Archive for September, 2010

Index Performance: August 2010

Sunday, September 5th, 2010

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for August, 2010, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
August 2010
Three Months
to
August 31, 2010
Ratchet -2.04% *** -1.99% ***
FixFloat -2.04% ** +0.05% **
Floater -2.04% -2.23%
OpRet +0.42% +2.11%
SplitShare +3.65% +7.48%
Interest +0.42%**** +2.11%****
PerpetualPremium +1.68%* +8.25%*
PerpetualDiscount +2.40% +10.72%
FixedReset +1.13% +4.57%
* The last member of the PerpetualPremium index was transferred to PerpetualDiscount at the May, 2010, rebalancing; the June performance is set equal to the PerpetualDiscount index; the index was repopulated (from the PerpetualDiscount index) at the June rebalancing.
** The last member of the FixedFloater index was transferred to Scraps at the June, 2010, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index
*** The last member of the RatchetRate index was transferred to Scraps at the July, 2010, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index
**** The last member of the InterestBearing index was transferred to Scraps at the June, 2009, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the OperatingRetractible index
Passive Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD +1.12% +5.36%
DPS.UN +1.29% +6.90%
Index
BMO-CM 50 +1.31% +6.16%
TXPR Total Return +1.29% +5.74%

There was another month of significant tracking error for CPD, as it implemented the July 2010 TXPR Rebalancing.

The pre-tax interest equivalent spread of PerpetualDiscounts over Long Corporates (which I also refer to as the Seniority Spread) ended the month at 265bp, a significant decline from the 275bp recorded at July month-end. Long corporate yields declined to 5.3% from 5.5% during the period while PerpetualDiscounts had the same decline in dividend terms, from 5.89% to 5.69%, which became a larger move in interest-equivalent terms, from 8.25% to 7.97%. I would be happier with long corporates in the 6.00-6.25% range, but what do I know? The market has never shown any particular interest in my happiness.

Long Corporates have simply been on wheels:


Click for Big

Charts related to the Seniority Spread and the Bozo Spread (PerpetualDiscount Current Yield less FixedReset Current Yield) are published in PrefLetter.

The trailing year returns are starting to look a bit more normal.


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But I suggest that eventually yields will make a difference:


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FixedResets set an all time low in median weighted average yield-to-worst during the month … this is going to end in tears.

And look, I know the index yield for Floaters shows discontinuities – it’s a result of index rebalancings due to volume shifting the mid point back and forth between the two BAM issues and either one of the PWF or the TRI issues. Give me better data and I’ll give you a better graph!

Floaters have had a wild ride; the latest decline is presumably due to the idea that the BoC will be slower rather than faster in hiking the overnight rate:


Click for big

FixedReset volume declined during the month after their burst of activity in April when they performed poorly. Volume may be under-reported due to the influence of Alternative Trading Systems (as discussed in the November PrefLetter), but I am biding my time before incorporating ATS volumes into the calculations, to see if the effect is transient or not.


Click for big

Compositions of the passive funds were discussed in the September, 2009, edition of PrefLetter.

Claymore has published NAV and distribution data (problems with the page in IE8 can be kludged by using compatibility view) for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to August 31, 2010
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
May 31, 2010 16.26      
June 25 16.47 0.21 +2.58% +2.58%
June 30 16.47 0.00 0.00%
July 27 16.62 0.069 +1.33% +1.57%
July 30 16.66 0.00 +0.24%
August 26 16.76 0.069 +1.01% +1.12%
August 31, 2010 16.78   +0.11%
Quarterly Return +5.36%

Claymore currently holds $486,846,162 (advisor & common combined) in CPD assets, up about $24-million from the $462,433,680 reported last month and up about $113-million from the $373,729,364 reported at year-end. The monthly increase in AUM of about 5% is larger than the total return of +0.72%, implying that the ETF experienced significant net subscriptions in August.

