Archive for September, 2010

FIG.PR.A Holders Approve Merger; Now up To FIG.UN

Monday, September 20th, 2010

Faircourt Asset Management has announced:

The adjourned special meetings of preferred securityholders of Faircourt Income & Growth Split Trust (“FIG”) and Faircourt Split Trust (“FCS”), which were originally held on September 13, 2010 but were adjourned for lack of quorum, were held today at which the preferred securityholders of FIG approved the merger of FIG into FCS (the “Merger”) and the exchange of preferred securities of FIG for a new class of preferred securities of FCS (the “Exchange”), and the preferred securityholders of FCS approved various amendments to the FCS declaration of trust and FCS trust indenture (the “FCS Proposals”), as described in the joint management information circular dated August 13, 2010 (the “Circular”). The Merger Proposal remains subject to approval by the unitholders of FIG.

The Merger and FCS Proposals are a response to expected changes in the taxation of income funds. As a result of these changes, there are now an insufficient number of “income funds” for FIG and FCS to continue to meet its investment restrictions. Consequently, upon implementation of the FCS Proposals, the investment mandate of FCS, as the continuing trust, will be expanded to remedy this situation and FCS will be able to invest in a broader range of securities and adjust its portfolio in the future as and when required to respond to market movements.

The Merger will also be considered by unitholders of FIG the funds at the adjourned special meeting of such unitholders to be held on September 27, 2010, and implementation of the Merger and the FCS Proposals are conditional on the approval of the unitholders of FIG at such meeting, all as described in the Circular.

FIG.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the first attempt to approve the merger did not get quorum. FIG.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps Index on credit concerns.

NEW.PR.C To Get Bigger

Monday, September 20th, 2010

NewGrowth Corp. has announced:

that the Company has issued one warrant for each Capital Share held by holders of Capital Shares of the Company of record as at the close of business on September 17, 2010.

Each warrant will entitle the holder to purchase one Unit, each Unit consisting of one Capital Share and one Preferred Share, for a subscription price of $41.57 per Unit. Commencing September 20, 2010, warrants may be exercised at any time on or before 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on March 31, 2011. The warrants are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol NEW.WT.

Holders of the Preferred Shares are entitled to receive quarterly fixed cumulative dividends equal to $0.2055 per Preferred Share. The Company’s Capital Share dividend policy is to pay holders of Capital Shares quarterly dividends in an amount equal to the revenue received by the Company on the underlying portfolio securities minus the dividends payable on the Preferred Shares and all administrative and operating expenses provided the net asset value per Unit at the time of declaration, after giving effect to the dividend, would be greater than the original issue price of the Preferred Shares.

NewGrowth Corp. is a mutual fund corporation whose investment portfolio consists of publicly-listed securities of selected Canadian chartered banks, telecommunication, pipeline and utility issuers. The Capital Shares and Preferred Shares of NewGrowth Corp. are both listed for trading on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols NEW.A and NEW.PR.C respectively.

The warrants will be outstanding for more than six months!

NEW.PR.C was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it started trading 2009-6-26. There are only 2.2-million of the $13.70 preferreds outstanding, so the issue won’t be tracked by HIMIPref™ any time soon.

DBRS Discontinues ELF Rating

Monday, September 20th, 2010

DBRS has announced that it:

has today announced that it will discontinue its public rating on the First Preference Shares, Series 1 of E-L Financial Corporation Limited (E-L) on October 20, 2010 (30 days from today).

DBRS notes that this action is unrelated to E-L’s credit profile.

ELF has two issues of preferreds outstanding, both PerpetualDiscounts: ELF.PR.F & ELF.PR.G. The issues have been rated Pfd-2(low) by DBRS for a long time, contrasted with S&P’s ratings of P-2(high)/BBB+.

I don’t see any other news – and remember, ELF is probably the largest public company in Canada, if not North America, that doesn’t have a website – so it’s hard to guess what this might mean. It could be a signal that a new issue is on its way and ELF didn’t feel like cutting more cheques to DBRS.

Contingent Capital Update

Saturday, September 18th, 2010

A Reuters columnist suggested Big banks winners from new contingent capital move:

Plans to make hybrid bond investors share the pain when banks run into trouble could polarise the financial sector into big firms that can afford to pay up for capital and smaller players that cannot.

But these plans from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision could reinforce a pattern emerging in the aftermath of the crisis — a two-tier banking market with international banks that investors favour over smaller banks seen as riskier.

“It could polarise the market further in terms of issuer access and could shut out some smaller institutions and give larger firms a competitive advantage,” said one debt capital markets banker at a major international banking group.

