Archive for November, 2009

SLA SLEECS: 5.863%+340

Tuesday, November 17th, 2009

Sun Life has announced:

that Sun Life Capital Trust II, a trust established by Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (“SLA”), will issue in Canada $500 million principal amount of Sun Life ExchangEable Capital Securities Series 2009-1 due December 31, 2108 (“SLEECS Series 2009-1”) under a final prospectus that it intends to file with the Canadian securities regulators as soon as possible. The SLEECS Series 2009-1 are expected to qualify as regulatory capital of SLA. The net proceeds of the issue will be used by SLA for general corporate purposes, including investments in subsidiaries.

Interest on the SLEECS Series 2009-1 will be payable semi-annually. The interest rate on the SLEECS Series 2009-1 from the date of issue to but excluding December 31, 2019 will be 5.863% per annum. On that date and thereafter on each fifth anniversary of that date, the interest rate on the SLEECS Series 2009-1 for the ensuing five years will be reset at a rate equal to 3.40% above the then-yield on a Government of Canada bond having a term to maturity of five years.

As described further in the prospectus, the SLEECS Series 2009-1 may in certain circumstances be automatically exchanged for a series of SLA preferred shares, and in certain other circumstances a series of SLA preferred shares may be issued in lieu of interest payable on the SLEECS Series 2009-1.

On or after December 31, 2014, subject to certain conditions, the SLEECS Series 2009-1 may be redeemed in whole or in part at the option of Sun Life Capital Trust II.

The issue of SLEECS Series 2009-1 is underwritten by a syndicate co-led by Scotia Capital Inc. and RBC Dominion Securities Inc., and is expected to close on November 20, 2009.

Note that these are issued at the level of SLA, the OpCo, which is intrinsically a better credit than SLF (the holdco), and in times of trouble they will convert to SLA prefs. DBRS rates existing SLEECS at A(high), the same as SLF sub-debt.

The following is from the preliminary prospectus:

From the Closing Date to but excluding •, 2019, the interest rate on the SLEECS will be fixed at •% per annum. Assuming the SLEECS are issued on •, 2009, the first interest payment due on the SLEECS on •, 2009 will be $• per $1,000 principal amount of SLEECS. Each interest payment on the SLEECS after the first interest payment (subject to the reset of the interest rate from and after •, 2019) will be in the amount of $• per $1,000 principal amount of SLEECS. Starting on •, 2019, and on every 5th anniversary of such date thereafter until •, 2104 (each such date, an “Interest Reset Date”), the interest rate on the SLEECS will be reset at an interest rate per annum equal to the Government of Canada Yield plus •%. The SLEECS will mature on •, 2108

On or after •, 2014, the Trust may, at its option, with the prior approval of the Superintendent, on giving not more than 60 nor less than 30 days’ notice to the holders of the SLEECS, redeem the SLEECS, in whole or in part. The redemption price per $1,000 principal amount of SLEECS redeemed on any day that is not an Interest Reset Date will be equal to the greater of par and the Canada Yield Price, and the redemption price per $1,000 principal amount of SLEECS redeemed on any Interest Reset Date will be par, together in either case with accrued and unpaid interest to but excluding the date fixed for redemption, subject to any applicable withholding tax. The redemption price payable by the Trust will be paid in cash. See “Description of the Trust Securities — SLEECS—Trust Redemption Right”.

Interest Reset Date means •, 2019, and every fifth anniversary of such date thereafter until •, 2104, on which dates the interest rate on the SLEECS and the SLA Debenture will be reset as described in this prospectus.

In bad times, the SLEECS convert to SLA preferred shares paying 30-Year Canadas + •

The SLF sub-debt, 5.4 of pretend-2037, are quoted by Perimeter to yield 6.24% (which will almost certainly assume a call at par in 2037, but I haven’t checked that), while the ENB 7.22 of 2030 are quoted at 5.73. … so the SLEECS seem kind of expensive to me. However, they will be quoted, traded and indexed as pretend-ten-years, and if anything goes wrong, who cares?

