Archive for August, 2010

MFC Warns of Increased Capital Requirements

Thursday, August 5th, 2010

Manulife Financial Corporation stated in their 2Q10 Earnings Release:

The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (“OSFI”) has been conducting a fundamental review of segregated fund/variable annuity capital requirements. As announced by OSFI on July 28, 2010, it is expected that existing capital requirements in respect of new (but not in-force) segregated fund/variable annuity business written starting in 2011 will change (e.g. post 2010 contracts). Our new products will be developed taking into account these new rules.

OSFI is also expected to continue its consultative review of its capital rules for more general application, likely in 2013. OSFI notes that it is premature to draw conclusions about the cumulative impact this process will have. OSFI has stated that increases in capital may be offset by other changes, such as hedge recognition. The Company will continue to monitor developments.

They lost a big whack of money on the quarter:

The Company reported a net loss attributed to shareholders of $2,378 million for the second quarter of 2010, compared to net income of $1,774 million for the second quarter of 2009.

The net loss for the second quarter was driven by non-cash mark-to-market charges of $1.7 billion related to equity market declines and by non-cash mark-to-market charges of $1.5 billion related to the decline in interest rates.

…but nobody should be surprised by this:

During the quarter, the S&P 500 declined 12 per cent, the TSX six per cent, and the Japan TOPIX 14 per cent. We previously reported that, at the end of the first quarter of 2010, our net income sensitivity to a ten per cent market decline was $1.1 billion. Because of the decline in markets in the second quarter, this has increased to $1.3 billion. By market index, our greatest sensitivity is to the S&P 500, followed by the TOPIX, and thirdly the TSX.

Numbers for interest rate sensitivities are similarly high:

We previously reported our interest rate sensitivities as at December 31, 2009 and they did not change materially in the first quarter of 2010. Since March 31, 2010 however, as a direct result of the decrease in interest rates, our sensitivity to a one per cent decrease in government, swap and corporate bond rates across all maturities with no change in spreads has increased to $2.7 billion as at June 30, 2010.

Estimated continuing profitability is also under pressure:

Adjusted earnings from operations for the second quarter of 2010 were $658 million, which is below the estimate in our 2009 Annual Report of between $700 million and $800 million for each of the quarters of 2010. The shortfall was due to the historically low interest rate environment which increased the strain (loss) we report on new business of long duration guaranteed products (primarily in JH Life); a lack of realized gains on our AFS equity portfolio; and the costs associated with the hedging of additional in-force variable annuity guaranteed value in the last 12 months.

Adjusted earnings from operations is a non-GAAP financial measure. Because adjusted earnings from operations excludes the impact of market conditions, it is not an indicator of our actual results which continue to be affected materially by the volatile equity markets, interest rates and current economic conditions.

As might be expected, they are not very supportive of the IFRS Exposure Draft on Insurance Contracts:

As indicated above, the IFRS standard for insurance contracts is currently being developed and is not expected to be effective until at least 2013. The insurance contracts accounting policy proposals being considered by the IASB do not connect the measurement of insurance liabilities with the assets that support the payment of those liabilities and, therefore, the proposals may lead to a large initial increase in insurance liabilities and required regulatory capital upon adoption, as well as significant ongoing volatility in our reported results and regulatory capital particularly for long duration guaranteed products. This in turn could have significant negative consequences to our customers, shareholders and the capital markets. We believe the accounting and related regulatory rules under discussion could put the Canadian insurance industry at a significant disadvantage relative to our U.S. and global peers and also to the banking sector in Canada. The IASB recently released an exposure draft of its proposals on insurance contracts with a four month comment period. We are currently reviewing the proposals and along with the Canadian insurance industry expect to provide comments and input to the IASB.

The insurance industry in Canada is currently working with OSFI and the federal government on these matters and the industry is urging policymakers to ensure that any future accounting and capital proposals appropriately consider the business model of a life insurance company and in particular, the implications for long duration guaranteed products.

It is unfortunate that they did not see fit to make any remarks of substance on this issue!

The next issue coming up (as alluded to by S&P) is the annual actuarial review:

The Company expects to complete its annual review of all actuarial methods and assumptions in the third quarter. In that regard, we expect that the methods and assumptions relating to our Long Term Care (“LTC”) business may be updated for the results of a comprehensive long-term care morbidity experience study, including the timing and amount of potential in-force rate increases. The study has not been finalized but is scheduled to be completed in the third quarter. We cannot reasonably estimate the results, and although the potential charges would not be included in the calculation of Adjusted Earnings from Operations, they could exceed Adjusted Earnings from Operations for the third quarter. There is a risk that potential charges arising as a result of the study may not be fully tax effected for accounting and reporting purposes. In addition, the non-cash interest related charges in the second quarter have created a future tax asset position in one of our U.S. subsidiary companies, and any increase in this position in the third quarter would be subject to further evaluation to determine recoverability of the related future tax asset for accounting and reporting purposes.

