Archive for the ‘Miscellaneous News’ Category

BCE on Credit Watch Negative : DBRS

Tuesday, April 17th, 2007

Following the announcement that BCE is in talks with privatizers, DBRS has announced that they:

today placed the ratings of BCE, A (low)/R-1 (low)/R-2 (high)/Pfd-2 (low), and its wholly owned subsidiary, Bell Canada, “A”/R-1 (low)/BBB (high), (collectively, BCE or the Company) Under Review with Negative Implications following the Company’s announcement today that it is reviewing strategic alternatives with a view to maximize shareholder value….Given the Company’s current operating structure, DBRS notes that any transaction that takes leverage above 4.0 times debt to EBITDA could cause its ratings to decline below the investment-grade threshold of BBB (low).

No word from S&P yet. I’ll keep you posted.

BCE has the following preferred shares outstanding: BCE.PR.A, BCE.PR.C, BCE.PR.E, BCE.PR.F, BCE.PR.G, BCE.PR.H, BCE.PR.I, BCE.PR.R, BCE.PR.S, BCE.PR.T, BCE.PR.Y & BCE.PR.Z

Update: S&P has joined the fun:

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services today said it placed its ratings, including its ‘A-‘ long-term corporate credit rating, on Montreal, Que.-based telecommunications provider BCE Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary, Bell Canada (collectively, BCE), on CreditWatch with negative implications, following the announcement that it had entered into discussions with a group of leading Canadian pension funds to explore the potential privatization of the company.

Should the leveraged buyout of BCE be successful, we expect debt leverage and corresponding credit metrics will materially weaken from our current expectations; adjusted debt leverage will significantly increase from our expectations of 2.6x at year-end 2007, which could lead to a multinotch downgrade, possibly to speculative-grade.

In the event a privatization is not consummated, we believe the company will be faced with increasing shareholder pressures for some form of leveraging transaction over the near term, which could also lead to lowering the ratings, given that BCE/Bell Canada has modest debt capacity under the current ratings.

BCE in Buyout Talks?

Tuesday, April 17th, 2007

Reuters has reported:

BCE Inc. has entered talks with a group of Canadian pension funds that could lead to the company being taken private, Canada’s top telecommunications group said on Tuesday.

I have seen long Bell bonds offered at 270bp over Canadas – a widening of 50bp over yesterday.

I have previously noted the event risk on the BCE preferreds … which, while having been hurt lately, have suffered not nearly as much as the Bonds … a widening of 50bp in one day? on bonds with a duration of about maybe 12? That’s 6% on price.

Retail – which means holders of BCE preferreds – may well do what retail is best at: ignore the situation until they’ve been told 20 times, then over-react big time.

This could be interesting.

Synthetic Floating Rate Preferreds : Better than BCE?

Monday, April 16th, 2007

Readers will have noticed that the market’s extreme dependence upon a single issuer as a source of Floating Rate issues. This dependence has even led to the closing of a major fund to new investment.

So: this is where financial engineering comes in. There is very little need to actually have floating rate issues … one can have a portfolio of perpetuals and swap the income stream into floating rate, via Interest Rate Swaps. Interest rate swaps are a huge market, big enough that the Chicago Board of Trade has designed a thirty-year swap contract to complement its wildly successful 10-year contract.

Swaps in Canada are traded Over-the-Counter by the bigger banks. Essentially, one party agrees to pay a fixed rate for a definite term – this fixed rate will be very closely related to the fixed rate the bank pays on its direct obligations of similar term. In return, the counterparty agrees to pay the three-month Bankers’ Acceptance rate, reset periodically, for the same term. Obligations are netted, to minimize credit risk as far as possible.

Therefore, there is no real need to rely on BCE for floating rate preferreds! You can buy a portfolio of bank-issued perpetuals and swap the income stream into something based on the BA rate.

It’s not a perfect hedge. There’s basis risk (bank prefs might not trade the same way as bank bonds, just for starters!), there’s tax risk (if short rates go to 25% then sure, you’ve got a pre-tax hedge, but not a post-tax one!) and there’s term risk (however much I may assume it in the programming, thirty years is not equal to infinity), to name but three.

