June 2, 2015

June 2nd, 2015

YiLi Chien of the St. Louis Fed writes a piece titled What Drives Long-Run Economic Growth?:

It has been shown, both theoretically and empirically, that technological progress is the main driver of long-run growth. The explanation is actually quite straightforward. Holding other input factors constant, the additional output obtained when adding one extra unit input of capital or labor will eventually decline, according to the law of diminishing returns. As a result, a country cannot maintain its long-run growth by simply accumulating more capital or labor. Therefore, the driver of long-run growth has to be technological progress.

ProductivityAndGrowth
Click for Legible

Good work by Canada, eh? We managed to beat Spain!

Nouriel Roubini, aka “Dr. Doom”, showed his total ignorance of markets:

So what accounts for the combination of macro liquidity and market illiquidity?

For starters, in equity markets, high-frequency traders (HFTs), who use algorithmic computer programs to follow market trends, account for a larger share of transactions. This creates, no surprise, herding behavior. Indeed, trading in the US nowadays is concentrated at the beginning and the last hour of the trading day, when HFTs are most active; for the rest of the day, markets are illiquid, with few transactions.

A second cause lies in the fact that fixed-income assets – such as government, corporate, and emerging-market bonds – are not traded in more liquid exchanges, as stocks are. Instead, they are traded mostly over the counter in illiquid markets.

Third, not only is fixed income more illiquid, but now most of these instruments – which have grown enormously in number, owing to the mushrooming issuance of private and public debts before and after the financial crisis – are held in open-ended funds that allow investors to exit overnight. Imagine a bank that invests in illiquid assets but allows depositors to redeem their cash overnight: if a run on these funds occurs, the need to sell the illiquid assets can push their price very low very fast, in what is effectively a fire sale.

Fourth, before the 2008 crisis, banks were market makers in fixed-income instruments. They held large inventories of these assets, thus providing liquidity and smoothing excess price volatility. But, with new regulations punishing such trading (via higher capital charges), banks and other financial institutions have reduced their market-making activity. So, in times of surprise that move bond prices and yields, the banks are not present to act as stabilizers.

This is the paradoxical result of the policy response to the financial crisis. Macro liquidity is feeding booms and bubbles; but market illiquidity will eventually trigger a bust and collapse.

With respect to his second point: exchange trading harms liquidity. It’s been shown time and time again … on an exchange, you get tighter spreads, but much less depth.

With respect to his fourth point … true enough as far as it goes, but it doesn’t go very far. Banks have been willing to keep large inventories for a few days, but not for much longer than that; and even then, only when their market intelligence gives them cause to believe that it’s just a greater than usual dose of greed or fear that’s causing a transient market move. When things are wild, they increase their spreads just as much as anybody else; when something fundamental is happening, they don’t stand in the way of the freight train. Their ability to smooth out transient spikes has been impaired by post-crisis regulation; they never had any ability to do more.

My own view is that post-crisis regulation has directly harmed liquidity of corporate bonds by the restrictions on inventory; but that it is financial repression that has harmed liquidity of Treasuries. New regulation has both increased the requirement for banks to hold treasuries, while the Fed’s low policy yields have decreased the incentive for anybody else to hold them. In fact, I will suggest that there are exactly two classes of investor holding US and Canadian government debt in significant size at the moment:

  • Regulated entities
  • Idiots

Remember the quotation from April 20:

Moreover, Gluskin Sheff + Associates chief economist David Rosenberg pointed out in a note to clients that 80 per cent of the new Treasuries supply over the past year have been bought by foreign central banks, pension funds, insurers, banks, and insurance companies.

If you want a liquid market, the most efficacious way of getting it is to ensure that the population of potential investors is heterogeneous … as much as possible, you want to ensure that no matter what is going on in the economy or in the marketplace, there is a broad group of participants who have a good reason to sell and a broad group of participants who have a good reason to buy. Treasury and Canada markets don’t have that at the moment.

But, on cue, there is some bearish growling from Europe:

Another bond market meltdown is brewing where the initial one began in April, in signs of a reinflating European economy.

Traders piled on sell orders from Germany to Italy on Tuesday as the first increase in consumer prices in the euro zone in six months suggests growth in the 19-nation economy and the risk of the return of the main nemesis of fixed-income investors: inflation.

SEC Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar made an interesting speech titled Capital Unbound: Remarks at the Cato Summit on Financial Regulation:

Over thirty years ago, economist Bruce Yandle famously coined the term “Bootleggers and Baptists” to describe a public choice theory of economics, which observes that, for regulation to endure, groups that otherwise have opposite points of view choose a regulatory structure that results in private benefits for both but perhaps is suboptimal for society.[1] In Yandle’s illustration, Baptists support laws that shut down all bars and liquor stores on Sundays. Bootleggers are also in favor of such laws, but for entirely different reasons. If Sunday closing laws are in place, both parties get their preferred outcome, and the rules are easy to administer. But if the problem is consumption of alcohol, Sunday closing laws merely shift the production and distribution of alcohol from one group — bars and liquor stores — to bootleggers, while giving a false impression that the public interest is being served. No pun intended.

Yandle described this regulatory approach as making complete sense, when viewed from the regulator’s perspective. A regulator, Yandle reasoned, is most focused on minimizing its costs, rather than the overall costs of the regulation. One example is the regulator’s cost of enforcement. A regulator may be inclined to favor rules that minimize the number of circumstances in which a mistake can be made; for instance, unless a lawmaker confuses the day of the week, it is clear under a Sunday closing law whether a bar or liquor store is required to be closed. It is less costly for a regulator to adopt simple, across-the-board rules that are easy to monitor and enforce than alternatives that take into account economic efficiency and distributional effects — how costs and benefits are distributed among different groups. One area where we see this result is private securities offerings.

I hadn’t realized that this concept was a formal economic theory!