Update, 2010-8-9: According to DBRS:

The Company has indicated that during the third quarter of 2010, it is expecting to complete its annual actuarial review of the morbidity assumptions embedded in the reserves held against its Long-Term Care policy liabilities. The Company expects to incur a charge of between $700 million and $800 million related to this change in assumptions, although this could be offset somewhat by in-force price adjustments.

MFC Prefs Downgraded to P-2(high) / BBB+ by S&P

Thursday, August 5th, 2010

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • The earnings volatility of the Manulife group of companies exceeds our expectations for higher ratings, and the group has significant variable annuity and segregated fund guarantee values that remain unhedged.
  • In addition, Manulife Financial Corp. reported a C$2.4 billion net loss for the quarter ended June 30, 2010, and there could be material charges in the next quarter arising from its annual review of all actuarial methods and assumptions.
  • As a result, we have lowered our counterparty credit rating on Manulife Financial Corp. to ‘A’ from ‘A+’ and our counterparty credit and financial strength ratings on its core and guaranteed insurance operating subsidiaries to ‘AA’ from ‘AA+’.
  • The outlook is negative because of the continuing earnings volatility and the associated pressure on fixed-charge coverage and capitalization levels.


We could lower the ratings again if 2011 earnings continue to be highly volatile (whether because of unhedged variable annuity guarantee values or risk exposures), if fixed-charge coverage is less than the 6x-8x expected for similarly rated holding companies in 2011, or if capitalization is not solidly redundant at the ‘AA’ confidence level. Alternatively, if the group meets these conditions on a sustained basis and the group maintains its broad competitive advantages and relatively conservative investment risk profile, we would likely affirm the ratings.

MFC has the following preferred shares outstanding: MFC.PR.A (OpRet); MFC.PR.B & MFC.PR.C (PerpetualDiscount); MFC.PR.D & MFC.PR.E (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™ and all are included in the noted indices.

This follows a similar cut in the SLF credit rating in April, although that one was on the basis of sustainable earnings rather than volatility.

Moody’s doesn’t rate MFC, but it does rate the subsidiaries … and it’s not too happy:

Moody’s Investors Service has placed on review for possible downgrade the Aa3 insurance financial strength (IFS) ratings of the life insurance subsidiaries of Manulife Financial Corporation (Manulife; TSX: MFC, unrated) – including The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company (MLI), and John Hancock Life Insurance Company (U.S.A). Other affiliated ratings were also placed on review for possible downgrade (see complete list, below). The rating action follows Manulife’s announcement of a C$2.4 billion net loss in 2Q10, as well as the likelihood of a sizeable charge in 3Q10 for unfavorable long-term care morbidity experience.

Commenting on the review for possible downgrade, Moody’s said that the poor experience of MFC’s U.S. long-term care (LTC) block was not anticipated in its 2009 rating downgrades of MFC’s life insurance subsidiaries. In addition, MFC’s 2Q10 results were materially worse than peers’, due to its more sizeable unhedged exposure to variable annuity/segregated funds and its greater sensitivity to low interest rates on its long-tailed, guaranteed insurance liabilities (i.e., LTC and universal life insurance with secondary guarantees).

MAPF Performance: July 2010

Thursday, August 5th, 2010

The fund had a good month in July, outperforming all the relevant indices and passive funds as the Seniority Spread (interest-equivalent PerpetualDiscount yield less the yield on long corporates) declined from 290bp on June 30 to 275bp on July 30 . Long corporate yields increased slightly on the month from 5.45% to 5.5%.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close July 30 was $10.8826.

Returns to July 30, 2010
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +2.89% +1.87% +1.56%
Three Months +9.73% +5.11% +5.18%
One Year +15.45% +9.88% +7.13%
Two Years (annualized) +34.45% +8.18% +6.18% *
Three Years (annualized) +18.87% +2.65% +0.99%
Four Years (annualized) +15.39% +2.15%  
Five Years (annualized) +13.14% +2.34%  
Six Years (annualized) +12.16% +2.79%  
Seven Years (annualized) +13.14% +3.25%  
Eight Years (annualized) +13.17% +3.62%  
Nine Years (annualized) +12.96% +3.66%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns. The figure shown is the square root of product of the current one-year return and the similar figure reported for July 2009.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.71%, +5.21% and +8.78%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.58%, +5.01% & +5.97% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for AIC Preferred Income Fund (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.27%, +4.80% & +5.80%, respectively

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

I am very pleased with the returns over the past year (which, now that the market and the fund’s returns have moderated, are now merely superb, as opposed to “ridiculous” or “nonsensical”). My personal benchmark for a “good year” is index+500bp before fees; a glance at the annualized performance to June, 2010 shows that I’ve been able to meet that goal five times out of nine attempts.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There have been a lot of strongly motivated market participants in the past year, generating a lot of noise! The conditions of the past two years may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.1883 0.3926
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.1883 0.4203
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.1883 0.4448
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.1883 0.4389
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.1883 $0.4449
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.1883 $0.5054
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.1883 $0.6206
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.1883 $0.6423
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.1883 $0.6524
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.1883 $0.6278
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0000 $0.6182
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0000 $0.6231
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.0000 $0.6329
July 2010 10.8826 5.81% 0.998 5.821% 1.0000 $0.6336
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.

