Archive for November, 2015

November 3, 2015

Wednesday, November 4th, 2015

There is a lot of confusion about Bombardier valuation:

On Monday, Mr. Tyerman cut his rating on the beleaguered stock to “sell” from “hold” and slashed his one-year price target on the company’s subordinated voting Class B shares to $1.10 from $1.35.

On Tuesday, Mr. Tyerman grounded his previous call. His new target has soared to $1.40, with a restored, turbulence-free rating of “hold.” He’s still got a downside target on the stock should Canada invest, but it is now $1.20, not 60 cents.

The reason for his change of course? Mr. Tyerman credits a “revised view of how a possible Canadian federal government investment in the C Series could play out,” apparently based on subsequent discussions with Bombardier. The analyst’s previously published view was that if Canada matched Quebec, the two governments would own a combined 99 per cent of the airliner project, leaving just 1 per cent of the economics of the plane for existing investors to share, and missing out on most of the upside if the poor selling plane actually becomes popular. That was based on Quebec securing 49.5 per cent ownership of the C Series program as part of its investment.

But Mr. Tyerman’s revised view is that the company “will retain more of the C Series economics than in our previous target,” or a one-third economic interest even if Canada were to put in a full $1-billion.

Huh. So the valuation of the common has been improved because of some feeling that the feds are going to get taken to the cleaners. Well, I suppose that’s even better than simply bailing them out in the first place, eh? Still, trouble with the C Series has returned Bombardier to its core competency:

Bombardier Inc. has increased lobbying of Canada’s federal government to an eight-year high, reinforcing its Ottawa connections as officials there prepare to review whether to join Quebec in helping bail out the struggling CSeries jet.

Canada’s largest aerospace company communicated 50 times with federal officials since Jan. 1, more than any full year in records dating to 2007, according to the government’s lobbyist registry. The total for 2014 was 48.

“Government relations have historically been at the heart of what Bombardier does,” Louis Hebert, a management strategy professor at the HEC Montreal business school, said in a telephone interview. “They are returning to their traditional competitive advantage.”

Industry Minister James Moore and staff of the industry department were the most frequent points of contact for Bombardier representatives, with at least 21 reported communications this year, the data show. Bombardier officials also met International Trade Minister Ed Fast and Finance Minister Joe Oliver.

Bombardier also spent more time lobbying Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s office this year, the records show. The company communicated with officials from Harper’s office seven times this year, compared with three times in 2014 and once in 2013.

Meanwhile, all the other piggies at the trough are jostling for position as the slops come into view:

Before the first dime of public money is spent, a strong made-in-Canada supply policy needs to be firmly in place. Without that, new jobs will not be created and existing ones will not be preserved. That policy needs to be paired with a review of a domestic playing field that leaves many Canadian companies at a disadvantage to cheap, subsidized imports.

At the same time, the government needs to reinvigorate the federal steel caucus, including MPs from all ridings where steel is manufactured.

It should also introduce a mechanism that adjusts import levels based on domestic capacity utilization. When Canadian steel production falls below a certain threshold, companies would be stabilized by the trigger of variable duties.

The BCSC has announced a new way to spend money:

The British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) today released the Smarter Investor Study, national research that examines client-advisor relationships in Canada, and introduces a new lens for understanding how personality affects Canadians’ investment decisions.

“Our Smarter Investor Study identifies five personality types within our sample group – confident, diligent, impulsive, reserved, and tumultuous,” said Brenda Leong, Chair and CEO of the BCSC. “What we found is that your personality plays a role when it comes to how you invest, particularly when you work with an advisor,”

Investors can find out their own personality and how it impacts their investing decisions by taking the Smarter Investor Quiz.

One key finding reveals that while Canadians in general-investors and non-investors alike-index at 62 on the 100-point scale. Those who work with an advisor are at 70 out of 100.

Other key findings include:

  • •While 30% of Canadians 35 and older invest with an advisor, more than half are not sure what they pay and less than one in five knows how their advisor is paid or have never asked about compensation.
  • •Six in 10 Canadians (61%) who invest with an advisor say that they always read the statements they received.
  • •Less than half (46%) of Canadians who invest with an advisor report having checked into the advisor’s background before they began working with them.
  • •Of those who say they did a background check, slightly more than half (53%) checked their advisor’s registration.
  • •30% of Canadians 35 and older invest with an advisor. Of the 70% who do not, 19% are DIY investors (those who invest but do not work with an advisor). A further 52% do not have any investments.
  • •Investors recognize that they have responsibilities. The study asked which of various responsibilities investors believed were either wholly or partially theirs when working with an advisor. The highest agreement for any one item was 76% (asking questions), while only 40% agreed that doing independent research was a part of their responsibility.

Accoording to the full report, the research was undertaken by Innovative Research Group Inc. I looked at their website; they are very shy about identifying themselves:

Who we are

We come from the client’s side. We came to research because we needed it to help us achieve our goals and we remain focused on serving our clients’ needs first.

We’re team players. We build successful, long-term partnerships with our clients and guide them through the intricacies of research, strategy and problem solving.

The core INNOVATIVE team is composed of seasoned practitioners with a proven track record over a wide array of challenges, and dedicated specialists with a unique command of critical skills.

INNOVATIVE complements its core team through relationships with leading research academics and professionals, connecting our staff to the latest in research techniques.

That’s it. No names, no pack-drill, nothing. It is also of interest to learn that the Canada 2020 Panel important in the preparation of the paper is self-selected, at least in part.

I don’t see the point of this research, frankly, but I suppose it helps get rid of a little excess money.

