Archive for August, 2009

August Edition of PrefLetter Released!

Monday, August 17th, 2009

The August, 2009, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The August edition contains a relatively long appendix which discusses the analysis of FixedResets, specifically the use of scenario analysis and the spread to Canadas on reset to quantify the chance of the issue being called – and the ill effects if markets change sufficiently that it isn’t.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the August, 2009, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the September, 2009, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close September 11 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on September 14.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: A recent enhancement to the PrefLetter website is the Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Opinion: Insurer's Risk Transformation

Sunday, August 16th, 2009

Risk cannot be eliminated, only transformed at great expense. Therefore, insurers should spin off at least a portion of their hedging activity to shareholders.

Look for the opinion link!

Research: Preferred Shares & GICs

Saturday, August 15th, 2009

Many fixed income investors do themselves a disservice by holding GIC Ladders. In this essay I attempt to highlight the weaknesses in the strategy and show how these weaknesses may be addressed by the addition of Preferred Shares or other longer-dated fixed income instruments.

Look for the research link!

Update, 2009-8-29 This essay was picked up in a Globe & Mail Round-up:

The 411 on GICs
The manual for conservative investing starts with the concept of the bond or GIC ladder, where you divide your money evenly into terms of one through five years. It’s a strategy that gives you new money to invest every year at potentially higher rates, while limiting the damage if rates fall. Now, read about the down side of laddering GICs from James Hymas, one of Canada’s foremost experts in preferred shares.

Mr. Hymas’ comments have been posted on the website of an independent education website called Independent Investor, which itself has some comments on GICs (called certificates of deposit here) and preferred shares.

The linked website provides its own perspective on the question, but I take issue with one aspect of the commentary:

He recently published a text (or a PDF version doc.1399) which criticizes the technique of building a ladder of fixed income investments using certificates of deposit, and proposes instead investing in preferred shares a significant portion (but less than 50%) of the fixed income portion of the securities portfolio of most (but not for all since , for example, he excludes 70 + years of age investors) investors.

I didn’t exclude investors of 70+ years of age, but I did state:

The ‘one size fits all’ nature of the fixed income strategy allows advisors to brush aside considerations such as:

  • • the purpose of the portfolio
  • • the likelihood of the portfolio achieving that purpose
  • • the ability of the client to question the skill of his advisor

These elements should not be ignored when constructing a fixed income portfolio. The fixed income portfolio of a high-net-worth seventy-year-old retiree should be very different from that of a forty-year-old with a family and mortgage to support; but to the best of my knowledge these questions have not been addressed by any of the proponents of the strategy.

… which is not the same thing as a flat exclusion – in fact, when I chose those two examples, I was thinking that the forty-year-old should be less exposed to preferreds than the seventy-year-old, since the former must address the possibility of job-loss, medical problems and university tuition (each of which could require some degree of portfolio liquidation) while the investment objective of the latter would have a greater weighting towards a desire for preservation of income over a thirty-year period.

Update, 2010-1-15: In the Ignorance Is Bliss department, Rob Carrick weighs in with In praise of a much maligned investment:

There’s some compensation for the lack of liquidity in a GIC. If there’s no market for selling them before maturity, then there’s no need to track daily prices as they rise and fall in response to interest rate changes. Net result: the value of a GIC in your account will remain steady as rates rise or grow in value to reflect the interest payments you’re accruing. If rates rise, bonds and bond funds fall in price.

I’ve said it before, I’ll say it again: just because the daily change in value is not reported doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist.

August Edition of PrefLetter Now in Preparation

Friday, August 14th, 2009

The markets have closed and the August edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. This will be the first issue that officially recognizes FixedResetPremium issues as a specific class. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The August edition will contain a longer than usual appendix addressing a nuance of FixedResetPremium valuation that the market appears to be ignoring completely.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The August issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the August Issue.

August 14, 2009

Friday, August 14th, 2009

Non-performing loans in the States are reaching extraordinary levels:

More than 150 publicly traded U.S. lenders own nonperforming loans that equal 5 percent or more of their holdings, a level that former regulators say can wipe out a bank’s equity and threaten its survival.