TIPS: GAO vs. TBAC

Monday, November 16th, 2009

The United States Government Accountability Office released a September report to Treasury, Treasury Inflation Protected Securities Should Play a Heightened Role in Addressing Debt Management Challenges:

Treasury faces two near-term challenges in managing the growing government debt: the rise in total outstanding debt and the shortening of the average maturity of the debt profile.3 Treasury’s total outstanding debt increased by $2.3 trillion (25 percent increase in federal debt) since the onset of the economic recession in December 2007. In actions Treasury described as in accordance with normal operating procedures, Treasury increased short-term borrowing to address its massive and immediate borrowing needs. As a result, the average maturity of Treasury’s debt decreased as the percentage of marketable debt maturing within 1 year increased from 35.6 percent to 41.1 percent between September 2007 and June 2009.


Click for big

Click for big.

Another ex-ante study, noted that if the TIPS program were as liquid as the market for off-the-run nominal Treasuries, Treasury would have realized total cost savings from the TIPS program of $22 billion to $32 billion. Over the short run, economists recognize that an assessment of TIPS program’s relative costs depends on whether Treasury or the investor is the beneficiary from differences in expected and actual inflation. The time horizon of the analysis affects the results since, over the long run, the average amount by which actual inflation exceeds expected inflation will roughly equal the average amount when the opposite is true.

23William C. Dudley, Jennifer Roush, and Michelle Steinberg Ezer, “The Case for TIPS: An Examination of the Costs and Benefits,” FRBNY Economic Policy Review (July 2009); and Dean Croushore, “An Evaluation of Inflation Forecasts From Surveys Using Real-Time Data,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Papers (December 2008).

The next part is interesting … I didn’t know that!

In addition, technical market factors closely linked to liquidity effects appear to have contributed to the decline in breakeven inflation rates. Lehman Brothers owned TIPS as part of repo trades or posted TIPS as counterparty collateral. Because of Lehman’s bankruptcy, the court and its counterparty needed to sell these TIPS, which created a flood of TIPS on the market. There appeared to be few buyers and distressed market makers were unwilling to take positions in these TIPS. As a result, the TIPS yields rose sharply.

The conclusion is:

GAO recommends that, in the context of projected sustained increases in federal debt, the Secretary of the Treasury take steps to increase TIPS liquidity and reduce their cost to Treasury: increase issuance, issue longer-dated maturities, and conduct more frequent auctions. Also, the Secretary should continually review the appropriate composition of the TIPS program and consider: the impact of Treasury’s public statements and TIPS issuance on TIPS liquidity, how different analytical perspectives are valuable for evaluating cost, how TIPS can diversify Treasury’s investor base, and how TIPS impact the cost of nominal securities.

However, the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee stated in its November 4th Report:

There was lively debate among the Committee members regarding the GAO Report published September 2009 entitled “Treasury Inflation Protected Securities Should Play a Heightened Role in Addressing Debt Management Challenges.” Committee members could not come to broad agreement on the findings of the report. While Committee members acknowledged the benefits of TIPS as a debt management tool, some members reiterated their higher cost to date versus nominal Treasury securities.

So take your choice.

I have previously highlighted the slides for the TBAC presentation.

November 16, 2009

Monday, November 16th, 2009

Take that! How long will it be before official Chinese pronouncements include the phrase ‘Helicopter Ben’?

China’s banking regulation chief joined Hong Kong’s leader in blaming the Federal Reserve’s interest-rate policy for fueling speculative capital flows that may spur asset-price inflation.

“The continuous depreciation in the dollar, and the U.S. government’s indication that, in order to resume growth and maintain public confidence, it basically won’t raise interest rates for the coming 12 to 18 months, has led to massive dollar arbitrage speculation,” Liu Mingkang, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, said in Beijing yesterday.

“I’m scared and leaders should look out,” [Chief Executive of Hong Kong Donald] Tsang said in Singapore Nov. 13. “America is doing exactly what Japan did last time,” he said, adding that Japan’s zero interest rate policy contributed to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and U.S. mortgage meltdown.

Bernanke himself points out that bubbles are a little easier to spot in hindsight:

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said it’s “not obvious” that asset prices in the U.S. are out of line with underlying values after a 64 percent jump in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index from its March low.