I don’t think that this is necessarily the case. Small banks in the US have never been able to issue their own non-equity regulatory capital – it has all been repackaged into CDOs. This was one of the sideswipes of the Panic of 2007 – the CDO market froze up and these smaller banks were unable to issue.

Investors have mixed views on contingent capital. They would have problems with more issues along the lines of bonds sold by British bank Lloyds, which are designed to convert to equity in the early stages of a bank running into difficulties.

“We don’t think there is a large market for them, certainly among institutional bond investors,” said Roger Doig, credit analyst at Schroders. Analysts say that such issues are difficult for credit rating agencies to evaluate and many institutional credit investors are not mandated to hold equity.

Well, we will see. It’s not fair focussing on the poorly structure Lloyds ECN issue as that gave no first-loss protection to holders.

The McDonald CoCos are not only much better structured and better investments, but they will also work better in averting a crisis, rather than helping to clean up.

Stan Maes and William Schoutens provide Contingent Capital: An In-Depth Discussion:

Somewhat paradoxically, funded contingent capital or CoCos may actually increase the systemic risks they are intended to reduce. For example, whereas some banking regulators recorded CoCos as capital, some insurance regulators treated them as debt. Hence, significant amounts of CoCos were held by insurers, creating a risk of contagion from the banking sector to the insurance sector. Also a problem of moral hazard arises. Taking excessive risks (by for example buying additional risky assets) could lead to a triggering of the note and hence the wiping out of a lot of outstanding debt. Banks with contingent debt could therefore be tempted to seek additional risk near the trigger point (taking risk on the back of the CoCo holders and maybe taxpayers as well).

Finally, Hart and Zingales (2010) argue that contingent capital introduces inefficiency as conversion eliminates default, which forces inefficient businesses to restructure and incompetent managers to be replaced.

Allowing CoCos to be held as assets by other financial institutions and risk-weighted as debt is just stupid. I won’t waste time discussing stupidity.

Given the above, it may make a lot of sense to define triggers in terms of market based terms. Note however that a simple market based trigger may not be desirable as short sellers may be tempted to push down the stock price in order to profit from the resulting dilution of the bank’s stock following the conversion triggered by the stock price drop. Such a self-generated decline in shares prices is referred to as a “death spiral”. The above problem can be mitigated by making the trigger dependent on a rolling average stock price (say the average closing price of the stock over the preceding 20 business days, as Duffie (2010) and Goodhart (2010) propose). In fact, Flannery (2009) demonstrates that the incentive for speculative attack is lessened or even eliminated altogether by setting a sufficiently high contractual conversion price, such that the conversion becomes anti-dilutive (raising the price of the share rather than lowering it).

A market based trigger has the additional advantage that it limits the ability of management to engage in balance sheet manipulation. Also, it prevents forbearance on behalf of the regulators, as it eliminates regulatory discretion in deciding when the trigger should be invoked. Some analysts refer to the double trigger as the double disaster (regulatory discretion as well as politics).

My own preference is for the Volume Weighted Average Price over a relatively lengthy period (20 trading days?) to be the trigger.

If the conversion ratio is based on the stock price at the time of the triggering point, the amount of capital to be brought in can be very substantial and will make thecounterparty a major, if not the largest, shareholder. Original shareholders will be diluted. On the one hand, there is a clear potential dilution effect which could affect the bank’s equity price itself. On the other hand, CoCos may as well introduce a floor on the equity price in these situations.

When the conversion ratio is determined at the time of conversion and not at the time of issuance, the conversion is likely to be relatively generous to the holder of the contingent capital instrument. When the debt holders can expect to get out at close to par value, it would reduce the cost of the contingent capital instrument, making it a significantly cheaper form of capital than equity (of course its low coupon would reduce investors’ appetite).

The authors close with:

We close by raising concerns about the pricing of the instruments by highlighting the similarities between CoCos and equity barrier options and credit default swaps. These barrier-like features and the fact that CoCos are fat-tail event claims, in combination with calibration and model risks, imply that these contingent instruments are very hard to value under a particular model. Since CoCos are expected not to be highly liquid instruments (and until real market prices are widely available), the extreme complexity of mark to modeling CoCos will be a big disadvantage that may hamper their success.

September 17, 2010

Friday, September 17th, 2010

Ireland needs some green:

Treasuries rose while the cost to insure Irish government bonds jumped to a record amid concern that Europe’s debt crisis is worsening and American consumer confidence is slumping.