Significant positions were held in Fixed-Reset issues on June 30; all of which (with the exception of YPG.PR.C) currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par at the first possible opportunity. A split-share issue (BNA.PR.C) is also held; since this has a maturity date, the yield cannot be regarded as permanently sustainable. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.96% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: July 2010 analysis (which is in excess of the 5.89% index yield on July 30). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $10.8826 * 0.0596 = 0.6486, down slightly from the 0.6503 reported in April 2010 (the best comparator due to the influence of dividends earned but not yet distributed). I do not believe the difference to be significant – changes in credit quality of the PerpetualDiscounts will have a larger effect than that! It might be said that the portfolio has borne little or no cost for the downside protection implicit in its holdings of the SplitShares and high-premium FixedResets.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: July 2010

Thursday, August 5th, 2010

Turnover declined in July to a sleepy 25%.

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may be thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2010-6-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 2.9% (0) 7.56% 6.74
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 82.6% (+0.2) 5.96% 13.96
Fixed-Reset 10.1% (+0.3) 3.64% 3.49
Scraps (FixedReset) 4.2% (-0.2) 7.05% 12.41
Cash 0.2% (-0.2) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.81% 12.60
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2010-7-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 72.6% (+3.4)
Pfd-2(high) 8.2% (-3.6)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 14.9% (+0.8)
Pfd-3(high) 4.2% (-0.2)
Cash 0.2% (-0.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2010-7-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.0% (0)
$50,000 – $100,000 2.8% (-0.1)
$100,000 – $200,000 37.5% (-3.2)
$200,000 – $300,000 28.4% (-3.6)
>$300,000 31.1% (+7.1)
Cash 0.2% (-0.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 17, 2009, and published in the September, 2009, PrefLetter. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a little lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to PerpetualDiscounts
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

GWO Warns of Higher Seg-Fund Capital Requirements

Thursday, August 5th, 2010

2Q10 Shareholders’ Report:

OSFI continues to update and amend the MCCSR guideline in response to emerging issues. The capital requirements for segregated fund guarantees were amended in 2008 and the Company expects that the requirements will increase for new business issued after December 31, 2010. The extent of the increase in requirements has not been finalized and discussions with OSFI are on-going. The Company expects further changes in segregated fund guarantee requirements, likely in 2013, that will impact its existing business. The impact of these future changes is uncertain.

.

Sun Life Warns on Insurer Capital Requirements

Thursday, August 5th, 2010

Sun Life Financial stated in its 2Q10 Earnings Release:

The regulatory environment is evolving as governments and regulators develop enhanced requirements for capital, liquidity and risk management practices. In Canada, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) is considering a number of changes to the insurance company capital rules, including new guidelines that would establish stand-alone capital adequacy requirements for operating life insurance companies, such as Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (Sun Life Assurance), and that would update OSFI’s regulatory guidance for non-operating insurance companies acting as holding companies, such as Sun Life Financial Inc. In addition, it is expected that OSFI will change the definition of available regulatory capital for determining regulatory capital to align insurance definitions with any changed definitions that emerge for banks under the proposed new Basel Capital Accord.

OSFI is considering more sophisticated risk-based modeling approaches to Minimum Continuing Capital and Surplus Requirements (MCCSR), which could apply to segregated funds and other life insurance products. In particular, OSFI is considering how advanced modeling techniques can produce more robust and risk-sensitive capital requirements for Canadian life insurers, including internal models for segregated fund guarantee exposures. OSFI expects to issue a draft advisory in the fall of 2010 for public comment which will change the existing capital requirements in respect of new, rather than in-force, segregated fund business (e.g. post 2010 contracts). OSFI is also reviewing internal models for in-force segregated fund guarantee exposures, a review process that is ongoing. OSFI is considering a range of alternatives for in-force business, including a more market-consistent approach and potentially credit for hedging. Although it is difficult to predict how long the process for reviewing in-force segregated fund guarantee exposures will take, OSFI expects the review to continue for several years, likely into 2013. It is premature to draw conclusions about the cumulative impact this process will have on capital requirements for Canadian life insurance companies.

The outcome of these initiatives is uncertain and could have a material adverse impact on the Company or on its position relative to that of other Canadian and international financial institutions with which it competes for business and capital. In particular, the draft advisory on changes to existing capital requirements in respect of new segregated fund business to be issued by OSFI in the fall of 2010 may result in an increase in the capital requirements for variable annuity and segregated fund policies currently sold by the Company in the United States and Canada on and after the date the new rules come into effect. The Company competes with providers of variable annuity and segregated fund products that operate under different accounting and regulatory reporting bases in different countries, which may create differences in capital requirements, profitability and reported earnings on these products that may cause the Company to be at a disadvantage compared to some of its competitors in certain of its businesses. In addition, the final changes implemented as a result of OSFI’s review of internal models for in-force segregated fund guarantee exposures may materially change the capital required to support the Company’s in-force variable annuity and segregated fund guarantee business. Please see the Market Risk Sensitivity and Capital Management and Liquidity sections of this document.

