Archive for the ‘Regulation’ Category

Greenspan Endorses Contingent Capital

Thursday, March 18th, 2010

Alan Greenspan has lost a little of his mystique since McCain said he continue as Fed Chairman after death, but he’s still one of the most knowledgable people out there.

He has delivered a speech at the Brookings Institute that is of great interest.

I can’t find a copyable paper (update: Dealbreaker has one), so you’ll just have to read the speech yourselves or rely on my paraphrases!

He notes that not a single hedge fund has defaulted on debt throughout the crisis, though many have suffered large losses and been forced to liquidate.

The crash of 1987 and the dotcom bubble bursting led the Fed to believe that financial bubbles had disengaged from the real economy.

He strongly doubts that stability can be achieved in the context of a competitive economy.

Capital and liquidity address all the regulatory shortcomings that were exposed by the crisis. Capital has the advantage that it is not necessary to identify which part of the financial structure is most at risk.

The behaviour of CDS spreads in the wake of the Lehman default and TARP imply that the “well capitalized” requirement for total bank capital should be 14%, not 10%, subject to some Herculean assumptions. This will allow bank equity to earn a competitive return while not constricting credit.

The solution, in my judgment, that has at least a reasonable chance of reversing the extraordinarily large “moral hazard” that has arisen over the past year is to require banks and possibly all financial intermediaries to hold contingent capital bonds, that is, debt which is automatically converted to equity when equity capital falls below a certain threshold. Such debt will, of course, be more costly on issuance than simple debentures, but its existence could materially reduce moral hazard.

The global housing bubble was driven by lower long-term rates, not policy rates. Home mortgage 30-year rates led the Case-Shiller index by 11 months with R-squared of 0.511, compared with Fed Funds, R-squared = 0.216 and and eight-month lead. This makes sense because housing is a long-term asset.

Some people (silly people) get this muddled because the correlation between Fed Funds and 30-year mortgages is 0.83 (until 2002). But the relationship delinked, which was the Greenspan Conundrum, so up yours.

Taylor’s wrong. He equates housing starts (supply) with demand. But starts don’t drive prices, it’s the other way ’round. Builders look at housing prices, not the Fed Funds rate. What’s more the correlation between house prices and consumer prices is small to negative.

Some people (silly people) believe that low Fed Fund rates lowered ARM teaser rates and led to increased demand. But the balance of probabilities is that the decision to buy preceded the decision on financing. Anyway, the correlation of Taylor rule deviations with house prices is statistically insignificant (Dokko, Jane, et al., “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble”, Finance & Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, Dec. 22, 2009)

Any attempt to instigate a “Systemic Regulator” is ill-advised and doomed to fail. Their models and forecasting ain’t gonna be any better than anybody else’s.

Dudley Warns on Regulatory Reform Progress

Tuesday, March 16th, 2010

William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, gave a speech at the Council of Society Business Economists Annual Dinner, London, 11 March 2010, titled The longer-term challenges ahead:

Turning to the first challenge of regulatory reform, the key issue is how to ensure that we take the right steps so that the type of financial crisis that occurred never happens again.

By me, the only way to ensure that is to reduce the earth to radioactive rubble – but maybe that’s just me.

From my perspective, I have several concerns about where the regulatory reform process is heading. First, the international consensus to harmonize standards globally appears fragile. If each country acts to strengthen its financial system in an uncoordinated way, we will be left with a balkanized system, riddled with gaps that encourage regulatory arbitrage. Second, I am concerned that the focus will be too bank-centric. Although it is clearly appropriate to strengthen the liquidity and capital standards for banks, regulatory reform needs to be comprehensive. Third, I worry that the Federal Reserve’s role with respect to bank supervision will be unduly constrained. Let me discuss each of these concerns in more detail.

