Archive for March, 2016

BCE.PR.M: Convert or Hold?

Friday, March 11th, 2016

It will be recalled that BCE.PR.M will reset to 2.764% effective March 31.

Holders of BCE.PR.M have the option to convert to FloatingResets, which will pay 3-month bills plus 209bp on the par value of $25.00. The deadline for notifying the company of the intent to convert is 5:00 p.m. (EST) on March 16, 2016; but note that this is a company deadline and that brokers will generally set their deadlines a day or two in advance, so there’s not much time to lose if you’re planning to convert! However, if you miss the brokerage deadline they’ll probably do it on a ‘best efforts’ basis if you grovel in a sufficiently entertaining fashion. The ticker for the new FloatingReset is not yet known.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g., PWF.PR.P and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

pairs_FR_160311
Click for Big

The market appears to have a distaste at the moment for floating rate product; almost all of the implied rates until the next interconversion are lower than the current 3-month bill rate and the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are both well below zero, at -0.79% and -0.73%, respectively! Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the BCE.PR.M FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-to-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Estimate of FloatingReset (received in exchange for BCE.PR.M) Trading Price In Current Conditions
  Assumed FloatingReset
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
FixedReset Bid Price Spread 0.00% -1.00% -2.00%
BCE.PR.M 12.90 209bp 12.23 11.23 10.24

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to be cheap and trading below the price of their FixedReset counterparts. Therefore, I recommend that holders of BCE.PR.M continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that, given the apparent cheapness of the FloatingResets, it may be a good trade to swap the FixedReset for the FloatingReset in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – presumably, according to this analysis – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the future path of policy rates. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Note as well that conversion rights are dependent upon at least one million shares of each series being outstanding after giving effect to holders’ instructions; e.g., if only 100,000 shares of BCE.PR.M are tendered for conversion, then no conversions will be allowed; but if only 100,000 shares of BCE.PR.M will remain after the rest are all tendered, then conversion will be mandatory. However, this is relatively rare: all 39 Strong Pairs currently extant have some version of this condition and all but four have both series outstanding.

FN.PR.A: Convert or Hold?

Friday, March 11th, 2016

It will be recalled that FN.PR.A will reset to 2.79% effective April 1.

Holders of FN.PR.A have the option to convert to FloatingResets, which will pay 3-month bills plus 207bp on the par value of $25.00. The deadline for notifying the company of the intent to convert is 5:00 p.m. (EST) on March 16, 2016; but note that this is a company deadline and that brokers will generally set their deadlines a day or two in advance, so there’s not much time to lose if you’re planning to convert! However, if you miss the brokerage deadline they’ll probably do it on a ‘best efforts’ basis if you grovel in a sufficiently entertaining fashion. The ticker for the new FloatingReset is not yet known.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g., PWF.PR.P and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

pairs_FR_160311
Click for Big

The market appears to have a distaste at the moment for floating rate product; almost all of the implied rates until the next interconversion are lower than the current 3-month bill rate and the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are both well below zero, at -0.79% and -0.73%, respectively! Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the FN.PR.A FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-to-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Estimate of FloatingReset (received in exchange for FN.PR.A) Trading Price In Current Conditions
  Assumed FloatingReset
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
FixedReset Bid Price Spread 0.00% -1.00% -2.00%
FN.PR.A 10.17 207bp 9.49 8.56 7.62

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to be cheap and trading below the price of their FixedReset counterparts. Therefore, I recommend that holders of FN.PR.A continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that, given the apparent cheapness of the FloatingResets, it may be a good trade to swap the FixedReset for the FloatingReset in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – presumably, according to this analysis – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the future path of policy rates. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Note as well that conversion rights are dependent upon at least one million shares of each series being outstanding after giving effect to holders’ instructions; e.g., if only 100,000 shares of FN.PR.A are tendered for conversion, then no conversions will be allowed; but if only 100,000 shares of FN.PR.A will remain after the rest are all tendered, then conversion will be mandatory. However, this is relatively rare: all 39 Strong Pairs currently extant have some version of this condition and all but four have both series outstanding.

GMP.PR.B: Convert or Hold?

Friday, March 11th, 2016

It will be recalled that GMP.PR.B will reset to 3.611% effective March 31.

Holders of GMP.PR.B have the option to convert to FloatingResets, which will pay 3-month bills plus 289bp on the par value of $25.00. The deadline for notifying the company of the intent to convert is 5:00 p.m. (EST) on March 16, 2016; but note that this is a company deadline and that brokers will generally set their deadlines a day or two in advance, so there’s not much time to lose if you’re planning to convert! However, if you miss the brokerage deadline they’ll probably do it on a ‘best efforts’ basis if you grovel in a sufficiently entertaining fashion. The ticker for the new FloatingReset is not yet known.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g., PWF.PR.P and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

pairs_FR_160311
Click for Big

The market appears to have a distaste at the moment for floating rate product; almost all of the implied rates until the next interconversion are lower than the current 3-month bill rate and the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are both well below zero, at -0.79% and -0.73%, respectively! Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the GMP.PR.B FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-to-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Estimate of FloatingReset (received in exchange for GMP.PR.B) Trading Price In Current Conditions
  Assumed FloatingReset
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
FixedReset Bid Price Spread 0.00% -1.00% -2.00%
GMP.PR.B 9.32 289bp 8.71 7.86 7.01

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to be cheap and trading below the price of their FixedReset counterparts. Therefore, I recommend that holders of GMP.PR.B continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that, given the apparent cheapness of the FloatingResets, it may be a good trade to swap the FixedReset for the FloatingReset in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – presumably, according to this analysis – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the future path of policy rates. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Note as well that conversion rights are dependent upon at least one million shares of each series being outstanding after giving effect to holders’ instructions; e.g., if only 100,000 shares of GMP.PR.B are tendered for conversion, then no conversions will be allowed; but if only 100,000 shares of GMP.PR.B will remain after the rest are all tendered, then conversion will be mandatory. However, this is relatively rare: all 39 Strong Pairs currently extant have some version of this condition and all but four have both series outstanding.