The DPS.UN NAV for September 1 has been published so we may calculate the approximate August returns.

p

DPS.UN NAV Return, August-ish 2010
Date NAV Distribution Return for sub-period Return for period
July 28, 2010 20.21      
September 1, 2010 20.57     +1.78%
Estimated July Ending Stub -0.24% **
Estimated September Beginning Stub -0.24% *
Estimated August Return +1.29% ***
*CPD had a NAVPU of 16.82 on September 1 and 16.78 on August 31, hence the total return for the period for CPD was +0.24%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal.
**CPD had a NAVPU of 16.62 on July 28 and 16.66 on July 30, hence the total return for the period for CPD was +0.24%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal.
*** The estimated August return for DPS.UN’s NAV is therefore the product of three period returns, +1.78%, -0.24% and -0.24% to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month of +1.29%

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for June and July:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-August-ish, 2010
June-ish +3.42%
July-ish +2.05%
Augusts-ish +1.29%
Three-months-ish +6.90%

Sentry Select is now publishing performance data for DPS.UN, but this appears to be price-based, rather than NAV-based. I will continue to report NAV-based figures.

Best & Worst Performers: August 2010

Sunday, September 5th, 2010

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

August 2010
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “August 31”)
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) -3.93% Recently downgraded. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.23% based on a bid of 18.12 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.D FixedReset Pfd-2(high) -3.73% Recently downgraded. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.88% based on a call 2014-7-19 at 25.00./td>
BAM.PR.K Floater Pfd-2(low) -3.55%  
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) -3.29%  
MFC.PR.E FixedReset Pfd-2(high) -2.74% Recently downgraded. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.66% based on a bid of 25.82 and a call 2014-10-19 at 25.00.
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +4.71% Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 20.89 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +5.03% Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 21.09 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +5.06% Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 20.55 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) +5.26% Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 20.10 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2 +6.20% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 22.08 and a limitMaturity.

September 3, 2010

Friday, September 3rd, 2010

Mr Thomas C Baxter, Jr, Executive Vice President and General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission regarding the Lehman bankruptcy:

As of that Friday, there were two prospective Lehman acquirers: Bank of America and Barclays. On Saturday, September 13, Bank of America abandoned the potential acquisition of Lehman and reached an agreement to acquire Merrill Lynch. Barclays was the only remaining suitor. On Sunday, September 14, with the consortium financing committed, we learned for the first time that Barclays would not be able to deliver a key document to carry the merger to conclusion: a guarantee of Lehman’s trading obligations between the signing of the merger agreement and its closing.

The Bear Stearns transaction taught us the importance of the guarantee to a successful rescue. A guarantee maintains the ability of the troubled company to operate as a going concern and, thus, preserves value. It does this by providing protection to counterparties during an especially vulnerable period – the period between merger contract and merger closing. Without such a guarantee, the creditors and counterparties of the firm would be at risk in the event that the merger fell apart because of a failed shareholder vote or some other contingency. Consequently, as a market matter, the guarantee is an indispensable part of any such rescue operation.

On Sunday, September 14, we learned that Barclays could not proffer the needed guarantee without a shareholder vote. This vote would take days, if not weeks or months, and there was no way to predict if the shareholders would even vote for the transaction to proceed. I explored with counsel whether the U.K. government, or one of its instrumentalities like the FSA, might waive this U.K. requirement, such that the guarantee could be delivered and the rescue effected. I learned that the U.K. authorities were not amenable to a waiver. Thus, Barclays ceased to be available as the willing buyer that we needed to rescue Lehman, and there was no other interest from any firm of sufficient size and capability that could acquire Lehman, a company with consolidated assets of about $600 billion.