Turning first to the issue of harmonization, I think it is underappreciated how important harmonization is to ensure success of the global regulatory reform effort. Without harmonized standards, financial intermediation would inevitably move toward geographies and activities where the standards are more lax. This, in turn, would provoke complaints from those who cannot make such adjustments as easily. The political process, in turn, would be sensitive to such complaints, creating pressure for liberalization, which would cause the tougher standards to unravel over time. In the discussion between countries, the emphasis would subtly shift from how to structure the regulatory regime to ensure financial stability toward negotiating a regulatory regime that works best for the institutions headquartered in each particular country.

The harmonization process has some momentum due to the sponsorship of the G-20 leadership and the efforts of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and other international standard setters. However, the process is fragile because there are pressures to shape the standards in a way that puts the least burden on the domestic banks and financial infrastructures in one country relative to the institutions in other countries. There is understandable and genuine concern that the impact of moving to global standards will fall disproportionately on some types of firms. In my view, the way to mitigate these issues is to have a long phase-in period in the transition to the new standards rather than to soften or alter the standards to shelter those firms that happen – perhaps by historical accident – to be starting in a less advantageous position. The focus should be more on the side of all ending up in a similar place, rather than on the relative degree of difficulty in getting there.

The process is also fragile because some countries seem intent on strengthening their own set of standards before the international process has had a chance to reach consensus. Although it is understandable that countries would want to move quickly to strengthen their regulatory regimes, such actions should not be undertaken in a way that is immutable and unresponsive to the emerging international consensus.

At the end of the day, to achieve harmonized standards, each sovereign nation is going to have to bend a little bit from what it believes is best for its financial system viewed in isolation. This is necessary, of course, because a series of regulatory regimes that appear best for each individual country would likely be distinctly second-best or even worse when considered collectively. The recent crisis underscores the fact that the regulatory regime needs to be harmonized and global in nature.

These concerns echo remarks made by RBC CEO Gord Nixon at his annual meeting, reported on PrefBlog on March 3.

He is alive to the idea that over-regulating banks will lead to activities being performed by non-banks, but his answer to that is simply to regulate everything. Rather than setting ourselves the goal of eliminating financial crises – which leads to the regulation of everything and ultimately won’t work – I suggest that we define, in a clear an orderly way, just what it is that we want to protect. The payments system, definitely. But what else?

For example, he over-reaches when discussing OTC derivatives:

OTC derivatives dealers have natural incentives to favor opaque, decentralized markets that preserve their information advantage relative to other participants. The greater profit margins that derive from this advantage create incentives to favor more bespoke OTC derivatives over more standardized OTC instruments. Making more and better pricing information available to a wider range of market participants will increase competition and lessen the profit incentives that stem primarily from the opacity of these instruments and markets. Improving transparency should make the benefits that stem from standardization such as increased liquidity, reduced transaction costs, and lower counterparty risks more dominant, helping push the evolution of the OTC derivatives market in the direction of greater standardization and homogeneity.

This doesn’t mean that bespoke products will vanish. They will continue to exist. But they will exist primarily because they better serve the needs of the OTC derivatives customer, not because they create an informational asymmetry that allows rents to accrue to the securities dealer.

I suggest it’s up to the customer to decide what he wants and what’s good. Anybody who buys some of the crap developed by the dealers – FX options masquerading as bonds, for one; stock index linked GICs, for another – deserves to have their heads handed to them and the sooner the better.

If regulators had ready access to current OTC derivatives transaction information in trade repositories, I suspect that this would serve as a brake on the use of OTC derivatives that are used for more questionable purposes. For example, this includes trades undertaken to evade accounting rules or to circumvent investment charter limitations.

Is it really the role of Big Brother to monitor and enforce investment charter limitations?