I want to move beyond the artificial distinction between so-called “accredited” and “non-accredited” investors and challenge the notion that non-accredited investors are “being protected” when the government prohibits them from investing in high-risk securities. Here, I appeal to two well-known concepts from the field of financial economics. The first is the risk-return tradeoff. Because most investors are risk averse, riskier securities must offer investors higher returns. This means that prohibiting non-accredited investors from investing in high-risk securities is the same thing as prohibiting them from investing in high-return securities.

The second economic concept is modern portfolio theory. By holding a diversified portfolio of assets, investors reap the benefits of diversification; that is, the risk of the portfolio as a whole is lower than the risk of any individual asset. I do not have the time today to give a full lecture on the mathematics and statistics of portfolio diversification, so I will just assure you the correlation of returns is key. When adding higher-risk, higher-return securities to an existing portfolio, as long as the returns from the new securities are not perfectly positively correlated with (move in exactly the same direction as) the existing portfolio, investors can reap higher returns with little or no change in overall portfolio risk. In fact, if the correlations are low enough, the overall portfolio risk could actually decrease.

These two concepts show how even a well-intentioned investor protection policy can ultimately harm the very investors the policy is intended to protect. Moreover, restricting the number of accredited investors in the “privileged class” can have additional (or what economists call “second-order”) effects. The accredited investors may enjoy even higher returns because the non-accredited investors are prohibited from buying and bidding up the price of, high-risk, high-return securities. Remarkably, if you think about it, by allowing only high-income and high-net-worth individuals to reap the risk and return benefits from investing in certain securities, the government may actually exacerbate wealth inequality.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 23bp, FixedResets off 7bp and DeemedRetractibles down 9bp. Floaters got hammered (and, unusually, featured in the Volume Highlights, suggesting that somebody really wanted out!), but otherwise the Performance Highlights table is much shorter than has been the norm for the past six months! Volume was well below average.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150602
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 23.68 to be $1.30 rich, while TRP.PR.G, resetting 2020-11-30 at +296, is $0.59 cheap at its bid price of 24.80.

impVol_MFC_150602
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Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule). It is clear that the lowest spread issue, MFC.PR.F, is well off the relationship defined by the other issues, but this doesn’t resolve the conundrum – it just makes it more conundrous.

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 23.75 to be $0.84 rich, while MFC.PR.G, resetting at +290bp on 2016-12-19, is bid at 25.00 to be $0.72 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150602
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The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.Z, resetting at +296bp on 2017-12-31, bid at 24.50 to be $0.36 cheap. BAM.PF.G, resetting at +284bp 2020-6-30 is bid at 24.97 and appears to be $0.67 rich.

impVol_FTS_150602
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FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.14, looks $0.91 cheap and resets 2020-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 21.62 and is $0.31 rich.

pairs_FR_150602
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Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of about 0.50%, and are very nicely clustered today. On the junk side, three pairs are outside the range of the graph: FFH.PR.E / FFH.PR.F at -0.97%; AIM.PR.A / AIM.PR.B at -1.43%; and BRF.PR.A / BRF.PR.B at -1.38%.

pairs_FF_150602
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Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.8091 % 2,165.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.8091 % 3,785.6
Floater 3.54 % 3.60 % 60,998 18.24 3 -2.8091 % 2,301.7
OpRet 4.44 % -14.09 % 28,776 0.09 2 0.0000 % 2,782.9
SplitShare 4.60 % 4.47 % 70,145 3.32 3 -0.2545 % 3,242.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,544.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % 4.72 % 64,156 1.50 19 -0.1406 % 2,517.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.07 % 5.04 % 115,590 15.44 14 0.2329 % 2,771.1
FixedReset 4.45 % 3.74 % 260,257 16.56 86 -0.0721 % 2,385.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 3.42 % 110,781 0.88 34 -0.0902 % 2,633.5
FloatingReset 2.49 % 2.90 % 54,947 6.16 9 -0.1656 % 2,332.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -3.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 13.90
Evaluated at bid price : 13.90
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -3.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 14.29
Evaluated at bid price : 14.29
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.96 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 14.02
Evaluated at bid price : 14.02
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
BAM.PF.E FixedReset -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 22.12
Evaluated at bid price : 22.72
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 16.75
Evaluated at bid price : 16.75
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 16.52
Evaluated at bid price : 16.52
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
ENB.PF.E FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 20.48
Evaluated at bid price : 20.48
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
ENB.PF.A FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 20.59
Evaluated at bid price : 20.59
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 18.91
Evaluated at bid price : 18.91
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 22.48
Evaluated at bid price : 22.88
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 22.24
Evaluated at bid price : 22.54
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.T FixedReset 86,200 RBC crossed blocks of 35,000 and 34,700, both at 19.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 19.31
Evaluated at bid price : 19.31
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 71,061 Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 19.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 18.97
Evaluated at bid price : 18.97
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 54,189 TD crossed 47,400 at 14.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 14.02
Evaluated at bid price : 14.02
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
RY.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 52,290 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 39,484 TD crossed 24,500 at 14.58.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 14.29
Evaluated at bid price : 14.29
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
ENB.PF.A FixedReset 28,475 Nesbitt crossed 12,000 at 20.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 20.59
Evaluated at bid price : 20.59
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CM.PR.O FixedReset Quote: 24.13 – 24.65
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3823

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 22.90
Evaluated at bid price : 24.13
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %

BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.96 – 23.47
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.4108

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.96
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %

PVS.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 24.26 – 24.62
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2639

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2021-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.26
Bid-YTW : 5.07 %

CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.58 – 24.85
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1743

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 24.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.58
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %

CM.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 23.49 – 23.89
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3051

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 23.49
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.05 – 25.36
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2170

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 24.83
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.36 %

FTS.PR.I Debuts with Reasonable Bid, Zero Volume

June 2nd, 2015

Fortis Inc. has announced:

that 2,975,154 of its 10,000,000 issued and outstanding Cumulative Redeemable Five-Year Fixed Rate Reset First Preference Shares, Series H (“Series H Shares”) were tendered for conversion, on a one‑for‑one basis into Cumulative Redeemable Floating Rate First Preference Shares, Series I (“Series I Shares”). As a result of the conversion, Fortis has 7,024,846 Series H Shares and 2,975,154 Series I Shares issued and outstanding. The Series H Shares will continue to be listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) under the symbol FTS.PR.H. The Series I Shares will begin trading on the TSX today under the symbol FTS.PR.I.