HSE.PR.A: Convert or Hold?

Friday, March 11th, 2016

It will be recalled that HSE.PR.A will reset to 2.404% effective March 31.

Holders of HSE.PR.A have the option to convert to FloatingResets, which will pay 3-month bills plus 173bp on the par value of $25.00. The deadline for notifying the company of the intent to convert is 5:00 p.m. (EST) on March 16, 2016; but note that this is a company deadline and that brokers will generally set their deadlines a day or two in advance, so there’s not much time to lose if you’re planning to convert! However, if you miss the brokerage deadline they’ll probably do it on a ‘best efforts’ basis if you grovel in a sufficiently entertaining fashion. The ticker for the new FloatingReset is not yet known.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g., PWF.PR.P and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

pairs_FR_160311
Click for Big

The market appears to have a distaste at the moment for floating rate product; almost all of the implied rates until the next interconversion are lower than the current 3-month bill rate and the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are both well below zero, at -0.79% and -0.73%, respectively! Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the HSE.PR.A FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-to-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Estimate of FloatingReset (received in exchange for HSE.PR.A) Trading Price In Current Conditions
  Assumed FloatingReset
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
FixedReset Bid Price Spread 0.00% -1.00% -2.00%
HSE.PR.A 9.23 160bp 8.59 7.64 6.69

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to be cheap and trading below the price of their FixedReset counterparts. Therefore, I recommend that holders of HSE.PR.A continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that, given the apparent cheapness of the FloatingResets, it may be a good trade to swap the FixedReset for the FloatingReset in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – presumably, according to this analysis – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the future path of policy rates. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Note as well that conversion rights are dependent upon at least one million shares of each series being outstanding after giving effect to holders’ instructions; e.g., if only 100,000 shares of HSE.PR.A are tendered for conversion, then no conversions will be allowed; but if only 100,000 shares of HSE.PR.A will remain after the rest are all tendered, then conversion will be mandatory. However, this is relatively rare: all 39 Strong Pairs currently extant have some version of this condition and all but four have both series outstanding.

L.PR.B Trend Positive, Says DBRS

Friday, March 11th, 2016

DBRS has announced that it:

has today confirmed the Issuer Rating, Medium-Term Notes and Debentures ratings of Loblaw Companies Limited (Loblaw or the Company) and the Senior Unsecured Debt rating of Shoppers Drug Mart Corporation (Shoppers) at BBB as well as Loblaw’s Short-Term Issuer Rating at R-2 (middle) and its Second Preferred Shares rating at Pfd-3. DBRS has changed the trends to Positive from Stable.

The trend change reflects the Company’s deleveraging efforts and successful integration subsequent to the acquisition of Shoppers as well as its solid operating performance in both food retail and pharmacy through the end of F2015. The ratings continue to be supported by Loblaw’s business profile which is considered very strong for the current BBB rating, featuring industry-leading size, scale and market positions in retail and pharmacy across Canada. The ratings also incorporate the intense competition in food retail in Canada and the risks associated with drug pricing and pharmacy reforms.

Loblaw’s financial profile should continue to improve over the medium term, benefiting from growth in earnings and cash flows as balance-sheet debt should remain relatively stable. Cash flow from operations should continue to track operating income while capital expenditures (capex) attributable to the retail operations is expected to decline moderately to approximately $1.0 billion. Retail capex will focus on improving existing stores as well as new food and drug store openings as larger supply chain and IT initiatives have been completed. DBRS believes that dividends on a per-share basis will continue to grow at a steady pace, but the cash outlay for dividends should remain near the $400 million level (as share repurchases are completed). As such, DBRS believes that free cash flow before changes in working capital should increase toward the $900 million to $1.0 billion range. Free cash flow is expected to be used to complete share repurchases. As a result, DBRS believes that balance-sheet debt should remain relatively stable and credit metrics should continue to improve as earnings grow.

If DBRS becomes confident in the next six to 12 months that Loblaw’s operating performance will remain sound and balance-sheet debt will remain fairly stable resulting in continued improvement in credit metrics, a ratings upgrade to the BBB (high) level would likely result.

L.PR.B is a 5.30% Straight Perpetual that commenced trading 2016-3-11 after being announced 2015-6-2. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

SJR.PR.A Downgraded To Pfd-3(low) By DBRS

Friday, March 11th, 2016

DBRS has announced that it:

has today downgraded Shaw Communications Inc.’s (Shaw or the Company) Issuer Rating and Senior Notes rating to BBB (low) from BBB and its Preferred Shares rating to Pfd-3 (low) from Pfd-3. The trends are Stable. This action follows the closing of the Company’s acquisition of WIND Mobile Corp. (WIND) and the announcement to sell its broadcasting subsidiary, Shaw Media Inc. (Shaw Media) to Corus Entertainment Inc. (Corus). The rating action is caused by a gradual erosion in the core cable business owing to persistent subscriber weakness and the expectation that the recent transactions will result in a material weakening of Shaw’s free cash flow profile over the near to medium term.

DBRS notes that Shaw’s earnings profile has been under pressure for some time, owing to continued technological substitution of phone and cable services, increased competition from TELUS Corporation’s (TELUS) Internet protocol television (IPTV) offering and, more recently, economic softness in Alberta, regulatory-driven headwinds. Subscriber erosion accelerated in F2015, with a 3.2% decline recorded in total revenue generating units following a 0.8% decline in F2014. As such, Shaw has had to rely more heavily on price increases to drive earnings growth within its wireline business amid an increasingly competitive telecommunications market. Organic growth was weak in F2015, with much of the revenue and EBITDA increases (4.7% and 5.2%, respectively) attributable to the full-year inclusion of ViaWest. DBRS believes that, independent of the recent transactions, because of mounting pressures on subscribers and expectations of less predictable and potentially more strained organic earnings going forward, Shaw is more appropriately placed in the BBB (low) rating category.

In terms of financial profile, DBRS expects leverage to be reasonable for the revised rating category. As proceeds from the sale of the media assets will be used to pay for the WIND transaction, Shaw will not be required to raise additional debt financing. Pro forma total debt is expected rise to $5.9 billion by year-end F2016 from $5.7 billion in F2015, but this is because of a recent debt-financed tuck-in acquisition by ViaWest. EBITDA, however, is expected to decline with the divestiture of Shaw Media’s operating income and the modest contribution of WIND. As such, pro forma gross debt to EBITDA is expected to peak at roughly 2.8 times (x) by year-end F2017 from 2.4x in the last 12 months Q1 F2016. DBRS notes that the Company has reiterated its long-term target of net debt-to-EBITDA of between 2.0x and 2.5x.

This follows the December, 2015, expressions of nervousness regarding Shaw and the assessment of a negative outlook by S&P in January 2016.

New Issue: CWB FixedReset, 6.25%+547, NVCC

Friday, March 11th, 2016

Canadian Western Bank has announced (but not yet on their website):

its intent to issue $100 million non-cumulative 5-year rate reset First Preferred Shares Series 7 (Non-Viability Contingent Capital (NVCC)) (the “Series 7 Preferred Shares”). The offering will be underwritten on a bought deal basis by a syndicate led by National Bank Financial Inc. The expected closing date is on or about March 31, 2016.

Under the terms of the offering, CWB will issue 4,000,000 Series 7 Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per share. CWB has also granted the underwriters an over-allotment option, solely to cover over-allotments, if any, exercisable for a period of 30 days following the closing date of the offering, to purchase up to an additional 600,000 Series 7 Preferred Shares on the same terms. Should the underwriters choose to exercise this option in full, the maximum gross proceeds raised under the offering will be $115 million.

Holders of the Series 7 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive a non-cumulative fixed dividend in the amount of $1.5625 annually, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of CWB, for the initial period ending July 31, 2021. The quarterly dividend represents an annual yield of 6.25% based on the stated issue price per share. Thereafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years at a level of 547 basis points over the then 5-year Government of Canada bond yield. The first of such dividends, if declared, will be payable on July 31, 2016 and will be $0.5223 per Series 7 Preferred Share, based on the anticipated closing date of the offering of March 31, 2016. CWB maintains the right to redeem, subject to the approval of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (“OSFI”), up to all of the then outstanding Series 7 Preferred Shares on July 31, 2021, and on July 31 every five years thereafter at a price of $25.00 per share.

Should CWB choose not to exercise its right to redeem the Series 7 Preferred Shares, holders of these shares will have the right to convert their shares into an equal number of non-cumulative floating rate First Preferred Shares Series 8 (Non-Viability Contingent Capital (NVCC)) (the “Series 8 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on July 31, 2021, and on July 31 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series 8 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of CWB, equal to the 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill rate plus 547 basis points.

Net proceeds from the offering will be added to CWB’s capital base and used for general corporate purposes and are expected to qualify as Tier 1 capital for CWB. The offering will be completed by way of short form prospectus to be filed in all provinces and territories of Canada.

This issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and assigned to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

This issue looks like it’s priced with a small concession. The bank’s extant FixedReset, CWB.PR.B, 4.40%+276 is currently bid at 16.35 to yield 5.66% to perpetuity, compared to 6.13% to perpetuity for the new issue (assuming a thirty year end-price of 23.14). Thus, the 271bp difference in Issue Reset Spread gives rise to a 47bp difference in yield, slightly above the norm.

March 10, 2016

Friday, March 11th, 2016

Europe continues to ease monetary policy:

In the face of a global debate on whether monetary policy has lost its effectiveness and is even planting the seeds of the next crisis, the ECB has delivered a solid defense of the right and power of central banks to boost growth and inflation at will. The best that can be said for euro-area fiscal policy is that it’s not hampering the recovery, so Draghi has underlined that he won’t wait for others to act.

The president announced cuts to all three of the ECB’s rates, bringing the deposit rate to minus 0.4 percent, and a 20 billion-euro ($22 billion) expansion of quantitative easing that for the first time opens the door to purchases of corporate bonds. On top of that, he announced a new four-year loan program that potentially allows banks to be remunerated for taking the ECB’s money if they expand credit to the real economy, in a quartet of operations stretching to 2021.

Draghi’s policy arc has been in defiance of warnings by monetary conservatives, including those in Germany’s Bundesbank since the beginning of his term, up to more recent calls by the Group of 20 nations to shift the burden of growth generation away from monetary policy and toward structural policies or more government investment.

Instead, Draghi sounded resigned when asked about euro-area fiscal policy. That domain spans countries including Spain, France and Italy that are close to their legal deficit limits, and nations that can afford to spend more — read Germany — that have promised voters they won’t do so.

Certainly the OSC is working hard to spark inflation:

The Ontario Securities Commission says its revenues will rise almost 14 per cent in its current fiscal year, leaving the regulator with a surplus of $6.6-million for the year.

The commission published details of its financial outlook Thursday for the fiscal year ending March 31, saying revenue has climbed due to fee changes introduced last year. Those fee adjustments, as well as fee increases introduced in 2013, have returned the commission to strong profitability after it recorded deficits from 2009 to 2013.

The OSC said it expects to take in revenue of $115.8-million in fiscal 2016, a 14-per-cent increase from $101.6-million in fiscal 2015. Expenses are expected to climb sharply to $109-million in the current year from $96.9-million in fiscal 2015, leaving the OSC with an anticipated surplus of $6.6-million this year, up from $4.7-million last year.

Market participants – including listed companies, investment firms and other registrants – pay participation and activity fees to the OSC, which account for more than 99 per cent of its revenue. The OSC adjusted its fee structure last year to base its participation fees on a firm’s most recent annual financial results so they closely track current market conditions.

Perhaps they now have enough to cut another cheque to their good buddies at FAIR Canada!

Canada is now a net creditor of the US – but I would really like to see some currency-adjusted figures!:

Canada is now a creditor to the U.S. for the first time on record, government data show, reflecting the northern nation’s love affair with assets south of the border.

The stock of U.S. assets held by Canadians in the fourth quarter of 2015 — everything from corporate acquisitions to portfolio investments — exceeded assets held by Americans in Canada for the first time since at least 1990, according to quarterly data published Thursday by Statistics Canada.

Easy credit, strong balance sheets, and lack of investing opportunities at home have been the main factors driving Canadian money managers and companies on a shopping spree south of the border. The value of those investments has jumped over the last couple of years as the U.S. dollar has strengthened. U.S. investors, meanwhile, haven’t been reciprocating.

Canada’s total net asset position with all countries rose to C$472 billion in the fourth quarter. That’s good news from a creditworthiness point of view. The more indebted a country is to foreigners the more vulnerable it is to financial shocks and Canada’s creditor status helps in times like this when financial markets are volatile, commodity prices are falling and the country is running large current account deficits.

The US is moving to get some more work out of its foreign graduates:

The federal government will publish the rule on Friday, saying that international students earning degrees in science, technology, engineering and mathematics fields in the United States will now be eligible to stay for three years of on-the-job training. This is seven months longer than under the 2008 rule it replaces for the STEM Optional Practical Training program, known as OPT. The new rule will take effect on May 10.

This rule is yet another flash point in the controversy over immigration reform. Industry leaders who say they are desperate for skilled talent and those defending the rights of American workers see the training program’s extension as an end-around to stalled reform. But that is all they agree upon.

“It’s an ongoing assault on American workers,” said John Miano, a lawyer for a technology workers’ union in Washington State, whose lawsuit last summer was what forced the government to vacate the previous rule and create a new one, this time for public comment.

There is speculation that TransCanada is contemplating a large acquisition:

TransCanada Corp. would snap up a big chunk of the natural gas business that’s given it the most troublesome competition if it completes a speculated U.S. takeover worth more than $9-billion (U.S.).

TransCanada said on Thursday that it was in talks with a third party, but did not name it or provide any guarantees that it would clinch a deal.

The company is in talks with Houston-based Columbia Pipeline Group Inc., according to the Wall Street Journal, which cited anonymous sources. Columbia is best known for its extensive pipeline network in the Marcellus and Utica natural gas regions in the U.S. Northeast.

Merrill Lynch has come up with some interesting figures on Canadian housing turnover:

Here are three key numbers to keep in mind when you’re talking about Canada’s housing markets: 24, 17 and 10.

Those, according to research from Bank of America Merrill Lynch, highlight the frothy nature of real estate in British Columbia and Ontario, compared with the rest of the country.

They’re the number of existing home sales per 1,000 people.

In B.C., home to Canada’s hottest market, the ratio is 24 per 1,000 in Vancouver. In Ontario, where Toronto is also a hotbed, it’s 17. And in the rest of Canada, it’s just 10, according to the bank’s North America economist, Emanuella Enenajor.

“Although Canada’s housing market may not be in a bubble, the B.C. (British Columbia) market likely is,” Ms. Enenajor said in her report.

