Archive for April, 2010

FTN.PR.A Gets Bigger

Wednesday, April 14th, 2010

Financial 15 Split Corp has announced it has:

today completed its secondary offering of 1,980,000 Preferred Shares and 1,980,000 Class A Shares of the Company for aggregate gross proceeds of $39,105,000, bringing the Company’s net assets to approximately $169 million. The shares will continue to trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the existing symbols FTN (Class A shares) and FTN.PR.A (Preferred shares).

The Preferred Shares were offered at a price of $10.00 per share to yield 5.25% based on current distribution policy. The Class A shares were offered at a price of $9.75 per share to yield 15.47% based on current distribution policy. RBC Capital Markets and CIBC World Markets were co-lead agents for the offering.

The proceeds from the re-opening of the Company, net of expenses and Agents’ fee, will be used by the Company to invest in an actively managed portfolio of 15 financial services companies made up of 10 Canadian and 5 U.S. issuers

There were about 7.3-million units outstanding as at November 30, 2009, so this offering improves liquidity by about 25%.

FTN.PR.A was last mentioned when the treasury offering was announced. FTN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

April 13, 2010

Tuesday, April 13th, 2010

Citigroup’s liquidity guarantees are attracting scrutiny:

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission investigators may conclude a primary cause of Citigroup’s 2008 bailout was the use of “liquidity puts” by traders to bolster sales, Chairman Phil Angelides said in an interview yesterday. Those puts allowed customers to sell debt securities back to the bank at face value if credit markets froze, something that Citigroup’s traders bet would never happen, according to Angelides.

To raise money to buy the assets, Citigroup sold commercial paper, with the assets pledged as collateral. Commercial paper is a type of debt that matures in less than a year and was popular with money-market funds and corporate treasurers who want to invest their surplus cash in readily redeemable funds while earning higher yields.

Liquidity puts were added to “facilitate” the sales of the commercial paper, [Citigroup CDO boss Nestor] Dominguez said; investors could “put back” the commercial paper to Citigroup if the market went cold. Dominguez described this as a “significant widening in credit spreads or a temporary inability to issue commercial paper.” Widening credit spreads, or the gap between a bond’s yield and benchmark rates, indicate slackening investor demand.

Citigroup used the liquidity puts partly because they required less capital support than backup credit lines that bank’s typically offer, Georgiou said.

The liquidity puts were subject to a 0.8 percent capital charge, [commission member Byron] Georgiou said. Put another way, the bank had to set aside $1 of capital for every $125 of commercial paper. That compares with Citigroup’s overall ratio of $1 for every $14.50 of loans, securities and other investments as of Dec. 31.

The International Monetary Fund has released the April 2010 Global Financial Stability Report. I haven’t had a chance to do much besides skim it, but the big news is that they’re recommending capital charges on “systemically important” banks based on regulatory fiat, rather than any kind of formula:

Regulators may find it necessary to weigh “direct preemptive measures,” including constraining the size of certain activities to limit the emergence of “systemically important” firms, the Washington-based IMF said today in its bi-annual Global Financial Stability Report.

The report precedes an April 23 meeting of the Group of 20 nations in Washington, where the IMF plans to detail for finance chiefs ways that financial firms may help pay for the costs of bailouts. Since the start of the credit crisis, governments and central banks have spent more than $11 trillion to support the financial industry, according to the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The capital surcharge would be “a buffer” designed to increase “the resiliency of the institution to sustain different shocks,” Juan Sole, one of the report’s authors, told reporters in Washington today.

Political momentum to overhaul financial regulations in some countries may be weakening as economic growth returns, IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn said in an interview in Kenya last month.

Parts of the financial industry have gone “back to practices of risk taking, which is probably not the most appropriate to have a stable financial system at the global level,” he said.

Now, more than ever, it is important for large banks to offer cushy jobs to ex-regulators!