They also provided more information regarding the effect of a market crash on their earnings. Whereas a 10% drop in equity prices from 2010-6-30 levels would cost $175-225-million, a 25% crash would cost $550-650-million. I was most impressed to see disclosure of the effect of their hedging programmes, which reduced the impact of these market moves by more than 50%. Now all we have to worry about is whether their hedges will, in fact, prove effective if needed!

They are not updating their guidance regarding underlying earnings:

Based on the assumptions and factors described below, in the third quarter of 2009, the Company estimated that its adjusted earnings from operations for the year ending December 31, 2010 would be in the range of $1.4 billion to $1.7 billion. The Company cautioned that its earnings in 2010 would reflect the lower asset levels and account values that were expected in 2010, as well as higher risk management costs, potential volatility and uncertainty in capital markets, the expected higher levels of capital required by regulators, lower leverage, currency fluctuations and the potential for higher tax costs as governments around the world look to address higher deficits.

Updates to the Company’s best estimate assumptions as well as changes in key internal and external indicators during the first half of 2010 did not impact the range of its estimated 2010 adjusted earnings from operations that was previously disclosed in the third quarter of 2009.

They’re also warning of a goodwill impairment charge under IFRS:

The Company anticipates that it will record a net goodwill impairment charge of approximately $1.7 billion, to be recognized in opening retained earnings upon transition to IFRS. This impairment relates to a portion of the goodwill recorded on the acquisitions of Keyport Life Insurance Company in the United States in 2001 and Clarica Life Insurance Company in Canada in 2002. This impairment charge reflects the application of IFRS standards as well as the continuing impact of the economic environment.

The impairment of goodwill is a non-cash item and will not impact the level of regulatory capital for the Company as existing goodwill is already deducted from available capital for regulatory purposes in the calculation of the MCCSR for Sun Life Assurance.

And there will be a small dilution adjustment:

Under IFRS, all financial instruments that contain a conversion feature to common shares must be included in the calculation of diluted earnings per share, irrespective of the likelihood of conversion. Certain innovative Tier 1 instruments issued by the Company (SLEECS Series A and SLEECS Series B) contain features which enable the holder to convert their securities into common shares under certain circumstances. The impact of including these financial instruments in the calculation of the Company’s diluted EPS will be a reduction in EPS of approximately $0.03 per quarter. If the SLEECs Series A are redeemed at their par call date in 2011, the ongoing reduction on diluted EPS is expected to be reduced to $0.01 per quarter.

And, of more potential interest, they note that they are highly interested in the IFRS exposure draft on Insurance Contracts, which has been previously discussed:

On July 30, 2010 the International Accounting Standards Board issued an exposure draft for comment, which sets out measurement changes on insurance contracts. The Company is in the process of reviewing the exposure draft, however it is expected that measurement changes on insurance contracts, if implemented as drafted, will result in fundamental differences from current provisions in Canadian GAAP, which will in turn have a significant impact on the Company’s business activities and volatility of its reported results. Changes from this exposure draft are expected to be finalized and applicable no earlier than 2013.

Elliott: Quantifying the Effects on Lending of Increased Capital Requirements

Thursday, August 5th, 2010

On July 12 I briefly introduced a study by the Institute of International Finance forecasting ruin and desolation in the worst-case scenario of every single proposed banking regulation being imposed.

Additionally, my attention was drawn to a Wall Street Journal article by David Enrich, titled Studies Question Bank Capital Fears which pooh-poohed the entire notion, referring to studies by Douglas J. Elliott of the Brookings Institute and three mysteriously unnamed researchers at Harvard and UChicago.

So I’ve had a look at the paper by Douglas Elliott, titled Quantifying the Effects on Lending of Increased Capital Requirements. This paper was given a passing mention in the IIF paper, by the way.

Mr. Elliott first derives an equation giving the lower bound of the interest rate on a loan:

L*(1‐t) >= (E*re)+((D*rd)+C+A‐O)*(1‐t)

where
L = Effective interest rate on the loan, including the annualized effect of fees
t = Marginal tax rate for the bank
E = Proportion of equity backing the loan
re = Required rate of return on the marginal equity
D = Proportion of debt and deposits funding the loan, assumed to be the amount of the loan minus E
Rd = Effective marginal interest rate on D, including indirect costs of raising funds, such as from running a
branch network
C = The credit spread, equal to the probability‐weighted expected loss
A = Administrative and other expenses related to the loan
O = Other offsetting benefits to the bank of making the loan

He then assigns values to build a base case, then increases the proportion of equity while jiggling other numbers to estimate the effects on loan costs of this change.