It was an off day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts and DeemedRetractibles both off 21bp and FixedResets down 39bp. The Performance Highlights table continues to show a lot of churn. Volume was well below average.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_160310
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 17.25 to be $1.27 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2021-1-30 at +296, is $0.84 cheap at its bid price of 11.06.

impVol_MFC_160310
Click for Big

Most expensive is MFC.PR.N, resetting at +230bp on 2020-3-19, bid at 17.50 to be 1.01 rich, while MFC.PR.G, resetting at +290bp on 2016-12-19, is bid at 17.78 to be 1.11 cheap.

impVol_BAM_160310
Click for Big

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 13.94 to be $1.11 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255 on 2020-3-31 is bid at 17.35 and appears to be $1.06 rich.

impVol_FTS_160310
Click for Big

FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 15.12 looks $0.52 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp and resetting 2020-6-1, is bid at 11.09 and is $0.39 cheap.

pairs_FR_160310
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -0.73%, with three outliers below -1.50% and one above +0.50%. Note that the range of the y-axis has changed today. There are two junk outliers below -1.50%.

pairs_FF_160310
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.11 % 6.21 % 12,271 16.42 1 0.0000 % 1,534.4
FixedFloater 7.19 % 6.31 % 24,098 15.96 1 0.1515 % 2,766.6
Floater 4.55 % 4.77 % 71,868 15.82 4 -0.7646 % 1,684.8
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1939 % 2,756.1
SplitShare 4.82 % 5.48 % 70,996 2.64 7 0.1939 % 3,225.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1939 % 2,516.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.81 % -0.61 % 74,756 0.08 6 0.0794 % 2,541.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.72 % 5.77 % 96,300 14.18 33 -0.2096 % 2,528.0
FixedReset 5.57 % 5.19 % 201,732 14.28 86 -0.3913 % 1,827.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.33 % 5.66 % 114,768 5.12 34 -0.2115 % 2,553.0
FloatingReset 3.09 % 5.08 % 40,146 5.45 16 0.1835 % 1,984.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PF.B FixedReset -5.59 % Nonsensical, as the issue traded 4,725 shares in a range of 16.75-00 before closing at 16.05-17.19, 8×1. VWAP was 16.89. I have not checked whether this lamentable state of affairs is due to inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange reporting or inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange supervision of market-makers.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 16.05
Evaluated at bid price : 16.05
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
TD.PF.C FixedReset -4.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 16.23
Evaluated at bid price : 16.23
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset -4.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 16.12
Evaluated at bid price : 16.12
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset -3.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.95
Bid-YTW : 8.80 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -3.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 12.70
Evaluated at bid price : 12.70
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -2.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 11.06
Evaluated at bid price : 11.06
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -2.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 11.09
Evaluated at bid price : 11.09
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset -2.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 11.52
Evaluated at bid price : 11.52
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -2.77 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 9.14
Evaluated at bid price : 9.14
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
PWF.PR.T FixedReset -2.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 19.10
Evaluated at bid price : 19.10
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
TRP.PR.H FloatingReset -2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 9.03
Evaluated at bid price : 9.03
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset -2.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.28
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset -2.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 16.60
Evaluated at bid price : 16.60
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset -2.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.90
Bid-YTW : 8.23 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset -1.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 15.12
Evaluated at bid price : 15.12
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 14.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.00
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
TRP.PR.G FixedReset -1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 18.24
Evaluated at bid price : 18.24
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.79
Bid-YTW : 7.40 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 17.11
Evaluated at bid price : 17.11
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %
TD.PR.Z FloatingReset -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 13.94
Evaluated at bid price : 13.94
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 11.50
Evaluated at bid price : 11.50
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 10.06
Evaluated at bid price : 10.06
Bid-YTW : 4.77 %
HSE.PR.C FixedReset -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 15.51
Evaluated at bid price : 15.51
Bid-YTW : 6.61 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.05
Bid-YTW : 8.74 %
BAM.PF.E FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 17.35
Evaluated at bid price : 17.35
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 17.52
Evaluated at bid price : 17.52
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 12.00
Evaluated at bid price : 12.00
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 13.22
Bid-YTW : 10.35 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.78
Bid-YTW : 8.37 %
BNS.PR.B FloatingReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.87
Bid-YTW : 5.43 %
BMO.PR.R FloatingReset 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.87
Bid-YTW : 4.50 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 7.37 %
BNS.PR.A FloatingReset 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.37
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 2.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 10.75
Evaluated at bid price : 10.75
Bid-YTW : 4.85 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 2.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.05
Bid-YTW : 9.24 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 2.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 12.55
Bid-YTW : 11.11 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 2.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 7.63 %
TD.PF.D FixedReset 7.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 18.54
Evaluated at bid price : 18.54
Bid-YTW : 4.81 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.G FixedReset 126,731 RBC sold 19,100 to anonymous at 25.50. Scotai crossed 50,500 at the same price. TD crossed 25,000 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 113,582 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 106,150 Scotia crossed 99,400 at 17.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 16.60
Evaluated at bid price : 16.60
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset 83,179 Scotia crossed 74,800 at 17.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.95
Bid-YTW : 8.80 %
RY.PR.Q FixedReset 68,036 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 66,637 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 16.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 16.12
Evaluated at bid price : 16.12
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.O FloatingReset Quote: 11.21 – 12.94
Spot Rate : 1.7300
Average : 1.2767

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 11.21
Bid-YTW : 11.99 %

BAM.PF.B FixedReset Quote: 16.05 – 17.19
Spot Rate : 1.1400
Average : 0.7419

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 16.05
Evaluated at bid price : 16.05
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %

TD.PF.C FixedReset Quote: 16.23 – 17.14
Spot Rate : 0.9100
Average : 0.5976

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 16.23
Evaluated at bid price : 16.23
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %

CM.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 18.57 – 19.30
Spot Rate : 0.7300
Average : 0.4861

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-10
Maturity Price : 18.57
Evaluated at bid price : 18.57
Bid-YTW : 4.81 %