The rebound in the market continued today on heavy volume, with PerpetualDiscounts up 26bp while FixedResets lost 4bp … taking the yield on the latter index within striking distance of 4%!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.60 % 2.71 % 55,414 20.88 1 -0.2764 % 2,122.8
FixedFloater 4.94 % 3.01 % 47,480 20.39 1 0.3238 % 3,237.9
Floater 1.90 % 1.65 % 42,088 23.46 4 0.3755 % 2,427.3
OpRet 4.88 % 3.48 % 107,376 0.29 10 -0.0350 % 2,313.7
SplitShare 6.34 % -1.27 % 136,202 0.08 2 0.0438 % 2,151.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0350 % 2,115.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.82 % 3.86 % 34,650 0.62 2 0.4654 % 1,853.8
Perpetual-Discount 6.14 % 6.20 % 197,668 13.65 76 0.2626 % 1,733.0
FixedReset 5.43 % 3.93 % 479,541 3.66 44 -0.0373 % 2,173.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-13
Maturity Price : 18.09
Evaluated at bid price : 18.09
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-13
Maturity Price : 18.21
Evaluated at bid price : 18.21
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-13
Maturity Price : 20.11
Evaluated at bid price : 20.11
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-13
Maturity Price : 18.01
Evaluated at bid price : 18.01
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-13
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-13
Maturity Price : 20.07
Evaluated at bid price : 20.07
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 92,850 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-13
Maturity Price : 24.35
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 70,460 National crossed 55,000 at 27.61.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.57
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 58,045 National crossed 50,000 at 27.44.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.37
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 53,818 RBC crossed 13,700 at 27.41; Nesbitt bought 10,000 from anonymous at 27.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.31
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 44,253 RBC bought 10,000 from National at 18.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-13
Maturity Price : 18.01
Evaluated at bid price : 18.01
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 44,214 National crossed 25,000 at 26.79.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.68
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
There were 61 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

S&P Downgrades SLF: Prefs now P-2(high) / BBB+

Tuesday, April 13th, 2010

Standard and Poor’s has announced:

  • We believe Sun Life Financial Inc.’s 2010 after-tax operating earnings will come in below our expectation and that the U.S. investment portfolio will show further asset impairments, which will add pressure to the group’s capital.
  • Based on weaker-than-expected operating earnings and expected future pressure on capital, we have lowered the ratings on SLF and its North American subsidiaries by one notch.
  • The outlook on SLF’s North American subsidiaries is stable, and the outlook on SLF is negative.

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services said today that it lowered its long-term counterparty credit and financial strength ratings on Sun Life Financial Inc.’s (SLF) core insurance subsidiaries–Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (SLA), Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.) (SLUS), and Sun Life Insurance & Annuity Co. of New York–to ‘AA-‘ from ‘AA’.

Standard & Poor’s also said that it lowered its financial strength ratings on Independence Life & Annuity Co., which benefits from an explicit claims guarantee for policyholder obligations provided by SLUS–to ‘AA-‘ from ‘AA’. The outlook on these companies is stable.

In addition, Standard & Poor’s lowered its long-term counterparty credit rating on SLF to ‘A’ from ‘A+’. The outlook on SLF in negative.

The ratings and outlook on SLF’s Hong Kong subsidiary, Sun Life Hong Kong Ltd. (A+/Stable/—), remain unchanged…

Sun Life’s 2009 operating earnings were well below the C$1.75 billion normal run rate required for the higher ratings, as outlined within the report we published on March 6, 2009. We believe SLF’s 2010 after-tax operating earnings will also come in below our expectation of at least C$1.75 billion. The company’s current earnings guidance is for adjusted earnings from operations for 2010 to be C$1.4 billion-C$1.7 billion, which is notionally below the above target.

Supporting the ratings are Sun Life’s very strong business profile and competitive advantages in Canada as well as its very strong earnings, capitalization, and investments. We view Sun Life’s enterprise risk management (ERM) as strong and a neutral to the ratings given the group’s complexity and risks. We view Sun Life’s financial flexibility as a weakness to the ratings.

Sun Life has six issues of PerpetualDiscounts outstanding: SLF.PR.A, SLF.PR.B, SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E, as well as one FixedReset, SLF.PR.F. All are tracked by HIMIPref™ and assigned to their expected subindices.

April 12, 2010

Monday, April 12th, 2010

Greece is getting a bail-out:

Forced into action by a surge in Greek borrowing costs to an 11-year high, finance ministers from the 16 euro countries said they and the International Monetary Fund would offer the loans at non-subsidized interest rates in case Greece runs out of money-raising options. European Union Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn said that the rate on the loans could be around 5 percent.

There’s no word regarding the attached strings.