I’m suspicious of any portfolio management model that includes the word “regression”, but there’s occasionally a good idea in there. Econbrowser‘s James Hamilton highlights his recent paper in a post Policy tools that could lower interest rates further:

Our starting point was a framework developed by Vayanos and Vila (2009), who interpret the term structure of interest rates as arising from the behavior of risk-averse arbitrageurs. This model is one way to capture formally the portfolio balance channel that Fed Chairman Bernanke indicated is central to the Fed’s understanding of how nonstandard monetary operations might affect the economy. Vayanos and Vila’s framework has previously been applied to our question by Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) and Doh (2010). One of our contributions is to develop specific measures of how the available supplies of Treasury securities of different maturities might be expected to influence the pricing of level, slope, and curvature risk of the term structure. Although I began as a skeptic of the claim that bond supplies would make much difference, we found pretty strong evidence that historically they have. For example, we found that over the 1990-2007 period, we could predict the excess return from holding a 2-year bond over a 1-year bond with an R2 of 71% on the basis of the level, slope, and curvature of the yield curve along with our 3 Treasury supply factors.

The full research paper is The Effectiveness of Alternative Monetary Policy Tools in a Zero Lower Bound Environment.

Just when you thought that nothing good could be said about Russian politicians, they prove you wrong:

Speaking as the Russian government announces plan to raise duty on alcohol and cigarettes, [Russian Finance Minister] Alexei Kudrin said that by smoking a pack, “you are giving more to help solve social problems such as boosting demographics, developing other social services and upholding birth rates”.

“People should understand: Those who drink, those who smoke are doing more to help the state,” he told the Interfax news agency.

He’s got my vote.

It was a solid day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 5bp and FixedResets gaining 3bp on average volume. There has been a lot of volume in MFC lately, presumably due to continued rebalancing after the downgrade.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3414 % 2,034.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3414 % 3,082.7
Floater 2.73 % 3.24 % 57,446 19.07 3 0.3414 % 2,197.2
OpRet 4.88 % 3.46 % 99,458 0.24 9 0.0472 % 2,357.5
SplitShare 5.99 % -38.02 % 68,324 0.09 2 0.2277 % 2,350.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0472 % 2,155.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.57 % 123,528 5.39 14 0.0113 % 1,969.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.69 % 5.76 % 187,422 14.22 63 0.0513 % 1,911.8
FixedReset 5.26 % 3.11 % 281,286 3.34 47 0.0282 % 2,256.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-03
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-03
Maturity Price : 22.80
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-03
Maturity Price : 21.66
Evaluated at bid price : 21.98
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 161,950 Nesbitt crossed 160,000 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 131,059 TD crossed blocks of 83,400 and 25,100, both at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.93
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 71,180 Nesbitt crossed 35,000 at 18.36.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-03
Maturity Price : 18.34
Evaluated at bid price : 18.34
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 66,062 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 26.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.57
Bid-YTW : 4.77 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 57,987 RBC crossed blocks of 10,000 and 38,500, both at 28.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.30
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 56,502 RBC bought 19,700 from Scotia at 25.86.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

GWL.PR.O To Be Redeemed

Friday, September 3rd, 2010

Great-West Life Assurance has announced:

that it intends to redeem all of its outstanding 5.55% Series O Preferred Shares (GWL.PR.O) on October 31, 2010. The redemption price will be $25.00 for each Series O Preferred Share plus an amount equal to all declared and unpaid dividends, less any tax required to be deducted and withheld by the Company. The paid-up capital of the Series O Preferred Shares is $17.26 per share.

A formal notice and instructions for the redemption of the Series O Preferred Shares will be sent to shareholders in accordance with the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attached to the Series O Preferred Shares.

Holders should very carefully examine the sentence about paid-up capital! When the issue is redeemed, holders will be taxed as if there is a capital loss from their purchase price to the paid-up capital of $17.26, with a deemed dividend equal to the difference between the $25.00 paid and this paid-up capital, or $7.74 (in addition to the dividends paid that actually look like dividends, of course). There will be many holders who hold it on the redemption date without knowing this, and there will be a great wailing and a gnashing of teeth when they do their taxes.

GWL.PR.O was last mentioned on PrefBlog when I discussed its particulars. GWL.PR.O is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is currently a member of the PerpetualPremium index.