It was another mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 25bp, FixedResets gaining 16bp and DeemedRetractibles off 5bp. The Performance Highlights table is again lengthy, indicating continued churn in the market. Volume was above average.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_151103
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 19.16 to be $0.57 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +154, is $0.80 cheap at its bid price of 13.20.

impVol_MFC_151103
Click for Big

Most expensive is MFC.PR.N, resetting at +230bp on 2020-3-19, bid at 20.35 to be 0.96 rich, while MFC.PR.F resetting at +141bp on 2016-6-19, is bid at 14.35 to be 0.69 cheap.

impVol_BAM_151103
Click for Big

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 16.30 to be $1.40 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp on 2020-3-31 is bid at 20.65 and appears to be $1.62 rich.

impVol_FTS_151103
Click for Big

FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 18.90, looks $0.73 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.G, with a spread of +213bp and resetting 2018-9-1, is bid at 18.20 and is $0.46 cheap.

pairs_FR_151103
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -0.72%, with two outliers above 0.00% and none below -2.00%. The distribution is just barely bimodal, with bank NVCC non-compliant pairs averaging -0.53% and other issues averaging -0.71%; note that the relative values have reversed today! There are four junk outliers above 0.00% and one below -2.00%.

pairs_FR_151103
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.41 % 5.30 % 31,707 17.47 1 0.0000 % 1,762.3
FixedFloater 6.42 % 5.65 % 31,046 16.75 1 -1.3333 % 3,040.3
Floater 4.20 % 4.24 % 62,324 16.91 3 0.3568 % 1,880.2
OpRet 4.84 % 4.33 % 31,717 0.80 1 0.0000 % 2,719.7
SplitShare 4.76 % 5.87 % 160,811 2.92 5 0.2302 % 3,194.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2302 % 2,492.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.83 % 4.13 % 81,629 0.08 6 0.1729 % 2,491.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.56 % 5.66 % 82,551 14.40 33 0.2498 % 2,573.5
FixedReset 4.97 % 4.51 % 215,789 15.48 76 0.1624 % 2,058.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.19 % 5.18 % 110,591 5.44 34 -0.0544 % 2,574.6
FloatingReset 2.57 % 3.72 % 55,729 5.81 10 0.3601 % 2,176.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -2.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 13.75
Evaluated at bid price : 13.75
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -2.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 15.05
Evaluated at bid price : 15.05
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
SLF.PR.I FixedReset -1.99 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.71
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.35
Bid-YTW : 9.61 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset -1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.40
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.16
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 13.40
Bid-YTW : 9.49 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.55
Bid-YTW : 7.83 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.95
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 19.10
Evaluated at bid price : 19.10
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.80
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 18.76
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 11.27
Evaluated at bid price : 11.27
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.93
Bid-YTW : 5.90 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.28
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.32
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.04
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.04
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 18.90
Evaluated at bid price : 18.90
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
BNS.PR.B FloatingReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.62
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
BIP.PR.A FixedReset 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 5.26 %
CU.PR.I FixedReset 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 19.16
Evaluated at bid price : 19.16
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
MFC.PR.N FixedReset 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.35
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 11.23
Evaluated at bid price : 11.23
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 15.75
Evaluated at bid price : 15.75
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 20.60
Evaluated at bid price : 20.60
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
HSE.PR.E FixedReset 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 21.99
Evaluated at bid price : 22.48
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset 1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 1.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
RY.PR.M FixedReset 1.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 20.67
Evaluated at bid price : 20.67
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
CU.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.96 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 23.52
Evaluated at bid price : 23.84
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset 2.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.35
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 2.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 17.40
Evaluated at bid price : 17.40
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
BAM.PF.E FixedReset 5.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 20.65
Evaluated at bid price : 20.65
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 81,211 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 19.63.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 19.69
Evaluated at bid price : 19.69
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset 64,933 TD crossed 33,500 at 20.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
BMO.PR.Y FixedReset 63,845 TD crossed 35,000 at 21.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.80
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 60,840 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 19.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 19.16
Evaluated at bid price : 19.16
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 51,230 TD crossed 39,400 at 20.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.50
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 39,735 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 19.32
Evaluated at bid price : 19.32
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 21.19 – 21.84
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.4132

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 21.19
Evaluated at bid price : 21.19
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %

GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.16 – 23.83
Spot Rate : 0.6700
Average : 0.4602

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.16
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %

MFC.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 20.13 – 20.98
Spot Rate : 0.8500
Average : 0.6448

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.13
Bid-YTW : 6.52 %

CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.33 – 22.80
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.2846

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 22.05
Evaluated at bid price : 22.33
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.40 – 22.95
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.3653

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-03
Maturity Price : 22.12
Evaluated at bid price : 22.40
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %

BMO.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 20.55 – 20.90
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2240

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %

New Issue: Two Series of RY Preferreds, USD, Issued As Merger Consideration

Tuesday, November 3rd, 2015

Royal Bank of Canada has announced:

it has completed the acquisition of City National Corporation (“City National”).

Based on the closing price on the New York Stock Exchange of RBC’s common shares on October 30, 2015 of US$ 56.83, the total transaction value is US$ 5.0 billion and will be paid with US$ 2.6 billion in cash and 41.6 million RBC common shares. In addition, RBC will issue US$ 275 million of RBC first preferred shares in exchange for all outstanding shares of City National preferred stock. The transaction is expected to reduce the Q1/2016 Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of RBC by approximately 70 basis points. RBC continues to forecast a strong capital position going forward.