MFC.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 16.95 – 17.59
Spot Rate : 0.6400
Average : 0.3982

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.95
Bid-YTW : 8.80 %

BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 18.79 – 19.33
Spot Rate : 0.5400
Average : 0.3473

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.79
Bid-YTW : 7.40 %

TA: Trend Changed To Negative By DBRS

Friday, March 11th, 2016

DBRS has announced that it:

has today changed the trends of all long-term debt ratings of Capital Power Corporation, Capital Power L.P. and TransAlta Corporation (collectively, the IPPs) to Negative from Stable. DBRS has also changed the trend of TransAlta Corporation’s preferred share rating to Negative from Stable. The rating actions reflect DBRS’s concern that the continued challenging wholesale power market environment and heightened political risk in Alberta may lead the IPPs’ credit risk profile to deteriorate to a level that is no longer consistent with their respective rating categories. The rating actions at this time are limited to trend changes with no immediate rating downgrades, as the negative factors that could lead to downward rating pressure are over the medium to long term. DBRS does not anticipate any material weakness in the IPPs’ financial profile in 2016 from 2015, largely because of strong hedging support and manageable capital spending, despite lower power prices in Alberta.

DBRS believes the continued weak operating environment and the effect of Alberta Climate Leadership Plan (ACLP) combined will gradually weaken several primary business risk profile factors for the IPPs, including (a) hedging profile, particularly post-2020, as all long-term Alberta power purchase arrangements (PPAs) expire by 2020; (b) market position; and (c) market structure and environment. A weakening business risk profile will likely result in a one-notch downgrade to BBB (low) from BBB for the IPPs. A multi-notch downgrade below investment grade is unlikely in the foreseeable future, unless the implementation of the ACLP would materially affect the IPPs’ financial flexibility and profitability.

While TransAlta is less affected by the Alberta climate change strategy than Capital Power, the phase-out of all coal plants by 2030 and rising carbon compliance costs also have potential negative rating implications for TransAlta. Furthermore, TransAlta’s key credit metrics have remained relatively constrained for the current rating, which provides TransAlta with very limited financial flexibility. DBRS acknowledges that TransAlta has responded to the weak power pricing environment by cutting dividends and implementing cost-saving measures.

There are four issues affected by this trend change: TA.PR.D, TA.PR.F, TA.PR.H and TA.PR.J. The first of these, TA.PR.D, will reset at 2.709% on March 31.

I don’t often publish Implied Volatility Analysis for this series – so here it is:

impVol_TA_160310
Click for Big

March 9, 2016

Thursday, March 10th, 2016

Today’s big news was the BoC announcement:

The Bank of Canada today announced that it is maintaining its target for the overnight rate at 1/2 per cent. The Bank Rate is correspondingly 3/4 per cent and the deposit rate is 1/4 per cent.

The global economy is progressing largely as the Bank anticipated in its January Monetary Policy Report (MPR). Financial market volatility, reflecting heightened concerns about economic momentum, appears to be abating. Although downside risks remain, the Bank still expects global growth to strengthen this year and next. Recent data indicate that the U.S. expansion remains broadly on track. At the same time, the low level of oil prices will continue to dampen growth in Canada and other energy-producing countries.

Prices of oil and other commodities have rebounded in recent weeks. In this context, and in light of shifting expectations for monetary policy in Canada and the United States, the Canadian dollar has appreciated from its recent lows. With these movements, both the price of oil and the exchange rate have averaged close to levels assumed in the January MPR.

Canada’s GDP growth in the fourth quarter was not as weak as expected, but the near-term outlook for the economy remains broadly the same as in January. National employment has held up despite job losses in resource-intensive regions, and household spending continues to underpin domestic demand. Non-energy exports are gathering momentum, particularly in sectors that are sensitive to exchange rate movements. However, overall business investment remains very weak due to retrenchment in the resource sector.

Inflation in Canada is evolving broadly as anticipated. The factors that pushed total CPI inflation up to 2 per cent will likely unwind in the months ahead. Measures of core inflation are at or just below 2 per cent, boosted by the temporary effects of past exchange rate depreciation. Material excess capacity in the Canadian economy will continue to dampen inflation.

An assessment of the impact of the upcoming federal budget’s fiscal measures will be incorporated into the Bank’s April projection. All things considered, the risks to the profile for inflation are roughly balanced. Meanwhile, financial vulnerabilities continue to edge higher, in part due to regional shifts in activity associated with the structural adjustment underway in Canada’s economy. The Bank’s Governing Council judges that the overall balance of risks remains within the zone for which the current stance of monetary policy is appropriate, and the target for the overnight rate remains at 1/2 per cent.

Meanwhile, there is a larger than usual international influence on Fed policy:

Investors are betting that the Fed will hold interest rates steady at its March 15-16 meeting as it assess the impact of a shaky global economy and jittery financial markets. A rise in the dollar triggered by easier policy from the ECB and perhaps the BOJ would support a go-slow strategy to raising rates in the U.S.

Asked how the U.S. central bank would respond if the ECB pushed rates further into negative territory, Fed Governor Lael Brainard told CNBC television on March 7 that she was focused on developments in the U.S. She quickly added though that the economy was being buffeted by “powerful cross currents” from abroad and that a further rise in the dollar would hit manufacturing-industry exports.