The number of banks exceeding the threshold more than doubled in the year through June, according to data compiled by Bloomberg, as real estate and credit-card defaults surged. Almost 300 reported 3 percent or more of their loans were nonperforming, a term for commercial and consumer debt that has stopped collecting interest or will no longer be paid in full.

On August 12 I mentioned some proposed changes to rules in the States that would draw some clearer lines between a broker’s agent & principal functions when underwriting new municipal issues. There’s an example of bone-headed new issue pricing from Chicago:

The Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, in a debt offering typical of President Barack Obama’s Build America Bonds, raised $600 million this week, relying on advice from Mesirow Financial Inc., a 72-year-old investment bank based in the city. Within 12 hours, the firm assured itself and investors a profit of at least 2 percent as the bonds appreciated as much as $25.82 for each $1,000 face amount, according to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.

The water district saved money for taxpayers with Build America Bonds, said Treasurer Harold Downs. The program, which started in April as part of President Barack Obama’s $787 billion stimulus plan, pays a subsidy for 35 percent of the interest costs on taxable debt sold by states, local governments and universities to finance capital projects creating jobs.

Does this prove that the underwriter was incompetent or that there was hanky-panky? No. Is this a question that really needs to be looked at carefully? Yes.

The preferred share market was on fire today, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 83bp in their thirteenth consecutive trading day of gains. Yawn. In the course of this run, they have gained 6.63%. Yawn. FixedResets trailed, but were in the black at +39bp today, but were shut out of the volume tables. Yawn. Volume continued high. Yawn.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.9032 % 1,426.0
FixedFloater 6.27 % 4.53 % 51,964 17.90 1 2.6020 % 2,450.1
Floater 3.20 % 3.21 % 68,459 19.17 2 1.9032 % 1,781.5
OpRet 4.86 % -7.81 % 142,806 0.09 15 0.4547 % 2,276.1
SplitShare 5.70 % 6.44 % 96,211 4.09 3 0.1264 % 2,037.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4547 % 2,081.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.17 % 72,627 2.64 4 0.2895 % 1,870.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.76 % 5.74 % 181,139 14.20 67 0.8319 % 1,784.7
FixedReset 5.48 % 3.95 % 506,564 4.16 40 0.3891 % 2,110.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 17.76
Evaluated at bid price : 17.76
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 23.87
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 19.70
Evaluated at bid price : 19.70
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 24.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.46
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.42
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 20.42
Evaluated at bid price : 20.42
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.39
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 22.64
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 24.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.43
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 20.43
Evaluated at bid price : 20.43
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 21.87
Evaluated at bid price : 21.98
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 20.60
Evaluated at bid price : 20.60
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 20.36
Evaluated at bid price : 20.36
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 17.81
Evaluated at bid price : 17.81
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 22.80
Evaluated at bid price : 23.06
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 21.90
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 2.17 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 12.27
Evaluated at bid price : 12.27
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 20.80
Evaluated at bid price : 20.80
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.73
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 1.77 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-07-19
Maturity Price : 26.25
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-09-13
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : -2.77 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 22.63
Evaluated at bid price : 23.45
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 22.66
Evaluated at bid price : 22.84
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 19.90
Evaluated at bid price : 19.90
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.04
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 21.01
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 2.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 21.46
Evaluated at bid price : 21.77
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 22.53
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 2.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 21.94
Evaluated at bid price : 22.05
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 2.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 24.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.37
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 12.36
Evaluated at bid price : 12.36
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 2.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 2.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.35
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 152,860 RBC bought two blocks from anonymous, of 14,800 and 16,800 shares, both at 21.48, then crossed 50,000 at 21.44 and finally bought 10,000 from TD at 21.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 21.44
Evaluated at bid price : 21.44
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 95,669 TD crossed three blocks, of 38,100 & 39,700 & 10,000 shares, all at 21.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.42
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 76,087 Anonymous crossed (?) 16,200 at 24.86, then sold two blocks, both of 20,000 shares, to Nesbitt at 24.87.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 24.55
Evaluated at bid price : 24.77
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 75,803 Desjardins crossed 46,400 at 19.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 7.00 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 53,876 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 21.85
Evaluated at bid price : 21.96
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 48,750 Nesbitt crossed 32,000 at 12.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-14
Maturity Price : 12.27
Evaluated at bid price : 12.27
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
There were 49 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

