Month: December 2008

Issue Comments

XMF.PR.A Proposes Reorganization

M-Split Corp. has announced:

due to the dramatic and volatile drop in the price of Manulife common shares, M Split Corp. (“the Company”) was required to sell the majority of its holdings in Manulife. The proceeds of these sales have been used to purchase fixed income securities under the Priority Equity Protection Plan as per the prospectus.

the Company is recommending to shareholders that the Company be reorganized. The Company, subject to all necessary Board and regulatory approvals, expects to send out the full details of this proposal to all shareholders through a Management Information Circular sometime in January, 2009 with a shareholder vote to follow in February, 2009. The key aspects of the proposal are discussed below.

The Plan will recommend the fixed income instruments purchased under the Priority Equity Protection Plan be liquidated and the proceeds be re-invested in common shares of Manulife.

The Plan will propose that each Priority Equity share be exchanged for the following three securities: i) one new $5 preferred share to yield 7.5% per annum; ii) one $5 par value equity share that will receive dividends of 7.5% per annum if and when the Company’s net asset value exceeds $12.50; and also iii) one half warrant to purchase a full unit (consisting of one new preferred share, one new equity share and a Class A share) of the Company at a price of $10 at specified times during the first two years subsequent to the approval date. The warrant will effectively provide upside potential on the performance of Manulife shares. The Company believes that the proposed package of securities will provide Priority Equity shareholders with substantial value added compared to their existing investment.

The Class A shares will remain the same except that the threshold for reinstatement of dividends on the Class A shares will only occur if the net asset value per unit reaches $15.00 per unit (current threshold is $12.50 net asset value per unit.) Increases in the net asset value per unit above $10 (current net asset value per unit was $9.63 as at November 28, 2008) will continue to accrue to the Class A shareholder. The value of this opportunity is that it is similar to an option on Manulife and the Company believes this provides substantial shareholder value relative to Class A shareholders’ existing investment.

At first blush, this sounds like a pretty lousy option for the preferred shareholders. Right now their dividends are impaired – or soon will be impaired – but they have full ownership of a portfolio of fixed income securities worth $9.63. If they proceed with this exchange, they will be getting 3.75% (approx) on their money as a dividend because the new class of shares will only pay dividends if there is significant price appreciation.

The new class of share will be fully exposed to declines in the value of the underlying Manulife shares, but will participate in future capital gains only to the extent of the $0.37 current price difference. The new class won’t even get dividends until there’s been a 25%+ increase in capital value.

I am open to arguments based on the value of the option they are being granted – feel free to write in and analyze! – but it looks to me like they should probably VOTE NO!

XMF.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the company announced it was mulling over plans to reorganize. XMF.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Update: After further thought, I have decided that I am not open to arguments based on the value of the option. The preferred shareholders – currently holding a perfectly good fixed-income portfolio – are being asked to provide all the funding for the new company, taking all the downside risk of the portfolio holdings and giving away, free, gratis and for nothing an option on a big chunk of the upside. VOTE NO!

Market Action

December 2, 2008

Bloomberg reports:

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission may act to curb conflicts of interest at credit-rating companies while delaying a mortgage-bond ranking proposal faulted by underwriters, two people familiar with the matter said.

SEC commissioners plan to bar employees who assess debt from discussing compensation with the bankers selling the bonds, said the people, who declined to be identified before a vote in Washington tomorrow. Commissioners also may limit gifts from underwriters and restrict debt analysts from offering advice on structuring securities to win top grades.

Well, it sure sounds tough doesn’t it? The whole point is to ensure that there are enough rules to ensure that everybody is guilty of something. Then when things go wrong, you have your choice of scapegoat … that’s what regulation’s all about. However, some good might come out of the process:

The SEC sought to encourage unsolicited rankings by proposing another rule in June that would have forced credit- rating companies to publish the data that goes into their assessments. As a result, competitors could have graded bonds even if they weren’t paid by debt underwriters.