There are two issues of City National preferreds that have been converted. The first is CYN.PRC, a 5.50% Straight Perpetual USD:

We will pay dividends on the Preferred Stock, when, as, and if declared by our board of directors or a duly authorized committee of the board. If declared, dividends will accrue and be payable on the liquidation preference amount, on a non-cumulative basis, from the date of issuance at a rate of 5.50% per annum, payable quarterly, in arrears. See also “Dividend Payment Dates” on page S-9. Upon the payment of any dividends on the Preferred Stock, holders of depositary shares will receive a related proportionate payment.

The second is CYN.PRD, a 6.75%+405.2 FixedFloater USD:

We will pay dividends on the Preferred Stock, when, as, and if declared by our board of directors or a duly authorized committee of the board, out of funds legally available to pay dividends, (i) from the date of issuance of the Preferred Stock to, but excluding November 7, 2023, at an annual rate of 6.750% on the liquidation preference amount of $1,000 per share of Preferred Stock, quarterly in arrears, on February 7, May 7, August 7 and November 7 of each year (each, a “dividend payment date”), beginning on February 7, 2014, and (ii) from, and including, November 7, 2023, at an annual rate equal to three-month LIBOR plus 4.052% on the liquidation preference amount of $1,000 per share of Preferred Stock, quarterly in arrears, on each dividend payment date, beginning on February 7, 2024. Upon the payment of any dividends on the Preferred Stock, holders of depositary shares will receive a related proportionate payment.

Neither new series is yet listed on RY’s preferred share page. If they are listed, they will be known as Series C-1 and Series C-2:

In addition, upon the consummation of the Merger, each outstanding share of City National’s 5.5% Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series C will be cancelled and RBC will issue to the former holder, in respect of each such outstanding share of preferred stock, one 5.50% Non-Cumulative Perpetual Preferred share, Series C-1 (“Series C-1 Preferred Share”) of RBC and each outstanding share of City National’s 6.75% Fixed Rate/Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series D will be cancelled and RBC will issue to the former holder, in respect of each such outstanding share of preferred stock, one 6.75% Fixed Rate/Floating Rate Non-Cumulative Preferred Share, Series C-2 (“Series C-2 Preferred Share”) of RBC. In consideration for the issuance of Series C-1 Preferred Shares and Series C-2 Preferred Shares, Holdco will issue to RBC a number of shares in the capital stock of Holdco for each Series C-1 Preferred Share and Series C-2 Preferred Share, respectively, having a fair market value equal to the fair market value of a Series C-1 Preferred Share and a Series C-2 Preferred Share, respectively, on the date of issuance.

As is typical with take-overs, various matters of great pith and moment are not spelled out, but it appears that the new series C-1 and C-2 are not NVCC-compliant:

Conversion Rights. New RBC Preferred Shares are not convertible into or exchangeable for any other class or series of shares or securities of, or any other interests in, RBC.

In addition I can find no mention in RY’s definitive filing with the SEC a discussion of tax considerations for Canadian residents; there is no such description in any of the various attachments, either. However, given that DBRS has assigned a bond-style rating to these new series … :

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has today assigned a rating of A (low) with a Stable trend to Royal Bank of Canada’s (RBC or the Bank) 5.50% Non-Cumulative Perpetual First Preferred Shares, Series C-1 (Preferred Shares, Series C-1) and 6.750% Fixed Rate/Floating Rate Noncumulative Perpetual First Preferred Shares, Series C-2 (Preferred Shares, Series C-2).

RBC has closed its acquisition of City National Corporation (City National) and will issue $275 million of RBC First Preferred Shares in exchange for all outstanding shares of City National’s Preferred Stock. RBC will issue $175 million of Preferred Shares, Series C-1 and $100 million of Preferred Shares, Series C-2. These new RBC preferred shares rank pari passu with all existing preferred shares of the Bank.

… I strongly suspect that Canadian shareholders will not receive benefit of the Dividend Tax Credit and Gross-Up; i.e., that these things are preferred securities not, by my definition, preferred shares.

These things are listed on NASDAQ with the symbols RY.PRS and RY.PRT.

November 2, 2015

Tuesday, November 3rd, 2015

The West’s fear of competition is leading for calls to recruit more Secret Policemen to enforce the laws of foreign countries:

Moving money in small increments to avoid reporting requirements is called “smurfing,” after the little blue cartoon characters who as small individuals constitute a larger whole. A record $194 billion exited China in September, according to a Bloomberg gauge estimating capital flows. The Chinese use numerous tactics to transfer money abroad, and smurfing is routine, with some of the cash flowing into overheated property markets in Vancouver, Hong Kong, New York and Sydney.

Now, as Chinese citizens bypass the country’s limit of converting $50,000 a person per year by enlisting friends, relatives and even employees to send out cash on their behalf, banks and regulators around the world are being forced to decide: Is it okay to knowingly allow Chinese citizens to evade their government’s controls if it doesn’t break your own country’s laws?

In Vancouver, a Supreme Court case showed that one lender, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, had assisted such transactions. The case arose when a CIBC financial adviser allowed a wealthy Chinese client to route two deposits of $50,000 through her private accounts to buy a home, leading to the dismissal of the banker for “commingling” her own funds with her client’s.
..
Elsewhere in China, examples include a company that ordered employees to use their accounts to wire money to Canada for private property purchases, according to Christine Duhaime, a Canadian lawyer specializing in financial crime.

China’s rules are being “made a mockery of,” she said. “I wouldn’t do it if I ran the banks.”