The yield on the 10-year Irish bond surged 26 basis points to 6.29 percent in London. The spread with German bunds widened to as much as 389 basis points, or 3.89 percentage points, the most on record, according to Bloomberg generic data.

Corporate creditworthiness in Europe is the best ever compared with governments, credit-default swap prices show, as companies cut debt while governments struggle with budget deficits.

The difference between the Markit iTraxx Europe Index of corporate credit-default swaps and the Markit iTraxx SovX Western Europe Index of contracts tied to government debt widened 1 basis point to a record 49, according to data from CMA and JPMorgan Chase & Co.

I don’t think there’s much need to worry. I think all those patriotic Americans who funded the IRA back in the eighties will be overjoyed to cut cheques to help out the old country.

Speaking of Europe, there’s a very good article on Greece, with the obligatory “It’s all Goldman Sachs’ fault” paragraph in the middle, by Michael Lewis, titled Beware of Greeks bearing bonds (hat tip: Financial Webring Forum).

A day of big volume on the Canadian preferred share market, with very strong returns: PerpetualDiscounts were up 45bp and FixedResets gained 12bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0554 % 2,094.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0554 % 3,173.6
Floater 2.91 % 3.37 % 69,826 18.83 3 0.0554 % 2,262.0
OpRet 4.85 % 0.59 % 86,715 0.20 9 0.2304 % 2,389.3
SplitShare 5.86 % -33.52 % 63,365 0.09 2 1.0215 % 2,400.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2304 % 2,184.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.69 % 5.32 % 136,547 5.36 14 0.2550 % 1,988.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.54 % 5.64 % 189,904 14.41 63 0.4514 % 1,963.3
FixedReset 5.23 % 3.00 % 289,142 3.31 47 0.1245 % 2,273.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 22.87
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 21.59
Evaluated at bid price : 21.59
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 22.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.36
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 21.90
Evaluated at bid price : 22.02
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 21.72
Evaluated at bid price : 22.07
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 23.29
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 22.48
Evaluated at bid price : 22.64
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.83
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 23.32
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 21.93
Evaluated at bid price : 22.05
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 5.25 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.45
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 2.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-17
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.98
Bid-YTW : -55.95 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWL.PR.O Perpetual-Premium 116,835 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 98,521 RBC bought 17,500 from anonymous at 25.20 and 10,900 from Nesbitt at the same price. Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 25.18.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 86,160 RBC bought two blocks of 11,000 each from anonymous, both at 28.45. RBC bought 10,000 from Desjardins at the same price. RBC crossed 13,400 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.42
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 83,789 RBC crossed blocks of 25,000 and 35,000, both at 21.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 21.46
Evaluated at bid price : 21.78
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 76,473 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 17,400 and 46,800, both at 19.98.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-17
Maturity Price : 19.92
Evaluated at bid price : 19.92
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 68,766 RBC bought two blocks of 10,000 each from HSBC, both at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.05
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
There were 65 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

September 16, 2010

Thursday, September 16th, 2010

Nothing happened today.

Volume was very good on the Canadian preferred share market, while PerpetualDiscounts were up 9bp and FixedResets gained 10bp – although the vagaries of the index calculations meant that the reported yield for FixedResets crept up 2bp (returns are a mean; YTW is a median). MFC issues were, for a change, missing from both the performance and volume highlights.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1660 % 2,093.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1660 % 3,171.8
Floater 2.91 % 3.38 % 65,384 18.80 3 -0.1660 % 2,260.7
OpRet 4.86 % 0.58 % 86,382 0.20 9 0.2910 % 2,383.8
SplitShare 5.92 % -29.91 % 61,605 0.09 2 0.4103 % 2,376.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2910 % 2,179.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.71 % 5.40 % 126,968 5.36 14 -0.1148 % 1,983.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.57 % 5.65 % 190,951 14.39 63 0.0862 % 1,954.5
FixedReset 5.24 % 3.06 % 292,068 3.31 47 0.1020 % 2,270.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-16
Maturity Price : 22.11
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 5.40 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-16
Maturity Price : 23.35
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-16
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : -27.95 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 168,500 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 100,000 and 29,000, both at 19.70. Desjardins crossed 11,800 at 19.59.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-16
Maturity Price : 19.69
Evaluated at bid price : 19.69
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 95,085 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 28.17; TD crossed 10,600 at the same price; Desjardins crossed 13,200 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.16
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 87,500 Nesbitt crossed 85,000 at 28.12.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.08
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 73,574 National crossed 10,900 at 27.62. TD crossed 13,600 at 27.55 and RBC crossed 35,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 2.80 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 71,650 RBC crossed 48,100 at 27.85; Desjardins crossed 17,500 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.86
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 65,550 TD crossed 53,800 at 28.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.28
Bid-YTW : 2.67 %
There were 50 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Carney, Haldane, Swaps

Thursday, September 16th, 2010

Let’s say you sit on the Public Services Board of a seaside town; one of the things your board does is hire lifeguards for the beach.

