MLEC/Super-Conduit is being ridiculed as too little, too late.

Accrued Interest thinks we’ll see more of this:

However, my view is that this won’t be the end of MBIA’s need for more capital. MBIA has about $84 billion in residential ABS and “multi-sector” CDOs, vs. about $82 billion with AMBAC. I recently estimated that AMBAC would need $2-3 billion in new capital, so I’d suspect that before this is all said and done, MBIA comes back to the market for more. Note I didn’t say that MBIA would get downgraded. I have a strong suspicion that the bond insurers have been tipped off by Moody’s and Fitch as to how the capital adequacy studies are going. I further suspect that any capital improvements you hear about in the coming days are over and above what Moody’s and Fitch will announce (supposedly next week) is needed.

David Dodge used a speech at the Empire Club to plug the Financial System Review article on the credit rating agencies. He also lends a certain amount of support to calls for repeal of the credit agencies favoured position with respect to material non-public information (in the US, this means exemption from Regulation FD; I don’t know what the legal framework is in Canada):

Let me touch briefly on the role of credit-rating agencies in all of this. There is an article in the current FSR that expands on the issues related to the possible reform of the credit-rating process. One thing that is clear is that in the future, credit-rating agencies will find it to their advantage to explain more clearly the rationale for, and limitations of, their ratings for highly structured products. There are some natural, self-correcting market forces at work that should lead the rating agencies to improve their processes. Indeed, those credit-rating agencies that do not work harder to improve their processes will likely have fewer clients willing to pay for their services. As I understand it, most agencies are working on such improvements.

But credit-rating agencies are not to blame for the lack of information about those highly structured products that were sold to highly-sophisticated investors in the so-called exempt market. In the retail market, securities regulators impose strict requirements about the information that must be provided through a prospectus or term sheet. But there are no such requirements in the exempt market. It seems to me that some very basic disclosure is needed in every market. And since securities designed for the exempt market are usually required to carry a rating from a credit-rating agency, one way to ensure that appropriate information is available could be to require issuers to publicly disclose the same information that they make available to credit-rating agencies. In this way, investors would have access to the information they need in order to make informed decisions.

I’d like to see more discussion of this issue; removal of the special privilege might mean that everybody gets to see the information; it might mean that nobody gets to see the information.

For example, it is my understanding that the guarantee of Principal Protected Notes by international banks has a two-tiered price structure: you can get the guarantee with or without using the name of the guarantor in your advertising. In the current system, the credit rating agency can (I think) look at all the information and rate the notes while taking into account the non-public nature of the guarantee. In the proposed system, not even the credit rating agency would get to see the terms of the notes and the guarantor, unless it was all public and therefore more costly.  

I spent some time today at the David Berry hearing. You know why lawyers get paid so much? It’s because they have to listen to so much mind-numbing detail, that’s why. The part I heard was an assertion by RS staff that RS does indeed have authority to make a finding of misconduct should they wish to do so. This has been challenged by Mr. Berry on a variety of grounds including – as far as I can make out – that the TSE was not timely in changing its rules to reflect the hand-off of regulatory powers to RS and that, while Mr. Berry was employed by a Member of the TSE at the time of the alleged offence, he is not so employed now.

To my great astonishment, the documents presented to the panel hearing the case have not been published on the RS website.

I’ve found a bit more information on the Coleman Stipanovich story:

Stipanovich has worked for the board since 1999. Before that he was president of an investment consulting firm in Gainesville. He has worked for Paine Webber as a consultant and investment executive. He has a master of science degree in Criminal Justice Administration from Michigan State University and a bachelor of science in criminology from Florida State University.

Democrats have questioned why Stipanovich, whose brother is lobbyist and Republican strategist J.M. “Mac” Stipanovich, was hired. “This administration is taking the friends-and-family plan to the extreme,” Democratic Party spokesman Ryan Banfill said. “A $100-billion fund — it seems to me to be a no-brainer that you would do a national search.”

And a report – how accurate I don’t know – on his salary:

After seven years of overseeing Florida’s investment portfolio, Coleman Stipanovich suddenly resigned his $182,000 job moments ago amid upheaval over a massive withdrawal of the local government investment pool.

So let me see if I have this straight … the CEO of a fund with $184-billion in assets is being paid $182,000? And was hired without a national search? Not that a national search would have found anyone well qualified, because you don’t need to be a very well established portfolio manager – not boss of investment firm, I mean portfolio manager – to make more than $182,000 anyway.

I just lost all sympathy for the Florida municipalities – regardless of how much, if any, of the blame for their mess can be laid at Mr. Stipanovich’s door, they deserve exactly what they’re getting.

Another day of good volume and good performance by the perpetuals today.

Dear Santa, I have tried very hard all year to be a good Portfolio Manager. All I want for Christmas is to keep the month-to-date relative returns for the fund. Sincerely, JH. P.S., If you have any relative returns left over, of course, I’ll take them. JH.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.96% 4.95% 97,845 15.54 2 +0.0819% 1,049.4
Fixed-Floater 4.83% 4.92% 92,896 15.61 8 -0.1068% 1,030.7
Floater 5.63% 5.73% 89,503 14.19 2 -1.8102% 843.6
Op. Retract 4.87% 4.07% 80,630 3.80 16 -0.2002% 1,032.4
Split-Share 5.30% 5.97% 97,855 4.07 15 +0.0584% 1,026.5
Interest Bearing 6.27% 6.64% 69,233 3.70 4 -0.5730% 1,061.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.80% 5.34% 83,035 5.86 11 +0.1704% 1,014.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.46% 5.51% 364,562 14.61 55 +0.1104% 929.7
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -2.5455%  
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.9895% Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of December 7, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.18% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.36 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.6981% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.04% based on a bid of 26.05 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.4833% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 20.59 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.3514% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.55% based on a bid of 21.90 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat -1.2677%  
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.1135% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.51% based on a bid of 28.65 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.0829% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 23.75 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.0667%  
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.0050% Asset coverage of just under 2.4:1 as of November 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.57% based on a bid of 9.85 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.0412% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 23.29 and a limitMaturity.
CU.PR.A PerpetualPremium +1.1041% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 25.64 and a call 2012-3-31 at 25.00.
POW.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.1466% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.75% based on a bid of 24.70 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount +1.2956% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.34% based on a bid of 21.11 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.3572% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.50% based on a bid of 18.67 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +2.2030% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 23.66 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +2.5776% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.20% based on a bid of 19.50 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 143,372 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.55% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 124,829 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 20.59 and a limitMaturity.
BPO.PR.F Scraps (would be OpRet, but there are credit concerns) 105,244 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.28% based on a bid of 25.02 and a softMaturity 2013-3-30 at 25.00.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 92,464 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 21.05 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 64,085 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.51% based on a bid of 18.65 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 58,619 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.55% based on a bid of 21.90 and a limitMaturity.

There were forty other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Bank Regulatory Capital : Summary, October 2007

Monday, December 10th, 2007

This post will summarize the information previously given for the Big 6 Canadian Banks: RY, BNS, BMO, TD, CM, & NA

Capital Structure
October, 2007
  RY BNS BMO TD CM NA
Total Tier 1 Capital 23,383 20,225 16,994 15,645 12,379 4,442
Common Shareholders’ Equity 95.2% 81.5% 83.8% 131.5% 90.1% 95.0%
Preferred Shares 10.0% 8.1% 8.5% 6.2% 23.7% 9.0%
Innovative Tier 1 Capital Instruments 14.9% 13.6% 14.3% 11.1% 0% 11.4%
Non-Controlling Interests in Subsidiaries 0.1% 2.5% 0.2% 0.1% 1.1% 0.4%
Goodwill -20.3% -5.6% -6.7% -49.0% -14.9% -15.8%

Some readers might be interested in comparing these figures to CitiBank’s 3Q07 Report: Tier 1 Capital was – after all the horrid writedowns, and before the $7.5-billion infusion – $92,370-million (USD). Total Tier 1 Capital for the Canadian Big 6 is $93,068-million (CAD). Citibank has no perpetual preferreds outstanding. They do have something in Tier 1 Capital called “Qualify mandatorily redeemable securities of subsidiary trusts” – frankly, I don’t know what those are.

Tier 1 Issuance Capacity
October 2007
  RY BNS BMO TD CM NA
Equity Capital (A) 17,545 15,840 13,126 12,931 9,448 3,534
Non-Equity Tier 1 Limit (B=A/3) 5,848 5,280 4,375 4,310 3,149 1,178
Innovative Tier 1 Capital (C) 3,494 2,750 2,422 1,740 0 508
Preferred Limit (D=B-C) 2,354 2,530 1,953 2,570 3,149 670
Preferred Y/E Actual (E) 2,344 1,635 1,446 974+250 2,931 400
New Issuance Capacity (F=D-E) 10 895 507 1,346 218 270
 

It seems unlikely that we’ll see any RY issuance this year, but any of the others appear to be able to top things up, if conditions are right.  