The Series H Shares will pay on a quarterly basis, for the five-year period beginning on June 1, 2015, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Fortis, a fixed dividend based on an annual fixed dividend rate of 2.50 per cent.

The Series I Shares will pay a floating quarterly dividend for the five-year period beginning on June 1, 2015, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Fortis. The floating quarterly dividend rate for the Series I Shares for the first quarterly floating rate period (being the period from June 1, 2015 to but excluding September 1, 2015) is 2.10 per cent and will be reset every quarter based on the applicable 3-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill rate plus 1.45%.

For more information on the terms of, and risks associated with an investment in, the Series H Shares and the Series I Shares, please see the Corporation’s prospectus dated January 18, 2010 which can be found under the Corporation’s profile on SEDAR at www.sedar.com and on the Corporation’s website at www.fortisinc.com.

I am very pleased to see this news release, following the earlier policy of minimal communication.

The 30% conversion rate of FixedReset into FloatingReset is lower than it has been for most issues lately; perhaps the persistently poor pricing of FloatingResets is beginning to seep into the market’s consciousness!

Vital statistics for the two elements of the Strong Pair are:

FTS.PR.I FloatingReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 15.70
Evaluated at bid price : 15.70
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-02
Maturity Price : 16.14
Evaluated at bid price : 16.14
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
pairs_FR_150602
Click for Big

The FTS.PR.H / FTS.PR.I pair is at the high end of break-even T-Bill rates, but not impossibly so at 0.63% compared with an average of 0.49% for all investment-grade pairs. There are three junk pairs implying a negative three-month bill rate over the next five-odd years.

June 1, 2015

June 2nd, 2015

Fed Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer reiterated Fed caution:

When it comes to describing how the Federal Reserve will exit the zero-rate era, “liftoff” is all wrong, says Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer.

The term, dear to investors and headline writers, “is the most misleading word you can imagine,” he said on Monday in Toronto.

“Liftoff says we’re going straight up with the interest rate,” Fischer said during a question-and-answer session after a speech on financial crises. “Well, we’re going up with the interest rate, then along, and then another little jump. That’s not liftoff, that’s crawling.”

His remarks underline a theme hammered home by Fed officials in recent weeks: They won’t follow a predictable path in raising rates, and instead will be guided by the latest economic data.

This is a nice try – a very nice try – but only one shift? Regrettably, it belongs in the “stunt” category:

After Starboard Value took over the board of Darden Restaurants Inc., the hedge fund wanted its newly minted directors to have a feel for the business. So it put them to work.

Every board member worked a night in a restaurant, said Starboard Chief Executive Officer Jeff Smith, who also is Darden’s chairman. Smith said he waited on tables and served food in the kitchen.

“It was not undercover — everyone knew,” Smith said in an interview on Bloomberg Television’s “Market Makers” with Stephanie Ruhle and Erik Schatzker. “It was an amazing experience. We felt we could not make the decisions without knowing what was happening in the restaurants.”

Hopefully, the directors are spending a lot of time in the restaurants, talking to staff, even if they’re not trying to prove they’re mennathepeople.

I have more education complaints, this time about attracting foreign students to Canada:

Canadian officials are finding it difficult to keep up with the increasing demand from international students, leading to waiting times for visas that are weeks longer than those in Britain or the United States, and reducing the program’s competitiveness.

The lengthy timelines are contained in a report from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), obtained by The Globe and Mail through freedom of information legislation. While the federal government wants to double the number of students from abroad by 2022, it has not provided sufficient resources to process the increased numbers, the report says. CIC blames this “lack of coordination” between federal departments for an increase of 30 per cent in processing times for study permits and a doubling of the time for temporary resident visas.

The report also recommends clarifying what role international students play in Canada’s overall immigration strategy. The goal of doubling student numbers was set by a 2012 panel as a way to fill labour-market shortages and increase global economic links. But those economic needs can’t be met without government co-ordination, said the panel’s chair.

Foreign students are great! They pay high fees (and therefore probably come from reasonably well-off families), they may well immigrate – with Canadian qualifications, which will help get a first job – and if they don’t immigrate, then they’ll at least live their lives not only knowing that we don’t all live in igloos, but (with luck) having a soft spot for us. I cannot understand why this programme is understaffed.

It was another disappointing day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 2bp, FixedResets losing 19bp and DeemedRetractibles off 1bp. The lengthy Performance Highlights table is dominated by losing FixedResets. Volume was average.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150601
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 23.50 to be $1.10 rich, while TRP.PR.G, resetting 2020-11-30 at +296, is $0.68 cheap at its bid price of 24.76.

impVol_MFC_150601
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Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 23.60 to be $0.64 rich, while MFC.PR.G, resetting at +290bp on 2016-12-19, is bid at 25.01 to be $0.69 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150601
Click for Big

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PF.B, resetting at +263bp on 2019-3-31, bid at 22.90 to be $0.43 cheap. BAM.PF.G, resetting at +284bp 2020-6-30 is bid at 24.91 and appears to be $0.56 rich.

impVol_FTS_150601
Click for Big

FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.06, looks $0.92 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 21.79 and is $0.47 rich.