One day, a vacationer drowns. You do what you can for the family and then haul the lifeguard on duty up in front of a committee to see why someone drowned on his watch.

“Not my fault!” the lifeguard tells you “He didn’t know how to swim very well and he went into treacherous waters.”

So what do you do? Chances are that you scream at the little twerp “Of course he went into treacherous waters without knowing how to swim well, you moron. That’s what vacationers do! That’s precisely why we hired you!”

Reasonable enough, eh? You’d fire the lifeguard if that was his best answer.

So why are we so indulgent with bank regulators? The banks were stupid. Of COURSE the damn banks were stupid. That’s what banks are best at, for Pete’s sake! We KNOW that. If they weren’t stupid, we wouldn’t need regulators, would we?

Which is all a way of saying how entertaining I find the bureaucratic scapegoating of banks in the aftermath of the crisis.

In my post reporting Carney’s last speech, I highlighted his reference to a speech by Haldane:

These exposures were compounded by the rapid expansion of banks into over-the-counter derivative products. In essence, banks wrote a series of large out-of-the-money options in markets such as those for credit default swaps. As credit standards deteriorated, the tail risks embedded in these strategies became fatter. With pricing and risk management lagging reality, there was a widespread misallocation of capital.

footnote: See A. Haldane, ―The Contribution of the Financial Sector—Miracle or Mirage?‖ Speech delivered at the Future of Finance Conference, London, 14 July 2010.

An interesting viewpoint, since writing a CDS is the same thing as buying a bond, but without the funding risk. I’ll have to check out that reference sometime.

I have now read Haldane’s speech, titled The contribution of the financial sector – miracle or mirage?, and it seems that what Haldane says is a bit of stretch … and the interpretation by Carney is a bit more of a stretch.

Haldane’s thesis is

Essentially, high returns to finance may have been driven by banks assuming higher risk. Banks’ profits, like their contribution to GDP, may have been flattered by the mis-measurement of risk.

The crisis has subsequently exposed the extent of this increased risk-taking by banks. In particular, three (often related) balance sheet strategies for boosting risks and returns to banking were dominant in the run-up to crisis:

  • increased leverage, on and off-balance sheet;
  • increased share of assets held at fair value; and
  • writing deep out-of-the-money options.

What each of these strategies had in common was that they generated a rise in balance sheet risk, as well as return. As importantly, this increase in risk was to some extent hidden by the opacity of accounting disclosures or the complexity of the products involved. This resulted in a divergence between reported and risk-adjusted returns. In other words, while reported ROEs rose, risk-adjusted ROEs did not (Haldane (2009)).

I don’t have any huge problems with his section on leverage. The second section makes the point:

Among the major global banks, the share of loans to customers in total assets fell from around 35% in 2000 to 29% by 2007 (Chart 29). Over the same period, trading book asset shares almost doubled from 20% to almost 40%. These large trading books were associated with high leverage among the world’s largest banks (Chart 30). What explains this shift in portfolio shares? Regulatory arbitrage appears to have been a significant factor. Trading book assets tended to attract risk weights appropriate for dealing with market but not credit risk. This meant it was capital-efficient for banks to bundle loans into tradable structured credit products for onward sale. Indeed, by securitising assets in this way, it was hypothetically possible for two banks to swap their underlying claims but for both firms to claim capital relief. The system as a whole would then be left holding less capital, even though its underlying exposures were identical. When the crisis came, tellingly losses on structured products were substantial (Chart 31).

… which is all entirely reasonable and is a failure of regulation, not that you’ll see anybody get fired for it.

The third section mentions Credit Default Swaps:

A third strategy, which boosted returns by silently assuming risk, arises from offering tail risk insurance. Banks can in a variety of ways assume tail risk on particular instruments – for example, by investing in high-default loan portfolios, the senior tranches of structured products or writing insurance through credit default swap (CDS) contracts. In each of these cases, the investor earns an above-normal yield or premium from assuming the risk. For as long as the risk does not materialise, returns can look riskless – a case of apparent “alpha”. Until, that is, tail risk manifests itself, at which point losses can be very large. There are many examples of banks pursuing essentially these strategies in the run-up to crisis. For example, investing in senior tranches of sub-prime loan securitisations is, in effect, equivalent to writing deep-out-of-the-money options, with high returns except in those tail states of the world when borrowers default en masse. It is unsurprising that issuance of asset-backed securities, including sub-prime RMBS (residential mortgage-backed securities), grew dramatically during the course of this century, easily outpacing Moore’s Law (the benchmark for the growth in computing power since the invention of the transistor) (Chart 32).

