Archive for November, 2008

The Preferred Way to Invest?

Tuesday, November 4th, 2008

I was quoted in a recent Investment Executive article with the captioned title.

November 3, 2008

Monday, November 3rd, 2008

Assiduous Readers will remember that the Fed’s balance sheet has been swollen as it has borrowed from Treasury and lent to … various third parties. The fact that Treasuries are being sold to finance the lending makes the various programmes monetarily neutral and therefore, to a first approximation, non-inflationary (inflation may still result if the process generates false signals regarding use of capital funds, but that’s a second order effect). Today the butcher’s bill came in:

The U.S. Treasury predicted it would borrow this quarter more than three times the amount initially forecast as weaker economic growth and the costs of a new bank rescue package swell the budget deficit.

Borrowing needs will rise to $550 billion in the three months to Dec. 31, compared with the $142 billion predicted in July, the Treasury said in a statement in Washington. That would be more than double the largest ever — a record $244 billion in new marketable debt in the first three months of this year.

I am an enthusiastic supporter of the Fed’s actions, but this is illustrative of the need for fiscal restraint in good times – which has been sorely lacking. At some point – as has happened in Taiwan with insurers and agency paper, as mentioned October 28 – the rest of the world will decide it has quite enough US paper, thank you very much, and then we’re all in trouble.

Econbrowser‘s (admittedly partisan) Menzie Chinn provides a comparison of the McCain and Obama tax ‘n’ stimulus plans:

Dr. Chinn also provides a link to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget’s Guide to Stimulus Proposals: The 2008 Presidential Election. I confess I have not investigated campaign or third-party reactions to this analysis – but it makes for good reading!

He also performs calculations based on analyses of the Tax Policy Centre:

I have added a bonus spreadsheet to the post regarding my essay on CPD.

A very strong day for PerpetualDiscounts, but volume returned to normal levels.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30.
The Fixed-Reset index was added effective 2008-9-5 at that day’s closing value of 1,119.4 for the Fixed-Floater index.
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 5.45% 5.54% 71,455 14.92 6 +0.4997% 959.1
Floater 6.74% 6.84% 48,590 12.70 2 +0.9284% 516.2
Op. Retract 5.28% 6.11% 129,514 4.00 15 +0.5423% 999.9
Split-Share 6.31% 10.79% 58,350 3.96 12 +0.1262% 932.8
Interest Bearing 8.13% 14.97% 61,714 3.26 3 -3.4615% 871.8
Perpetual-Premium N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Perpetual-Discount 6.77% 6.83% 178,900 12.80 71 +1.0859% 805.1
Fixed-Reset 5.35% 5.13% 906,342 15.13 11 +0.5319% 1,077.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
FIG.PR.A InterestBearing -7.4074% Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 based on Capital Unit NAV of 4.88 and 0.71 Capital Units per Preferred. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 12.41% based on a bid of 7.5 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-31 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.50-12, 5×1. Day’s range of 7.44-24.
BNA.PR.A SplitShare -6.8519% Asset coverage of just under 2.8:1 as of September 30 according to the company. Coverage now of 2.1+:1 based on BAM.A at 21.96 and 2.4 BAM.A held per preferred. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 19.84% based on a bid of 20.12 and a hardMaturity 2010-9-30 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.B (10.12% to 2016-3-25) and BNA.PR.C (14.16% to 2019-1-10). Closing quote 20.12-70, 1×1. Day’s range 20.06-22.00.
BAM.PR.K Floater -6.6790%  
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -3.1683% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.77% based on a bid of 19.56 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 19.56-97, 14X1. Day’s range 20.00-06.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +3.0534% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.83% based on a bid of 16.76 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 16.76-25, 7×2. Day’s range of 16.50-75.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount +3.2719% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.58% based on a bid of 17.36 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 17.36-55, 4×1. Day’s range of 17.31-74.
BNS.PR.O PerpetualDiscount +3.4722% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.31% based on a bid of 22.35 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 22.35-89, 10×5. Day’s range of 22.00-90.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +4.0099% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.60% based on a bid of 21.01 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 21.01-49, 2×1. Day’s range of 20.41-21.50.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +4.0099% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.60% based on a bid of 21.01 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 18.73-99, 22X7. Day’s range of 18.49-99.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +4.1152% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.96% based on a bid of 17.71 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 17.71-69, 11×2. Day’s range of 17.24-18.69.
TD.PR.Y FixedReset +4.3497%  
BNA.PR.B SplitShare +4.7726 See BNA.PR.A, above. Closing quote of 18.66-20.55 (!) 13×7. Day’s range of 18.50-49
W.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +4.7953% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.92% based on a bid of 17.92 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 17.92-24, 3×1. Day’s range of 17.68-96.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +5.2016% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.20% based on a bid of 18.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 18.00-18, 6×20. Day’s range of 17.15-18.50.
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +5.5882% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.77% based on a bid of 17.95 and a limitMaturity. Closing Quote 17.95-73, 1×1. Day’s range of 17.75-50.
LBS.PR.A SplitShare +5.5901% Asset coverage of 1.7+:1 as of October 30 according to Brompton Group. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.14% based on a bid of 8.50 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00. Closing quote of 8.50-00, 2×1. Day’s range of 8.12-00.
BAM.PR.B Floater +8.0808%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
RY.PR.L FixedReset 418,820 National Bank crossed 175,000 at 24.70 and RBC bought three blocks of 10,000 each, from anonymous (24.74), Dundee (24.75) and CIBC (24.75). New issue, settled today.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 75,725 Nesbitt crossed 70,000 at 19.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.82% based on a bid of 19.36 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 25,370 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.65% based on a bid of 18.39 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 20,332 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.33% based on a bid of 17.85 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 17,500 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.41% based on a bid of 17.61 and a limitMaturity.