On the other hand I, for one, would much rather have a bank-floater-equivalent than a BCE floater (all else being equal), so a few risks are acceptable, as long as they are quantified and understood.

I’ve uploaded a more detailed proposal. Does anyone have, say, $50-million in perps they want to convert to floaters?

Claymore Preferred ETF Changes Name, to Commence Trading 4/10

Monday, April 9th, 2007

Well, when it was announced it was the “Claymore S&P CDN Preferred Share ETF”. Now, however, Claymore has announced that:

The Claymore S&P/TSX CDN Preferred Share ETF is comprised of preferred share issues listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange that meet criteria relating to market capitalization, liquidity, and issuer rating.
    “We are very pleased to be able to launch this new ETF based on the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index, which will be the first ETF based on the Canadian Preferred share market…”

I thought something might be up when the TSX announced a new index!

It should prove to be a lucrative market for Claymore and some advisors … Claymore gets a management fee of 45bp and advisor-class units will charge another 50bp on top of that. To be sure, Claymore will be paying fund expenses out of their take – but, as I read the prospectus anyway, Claymore will receive extra compensation to cover these expenses, up to a limit of the amount of securities lending revenue earned by the fund.

The ticker for the fund is CPD.

There is, as yet, no further information regarding this ETF on the Claymore website.

Preferred Shares are Equities, says CIFSC

Monday, April 9th, 2007

The Canadian Investment Funds Standards Committee

was formed in January 1998 by Canada’s major mutual fund database and research firms with a self-imposed mandate to standardize the classifications of Canadian-domiciled mutual funds.

They have now released a new classification scheme of funds’ underlying investments and provided schematics of how funds may be categorized.

Preferreds and Convertible Preferreds are both considered to be equities. It is not clear to me whether a preferred that converts into common at a variable rate based on the market price is considered a convertible preferred, or whether this status is reserved for preferreds that convert into a fixed number of common and can therefore ‘trade off the stock’.

At any rate, I find the classification of preferred shares as equities by default to be more than just a little bit puzzling, and have sent them a query:

I note that preferred shares are considered to be equities by default, although you note that you may treat them as fixed income on an exception basis.

How did you arrive at the conclusion that this was the correct classification? Did you, for instance, perform a correlation analysis between historical returns preferred shares, equities and bonds?

On what basis will exceptions be considered?

We shall see!

Hat tip to Financial Webring for publicizing this development.

S&P Canadian Preferred Index to Launch Shortly

Wednesday, April 4th, 2007

According to the Globe & Mail:

Standard & Poor’s Corp. plans to start a new Canadian preferred share index comprised of 52 different issues with a total market capitalization of $14.1-billion…. 

The new index will include all types of investment-grade preferred shares.

It is expected that an exchange-traded fund will be created to allow yield-oriented investors to trade or invest in the index, Mr. North said.

Presumably this is the index planned for the Claymore ETF but I cannot find confirmation of this speculation. I’ll bet a nickel on it, though!

This should be good for the market – it will bring in new investors and create inefficiencies that will reward informed active management.

Update & Bump: The actual press release – not the Globe & Mail rewrite – is on the S&P Website – the “Index News” page, press release of April 3, 2007.

This index has actually been developed for the TSX. Whether or not Claymore intends to use this index rather than a proprietary one is not addressed, but I’ll be willing to bet – here goes another nickel! – that they do.

Index performance is listed as

One Year 4.71%
Two Years 3.95%
Three Years 3.85%

I know perfectly well that the above table does not make clear just what exactly the end-date of the periods is. Sue me. I suspect that the period end-dates are 2/28, but the press release does not make this entirely clear.

Regardless, it’s apparent that the index construction is very different from the BMO NB-50, since one-year and two-year figures are wildly different. The three year, though, is roughly more or less sort of equivalent, kinda.

