AQN.PR.A Upgraded to P-3(high) from P-3 by S&P

October 11th, 2013

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • We are raising our long-term corporate credit rating on Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. (APUC) and subsidiaries Algonquin Power Co. (APCO) and Liberty Utilities Co. to ‘BBB’ from ‘BBB-‘.
  • We are also raising our senior unsecured debt rating on APCO to ‘BBB’ from ‘BBB-‘.
  • In addition, we are raising our global scale and Canada scale preferred stock ratings on APUC to ‘BB+’ and ‘P-3 (High)’ from ‘BB’ and ‘P-3’, respectively.
  • We base the upgrade on the increase in regulated cash flow, which is currently at 40%-45% of consolidated cash flow and which we forecast will continue to increase in the medium term.
  • The stable outlook reflects our assessment of relatively stable cash flows supported by regulated cash flow from Liberty’s regulated utility business and APCO’s largely contracted power asset portfolio.


The stable outlook reflects our assessment of relatively stable cash flows, supported by regulated cash flow from Liberty’s regulated utility business, and APCO’s largely contracted power asset portfolio.

We could take a negative rating action if APUC fails to execute its development projects and acquisitions with financing arrangements that allow it to maintain its key financial measures. We expect APUC to achieve AFFO-to-total debt of greater than 15% within the next 12 to 24 months, with at least 45% of its consolidated cash flows supported by regulated cash flows from Liberty. Failure to achieve this expectation could also result in a negative rating action.

We could raise the rating if APUC achieves sustained AFFO-to-debt of greater than 25%, with a higher proportion of cash flow contributions from Liberty, all else being equal.

TXPR / TXPL Index Revision

October 11th, 2013

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

the following index changes as a result of the quarterly S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index and S&P/TSX Venture Select Index Reviews. These changes will be effective at the open on Monday, October 21, 2013.

S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index

ADDITIONS
Symbol Issue Name CUSIP
BMO.PR.R BANK OF MONTREAL FLTG RATE CL ‘B’ PR SER 17 063671 77 0
BNS.PR.O BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA (THE) PR SERIES ’17’ 064149 75 0
FTS.PR.K FORTIS INC. 1ST PR SERIES ‘K’ 349553 78 4
L.PR.A LOBLAW COMPANIES LIMITED 2ND PR SERIES ‘A’ 539481 60 6
PPL.PR.A PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION CL ‘A’ PR SER 1 706327 20 2
POW.PR.D POWER CORPORATION OF CANADA 5.00% SER ‘D’ PR 739239 86 1
POW.PR.A POWER CORPORATION OF CANADA 5.60% SER ‘A’ PR 739239 88 7
RY.PR.G ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 1ST PR NON-CUM SER ‘AG’ 780102 55 4
TD.PR.T TORONTO-DOMINION BANK(THE) FLTG RT PR SER T 891145 72 4
W.PR.H WESTCOAST ENERGY INC. 5.50% 1ST PR SERIES ‘7’ 95751D 88 8
DELETIONS
Symbol Issue Name CUSIP
CIU.PR.B CU INC. CUMULATIVE PR SERIES ‘2’ 22944C 30 4

S&P/TSX Preferred Share Laddered Index

ADDITIONS
Symbol Issue Name CUSIP
PPL.PR.A PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION CL ‘A’ PR SER 1 706327 20 2

October 10, 2013

October 10th, 2013

Maneuvering continues on the US debt limit:

The White House endorsed a short debt-limit increase with no policy conditions attached, signaling potential support for House Republicans’ plan for a month-long reprieve from a default.

The idea, proposed today by House Speaker John Boehner, wouldn’t end the 10-day old partial shutdown of the federal government. The plan would push the lapse of U.S. borrowing authority to Nov. 22 from Oct. 17.