Fed Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer alluded to the central bank’s dollar dilemma when he spoke to the American Economic Association’s annual meeting in San Francisco on Jan. 3.

While policy makers in general recognize the benefits of floating currency rates in redistributing demand throughout the world economy, “they’re not so happy” when they’re the ones “giving up some growth, for instance, by having their exchange rate appreciate,” he said.

And New Zealand has cut its policy rate:

New Zealand’s central bank unexpectedly cut interest rates to a fresh record low and signaled further easing may be needed, saying it’s concerned by a slump in inflation expectations. The kiwi plunged by more than one U.S. cent.

Reserve Bank Governor Graeme Wheeler lowered the official cash rate by a quarter point to 2.25 percent, a move predicted by just two of 17 economists surveyed by Bloomberg. The remainder tipped no change. “Further policy easing may be required to ensure that future average inflation settles near the middle of the target range,” Wheeler said Thursday in Wellington.

Wheeler has resumed easing monetary policy as a stubbornly firm New Zealand dollar, weaker commodity prices and falling price expectations keep inflation beneath his 1-3 percent target. The central bank’s forecasts suggest one further reduction in borrowing costs this year to underpin economic growth and return inflation to its 2 percent target midpoint by early 2018.

The New Zealand dollar plunged after the statement, buying 66.58 U.S. cents at 9:38 a.m. in Wellington from 67.80 before the decision. The currency has climbed since late January, muting price pressures, and “a decline would be appropriate given the weakness in export prices,” Wheeler said today.

CalPers, the $284.56-billion dollar pension fund that doesn’t do its own credit analysis, has managed to shake down Moody’s:

Moody’s Investors Service Inc. agreed to pay $130 million to settle claims by the California Public Employee Retirement System over allegedly inflated ratings on residential-mortgage bond deals.

The largest U.S. state pension fund’s accord with Moody’s follows the February 2015 announcement that McGraw Hill Financial Inc.’s Standard & Poor’s would pay $125 million to settle claims by Calpers over grades on subprime mortgages during the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis.

McGraw Hill’s pact with Calpers was part of a $1.5 billion settlement to resolve similar allegations from the U.S. Justice Department and more than a dozen states.

Calpers sued the companies along with Fitch Ratings Ltd. in 2009 alleging it sustained losses of as much as $1 billion from “wildly inaccurate” risk assessments. Calpers said it put $1.3 billion into three investment vehicles backed by subprime mortgages in 2006 and 2007. The investments crumbled amid the housing crisis. The pension fund claimed the ratings companies helped fuel the investments and bent rules to give them the highest ratings to boost their profits from issuers, Calpers alleged.

They’d be better off checking their assumptions:

The economic assumptions include an assumed inflation assumption of 2.75 percent compounded annually. The inflation assumption is a component of assumed investment return, assumed wage growth, and assumed future post-retirement cost-of-living increases.

Based upon the asset allocation of the Public Employees’ Retirement Fund (PERF), the assumed investment return (net of administrative and investment expenses) is 7.5 percent per year, compounded annually.

On a positive note, the settlement will provide funds for senior management to give to their buddies, similarly to the scam discussed on April 23, 2012.

The Saudis are looking for a bank loan:

Saudi Arabia is seeking a bank loan of between $6-billion (U.S.) and $8-billion, sources familiar with the matter told Reuters, in what would be the first significant foreign borrowing by the kingdom’s government for over a decade.

Riyadh has asked lenders to submit proposals to extend it a five-year U.S. dollar loan of that size, with an option to increase it, the sources said, to help plug a record budget deficit caused by low oil prices.

The kingdom’s budget deficit reached nearly $100-billion last year. The government is currently bridging the gap by drawing down its massive store of foreign assets and issuing domestic bonds. But the assets will only last a few more years at their current rate of decline, while the bond issues have started to strain liquidity in the banking system.

Comic book fans and supporters of civil forfeiture will be pleased to learn that the Junior Justice League has another member:

The NHL ruled that an off-season rape allegation made against Patrick Kane was unfounded in determining that the Chicago Blackhawks star forward will not face any league disciplinary action.

The decision was issued on Wednesday, when the league issued a one-paragraph statement announcing it had completed its independent review of the allegations against Kane. The final step of the investigation occurred on Monday, when Kane met with NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman in New York.

Barry Critchley has enthusiastically endorsed the quixotic bid to get RON.PR.A taken out at par. I have updated the PrefBlog report on this week’s development.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 2bp, FixedResets up 37bp and DeemedRetractibles off 26bp. The Performance Highlights table is lengthy, with numerous TRP and HSE issues at the top of the list. Volume was below average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.76%, equivalent to 7.49% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.25%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 325bp, equal to the spread reported on March 2.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_160309
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TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 17.30 to be $0.99 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2021-1-30 at +296, is $0.69 cheap at its bid price of 11.40.

impVol_MFC_160309
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Most expensive is MFC.PR.N, resetting at +230bp on 2020-3-19, bid at 17.50 to be 1.08 rich, while MFC.PR.G, resetting at +290bp on 2016-12-19, is bid at 17.55 to be 1.32 cheap.

impVol_BAM_160309
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The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 13.77 to be $1.29 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255 on 2020-3-31 is bid at 17.55 and appears to be $1.15 rich.

impVol_FTS_160309
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FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 15.40 looks $0.53 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.G, with a spread of +213bp and resetting 2018-9-1, is bid at 15.05 and is $0.24 cheap.