This construction difference is apparent from the release. The top three constituents are GWO.PR.X, BCE.PR.A and BCE.PR.C. You know what I like? I like indices that are easy to beat, that’s what I like. I might even be able to earn my fees just by avoiding those things and closet indexing the rest of the portfolio!

Update, 2008-6-30: The last paragraph was referenced by Larry MacDonald in Canadian Business Online, April 12, 2007. Well … I did beat the index in year to March 31, 2008 … but it wasn’t due to simple avoidance of those issues! The prolonged bear market in preferreds continues.

David Berry Saga : McQuillen Settles

Wednesday, February 28th, 2007

Marc McQuillen, who was David Berry’s assistant, has settled with RS regarding the allegations made against him. While I cannot say I have examined every jot and tittle of the document, it appears that the RS allegations were a carbon copy of the Scotia Settlement and allegations against Berry.

The sanction imposed was a fine of $25,000.

There is a little more information in the settlement agreement that I consider particularly interesting:

In addition, solely for the purpose of this Settlement, McQuillen relies upon the following facts:

  • (a) Berry’s supervisor during the period 1999 to October 2002 has stated that he was aware of certain aspects of the Trading (as described in paragraph 22 of the Statement of Allegations), as follows, but he did not appreciate that it resulted in clients receiving secondary market shares in the new issue:
    • (i) Berry and/or McQuillen took orders from clients for shares in a new issue during the selling period and filled these orders through sales from the 08 account when the new issue began trading on the TSX.
    • (ii) In some instances, the 08 account would receive an allocation of new issue shares but ultimately incur a short position in the shares of the new issue through sales with clients.
    • (iii) In other cases, a swap transaction with a client’s existing position was involved.

  • (b) The supervisor has stated that he was not aware of instances in which the 08 account sold short shares in the new issue to clients without taking an allocation in the new issue.

As far as I can make out, the supervisor has not been named or been the subject of disciplinary hearings. These are murky waters … I suspect that the significance of the above extract will emerge as the legal struggle continues. We already know that one element of Berry’s lawsuit for wrongful dismissal is that he was not trained or supervised properly (or words to that effect) and hence cannot be nailed for doing his job in the best way he knew how.

David Berry Saga : Finally, Some Details!

Monday, February 26th, 2007

Regulation Services has released a Settlement Agreement between itself and Scotia Capital regarding the continuing David Berry Saga:

Specifically, in the Relevant Period, Berry and McQuillen solicited 39 client orders in 16 new issues during the distribution period at the distribution price. In respect of 15 of the solicitations, on or about the first day of trading, Berry and McQuillen conducted off-marketplace trades in the newly listed shares by selling them short from the Inventory Account at the distribution price. In respect of 24 of the solicitations, the trades to clients from the Inventory Account took place before the security was listed, in the “grey market.” Berry and McQuillen covered their short positions in the Inventory Account by buying shares in the marketplace. The majority of the new issues shares involved in the trading traded in the secondary market at prices lower than the distribution price paid by clients and never reached the distribution price before the short positions in the Inventory Account were covered. The profit to the Inventory Account from shorting the shares was $731,959.00, of which Berry received 20% ($142.792.00) and Scotia Capital received 80% ($571,161.00). 

Because the syndication process was by-passed, clients purchased newly listed shares from the secondary market through the Inventory Account. They were therefore not afforded the inherent rights of purchasers pursuant to a prospectus. In addition, the off-marketplace trades were not transparent to other market participants and may have misled other participants as to the true nature of the demand for the shares and affected their subsequent investment decisions.

Specifically, for instance:

Solicitations 4, 5 and 6 – March 2005 – CIBC Series 30 (“CM.PR.H”)

4. On February 24, 2005, Berry and McQuillen solicited an order to purchase from client 1 to buy 100,000 CM.PR.H @ $25.00 per share. 

5. On February 24, 2005, Berry and McQuillen solicited an order to purchase from client 2 to buy 15,000 CM.PR.H @ $25.00 per share. 

6. On February 24, 2005, Berry and McQuillen solicited an order to purchase from client 3 to buy 75,000 CM.PR.H @ $25.00 per share. 