Coming up next – banks will be put in charge of Canada’s efforts to stamp out Falun Gong. After all, if the Chinese government says something’s the right thing to do, how could it possibly be wrong? Another Bloomberg story illustrates other ways of getting money out of China, for those interested in a new career. However, it’s an an ill wind that blows nobody any good:

The Royal Bank of Canada scrapped an internal limit on mortgage-loan size for immigrants in the spring to tap into surging demand for financing on multi-million-dollar houses from newcomers to Vancouver.

Wealthy buyers, mostly from China, are fuelling a booming mortgage business in Vancouver, where the median price for a detached home in the desirable west side jumped 31 per cent to $2.87-million in the last two years.

RBC, Canada’s largest bank, removed its $1.25-million cap on loans to borrowers with no local credit history in May, said Christine Shisler, the bank’s director of multicultural markets, who works with an immigrant clientele.

“We’re seeing a lot of affluent newcomers looking to buy high purchase-price homes,” she said. “Now we can actually service any mortgage amount.”

Nevertheless, it’s clear that anti-money-laundering laws, foisted on a gullible public on the basis of Fighting Crime and Eliminating Terrorism, are actually being used as a non-tariff impediment to real-estate transactions. So what else is new?

Regulators in six provinces have announced a Finalized Offering Memorandum Exemption:

The following are some of the key investor protection measures included in the offering memorandum exemption:

  • •Non-reporting issuers will be required to, among other measures, provide investors with audited annual financial statements and an annual notice describing how the proceeds raised under the offering memorandum exemption were used.
  • •Any marketing materials will be required to be incorporated by reference in the offering memorandum so that they are subject to the same liability as the disclosure provided in the offering memorandum in the event of a misrepresentation.
  • •Individual investors relying on the offering memorandum exemption will be subject to investment limits in most cases.
  • •All investors will be required to sign a risk acknowledgement form.

The offering memorandum exemption was designed to facilitate capital-raising by allowing issuers to solicit investments from a wider range of investors than they would be able to under other prospectus exemptions, provided that certain conditions are met.

Provided all necessary ministerial approvals are obtained, the final amendments will come into force in Ontario on January 13, 2016 and in Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Québec and Saskatchewan on April 30, 2016.

The final amendments do not modify the OM exemption that exists in any CSA jurisdiction other than the participating jurisdictions.

The list of amendments to NI 45-106 notes:

The participating jurisdictions have adopted investment limits for both eligible and non-eligible investors that are individuals (other than those that qualify as accredited investors or under the family, friends and business associates exemption). These limits will not apply to non-individual investors, whether eligible or non-eligible. The final amendments permit a higher investment threshold for eligible investors when a portfolio manager, investment dealer or exempt market dealer has made a positive suitability assessment.

The investment limits will apply to all securities acquired under the OM exemption as follows:

  • • in the case of a non-eligible investor that is an individual, the acquisition cost of all securities acquired by the purchaser under the OM exemption in the preceding 12 months cannot exceed $10,000,
  • • in the case of an eligible investor that is an individual, the acquisition cost of all securities acquired by the purchaser under the OM exemption in the preceding 12 months cannot exceed $30,000, and
  • • in the case of an eligible investor that is an individual and that receives advice from a portfolio manager, investment dealer or exempt market dealer that the investment above $30,000 is suitable, the acquisition cost of all securities acquired by the purchaser under the OM exemption in the preceding 12 months cannot exceed $100,000.

I’m not sure whether there are any possible implications for Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, but you can bet I’ll be asking my lawyer! Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP comments:

The OM Exemption reflects a balancing of interests: issuers are provided with the opportunity to tap into a larger pool of investors, but must have in place the financial and human resources to prepare an offering memorandum and produce audited annual financial statements. For non-reporting issuers, the OM Exemption can best be thought of as a stepping stone to becoming a public company.

One impediment for non-reporting issuers is that the offering memorandum and marketing materials filed with the Ontario Securities Commission will be publicly filed and therefore available to all of the issuer’s employees, customers, suppliers and competitors. In addition, small, early-stage issuers may not find the OM Exemption attractive due to the costs associated with preparing an offering memorandum and audited financial statements, ongoing disclosure obligations and potentially being designated as a market participant.

Reporting issuers, particularly junior issuers, may find the OM Exemption to be a cheaper and less time-consuming alternative to a prospectus offering.

The OM Exemption does not limit or affect the availability to issuers of other prospectus exemptions, such as the accredited investor or minimum amount exemptions.

Time will tell whether the OM Exemption is adopted and accepted by the capital markets. Although using the OM Exemption could help smaller issuers tap into a larger market, it comes at a cost that may be too high for some issuers to entertain.

I’ll be most interested in reading a comparison between this regime and the SEC’s crowdfunding initiative discussed on October 30; if anybody sees such a thing, be sure to let me know!

It would seem that the Fed’s proposed rules on ‘bail-in’ capital (discussed October 30) may well have the intended effect, according to S&P:

  • •Following the release last week of the Federal Reserve’s notice of proposed rulemaking, Standard & Poor’s is reviewing the resolution regime for U.S. banks to consider its effectiveness and impact on our ratings.
  • •We expect the outcome of the review will be that extraordinary government support will no longer be factored into the ratings on the eight U.S. global systemically important banks (GSIBs) and that this will result in lower ratings on these banks’ nonoperating holding companies (NOHCs). As a result, we are placing on CreditWatch with negative implications our NOHC ratings on the U.S. GSIBs: Bank of America Corp., Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corp., The Goldman Sachs Group, and Wells Fargo & Co.
  • •But, due to the construct of the U.S. resolution regime, in which NOHC creditors could ultimately provide capital support to the operating entity, we are taking no negative actions on these banks’ operating entities, and, on certain banks taking positive rating actions, despite
    the likely removal of extraordinary government support.