Update, 2010-9-15: Bolding above is a correction to a stenographical error.

September 2, 2010

Thursday, September 2nd, 2010

Nothing happened in the financial markets today, so today the entire market update will be devoted to Canadian politics. Ain’t you lucky? But the integrity of the judicial system is important, as minority shareholders in Mascan Corp. can testify.

There’s a kerfuffle about a judge whose husband posted risque pictures of her on the Internet that has come to light because some little twerp has seen a chance for some legalized blackmail. There’s no indication the judge herself did anything wrong; unless you believe that allowing your spouse to take risque pictures of you is wrong. The whole story is no big deal, except for one incredible quote:

“If pictures of you naked end up on an internet site, it’s quite difficult to say you have the credibility to be a judge,” said Sébastien Grammond, dean of civil law at the University of Ottawa.

On the basis of what has been disclosed, I have no qualms about the credibility or ability of Associate Chief Justice Lori Douglas. However, I have deep qualms about the ability of Sébastien Grammond to think things through and to be responsible for the education of the next generation of lawyers. He should be removed from his post immediately.

Similarly:

“I think that no judge who has a cloud of scandal hanging over their heads is able to … act effectively as a member of the judiciary,” said Annalise Acorn, a law professor at the University of Alberta who specializes in ethics.

“I simply think it’s not consistent with the image of dignity and authority that the judiciary needs to have.”

Prof. Acorn said she would be “flabbergasted” if Judge Douglas stays on as a judge, and expects she might resign in the coming days.

It’s easy to tell member of a profession who are completely unable to do the work – they specialize in ethics. After all, how can you ever actually prove they’re wrong? It’s very convenient. The only surprising thing is that some authorities are actually willing to pay these people.

Alice Woolley claims that:

The problem is that her knowledge of those pictures prior to her appointment undermines the already fragile legitimacy of our appointments process. Applicants for judgeships are asked, “is there anything in your past or present which could reflect negatively on yourself or the judiciary, and which should be disclosed?” The question asks applicants to provide the committee with the information necessary to make a fair and appropriate assessment of the applicant’s qualifications to be a judge.

In this instance Douglas had to answer “yes” to that question.

It is not even about whether she would be a good judge. It is about whether people appearing before her could feel confident that their cases were being heard fairly and dispassionately. If those people included a black man, or a white woman divorcing a black man, or a Mexican family dealing with a child apprehension case, those people could reasonably wonder whether the racial stereotyping that the website reflects is one that Douglas shares, and that will impact her judgment.

The last sentence is pure bullshit. These people could wonder, complain and appeal, but not reasonably. If they wanted, they could always demand that the judge recuse herself. It’s just another legal manoevre.

But wait! We have not yet finished plumbing the depths of Alice Woolley’s ignorance. Clearly, Douglas’ behaviour is not, in and of itself, a factor. So what if … what if she’d be sunbathing topless and her husband had posted those pictures? What if it wasn’t her husband, but a voyeur posted pictures of her on the internet? What if he had identified her? What if he had claimed he could arrange sexual liasons with her? What if he claimed she liked Mexicans, wink-wink nudge-nudge? What if it wasn’t even a topless picture, it was her official picture taken during her investiture?

Alice Woolley’s series of assertions – they are far too childish to be honoured with the sobriquet of “argument” – work equally well in any of these situations.

We can go further. What if a tireless research finds that, while in high school, Douglas answered a Teen Queen Magazeen quiz by circling the “tall dark and handsome” choice for ‘Guy you want’. When we consider this situation, we’re at least looking at something she did herself, not something done by a third party without her knowledge or consent. Does this expression of preference make her forever unfit to be a judge? What if she hears a case involving some short, fair, average-looking guy? In Alice Woolley’s anarchic dream world, in which assertion of bias is deemed equivalent to proof of bias, such a thing would bar her – and, basically, every living, breathing human on the planet – from the judiciary.