New York-based Moody’s in a July 28 letter to the SEC said the proposal would trigger lawsuits and encourage banks to take their business to the credit-rating company that asked for “the least amount of information.”

SEC commissioners will seek a second round of public comment on the proposal instead of adopting it at tomorrow’s 10 a.m. Washington time meeting, the people said.

The ratings agencies’ exemption from Regulation FD must be repealed. It’s the only way … I’ve written an essay on the topic. Unfortunately, however, addressing this issue would involve the authorities admitting that the current system works pretty well and the agencies do a pretty good job … subject to all the caveats that apply in assessment of any forecasting ability.

Since the regulators’ myth-du-jour is that the credit crunch was caused by Evil Credit Agency exploitation of Innocent Portfolio Managers (rarely, if ever, criticized; presumably because they already have regulations coming out their ying-yang) it will be inconvenient to acknowledge reality. Fortunately, this bothers neither regulators nor politicians.

A good solid day for PerpetualDiscounts, up nearly 1% in a sloppy market. Another two weeks of good returns like this and we’ll make up for November!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30.
The Fixed-Reset index was added effective 2008-9-5 at that day’s closing value of 1,119.4 for the Fixed-Floater index.
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 6.89% 7.23% 78,980 13.40 6 -1.5584% 764.2
Floater 9.92% 10.22% 57,925 9.02 2 +0.9081% 357.0
Op. Retract 5.52% 7.00% 137,155 4.18 15 +0.1794% 977.5
Split-Share 7.41% 15.05% 64,770 3.92 14 +1.0165% 825.1
Interest Bearing 9.37% 19.71% 58,012 2.89 3 +0.0790% 780.0
Perpetual-Premium N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Perpetual-Discount 7.94% 8.06% 193,760 11.38 71 +0.9365% 695.8
Fixed-Reset 6.15% 5.60% 1,102,580 14.18 15 -0.1895% 972.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.H OpRet -7.3171% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 15.82% based on a bid of 19.00 and a softMaturity 2012-3-30 at 25.00. Closing quote of 19.00-25, 19×18. Day’s range of 18.50-20.50 (!).
ENB.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -4.7619% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.94% based on a bid of 20.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 20.00-30, 8×5. Day’s range of 19.86-30.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat -4.1765%  
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -4.1278% Asset coverage of 1.1+:1 as of November 27 according to TD Securities. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 16.97% based on a bid of 7.20 and a hardMaturity 2011-12-15 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.20-48, 1×1. Day’s range of 7.10-75.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -3.7805% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.42% based on a bid of 15.78 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.78-25, 6×10. Day’s range of 15.77-17.00.
BMO.PR.M FixedReset -3.7559%  
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -3.4722% Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of November 14 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 17.73% based on a bid of 5.56 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 5.56-75, 3×8. Day’s range of 5.49-77.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -3.2825% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.12% based on a bid of 16.50 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.50-97, 11×3. Day’s range of 16.50-18.17.
POW.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +3.0675% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.52% based on a bid of 16.80 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.80-99, 2×1. Day’s range of 16.69-01.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +3.1250% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.41% based on a bid of 15.51 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.51-87, 3×1. Day’s range of 15.36-11.
NA.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +3.1915% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.84% based on a bid of 19.40 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 19.40-95, 23×5. Day’s range of 19.00-40.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +3.3333% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.38% based on a bid of 15.50 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.50-94, 10X10. Day’s range of 15.10-94.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +3.5897% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.93% based on a bid of 16.16 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.16-50, 7×3. Day’s range of 16.00-47.
LBS.PR.A SplitShare +3.6309% Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of October 17, according to Brompton Group. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 14.66% based on a bid of 6.85 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00. Closing quote of 6.85-22, 35×1. Day’s range of 6.61-99.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +3.7064% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.09% based on a bid of 14.27 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.27-98, 1×2. Day’s range of 14.00-93.
BAM.PR.K Floater +3.7143%  
CM.PR.K FixedReset +3.7500%  
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +4.1606% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.82% based on a bid of 14.27 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.27-08, 12×2. Day’s range of 14.00-15.50.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +4.1801% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.02% based on a bid of 16.20 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.20-44, 1×5. Day’s range of 15.50-40.
DFN.PR.A SplitShare +4.7880% Asset coverage of 1.9-:1 as of November 14 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 10.73% based on a bid of 7.66 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.66-89, 5×2. Day’s range of 7.16-00.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +5.4737% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.53% based on a bid of 15.03 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.03-44, 3X9. Day’s range of 14.30-10.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +5.7082% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.11% based on a bid of 15.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.00-16.25 (!), 4X7. Day’s range of 14.19-15.45.
LFE.PR.A SplitShare +6.2591% Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of November 14 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 14.50% based on a bid of 7.30 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.30-69, 113×3. Day’s range of 7.30-50.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +6.7887% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.70% based on a bid of 14.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.00-45, 3×3. Day’s range of 13.55-00.
BAM.PR.J OpRet +9.6296% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 13.49% based on a bid of 14.80 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. Closing quote of 14.80-99, 5×6. Day’s range of 13.90-14.99.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 637,525 RBC bougth 54,300 from Nesbitt at 14.26; then Nesbitt crossed 527,900 at 14.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.93% based on a bid of 14.35 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 627,500 TD crossed 577,700 at 12.75 … and they had to take the bid down half a buck to do it! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.67% based on a bid of 13.23 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 76,075 RBC crossed 50,000 at 14.70. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.63% based on a bid of 14.60 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 75.519 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 14.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.11% based on a bid of 15.00 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 71,210 Desjardins crossed 38,700 at 23.80; Scotia bought 25,800 from Anonymous at 24.00. Recent new issue.