A similar risk-taking strategy was the writing of explicit insurance contracts against such tail risks, for example through CDS. These too grew very rapidly ahead of crisis (Chart 34). Again, the writers of these insurance contracts gathered a steady source of premium income during the good times – apparently “excess returns”. But this was typically more than offset by losses once bad states materialised. This, famously, was the strategy pursued by some of the monoline insurers and by AIG. For example, AIG’s capital market business, which included its ill-fated financial products division, reported total operating income of $2.3 billion in the run-up to crisis from 2003 to 2006, but reported operating losses of around $40 billion in 2008 alone.

I have a big problem with the concept of CDSs as options. Writing a Credit Default Swap is, essentially, the same thing as buying a corporate bond on margin. If the CDS is cash-covered, the risk profile is very similar to a corporate bond, differing only in some special cases that did not have a huge impact on the crisis.

You can, if you squint, call it an option, but only to the extent that any loan has an implicit option for the borrower not to repay the debt. If you misprice that option – more usually referred to as default risk – sure, you will eventually lose money.

But AIG’s big problem was not that it wrote CDSs, it was that it wrote far too many of them; it was effective leverage that was the big problem. And the potential for contagion if AIG fell was not so much the fault of the manner in which the deals were structured as it was the fault of the banks for not insisting on collateral, and the fault of the regulators for not addressing the problem with uncollateralized loans.

So Haldane’s thir point is more than just a little shaky, and Carney’s use of this to state that derivative use by banks was a contributing factor to the Panic of 2007 is shakier.

September 15, 2010

Wednesday, September 15th, 2010

OSFI has released its annual performance assessment:

A total of 49 one-on-one interviews were conducted among Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), Chief Financial Officers (CFOs), Chief Risk Officers (CROs), Chief Compliance Officers (CCOs), other senior executives, auditors and lawyers of deposit-taking institutions regulated by OSFI.

The regulated profess that the regulator is doing a great job!

Maple bonds issues are picking up:

Maple issuance may accelerate to C$6 billion ($5.8 billion) to C$8 billion next year, according to Greg McDonald, vice president and director of debt capital markets at Toronto- Dominion Bank’s TD Securities unit. The rest of this year may see an additional C$1 billion to C$1.5 billion in the Canadian dollar-denominated foreign debt, adding to the C$2.4 billion raised since January, he said.

Sales of Maple bonds, nicknamed after the leaf on the Canadian flag, surpassed the C$1.37 billion raised in all of 2009 in April, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. There haven’t been any Maple sales since July, when National Australia Bank Ltd. and Nederlandse Waterschapsbank NV raised C$600 million from two issues, as concern of a global economic slowdown drove investors to the refuge of government debt.

Would you like to diversify your fixed income portfolio with some Maples? Tough. The regulators say you’re too damn stupid for them to allow such a thing.

Subsidies to solar power lobbyists are continuing:

Prices for photovoltaic panels that convert sunlight into electricity may fall about 10 percent next year, less than analysts forecast, as European demand increases.

First-quarter prices will drop to an average of $1.65 a watt compared with $1.50 in the previous median estimate of five analysts surveyed by Bloomberg News. Analysts who contributed to the surveys included John Hardy at Gleacher & Co. in Connecticut and Sanjay Shrestha at Lazard Capital Markets. This year, contracts may average $1.80 to $1.85 a watt, they forecast.

Developers have rushed to complete solar-energy projects ahead of planned declines in government incentives in Germany and Spain. At the same time, smaller markets expanded in France, the Czech Republic and the U.S. Increased orders will extend to 2011, when the analysts forecast sales to increase 20 percent.

Demand growth in Europe and North America will outpace higher production in Asia, Hardy and Shrestha said.

Evidence of currently reduced supply can be found in inventories and in some order terms.

Julie Williams, Chief Counsel for the OCC testifed on covered bonds:

Another important component of a statutory covered bond program is the types of assets eligible to collateralize the covered bonds. Typically, in Europe, covered bonds are associated with high quality assets comprised of residential or commercial mortgage loans and public-sector debt. While some have advocated a broad statutory spectrum of U.S. asset types, including credit card, student, small business, and auto loans, more recent proposals have tended to narrow the eligible asset classes.