Alice Woolley is a fool – and a dangerous fool at that, for urging standards that will accomplish nothing but making judges easier to blackmail.

Honestly, the howls for Douglas’ head are so shockingly removed from any semblence of intellectual rigour that one has to wonder if the real story is being told – when smart people say dumb things, it’s often because they don’t want to say the sleazy thing, as when doctors claim they won’t give terminal patients sufficient painkillers ‘because there is the chance of addiction’, when the real story is that they don’t want to get a call from the ministry and fill out the painkiller forms. Are the critics going after her for some other, less publicly expressible reason? Was she appointed by the wrong party? In Harper’s Canada, did she find the wrong person liable?

It was another good day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 11bp and FixedResets winning 2bp. Volume and volatility were enough to make the day interesting.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3214 % 2,028.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3214 % 3,072.2
Floater 2.74 % 3.27 % 58,407 19.00 3 -0.3214 % 2,189.7
OpRet 4.89 % 3.59 % 102,951 0.24 9 0.0515 % 2,356.4
SplitShare 6.00 % -36.75 % 70,620 0.09 2 1.1307 % 2,344.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0515 % 2,154.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.55 % 121,928 5.55 14 -0.0169 % 1,969.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.69 % 5.79 % 188,386 14.18 63 0.1103 % 1,910.8
FixedReset 5.27 % 3.13 % 273,360 3.35 47 0.0219 % 2,256.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
GWO.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 24.22
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.24
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 22.42
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.29
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 21.88
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-02
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.01
Bid-YTW : -36.75 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 22.78
Evaluated at bid price : 22.99
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 103,626 Scotia crossed blocks of 25,000 and 40,000, both at 26.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 95,964 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 25.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 67,210 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 10,000, both at 25.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 59,490 RBC crossed blocks of 23,900 and 24,900, both at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.95
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 50,329 TD bought 10,000 from RBC at 22.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 22.52
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 5.40 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 47,418 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-02
Maturity Price : 18.35
Evaluated at bid price : 18.35
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
There were 35 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Moody's Warns on Banks' Rating Volatility

Thursday, September 2nd, 2010

Moody’s has released a report on Canadian banks’ risk exposure due to investment banking activities:

While the Canadian banking system outperformed most developed country banking systems during the 2007–2009 credit crisis, the Canadian banks’ expansion of their capital markets platforms, particularly outside Canada, is not without risk, Moody’s Investors Service says in its new report.

The banks’ performance, coupled with the oligopolistic structure of the Canadian system, has allowed them to maintain very high ratings. Nevertheless, the mature domestic market raises a strategic challenge with regards to growth, and the void left by the retrenchment of many global investment banks represents one avenue for growth and revenue diversification. Therefore, several Canadian banks are now expanding their wholesale investment banking (WIB) activities.

Golly, not a word about the beneficial, if not to say brilliant and incisive, supervision by OSFI! I guess they forgot that bit.

Moody’s has previously cited the risks associated with WIB business and noted that even the most well-managed WIBs can suffer from unusual earnings volatility, and when serious risk-management failures occur, significant ratings transitions are possible.

The report is titled, “Capital Markets Activities of Canadian Banks: A Growing Risk”

A few tid-bits are disclosed in a Globe story on the report, Banks take $21.5-billion hit on risk:

Ratings agency Moody’s Investor Services has tallied up the hit Canadian banks took through their capital markets divisions from the start of 2007 to the end of 2009, and the toll has reached nearly $21.5-billion.

That is the amount Moody’s figures the banks would have recorded as profit if not for the writeoffs they took due to their exposure to the markets.

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce topped the list with a $10.5-billion hit during those three years, largely because of bets on U.S. structured debt products that went sour, followed by Royal Bank of Canada at $4.3-billion. Bank of Montreal ($2.9-billion), Bank of Nova Scotia ($2.2-billion) and National Bank of Canada ($1.1-billion) came next. Toronto Dominion Bank took the smallest hit at $727-million, the report says.