Rabobank Issues € 1.25-billion Contingent Capital

Monday, March 15th, 2010

Rabobank has announced that it:

successfully issued a EUR 1.25 billion, benchmark 10 year fixed rate Senior Contingent Note (“SCN”) issue, priced at an annual coupon of 6.875%, reflective of a premium to Rabobank subordinated debt paper, as well as a meaningful discount to where we believe Rabobank would be able to complete a hybrid Tier 1 offering.
The transaction enables Rabobank to further enhance the Bank’s creditworthiness, as the offering is designed to ensure that Rabobank’s Core Capital is strengthened in the very unlikely event that the Bank’s Equity Ratio were to fall below 7%. Rabobank has always been amongst the most conservative banks in the world, and this transaction, which effectively hedges tail risk, once again demonstrates the bank’s unwavering commitment to prudence. Finally, the offering anticipates on future (expected) regulatory requirements which are widely expected to be introduced in the near future, and to recognize the value of contingent buffers of capital.

Given the novelty of the transaction structure, an interactive and highly intensive execution process was adopted, starting with the wall-crossing of a limited number of large credit buyers, in the days leading up to Rabobank’s annual results on March 4th, followed by a very intensive 4-day marketing effort across London, Paris and Frankfurt in the week of March 8th during which the product and the issuer’s credit were discussed with over 80 institutional investors.

Having garnered total orders in excess of EUR 2.6 billion, from more than 180 different accounts, it was decided to formally launch and price a more than twice oversubscribed EUR 1.25 billion offering on Friday March 12.

Rabobank has € 38.1-billion equity against € 233.4-billion Risk Weighted Assets, so I suspect that their current equity ratio is about 16.3%, although I cannot find a copy of the prospectus to nail down the definition. One source claims:

Lloyds’ deal, unlike the Rabobank structure, was to a large degree based on substituting existing subordinated debt for the new security. The “trigger”, the point at which the Lloyds debt would convert into equity in the bank, was set for when the bank’s core Tier 1 ratio fell below 5%. Rabobank, by contrast, has a trigger of 7% of its equity capital ratio, at which point the notes will be written down to 25% of their original value and paid off immediately.

However, converting the equity capital ratio, a much simpler measure of shares divided by debt, to a core Tier 1 trigger actually means the Rabobank trigger sits at about 5.5%. compared to Lloyds’, according to one banker on the deal.

Bloomberg claims:

Rabobank hired Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse Group AG, Morgan Stanley and UBS AG to organize presentations, according to Marc Tempelman, a managing director in Bank of America’s financial institutions group. The notes will be written down to 25 percent of face value and repaid if the bank’s capital as a percentage of assets is less than 7 percent.

Rabobank has 29.3 billion euros of equity capital, which it defines as member certificates and retained earnings, according to Tempelman. To trigger the contingent capital notes, capital levels would have to fall by 12.9 billion euros, he said.

This will take a while to think about.

There’s a degree of first loss protection, sure: if the bank loses less than € 12.9-billion, there’s no loss to noteholders. But then the loss gets triggered … equity holders (as defined) have lost 44% and this leads to a 75% loss for noteholders!

This isn’t a bond, it’s an insurance policy. And the presumption that the trigger is based on financial statements is a temptation for all kinds of jiggery pokery. AND in the event that the loss is triggered, there will be cash leaving the firm.

If anybody can find a prospectus, please let me know.

There is speculation that Royal Bank of Scotland is mulling over issuance of a similar structure.

Pegged Orders: IIROC & CSA to Host Semi-Open Meeting

Saturday, March 6th, 2010

The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada has announced:

The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) invite all interested parties to attend a forum to discuss market structure issues raised in Joint CSA/IIROC Consultation Paper 23-404 Dark Pools, Dark Orders, and Other Developments in Market Structure in Canada (the Consultation Paper). The forum will be held:

Tuesday, March 23rd, 2010 from 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m.
at the Design Exchange, 234 Bay Street in Toronto (Trading Floor, 2nd Floor)


While the forum will allow those that commented on the Consultation Paper to discuss their views, we welcome others that would like to observe the presentations and discussion to attend. If you wish to attend the forum as an observer, please complete the registration form (available on the IIROC website at www.iiroc.ca under the “What’s New” heading) by Friday, March 19th. Space is limited, so registrations will be accepted on a first come, first serve basis.