There were eighteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

RY.PR.L Fixed-Reset Settles: Trades Like Five-Year

Monday, November 3rd, 2008

The Royal Bank Fixed-Reset 5.60%+267 closed today, an event fraught with interest due to the question posed on October 28: “through or wide?”.

The problem, you see, is that the extant fixed-resets are all trading with a yield-to-five-year-call well in excess of the 5.60% dividend and simultaneously with a yield-to-limitMaturity well below the 5.60% dividend. Thus, if the market considers these issues to be five-years, the new Royal should trade at a discount to par; if it considers them to be perpetuals, at a premium. This is the first case where the initial fixed coupon and the subsequent resets were significantly enough different from extant issues to make such a comparison meaningful.

And the results are in! RY.PR.L traded 418,820 shares today and closed at 24.70-75. After accounting for underwriter support, we can draw a preliminary conclusion, based mainly on the fact that the issue trades at a discount to par: the market considers it to be a five year. Probably. The issues trade with less five year variance than perpetual variance but the results are not devoid of ambiguity … they never are! That’s what makes this fun!

RY.PR.L and some comparators
Ticker Fixed Reset Quote Yield
to
5-year call
Yield
to
limitMaturity
RY.PR.L 5.60% +267bp 24.70-75 5.90% 5.61%
TD.PR.Y 5.10% +168bp 23.75-99 6.29% 4.92%
RY.PR.I 5.00% +193bp 23.70-99 6.33% 5.15%
TD.PR.A 5.00% +196bp 23.45-00 6.59% 5.23%
TD.PR.S 5.00% +160bp 23.57-24.69 6.42% 4.86%

We’ll get another data point on Wednesday, when the TD 5.60%+274 settles.

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: October 2008

Sunday, November 2nd, 2008
HIMI Index Changes, October 31, 2008
Issue From To Because
PWF.PR.D Scraps OpRet Volume
CL.PR.B PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during October 2008
Issue Action Index Because
CGI.PR.A Delete Scraps Redeemed
IQW.PR.C Delete Scraps Price

After the precipituous decline in price of CL.PR.B over the month, it has been transferred to the PerpetualDiscount index from PerpetualPremium. There are now no more PerpetualPremium issues left … and don’t count on a new one in the near future, because the highest priced PerpetualDiscount right now is CU.PR.A, with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.35% based on a bid of 23.25 and a limitMaturity.

MAPF Portfolio Composition, October 2008

Sunday, November 2nd, 2008

Trading was heavy in October as a disorderly decline in a confused market brought many opportunities to the Fund. Turnover was approximately 200% for the month, but a high proportion of these trades were intra-issuer (trades between the CM issues were particularly frequent) and most others were intra-sector (PerpetualDiscounts rose at different rates).

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may the thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2008-10-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 21.1% (+2.6) 14.95% 4.45
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (-0.3) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 74.9% (-3.1) 7.19% 12.34
Scraps 0% N/A N/A
Cash +3.9% (+0.8) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 8.55% 10.20
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from September month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

The proportion of SplitShares held was due to a small trade executed to maximize holdings of WFS.PR.A when the price declined in early October. A post-mortem of this trade is:

Post-Mortem: BMO.PR.H to WFS.PR.A
  BMO.PR.H WFS.PR.A
9/30
Prices
21.10 9.00
Trade
10/7
Net of
Commission
20.97 8.22
10/31
Prices
19.03 7.71
Dividends
October
Missed
Dividend
0.33125
No
Dividend

So the return of BMO.PR.H since the trade has been -7.67% (including the dividend) while the return of WFS.PR.A has been -6.20%. Thus far, the trade has been successful.

The decline in price of WFS.PR.A is probably due to concerns over credit quality. Asset coverage over the period, according to Mulvihill has been:

WFS.PR.A Credit Quality
Date Asset
Coverage
September 30 1.546:1
October 9 1.324:1
October 16 1.382:1
October 23 1.360:1

As of June 30, according to Mulvihill, the underlying portfolio for WFS was:

  • Canada, 35.9%
  • United States, 23.3%
  • International, 23.0%
  • Cash & Other, 17.8%

Of the 93.2% of total assets held in equities, 17.6% was hedged with put options.

WFS.PR.A has a scheduled maturity of 2011-6-30, so the remaining term is just 2 years & 8 months. The price should be supported by a valuable monthly retraction privilege – but this is not happening for reasons I don’t understand. As a count against the position, it should be noted that DBRS has the issue under Credit Review Negative and it may be downgraded from its current Pfd-2(low) rating.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2008-10-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 75.2% (+20.5)
Pfd-1(low) 0.3% (-20.4)
Pfd-2(high) 0% (-3.5)
Pfd-2 0.4% (-0.1)
Pfd-2(low) 20.1% (+3.7)
Cash 3.9% (+0.8)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from September month-end.

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

The improvement in credit quality was driven largely by movement out of PWF and GWO issues (which comprised 18.7% of the portfolio on 9/30) into BMO (from 7.3% of the portfolio to 25.5%). BMO issues were hit by weakness in the latter part of the month and these quality improvements have not yet borne fruit: the quality spread continued to narrow to the point where the lower quality issues are trading at even-yield (or through!) the higher quality issues. On the positive side, there has been significant opportunity for trading amongst the BMO issues, so the effort has not been a total loss.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2008-10-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.6% (0)
$50,000 – $100,000 28.5% (+1.5)
$100,000 – $200,000 30.4% (-24.4)
$200,000 – $300,000 18.5% (+4.1)
>$300,000 18.0% (+18.0)
Cash 3.9% (+0.8)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from September month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on The Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 29. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is superior
  • MAPF liquidity is somewhat higher
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • But … MAPF is more exposed to PerpetualDiscounts and SplitShares
  • MAPF is less exposed to Fixed-Resets and Operating Retractibles

Best & Worst Performers: October 2008

Saturday, November 1st, 2008

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

October, 2008
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “October 30”)
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) -36.5385% Was also the worst performer in September – it has been hit not just by the general downdraft in BAM issues, but by expectations of continuing drops in prime. Is it any wonder it is starting to attract interest?
BAM.PR.K Floater Pfd-2(low) -34.6667% Also a poor performer in September.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing Pfd-2(low) -33.0673% Asset coverage of 0.9+:1 as of October 24 according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 17.21% based on a bid of 5.87 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00 … though as pointed out by Assiduous Reader prefhound, use of $10.00 maturity value is, at the very least, something of a leap of faith. Brookfield Funds has announced suspension of dividends for the capital units and suspension of retraction rights.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) -19.4846% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.46% based on a bid of 12.81 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) -19.3038% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.50% based on a bid of 12.75 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(high) -0.0971% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.57% based on a bid of 20.58 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.N FixedReset Pfd-1(low) +0.2053%  
ALB.PR.A SplitShare Pfd-2(low) +0.3040% Asset coverage of 1.5+:1 as of October 30 according to Scotia Managed Companies. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.29% based on a bid of 23.10 and a hardMaturity 2011-2-28 at 25.00.
BMO.PR.I OpRet Pfd-1 +0.4246% Called for redemption.
PWF.PR.D OpRet Pfd-1(low) +1.9405% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.05% based on a bid of 25.16 and a softMaturity 2012-10-30 at 25.00.

Just as in August 2007, BAM issues are over-represented in the poor performers’ list … and I am just as unable to find a convincing rationale for this.

Consider, for example, BBD.PR.B. It’s a ratchet-rate issue, paying a maximum of 100% of prime on its par value, minimum 50%. On October 31, DBRS confirmed Bombardier’s preferreds at Pfd-4. Since Brookfields floaters in the index, BAM.PR.B and BAM.PR.K, both pay 70% of prime on their par value, we can assume that, given equal credit quality, BBD.PR.B should trade at 100/70 = 1.43 times the price of BAM.PR.B/K (since a reduction in BBD.PR.B’s rate will occur only if it trades significantly above par, which does not appear too likely in the near future).

BBD.PR.B is quoted at 12.00-23, implying – roughly speaking – that if it paid 70% of prime it would be trading at 8.40. Compare that to BAM.PR.B/K, at 9.90-98 and 10.78-11.66, respectively – there is not much premium being paid for the difference between Pfd-2(low) and Pfd-4!

Compare also (as Mr. Nagel did) to TRI.PR.B: it’s also rated Pfd-2(low) and also pays 70% of prime, but is less liquid … and is quoted at 18.05-00!

I will suggest that the Street is trading the BAM issues as if their credit quality is significantly worse than it actually is.

If you like floaters, you’ll probably like the Brookfield issues – but remember! While Brookfield is a good name, it is not so good a name that it may be overweighted with abandon! Investing in Brookfield is a bet on their credit quality, the same way as investing in any fixed income issue is a bet on credit quality. Recognize that occasionally you’re going to be wrong and keep your bets small in order to give the statistics a chance to work.

John Nagel Likes Brookfield Floaters

Saturday, November 1st, 2008

Fabrice Taylor had a column in the Globe yesterday, Preferred offer value, but watch your step. I confess to being a little perplexed by his remarks on discounts to call:

And you have to understand the math. Take a $20 par value preferred that can be called from you (i.e., the company can buy back from you) in two years. If it pays a fixed dividend of $1 per year but can be had for $16, you’re not getting 5 or 6 per cent, you’re getting almost 18 per cent annually. That’s the real beauty of buying these things below par.

Call options are bad. They are always bad. They always limit your winnings in the event of yield declines, while doing nothing to protect you in the event of yield increases. Unfortunately, they cannot be avoided – so the question on an investor’s mind should always be “How bad is this particular call option schedule and how much extra yield do I want in this particular case as compensation?”.

Mr. Taylor also quotes John Nagel, who has been mentioned on PrefBlog previously, touting BCE Prefs:

When we spoke, [Desjardins’ preferred share trader] Mr. Nagle [sic] was partial to a Brookfield Asset Management floating rate preferred issue that, while enjoying the same rating as a Thomson Reuters issue, is quoted at half the price. He’s waiting for Brookfield’s earnings next week to see if that discount is warranted, but otherwise finds the discount highly attractive, and there are other opportunities for those who can roll up their sleeves and do some hard-nosed work.

Mr. Nagel’s track record was not disclosed. Brookfield’s quarterly earnings will be released on November 7, but I can’t help but think that waiting to see them is a bit of an affectation. Brookfield is an investment grade company. Black swan events excepted – always excepted! – one quarter’s earnings are not going to make a huge amount of difference to its credit risk, whatever it might do to the stock. If it were otherwise, the company would not be investment grade: virtually the whole meaning of “investment grade” is that a bad quarter or two – even the occasional horrible quarter – will not dislodge the company’s status.

There have been no rumours of a Black Swan event at Brookfield and,while the common (which takes the first loss) has done just as badly as everything else lately, it hasn’t been taken out to the woodshed for particular punishment. While I will be just as interested in Brookfield’s earnings as anybody else, I’m not about to recommend freezing trading in its issues until they have been released.

The BAM issues are discussed often on PrefBlog – f’rinstance, with respect to the BAM / BPO Floater Credit Inversion and the recent DBRS affirmation of BAM’s credit quality.

I’ve uploaded some charts [click for big] … for instance BAM.A (common) versus BAM.PR.K (floater):

and TRI (common) vs. TRI.PR.B (floater):

and, just for fun, RY (common) vs. RY.PR.F (PerpetualDiscount)

and BMO (common) vs. BMO.PR.J (PerpetualDiscount):

Update, 2008-11-14: I missed this at the time, but Brookfield issued (small) US debt 2008-10-24:

TORONTO, October 24, 2008 – Brookfield Asset Management Inc. (“Brookfield”) (NYSE/TSX: BAM) announced today that it has issued US$150 million of unsecured term debt comprising US$75 million of 5-year 6.65% notes and US$75 million of 4-year 6.4% notes.