NBF.PR.A: Capital Unit Dividend Reinstated

Friday, August 14th, 2009

NB Split Corp. announced in February that:

The Board of Directors has determined that it will not declare a dividend on the Capital Shares for this quarter. The Board of Directors will review on a quarterly basis whether the Company will declare a dividend on the Capital Shares. Any excess of dividends received by the Company over that required to fund the Preferred Share distributions and operating expenses will be held in cash or cash equivalents by the Company.

… and announced in May

that:

In deciding to reinstate the dividend on the Capital Shares this quarter, the Board of Directors considered, among other things, the improved performance of the Company’s portfolio since the last quarter, the rights attaching to the Preferred Shares, including the priority of the Preferred Shares for the payment of cumulative dividends and return of capital prior to the rights of the Capital Shares, estimated expense levels and the anticipated distributions receivable on the Company’s portfolio. A consideration of these factors, among other matters, resulted in the determination of the Board to suspend Capital Share dividends in the prior quarter and the reinstatement of these dividends in the current quarter.

The Board of Directors will continue to monitor these factors, among others, when deciding on the declaration and payment of dividends in the future and these factors may cause the board to reduce, suspend or increase dividends on the Capital Shares in future periods.

Just trying to keep things up to date! NB Split’s portfolio is entirely comprised of NA common. Asset Coverage as of August 13 was 1.4+:1 according to the company.

NBF.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™ since the issue size is too small. It was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was downgraded to Pfd-4(low) by DBRS.

August 13, 2009

Thursday, August 13th, 2009

The Fed has announced a written agreement with CIT Group. Most of it is the usual regulatory ‘run your business properly and tell us what’s going on’ boilerplate (annoying and embarrassing, but it’s only paperwork) but there are some points of particular interest:

Within 15 days of this Agreement, Bancorp shall submit to the Reserve Bank an acceptable written plan (the “Capital Plan”) to maintain sufficient capital at Bancorp, on a consolidated basis, and at the Bank, as a separate legal entity on a stand-alone basis. The Capital Plan shall describe the specific actions that Bancorp proposes to take, and the timeframes for these actions. Within 15 days of this Agreement, Bancorp shall submit to the Reserve Bank an acceptable written plan (the “Capital Plan”) to maintain sufficient capital at Bancorp, on a consolidated basis, and at the Bank, as a separate legal entity on a stand-alone basis. The Capital Plan shall describe the specific actions that Bancorp proposes to take, and the timeframes for these actions. The Capital Plan shall, at a minimum, address, consider, and include:

(d) the source and timing of additional funds necessary to fulfill the consolidated organization’s and the Bank’s future capital requirements, as well as the impact that the actions to generate such funds will have on projected net income and retained earnings;

8. (a) Bancorp shall not declare or pay any dividends without the prior written approval of the Reserve Bank and the Director of the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation (the “Director”) of the Board of Governors.

(c) Bancorp and its nonbank subsidiaries shall not make any distributions of interest, principal or other sums on subordinated debentures or trust preferred securities without the prior written approval of the Reserve Bank and the Director.

The agreement is dated August 12, so the Capital Plan must be in place by month-end. When announcing the agreement itself, CIT also announced a Rights plan:

adopted a Tax Benefits Preservation Plan (the “Rights Plan”).

While the Rights Plan will not impede the Company’s ability to pursue restructuring or strategic opportunities, it is designed to protect the Company’s ability to utilize its net operating losses and other tax assets, preserving value for the benefit of all stakeholders. This value could be reduced if the Company experiences an “ownership change” under U.S. federal income tax rules, which occurs if one or more “5% shareholders” (as defined under U.S. federal income tax laws) have aggregate increases of 50% in their CIT ownership over a three year historic period. The Rights Plan reduces the likelihood that CIT experiences such an ownership change by discouraging any person or group from becoming a “5% shareholder.”

Bloomberg reported on the Rights plan:

“By protecting these net operating losses, they’re preserving value for the estate should they see a bankruptcy or other types of restructuring,” CreditSights Inc. analyst Adam Steer said in an interview. “They’re trying to protect value, in this case, tax benefits, which is good, good for shareholders, and it would also be good for the bondholders and other creditors of the estate.”

Citigroup Inc., the third-biggest U.S. bank by assets, adopted a similar plan in June, and other companies including homebuilder Hovnanian Enterprises Inc. and Stamps.com have taken steps in the last year to limit the size of individual stakes. CIT said it would disclose the details of the plan in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The plan would “deter in a pretty effective way the possibility of an ownership change” by activating the rights of existing owners to buy CIT stock at half its trading value — instantly forcing the new stockholder to “suffer a very serious and immediate dilution,” Willens said.

Yet another day of good returns for PerpetualDiscounts, slightly OK returns for FixedResets and good volume. This is getting BORING. Remember the good old days, when you were never sure whether the market would go down fifty cents or a whole dollar? That was exciting. Will somebody PLEASE go bankrupt and give me something to write about?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4990 % 1,399.3
FixedFloater 6.43 % 4.67 % 53,858 17.71 1 -2.0278 % 2,388.0
Floater 3.26 % 3.28 % 128,642 19.00 2 0.4990 % 1,748.2
OpRet 4.88 % -7.50 % 144,634 0.09 15 -0.2044 % 2,265.8
SplitShare 5.70 % 6.48 % 96,349 4.10 3 -0.1822 % 2,034.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2044 % 2,071.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.52 % 73,197 6.29 4 -0.0559 % 1,864.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.80 % 5.81 % 177,833 14.12 67 0.2673 % 1,770.0
FixedReset 5.49 % 4.07 % 499,822 4.15 40 0.0406 % 2,102.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -2.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.91
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 22.50
Evaluated at bid price : 23.33
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 22.26
Evaluated at bid price : 22.41
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.53
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 21.43
Evaluated at bid price : 21.72
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 19.66
Evaluated at bid price : 19.66
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 19.50
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 23.01
Evaluated at bid price : 23.21
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 22.76
Evaluated at bid price : 23.64
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.10
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 20.50
Evaluated at bid price : 20.50
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 22.36
Evaluated at bid price : 22.62
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 12.07
Evaluated at bid price : 12.07
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 93,000 Nesbitt crossed two blocks, of 53,200 and 36,800 shares, both at 21.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.72
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium 88,780 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 78,700 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 27.01.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 47,800 National crossed 40,000 at 17.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.91
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 43,610 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-13
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 36,800 RBC crossed 24,900 at 27.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.06
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

August 12, 2009

Wednesday, August 12th, 2009

Some Assiduous Readers may feel that I have a knee jerk reaction to increased rule-making … but it isn’t always the case! The proposed rules on US Municipal bond new issues isn’t all that bad:

Some institutional investors claimed that underwriters and their related accounts “buy bonds in the primary offering for their own account even though other orders remain unfilled,” the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board said in a statement today. The board is an industry self-regulatory group dominated by securities dealers.

The board proposal would require underwriters to “give priority to customer orders over orders for its own account” or from affiliates. It wouldn’t prohibit sales to related accounts, though underwriters “shall have the burden of justifying that such allocation was in the best interests of the syndicate” and in accord with principles of “fair dealing,” the board said in a draft interpretive notice.

The board’s announcement doesn’t mention complaints by issuers, who incur extra costs if bonds are sold at lower prices and higher interest rates than needed.

“The proposed changes help make the case for competitive rather than negotiated bond sales,” said Robert Doty, president of American Government Financial Services, a Sacramento, California-based adviser to issuers.

In competitive sales, issuers take the best price offered by bankers, whereas in negotiated sales, they rely on the advice of their underwriter and sometimes a financial adviser. Local governments’ and not-for-profits’ negotiated deals accounted for 86 percent of the $391.3 billion of new municipal bonds sold last year, according to Thomson Reuters data.

“Bond pricing in 2009 is the least efficient in years,” bankers at Ziegler Cos. said in a July 27 letter sent to clients who issue bonds. After underwriters set prices low enough to attract more orders than there are bonds, “investors rush to buy the cheap securities, and many flip them the next day for a quick profit,” the Chicago-based firm said.

Conflict of interest is an often overrated fault, but acting as both advisor and counterparty to an issuer … well, I call that a step over the line. By me, advising on price is an advisory matter and the brokerage is an agent; they are more than welcome to backup their advice with money and say something like …. ‘well, we can try and sell it at 5.50%, but if you go to 5.60% we’ll guarantee it’, and provide a backstop for the success of the underwriting. The key part of the word “backstop”, however, is “back” and third party orders should take priority. Once they start giving preferential – or even pro-rata – fills to related accounts, however, they are no longer agents but principals; they should make it very clear from the beginning just how they are acting.

Frankly, I’m a little surprised this issue hasn’t surfaced before, or that clients have allowed it! The source document states:

The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the “MSRB”) is requesting comment on draft amendments to Rule G-11, on new issue syndicate practices, Rule G-8, on books and records, and Rule G-9, on preservation of records. The draft amendments to Rule G-11 would expand the rule to cover all primary market offerings, not just those for which syndicates are formed. They would also provide that, in general, unless otherwise agreed to by the issuer, the syndicate manager or the sole underwriter (as the case may be) shall give priority to customer orders over orders for its own account, orders from an affiliate for its account, or orders for their respective related accounts.

The UK FSA has published its rules on bonuses. Many of the principles insist on giving the employer a great deal of discretion:

Non-financial performance metrics should form a significant part of the performance assessment process.

The measurement of performance for long-term incentive plans, including those based on the performance of shares, should be risk-adjusted.

These changes will make lawyers very, very happy.

The CIT drama continues with a SEC filing:

As a first step of the restructuring plan, on July 20, 2009, the Company commenced a cash tender offer for its outstanding $1 billion in floating rate senior notes due August 17, 2009 and amended the offer on August 3, 2009. A description of the terms of the offer and the amendment are contained in Form 8-K’s filed by the Company on July 21, July 24 and August 3, 2009.

If the tender offer is successfully completed, the Company intends to use the proceeds of the Credit Facility to complete the tender offer and make payment for the August 17 notes. Further, the Company and a Steering Committee of the bond holder lending group do not intend for the Company to seek relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, but rather will pursue restructuring efforts as part of the comprehensive restructuring plan to enhance the Company’s liquidity and capital position. If the pending tender offer is not successfully completed, and the Company is unable to obtain alternative financing, an event of default under the provisions of the Credit Facility would result and the Company could seek relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

The Credit Facility contains provisions (i) requiring the Company and the Steering Committee to work together in good faith to promptly develop a mutually acceptable restructuring plan for the Company and its Subsidiaries and (ii) requiring the Company to adopt a restructuring plan acceptable to the majority in number of the Steering Committee by October 1, 2009. The agreement also calls for a draft of the restructuring plan on a “best efforts basis” by August 14, 2009. As a result, the Company currently expects to complete and begin executing on the restructuring plan prior to the required October 1 deadline.

In a successful effort to prove that they are morons, they copy-protected the PDF, so I copy-pasted from the MS-Word version. Just so you know.

Bloomberg had an interesting piece on the market for US RMBS:

Investors are overestimating potential yields in part because they are failing to consider how many loans are becoming delinquent for the first time and in part because they are arriving at incorrect conclusions on how long it will take to liquidate seized homes, the [Amherst Securities Group LP] New York-based analysts led by Laurie Goodman wrote in a report yesterday. Those issues can influence both the size of foreclosure losses and how quickly bonds get paid down.

“Do your homework, and sell securities which are being evaluated incorrectly by the marketplace,” the analysts wrote.

For example, the most-senior classes of 2006 and 2007 securities backed by prime-jumbo mortgages have rallied to more than 80 cents on the dollar, from as low as 55 cents, according to Amherst. So-called super-senior bonds backed by “option” adjustable-rate mortgages have jumped to about 48 cents, from the “low 30s,” the analysts wrote.

Investors also have been doing too little analysis of the differences, such as the level of home equity, among borrowers with currently non-delinquent mortgages backing non-agency bonds, which lack guarantees from government-supported Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or U.S. agency Ginnie Mae, they said.

What? Homework? Analysis? Who has time for that stuff, anyway, in between client meetings and sales? Just buy what the smiley-boy at the dealer’s tells you is good.

PerpetualDiscounts had yet another good day today, with a total return of +62bp to bring the median YTW down to 5.84%, equivalent to 8.18% interest at the standard pre-tax equivalency factor of 1.4x for taxable holders. Long Corporates now yield a hair over 6.0%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 215bp, narrowing in from the 230bp recorded on August 5 and returning to its month-end level.

Volume continued strong, with PerpetualDiscounts dominating the volume highlights table.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 6.6046 % 1,392.4
FixedFloater 6.30 % 4.56 % 49,673 17.85 1 1.5294 % 2,437.4
Floater 3.27 % 3.25 % 124,343 19.08 2 6.6046 % 1,739.5
OpRet 4.87 % -9.57 % 145,125 0.09 15 0.1535 % 2,270.4
SplitShare 5.69 % 6.48 % 96,070 4.10 3 0.2107 % 2,038.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1535 % 2,076.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.31 % 86,827 2.65 4 0.0199 % 1,865.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.82 % 5.84 % 173,684 14.10 67 0.6240 % 1,765.2
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.07 % 507,015 4.15 40 0.0277 % 2,101.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.82
Evaluated at bid price : 22.97
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 24.63
Evaluated at bid price : 24.92
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 23.27
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 22.21
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 45.86
Evaluated at bid price : 48.61
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.54
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.70
Evaluated at bid price : 23.59
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 17.83
Evaluated at bid price : 17.83
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 20.14
Evaluated at bid price : 20.14
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.68
Evaluated at bid price : 23.69
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 19.28
Evaluated at bid price : 19.28
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.26
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.54
Evaluated at bid price : 22.72
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 23.72
Evaluated at bid price : 24.03
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 19.98
Evaluated at bid price : 19.98
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 1.99 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.66
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 2.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.34
Evaluated at bid price : 21.34
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 2.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.53
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 19.81
Evaluated at bid price : 19.81
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 5.63 % A real move, as it traded 3,945 shares in a range of 11.52-07 before closing at 11.83-48, 5×2. This may be related to the announcements regarding the real estate vulture fund and the BPO equity issue … or it may not be. Take your pick.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 11.83
Evaluated at bid price : 11.83
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 7.57 % Traded 12,091 shares in a range of 11.37-21 before closing at 12.22-30, 1×23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 12.22
Evaluated at bid price : 12.22
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 111,000 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 53,300 and 35,000 shares at 19.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 106,800 TD crossed 99,000 shares at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 106,600 TD crossed 92,200 at 27.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.62
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 102,181 RBC crossed 51,600 at 20.43; Nesbitt crossed 37,000 at 20.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium 102,050 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 25.00; RBC crossed 67,500 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 97,998 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 20.20; Desjardins crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 20.21
Evaluated at bid price : 20.21
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
There were 47 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

AIC Preferred Income Fund: Under New Management

Wednesday, August 12th, 2009

Manulife has announced:

that Manulife has signed an agreement to acquire AIC’s Canadian retail investment fund business.