Base Case and Possible Future per Elliott
Variable Base Case Possible Future
Equity 6% 10%
ROE 15% 14%
Proportion Debt 94% 90%
Cost of Debt 2.0% 1.8%
Credit Spread 1.0% 0.95%
Admin 1.5% 1.4%
Offsetting Benefits -0.5% -0.6%
Marginal Tax Rate 30% 30%
Loan Rate 5.17% 5.37%

He concludes that a hike in capital ratios from 6% to 10% will quite feasibly result in an increase in the loan rate of 20bp. Several variables were adjusted in this estimation:

Return on debt/deposits: Creditors ought also to be willing to drop their required returns at least modestly to reflect the lowered risk. On the deposit side, part of the adjustment might be a shift in deposit market share towards more efficient banks whose indirect cost of raising deposits is lower.

I don’t buy it. The bulk of deposits are explicitly federally insured anyway and the uninsured deposits are implicitly insured – I don’t believe uninsured depositors at US banks have yet lost a single dollar as a result of FDIC siezure. Thus, the entire 20bp reduction in the Cost of Debt will have to come from the wholesale funding markets and senior bonds. This claim will require a lot more backup than currently provided.

Credit spread: Banks ought to be able to reduce credit risk marginally by turning down less attractive loans and by imposing covenants or other features that reduce the bank’s risk of loss. The 5 basis point reduction was chosen because it appears achievable from changes in covenants and loan protections without the necessity to turn down more loans. Thus, the drop in loan supply appears unlikely to be significant.

I don’t buy it. People who “work” for banks may be a little on the otnay ootay ightbray side, if you get my drift, but I don’t believe that you can improve credit losses by 5bp simply by fiat. This claim is reminiscent of politicians who sweep into office promising more services and lower taxes, to be paid for with efficiency gains. I have no doubt but that efficiency can be improved … but show me first, OK?

Administrative costs and other benefits: These small changes would seem feasible, if banks found it necessary to alter the way they do business. This is one area where reductions in compensation could make a significant difference. Market share shifts could also account for a significant part of the change.

I don’t buy it. See above. I am particulary incensed that administrative costs are presumed to go down at the same time as extra covenants, etc, are being added to the loan terms. That doesn’t sound quite right.

So according to me, the possible future looks more like:

Base Case and Possible Future per Elliott
Variable Possible Future per Elliott Possible Future per JH
Equity 10% 10%
ROE 14% 14%
Proportion Debt 90% 90%
Cost of Debt 1.8% 2.0%
Credit Spread 0.95% 1.0%
Admin 1.4% 1.5%
Offsetting Benefits -0.6% -0.5%
Marginal Tax Rate 30% 30%
Loan Rate 5.37% 5.80%

So throwing out the more dubious changes adds 43bp on to loan cost, meaning the effect of increasing capital from 6% to 10% is not 20bp as Elliott claims, but more like 63bp according to me.

Who’s right? Who’s wrong? Who knows? There is no supporting detail in the paper that tracks the performance of the model through time. We don’t even know if the model accounts for enough of the truth to be worth-while, let alone how sticky the numbers are, or how well correllated they might be.

Anyway, according to this simple model, changing the base case in a manner with which I am more familiar, increasing capital from 6% to 10% raises the cost of a loan 63bp. 63bp! That’s a lot! Hands up everybody who doesn’t think 63bp on their mortgage is a lot!

I’m too much of an economic auto-didact to really know whether it’s strictly kosher to reverse engineer the Taylor Rule, but if we use a Taylor output gap coefficient of 0.5 then a tightening due to capital costs of 63bp means the output gap will grow by 126bp. And that’s a big number.

All in all, while the Elliott paper is interesting and provides a decent intuitive framework for a first stab at quantifying economic effects of bank capital increases, I don’t feel that there’s enough meat on these bones to justify a conclusion that we can hike bank capital and get away scot free.

And I’m still waiting for OSFI to quantify the bad effects of its insistence on high capital levels, together with the claimed good effects!

August 4, 2010

Wednesday, August 4th, 2010

A provocative BIS working paper by by Előd Takáts is titled Ageing and Asset Prices:

The paper investigates how ageing will affect asset prices. A small model is used to show that economic and demographic factors drive asset, and in particular house, prices. These factors are estimated in a panel regression framework encompassing BIS real house price data from 22 advanced economies between 1970 and 2009. The estimates show that demographic factors affect real house prices significantly. Combining the results with UN population projections suggests that ageing will lower real house prices substantially over the next forty years. The headwind is around 80 basis points per annum in the United States and much stronger in Europe and Japan. Based on the analysis, global asset prices are likely to face substantial headwinds from ageing.

However, the estimates are still short of the Mankiw and Weil’s (1989) asset price meltdown projection, which would imply around 300 basis points per annum real house price decline.