We can now show the all important Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios!

        

Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios
October 2007

  Note RY BNS BMO TD CM NA
Equity Capital A 17,545 15,840 13,126 12,931 9,448 3,534
Risk-Weighted Assets B 247,635 218,300 178,687 152,519 127,424 49,336
Equity/RWA C=A/B 7.09% 7.3% 7.35% 8.48% 7.41% 7.16%
Tier 1 Ratio D 9.4% 9.3% 9.51% 10.3% 9.7% 9.0%
Capital Ratio E 11.5% 10.5% 11.74% 13.0% 13.9% 12.4%

TD’s figure needs to be taken with a grain of salt; their takeover of Commerce Bancorp is expected to reduce Tier 1 Capital to the 8.75%-9.00% range; presumably with a similar effect on the Equity Ratio and Total Capital Ratio.

Otherwise, it is interesting to note that CM has the best protected Preferreds (with “protection” defined solely in terms of the regulatory risk-weighted-assets and capital that is junior to preferreds) while RY has the least protected.

And again, for those interested, Citibank had (at the third quarter 2007) a Tier 1 Ratio of 7.32% and a Total Capital Ratio of 10.61%. It should be noted that regulatory ratios are not directly comparable between regulators, as the regulators have a certain amount of discretion in applying the internationally agreed guidelines.

BNS Tier 1 Capital : October 2007

Monday, December 10th, 2007

The Bank of Nova Scotia has released its Fourth Quarter Supplementary Information; I will analyze this in the same format as was has been recently done for CM, RY, NA, TD and BMO.

Step One is to analyze their Tier 1 Capital, reproducing the summary prepared last year:

BNS Capital Structure
October, 2007
& October 2006
  2007 2006
Total Tier 1 Capital 20,225 20,109
Common Shareholders’ Equity 81.5% 84.3%
Preferred Shares 8.1% 3.0%
Innovative Tier 1 Capital Instruments 13.6% 14.9%
Non-Controlling Interests in Subsidiaries 2.5% 2.2%
Goodwill -5.6% -4.3%

Next, the issuance capacity (from Part 3 of last year’s series):

BNS Tier 1 Issuance Capacity
October 2007
& October 2006
  2007 2006
Equity Capital (A) 15,840 16,509
Non-Equity Tier 1 Limit (B=A/3) 5,280 5,503
Innovative Tier 1 Capital (C) 2,750 3,000
Preferred Limit (D=B-C) 2,530 2,503
Preferred Y/E Actual (E) 1,635 600
New Issuance Capacity (F=D-E) 895 1,903
Items A, C & E are taken from the table
“Regulatory Capital”
of the supplementary information;
Note that Item A includes Goodwill and non-controlling interest
Item B is as per OSFI GuidelinesItems D & F are my calculations.

We can now show the all important Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios!

BNS
Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios
October 2007
& October 2006
  Note 2007 2006
Equity Capital A 15,840 16,509
Risk-Weighted Assets B 218,300 197,000
Equity/RWA C=A/B 7.3% 8.4%
Tier 1 Ratio D 9.3% 10.2%
Capital Ratio E 10.5% 11.7%
A is taken from the table “Issuance Capacity”, above
B, D & E are taken from the Supplementary Report
C is my calculation.

Note that, as with all banks examined thus far, the Equity/RWA ratio and Tier 1 Ratio have both deteriorated over the year; for BNS, CM, NA and RY the Total Capital Ratio has also declined. BNS’s Subordinated Debt outstanding has increased slightly over the past year.

It is disappointing to see the deterioration in the Equity/RWA ratio over the year – I consider this to be a measure of the safety of the preferred shares, as it is the “total risk” of the bank’s assets (as defined by the regulators) divided by the value of capital junior to preferreds (which therefore takes the first loss). It is by no means anything to lose a lot of sleep over, as it still remains strong – the preferreds are better protected than the sub-debt of a lot of global banks – but … geez, the direction’s wrong!

I won’t discuss the annual results to any great extent – there will be innumerable reports over the next few months released by analysts with a great deal more time to spend on the matter than I have.