Pegged Orders were last discussed on PrefBlog when comments on the consultation paper were republished.

IFRS + ACM = Trouble for Trustcos?

Wednesday, March 3rd, 2010

Assiduous Reader JP Koning brings to my attention a column by Barry Critchley in the Financial Post titled David-Goliath matchup:

The Office of the Superindendant of Financial Institutions advisory states that as of Jan. 1 2010, National Housing Act MBS’s that are securitized will move from being an off balance sheet item to a balance sheet item, a move that boost the institution’s ACM ratio. At the margin, such transfers could limit the amount of securitizations that are completed in Canada every year, securitizations that lower the cost of mortgages more than otherwise.

While market participants await an updated advisory, some small players are less than happy with what has been proposed. The Trust Companies Association of Canada, a group of 19 member firms, has written to OSFI and to the Minister of Finance and given their views on the details included in the advisory. The members, whose largest include Community Trust, Equitable Trust and Home Capital, have more than $16-billion in outstanding mortgage backed securities.

If the rules in the OSFI draft advisory do go into effect, the letter says “many trust companies and indeed other regulated financial institutions, will have no effect but to exit or significantly reduce MBS/CMB program activity as the cost of incremental capital required to meet the ACM constraint will make these activities unprofitable.”…”Unregulated companies may seek to increase their presence to fill some of the void in the supply of mortgages for the MBS/CMB program.”

I would like to read and link to the actual letter, but as far as Google and I know, the TCAC doesn’t have a web-site. Highly peculiar. However, an examination of their stationery does reveal a ‘phone number, so at least they are bravely coping with the technological advances of the 19th century.

As I have repeatedly stressed over the past two years, increased regulation will improve the competitive position of non-regulated entities; whether this involves market making and prop trading by hedge funds or, it appears, mortgage sourcing by small financial institutions.

One thing that interests me about the current situation is the economics of mortgage sourcing. The TCAC claims that incremental cost of capital will result in the activity becoming upprofitable, but will this apply to all players? If so, then logically the IFRS/ACM interaction will simply push up the price of mortgages from all regulated players. If not, then what is the difference? Gross Margins, net margins, cost of capital, or what?

One point emphasized by Mr. Critchley was:

One academic, who requested anonymity, argued that through the new rules, OSFI is effectively creating an unfair advantage for unregulated players in the mortgage market “I think the credit crisis has taught us that it’s better to have large-scale lending operations [such as residential mortgages] in line of sight of the regulators and for borrowers to have the capacity to balance sheet their production [using deposits] if capital markets become shaky.”

I’ll have to think about that one. In a crisis that involves a lock-up of the mortgage market, there’s not likely to be much balance sheet room to spare for even the best-capitalized institutions; both the Canadian and US authorities have injected money into the economy by buying securitized mortgage paper in immense blocks. Additionally, a big chunk of the credit crunch happened precisely because securitizers were balance-sheeting their production, albeit in different branches of the firms. Admittedly, they were retaining the credit risk in addition to the funding, but still the anonymous academic’s argument is unclear to me.

OSFI Becoming Even More Secretive?

Sunday, February 28th, 2010

Tara Perkins of the Globe & Mail claims:

Canada’s financial regulator has told banks and insurance companies they must finance any big takeovers by issuing new shares, making major acquisitions more difficult just as the country’s banks are at the height of their international prowess.

OSFI did not issue a written notice of its edict, but has been quietly advising the banks and insurers of the requirement. OSFI has told the financial institutions it oversees that it expects them to “finance material acquisitions through new equity,” spokesman Rod Giles said. “This is primarily because capital requirements are subject to significant change.”

Analysts who cover the banks say they were not aware that the regulator had told the institutions to pay for deals with new equity, but it’s likely the market would demand the same thing for any major deal because investors realize how important capital will be in the future.

Such secretiveness and back-door regulation is a disgrace if true – and OSFI has often demonstrated its contempt for investors – who are supposed to be the “third pillar” supporting bank safety.

Payoff Structure of Contingent Capital with Trigger = Conversion

Sunday, February 28th, 2010

As Assiduous Readers will know, I advocate that contingent capital be issued by banks with the conversion trigger being the decline of the common stock below a certain price; should conversion be triggered, the conversion into equity of the preferreds / Innovative Tier 1 Capital / Sub Debt should be at that same price.

The Conversion/Trigger price should be set at issue-time of the instrument and, I suggest, be one-half the issue-time price of the common in the case of Tier 1 Capital, with a factor of one-quarter applied for Tier 2 capital. Note that in such a case, Tier 2 capital will not be “gone concern” capital; it will be available to meet losses on a going-concern basis, but the small probability of the issuer’s common losing three-quarters of its value should make it easier, and cheaper, to sell.

Anyway, one nuance to this idea is that the conversion feature will be supportive of the preferreds price in times of stress, since the preferred will convert at face value into current market price of common.

In other words, say the price of both common and preferred has nearly, but not quite, halved, but the situation appears to be stabilizing. In such an event, some investors will buy the preferreds in the hope that conversion will be triggered since they will be paid full face value for the preferred in market value of the common. Therefore, the preferreds will be bid up – at least to some extent – in times of stress.

Let us say that issues exist such that the conversion/trigger price is $25, but the price of the preferreds has declined such that the effective conversion price is $20. The payoff diagram in terms of the common stock price then looks like this:


Click for Big

This diagram assumes that the conversion/strike price is $25, and that the preferreds are trading for 80% of face value.

Thus, an investor contemplating the purchase of the preferreds at 80% of face value will make $5 per share if the common dips just below the trigger price and stays there; he will only realize a loss if the price of the common goes below 80% of the conversion price. This is in addition to any calculations he might make as to the intrinsic value of the preferred if it doesn’t convert, of course.

This payoff diagram can be analyzed into component options:


Click for Big

In this diagram, I have offset the payoff diagrams for the options slightly in order that they be more readily distinguished.

It may be seen that the payoff structure can be replicated with three options:

  • Long Call, strike $20
  • Short Put, strike $20
  • Short Call, strike $25

What’s the point? Well, there isn’t one, really. But I wanted to point out the supportive effect of the conversion feature on the preferreds – even in times of stress! – and show how the payoffs could be replicated or hedged in such a case. Doubtless, more mulling over this dissection will lead to more conclusions being drawn about the relative behaviour of preferred and common prices in such a scenario of extreme stress.

Contingent Capital Criticized

Saturday, February 27th, 2010

The Telegraph recently published a story Mervyn King’s plan for bank capital ‘will backfire’:

Bankers and shareholders, however, fear that the act of converting cocos into equity would be a “red flag” to the market, prompting counterparties to withdraw funds and sparking a liquidity crisis like those at Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock. They say it would act as an “accelerator into distress”.

One senior bank executive said: “The point of conversion would kill the bank. Everyone would pull their liquidity out.” The sentiment was echoed by a leading institutional shareholder, who said: “Institutions don’t like them. If cocos ever converted, that bank would be toast.” Among investors, cocos are colloquially known as “death spiral convertibles”.

I agree that this is the case if there is any discretion at all in the conversion decision, whether this discretion is exercised by the regulators or the issuer. I will also agree that it may very well be the case if some degree of discretion is exercised – which would be the case if regulatory capital triggers are used. If a bank announces in its quarterly results enough losses and provisions to result in ratios being just under or just over the trigger point, there will be an immediate suspicion of jiggery-pokery.

However, I am more dubious about the potential for self-feeding collapse if the trigger I advocate – the price of the common stock – is utilized.

Bankers have also identified a second cause for concern, which they term “negative convexity”. They say coco holders would hedge their position by shorting the bank’s shares as capital ratios fell close to the conversion level.

Paul Berry, from Santander’s global banking and markets’ division, has explained: “As the share price falls, the likelihood increases of conversion. Holders, who do not wish to have any exposure to the share, sell shares to hedge this risk. This selling sends the stock lower, resulting in further stock selling.

“This will send the share price into a terrible self-reinforcing spiral downwards.”

Geez, it’s nice to see the phrase “negative convexity” used in a daily general interest newspaper! Negative convexity is indeed a problem; but one that can be minimized by ensuring that the trigger price is equal to the conversion price. I will certainly agree that the poorly structured Lloyds bank deal, which provides no first-loss protection to the noteholders on conversion, will definitely have that effect.

If structured properly and present in good quantity, contingent capital will simply replace the fire-sales of common shares that were common during the crisis. For instance:
1) Royal Bank sells contingent capital when their stock is trading at $50. In such a situation, I suggest that the conversion and trigger price for Tier 1 Capital (preferred shares and Innovative Tier 1 Capital) be $25.00 (one-half the issue-time price of the common; for Tier 2 Capital the conversion/trigger would be one-quarter of this price)
2) Royal Bank gets into trouble.
3) Share price drops to $25.
4) Royal Bank doesn’t need to sell equity. Instead, the previously issued Tier 1 Capital converts (at $25). They can sell new Tier 1 Capital with a conversion/trigger price of $12.50, instead.

It is, of course, certain that there will be selling pressure on the common when it’s at $30 from the Tier 1 Capital holders (directly and through the options market). However, in the absence of the convertible instruments, there will also be selling pressure based on expectations of new issuance. I suggest that the presence of Contingent Capital structured in this manner will reduce uncertainty, which is the vital thing.

I recently published an opinion piece on Contingent Capital.

Moody's Discusses Contingent Capital

Thursday, February 25th, 2010

Moody’s has discussed Rating considerations for contingent capital securities, which has made its way (via Info-Prod Research (Middle East)) to iStockAnalyst under the title Moody’s Publishes Rating Considerations for Bank Contingent Capital Securities:

Moody’s Investors Service said today in anew report that it would rate a contingent capital security that mayconvert into common equity only if it can reasonably assess when thesecurity’s conversion would likely occur. The rating on a bank’scontingent capital security, if it were to be rated, would likely be non-investment-grade, regardless of the bank’s financial strength.

“We will consider rating bank contingent capital securities that convertinto common equity, but only if their triggers are objective andmeasurable,” said Senior Vice President Barbara Havlicek. In determining whether a trigger is “objective and measurable,” Moody’sanalysis will focus on the definition of the trigger. For financial statement-based triggers, the analysis will include consideration of theaccounting principles used in the preparation of financial statements,the timing and intervals at which the trigger levels are beingdetermined, and the securities laws in a given jurisdiction that couldimpact the quality of financial reporting. Moody’s will not rate any contingent capital security where conversion into common equity is at the option of the issuing bank or is tied to the breach of triggers that are unrelated to the financial health of thebank. Moody’s will also not rate any contingent capital security thatuses a credit rating in a conversion trigger. Additionally, at this time, Moody’s will not rate contingent capital securities where conversion into common equity is subject to thediscretion of regulators or the breach of regulatory capital triggers.

As I’ve said before, using regulatory capital triggers is thoroughly insane. What if the prescribed calculation changes? What if the regulatory minimum rises above the trigger point?

.However, in the future, if clear regulatory rule sets develop that would significantly enhance the predictability of a triggering event, Moody’s may then assign a rating. Any rating Moody’s assigns to a contingent capital security would be no higher than the rating on the issuing bank’s non-cumulative preferredsecurities. The rating on the contingent capital security would also likely be non-investment-grade, regardless of the bank’s financial strength.

Opinion: Contingent Capital

Thursday, February 25th, 2010

The concept and implications of Contingent Capital have been discussed extensively on PrefBlog. This commentary has been distilled into an article published by Advisors’ Edge Report.

Look for the Opinion Link!

The draft version with footnotes is also available.