There were fifty-seven index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today

Issue Comments

MFC.PR.A / MFC.PR.B / MFC.PR.C : S&P Affirms Ratings, Outlook Negative

MFC, after getting into trouble with imprudent stock speculation – and partially bailed out by OSFI – is issuing common stock:

Manulife Financial Corporation (MFC) will further strengthen its financial and capital position by issuing $2.125 billion in common equity which would raise its regulatory capital ratio to one of the highest levels in the Company’s history.

On a pro forma basis, after giving effect to the $2.125 billion of common equity and the remaining $2 billion credit facility, and reflecting global equity market levels as of the end of November 2008, the consolidated capital ratio or MCCSR is estimated to be approximately 235%, one of the highest in the company’s history.

MFC also provided an update on its expected earnings for 2008. Assuming global equity markets closed at the end of November 2008 levels, net income for the year is estimated to be approximately $900 million.

2008 earnings to the end of the third quarter had been reported as $2,485-million. Perhaps Manulife should have taken lessons from Portus Group, whose principal protection seems to have held up pretty well!

S&P announced:

it revised its outlook on Manulife Financial Corp. and all of its rated operating companies to negative from stable. In addition, Standard & Poor’s affirmed its ratings on Manulife Financial, including its ‘AA’ long-term counterparty credit rating and the ‘AAA’ financial strength ratings on its rated operating subsidiaries. Its key operating subsidiaries include: The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., John Hancock Life Insurance Co., John Hancock Life Insurance Co. (U.S.A.), Manulife (International) Ltd., and Manulife Life Insurance Co. Ltd.

The outlook revision reflects our opinion of the reduced level of financial flexibility that the group has with its ‘AAA’ financial strength ratings given the decline and volatility of the global equity markets and the resultant impact on earnings and capital, utilization of its bank term facility, and plans to complete a C$2.125 billion common equity issue.