Moody’s has raised flags about this exposure in the past, notably when downgrading BMO prefs an extra notch last spring.

September 1, 2010

Wednesday, September 1st, 2010

Donald C. Langevoort made a good point about trade-throughs in his paper U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION AND GLOBAL COMPETITION:

Gadinis points out that U.S. and European regulation is similar in one strategy—trying to force trading interest into public view in the form of limit order quotes so that the price can reflect available supply and demand at increments a little higher or lower than the last sale. Reg NMS goes one step further, however, by forcing the trade-through of orders to the market with the best displayed price, so long as that market has fast (that is, fully automated) execution capacity. This is required for two reasons: first, to give protection to and thereby encourage the display of quotations and limit orders; second, as a mechanism to try to ensure that brokers offer their customers best execution. In contrast, European market regulation does not have a trade-through regime, and leaves best execution to negotiation between broker and customer. For obvious reasons, many institutional investors feel hampered by Reg NMS, and many investors, brokers, and trading sites have taken advantage of exceptions in the regulation to accommodate so-called “dark pools”—undisclosed trading interest—and trading that is based on non-price preferences.

The differences in approach are not hard to understand. The national market system in the United States is a legacy of public markets wherein retail investors are protected not only from the abuses of monopolistic trading sites but also from being elbowed aside by large traders in an increasingly institutional marketplace. Europe has little direct retail participation, and so that legacy is not present. What Gadinis describes there is precisely what one would expect from markets that have been built in recent years almost entirely for the benefit of the institutional trade.

U.S. institutional investors have ways of moving trading abroad when the domestic regulatory burdens are too much. As a result, Reg NMS is probably quite unstable. To date, the SEC has conditioned the cross-border mergers of exchanges (for example, New York Stock Exchange and Euronext) on keeping them separate for purposes of compliance with domestic market regulation. But that is inefficient, and probably hopeless in the long run. The right vision is no longer of a national market system but a global market system, and there is simply no way the SEC can impose its retail investor legacy extraterritorially. One suspects that it is simply a matter of time before the SEC does in this area what it did with IFRS: abandon exceptionalism in an effort to gain greater influence over market structure evolution around the world.

The issue of trade-throughs was discussed on August 27.

BIS has released preliminary results from its survey of FX and OTC derivatives:

•Activity in OTC interest rate derivatives grew by 24%, with average daily turnover of $2.1 trillion in April 2010. Almost all of the increase relative to the last survey was due to the growth of forward rate agreements (FRAs), which increased by 132% to reach $601 billion

The Bank of Canada has published its specific contribution, with the nugget:

Similarly, as an approximation, the three execution methods—(i) customer direct (over the telephone), (ii) multi-bank dealing systems, and (iii) single bank proprietary platforms—can be viewed as being execution methods primarily for customers. On that basis, 77 per cent of all customer trades in Canada are undertaken directly with the customer over the telephone, and 23 per cent are executed through either multi-bank or single-bank electronic trading systems.

In possibly the most amazing news story in the history of the universe, Bloomberg advises that Hong Kong i-bankers are competing on fees:

Hong Kong bankers are charging the lowest fees on record to arrange initial public offerings as firms vie for deals in a market where IPOs are raising more than in the U.S. and U.K. combined.

Initial sales by 37 companies in Hong Kong have paid average fees of 2.2 percent in 2010, the lowest level since Bloomberg began tracking the data in 1999. While companies going public raised $18.7 billion, 64 percent more than American IPOs, banks earned about 43 percent less underwriting in the territory, the data show.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Deutsche Bank AG are leading Wall Street in reducing fees and winning sales where Chinese companies go public to help finance the fastest growth among the world’s biggest economies. The firms are facing more competition from mainland banks that have boosted their share by 50 percent since the start of the financial crisis.

We won’t be seeing that here in hurry!