These estimates are not real house price forecasts, but only estimates of the demographic impact on real house prices. As a number of other factors affect these prices, their movements can be very different from those implied by demographics. For instance, both Italy and Korea experienced strong real house price growth in spite of significant estimated demographic headwinds in the past forty years.

Remember Basis Yield Alpha Fund (last mentioned June 9)? They’re the guys who used their well-honed analytical skills and uncanny grasp of macro-economic trends to buy stuff that the dealer said was good, remember? Goldman is applying to have the boo-hoo-hoo dismissed on on jurisdictional grounds:

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. asked a New York judge to dismiss a $1 billion lawsuit by Australian hedge fund Basis Capital, arguing that a June U.S. Supreme Court decision bars the claim.

Goldman Sachs argued that the suit is barred by the Supreme Court’s June 24 ruling in Morrison v. National Australia Bank. In that case, the high court held that U.S. securities laws don’t apply to the claims of foreign buyers of non-U.S. securities on foreign exchanges.

“This litigation presents a contract dispute between two foreign entities, executed abroad and governed by English law, and Morrison makes clear that it does not belong in this court,” New York-based Goldman said in a filing dated Aug. 2.

Passive/Active nomenclature is going to get even more blurred:

According to the application filed today, BlackRock will offer ETFs based on indexes that invest in some assets, known as long positions, and sell others to create short positions. The firm may later create funds that are based on indexes that exclusively hold short positions, the filing said.

BlackRock will initially create a 130/30 fund based on the MSCI USA Barra Earnings Yield index, according to the company’s application. This index uses mathematical models to buy companies with “positive earnings momentum” and sell short those that have negative earnings momentum, the filing said.

A passive fund that uses mathematical models to select securities? Ummmmm….

The Chinese could give the Europeans some lessons on stress-tests:

China’s banking regulator told lenders last month to conduct a new round of stress tests to gauge the impact of residential property prices falling as much as 60 percent in the hardest-hit markets, a person with knowledge of the matter said.

Banks were instructed to include worst-case scenarios of prices dropping 50 percent to 60 percent in cities where they have risen excessively, the person said, declining to be identified because the regulator’s requirement hasn’t been publicly announced. Previous stress tests carried out in the past year assumed home-price declines of as much as 30 percent.

Although mind you, there are persistent worries about Chinese loan quality, with staggering estimates of default risk.

I was going to make the following links into a full post … but that was three months ago! So here are some links on rights issues. Report to HM Treasury on the implementation of the recommendations of the Rights Issue Review Group

See also PRE-EMPTION RIGHTS: FINAL REPORT

summary of UK law:

If a company proposes to allot any relevant shares or relevant employee shares or grant any rights over them, those shares or rights must first be offered (for a period of at least 21 days) to the existing members in proportion to their existing holdings on terms no less favourable than are being offered to any third party. Where there are differing classes of shares, the relevant shares may first be offered to members of the relevant class if the Memorandum or Articles so require. Any shares not taken up must then be offered to the members of the company as a whole.
This does not apply to: …

I ran across some disturbing censored TV ads yesterday and was prompted to send the publishers an eMail:

Sirs,

I have viewed the videos at http://www.homefrontcalgary.com/tv-spots.html and found them quite disturbing – I am not surprised the authorities prefer images of kittens and bunnies.

However, I am curious regarding the efficiacy of the approach. The main message is addressed to the abuser, who has presumably been preached at many times in his life and will simply shrug off the message or rationalize his actions in some manner.

Would it not be better to address TV spots of this nature towards the abused woman, something along the lines of “You don’t need to tolerate this, your life can be better, here’s what to do:”?

Today I received a standardized response from them – sufficiently general as to indicate it is the response for any letter having to do with the videos. When even the do-gooders brush off your queries, you know you’re in trouble!

Another day of solid advances on the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 18bp and FixedResets gaining 5bp. The median weighted average yield on the latter class is now 3.39% … the fifth-lowest on record and within striking distance of the all-time low of 3.31%. Amusingly, the Bozo Spread (Current Yield PerpetualDiscounts less Current Yield FixedResets) remains steady at 50bp.

This is going to end in tears.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.84%, equivalent to 8.18% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long corporates now yield about 5.5%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (aka the Seniority Spread) now stands at about 270bp, a small (and perhaps meaningless) tightening from the 275bp reported on July 30.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0783 % 2,080.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0783 % 3,151.3
Floater 2.51 % 2.13 % 36,738 22.04 4 -0.0783 % 2,246.1
OpRet 4.89 % -0.37 % 109,713 0.24 9 0.2970 % 2,353.7
SplitShare 6.16 % 1.70 % 73,424 0.08 2 0.4908 % 2,251.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2970 % 2,152.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 5.53 % 103,216 5.68 7 0.2436 % 1,943.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.81 % 5.84 % 183,319 14.08 71 0.1761 % 1,866.1
FixedReset 5.31 % 3.39 % 295,117 3.42 47 0.0529 % 2,232.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-09-03
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : -7.19 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 70,795 RBC sold two blocks to anonymous: 11,800 at 27.87 and 14,400 at 27.86. RBC then crossed 18,800 at 27.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.77
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 36,900 RBC crossed 30,000 at 20.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.19
Evaluated at bid price : 20.19
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 34,535 Desjardins bought 10,000 from anonymous at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 26,981 National crossed 14,500 at 20.08.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.12
Evaluated at bid price : 20.12
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 25,903 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 24.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-04
Maturity Price : 24.46
Evaluated at bid price : 24.74
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 24,280 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-04
Maturity Price : 24.88
Evaluated at bid price : 24.93
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

ALB.PR.A Considering Reorg Potential

Wednesday, August 4th, 2010

Allbanc Split Corp. II has announced:

The Company announced today that its Board of Directors has retained Scotia Capital to advise the Company on a possible extension and reorganization of the Company. There is no guarantee that after such review an extension will be proposed or if proposed, will be approved by shareholders.

It will be convenient for the company to work with Scotia Capital, seeing as how they’re the sponsor!

ALB.PR.A is scheduled to mature 2011-2-28. In a reorganization it could be refunded or extended – it could go either way, but given that the issue yield is only 4.25% – and it’s trading above par! – I suggest that an attempt to extend is likely. But we will see!

ALB.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when there was a partial call for redemption. ALB.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

August 3, 2010

Tuesday, August 3rd, 2010

European banks have a lot of refinancing to do:

Banks in Europe’s most indebted nations need to refinance $122 billion of bonds this year, likely paying high interest costs even after receiving a clean bill of health from regulators.

Italy’s Intesa Sanpaolo SpA has the most debt coming due at $28 billion, followed by UniCredit SpA with $21 billion, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Italian banks must refinance a total $69 billion of bonds this year and $157 billion in 2011, while Spanish lenders have $28 billion and $73 billion of debt that needs to be paid.

Banks in so-called peripheral European countries from Greece to Ireland have been largely shut out of debt markets since April amid concern their governments will struggle to cut budget deficits.

The extra yield investors demand to own European financial- company bonds has climbed 0.5 percentage point to 2.17 percentage points from a 29-month low on April 16, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch’s EMU Financial Corporate Index.

Spanish bank spreads average 333 basis points, 62 percent wider than at the beginning of April. Portuguese lenders’ margins average 495 basis points, 85 percent wider, while Irish financial debt pays a 585 basis-point margin, 35 percent more. Italian bank spreads are 218 basis points, an increase of 34 percent compared with four months ago.

With many frozen out of the bond market, banks in the peripheral countries are relying on the European Central Bank for the bulk of their funding. Spanish lenders, which account for 10.5 percent of assets in the EU financial system, borrowed a record 126.3 billion euros from the Frankfurt-based ECB in June, the most recent Bank of Spain data show.

The Americans found out during the S&L Crisis that there is a vital difference between “illiquid” and “insolvent” banks, and that the Fed should not prop up the latter. Have the Europeans learnt the same lesson?

There are encouraging reports from Greece:

Prime Minister George Papandreou has raised taxes, cut wages and overhauled the state-run pension system, while braving months of strikes against the measures that helped shrink the budget gap by 45 percent in the first half. Sustaining the effort and qualifying for another 9 billion euros of EU-IMF funds will be complicated by a recession that has been deepened by his steps.

For Papandreou, abiding by the EU-IMF recommendations may trigger further protests. Both institutions have said part of the inflation jump is from a lack of competitiveness that can be addressed in part by opening up professions deemed “closed,” such as trucking.

Truckers last week starved Greek gas stations of fuel as they opposed the government’s plan to issue the first new licenses since 1971. The strike was called off on Aug. 1 after the government commandeered trucks and said the drivers would be prosecuted. Papaconstantinou has pledged to push ahead with changes to open up professions ranging from pharmacists to architects.

“Closed professions will open,” he said in Parliament on July 28. “They will open because prices must fall. They will open because this will help the budget of each household and they will open because that is how the country’s growth will be helped.”

I’m not sure how far their deficit numbers can be trusted, but increased competition amongst previously closed shops has to be a good thing.

There is the possibility that US Banks are finally putting their excess reserves to work, buying Mortgage-Backeds:

Large U.S. commercial banks added $51.4 billion of so- called agency mortgage-backed securities in the two weeks ended July 21, according to the latest data released by the Federal Reserve. The holdings fell from $696.6 billion in the middle of 2009 to $687.2 billion on July 7 even as the lenders’ portfolios of Treasuries and agency corporate debt grew $104 billion.

Large banks, which now hold $736.8 billion of the securities, avoided the debt as the Fed’s $1.25 trillion of buying drove down yield premiums to record lows relative to 10- year Treasuries, and acquisitions by private investors then restrained spreads.
Fannie Mae’s current-coupon notes, or those trading closest to face value, yield 3.54 percent as of 12:37 p.m. in New York, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That’s 0.64 percentage point more than 10-year Treasuries, up from a record low of 0.54 percentage point reached July 30, Bloomberg data show.