pairs_FR_150601
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of about 0.50%, and are very nicely clustered today. On the junk side, four pairs are outside the range of the graph: FFH.PR.E / FFH.PR.F at -1.02%; AIM.PR.A / AIM.PR.B at -0.91%; BRF.PR.A / BRF.PR.B at -1.83%; and FFH.PR.C / FFH.PR.D at +1.00%.

pairs_FF_150601
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.4746 % 2,227.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.4746 % 3,895.1
Floater 3.45 % 3.50 % 56,594 18.45 3 -1.4746 % 2,368.2
OpRet 4.44 % -14.24 % 29,960 0.09 2 0.0395 % 2,782.9
SplitShare 4.59 % 4.47 % 68,554 3.33 3 -0.2005 % 3,250.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0395 % 2,544.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % 3.99 % 61,593 0.41 19 0.0434 % 2,520.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.08 % 5.06 % 115,767 15.38 14 -0.0151 % 2,764.7
FixedReset 4.44 % 3.76 % 264,096 16.58 86 -0.1933 % 2,386.7
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 3.41 % 107,115 0.88 34 -0.0059 % 2,635.8
FloatingReset 2.43 % 2.91 % 54,502 6.14 8 -0.0907 % 2,336.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -3.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 14.71
Evaluated at bid price : 14.71
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -2.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 19.41
Evaluated at bid price : 19.41
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -2.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.63
Bid-YTW : 7.19 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 16.06
Evaluated at bid price : 16.06
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 14.38
Evaluated at bid price : 14.38
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset -1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 19.01
Evaluated at bid price : 19.01
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 18.76
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 18.72
Evaluated at bid price : 18.72
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 14.30
Evaluated at bid price : 14.30
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
ENB.PR.J FixedReset -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 14.75
Evaluated at bid price : 14.75
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 18.46
Evaluated at bid price : 18.46
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 24.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 19.28
Evaluated at bid price : 19.28
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 17.75
Evaluated at bid price : 17.75
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 18.21
Evaluated at bid price : 18.21
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
BAM.PF.F FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
GWO.PR.S Deemed-Retractible 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 22.23
Evaluated at bid price : 22.58
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.10
Bid-YTW : 6.40 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.30
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 174,900 Desjardins crossed 166,700 at 22.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 22.29
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 4.97 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 100,240 Called for redemption 2015-6-19.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
ENB.PR.D FixedReset 29,342 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 18.68
Evaluated at bid price : 18.68
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 26,478 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.63
Bid-YTW : 7.19 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 24,862 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 21.49
Evaluated at bid price : 21.85
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 24,065 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.73
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.54 – 26.49
Spot Rate : 0.9500
Average : 0.5414

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : -11.39 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 18.32 – 18.99
Spot Rate : 0.6700
Average : 0.4250

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 18.32
Evaluated at bid price : 18.32
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 19.41 – 19.93
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3772

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 19.41
Evaluated at bid price : 19.41
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 24.10 – 24.56
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3233

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %

TRP.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 14.71 – 15.13
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.3101

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 14.71
Evaluated at bid price : 14.71
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %

ENB.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 20.30 – 20.60
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2103

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-06-01
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %

New Issue: Loblaw 5.30% Straight

June 2nd, 2015

Loblaw Companies Limited has announced:

a domestic public offering of 6 million cumulative Second Preferred Shares, Series B (the “Preferred Shares Series B”) at a price of $25.00 per share, to yield 5.30% per annum, for an aggregate gross amount of $150 million.

Loblaw has agreed to sell the Preferred Shares Series B to a syndicate of underwriters co-led by RBC Capital Markets, Scotiabank and TD Securities Inc. on a bought deal basis. Loblaw has granted to the underwriters an option to purchase an additional $50 million of the Preferred Shares Series B at any time up to 48 hours prior to closing.

The Preferred Shares Series B will be offered by way of prospectus supplement under the short form base shelf prospectus of Loblaw dated March 19, 2015. The prospectus supplement will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in all provinces of Canada.

Loblaw also announced that it intends to redeem all of its outstanding Second Preferred Shares, Series A (TSX:L.PR.A) (the “Preferred Shares Series A”) for cash on July 31, 2015 (“redemption date”). The redemption price for each Preferred Share Series A will be $25.00. Holders of Preferred Shares Series A will separately receive all accrued and unpaid dividends outstanding on the redemption date. Loblaw intends to use the net proceeds of the issue of Preferred Shares Series B to partially fund the redemption of its Preferred Shares Series A. The offering is expected to close on or about June 9, 2015.

Later, they announced:

that as a result of strong investor demand for its offering that was announced earlier today, it has agreed to increase the size of the offering from 6 million to 9 million cumulative Second Preferred Shares, Series B (the “Preferred Shares Series B”) at a price of $25.00 per share, to yield 5.30% per annum, for an aggregate gross amount of $225 million. In addition, there will not be an underwriters’ option as was previously granted.

Loblaw has agreed to sell the Preferred Shares Series B to a syndicate of underwriters co-led by RBC Capital Markets, Scotiabank and TD Securities Inc. on a bought deal basis.

The Preferred Shares Series B will be offered by way of prospectus supplement under the short form base shelf prospectus of Loblaw dated March 19, 2015. The prospectus supplement will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in all provinces of Canada.

Loblaw also announced that it intends to redeem all of its outstanding Second Preferred Shares, Series A (TSX: L.PR.A) (the “Preferred Shares Series A”) for cash on July 31, 2015 (“redemption date”). The redemption price for each Preferred Share Series A will be $25.00. Holders of Preferred Shares Series A will separately receive all accrued and unpaid dividends outstanding on the redemption date. Loblaw intends to use the net proceeds of the issue of Preferred Shares Series B to partially fund the redemption of its Preferred Shares Series A. The offering is expected to close on or about June 9, 2015.