4. On March 10, 2005, client 1 bought 15,000 shares of CM.PR.H @ $25.00 per share in a principal trade with the 08 account.

5. On March 10, 2005, client 2 bought 100,000 shares of CM.PR.H @ $25.00 per share in a principal trade with the 08 account. 

The trades were not printed over the TSX. 

 

Feb 24, 2005

Press Release.

Berry and McQuillen solicited orders @ $25.00 per share from client 1 to buy 100,000 shares of CM.PR.H, from client 2 to buy 15,000 shares of CM.PR.H and from client 3 to buy 75,000 shares of CM.PR.H.

Client 3 is the same client referred to in trade 3 above. See Berry’s February 24, 2005 statements to the client in trade 3 regarding the source of the shares. 

 

March 1, 2005

Final prospectus receipted. 

March 7, 2005

A buy ticket for client 2 was prepared without quantity, price or symbol by McQuillen. The trade to client 3 was transacted in the grey market and confirmed to client 3 as transacted on this date.

 

March 9, 2005

A buy ticket for client 1 for 100,000 CM.PR.H @ $25.00 was time-stamped.

CM.PR.H was listed.

 

March 10, 2005

The buy ticket for client 1 was stamped a second time by McQuillen.

A buy ticket for client 2 to buy 15,000 CM.PR.H @ $25.00 was time-stamped by McQuillen.

The 08 account sold 100,000 CM.PR.H to client 2 @ $25.00.

The 08 account sold 15,000 CM.PR.H to client 1 @ $25.00.

CM.PR.H began trading on TSX; it opened @ $24.00 and closed @ $24.05 with a high of $24.10.

The trades with the clients 1 and 2 did not appear on the TSX trading data.

 

Profit/Loss

The 08 account was short 190,000 CM.PR.H shares as of March 10, 2005 as a result of selling to these 3 clients. 

Throughout the day on March 10, 2005, McQuillen sold short 2,000 CM.PR.H for the 08 account and also bought a total of 249,700, on the TSX, leaving the account with a long position.

The profit to the 08 account on the trading of CM.PR.H was $188,100.

Now, perhaps this just shows my evil nature, but I can’t see what harm was done in this instance that was worth destroying a man’s career. Rules are rules, and it certainly seems from the agreement that RS & Scotia have agreed that they have been broken, but when we look at the Section titled “Effect of the Trading Strategy on Scotia Capital’s Clients and Market Integrity, we see:

In the 15 instances of off-marketplace trades, the syndication process was by-passed and, as a consequence, clients purchased newly listed shares from the secondary market through the 08 account. Because clients did not receive new issue shares from the primary market through the Syndication Desk, pursuant to a prospectus, they were deprived of all the inherent rights afforded to such purchasers.

OK, there’s the right of recission. Big deal. Are there any others? I quite honestly don’t know.

Some clients were aware that they would be receiving shares in the new issue at the distribution price from a transaction with the 08 account which might result in a profit to the 08 account. Some were not.

They got their shares at the price they agreed to pay, which was the same price as the syndication price. There are problems here with the difference between acting as broker and acting as principal, which in some cases can be meaningful … but the harm done in this case seems pretty minor.

The majority of the new issue shares involved in the Trading traded in the secondary market at prices lower than the distribution price paid by the clients and never reached the distribution price before any short positions in the 08 account were subsequently covered. Accordingly, the 08 account profited from its short positions in these shares.

OK. And?

By filling client orders by means of the Trading, Berry was not restricted to the allocation formula or guidelines used by Scotia Capital in the normal syndication process. This increased Berry’s opportunity for profit and generated goodwill from clients.

OK. And?

The overall profit to the 08 account from shorting the shares was $713,959. Berry received 20% of the profit or $142,792. Scotia Capital’s profit was therefore $571,167.

OK. And?

The off-marketplace trades precluded other market participants from seeing those trades printed on a marketplace or organized regulated market and resulted in a lack of transparency to other market participants. Transparency is a cornerstone of the maintenance of market integrity.