PerpetualDiscounts continued their recovery today, gaining 38bp on continued heavy volume, while FixedResets were basically unchanged, gaining 1bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.60 % 2.69 % 54,786 20.89 1 -0.8676 % 2,128.7
FixedFloater 4.90 % 3.02 % 47,787 20.12 1 -0.2247 % 3,227.5
Floater 1.91 % 1.67 % 42,337 23.41 4 -0.0242 % 2,418.2
OpRet 4.88 % 3.55 % 105,244 1.10 10 0.0000 % 2,314.5
SplitShare 6.35 % -3.32 % 133,872 0.08 2 0.1315 % 2,150.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,116.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.84 % 3.85 % 33,374 0.62 2 0.6517 % 1,845.2
Perpetual-Discount 6.16 % 6.19 % 196,893 13.66 76 0.3795 % 1,728.5
FixedReset 5.42 % 3.87 % 481,188 3.66 44 0.0052 % 2,174.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-12
Maturity Price : 23.84
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-12
Maturity Price : 19.10
Evaluated at bid price : 19.10
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-12
Maturity Price : 19.95
Evaluated at bid price : 19.95
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-12
Maturity Price : 23.80
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-12
Maturity Price : 19.15
Evaluated at bid price : 19.15
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-12
Maturity Price : 22.84
Evaluated at bid price : 23.13
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-12
Maturity Price : 24.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-12
Maturity Price : 21.09
Evaluated at bid price : 21.09
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 461,960 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-12
Maturity Price : 24.37
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 74,430 RBC crossed 60,000 at 27.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.40
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 65,920 TD bought 20,000 from anonymous at 25.72. National bought 11,000 from Desjardins at 25.70 and 11,200 from RBC at 25.71.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 65,875 National crossed blocks of 30,000 and 10,000 at 27.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.90
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 62,600 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.78; National crossed 11,000 at 25.74.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.72
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 52,551 National crossed blocks of 30,000 and 10,000 at 27.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.81
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
There were 54 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BNS.PR.Y Drops on Opening! FixedResetDiscount?

Monday, April 12th, 2010

This issue is a 3.85%+100 FixedReset announced March 25.

BNS has announced:

that as a result of investor demand for its domestic public offering of non-cumulative 5-year rate reset preferred shares Series 30 (the “Preferred Shares Series 30”), the size of the offering has been increased to 10.6 million Preferred Shares Series 30. The gross proceeds of the offering will now be $265 million.

The offering was made through a syndicate of investment dealers led by Scotia Capital Inc. The Preferred Shares Series 30 commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange today under the symbol BNS.PR.Y.

Holders of Preferred Shares Series 30 will be entitled to receive a non-cumulative quarterly fixed dividend for the initial period ending April 25, 2015 yielding 3.85% per annum, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Scotiabank. Thereafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years at a rate equal to 1.00% over the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield. Holders of Preferred Shares Series 30 will, subject to certain conditions, have the right to convert all or any part of their shares to non-cumulative floating rate preferred shares Series 31 (the “Preferred Shares Series 31”) of Scotiabank on April 26, 2015 and on April 26 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Preferred Shares Series 31 will be entitled to receive a non-cumulative quarterly floating dividend at a rate equal to the 3-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 1.00%, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Scotiabank.

BNS.PR.Y traded 461,960 shares in a range of 24.30-64 (!) today, before settling at 24.42-49.

Vital statistics are:

BNS.PR.Y FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-12
Maturity Price : 24.37
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %

BNS.PR.Y is tracked by HIMIPref™. It is assigned to the “FixedReset” index; when there is enough differentiation of prices to justify a new index, the FixedReset index will be split into discount and premium indices; just by price, I think: doing it by reset level and call expectation might be too complex for what is meant to be a simple index.

WFS.PR.A Warrant Offering 10% Subscribed

Monday, April 12th, 2010

Mulvihill has announced 898,716 warrants for full units of World Financial Split Corp. were exercised. Issuance was 8,557,010, hence: 10%.

The 900,000-odd new shares added to the 8.6-million old ones should increase the liquidity of WFS.PR.A; it’s a shame about the credit quality.