Under the agreement, Manulife Mutual Funds would manage all AIC funds in Canada and AIC would continue to act as a fund sub-advisor for Manulife Mutual Funds.

Further:

Once complete, the acquisition of AIC Limited’s retail investment fund business by Manulife Financial will create significant scale and presence for Manulife’s individual wealth management business across Canada.

At AIC Limited, key members of its portfolio management team will return to their asset management roots by creating a sub-advisory business focused on high net-worth individuals, plus will continue to act as a sub-advisor for Manulife Mutual Funds.

The businesses based in Burlington and Toronto, Ontario currently have almost $13.7 billion* in combined investment funds assets under management across Canada.

“plus will continue to act …”? Oh, well, the doctors say I have to learn to let these things go.

AIC provides further details:

Investment management for the following AIC-managed and sub-advised funds will remain in place for the time-being, but Manulife Mutual Funds will review the line-up to determine the most appropriate next steps. The result of this review should be available shortly:

AIC Trust Funds:

  • AIC Preferred Income Fund

AIC Preferred Income Fund is rather interesting. Their promotional material states:

Why a preferred income fund?

Preferred shares are safer than common stocks not simply because they typically rank higher up the capital structure but also because traditionally only Canada’s largest public companies can earn access to the preferred market. AIC’s familiarity with all of those issuers increases the chances that AIC Preferred Income Fund will come to own the best of those issues.

A diversified portfolio of preferred shares and other attractive income-producing investments is a prudent choice for many investors. But choices are many and attention to the detailed terms, nuances and credit ratings of each issue/issuer is absolutely required. Ownership of the AIC Preferred Income Fund is simply an easier alternative … let us do the management and monitoring of the portfolio for you.

AIC Preferred Income Fund offers tax-advantaged income at a high current yield with relative safety in a single decision purchase. With an emphasis on dividend-paying preferred shares, AIC Preferred Income Fund delivers a steady stream of monthly income subject to lower tax rates relative to fixed income instruments (held outside a registered account). For investors at the highest marginal tax rates, in all provinces, after–tax returns on dividends exceed after–tax income returns from bonds or bond funds of similar current yield (held outside a registered account). And for many investors in lower tax brackets dividend income (held outside a registered account) can actually be completely free of tax. Distributions from the Fund may consist of dividends, capital gains, interest and/or return of capital.

AIC Preferred Income Fund provides you attractive current yield and tax efficiency.

… which is all very good, although more details supporting the statement AIC’s familiarity with all of those issuers increases the chances that AIC Preferred Income Fund will come to own the best of those issues. would have been most interesting.

Of additional interest is their statement of holdings reported by Morningstar:

Zeus Receivables Trust 8.7
Diversified Trust 6.8
Ridge Trust 5.8
Darwin Receivables Trust 5.8
Sun Life Finl 4.9
Canadian Master Trust 4.8
TORONTO DOMINION BK ONT 4.8
Bk Montreal Que Pfd 4.8
BANK N S HALIFAX 4.8
CANADIAN IMPERIAL BK COMM TORONTO ONT 4.8

Zeus Receivables is bank sponsored ABCP.

Diversified Trust is bank sponsored ABCP.

Ridge Trust is bank sponsored ABCP.

Darwin Receivables Trust is bank sponsored ABCP.

Canadian Master Trust is bank sponsored ABCP.

August 11, 2009

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

There’s an interesting bit of law being litigated, regarding securitization and bankruptcy:

Terms of the two Lehman transactions, named Dante after the entity that issued the notes, specify that investors have first claim on whatever money is available if Lehman defaults or goes bankrupt. While the U.K.-based contract favors the noteholders, U.S. bankruptcy law normally protects a debtor company’s assets. Lehman is asking the bankruptcy judge to rule in its favor.

Not Yet Tested

Not yet tested is whether U.S. law permits the investors to use a written contract to give themselves priority claims after a bankruptcy. In the U.K., the related case was brought against Lehman and Bank of New York by a trustee for Australian noteholder Perpetual Trustee Co.