While the negative outlook on Manulife Financial and its rated subsidiaries reflects our view of the group’s reduced level of financial flexibility, we believe that Manulife is likely to continue to maintain its solid operating performance, business franchise, and capital adequacy position. From our analysis, it has a higher risk business profile compared with other ‘AAA’ rated insurers. Standard & Poor’s ratings anticipate that the firm will maintain its current enterprise risk management practices, although we will continue to monitor how the company assesses its appetite for equity risk retention. Our ratings also reflect our expectations that the investment portfolio likely will remain well diversified with minimal asset quality issues, and revenue growth and financial leverage are expected to remain at levels that are in line with the current ratings. We could revise the outlook to stable if management actions remain responsive, the business franchise continues to show resilience through these challenging times by displaying very strong core operating performance, and the equity markets begin to show signs of recovery and the pressure on VA reserve and capital requirements diminish. We expect that the ratings could be lowered by one notch if there is any evidence of deterioration in one or more of the above metrics, or if the global equity markets remain in a deep and permanent decline.

These issues were last highlighted on PrefBlog when DBRS changed the trend from positive to stable.

Issue Comments

EN.PR.A: Partial Call for Redemption

Energy Split Corp. II has announced:

it has called 26,750 ROC Preferred Shares for cash redemption on December 16, 2008 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 2.655% of the outstanding ROC Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 403,700 Capital Yield Shares by the holders thereof. The ROC Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of ROC Preferred Shares of record on December 15, 2008 will have approximately 2.655% of their ROC Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the ROC Preferred Shares will be $13.74 per share.

Holders of ROC Preferred Shares that are on record for dividends but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including December 16, 2008.

Payment of the amount due to holders of ROC Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on December 16, 2008. From and after December 16, 2008 the holders of ROC Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any right in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

EN.PR.A was last mentioned on HIMIPref™ when they were subdivided to reflect differing rates of retraction when the term was extended last year.

EN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™. It is incorporated in the “Scraps” sub-index rather than “SplitShare” due to volume concerns.

Regulatory Capital

BNS Capitalization: 4Q08

BNS has released its Fourth Quarter 2008 Investor Presentation and Supplementary Package, so it’s time to recalculate how much room they have to issue new preferred shares – assuming they want to! Note that it’s also time to update old installations of Adobe Acrobat … I had to update mine, because version 5.0 said the supplementary data file was damaged; verion 9.0 (has it been that long?) was fine.

Step One is to analyze their Tier 1 Capital, reproducing the prior format:

BNS Capital Structure
October, 2007
& October, 2008
  4Q07 4Q08
Total Tier 1 Capital 20,225 23,263
Common Shareholders’ Equity 81.5% 86.8%
Preferred Shares 8.1% 12.3%
Innovative Tier 1 Capital Instruments 13.6% 11.8%
Non-Controlling Interests in Subsidiaries 2.5% 2.2%
Goodwill -5.6% -9.8%
Miscellaneous NA -3.3%

Next, the issuance capacity (from Part 3 of the introductory series):

BNS
Tier 1 Issuance Capacity
October 2007
& October 2008
  4Q07 4Q08
Equity Capital (A) 15,840 17,653
Non-Equity Tier 1 Limit (B=A/3), 4Q07
(B=0.666*A), 4Q08
5,280 11,757
Innovative Tier 1 Capital (C) 2,750 2,750
Preferred Limit (D=B-C) 2,530 9,007
Preferred Actual (E) 1,635 2,860
New Issuance Capacity (F=D-E) 895 6,147
Items A, C & E are taken from the table
“Regulatory Capital”
of the supplementary information;
Note that Item A includes Goodwill, FX losses, “Other Capital Deductions” and non-controlling interest


Item B is as per OSFI Guidelines; the limit was recently increased.
Items D & F are my calculations

and the all important Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios!