WFS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was upgraded to Pfd-4(high) by DBRS. WFS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

SBN.PR.A Warrant Offering 34% Subscribed

Monday, April 12th, 2010

Mulvihill has announced that the SBN.PR.A warrant offering has succeeded in selling slightly under 1.3-million units, for gross proceeds of $24.24-million.

The prospectus stated 3.8-million units were up for sale; hence, 34%.

The 1.3-million new shares, added to the 3.8-million old ones, means this fund is starting to get to a respectable size. Now, if only the credit quality was better…

SBN.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the warrant prospectus was filed. SBN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

DBRS Addresses Contingent Capital

Monday, April 12th, 2010

DBRS has announced a policy on contingent capital.

DBRS has today clarified its approach to rating a subset of hybrids and other debt capital instruments whose features include principal write-downs or conversions to lower positioned instruments, if certain trigger events occur. See DBRS Methodology, “Rating Bank Subordinated Debt and Hybrid Capital Instruments with Contingent Risks” April 2010.

“Principal write-downs” were used in the recent Rabobank issue. “Conversions to lower positioned instruments” (which, presumably, includes the possible conversion of Innovative Tier 1 Capital to preferred shares, which has been around for ages), is the mainstream proposal and was used in the ground-breaking Lloyds deal (which was poorly structured due to the high conversion price).

The DBRS Methodology: Rating Bank Subordinated Debt and Hybrid Capital Instruments with Contingent Risks notes:

This view that most hybrids are closer to debt than equity was evident in the global fi nancial crisis. Despite all their ‘bells and whistles’, most of these bank capital instruments could not be converted into equity to help struggling banks absorb losses and bolster their capital while they were still operating. The main benefi t for bank equity capital came when banks made exchange offers for hybrids, either at less than par or for equity instruments. The limited contribution to equity capital is consistent with DBRS’s perspective on the function of these instruments for banks. In analyzing the contribution of bank capital instruments to a bank’s capitalization, DBRS does not generally give any signifi cant equity credit for hybrid instruments, although we recognize their full value in meeting regulatory requirements.

They classify triggering events as:

In assessing the additional risk of these contingent features, an important factor is the ease of tripping the triggers that cause the adverse event to occur. The easier the triggers are to trip, the greater the additional risk for the hybrid holder. DBRS organizes the ease of tripping triggers into four broad categories:
• Level 4 “Very Hard”, e.g., Bank is insolvent or has been seized
• Level 3 “Hard”, e.g., Bank has exhausted most of its capital, but is not technically insolvent
• Level 2 “Easier”, e.g., Bank no longer meeting minimum regulatory requirements
• Level 1 “Easiest”, e.g., Capital ratio falls below a level set above minimum requirements
For those instruments where the trigger event requires the bank to be insolvent or seized by the authorities, DBRS views the risk as similar to debt instruments.

Julie Dickson’s op-ed advocated – eseentially – a Level 4 trigger – but, of course, she is trying to get something for nothing: equity capital priced like debt. The solution I advocate, a conversion into stock if the stock trades below a certain level, is a Level 1 solution; more expensive for the banks, but on the other hand, actually has a hope of accomplishing something. YOU CAN’T GET SOMETHING FOR NOTHING FOREVER! Hasn’t the last few years convinced anybody of that?

The fi rst step is evaluating the elevated risk posed by the specifi c features of each instrument. For some instruments, the combinations are relatively straightforward. An instrument with triggers that are hard to trip and resulting positions that are above preferreds is viewed as having elevated risk. For instruments with triggers that are easier to trip and resulting positions that are comparable to preferreds, the risk is viewed as being very elevated. Under DBRS’s approach certain instruments with contingent features can pose exceptional risk, if their triggers are the easiest to trip and the resulting position for holders is closer to common equity. One factor in rating these instruments below preferred shares could be that tripping the triggers could occur without preference shares being impacted or leave them in a preferential position relative to the converted instruments. Outside these straightforward combinations, there are a number of combinations that involve judgment in making the assessment of risk (See Exhibit 1). or those instruments where the write-downs or conversions to lower positioned instruments can be reversed, if the bank survives, the risk to investors remains largely the same as it would be in the absence of the feature. That is, investors face losses only if the bank is declared insolvent.

There seems to be acceptance of the idea that it will be possible for subordinated debt to leapfrog prefs and become equity; and I don’t understand this idea at all. Once you allow leapfrogging, investing becomes a lottery. Let all elements of capital have a mandatory conversion into equity at some point, says I; and make it clear that leapfrogging is not likely.