The redemption of L.PR.A has been reported previously.

It’s quite a treat to see another Straight issue being issued hard on the heels of the last one, although there are some among us who might mutter darkly that 40bp isn’t much of a spread for such a wide credit jump (Loblaw is Pfd-3 vs. Royal Bank’s Pfd-2, according to DBRS; P-3(high) vs. P-2, according to S&P).

This issue also looks a little rich when compared to the closest comparables – Straights from its parent, Weston:

WN Straights
Ticker Dividend Quote
2015-6-1
Bid YTW
WN.PR.A 1.45 25.29-35 Negative
(immediate call)
WN.PR.C 1.30 24.39-83 5.41%
WN.PR.D 1.30 24.79-95 5.32%
WN.PR.E 1.1875 23.68-71 5.08%

WN.PR.C appears to have lost its bid today; it was quoted at 24.81-90 on Friday May 29. Still, I think a 5.40% or 5.45% coupon would have been more appropriate, giving a tiny bit of compensation for a tiny amount of extra call risk, and 10bp as a new issue concession … but, with a 3% commission on sales, it’s doing well anyway!

Update, 2015-6-3: Rated Pfd-3 by DBRS.

TRP.PR.B To Reset At 2.152%

June 1st, 2015

TransCanada Corporation has announced:

that it has notified the registered shareholder of its Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series 3 (Series 3 Shares) of the Conversion Privilege and Dividend Rate Notice.

Beginning on June 1, 2015 and ending on June 15, 2015, holders of the Series 3 Shares will have the right to choose one of the following options with regard to their shares:
1.To retain any or all of their Series 3 Shares and continue to receive a fixed quarterly dividend; or
2.To convert, on a one-for-one basis, any or all of their Series 3 Shares into Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series 4 (Series 4 Shares) of TransCanada and receive a floating quarterly dividend.

Holders of the Series 3 Shares and the Series 4 Shares will have the opportunity to convert their shares again on June 30, 2020, and every five years thereafter as long as the shares remain outstanding.

Effective June 1, 2015, the Annual Fixed Dividend Rate for the Series 3 shares was set for the next five year period at 2.152%.

Effective June 1, 2015, the Floating Quarterly Dividend for the Series 4 Shares was set for the first Quarterly Floating Rate Period (being the period from and including June 30, 2015, to but excluding September 30, 2015) at 1.945%. The Floating Quarterly Dividend Rate will be reset every quarter.

The Series 3 Shares are issued in “book entry only” form and, as such, the sole registered holder of the Series 3 Shares is the Canadian Depositary for Securities Limited (CDS). All rights of beneficial holders of Series 3 Shares must be exercised through CDS or the CDS participant through which the Series 3 Shares are held. The deadline for the registered shareholder to provide notice of exercise of the right to convert Series 3 Shares into Series 4 Shares is 3 p.m. (MDT)/ 5 p.m. (EDT) on June 15, 2015. Any notices received after this deadline will not be valid. As such, holders of Series 3 Shares who wish to exercise their right to convert their shares should contact their broker or other intermediary for more information and it is recommended that this be done well in advance of the deadline in order to provide the broker or other intermediary with time to complete the necessary steps.

For more information on the terms of, and risks associated with an investment in, the Series 3 Shares and the Series 4 Shares, please see the Corporation’s prospectus supplement dated March 4, 2010 which is available on sedar.com or on the Corporation’s website.

TRP.PR.B has paid 4.00% over the past five years, so the change in dividend represents a cut of 46%. Ouch! +128 is a pretty skinny spread!

TRP.PR.B was announced 2010-3-4 and commenced trading 2010-3-11. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset subindex.

Note that holders of TRP.PR.B have the right, until 5:00 p.m. (ET) on Monday, June 15, 2015, to notify the company that they wish to convert to the new FloatingReset series – the two series will be interconvertible every five years for as long as they exist. Note that brokers will have earlier internal deadlines.

I will post regarding my opinion on whether to retain or convert TRP.PR.B closer to the deadline; until then, contemplate today’s graph of FixedReset/FloatingReset Strong Pairs:

pairs_FR_150601
Click for Big

The Investment Grade pairs are very well-behaved today, with implied break-even 3-Month T-Bill rates in a nice cluster between 0.31% and 0.63%, with an average of 0.48%.

Estimate of TRP.PR.? FloatingReset Trading Price In Current Conditions
  Assumed FloatingReset
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
FixedReset Bid Price Spread 0.30% +0.45% +0.60%
TRP.PR.B 14.71 128bp 14.10 14.26 14.42

So at this point, it appears that holders of TRP.PR.B who wish to own the FloatingReset issue would be better advised not to convert, but to swap on the market; this will result in a small cash take-out provided that the new pair trades in line with extant pairs, which is by no means guaranteed.

SLF.PR.G To Reset At 2.275%

June 1st, 2015

Sun Life Financial Inc. has announced:

the applicable dividend rates for its Class A Non-Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares Series 8R (the “Series 8R Shares”) and Class A Non-Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares Series 9QR (the “Series 9QR Shares”).

With respect to any Series 8R Shares that remain outstanding after June 30, 2015, commencing as of such date, holders thereof will be entitled to receive non-cumulative preferential cash dividends on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Sun Life Financial and subject to the Insurance Companies Act (Canada). The dividend rate for the five-year period commencing on June 30, 2015 to but excluding June 30, 2020 will be 2.275 % per annum or $0.142188 per share per quarter, being equal to the sum of the Government of Canada Yield, as defined in the terms of the Series 8R Shares, on Monday, June 1, 2015 plus 1.41%, as determined in accordance with the terms of the Series 8R Shares.

With respect to any Series 9QR Shares that may be issued on June 30, 2015, holders thereof will be entitled to receive floating rate non-cumulative preferential cash dividends on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Sun Life Financial and subject to the Insurance Companies Act (Canada), based on a dividend rate equal to the sum of the T-Bill Rate, as defined in the terms of the Series 9QR Shares, plus 1.41% (calculated on the basis of the actual number of days elapsed in such Quarterly Floating Rate Period divided by 365 days), subject to certain adjustments in accordance with the terms of the Series 9QR Shares. The dividend rate for the period commencing on June 30, 2015 to but excluding September 30, 2015 will be equal to 2.075 % per annum or $0.130753 per share, as determined in accordance with the terms of the Series 9QR Shares.

Beneficial owners of Series 8R Shares who wish to exercise their right of conversion should communicate as soon as possible with their broker or other nominee and ensure that they follow their instructions in order to meet the deadline to exercise such right, which is 5:00 p.m. (ET) on Monday, June 15, 2015.

An application will be made to list the Series 9QR Shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

SLF.PR.G has paid 4.35% over the past five years, so the change in dividend represents a cut of 48%. Ouch!

SLF.PR.G was announced 2010-5-13 and commenced trading 2010-5-25. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset subindex. As it is an insurance issue, it is my opinion that OSFI will – eventually – apply the NVCC rules to it and as it is not NVCC-compliant, it is my further opinion that it will be redeemed on or before a certain date. For analytical purposes, I have currently set that date to be 2025-1-31; it will probably be pushed back a year or two as OSFI’s foot-dragging with respect to the Life Insurance Regulatory Framework continues. You may agree or disagree with me as you wish; at present, the performance of insurance issues suggests the market as a whole disagrees.

Note that holders of SLF.PR.G have the right, until 5:00 p.m. (ET) on Monday, June 15, 2015, to notify the company that they wish to convert to the new FloatingReset series – the two series will be interconvertible every five years for as long as they exist. Note that brokers will have earlier internal deadlines.

I will post regarding my opinion on whether to retain or convert SLF.PR.G closer to the deadline; until then, contemplate today’s graph of FixedReset/FloatingReset Strong Pairs:

pairs_FR_150601
Click for Big

The Investment Grade pairs are very well-behaved today, with implied break-even 3-Month T-Bill rates in a nice cluster between 0.31% and 0.63%, with an average of 0.48%.

Estimate of SLF.PR.? FloatingReset Trading Price In Current Conditions
  Assumed FloatingReset
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
FixedReset Bid Price Spread 0.30% +0.45% +0.60%
SLF.PR.G 16.63 141bp 16.02 16.18 16.34

So at this point, it appears that holders of SLF.PR.G who wish to own the FloatingReset issue would be better advised not to convert, but to swap on the market; this will result in a small cash take-out provided that the new pair trades in line with extant pairs, which is by no means guaranteed.

L.PR.A To Be Redeemed

June 1st, 2015

Loblaw Companies Limited has announced (as part of their new issue announcement):

that it intends to redeem all of its outstanding Second Preferred Shares, Series A (TSX:L.PR.A) (the “Preferred Shares Series A”) for cash on July 31, 2015 (“redemption date”). The redemption price for each Preferred Share Series A will be $25.00. Holders of Preferred Shares Series A will separately receive all accrued and unpaid dividends outstanding on the redemption date. Loblaw intends to use the net proceeds of the issue of Preferred Shares Series B to partially fund the redemption of its Preferred Shares Series A. The offering is expected to close on or about June 9, 2015.

This is not really the biggest surprise in the world – L.PR.A is an OperatingRetractible paying 5.95% which becomes redeemable at par on 2015-7-31 and also becomes retractible for shares on that date.

How times change! When this issue was announced 2008-6-11 I opined that it looked expensive and when it commenced trading 2008-6-20 it turned out that the market agreed with me.

Doubtless this will cause a certain amount of angst for some investors … given the imminent redemption of MFC.PR.A the ranks of OperatingRetractibles are dwindling quickly!

MAPF Performance: May 2015

May 31st, 2015

The fund slightly outperformed the TXPR index in May (the BMO-CM “50” index returns are not yet available), a month marked by a good upswing in the first half and steady losses in the second half.

ZPR, is an ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues and a very high proportion of junk issues, returned +%, +% and +% over the past one-, three- and twelve-month periods, respectively (according to the fund’s data), versus returns for the TXPL index of -0.20%, -1.52% and -7.38% respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $1,099-million $1,111-million since inception in November 2012; AUM declined by $12-million in May; given an index return of -0.20% a decrease of about $2-million was expected, so in May 2015 the fund had a relatively rare cash outflow. I feel that the flows into and out of this fund are very important in determining the performance of its constituents.

TXPR had returns over one-, three- and twelve-months of -0.49%, -1.39% and -3.11% respectively with CPD performance within expectations.

Returns for the HIMIPref™ investment grade sub-indices for the month were as follows:

HIMIPref™ Indices
Performance to May 29, 2015
Sub-Index 1-Month 3-month
Ratchet N/A N/A
FixFloat N/A N/A
Floater -0.59% -1.81%
OpRet +0.58% +0.90%
SplitShare +0.78% +1.41%
Interest N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium +0.05% +0.14%
PerpetualDiscount -0.45% -1.35%
FixedReset -0.11% -0.48%
DeemedRetractible -0.42% -0.58%
FloatingReset +0.66% +0.50%

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close May 29, 2015, was $9.8993