Not a good thing. I am not clear on the grey-market rules (I just buy things when I think they’re cheap and sell when I think they’re expensive, but I’m kind of old fashioned that way). It is not clear to me whether a grey-market transaction was possible in such a situation, and what the implications of alternatives are, but I see no real harm arising from this particular case.

Market participants had no knowledge of Berry and McQuillen selling shares in the new issue to clients once the shares opened for trading. They only saw Berry and McQuillen buying the shares, which is consistent with an accumulation strategy. This had the potential to mislead other market participants as to the true nature of the demand for the stock, and affect their subsequent investment decisions.

If there were, in fact, market participants who nodded wisely to each other about ‘Scotia’s accumulation strategy’ and slapped dollars down on the table as a result of this, then the faster those market participants go bankrupt and lose their licenses on grounds of boneheadedness, the better.

David Berry is facing a “Contested Hearing” on this matter (essentially, the same thing as the Scotia Settlement, but re-labelled). It will be most interesting to hear further arguments as to the actual harm caused.

Update : Perhaps somebody with more familiarity with the trading and syndication rules than I can comment on how Berry could have accomodated his clients without falling afoul of the rules … if indeed he did, which has been agreed to by Scotia, but not yet by Berry in his contested hearing.

And, to clarify a bit: my point in not taking umbrage at the conflict is that the clients purchased their shares at the same price everybody else did. There is a definite problem with Berry acting as principal if the client thought he was acting as broker … but on the other hand, Berry was in fact taking on market risk in confirming a sale in the expectations of covering on the market later. It’s not quite the same thing as telling a client that, as broker, you bought shares for him at $25, when in fact you had already bought them as principal at $24.

Another Update: It should be remembered that my background is bonds. Good old fixed income bonds, where it’s understood that everybody deals as principal and if you can make a nickel by bankrupting somebody, your boss will ask you why you didn’t make a dime. There’s one story I particularly remember, from the Euromarket in the late eighties … Merrill Lynch bought more of a new issue than existed and the other dealers, who had gone short in expectations of covering in the open market (just like Berry!) found out they had … er … something of a problem, what with Merrill insisting on either delivery, or a buy-in at a ridiculous price.

Yet another update: I really don’t want anybody to think I’m a scofflaw! I would be much more upset about this situation if, for instance, Berry had sold to his client at $25.10 while I or anybody else was dutifully following the rules and publicly trying to sell at $25.05. But there’s no indication in the settlement that Berry was trading at a price that ignored an extant market … the short was done at $25.00 while every other transaction was done at $25.00 and covered on the open market later on at a lower price. It is possible (and has been agreed by Scotia & RS) that there was some rulebreaking. It’s not clear to me that this is anything other than “Gotcha Regulation” – at least, to the extent that Scotia is taking umbrage at the (alleged) misconduct.

Par Value

Thursday, February 22nd, 2007

This is an interesting, albeit trivial, topic.

I entered into a discussion on Wikipedia about Par Value on Preferred Stock. Somebody had queried a statement in the article:

Preferred stock has a par value or liquidation value associated with it. This represents the amount of capital that was contributed to the corporation when the shares were first issued.

and complained:

What is this? Par value is an amount set by the articles of organization or bylaws (need research as to which one) as to the value of the preferred stock. The proceeds actually contributed to the corporation is almost always higher than the par value, especially since we’re talking about preferred stock here (and not common stock). The proceeds actually collected for the issuance of the stock is actually: Par value + Additional-paid-in-capital. APIC has not even been discussed in the article

I asked for some examples and was referred to Northrop Grumman preferred B and Realty Income Corp., 7 3/8% Preferred D, both US stocks where, in fact, liquidation value or subscription price is very different from par value.

A little worried, I checked to see what was on line. CIBC Investors Edge states:

Par Value

The stated face value of a bond or, in the case of stock, an amount assigned by the company’s charter and expressed as a dollar amount per share. Par value of common stock usually has no relationship to the current market value and so no par value stock is issued. Par value of preferred stock is significant, however, as it indicates the dollar amount of assets each preferred share would be entitled to in the event of liquidation of the company.

National Bank states:

Par Value

The stated face value of a bond or, in the case of stock, an amount assigned by the company’s charter and expressed as a dollar amount per share. Par value of common stock usually has no relationship to the current market value and so no par value stock is issued. Par value of preferred stock is significant, however, as it indicates the dollar amount of assets each preferred share would be entitled to in the event of liquidation of the company.

According to GlobeInvestor:

Par Value:

The stated face value of a bond or, in the case of stock, an amount assigned by the company’s charter and expressed as a dollar amount per share. Par value of common stock usually has no relationship to the current market value and so no par value stock is issued. Par value of preferred stock is significant, however, as it indicates the dollar amount of assets each preferred share would be entitled to in the event of liquidation of the company.

It does my heart good to see such unanimity!

IFIC states:

Par value: The principal amount, or value at maturity, of a debt obligation. It is also known as the denomination or face value. Preferred shares may also have par value, which indicates the value of assets each share would be entitled to if a company were liquidated.

which is echoed by AIM Trimark

Par value – The principal amount, or value at maturity, of a debt obligation. It is also known as the denomination or face value. Preferred shares may also have par value, which indicates the value of assets each share would be entitled to if a company were liquidated.

The Journal of Accountancy states:

Preferred shares pay a fixed quarterly dividend based on a stated par value. If XYZ Corp. issues a preferred stock with a par value of $50 and paying a quarterly 2% dividend, that’s a $1 dividend each quarter.

citing riskGlossary.com, which further states

However, preferred shares are superior to common shares. No dividends may be paid to holders of common stock unless dividends to preferred shareholders are also paid in full. In liquidation, preferred shareholders are entitled to at least their par value before common shareholders can receive anything.

RiskGlossary, in its discussion of par value, further states:

For common stocks, par value became a stated minimum issue price. In the United States, a corporation could issue stock at a price in excess of par value. If it issued the stock below par value, the stock was called watered. Purchasers of watered stock were liable to the corporation for the difference between the par value and the price they paid. Today, in many jurisdictions, par values are no longer required for common stocks. In jurisdictions that still require them, corporations typically state nominal par values, perhaps listing a USD .01 par value for a stock that will be issued at USD 25.00. 

For preferred stocks, par value remains relevant. Preferred stock is typically issued at a price close to the par value. Preferred stock dividends are calculated as a percentage of par value. Also, if common stock is callable, it is usually at par value or at a small premium over par value.

It would appear, then, that if I was mistaken, I am in good company!

But on the other hand, par value isn’t really formally spoken about much, at least in Canada. For instance, the Bank of Montreal states:

We are authorized by our shareholders to issue an unlimited number of Class A Preferred Shares and Class B Preferred Shares without par value, in series, for unlimited consideration. Class B Preferred Shares may be issued in non-Canadian currency.

In the prospectus for the recent Sun Life Financial issue, the phrase “par value” is not found anywhere.

I do, however, see a recent ruling regarding Canfor that states:

At the end of the series of steps comprising the Arrangement, the authorized share capital of Canfor will consist of 1,010,000,000 shares divided into 1,000,000,000 common shares without par value and 10,000,000 preferred shares with a par value of $25 each. At June 5, 2006 there were 142,540,059 common shares issued and outstanding and no preferred shares is sued and outstanding.

so the words “par value” are not completely unknown in formal description, anyway!

If you’ve read all the way down to here expecting an earthshaking revelation, then I’m very sorry to disappoint you: there ain’t none. However, any insights anybody would like to share with me about “Par Value” and any legal weight the phrase might have or, perhaps, the insistence of certain jurisdictions (which ones?) that insist on all issues being assigned a par value of some kind will be very gratefully ripped off and presented as the fruits of my own research.

Unless requested otherwise!