In my proposal, where prefs would trigger/convert at 50% of the common price at time of issue and sub-debt would trigger/convert at 25%, leapfrogging is sort of possible. You could issue a pref, wait a few years (decades?) until the common price doubles, then issue sub-debt. But that’s fine, that’s allowed. All the regulators should be worried about is the risk at the time of sale to the public.

DBRS also published a not-very-interesting Methodology
Rating Bank Subordinated Debt and Hybrid Instruments with Discretionary Payments
. They used it when downgrading Dexia’s sub-debt today, amongst other actions.

MAPF Performance: March, 2010

Monday, April 12th, 2010

The fund underperformed in March, weighed down by its lack of holdings in the Floating Rate sector, in which performance continues to astonish, and by its overweighting in PerpetualDiscounts, which underperformed.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close March 31 was $10.2497, after giving effect to a dividend distribution of $0.136431.

Returns to March, 2010
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month -2.42% -0.66% -0.89%
Three Months -1.70% +0.33% -1.29%
One Year +45.76% +26.39% +21.33%
Two Years (annualized) +25.27% +4.33% N/A*
Three Years (annualized) +15.59% +0.38%  
Four Years (annualized) +12.97% +1.33%  
Five Years (annualized) +11.92% +2.10%  
Six Years (annualized) +10.90% +2.09%  
Seven Years (annualized) +14.68% +3.31%  
Eight Years (annualized) +12.23% +3.43%  
Nine Years (annualized) +12.65% +3.19%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns. The figure shown would be the product of the current one-year return and the similar figure reported for March 2009; but that figure was not published by Claymore at that time.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.8%, +0.2% and +24.0%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.4%, +0.4% & +19.0% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for AIC Preferred Income Fund (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.3%, +0.3% & N/A, respectively

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

I am very pleased with the returns over the past year, but implore Assiduous Readers not to project this level of outperformance for the indefinite future. The year in the preferred share market was filled with episodes of panic and euphoria, together with many new entrants who do not appear to know what they are doing; perfect conditions for a disciplined quantitative approach.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There have been a lot of strongly motivated market participants in the past year, generating a lot of noise! The conditions of the past year may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. Just don’t expect the current level of outperformance every year, OK? While I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform, it should be borne in mind that beating the index by 500bp represents a good year, and there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.1883 0.3926
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.1883 0.4203
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.1883 0.4448
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.1883 0.4389
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.1883 $0.4449
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.1883 $0.5054
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.1883 $0.6206
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.1883 $0.6423
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.1883 $0.6524
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.1883 $0.6278
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0000 $0.6182
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0000 $0.6231
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.

Significant positions were also held in Fixed-Reset issues on March; all of which (with the exception of YPG.PR.C) currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par at the first possible opportunity. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 6.30% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: March 2010 analysis(which is in excess of the 6.16% index yield on March 31). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $10.2497 * 0.0630 = 0.6457 whereas similar calculations for February and January result in $0.6418 and $0.6338, respectively

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: March 2010

Monday, April 12th, 2010

Turnover increased slightly in March to about 28%. The current decline in the number trading opportunities is annoying, but one of the great constants in financial markets is a demand for liquidity and the fund is ready to meet that demand at a moment’s notice.

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may the thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2010-3-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 4.0% (0) 8.14% 6.92
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 77.9% (+0.4) 6.30% 13.51
Fixed-Reset 12.3% (-1.3) 3.65% 3.77
Scraps (FixedReset) 4.9% (+0.1) 7.02% 12.58
Cash 0.8% (+0.8) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 6.03% 11.88
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2010-3-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 68.7% (-7.0)
Pfd-2(high) 15.5% (+6.2)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 10.1% (0)
Pfd-3(high) 4.9% (+0.1)
Cash 0.8% (+0.8)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2010-3-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.0% (0)
$50,000 – $100,000 0.0% (0)
$100,000 – $200,000 24.7% (+0.7)
$200,000 – $300,000 33.5% (-9.2)
>$300,000 41.0 (+7.7)
Cash 0.8% (+0.8)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 17 and published in the September PrefLetter. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a little better
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to PerpetualDiscounts
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower