On the thread for April 27, Drew asked:
The YTW of split shares and perpetual premium shares seems to have risen over the last month substantially more than that of perpetual discount shares. My impression is that the bond yield curve has not flattened like this. Am I correct and, if so, do you have a theory?
Well, first off, let’s look at the index data: March 30:
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30 | |||||||
Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) | Mean YTW | Mean Average Trading Value | Mean Mod Dur (YTW) | Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Op. Retract | 4.72% | 3.04% | 85,479 | 2.16 | 17 | -0.0828% | 1,034.0 |
Split-Share | 5.01% | 3.14% | 158,951 | 3.31 | 14 | +0.0234% | 1,052.8 |
Perpetual-Premium | 5.02% | 3.56% | 219,123 | 5.15 | 53 | -0.0031% | 1,059.8 |
Perpetual-Discount | 4.53% | 4.54% | 762,721 | 15.37 | 10 | -0.0157% | 1,066.8 |
…and for April 27:
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30 | |||||||
Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) | Mean YTW | Mean Average Trading Value | Mean Mod Dur (YTW) | Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Op. Retract | 4.73% | 3.22% | 84,115 | 2.38 | 17 | -0.0108% | 1,033.0 |
Split-Share | 5.03% | 4.29% | 179,611 | 4.02 | 12 | +0.1756% | 1,046.1 |
Perpetual-Premium | 5.07% | 4.50% | 222,579 | 6.25 | 54 | -0.1567% | 1,051.4 |
Perpetual-Discount | 4.57% | 4.59% | 924,984 | 16.22 | 12 | -0.0112% | 1,056.4 |
From these indications, we see huge apparent changes in the yield of split shares. There are, as always, details of the analysis that must be understood before we pat ourselves on the back, however.
Consider the April 27 Split Share Index. Well, it looks like one thing that’s going to happen soon is that MUH.PR.A and ASC.PR.A will be moved to the “Scraps” index, on grounds of insufficient averageTradingValue, but never mind that.
One thing we notice is that DFN.PR.A & FFN.PR.A have much higher YTWs than FTN.PR.A, thanks to the recently approved term extensions on the former two issues. Be sure to write a thank-you note to your friendly neighborhood capital unit holder for the gift! Another thing we notice when looking at the index table is that the Split-Share index has been hit a lot harder than the Operating-Retractible index. This effect is due, I think, to a lack of understanding in the marketplace in general as to the nature of a split-share corporation. For example, one commenter on Financial Webring Forum stated that he was “not interested in … split shares that mature at NAV”.
Well, the preferred share component of a split share corp does not mature at NAV, absent default. The last two words are very important, because as I showed in the article Are Floating Prefs Money Market Vehicles?, Split Shares have, historically, been more susceptible to credit downgrades than other classes of share. However, readers who have read Using Credit Ratings When Buying Preferreds and Split Shares will know how to watch for the signs of an imminent downgrade. It seems to me that DBRS has been tightening its standards for Split Share credit ratings in the past year or two; as well, while the nature of a split share makes the rating more volatile, it also makes credit analysis a lot easier! So, while you have to watch them, so what? You have to watch everything in this uncertain world.
Some institutional investors, as well, don’t like Split Shares: one reasonably good reason is that not only are issue sizes relatively small, but they are rarely available as a new issue bought en bloc unless you also buy the Capital Units. One relatively bad reason is that many institutional guys don’t understand them either, another is that buying them might give the impression that they are sub-contracting asset management to the Split-Share’s sponsor, or at least have to explain to clients why that is not a fair characterization.
So in the end, Split Shares become not just a playground for retail, but for a relatively small component of the retail preferred share buying populace at that. This makes them much more susceptible to volatility and what I currently believe is contagion from the continuing woes of BCE.
I’ve uploaded a graph of the yieldCurvePremiumRetractible and the yieldCurvePremiumSplitShareCorp. On April 27, these values stood at -0.44% and +0.40%, respectively, changing from -0.42% and +0.34%, respectively, on March 30. So, yeah, Split Share spreads have widened quite noticeably over the past month. I’ve also uploaded a graph of the core yield curves at year-end, March month-end and now, for your inspection. All these curves and spreads, I hasten to note before I forget, are AFTER TAX.
Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund currently has a relatively high exposure to Split Shares, so I could be accused of talking up my inventory. I could also be accused of putting my money where my mouth is. Take your pick – you have been warned!
PrefLetter : Questions from a Subscriber
Tuesday, May 29th, 2007I have received an eMail with some questions of sufficient generality that I thought I would publish it – suitably redacted, of course!
A “normal bond”, by which I mean a fixed-income instrument with no embedded options, will always have a positive convexity, which will vary (roughly speaking) as the square of the duration.
[One implication of this relationship is that one may use convexity as a measure of the “barbelledness” of a bond portfolio; for instance, an extremely barbelled portfolio comprised of 3-month treasury bills and 30-year bonds will have a greater convexity than an extremely bulletted portfolio comprised solely of 10-year bonds even though both portfolios have exactly the same weighted average duration.
Classical fixed-income mathematics states that a more convex portfolio will always outperform a less convex portfolio that has the same yield, regardless of the direction of a change in interest rates; this is because classical fixed income mathematics assumes that all changes to the yield curve will be parallel. In fact, (given equal durations, different convexities) convexity (= barbelledness) helps when the curve is flattening, hurts when it is steepening. When it is humping (by which I mean the middle is increasing in yield by more than the average of the two endpoints – what did you think I meant?) convexity helps; when de-humping (I will admit that I’ve never used this term before, although I have used “humpedness”) convexity hurts.
However, classical fixed income mathematics has led to one of the more truly dumb slogans ever used in portfolio management: the benter the better. This phrase picks up from looking at plots of duration vs. price; since (in classical fixed-income mathematics with perfectly normal bonds) the curvature of this plot works in the holder’s favour so some believe that more bending = more value.
End of rant, back to the main question.]
Convexity is of very little value in quantitative fixed income analysis, but has some use as a qualitative measure (as long as you don’t take it too seriously). Pseudo-Convexity, used in HIMIPref™, results from a mathematical calculation that seeks to accomplish the same thing while accounting for embedded options. It is a Good Thing for pseudoConvexity to be positive (all else being equal, which is never the case) because
When confronted by the choice between two instruments that differ in pseudo-convexity, you should ensure that you are being paid (higher expected total return) for the risks you are incurring by taking a lower convexity [to the extent that this lower convexity is due to embedded options, not simply lower duration. Virtually all differences in pseudoConvexity will be due to embedded options].
This is a big, big question. All I can really do is point you to the various articles I have written, specifically those referenced on the PrefLetter page introducing these types.
This is another big, big question. I will be writing an article shortly for Canadian Moneysaver regarding portfolio construction that I hope will be found somewhat helpful.
I don’t think you will ever see a “Model Portfolio”, labelled as such, coming from me. Model Portfolios are tools of the devil.
Assume, for instance, that you are following a model portfolio and have achieved 100% congruence with the recommendations. Then, for good reasons or bad, the model portfolio changes. In order to maintain congruence, the follower must therefore execute the required swap irrespective of price.
Those last three words are the dealbreaker, particularly in fixed income portfolio management. I might be very happy to sell X and buy Y if I can take out twenty cents, but consider it the worst trade ever proposed if I have to trade flat.
Even if I say on Day 1 that a take-out of twenty cents is a great trade, there’s no guarantee that on Day 2 I’ll say the same thing. The absolute prices may have changed (either due to normal fluctuations, or even – trivially – because of a dividend), which will change all the yields and option-exercise probabilities. Even if the prices have not changed, a change in the rest of the yield curve might make a big difference [for example, say the trade is from a short-term retractible into a perpetual discount. PerpetualDiscounts have dropped a lot in the past month; I want more yield pick-up today than I did three weeks ago before I’ll consider the trade.
I’m sure this all sounds evasive, and don’t be afraid to tell me so in the comments. But the simple fact is, fixed income portfolio management, when done professionally, is a complicated thing. And so, yes, I think that in many cases clients will be better off purchasing my fund. The objective of PrefLetter is to provide retail investors – who don’t want to give up control and who don’t want to pay fees – and their advisors with a short-list of buy-and-hold recommendations for each preferred share type.
When considering a sale … well, look at what you have. First, in terms of overall asset-class selection and how well it reflects what you are attempting to accomplish with the portfolio. Second, in terms of potential swaps. Say you hold X and I’m recommending Y, in the same class. Look at the yield-to-worst of the two instruments, their terms and their credits; if Y looks better at prices where you can execute, then by all means go for it! You might not be doing optimal trading, but if, say, you can come up with a good rationale for why Y is better than X (credit, interest rate protection, yield), after commission & taxes, for every trade, I suggest you’ll be doing all right.
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