BNS
Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios
October 2007
& October 2008
  Note 2007 4Q08
Equity Capital A 15,840 17,653
Risk-Weighted Assets B 218,300 250,600
Equity/RWA C=A/B 7.26% 7.04%
Tier 1 Ratio D 9.3% 9.3%
Capital Ratio E 10.5% 11.1%
Assets to Capital Multiple F 18.22x 18.23x
A is taken from the table “Issuance Capacity”, above
B, D & E are taken from BNS’s Supplementary Report
C is my calculation.
F is from OSFI (4Q07) and BNS’s Supplementary Report (4Q08) of total assets ($507.6-billion) divided by total capital ($27.847-billion)
(see below)

The calculations for the Assets-to-Capital multiple are not comparable; the OSFI figure will include an allowance for off-balance-sheet exposure.

It is apparent from the Quarterly Trend in the Basel I data that Scotia has been bulking up on its Risk Weighted Assets big-time, largely through “Loans and Acceptances” (which includes Securities Purchased under Resale Agreements”. This has been financed largely through deposits. To some extent, this reflects Scotia’s acquisition of Banco del Desarrollo in 2Q08:

The Bank completed the acquisition of Chile’s Banco del Desarrollo on November 26, 2007, through the acquisition of 99.5 per cent of the outstanding shares for $1.0 billion Canadian dollar equivalent (CDE). Total assets at acquisition were approximately CDE $5.6 billion, mainly comprised of loans. The Bank will combine the operations of Banco del Desarrollo with its existing Scotiabank Sud Americano banking operations. Based on acquisition date fair values, approximately CDE $797 million has been allocated to the estimated value of goodwill acquired. The purchase price allocation may be refined as the Bank completes its valuation of the assets acquired and liabilities assumed.

Risk-Weighted assets grew by $25-billion in the fourth quarter. On the Asset side of the average balance sheet (page 12), this was due to increases in Deposits with Other Banks ($4-billion), loans to retail & business ($15-billion) and the always popular “Other Assets” ($6-billion). This was financed by an increase in Business & Government Deposits ($10-billion), “Other Liabilities” ($12-billion) [which appear, via page 11, to be amounts owing on Derivatives]

Now let’s see if they announce another preferred share issue this afternoon!

Index Construction / Reporting

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: November 2008

HIMI Index Changes, November 28, 2008
Issue From To Because
DF.PR.A Scraps SplitShare Volume
SBN.PR.A Scraps SplitShare Volume

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during November 2008
Issue Action Index Because
RY.PR.L Add FixedReset New Issue
TD.PR.C Add FixedReset New Issue
IAG.PR.C Add FixedReset New Issue
BMO.PR.I Delete OpRet Redeemed
GWO.PR.J Add FixedReset New Issue
PWF.PR.M Add FixedReset New Issue

We are a long, long way from re-establishing the PerpetualPremium index … the highest priced PerpetualDiscount remains CU.PR.A, with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.96% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.

Market Action

December 1, 2008

Total confusion in the news today about the duration of perpetual annuities, a subject dear to the hearts of preferred share investors. Bloomberg reports (hat tip: Assiduous Reader MP):

The gilts, known as perpetuals because they have no maturity date, have a coupon of 3.5 percent compared with the U.K.’s 4.5 percent inflation rate. Investors hold about 1.9 billion pounds ($2.9 billion) of the securities that still pay interest 90 years after the end of the Great War, according to the U.K.’s Debt Management Office.

The “Jolly Long Bond,” as Hendry calls the war loan, will be the most reactive to deflation because not having a maturity means it has long duration, said Charles Diebel, head of European interest-rate strategy at Nomura International Plc in London. A bond with a higher duration will increase more in value than one with a shorter duration for a given decline in yield.

“His philosophy behind it makes a lot of sense,” Diebel said. “If you have an extended period of time where inflation is not a problem, you get no yield at the front end of the curve and people will be forced out the yield curve. You can’t be forced out further on the yield curve than a perpetual.”

Assiduous Readers will instantly recognize this as highly suspicious, at best. The duration of a perpetual annuity is the inverse of the interest rate. Long Gilts are currently yielding about 4.5% … assuming that the Gilt Perpetuals are trading around there, the modified duration is (1 / 0.045) = 22.2 years.