Rating agencies could start to downgrade credit-linked notes if Peck says Lehman can take away assets protecting the investments, debt research firm CreditSights Inc. said in a July 12 report. Insulating such deals from bankruptcy “forms the bedrock of securitization,” CreditSights analyst Atish Kakodkar said in the report.

Comrade Obama announced today that Americans are too stupid to invest:

The main difference in the proposal from earlier outlines is a provision to “better protect” small municipalities and “unsophisticated investors” by limiting their eligibility to trade derivatives. The rest of the statement mirrors earlier proposals by asking Congress to impose higher capital and margin requirements, move most derivatives to regulated exchanges and clearinghouses and impose supervision over all dealers.

Frank and Peterson’s proposal also left open whether to ban trading of so-called naked credit-default swaps, which were designed to insure against the default of a company’s bonds. Lawmakers and administration officials say the product has been abused by hedge funds and other investors who used them to speculate on the likelihood of a company’s collapse.

Naked contracts or positions are those in which the buyer doesn’t own the underlying asset or stock on which the trading is based.

Frank told reporters last month that he supports proposals to restrict derivatives sales to municipalities.

Soon all shorting will be illegal, and then everything will always go up!

DBRS downgraded some MAV2 notes today (MAV2 is the reincarnation of ABCP):

Negative rating migration in the underlying asset interests, particularly in CDO transactions with relatively low levels of credit enhancement, has increased the required enhancement level for the Notes to above that commensurate with the “A” rating assigned on January 21, 2009. Numerous reference entities have been downgraded (in some cases by more than ten notches), resulting in higher probabilities of default for the CDO asset interests. Monoline downgrades in particular have put pressure on the rating of the Notes. Any future deterioration in the credit quality of monoline insurers may lead to further ratings action. Figure 1 below lists the most notable downgrades of reference entities since January 1, 2009. In addition, a number of credit events, coupled with historically low realized recoveries, have reduced enhancement levels available to the CDO transactions. Figure 2 below lists the credit events and International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) protocol recoveries since January 1, 2009. These factors have resulted in a rapid deterioration in the credit quality of certain CDO asset interests.

Preferreds continued their winning ways today (this is the tenth consecutive trading day of gains for PerpetualDiscounts, over the course of which they have gained 4.81%) amidst continued heavy volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.4845 % 1,306.1
FixedFloater 6.40 % 4.65 % 48,443 17.73 1 3.0303 % 2,400.7
Floater 3.49 % 3.49 % 123,724 18.50 2 1.4845 % 1,631.7
OpRet 4.87 % -7.78 % 139,776 0.09 15 0.3517 % 2,266.9
SplitShare 5.71 % 6.47 % 93,891 4.10 3 0.1970 % 2,034.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3517 % 2,072.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.26 % 73,591 2.65 4 0.3093 % 1,865.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.85 % 5.89 % 173,199 14.03 67 0.1544 % 1,754.3
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.05 % 512,040 4.15 40 0.0083 % 2,100.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 22.43
Evaluated at bid price : 23.07
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 11.36
Evaluated at bid price : 11.36
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 22.07
Evaluated at bid price : 22.52
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 11.20
Evaluated at bid price : 11.20
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 5.90 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 2.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 23.33
Evaluated at bid price : 23.62
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 2.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.43
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 19.01
Evaluated at bid price : 19.01
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 3.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 279,261 RBC crossed 266,400 at 27.80. Nice ticket!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.90
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 187,631 RBC crossed 183,000 at 20.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 20.31
Evaluated at bid price : 20.31
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 88,141 RBC crossed 84,000 at 24.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 24.41
Evaluated at bid price : 24.63
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 69,796 RBC crossed 25,000 at 20.34, then 22,200 at 20.36.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 20.27
Evaluated at bid price : 20.27
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 69,545 TD crossed 45,000 at 21.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 21.40
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium 66,735 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 24.74
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.