  • •As part of our review of the U.S. resolution regime, we are also
    reviewing our current treatment of nondeferrable subordinated debt (NDSD) in the U.S. and considering whether it can absorb losses in advance of an entity’s nonviability or as part of a resolution without senior unsecured creditors being in default. A change in our treatment of NDSD would extend to all rated U.S. banks, and not just the GSIBs, but would have
    limited ratings impact

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerptualDiscounts off 10bp, FixedResets down 71bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 1bp. MFC FixedResets were prominent on the bad side of a lengthy Performance Highlights table. Volume was a touch on the low side.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_151102
Click for Big

TRP.PR.B, which resets 2020-6-30 at +128, is bid at 12.90 to be $0.54 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +154, is $0.52 cheap at its bid price of 13.31.

impVol_MFC_151102
Click for Big

Most expensive is MFC.PR.N, resetting at +230bp on 2020-3-19, bid at 20.07 to be 0.63 rich, while MFC.PR.I resetting at +286bp on 2017-9-19, is bid at 21.28 to be 0.42 cheap.

impVol_BAM_151102
Click for Big

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 16.26 to be $1.27 cheap. BAM.PF.G, resetting at +284bp on 2020-6-30 is bid at 21.01 and appears to be $0.70 rich.

impVol_FTS_151102
Click for Big

FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 18.70, looks $0.58 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.G, with a spread of +213bp and resetting 2018-9-1, is bid at 18.30 and is $0.31 cheap.

pairs_FR_151102
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -0.72%, with one outlier above 0.00% and one below -2.00%. The distribution is just barely bimodal, with bank NVCC non-compliant pairs averaging -0.84% and other issues averaging -0.51%. There are four junk outliers above 0.00% and one below -2.00%.

pairs_FF_151102
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 1 1.5705 % 1,762.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 1 1.5705 % 3,081.3
Floater 4.21 % 4.27 % 61,610 16.84 3 1.5705 % 1,873.5
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 1 0.0000 % 2,719.7
SplitShare 4.77 % 5.95 % 163,399 2.92 5 0.0000 % 3,187.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,486.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.84 % 5.78 % 84,579 2.73 6 -0.0665 % 2,486.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.56 % 5.69 % 81,763 14.35 33 -0.1021 % 2,567.1
FixedReset 4.97 % 4.47 % 212,285 15.43 76 -0.7121 % 2,054.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.19 % 5.60 % 110,366 5.44 34 0.0099 % 2,576.0
FloatingReset 2.58 % 3.82 % 56,415 5.81 10 -0.1028 % 2,168.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.K FixedReset -4.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 7.04 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset -4.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.94
Bid-YTW : 7.17 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -3.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 13.50
Evaluated at bid price : 13.50
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %
HSE.PR.G FixedReset -2.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 22.18
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
MFC.PR.N FixedReset -2.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.07
Bid-YTW : 6.48 %
HSE.PR.E FixedReset -2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 21.74
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset -2.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
HSE.PR.C FixedReset -2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 21.28
Evaluated at bid price : 21.56
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset -1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.15
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset -1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset -1.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.50
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
NA.PR.W FixedReset -1.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 19.02
Evaluated at bid price : 19.02
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 15.41
Evaluated at bid price : 15.41
Bid-YTW : 4.71 %
NA.PR.S FixedReset -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
TD.PF.C FixedReset -1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 19.16
Evaluated at bid price : 19.16
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset -1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.56
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 20.27
Evaluated at bid price : 20.27
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 18.90
Evaluated at bid price : 18.90
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 16.26
Evaluated at bid price : 16.26
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 19.01
Evaluated at bid price : 19.01
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
RY.PR.M FixedReset -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
BMO.PR.W FixedReset -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 18.71
Evaluated at bid price : 18.71
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 14.16
Evaluated at bid price : 14.16
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.27
Bid-YTW : 6.99 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 18.66
Evaluated at bid price : 18.66
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
IFC.PR.C FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.69
Bid-YTW : 7.56 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 22.18
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.52 %
BNS.PR.D FloatingReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.30
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 19.30
Evaluated at bid price : 19.30
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
BAM.PR.G 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.00
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
GWO.PR.R Deemed-Retractible 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 21.12
Evaluated at bid price : 21.12
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 13.31
Evaluated at bid price : 13.31
Bid-YTW : 4.61 %
BAM.PR.E 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.50
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 11.16
Evaluated at bid price : 11.16
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
TRP.PR.H FloatingReset 2.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 11.56
Evaluated at bid price : 11.56
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 3.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 11.41
Evaluated at bid price : 11.41
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 4.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.60
Bid-YTW : 9.37 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.S FixedReset 77,983 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 31,800 and 35,000, both at 19.37.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 19.36
Evaluated at bid price : 19.36
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 67,389 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 46,951 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 19.38
Evaluated at bid price : 19.38
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 36,348 TD crossed 13,500 at 11.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 11.41
Evaluated at bid price : 11.41
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
PVS.PR.E SplitShare 33,090 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
BAM.PF.H FixedReset 29,961 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 11.06 – 11.76
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.4775

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 11.06
Evaluated at bid price : 11.06
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %

BAM.PF.E FixedReset Quote: 19.51 – 20.47
Spot Rate : 0.9600
Average : 0.7715

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %

TRP.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 21.75 – 22.26
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.3505

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 4.47 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 14.13 – 14.59
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3666

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 14.13
Evaluated at bid price : 14.13
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %

CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.14 – 21.60
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3774

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 21.14
Evaluated at bid price : 21.14
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %

NA.PR.W FixedReset Quote: 19.02 – 19.34
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2378

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-11-02
Maturity Price : 19.02
Evaluated at bid price : 19.02
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %

MAPF Performance: October, 2015

Monday, November 2nd, 2015

The fund underperformed the indices in October, as several of the insurance sector low-spread FixedResets held gave up their relative out-performance over the prior two months.

When I wrote eMail To A Client towards the end of July, one had to go back to January, 2011, to find a starting point that would give you a positive return through the holding period. As of the end of September, the required starting point moved back again, to July month-end, 2010. Readers will be happy to learn that, according to the TXPR index, one now sees positive returns for the period August 2010 to October 2015.

The current 62-month total cumulative return of basically zero was only exceeded during the Credit Crunch – and even then, the figure was only negative for seven months, from October 2008 to April 2009 inclusive. The discussion in eMail To A Client still applies … but more so, now!

So why is this happening? I believe that a sudden realization that low Canada yields would be reflected in dividends of FixedResets, that started with the reset of TRP.PR.A announced in early December, 2014, turned into unreasonable fear in the spring of 2015 and escalated into blind panic. The yield of FixedResets has decoupled from the five-year Canada rate (note that this chart was prepared prior to the monster rally of the second half of October):

PL_151009_App_FR_Chart_51
Click for Big

This has led to a narrowing spread between PerpetualDiscounts and FixedResets (note that this chart was prepared prior to the monster rally of the second half of October) … :

PL_151009_App_FR_Chart_49
Click for Big
n.b.: the spread here is “interest-equivalent”

… which has put pressure on the price of PerpetualDiscounts, raising their spread to long corporate bonds to Credit Crunch proportions (note that this chart was prepared prior to the monster rally of the second half of October):

PL_151009_Body_Chart_16
Click for Big
n.b.: the spread here is “interest equivalent”

So there you have it in a nutshell! Regrettably, I am unable to predict either the timing or the degree of the correction that must happen at some point.

ZPR, is an ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues and a very high proportion of junk issues, returned -%, -% and -% over the past one-, three- and twelve-month periods, respectively (according to the fund’s data), versus returns for the TXPL index of +7.28%, -4.75% and -21.19% respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $1,043-million since inception in November 2012; AUM increased by $144.1-million in September; given an index return of +7.28% an increase of about $65-million was expected, so there was a very significant cash inflow over the month. I feel that the flows into and out of this fund are very important in determining the performance of its constituents. ZPR changed its index provider effective October 2015; I believe that this may have been at least partially motivated by a desire to de-emphasize the horrific performance of the past three years by using an index with a very recent inception date; and that this may be taken – with a grain of salt – as an indication that the BMO Brain Trust thinks FixedResets are at a bottom.

TXPR had returns over one-, three- and twelve-months of +5.74%, -3.95% and -15.45% respectively with CPD performance within expectations.

Returns for the HIMIPref™ investment grade sub-indices for the month were as follows:

HIMIPref™ Indices
Performance to August, 2015
Sub-Index 1-Month 3-month
Ratchet N/A N/A
FixFloat N/A N/A
Floater +5.68% -13.49%
OpRet N/A N/A
SplitShare -1.56% -2.05%
Interest N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium +1.01% -0.14%
PerpetualDiscount +2.72% -1.60%
FixedReset +4.89% -7.35%
DeemedRetractible +1.35% -0.22%
FloatingReset +5.04% -4.21%

It will be noted that the highest sectoral return observed, +4.89%, is less than the performance achieved by the TXPR index! This is due to October’s outperformance by junk issues, which was illustrated in the post Low-Spread FixedResets: October 2015.

Additionally, the poor October performance by the fund’s large holdings of low-spread insurance-related FixedResets has been fingered as the cause for underperformance in October. This is due to the reversion of these issues to ‘normal’ for low-spread issues not subject to OSFI regulation over a three month period, as shown in the table below:

Ticker October Performance Three-Month Performance Regressed Three-Month Performance
GWO.PR.N -1.01% -13.34% -15.85%
PWF.PR.P -1.29% -14.77% -14.15%
MFC.PR.F -0.85% -15.98% -15.23%
SLF.PR.G +0.13% -7.64% -15.23%
The ‘Regressed Three-Month Performance’ is the performance predicted by the regression line in the last chart of the post Low-Spread FixedResets: October 2015

All that being said, however, there is reason to believe these lower-spread issues are currently cheap. We can look at the Implied Volatility calculation for the MFC FixedResets, with MFC.PR.F shown at its actual bid of 14.02, and a counter-factual price of 15.17, which is where it would be if it had achieved an October return of 7.28%, equal to that of the TXPL index. This results in the following chart:

impVol_MFC_151030_adjMFCPRF
Click for Big

So, this very significant change in price looks entirely reasonable according to the pattern displayed by the other MFC FixedResets. We will just have to wait and see how it turns out!

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close October 30, 2015, was $8.0903.