Checking accounts, among the means through which banks raise money that they can invest in securities, pay depositors 0.53 percent on average, according to Bankrate.com data. Rates on the accounts typically vary based in part on the Fed’s target rates. A rise in banks’ deposits, which Fed data show growing for large banks by $37 billion from April 21, has contributed to their desire to invest more in mortgage securities, [Barclays analyst Derek] Chen wrote.

Additionally, excess reserves are down by a preliminary $35-billion in the period June 2 – July 28. Who knows? Maybe this new-found interest in RMBS is a tiny step towards James Hamilton’s archetypal car loans.

The SEC’s Department of Making Prospectuses Longer has been working overtime:

U.S. regulators said mutual funds aren’t telling investors enough about why they use derivatives, with some funds providing “generic” disclosures and others failing to explain how the products affect performance.

Regulators said they are concerned that the use of derivatives has increased in the mutual-fund industry without shareholders comprehending the risks or investment strategies. Some funds offer information that “may not be consistent with the intent” of required registration forms, the Securities and Exchange Commission wrote in a July 30 letter to the Investment Company Institute, the industry’s biggest trade group.

The SEC also raised concerns about “abbreviated” disclosures that give investors a false sense of security about how much funds rely on derivatives.

Speaking of the SEC, former Countrywide CEO Mozila is fighting his battles in (gasp!) court:

“The undisputed evidence establishes, and the SEC now admits, that stockholders understood Countrywide’s underwriting guidelines expanded over time,” lawyers for Mozilo and the two other defendants said in the filing.

The SEC admitted in response to inquiries from the defendants’ lawyers that information about its riskier loans was reflected in the company’s stock price, according to Mozilo’s filing. Countrywide provided information about those loans in prospectus supplements for mortgage-backed securities sold in the secondary market, Mozilo said in the filing.

John McCoy, a lawyer for the SEC, didn’t immediately return a call seeking comment.

The SEC sued Mozilo in June 2009, saying he publicly reassured investors about the quality of Countrywide’s loans while he issued “dire” internal warnings and sold about $140 million of his own Countrywide shares. Mozilo wrote in an e-mail that Countrywide was “flying blind” and had “no way” to determine the risks of some adjustable-rate mortgages, according to the SEC complaint.

I don’t have a view on Mozilo’s guilt or innocence … but I have a view on the desirability of the SEC getting a black eye!

Interesting article about Somali piracy, but the world has become awfully wussy. Julius Caesar knew what to do about pirates; so did Thomas Jefferson.

Premier Dad has clearly identified “morons” as a crucial demographic for the next election with his ‘Zero-Brains’ policy on young drivers and alchohol. “Better enforcement tools for the police!” cheer the dimwits. “So much more efficient than the silly old court system!”. After all, police would never abuse their authority, would they? And they always tell the truth, right? So what do we need the courts for, anyway?

The Canadian preferred share market moved up today on light trade, as PerpetualDiscounts gained 2bp and FixedResets gained 16bp, taking the median weighted average yield to worst of the latter class all the way down to 3.44%. That’s the eighth lowest yielding close on record … can we push past the 3.31% mark, set March 26? Stay tuned! The Bozo Spread (Current Yield PerpetualDiscounts less Current Yield FixedResets) remains in its range at 51bp … which makes me laugh.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1438 % 2,081.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1438 % 3,153.8
Floater 2.51 % 2.13 % 37,296 22.01 4 0.1438 % 2,247.9
OpRet 4.87 % 3.41 % 101,589 0.32 10 0.1865 % 2,346.7
SplitShare 6.19 % 3.81 % 73,746 0.08 2 0.5148 % 2,240.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1865 % 2,145.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.81 % 5.67 % 104,287 5.62 7 0.0623 % 1,938.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.82 % 5.88 % 177,094 14.09 71 0.0211 % 1,862.9
FixedReset 5.31 % 3.44 % 299,261 3.42 47 0.1588 % 2,231.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 22.90
Evaluated at bid price : 23.73
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 20.62
Evaluated at bid price : 20.62
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 19.35
Evaluated at bid price : 19.35
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.51
Bid-YTW : 7.40 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 25.58
Evaluated at bid price : 25.63
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
NA.PR.P FixedReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.87
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 21.70
Evaluated at bid price : 21.70
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 161,227 Scotia crossed blocks of 25,300 shares, 30,000 and 10,000, all at 25.75. RBC crossed 19,500 at 25.75, and Scotia closed by crossing 49,600 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 30,000 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 27,505 RBC crossed 22,600 at 27.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 27,040 RBC crossed 20,000 at 27.56.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.56
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 26,258 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 20.11
Evaluated at bid price : 20.11
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 21,101 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 21.68
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
There were 14 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.