“It is inherently extraordinarily difficult to know whether an asset’s price is in line with its fundamental value,” he said today in response to audience questions after a speech in New York. “It’s not obvious to me in any case that there’s any large misalignments currently in the U.S. financial system.”

“The best approach here if at all possible is to use supervisory and regulatory methods to restrain undue risk-taking and to make sure the system is resilient in case an asset-price bubble bursts in the future,” Bernanke said.

His prescription is entirely sensible and will therefore be ignored.

DBRS has published an amusing letter to the SEC:

The Commission initially put these proposals out for comment last year. With very few exceptions, the proposals elicited an overwhelmingly negative response from the public commenters, including DBRS. The Commission recently adopted the few proposed rule changes that the public found unobjectionable. However, instead of heeding the cogent arguments the commenters put forth regarding the rest of the proposals, the Commission has asked for more comments, hoping this time to elicit a different response.

Footnote: For example, with regard to the proposed elimination of NRSRO references from Regulation M, the Commission says, “In light of the uniform opposition in the comment letters and the Commission’s remaining concern regarding the undue influence of NRSRO ratings, the Commission is seeking additional comment.” Re-proposing Release, at 6, 74 Fed. Reg. at 52375.

No word yet on the DFN / DFN.PR.A Rights Issue. Maybe tomorrow.

The preferred share market continued its rally today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 8bp and FixedResets gaining 17bp. Not much price volatility, volume was lukewarm.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.8437 % 1,498.8
FixedFloater 5.97 % 4.09 % 43,737 18.69 1 0.8864 % 2,608.9
Floater 2.60 % 3.05 % 94,019 19.56 3 0.8437 % 1,872.4
OpRet 4.81 % -4.83 % 120,693 0.09 14 -0.0628 % 2,304.8
SplitShare 6.34 % 6.37 % 340,439 3.88 2 0.0875 % 2,085.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0628 % 2,107.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.90 % 5.57 % 126,100 1.14 4 0.2990 % 1,863.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.89 % 5.95 % 183,829 13.98 70 0.0769 % 1,762.1
FixedReset 5.48 % 3.97 % 393,460 3.94 41 0.1655 % 2,131.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 18.93
Evaluated at bid price : 18.93
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-12-16
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : -13.64 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.77
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 19.11
Evaluated at bid price : 19.11
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 12.80
Evaluated at bid price : 12.80
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 13.01
Evaluated at bid price : 13.01
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 269,711 Nesbitt crossed 230,000 at 27.00; RBC crossed 35,800 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet 146,619 TD crossed 131,400 at 26.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-12-16
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : -13.64 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 56,250 RBC crossed 50,000 at 27.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.99
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 53,329 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 40,610 RBC crossed 20,000 at 19.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 19.12
Evaluated at bid price : 19.12
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 38,858 Desjardins crossed 31,900 at 17.86.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 17.77
Evaluated at bid price : 17.77
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

November Edition of PrefLetter Released!

Monday, November 16th, 2009

The November, 2009, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The November edition contains an appendix examining the rise of Alternative Trading Systems in Canada and discusses two order types that may become possible with increased automation and competition.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the November, 2009, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the December, 2009, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close December 11 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on December 14.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: A recent enhancement to the PrefLetter website is the Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

TBAC Claims Real Rates Bigger Problem Than Inflation

Sunday, November 15th, 2009

My attention was drawn to the latest efforts of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee by a Bloomberg story:

The 13-member committee of bond dealers and investors that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner depends on for advice, and includes officials of Pacific Investment Management Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc., highlighted the surge on page 36 of a 67-page report on Nov. 3. On the same page, they showed inflation expectations are subdued based on gauges watched by the Federal Reserve. In their discussions, the group noted that a second year of government debt sales approaching $2 trillion may weigh on investors as the Fed stops buying notes and bonds.

The presentation is on-line. Lots of fascinating charts, including the two highlighted ones:

Option Skew…

…and forward inflation…

This looks like good stuff – and I believe I’ve highlighted some of their work before, in the context of five-year TIPS elimination – that I want to chew on for a while … but I’m knee-deep in PrefLetter at the moment … and then there’s some urgent programming … then a couple of letters …

How might an investor exploit a high-real-rate-low-inflation scenario? Answer that, win a kewpie doll.