Returns to October 30, 2015
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month +3.54% +5.22% +5.74% N/A
Three Months -8.57% -4.50% -3.95% N/A
One Year %-19.02 -15.34% -15.45% -15.64%
Two Years (annualized) -5.83% -5.95% -5.29% N/A
Three Years (annualized) -4.32% -3.91% -3.97% -4.31%
Four Years (annualized) -0.66% -1.47% -1.58% N/A
Five Years (annualized) -0.06% +0.07% -0.40% -0.83%
Six Years (annualized) +3.21% +2.30% +1.57%  
Seven Years (annualized) +10.62% +4.38% +3.53%  
Eight Years (annualized) +8.44% +2.15% +1.33%  
Nine Years (annualized) +7.10% +1.34%    
Ten Years (annualized) +7.02% +1.71%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +6.97% 1.91%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +7.65% +2.21%    
Thirteen Years (annualized) +8.99% +2.60%    
Fourteen Years (annualized) 8.23% +2.66%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +3.58%, -3.04% and -11.69%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is -2.18%; five year is +0.75%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Class Adv [into which was merged Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund)] (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +5.53%, -4.27% & -15.87, respectively. It will be noted that AIC Preferred Income Fund was in existence prior to August, 2009, but long term performance figures have been suppressed.
Figures for Horizons Active Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +5.15%, -3.36% & -12.88%, respectively. Three year performance is -2.59%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are +4.98%, -3.60% and -14.29% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively. Three year performance is -4.37%
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is +7.03%, -4.89% and -21.45% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively. Two year performance is -9.14%.
Figures for NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund (Dividend Tax Credit Class, the best performing) are -%, -% and -% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund are -3.74% and -14.20% for the past three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for PowerShares Canadian Preferred Share Index Class, Series Fare +4.83%, -3.32% and -15.64% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The three-year figure is -5.23%
Figures for the First Asset Preferred Share Investment Trust (PSF.UN) are +6.36%, -6.80% and -20.57% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The two-, three-, four- and five-year figures are -9.35%, -7.07%, -4.54% and -3.58%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past four years has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. Until the market became so grossly segmented, there were many comparables for any given issue – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio was, in effect ‘locked in’ to the low coupon DeemedRetractibles due to projected long-term gains from a future OSFI decision to the detriment of trading gains, particularly in May, 2013, when the three lowest-coupon SLF DeemedRetractibles (SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were the worst performing DeemedRetractibles in the sub-index, and in June, 2013, when the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles behaved like PerpetualDiscounts in a sharply negative market. Nowadays, the fund is ‘locked-in’ to the low-spread FixedResets from these companies: GWO.PR.N, MFC.PR.F, and SLF.PR.G.

In October, insurance DeemedRetractibles outperformed bank DeemedRetractibles:

bankInsPerf_151030
Click for Big

… but underperformed Unregulated Straight Perpetuals…

insStraightPerf_151030
Click for Big

Correlations were poor for bank DeemedRetractibles (4%, not shown) and insurance (-5%; not shown) but pretty good for unregulated/NVCC-compliant issues (38%).

A lingering effect of the downdraft of 2013 has been the return of measurable Implied Volatility but given my recent updates in recent daily market reports, I will not discuss them further in this post.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles; something that dismays me, particularly given that the market does not yet agree with me regarding the insurance issues! There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

What has happened over the past year has been – obviously, now! – a very significant re-pricing of the FixedReset market. My analytical software, HIMIPref™ assumes that the market is always right when it comes to pricing asset classes; it seeks to pick off the individual issues that stray too far from the normal price. Two years ago, FixedResets were yielding so little that the system didn’t see much value even in buying the mispriced ones – the weighting of FixedResets in the September, 2013, MAPF Portfolio Composition was only 8%. However, as the market drifted lower, the cheap outliers gradually became more and more attractive, and the weighting increased from 23.4% in the September, 2014, MAPF Portfolio Composition to its current figure of 70.2% in the September, 2015, MAPF Portfolio Composition. So … too early! But who would have thought that the market would be astonished in December, 2014, that the GOC-5 yields that have been so low for years could possibly have had an effect on dividends? Regrettably, when the entire market is blind, so are quantitative systems. Still, while relative performance has been poor lately, it hasn’t been disastrous … although some clients might feel that absolute performance has been quite disastrous enough, thank you very much.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is very often irrational and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
June 10.5877 5.09% 0.998 5.100% 1.0000 $0.5395
September 10.4601 5.28% 0.997 5.296% 1.0000 $0.5540
December, 2014 10.5701 4.83% 1.009 4.787% 1.0000 $0.5060
March, 2015 9.9573 4.99% 1.001 4.985% 1.0000 $0.4964
June, 2015 9.4181 5.55% 1.002 5.539% 1.0000 $0.5217
September, 2015 7.8140 6.98% 0.999 6.987% 1.0000 $0.5460
October, 2015 8.0903 6.84% 1.002 6.826% 1.0000 $0.5522
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The same reasoning is also applied to FixedResets from these issuers, other than explicitly defined NVCC from banks.

Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.
Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates. For September 30, 2015, yields of 0.78% and 0.40%, respectively, were assumed; base rates in October, 2015, were 0.80% and 0.36%, respectively.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible, SplitShare and NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on September 30; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

I no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as the fund has only a small position in these issues.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Dividend Yield” of 4.5% as of August 29, 2014, but this is the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF was 4.89% as of August 29, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s a little higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to discuss it in the context of portfolio reporting is misleading.

However, BMO has taken a significant step forward in that they are no longer reporting the “Portfolio Yield” directly on their website; the information is taken from the “Enhanced Fund Profile” which is available only as a PDF link. CPD doesn’t report this metric on the CPD fact sheet or on their website. I may have one less thing to mock the fundcos about!

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance has generally been due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

Low-Spread FixedResets: October 2015

Sunday, November 1st, 2015

As noted in MAPF Portfolio Composition: October 2015, the fund now has a large allocation to FixedResets, mostly of relatively low spread.