Small issues, but in this environment those are pretty good terms.

Treasury Releases Capital Purchase Details: More Generous than UK Terms

Saturday, November 1st, 2008

The US Treasury has announced it has:

issued additional documents for publicly traded financial institutions applying for the capital purchase program authorized by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. Documents include:

  • Securities Purchase Agreement: This document describes the terms of the financial institution’s agreement to issue shares and fulfill other requirements in exchange for Treasury’s investment.
  • Form of Letter Agreement: This contractual agreement describes the firm-specific information necessary to implement the securities purchase agreement and represents the financial institution’s commitment to the terms of the Securities Purchase Agreement.
  • Certificate of Designations: This document creates the preferred shares.
  • Form of Warrant – Stockholder Approval Not Required: This document describes the terms of the warrants Treasury receives when stockholder approval is not required.
  • Form of Warrant – Stockholder Approval Required: This document describes the terms of the warrants Treasury receives when stockholder approval is required.
  • Term Sheet
  • SEC, FASB Letter on Warrant Accounting

It’s all at Treasury’s EESA website, under Capital Purchase Program. Of particular interest is the Transaction Report, which shows nine transactions totalling $125-billion.

The terms were announced previously:

The senior preferred shares will pay a cumulative dividend rate of 5 percent per annum for the first five years and will reset to a rate of 9 percent per annum after year five. The senior preferred shares will be non-voting, other than class voting rights on matters that could adversely affect the shares. The senior preferred shares will be callable at par after three years. Prior to the end of three years, the senior preferred may be redeemed with the proceeds from a qualifying equity offering of any Tier 1 perpetual preferred or common stock. Treasury may also transfer the senior preferred shares to a third party at any time. In conjunction with the purchase of senior preferred shares, Treasury will receive warrants to purchase common stock with an aggregate market price equal to 15 percent of the senior preferred investment. The exercise price on the warrants will be the market price of the participating institution’s common stock at the time of issuance, calculated on a 20-trading day trailing average.

In the UK, Barclays has refused to play along:

Barclays Plc, the bank that opted out of a plan to sell a stake to the U.K. government, will have Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a member of Abu Dhabi’s royal family, as its biggest shareholder.

Sheikh Mansour will collect interest payments of as much as 14 percent and control 16.3 percent of the London-based bank after putting up 5 billion pounds ($8 billion), the company said in a statement today. Barclays fell 13 percent after analysts at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. said the bank is paying a “fairly expensive” price for the capital injection.

Barclays has posted details of the transaction.

The UK scheme that Barclays is avoiding was announced on October 8 has various strings attached:

As part of its investment, the Government has agreed with the banks supported by the recapitalisation scheme a range of commitments covering:

  • maintaining, over the next three years, the availability and active marketing of competitively-priced lending to homeowners and to small businesses at 2007 levels;
  • support for schemes to help people struggling with mortgage payments to stay in their homes, and to support the expansion of financial capability initiatives;
    remuneration of senior executives – both for 2008 (when the Government expects no cash bonuses to be paid to board members) and for remuneration policy going forward (where incentive schemes will be reviewed and linked to long-term value creation, taking account of risk; and restricting the potential for “rewards for failure”);

  • the right for the Government to agree with boards the appointment of new independent non-executive directors; and
  • dividend policy

The Chancellor’s statement of October 13 contains a few more details, but no actual numbers – he noted:

These conditions are set out in the individual agreements with the banks – copies of which will be placed in the library.

The UK conditions for the preference shares are far more onerous than the US ones:

As the statement says the detailed points about the agreements with the individual banks are set out in the individual agreements contained in Deposited paper 2008/2350.

These are substantial documents and would appear, at the time of their deposit 10 am, 14 October, to still contain draft elements and be partially incomplete. Some elements however,
are worth noting are:

The Lloyds and HBOS shares are being bought at premiums to their nominal value. The precise figures appear to be undecided at time of writing. They will share equal rights with existing preference share holdings. Dividends from HBOS will fall in two periods. First, a period of up to five years will be fixed at 12%. The second period will be 7% plus LIBOR rate until their redemption. Lloyd’s dividends will be 7% plus LIBOR for the duration.