It looks like there’s a bit of capital flight from Greece:

Withdrawals by cash-strapped customers such as Efthymiou, as well as by Greeks moving money out of the country, helped push deposits at the nation’s banks down by 9 percent since the end of 2009.

Business and household deposits in June fell for a sixth straight month to 216.5 billion euros ($277.3 billion) from 238 billion euros at the end of 2009, according to figures from the Bank of Greece.

The reporter, the politicians and the banks are emphasizing the ‘draw-down of savings to offset government payment reduction’ idea, but Greece’s GDP is USD 356-billion. So that’s about 6% of GDP in reduced bank deposits. I vote for capital flight and eagerly await compelling evidence and incisive arguments proving me wrong.

PrefBlog’s Strange Funds Department has come up with another exhibit:

Connor, Clark & Lunn Capital Markets Inc. (the “Manager”) is pleased to announce that a preliminary prospectus for HBanc Capital Securities Trust (the “Fund”) has been filed

The Fund was established to provide investors with high levels of stable, tax-advantaged distributions through exposure to Capital Securities issued by HSBC Holdings plc, a conservatively positioned and strongly capitalized global bank.

CC&L is best known for packaging multi-name Credit Default Swaps as preferred shares and thereby vaporizing a lot of client money. More than once. However, I am confident that the time spent developing and managing these products will be properly accounted for as “experience” in the prospectus for the new fund.

Mayoral candidate Joe Pantalone has presented his vision of doing business in the city:

“I have no problem with people finding loopholes, if they’re good people,” says councillor Joe Pantalone, who spearheaded the moratorium.

“I know Albino well and I can’t say enough about what a good Torontonian he is.”

I have no idea how one gets to be a “good Torontonian”, but presumably it involves cash and being a friend of Joe Pantalone.

The Canadian preferred share market continued to gain today, with both PerpetualDiscounts and FixedResets up 9bp. Volume was good, but volatility was subdued, with the performance highlights table being empty.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.78%, equivalent to 8.09% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield 5.3%, so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread is now 280bp, a significant rebound from the 265bp reported at August 31; however, note that in the interim there has been a migration of high-coupon, high-yield issues from PerpetualDiscounts to PerpetualPremiums, which has artificially reduced the yield on the PerpetualDiscount index.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0944 % 2,034.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0944 % 3,082.1
Floater 2.73 % 3.24 % 58,756 19.07 3 -0.0944 % 2,196.8
OpRet 4.89 % 3.38 % 102,632 0.24 9 0.1419 % 2,355.2
SplitShare 6.07 % -25.07 % 65,334 0.09 2 0.3361 % 2,318.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1419 % 2,153.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.60 % 136,501 5.54 14 -0.0113 % 1,969.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.70 % 5.78 % 187,584 14.19 63 0.0868 % 1,908.7
FixedReset 5.27 % 3.13 % 273,729 3.35 47 0.0948 % 2,255.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
No individual gains or losses exceeding 1%!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 107,310 TD crossed 100,000 at 28.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.91
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 105,395 TD crossed 100,000 at 28.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 102,885 TD crossed 99,300 at 26.63.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Premium 90,650 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.15; Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-05-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 64,803 RBC crossed two blocks of 25,000 each, both at 25.77.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : -1.75 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset 61,154 TD crossed two blocks of 30,000 each, both at 27.83.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.85
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: August 2010

Wednesday, September 1st, 2010
HIMI Index Changes, August 31, 2010
Issue From To Because
CM.PR.D PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
TD.PR.R PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
NA.PR.K PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
TD.PR.Q PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
PWF.PR.I PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
BNS.PR.O PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
IAG.PR.E PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount Scraps Volume
PWF.PR.A Floater Scraps Volume

It’s nice to see a meaningful migration into the PerpetualPremium index!

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during August 2010
Issue Action Index Because
PWF.PR.J Delete OpRet Redeemed
ALA.PR.A Add Scraps New Issue