pairs_FR_160309
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Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -0.95%, with one outlier below -2.00%. There is one junk outlier above 0.00%.

pairs_FF_160309
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Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.11 % 6.21 % 12,116 16.42 1 0.0000 % 1,534.4
FixedFloater 7.20 % 6.32 % 24,080 15.95 1 0.9946 % 2,762.4
Floater 4.52 % 4.71 % 73,033 15.94 4 0.8191 % 1,697.8
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0730 % 2,750.8
SplitShare 4.83 % 5.82 % 71,615 2.64 7 0.0730 % 3,219.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0730 % 2,511.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.81 % -0.80 % 77,419 0.08 6 0.1259 % 2,539.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.71 % 5.76 % 98,605 14.20 33 0.0219 % 2,533.3
FixedReset 5.54 % 5.19 % 205,975 14.53 86 0.3709 % 1,834.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.32 % 5.54 % 115,745 5.12 34 -0.2631 % 2,558.4
FloatingReset 3.09 % 4.98 % 40,623 5.45 16 0.5651 % 1,981.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TD.PF.D FixedReset -8.12 % Completely nonsensical, as the issue traded 6,646 shares today in a range of 18.50-17 before closing at 17.32-19.30. VWAP was 18.87. Way to go with the $1.98 spreads there, guys! I have not checked whether this lamentable state of affairs is due to inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange reporting or inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange supervision of market-makers.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.32
Evaluated at bid price : 17.32
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset -3.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.30
Evaluated at bid price : 17.30
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -2.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 10.52
Evaluated at bid price : 10.52
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 10.31
Evaluated at bid price : 10.31
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %
BAM.PF.F FixedReset -1.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 18.36
Evaluated at bid price : 18.36
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset -1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 16.80
Evaluated at bid price : 16.80
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %
BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible -1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.04
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.55
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 12.26
Bid-YTW : 11.43 %
BAM.PF.E FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.55
Evaluated at bid price : 17.55
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 7.35 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 16.84
Evaluated at bid price : 16.84
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.68
Bid-YTW : 9.57 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.38
Evaluated at bid price : 17.38
Bid-YTW : 4.50 %
SLF.PR.I FixedReset 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.30
Bid-YTW : 8.52 %
RY.PR.M FixedReset 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.91
Evaluated at bid price : 17.91
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
IFC.PR.C FixedReset 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.40
Bid-YTW : 9.37 %
GWO.PR.O FloatingReset 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 11.20
Bid-YTW : 12.00 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.02
Evaluated at bid price : 17.02
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 16.98
Evaluated at bid price : 16.98
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 8.57 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 13.07
Bid-YTW : 10.50 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.09
Bid-YTW : 7.10 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.28
Bid-YTW : 7.83 %
CM.PR.P FixedReset 1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 16.86
Evaluated at bid price : 16.86
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.25
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 13.16
Evaluated at bid price : 13.16
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.70
Evaluated at bid price : 17.70
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 11.85
Evaluated at bid price : 11.85
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 11.43
Evaluated at bid price : 11.43
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 11.75
Bid-YTW : 11.52 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 2.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 11.65
Evaluated at bid price : 11.65
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 2.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.20
Bid-YTW : 8.01 %
HSE.PR.C FixedReset 2.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 15.70
Evaluated at bid price : 15.70
Bid-YTW : 6.52 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset 2.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 18.44
Evaluated at bid price : 18.44
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
BIP.PR.A FixedReset 2.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 2.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 14.15
Evaluated at bid price : 14.15
Bid-YTW : 5.51 %
TRP.PR.H FloatingReset 2.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 9.25
Evaluated at bid price : 9.25
Bid-YTW : 4.64 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 2.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 11.40
Evaluated at bid price : 11.40
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
HSE.PR.G FixedReset 3.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.69
Evaluated at bid price : 17.69
Bid-YTW : 6.25 %
TRP.PR.I FloatingReset 3.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 10.90
Evaluated at bid price : 10.90
Bid-YTW : 4.59 %
HSE.PR.E FixedReset 3.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.69
Evaluated at bid price : 17.69
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 4.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 9.40
Evaluated at bid price : 9.40
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.R FixedReset 255,385 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 60,655 RBC crossed 40,000 at 17.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.25
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 4.59 %
RY.PR.Q FixedReset 60,473 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 60,419 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 20.01.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 7.64 %
TD.PF.G FixedReset 51,152 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.49
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 46,730 Scotia crossed 20,600 at 21.22. CIBC bought 20,000 from TD at 21.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 21.22
Evaluated at bid price : 21.22
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TD.PF.D FixedReset Quote: 17.32 – 19.30
Spot Rate : 1.9800
Average : 1.1657

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.32
Evaluated at bid price : 17.32
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 13.20 – 14.50
Spot Rate : 1.3000
Average : 0.8361

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 13.20
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %

TRP.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 17.30 – 18.40
Spot Rate : 1.1000
Average : 0.6668

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 17.30
Evaluated at bid price : 17.30
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %

MFC.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 16.32 – 17.27
Spot Rate : 0.9500
Average : 0.6609

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.32
Bid-YTW : 9.12 %

TRP.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 10.31 – 10.95
Spot Rate : 0.6400
Average : 0.4377

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-03-09
Maturity Price : 10.31
Evaluated at bid price : 10.31
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %

PVS.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 22.71 – 23.24
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3465

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2021-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.71
Bid-YTW : 6.52 %