Gilt Strips are well known.

The Macaulay Duration of a strip is equal to its term. The Modified Duration is equal to Macaulay Duration divided by (1+r). Assuming a 5% yield on long gilt strips, we arrive at the conclusion that any Gilt Strip with a term of 25+ years will have a higher duration than the perp.

Sometimes I despair.

Well, things settled down a little today, but I’m still cutting off the price changes table a +- 3%!

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 8.13%, equivalent to 11.38% pre-tax interest at the standard conversion factor of 1.4x. Long corporates look to have settled in at around the 7.50% mark, so the Pre-Tax Interest-Equivalent spread is now 382 … massive, massive, massive!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30.
The Fixed-Reset index was added effective 2008-9-5 at that day’s closing value of 1,119.4 for the Fixed-Floater index.
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 6.78% 7.12% 78,621 13.52 6 -1.9692% 776.3
Floater 10.00% 10.30% 58,326 9.19 2 +1.0949% 353.8
Op. Retract 5.53% 6.92% 137,363 4.16 15 -0.4293% 975.8
Split-Share 7.59% 16.15% 70,290 3.71 12 -0.0120% 816.8
Interest Bearing 9.37% 20.25% 58,415 2.93 3 -2.3755% 779.4
Perpetual-Premium N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Perpetual-Discount 8.01% 8.13% 191,315 11.31 71 -0.1284% 689.4
Fixed-Reset 6.13% 5.59% 1,120,172 14.21 12 -0.2914% 973.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -7.1031% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.67% based on a bid of 15.04 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.04-50, 3×1. Day’s range of 15.30-16.59.
LFE.PR.A SplitShare -6.1475% Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of November 14 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 16.34% based on a bid of 6.87 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 6.87-20, 10×3. Day’s range of 6.50-20.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -5.8380% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.66% based on a bid of 15.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.00-63, 38×4. Day’s range of 15.00-16.90.
BAM.PR.I OpRet -5.5556% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 15.12% based on a bid of 17.00 and a softMaturity 2013-12-30 at 25.00. Closing quote of 17.00-75, 15×7. Day’s range of 17.70-00.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -5.1429% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.63% based on a bid of 13.28 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 13.28-59, 5×5. Day’s range of 13.10-03.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -5.1110% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.67% based on a bid of 14.11 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.11-25, 3×5. Day’s range of 14.01-99.
BNA.PR.A SplitShare -4.4737% Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 based on BAM.A at 17.36 and 2.4 BAM.A per unit. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 26.19% based on a bid of 18.15 and a hardMaturity 2010-9-30 at 25.00. Closing quote of 18.15-40, 2×17. Day’s range of 18.05-90.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -4.3750% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.16% based on a bid of 15.30 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.30-75, 9×1. Day’s range of 15.20-16.25.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -4.2553% Asset coverage of 0.9-:1 as of November 28, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 23.04% based on a bid of 4.50 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at a currently unlikely 10.00. Closing quote of 4.50-95, 1×4. Day’s range of 4.50-70.
WFS.PR.A SplitShare -3.8462% Asset coverage of 1.1+:1 as of November 20, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 18.45% based on a bid of 7.50 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.50-88, 10×10. Day’s range of 7.60-94.
FIG.PR.A InterestBearing -3.6641% Asset coverage of 1.2-:1 as of November 28, based on capital unit value of 2.51 according to Faircourt and 0.71 capital units per preferred. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 16.50% based on a bid of 6.31 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-31 at 10.00. Closing quote of 6.31-66, 5×1. Day’s range of 6.50-70.
NA.PR.N FixedReset -3.2554%  
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -3.2105% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.45% based on a bid of 16.28 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.28-80, 7×19. Day’s range of 16.20-01.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat -3.0787%  
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -3.0612% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.94% based on a bid of 14.25 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.25-50, 14×4. Day’s range of 13.85-81.
NA.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +3.0137% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.09% based on a bid of 18.80 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 18.80-25, 20×5. Day’s range of 18.25-97.
PWF.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +3.0303% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.61% based on a bid of 17.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 17.00-50, 3×7. Day’s range of 16.45-20.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +3.0928% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.03% based on a bid of 16.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.00-50, 10×12. Day’s range of 15.52-16.95.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +3.2511% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.61% based on a bid of 17.15 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 17.15-50, 5X2. Day’s range of 16.53-50.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +3.3278% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.80% based on a bid of 12.42 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 12.01-42, 2×8. Day’s range of 12.00-13.20.
ENB.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +3.3973% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.60% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 21.00-28, 1×5. Day’s range of 19.05-20.10.
BNS.PR.O PerpetualDiscount +3.5048% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.78% based on a bid of 18.31 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 18.31-58, 20×5. Day’s range of 18.01-65.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +4.1642% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.62% based on a bid of 17.51 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 17.51-89, 10×10. Day’s range of 17.20-18.49.
BNA.PR.B SplitShare +4.9180% See BNA.PR.A, above. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 12.72% based on a bid of 16.00 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. Closing quote of 16.00-64, 11×1. Day’s range of 14.26-16.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 159,780 Nesbitt crossed 150,000 at 14.45. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.94% based on a bid of 14.25 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 83,867 Nesbit crossed 10,400 at 17.77. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.62% based on a bid of 17.51 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.O OpRet 48,972 Anonymous bought 10,000 from Scotia at 18.50, then another 20,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 13.87% based on a bid of 17.95 and optionCertainty 2013-6-30 at 25.00.
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 40,100 New issue settled Nov. 27.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 35,082 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.87% based on a bid of 14.45 and a limitMaturity.