Update : The State of Delaware has some interesting tax rules based on their Franchise Tax:

To use this method, you must give figures for all issued shares (including treasury shares) and total gross assets in the spaces provided in your Annual Franchise Tax Report.  Total Gross Assets shall be those “total assets” reported on the U.S. Form 1120, Schedule L (Federal Return) relative to the company’s fiscal year ending the calendar year of the report.  The tax rate under this method is $250.00 per million or portion of a million of the assumed par value capital, which is calculated as described below, if the assumed par value capital is greater than $1,000,000.  If the assumed par value capital is less than $1,000,000, the tax is calculated by dividing the assumed par value capital by $1,000,000 then multiplying that result by $250.00.  

The example cited below is for a corporation having 1,000,000 shares of stock with a par value of $1.00 and 250,000 shares of stock with a par value of $5.00 , gross assets of $1,000,000.00 and issued shares totaling 485,000.

  1. Divide your total gross assets by your total issued shares carrying to 6 decimal places.  The result is your “assumed par”.Example: $1,000,000 assets, 485,000 issued shares = $2.061856 assumed par.
  2. Multiply the assumed par by the number of authorized shares having a par value of less than the assumed par.Example: $2.061856 assumed par s 1,000,000 shares = $2,061,856.
  3. Multiply the number of authorized shares with a par value greater than the assumed par by their respective par value.Example: 250,000 shares s $5.00 par value = $1,250,000
  4. Add the results of #2 and #3 above.  The result is your assumed par value capital.Example:  $2,061,856 plus 1,250,000 = $3,311 956 assumed par value capital.
  5. Figure your tax by dividing the assumed par value capital, rounded up to the next million if it is over $1,000,000, by 1,000,000 and then multiply by $250.00.Example: 4 x $250.00 = $1,000.00

NOTE: If an amendment changing your stock or par value was filed with the Division of Corporations during the year, issued shares and total gross assets within 30 days of the amendment must be given for each portion of the year during which each distinct authorized amount of capital stock or par value was in effect.  The tax is then prorated for each portion of the year dividing the number of days the stock/par value was in effect by 365 days (366 leap year), then multiplying this result by the tax calculated for that portion of the year.  The total tax for the year is the sum of all the prorated taxes for each portion of the year.

Harvard Business Services also states:

Since your annual Delaware franchise taxes are based on your number of shares and their par-value, it is best to keep both of these as low as you can.

If you need more than 1,500 shares of stock initially, it becomes expensive to issue “no-par” stock. By placing a small par-value on your stock you can save a significant tax bite.

Par-value has no relation to “market value” or “stock price”, except that you cannot sell stock for less than par. Therefore, if you plan on issuing yourself stock for starting the company, you may want to consider keeping your par-value low. This does not limit you with respect to stock price when you sell shares of stock to investors.

Hat-tip to Art LaPella on Wikipedia for showing me this.

Update Oklahoma also charges fees based on declared par-value:

CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION (Domestic Business or Professional): One-tenth of one percent (1/10th of 1%) of the authorized capital stock. No par value is based on $50.00 per share, for computing filing fees only. 18 O.S., §1142 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MINIMUM: $50.00

Although, as far as I can make out, they don’t charge continuing taxes based on par-value. The incorporation fees are also charged when articles of incorporation are amended:

If the authorized capital is increased in excess of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), the filing fee shall be an amount equal to one-tenth of one percent (1/10 of 1%) of such increase.

which leads to amusing situations … or, at least, situations I consider amusing, such as American Natural Energy Corp.’s amendment in which the number of authorized common shares was increased from 100-million with a par value of $0.01 to 250-million with a par value of $0.001.

Update, 2011-11-24: See the second section of Security Transaction Taxes and Market Quality for an entertaining account of Par Value as it relates to common stock and trading in New York when it had a securities transaction tax.

eMail Problems!

Thursday, February 22nd, 2007

My service provider, Bell Canada, seems to be doing extensive maintenance on their eMail system. Over the past day or so, I have been told on several occasions that access to my eMail is “forbidden” and I have recently been told by a client that an eMail that was sent to me bounced back, on the grounds that my mailbox was full.

So … if you really need to contact me, use the ‘phone! 416-604-4204.

But with any luck my eMail will be fixed soon.