Update: The report to the Treasury Secretary is online:

With regard to TIPS, the Committee recommends increasing TIPS issuance from $58 billion in 2009 to $70-$80 billion in 2010. The auction schedules for both 5 and 10-year TIPS would be maintained, although sizes would increase. However, 20-year TIPS issuance would be replaced with 30-year TIPS, on the same auction schedule, with larger sizes. The Committee felt that this would both lengthen the average maturity of Treasury’s debt, while attracting investors interested in longer duration inflation protection. In the medium term, the Committee felt that the market could support increases in both auction sizes and frequency, growing gross TIPS issuance to $100-$130 billion per annum. These actions maintain, if not increase, the proportion of TIPS to total marketable debt outstanding.

November Edition of PrefLetter Now in Preparation

Friday, November 13th, 2009

The markets have closed and the November edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The November edition will contain an appendix examining the advent of Alternative Trading Systems, their importance to the preferred share market and a note on order types.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The November issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the November issue.

November 13, 2009

Friday, November 13th, 2009

A good solid day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 15bp while FixedResets gained 4bp … reasonably close to a parallel shift in yields, given the difference in their weighted-median average modified duration. Not a lot of price volatility, not a lot of volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5582 % 1,486.3
FixedFloater 6.02 % 4.14 % 43,467 18.63 1 1.3476 % 2,585.9
Floater 2.62 % 3.09 % 94,418 19.45 3 0.5582 % 1,856.8
OpRet 4.81 % -7.44 % 114,939 0.09 14 0.1082 % 2,306.2
SplitShare 6.35 % 6.34 % 352,496 3.89 2 -0.0219 % 2,084.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1082 % 2,108.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.92 % 5.67 % 126,864 1.15 4 -0.2486 % 1,857.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.89 % 5.95 % 182,981 13.97 70 0.1509 % 1,760.7
FixedReset 5.49 % 4.03 % 399,738 3.95 41 0.0418 % 2,128.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 19.78
Evaluated at bid price : 19.78
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 22.90
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.05
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 12.82
Evaluated at bid price : 12.82
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.62
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 22.40
Evaluated at bid price : 22.56
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.P FixedReset 99,550 RBC bought three blocks of 10,000 shares each from HSBC, all at 27.25, then crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.21
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 54,220 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 27.30; RBC crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 44,215 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 43,180 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 19.78
Evaluated at bid price : 19.78
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 36,695 RBC crossed 25,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 32,600 RBC crossed 31,000 at 19.74.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 2.02 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Utilities and Preferred Shares

Friday, November 13th, 2009

This is way out of date, but I ran across it and thought I’d pass it along anyway.

The following is from the Alberta Energy & Utilities Board Decision 2006-100, regarding Atco Utilities [AU]:

AU submitted that its preferred shares have ensured that its customers have enjoyed the benefits of the lowest cost financing on the most flexible terms available in the Canadian financial market because AU’s existing preferred shares provide support to its credit rating.

The Board notes that AU provided an analysis indicating that replacing preferred shares with debt would provide initial savings but the cumulative savings would become negative within four years due to the cumulative higher costs of new debt issued each year.

The Board notes that the approach used by both AU and CG to determine the cost effectiveness of preferred shares is dependent on AU’s specific debt requirement needs, with a focus on the next four to six years. However, all debt would eventually be refinanced and accordingly would be affected by any lower credit rating. In the Board’s view, the cost effectiveness of using preferred shares should be evaluated on a more generic basis that considers the long-run steady state impacts and that is not dependent on the particular immediate borrowing needs of AU. This can best be accomplished by comparing the total yearly cost of non-common equity financing with and without preferred shares at current market rates for debt and preferred shares. In this context “current” refers to the most current market figures available on the record of this proceeding.

AU’s updated evidence indicated that preferred shares had a current market cost of 4.60% and that AU’s income tax rate was currently 31.37%. This translates to a pre-tax cost of (4.60/ (1-0.3137)) 6.70%. AU’s updated evidence indicated that the current market cost for long-term debt was 5.75%. As a result, preferred shares were estimated to have a current market cost that was 95 basis points higher than the current market cost of debt, at the time of that estimate.