Many of these were largely purchased with proceeds of sales of DeemedRetractibles from the same issuer; it is interesting to look at the price trend of some of the Straight/FixedReset pairs. We’ll start with GWO.PR.N / GWO.PR.I; the fund sold the latter to buy the former at a takeout of about $1.00 in mid-June, 2014; relative prices over the past year are plotted as:

GWOPRN_GWOPRI_151030_bidDiff
Click for Big

Given that the October month-end take-out was $7.49, this is clearly a trade that has not worked out very well.

In July, 2014, I reported sales of SLF.PR.D to purchase SLF.PR.G at a take-out of about $0.15:

SLFPRG_SLFPRD_151030_bidDiff
Click for Big

There were similar trades in August, 2014 (from SLF.PR.C) at a take-out of $0.35. The October month-end take-out (bid price SLF.PR.D less bid price SLF.PR.G) was $5.65, so that hasn’t worked very well either.

November saw the third insurer-based sector swap, as the fund sold MFC.PR.C to buy the FixedReset MFC.PR.F at a post-dividend-adjusted take-out of about $0.85 … given a October month-end take-out of $6.62, that’s another regrettable trade, although another piece executed in December at a take-out of $1.57 has less badly.

SLFPRG_SLFPRD_151030_bidDiff
Click for Big

This trend is not restricted to the insurance sector, which I expect will become subject to NVCC rules in the relatively near future and are thus subject to the same redemption assumptions I make for DeemedRetractibles. Other pairs of interest are BAM.PR.X / BAM.PR.N:

BAMPRX_BAMPRN_151030_bidDiff
Click for Big

… and FTS.PR.H / FTS.PR.J:

FTSPRH_FTSPRJ_151030_bidDiff
Click for Big

… and PWF.PR.P / PWF.PR.S:

PWFPRP_PWFPRS_151030_bidDiff
Click for Big

I will agree that the fund’s trades highlighted in this post may be decried as cases of monumental bad timing, but I should point out that in May, 2014, the fund was 63.9% Straight / 9.5% FixedReset while in May 2015 the fund was 12% Straight / 86% FixedReset, FloatingReset and FixedFloater (The latter figures include allocations from those usually grouped as ‘Scraps’). Given that the indices are roughly 30% Straight / 60% FixedReset & FloatingReset, it is apparent that the fund was extremely overweighted in Straights / underweighted in FixedResets in May 2014 but this situation has now reversed. HIMIPref™ analytics have been heavily favouring low-spread issues and the fund’s holdings are overwhelmingly of this type.

Summarizing the charts above in tabular form, we see:

FixedReset Straight Take-out
December 2013
Take-out
MAPF Trade
Take-out
December 2014
September 2015 October 2015
GWO.PR.N
3.65%+130
GWO.PR.I
4.5%
($0.04) $1.00 $2.95 7.21 7.49
SLF.PR.G
4.35%+141
SLF.PR.D
4.45%
($1.29) $0.25 $2.16 5.17 5.65
MFC.PR.F
4.20%+141
MFC.PR.C
4.50%
($1.29) $0.86 $1.20 6.62 6.88
BAM.PR.X
4.60%+180
BAM.PR.N
4.75%
($2.06)   $0.17 5.51 5.18
FTS.PR.H
4.25%+145
FTS.PR.J
4.75%
$0.60   $5.68 8.20 8.04
PWF.PR.P
4.40%+160
PWF.PR.S
4.80%
($0.67)   $3.00 6.72 7.99
The ‘Take-Out’ is the bid price of the Straight less the bid price of the FixedReset; approximate execution prices are used for the “MAPF Trade” column. Bracketted figures in the ‘Take-Out’ columns indicate a ‘Pay-Up’

In January, a slow decline due to fears of deflation got worse with Canada yields plummeting after the Bank of Canada rate cut with speculation rife about future cuts although this slowly died away.

And in late March / early April it got worse again, with one commenter attributing at least some of the blame to the John Heinzl piece in which I pointed out the expected reduction in dividend payouts! In May, a rise in the markets in the first half of the month was promptly followed by a slow decline in the latter half; perhaps due to increased fears that a lousy Canadian economy will delay a Canadian tightening. Changes in June varied as the markets were in an overall decline.

In August we saw increased fear of global deflation emanating from China, although the ‘China Effect’ is disputed.

In September the market just collapsed for no apparent reason; in October the market reversed the September collapse for no apparent reason.

All in all, I take the view that we’ve seen this show before: during the Credit Crunch, Floaters got hit extremely badly (to the point at which their fifteen year total return was negative) because (as far as I can make out) their dividend rate was dropping (as it was linked to Prime) while the yields on other perpetual preferred instruments were skyrocketing (due to credit concerns). Thus, at least some investors insisted on getting long term corporate yields from rates based (indirectly and with a lag, in the case of FixedResets) on short-term government policy rates. And it’s happening again!

There is further discussion of the extremely poor performance in the seven months to July 31 of FixedResets in the post eMail to a Client. Things haven’t really changed since that was written; they’ve just gotten ever so much more so.

Here’s the October performance for FixedResets that had a YTW Scenario of ‘To Perpetuity’ at mid-month.:

FRPerf_151030_1Mo
Click for Big

The market was very disorderly in October and correlations of performance are negligible, whether against spread or term-to-reset. However, I have added the regression line for the Pfd-3 group to the above chart, not because the correlation is so great (at only 8%, it isn’t) but because it shows that to the extent that there is a correlation between spreads and returns, the slope is negative.

FRPerf_151030_1Mo_Term
Click for Big

Interestingly, though, three month performance is well correlated for the Pfd-2 group (40%), although no significant relationship is found for the Pfd-3 group:

FRPerf_151030_3Mo
Click for Big