Returns to May 29, 2015
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month -0.37% -0.52% -0.49% N/A
Three Months +0.37% -0.72% -1.31% N/A
One Year -1.69% -3.36% -3.11% -3.36%
Two Years (annualized) +0.41% -1.49% -1.68% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +3.47% +0.66% +0.69% +0.24%
Four Years (annualized) +2.46% +1.47% +1.34% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +6.97% +4.49% +3.81% +3.25%
Six Years (annualized) +9.05% +5.60% +4.56%  
Seven Years (annualized) +11.43% +3.99% +3.06%  
Eight Years (annualized) +10.30% +3.23%    
Nine Years (annualized) +9.72% +2.98%    
Ten Years (annualized) +9.26% +2.99%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +9.35% +3.33%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +10.30% +3.40%    
Thirteen Years (annualized) +10.00% +3.74%    
Fourteen Years (annualized) +10.45% +3.60%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.10%, -0.93% and -0.68%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +1.84%; five year is +4.65%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Class Adv [into which was merged Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund)] (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.42%, -1.76% & N/A, respectively.
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.36%, -1.02% & -2.16%, respectively. Three year performance is +1.49%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are -0.46%, -1.32% and -3.46% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is -0.21%, -1.41% and -7.75% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively. Two year performance is -4.95%.
Figures for NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund (Dividend Tax Credit Class, the best performing) are +%, +% and +% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund are -1.64% and -3.03% for the past three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for PowerShares Canadian Preferred Share Index Class, Series Fare -0.36%, -2.46% and -4.49% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The three- and five-year figures are -1.03% and +2.18%, respectively.
Figures for the First Asset Preferred Share Investment Trust (PSF.UN) are -0.22%, -2.27% and -4.93% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The two-, three-, four- and five-year figures are -3.43%, -1.11%, -0.67% and +1.26%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past four years has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. Until the market became so grossly segmented, there were many comparables for any given issue – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio was, in effect ‘locked in’ to the low coupon DeemedRetractibles due to projected long-term gains from a future OSFI decision to the detriment of trading gains, particularly in May, 2013, when the three lowest-coupon SLF DeemedRetractibles (SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were the worst performing DeemedRetractibles in the sub-index, and in June, 2013, when the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles behaved like PerpetualDiscounts in a sharply negative market. Nowadays, the fund is ‘locked-in’ to the low-spread FixedResets from these companies: GWO.PR.N, MFC.PR.F, and SLF.PR.G.

In May, insurance DeemedRetractibles performed worse than bank DeemedRetractibles:

DR_1MoPerf_150529
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… and a little worse than Unregulated Straight Perpetuals.

insPerp_1MoPerf_150529
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Correlations were very poor for banks (5%; not shown), not much good for insurance (9%; not shown) but quite reasonable for unregulated issues (52%).

A lingering effect of the downdraft of 2013 has been the return of measurable Implied Volatility but given my recent updates in recent daily market reports, I will not discuss them further in this post.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles; something that dismays me, particularly given that the market does not yet agree with me regarding the insurance issues! There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is very often irrational and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
June 10.5877 5.09% 0.998 5.100% 1.0000 $0.5395
September 10.4601 5.28% 0.997 5.296% 1.0000 $0.5540
December, 2014 10.5701 4.83% 1.009 4.787% 1.0000 $0.5060
March, 2015 9.9573 4.99% 1.001 4.985% 1.0000 $0.4964
May, 2015 9.8993 5.25% 0.989 5.308% 1.0000 $0.5255
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The same reasoning is also applied to FixedResets from these issuers, other than explicitly defined NVCC from banks.

Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.
Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates. For May, 2015, yields of 1.05% and 0.61%, respectively, were assumed.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible, SplitShare and NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on May 29; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas (set at 1.40% for the December 31 calculation and 0.88% for the March 31 calculation) to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

I no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as the fund has only a small position in these issues.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Dividend Yield” of 4.5% as of August 29, 2014, but this is the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF was 4.89% as of August 29, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s a little higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to discuss it in the context of portfolio reporting is misleading.

However, BMO has taken a significant step forward in that they are no longer reporting the “Portfolio Yield” directly on their website; the information is taken from the “Enhanced Fund Profile” which is available only as a PDF link. CPD doesn’t report this metric on the CPD fact sheet or on their website. I may have one less thing to mock the fundcos about!

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance has generally been due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

Low Spread FixedResets: May 2015

May 31st, 2015

As noted in MAPF Portfolio Composition: May 2015, the fund now has a large allocation to FixedResets, mostly of relatively low spread.

Many of these were largely purchased with proceeds of sales of DeemedRetractibles from the same issuer; it is interesting to look at the price trend of some of the Straight/FixedReset pairs. We’ll start with GWO.PR.N / GWO.PR.I; the fund sold the latter to buy the former at a takeout of about $1.00 in mid-June, 2014; relative prices over the past year are plotted as:

GWOPRN_GWOPRI_bidDiff_150529
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Given that the May month-end take-out was $6.46, this is clearly a trade that has not worked out very well.

In July, 2014, I reported sales of SLF.PR.D to purchase SLF.PR.G at a take-out of about $0.15:

SLFPRG_SLFPRD_bidDiff_150529
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There were similar trades in August, 2014 (from SLF.PR.C) at a take-out of $0.35. The April month-end take-out (bid price SLF.PR.D less bid price SLF.PR.G) was $5.61, so that hasn’t worked very well either.

November saw the third insurer-based sector swap, as the fund sold MFC.PR.C to buy the FixedReset MFC.PR.F at a post-dividend-adjusted take-out of about $0.85 … given a May month-end take-out of about $4.88, that’s another regrettable trade, although another piece executed in December at a take-out of $1.57 has less badly.