The ATCO Utilities proposed a preferred equity ratio of 6% and a debt ratio that approximates 57% across the four ATCO Utilities, which would then approximate 63% if the preferred shares were replaced with debt. In these proportions, the debt portion of capital is approximately 10 times larger than the preferred equity portion of capital. On this basis, the Board calculates that if the debt costs were to rise by any more than approximately 10 ( i.e. 95/10) basis points, due to the replacement of preferred shares with debt, then the added cost of the (then) approximately 63% debt component would outweigh the approximate 95 basis points savings on the current 6% preferred share component. The Board notes that, in keeping with its steady-state approach, this calculation assumes that the added cost would apply to both existing and new debt.

AU’s expert, Mr. Neysmith indicated that replacing AU’s preferred shares with debt would lead to a debt credit rating downgrade of at least one to two notches. AU estimated that this would increase its debt interest costs by 30 to 60 basis points. AU also provided a letter from a financial market advisor, Mr. Engen, which indicated that AU’s interest costs would rise by 5 to 10 basis points if the market viewed CU’s regulatory environment to be largely unchanged and 20 to 40 basis points if the market viewed CU’s regulatory environment as having worsened because of the Board’s decision to remove the preferred shares. Both of these estimates were based on current market conditions. Mr. Engen indicated that in a less attractive spread environment, the differential could be expected to widen.

It is not clear how many basis points would be added to AU’s debt costs if preferred shares were replaced with debt. However, the Board accepts that directionally it should expect some increase in debt costs in such a scenario. The Board accepts AU’s submission that the debt cost impact would vary depending on market conditions. In the Board’s view, a 10 basis points or greater increase in debt costs for AU resulting from the discontinuance of the use of preferred shares in AU’s capital structure would be sufficient to demonstrate the continued cost effectiveness of employing preferred shares. The Board considers the evidence provided by AU and its experts persuasive that the discontinuance of the use of preferred shares could be expected in the present market conditions to increase AU’s debt costs by approximately 10 basis points. The Board also notes that AU’s evidence indicated that the impact could be as high as 60 basis points. Therefore the Board finds that the continued use of preferred shares is cost effective at this time.

Under cross-examination by Board Counsel, AU indicated the optimum amount of preferred shares had been estimated by AU to be within a range of 5% to 10%.

It should be noted that the Alberta Utilities Commission sets Return-on-Equity allowances for the utilities it regulates based on common equity:

In addition, in Decision 2009-216, 2009 Generic Cost of Capital, issued today, the AUC set a new return-on-equity (ROE) level of nine per cent for all the utilities for 2009 and 2010, and established moderately higher individual equity ratios for each of the firms. The changes were in part to address pressures stemming from the global credit crunch.

The changes apply to all regulated utilities in Alberta serving the electricity and natural gas sectors. These include distribution and transmission providers. The uniform, or generic, ROE is applied to the portion of a utility’s rate base financed by common equity to determine the utility’s return on equity capital.

OSFI Looking Closely at Lifeco Consolidated Capital

Friday, November 13th, 2009

The Office of the Superintendant of Financial Institutions has released a remarks by Julie Dickson to the 2009 Life Insurance Forum.

Of greatest interest was the short section on consolidated capital. When the tenor the speech is taken together with the prior speech by Mark White (amusingly, Ms. Dickson’s remarks on this specific topic are almost word-for-word identical with those of Mr. White) and warnings in MFC’s 3Q09 results and SLF’s 3Q09 results … I suspect that this is going to happen, sooner rather than later:

Events such as those at AIG have shown that holding company strength is important to their regulated subsidiaries. This is particularly true where the holding company is the primary issuer of capital or is required to raise debt. As OSFI regulates non-operating insurers acting as holding companies, we are considering updating our current regulatory guidance for these entities to promote a more integrated and consistent approach to determining regulatory capital requirements. For example, OSFI’s MCCSR tests could be used to evaluate the group’s consolidated risk-based capital – and a test similar to the asset-to-capital multiple (ACM) test could be used to evaluate leverage.