There were forty-two index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today

Issue Comments

UNG.PR.C & UNG.PR.D Will Remain Outstanding

Union Gas has announced:

that it will not proceed with a proposed preference share redemption, planned for January 1, 2009. The share redemption, which received Board of Directors approval last September, was under consideration as part of a potential conversion of Union Gas into an unlimited liability company which will not proceed.

It’s rather odd. A “Material Change Report” filed on SEDAR states:

On September 11, 2008, the Corporation issued a news release through the facilities of Marketwire.

… and appends the press release in question …

Union Gas Limited announced today that it has received Board of Directors approval to initiate the redemption of all preference shares Union Gas has issued and outstanding. This share redemption would be effective January 1, 2009. The redemption would be undertaken in order to implement a new corporate legal structure that achieves financial benefits which far exceed share redemption expenses.

Union Gas will require approval from the Ontario Energy Board in connection with an internal share transfer that, together with the share redemption, would ultimately lead to the conversion of Union Gas into an unlimited liability company.

Union Gas reserves the right to not proceed with the redemption of the preference shares or the other reorganization actions. Should Union Gas determine to proceed with the redemption, it will issue a formal notice of redemption to the holders of preference shares in accordance with the preference share rights and restrictions.

Union Gas currently has the following classes of preference shares issued and outstanding:
1. 47,672 5.5% Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preference Shares, Series A;
2. 90,000 6% Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preference Shares, Series B;
3. 49,500 5% Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preference Shares, Series C; and
4. 4,000,000 4.79% Cumulative Redeemable Convertible Class B Preference Shares, Series 11.

… but there are no press releases data Sept. 11 for Union Gas on Marketwire. It’s on CNW … and somehow I missed it at the time.

UNG.PR.C & UNG.PR.D are not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Banking Crisis 2008

Important Speech by Bernanke

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has made a significant speech in Austin Texas:

in my view, the failure of a major financial institution at a time when financial markets are already quite fragile poses too great a threat to financial and economic stability to be ignored. In such cases, intervention is necessary to protect the public interest. The problems of moral hazard and the existence of institutions that are “too big to fail” must certainly be addressed, but the right way to do this is through regulatory changes, improvements in the financial infrastructure, and other measures that will prevent a situation like this from recurring. Going forward, reforming the system to enhance stability and to address the problem of “too big to fail” should be a top priority for lawmakers and regulators.