Various types of standards could be embodied in a covered bond regulatory framework. For example, all covered bonds, by asset class, should have minimum eligibility criteria setting asset quality standards to promote the inclusion of high quality assets in the cover pool. Most European jurisdictions prescribe asset quality criteria for the assets subject to the statutory covered bond program. Those standards in the U.S. could be set by statute or by the covered bond regulators through rulemaking. Given the likely detail involved, regulatory standards seem preferable.

Covered bond legislation could authorize the covered bond regulators to establish minimum overcollateralization requirements for covered bonds backed by different eligible asset classes. As a related standard, legislation also could set forth a framework requiring each cover pool to satisfy an asset coverage test that assesses whether the minimum overcollateralization requirements are met, and obligates the issuer and an independent “Asset Monitor” to confirm on a periodic basis whether the asset coverage test is satisfied.

Similar to the default situation approach, a statutory framework could create a
separate estate for the covered bond program similar to those in certain European jurisdictions. A recent legislative proposal creates a structure with the following general components when the FDIC is appointed as conservator or receiver for an insolvent issuer:

  • Creation of a separate estate and provision to the FDIC of an exclusive right for 180 days to transfer the issuer’s covered bond program to another eligible issuer.
  • A requirement that the FDIC as conservator or receiver, during the 180-day period, perform all monetary and nonmonetary obligations of the issuer until the FDIC completes the transfer of the covered bond program, the FDIC elects to repudiate its continuing obligations to perform, or the FDIC fails to cure a default (other than the issuer’s conservatorship or receivership).

US state pensions are in a bad way:

Less than half the 50 state retirement systems had assets to pay for 80 percent of promised benefits in their 2009 fiscal years, according to data compiled for the Cities and Debt Briefing hosted by Bloomberg Link in New York today. Two years earlier, only 19 missed the mark. Illinois covered just 50.6 percent of benefits last year, the lowest so-called funded ratio, which actuaries say shouldn’t be less than 80 percent.

Benefits paid by funds in at least 14 states equaled more than 10 percent of assets in the fiscal year, the figures show. In 2007, none exceeded the threshold. The growing burden prompted Colorado, Minnesota, Michigan and other states to trim benefits for millions of teachers and government workers. It also forced fund managers to keep money in short-term low-return investments to pay benefits, reducing chances pensions can earn their way back to financial health.

Expect to see more furious attacks on the reckless banks. Some misdirection is occurring already:

California sued Robert Rizzo, the ousted city manager of Bell who was paid almost $800,000 a year, and seven current and former officials, seeking the return of “excess salaries” and reductions in pension payouts.

“We are filing our lawsuit on behalf of the public to recover the excess salaries that Bell officials awarded themselves and to ensure their future pensions are reduced to a reasonable amount,” state Attorney General Jerry Brown said in a statement.

But this is funny:

Fannie Mae agreed to finance loans to homebuyers putting as little as $1,000 down without getting the approval of the U.S. agency in charge of minimizing the costs of the mortgage company’s bailout.

Fannie Mae is buying the Affordable Advantage loans from housing finance authorities in Massachusetts, Minnesota, Wisconsin and Idaho, Janis Smith, a spokeswoman, said today in a telephone interview. She declined to comment further.

The state housing authorities last year created the loan product aimed at first-time buyers, the New York Times reported Sept. 5. The mortgages come with 30-year fixed rates, require homeownership counseling, and are available to people with credit scores of at least 680 or 720, the paper said.

I love the bit about homeownership counselling. People only do naughty things because they don’t know better! That’s the only reason!

What makes this even funnier is some research from FRB-Richmond by Andra C. Ghent and Marianna Kudlyak, titled Recourse and Residential Mortgage Default: Theory and Evidence from U.S. States with the abstract:

We analyze the impact of lender recourse on mortgage defaults theoretically and empirically across U.S. states. We study the effect of state laws regarding deficiency judgments in a model where lenders can use the threat of a deficiency judgment to deter default or to shorten the default process. Empirically, we find that recourse decreases the probability of default when there is a substantial likelihood that a borrower has negative home equity. We also find that, in states that allow deficiency judgments, defaults are more likely to occur through a lender-friendly procedure, such as a deed in lieu of foreclosure.

They classify Minnesota and Wisconsin, two of the states mentioned with respect to the $1,000-down programme, as being non-recourse!