Update, 2009-11-14: I just realized! She didn’t repeat the following assertion from Mr. White’s speech:

OSFI regulates both non-operating insurers acting as holding companies, and entities that are formed as holding companies under applicable financial institution legislation. Currently, this only affects the life insurance industry.

… which I believe to be incorrect. E-L Financial owns both Empire Life (a lifeco) and Dominion General (P&C).

November 12, 2009

Friday, November 13th, 2009

The SEC is casting aspersions on the hedge fund industry:

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami said the recent insider-trading cases among hedge funds including Galleon Group reflect “systemic behavior” in the industry.

“You have funds whose business model consisted of vigorous attempts to collect information from corporate insiders and to utilize that information to trade,” Khuzami said today at the Bloomberg Washington Summit. The cases point to “a more systemic approach to the problem and therefore potentially more dangerous.”

Whether that’s true or not I couldn’t say, but based on some of the people I’ve met in the industry … it doesn’t surprise me.

Canadian Pacific Railway has issued a thirty-year MTN with a 6.45% coupon:

DBRS has today assigned a BBB rating, with a Stable trend, to the $400 million in Medium-Term Notes (Notes) issued today by Canadian Pacific Railway Company (CP or the Company). The 6.45% Notes are due in November 2039, will rank pari passu with the Company’s existing senior unsecured debt, and include change of control provisions. The debt will be offered under the Company’s base shelf prospectus dated June 26, 2009 for up to $1.5 billion in medium-term notes. Proceeds from the issuance are expected to be used for general corporate purposes, which may include the funding of pension plan obligations and the reduction and restructuring of indebtedness.

There’s a speech by Julie Dickson on Lifeco regulation that demands it’s own post … but I don’t know if I’ll get to it tonight.

I note that NS Power and its tidal technology partner OpenHydro have successfully deployed the first commercial scale in-stream tidal turbine in the Bay of Fundy today. Thank heaven! I heard about those plans so often in high school that I achieved deep understanding of the term “tidal bore”.

It was a “little” day today … the market edged up a little; volume recovered a little.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.7534 % 1,478.0
FixedFloater 6.11 % 4.21 % 45,207 18.54 1 1.7133 % 2,551.6
Floater 2.64 % 3.15 % 95,642 19.32 3 -0.7534 % 1,846.5
OpRet 4.81 % -8.93 % 119,092 0.09 14 -0.1989 % 2,303.7
SplitShare 6.34 % 6.32 % 357,922 3.90 2 -0.4139 % 2,084.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1989 % 2,106.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.90 % 5.66 % 128,128 1.16 4 -0.0161 % 1,862.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.90 % 5.95 % 184,829 13.94 70 0.0669 % 1,758.1
FixedReset 5.49 % 4.03 % 395,554 3.96 41 0.0751 % 2,127.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.O OpRet -2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-12
Maturity Price : 21.20
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-12
Maturity Price : 24.33
Evaluated at bid price : 24.63
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-12
Maturity Price : 12.60
Evaluated at bid price : 12.60
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-12
Maturity Price : 12.59
Evaluated at bid price : 12.59
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-12
Maturity Price : 21.98
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-12
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.81
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-12
Maturity Price : 23.80
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 206,500 Trade-a-rama! Nesbitt crossed 25,000; RBC crossed 35,000; Desjardins crossed 15,000; HSBC sold six blocks of 10,000 to anonymous and another 10,000 to Nesbitt; RBC crossed 25,000; all this was done at the 26.00 price point.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 144,025 HSBC sold blocks of 10,000 and 20,000 to RBC at 27.52; RBC crossed 58,000 at 27.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.55
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 96,775 Scotia sold 21,100 to anonymous at 25.50; UBS sold 13,000 to anonymous at the same price; Nesbitt bought 16,000 from anonymous at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 63,392 TD crossed 47,700 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 59,860 Canaccord bought blocks 15,000 and 17,500 from TD at 20.75 (there is no word regarding whether Canaccord considers itself to have expertise in preferred shares; I trust TD has taken legal advice on the trade).
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-12
Maturity Price : 20.73
Evaluated at bid price : 20.73
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 47,610 RBC crossed 30,000 at 19.57.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-12
Maturity Price : 19.57
Evaluated at bid price : 19.57
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.