MFCPRF_MFCPRC_bidDiff_150529
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This trend is not restricted to the insurance sector, which I expect will become subject to NVCC rules in the relatively near future and are thus subject to the same redemption assumptions I make for DeemedRetractibles. Other pairs of interest are BAM.PR.X / BAM.PR.N:

BAMPRX_BAMPRN_bidDiff_150529
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… and FTS.PR.H / FTS.PR.J:

FTSPRH_FTSPRJ_bidDiff_150529
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… and PWF.PR.P / PWF.PR.S:

PWFPRP_PWFPRS_bidDiff_150529
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I will agree that the fund’s trades highlighted in this post may be decried as cases of monumental bad timing, but I should point out that in May, 2014, the fund was 63.9% Straight / 9.5% FixedReset while in May 2015 the fund was 11% Straight / 82% FixedReset, FloatingReset and FixedFloater (The latter figures include allocations from those usually grouped as ‘Scraps’). Given that the indices are roughly 30% Straight / 60% FixedReset & FloatingReset, it is apparent that the fund was extremely overweighted in Straights / underweighted in FixedResets in May 2014 but this situation has now reversed. HIMIPref™ analytics have been heavily favouring low-spread issues and the fund’s holdings are overwhelmingly of this type.

Summarizing the charts above in tabular form, we see:

FixedReset Straight Take-out
December 2013
Take-out
MAPF Trade
Take-out
December 2014
Take-out
April 2015
May 2015
GWO.PR.N
3.65%+130
GWO.PR.I
4.5%
($0.04) $1.00 $2.95 $5.69 6.46
SLF.PR.G
4.35%+141
SLF.PR.D
4.45%
($1.29) $0.25 $2.16 $6.25 5.61
MFC.PR.F
4.20%+141
MFC.PR.C
4.50%
($1.29) $0.86 $1.20 $5.35 4.98
BAM.PR.X
4.60%+180
BAM.PR.N
4.75%
($2.06)   $0.17 $4.18 3.62
FTS.PR.H
4.25%+145
FTS.PR.J
4.75%
$0.60   $5.68 $8.07 8.02
PWF.PR.P
4.40%+160
PWF.PR.S
4.80%
($0.67)   $3.00 $6.50 6.71
The ‘Take-Out’ is the bid price of the Straight less the bid price of the FixedReset; approximate execution prices are used for the “MAPF Trade” column. Bracketted figures in the ‘Take-Out’ columns indicate a ‘Pay-Up’

There was not much change from April month-end to May month-end.

In January, a slow decline due to fears of deflation got worse with Canada yields plummeting after the Bank of Canada rate cut with speculation rife about future cuts although this slowly died away.

And in late March / early April it got worse again, with one commenter attributing at least some of the blame to the John Heinzl piece in which I pointed out the expected reduction in dividend payouts! In May, a rise in the markets in the first half of the month was promptly followed by a slow decline in the latter half; perhaps due to increased fears that a lousy Canadian economy will delay a Canadian tightening.

All in all, I take the view that we’ve seen this show before: during the Credit Crunch, Floaters got hit extremely badly (to the point at which their fifteen year total return was negative) because (as far as I can make out) their dividend rate was dropping (as it was linked to Prime) while the yields on other perpetual preferred instruments were skyrocketing (due to credit concerns). Thus, at least some investors insisted on getting long term corporate yields from rates based (indirectly and with a lag, in the case of FixedResets) on short-term government policy rates. And it’s happening again!

Here’s the May performance for FixedResets that had a YTW Scenario of ‘To Perptuity’ at mid-month.:

FR_1MoPerf_150529
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The market continues to be rather disorderly; correlations between Issue Reset Spread and monthly performance for May are basically zero. Interestingly, the correlation for the Pfd-2 Group issues against term to reset was a little better, although still lousy at 12%.

FR_1MoPerf_Term_150529
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MAPF Portfolio Composition: May, 2015

May 31st, 2015

Turnover declined precipitously in May, to about 7%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped was the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) in early 2013 – many of the PerpetualPremiums had negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! While market weakness since the peak of the PerpetualDiscount subindex in May, 2013, has mitigated the situation somewhat, the population of PerpetualDiscounts is still exceeded by that of PerpetualPremiums – many of which are trading at a negative Yield-to-Worst.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to further footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on May 29 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2015-5-29
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 3.9% (+0.4) 4.72% 5.50
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 1.0% (0) 5.46% 14.63
Fixed-Reset 66.2% (-2.1) 5.43% 11.20
Deemed-Retractible 9.7% (-0.3) 5.51% 7.74
FloatingReset 7.1% (0) 3.32% 18.99
Scraps (Various) 11.0% (+0.9) 5.90% 14.63
Cash 1.1% (+1.1) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.25% 11.32
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming a constant GOC-5 rate of 1.05% and a constant 3-Month Bill rate of 0.61%

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2015-5-29
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 18.3% (-0.6)
Pfd-2(high) 29.3% (-6.2)
Pfd-2 0%
Pfd-2(low) 40.2% (+4.7)
Pfd-3(high) 1.8% (0)
Pfd-3 4.4% (0)
Pfd-3(low) 4.3% (+1.0)
Pfd-4(high) 0% (-0.7)
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0% (0)
Pfd-5(high) 0% (0)
Pfd-5 0.5% (0)
Cash 1.1% (+1.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end.
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.C, which is rated P-5 by S&P and is unrated by DBRS
A position held in NPI.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3(high)” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3(high).
A position held in INE.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3.

There was some shifting from Pfd-2(high) to Pfd-2(low); this was due largely to sales of BNS.PR.Z throughout the month at prices ranging from 23.20 to 23.78 and purchases HSE.PR.A at prices ranging from 17.20 to 17.89; BAM.PR.X at 18.01 to 18.74; and BAM.PR.R at 21.05 to 21.39.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2015-5-29
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 2.6% (0)
$50,000 – $100,000 2.2% (0)
$100,000 – $200,000 40.4% (+7.9)
$200,000 – $300,000 38.0% (-3.7)
>$300,000 15.6% (-4.3)
Cash 1.1% (+1.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is less exposed to Straight Perpetuals (including DeemedRetractibles)
    • MAPF is less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF is overweighted in FixedResets