Another day of good returns and good volume on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 21bp and FixedResets up 10bp. MFC issues continued to be prominently displayed in the volume and performance tables.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.67%, equivalent to 7.94% interest at the standard equivalency actor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield 5.4%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 255bp, a sharp tightening from the 270bp reported on September 8.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7245 % 2,097.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7245 % 3,177.1
Floater 2.90 % 3.38 % 65,756 18.81 3 0.7245 % 2,264.5
OpRet 4.87 % -0.19 % 87,062 0.21 9 -0.0855 % 2,376.9
SplitShare 5.95 % -28.56 % 63,679 0.09 2 0.0821 % 2,366.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0855 % 2,173.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.70 % 5.36 % 128,075 5.36 14 0.3258 % 1,986.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.57 % 5.67 % 191,620 14.42 63 0.2078 % 1,952.8
FixedReset 5.24 % 3.04 % 277,968 3.31 47 0.1021 % 2,268.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.39
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-15
Maturity Price : 22.49
Evaluated at bid price : 22.67
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-15
Maturity Price : 19.24
Evaluated at bid price : 19.24
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-15
Maturity Price : 19.89
Evaluated at bid price : 19.89
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-15
Maturity Price : 15.49
Evaluated at bid price : 15.49
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Premium 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-15
Maturity Price : 15.38
Evaluated at bid price : 15.38
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 102,758 Nesbitt crossed 19,600 at 19.30; RBC crossed 45,000 at 19.31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-15
Maturity Price : 19.24
Evaluated at bid price : 19.24
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 81,248 Nesbitt bought two blocks of 10,000 each from RBC, both at 26.14. Nesbitt crosed 40,000 at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.13
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 74,405 TD sold 10,000 to anonymous at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.15
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 74,092 Nesbitt crossed 53,000 at 20.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-15
Maturity Price : 19.89
Evaluated at bid price : 19.89
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Premium 70,130 Nesbitt bought 15,000 from anonymous at 25.30 and crossed 25,000 at 25.31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 66,165 Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 25.23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-15
Maturity Price : 25.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MFC USD Debt Issue: Pricing Clue for MFC Prefs?

Wednesday, September 15th, 2010

Manulife Financial Corporation has announced

that it has priced a public offering in the United States of U.S.$1.1 billion aggregate principal amount of two series of its senior notes consisting of U.S.$600 million aggregate principal amount of 3.40% senior notes due 2015 (the “2015 Notes”) and U.S.$500 million aggregate principal amount of 4.90% senior notes due 2020 (the “2020 Notes”). The public offering price of the 2015 Notes is 99.854% and the public offering price of the 2020 Notes is 99.844%. The offering was made pursuant to an effective shelf registration statement.

The Company intends to use the net proceeds from the sale of the notes for general corporate purposes, including investments in its subsidiaries.

Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Banc of America Securities LLC and Goldman, Sachs & Co. are acting as joint book-running managers for the offering.

At 3.40%, the five-year notes yield 215bp over Treasuries; meanwhile, I see on CBID that the recent CAD 4.079% of 2015 are yielding 4.16%, about 205bp over Canadas.

These yields may be contrasted with the MFC sort-of-short-term preferreds:

MFC Sort-of-Short-Term Preferreds
Closing, 2010-9-14
Ticker Expected Maturity Extension Risk Quote Bid Yield to Presumed Call
MFC.PR.A 2015-12-18 Common < $2 25.10-15 4.02%
MFC.PR.D 2014-6-19 Market Reset Spread > 456bp 27.11-45 4.22%
MFC.PR.E 2014-9-19 Market Reset Spread > 323bp 26.30-60 4.20%

To the extent one is fearful that the extension risk will apply (or, to take a more extreme view, that they may actually go bankrupt in the next five years, which will presumably wipe out preferred shareholders while merely hurting the debtholders), there should be a premium on the preferreds; but given that the Bid Yield to Presumed Call will be received as the net amount of dividends and the expected capital loss on call, then those yields may be multiplied by the standard factor of 1.4x to give interest-equivalent yields in the range of 5.62%-6.08% … which seems like an awfully strong inducement.

The debt issue are interesting for another reason … there is some thought that MFC has maxed out on debt:

Manulife Financial Corp.’s US$1.1-billion debt raise (US$600-million in 5-year notes at 3.40% and US$500-million in 10-year notes at 4.90%) would bring its debt (plus preferreds and hybrids) to total capital ratio up to 30% from 27.7%.

That’s probably at the top end of Manulife’s range and above its long-term 25% target, according to BMO Capital Markets analyst Tom MacKinnon. As a result, he believes the company has little room for more debt or preferreds.

.