No more Lehmans!

In the absence of an appropriate, comprehensive legal or regulatory framework, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury dealt with the cases of Bear Stearns and AIG using the tools available. To avoid the failure of Bear Stearns, we facilitated the purchase of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase by means of a Federal Reserve loan, backed by assets of Bear Stearns and a partial guarantee from JPMorgan. In the case of AIG, we judged that emergency Federal Reserve credit would be adequately secured by AIG’s assets. However, neither route proved feasible in the case of the investment bank Lehman Brothers. No buyer for the firm was forthcoming, and the available collateral fell well short of the amount needed to secure a Federal Reserve loan sufficient to pay off the firm’s counterparties and continue operations. The firm’s failure was thus unavoidable, given the legal constraints, and the Federal Reserve and the Treasury had no choice but to try instead to mitigate the fallout from that event.

Fortunately, we now have tools to address any similar situation that might arise in the future.

But Lehman wasn’t the Fed’s fault!

Indeed, the actual federal funds rate has been trading consistently below the Committee’s 1 percent target in recent weeks, reflecting the large quantity of reserves that our lending activities have put into the system. In principle, our ability to pay interest on excess reserves at a rate equal to the funds rate target, as we have been doing, should keep the actual rate near the target, because banks should have no incentive to lend overnight funds at a rate lower than what they can receive from the Federal Reserve. In practice, however, several factors have served to depress the market rate below the target. One such factor is the presence in the market of large suppliers of funds, notably the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are not eligible to receive interest on reserves and are thus willing to lend overnight federal funds at rates below the target. We will continue to explore ways to keep the effective federal funds rate closer to the target.

Footnote:Banks have an incentive to borrow from the GSEs and then redeposit the funds at the Federal Reserve; as a result, banks earn a sure profit equal to the difference between the rate they pay the GSEs and the rate they receive on excess reserves. However, thus far, this type of arbitrage has not been occurring on a sufficient scale, perhaps because banks have not yet fully adjusted their reserve-management practices to take advantage of this opportunity.

Acknowledging the puzzle of the Effective Fed Funds Rate and saying he doesn’t know how to fix it either. His provisional explanation – that it’s mainly an administrative log-jam – fits with my earlier hypothesis:

I will suggest, however, that the immense volume of Fed Funds has simply overwhelmed the operational procedures set up in calmer times; accounts need to be opened, credit limits need to be increased, all the bureaucracy of modern banking has to be brought to bear on the issue before we can again deal with a situation in which liquidity may be approximated to “infinite”.

Back to Dr. Bernanke:

Although conventional interest rate policy is constrained by the fact that nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero, the second arrow in the Federal Reserve’s quiver–the provision of liquidity–remains effective. Indeed, there are several means by which the Fed could influence financial conditions through the use of its balance sheet, beyond expanding our lending to financial institutions. First, the Fed could purchase longer-term Treasury or agency securities on the open market in substantial quantities. This approach might influence the yields on these securities, thus helping to spur aggregate demand.

Quantitative easing, here we come! This is step one of Econbrowser‘s James Hamilton’s plan, discussed here on November 21.

Bloomberg reports:

Treasury prices rose on Bernanke’s remarks, with yields on 10-year Treasuries tumbling about 10 basis points to 2.74 percent and two-year notes dropping to 0.85 percent.

Also of note was a Bloomberg report that at least one Government Bond fund is being squeezed into guaranteed corporates:

BB&T, BlackRock Inc., T. Rowe Price Group Inc. and Sage Advisory Services Ltd. are looking elsewhere for returns, including bonds of the banks that were almost ruined by $967 billion in losses and writedowns since the start of 2007. Treasury funds are receiving permission to buy debt of Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. finalized plans on Nov. 21 to guarantee their debt.