Note, however, that the smaller IAG was confirmed at Pfd-2(high) in February with higher gross leverage:

Capitalization has become more aggressive, in line with that of the industry, with a total debt ratio of 32% at the end of 2009, increasing to 33.2% pro forma a $200 million preferred and common share issue in mid-February. Within the last two years, Canadian life insurance companies have been increasing their financial leverage to better maximize return on equity, while also optimizing regulatory capital in a low interest rate environment. The Company’s adjusted debt ratio, which gives some equity treatment to preferred shares, was 22.6% at year-end, falling to 22% following the February issues, which is within DBRS’s tolerance for the current credit rating. However, the Company’s use of hybrid capital instruments such as preferred shares has increased over the past two years, significantly reducing its fixed-charge coverage ratio, which has fallen from double digits in the pre-2008 period to 6.0 times in 2009, notwithstanding the return to normal profitability.

September 14, 2010

Tuesday, September 14th, 2010

The Treasury Market Practices Group has updated its Best Practices Guidelines. The TMPG is a relatively recent creation:

The TMPG was formed in February 2007 in order to encourage dialogue on market issues and to offer recommendations for best practices in the Treasury cash, repo, and related markets. This private-sector group is currently composed of representatives from dealers, buy-side firms, custodians, and other market participants. In light of its aforementioned expansion, the TMPG’s membership composition will likely evolve over time to ensure robust support of the group’s efforts across the Treasury, agency debt, and agency MBS markets.

Sure, a private-sector group. When push comes to shove, which dealer in Treasuries is going to piss off the New York Fed?

One of the “best practices” is highly peculiar and likely to be counter-productive:

Market participants should be responsible in quoting prices and should promote overall price transparency in the interdealer brokers’ market.

  • Although legitimate price discovery activities are an integral part of the Treasury, agency debt, and agency MBS markets and should be encouraged, market participants should avoid pricing practices that do not have the objective of resulting in a transaction, or that otherwise result in market distortions.
  • Price discovery relies on efficient price reporting and transparent markets. Market participants should not conduct trades through interdealer voice brokers with electronic trading screens without having a record of the transaction published on the screen at the time of the transaction. In addition, market participants should avoid conduct that deliberately seeks to evade regulatory reporting requirements or impedes market transparency efforts.

Ludicrous. Remember, kiddies, bond trading is a cooperative game. It’s not about winning, it’s about being good citizens.

Not sure what to make of this:

International Business Machines Corp. Chief Executive Officer Sam Palmisano, who will turn 60 next year, said the practice of the company’s CEOs retiring from the position at that age isn’t “cast in stone.”

Ain’t nuthin’ cast in stone. You can carve things in stone and you can cast them in iron, but I’ve never heard of casting stone.

Another good day on good volume for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 24bp and FixedResets gaining 9bp. The yield on latter index is inching slowly towards 3%…

MFC.PR.A continues to trade heavily, at about even yield with the recent bond issue.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1492 % 2,082.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1492 % 3,154.2
Floater 2.93 % 3.43 % 64,397 18.70 3 0.1492 % 2,248.2
OpRet 4.87 % 0.56 % 90,335 0.21 9 -0.0299 % 2,378.9
SplitShare 5.95 % -34.10 % 64,330 0.09 2 0.0000 % 2,364.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0299 % 2,175.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.72 % 5.43 % 127,499 5.36 14 -0.1122 % 1,979.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.58 % 5.67 % 191,243 14.38 63 0.2371 % 1,948.7
FixedReset 5.25 % 3.05 % 279,037 3.31 47 0.0874 % 2,266.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Premium -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-14
Maturity Price : 20.14
Evaluated at bid price : 20.14
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-14
Maturity Price : 21.40
Evaluated at bid price : 21.40
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-14
Maturity Price : 20.45
Evaluated at bid price : 20.45
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-14
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-14
Maturity Price : 19.71
Evaluated at bid price : 19.71
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet 103,656 RBC crossed 17.700 at 25.00. Nesbitt crossed blocks of 19,100 and 45,000, both at 25.01.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 97,816 RBC crossed 91,200 at 23.37.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-14
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 23.36
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 90,443 RBC crossed 25,000 at 28.15. Desjardins crossed 26,200 at 28.15 and 28,800 at 28.18.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.14
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 79,773 TD crossed 15,000 at 26.67 and 59,900 at 26.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 67,875 TD crossed 51,500 at 21.56.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-14
Maturity Price : 21.49
Evaluated at bid price : 21.49
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 56,978 TD crossed blocks of 15,000 and 20,000, both at 28.06.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.05
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
There were 48 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.