It was a rather strangely mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts and DeemedRetractibles both flat, while FixedResets were down 23bp. BAM issues were notable losers on the Performance Highlights table. Volume was quite high.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2583 % 2,485.6
FixedFloater 4.33 % 3.59 % 30,899 18.24 1 -0.1914 % 3,874.7
Floater 2.72 % 2.97 % 61,485 19.81 5 -0.2583 % 2,683.8
OpRet 4.62 % 3.18 % 61,408 0.63 3 0.2829 % 2,643.9
SplitShare 4.77 % 5.08 % 65,038 4.01 6 0.1491 % 2,940.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2829 % 2,417.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 1.42 % 108,513 0.10 8 -0.0948 % 2,276.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.59 % 5.56 % 160,692 14.45 30 -0.0015 % 2,329.4
FixedReset 4.97 % 3.74 % 235,995 3.60 85 -0.2346 % 2,446.4
Deemed-Retractible 5.15 % 4.46 % 187,539 6.87 43 0.0000 % 2,372.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 6.25 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 22.58
Evaluated at bid price : 23.33
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 17.57
Evaluated at bid price : 17.57
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 21.96
Evaluated at bid price : 22.37
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.42
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 22.40
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 17.74
Evaluated at bid price : 17.74
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 22.43
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 21.06
Evaluated at bid price : 21.06
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 2.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 22.49
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet 304,000 TD crossed blocks of 199,500 and 50,000 at 25.55. RBC crossed 49,400 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.39 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 109,600 RBC crossed two blocks of 49,400 each, both at 25.48.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset 60,270 TD crossed 49,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 57,075 Maple (who?) bought 19,300 from Hampton (who?) at 19,300.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.77
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 54,779 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 21.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 44,800 RBC crossed 35,000 at 21.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 21.06
Evaluated at bid price : 21.06
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
There were 49 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IFC.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 24.15 – 24.52
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2250

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %

TD.PR.S FixedReset Quote: 24.48 – 24.78
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1785

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.48
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %

IFC.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.51 – 25.79
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1674

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %

TD.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.62 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1774

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 2.70 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 19.36 – 20.15
Spot Rate : 0.7900
Average : 0.6938

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 19.36
Evaluated at bid price : 19.36
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.45 – 22.98
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.4366

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 22.16
Evaluated at bid price : 22.45
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %

October 9, 2013

October 10th, 2013

It’s official – Yellen is the nominee for Fed governor:

President Barack Obama will nominate Janet Yellen as chairman of the Federal Reserve, which would put the world’s most powerful central bank in the hands of a key architect of its unprecedented stimulus program and the first female leader in its 100-year history.

Obama will announce the nomination at 3 p.m. today in Washington, a White House official said in an e-mailed statement. Yellen, 67, would succeed Ben S. Bernanke, whose term expires on Jan. 31.

Bernanke says:

President Obama has made an outstanding choice in nominating my colleague and friend Janet Yellen to chair the Federal Reserve Board. Janet is exceptionally well qualified for the position, with stellar academic credentials and a strong record as a leader and a policymaker.

Yellen says:

Thank you, Mr. President, I am honored and humbled by the faith you have placed in me. If confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to do my utmost to keep that trust and meet the great responsibilities that Congress has entrusted to the Federal Reserve–to promote maximum employment, stable prices, and a strong and stable financial system.

I’d also like to thank my spouse, George, and my son, Robert. I couldn’t imagine taking on this new challenge without their love and support.

The past six years have been tumultuous for the economy and challenging for many Americans. While I think we all agree, Mr. President, that more needs to be done to strengthen this recovery, particularly for those hardest hit by the Great Recession, we have made progress. The economy is stronger and the financial system sounder. As you said, Mr. President, considerable credit for that goes to Chairman Bernanke for his wise, courageous, and skillful leadership. It has been my privilege to serve with him and learn from him.

While we have made progress, we have farther to go. The mandate of the Federal Reserve is to serve all the American people, and too many Americans still can’t find a job and worry how they will pay their bills and provide for their families. The Federal Reserve can help, if it does its job effectively. We can help ensure that everyone has the opportunity to work hard and build a better life. We can ensure that inflation remains in check and doesn’t undermine the benefits of a growing economy. We can and must safeguard the financial system.

The Fed has powerful tools to influence the economy and the financial system, but I believe its greatest strength rests in its capacity to approach important decisions with expertise and objectivity, to vigorously debate diverse views, and then to unite behind its response. The Fed’s effectiveness depends on the commitment, ingenuity, and integrity of the Fed staff and my fellow policymakers. They serve America with great dedication.

Mr. President, thank you for giving me this opportunity to continue serving the Federal Reserve and carrying out its important work on behalf of the American people.

Iceland has foreign exchange problems:

Iceland’s private sector is running out of cash to repay its foreign currency debt, according to the nation’s central bank.

Non-krona debt owed by entities besides the Treasury and the central bank due through 2018 totals about 700 billion kronur ($5.8 billion), the bank said yesterday. The projected current account surpluses over the next five years aren’t estimated to reach even half of that and will equal a shortfall of about 20 percent of gross domestic product.

Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson has said Iceland’s foreign exchange shortfall is “a matter of huge concern” as he tries to scale back currency controls in place since 2008. The government’s biggest challenge is to allow capital to flow freely without triggering a krona sell-off that would cause Iceland’s foreign debt to spike and undermine the nation’s economic recovery.

I find it hard to get excited about the US debt shennanigans and tapering … the real problem is in the real economy:

The U.S. Federal Reserve has tripled the size of its balance sheet by “printing” an ocean of money. But despite the hand-wringing of the gold bugs, recent data proves that deflation, not inflation, remains the biggest threat to the U.S. economy.

The loan-to-deposit ratio for U.S. banks explains why Fed stimulus is not translating into inflationary pressure – the added funds remain trapped in the banking system and are not reaching the real economy.

The intention behind the Fed’s stimulus program was that by expanding bank balance sheets, customer lending would rise, and this would create consumer and corporate demand for products and services. The loan-to-deposit ratio illustrates that the process is stalled at step two – big bank balance sheets are bloated but aggregate demand in the U.S. economy has barely improved. The output gap remains.

I suggest that investors in long-term fixed income should be cheering the dysfunction and sending large donations to the Republican Party. While long-term fixed income is priced on expected inflation, it realizes based on realized inflation. Recessions are good! Depressions are wonderful! And here’s what the OECD honcho has to say:

“We still see the probability of failing to raise the debt ceiling as low, but as the government shutdown drags on, the level of concern is ratcheting up,” said [secretary-general of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development] Mr [Angel] Gurria.

“If the debt ceiling is not raised – or, better still, abolished – our calculations suggest that the OECD region as a whole will be pushed back into recession next year, and emerging economies will experience a sharp slowdown.”

The OECD projects U.S. government consumption would contract immediately by the equivalent of at least four percentage points of gross domestic product, shaving that amount from economic growth next year.

A default, of course, would be even worse, he warned, and would hit other countries hard.

Meanwhile, DBRS has put the US under Review-Negative:

This action reflects the growing risk of a selective default by the federal government on its debt securities as a result of the lack of an agreement to raise the statutory limit on federal debt (the debt ceiling). According to the U.S. Treasury, its ability to borrow will be exhausted no later than October 17, 2013, leaving a cash balance of approximately $30 billion. If the debt ceiling is not raised or eliminated by October 17, it is unclear how the Treasury would operate. While a low probability, missing payments on selected government securities cannot be ruled out. In the view of DBRS, the longer it takes for an agreement to be reached on the debt ceiling, the greater the risk of missed payments.

The review for downgrade reflects the increasing uncertainty over the debt ceiling outcome, combined with the potential lingering repercussions on both domestic and international investor sentiment, and therefore the U.S. economy and financial markets. DBRS notes that the magnitude of these repercussions could increase each day this impasse continues.

If by October 17 there is still no agreement to raise the debt ceiling and the United States subsequently misses a debt payment, DBRS would assign a Selective Default rating to the affected securities, as long as we expect the Treasury to meet its other obligations in a timely manner. If there is a full-fledged default involving a wide array of securities, the magnitude of the downgrade would be greater.

It is an article of faith that Congress’ dysfunction is due to gerrymandering and the consequent importance of primaries. There’s at least some evidence that polarization of Congress reflects polarization of the electorate – extending beyond ideology to geography:

The real reason for our increasingly divided political system is much simpler: The right wing of the Republican Party has embraced a fundamentalist version of free-market capitalism and succeeded in winning elections. (The Democrats have moved to the left, but less so.)

The Republican shift is the result of several factors. The realignment of Southern white voters into the Republican Party, the branch of conservative activism created by Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign and the party’s increasingly firm stance on issues such as income inequality and immigration, can all be important to Republicans’ rightward shift.

The “blame it on the gerrymanders” argument mistakenly assumes that because redistricting created more comfortable seats for each party, polarization became inevitable. Our research, however, casts serious doubt on that idea.

Many districts are safe for one party or the other because of how Americans have sorted themselves geographically — choosing to live closer to people who are politically or culturally like-minded. In Florida, for example, Palm Beach County will be reliably Democratic and the Panhandle will consistently vote for Republicans. These geographic shifts mean that state legislatures, which approve congressional district lines, can tweak but not fundamentally alter the ideological makeup of Congress.

The research cited is a paper titled Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?

Arthur Heinmaa of Toron observes:

This chart continues to really worry me. There is no stopping the Canadian trend.


Click for Big

I will laugh through my tears if popping our bubble is as painful (and my guess would be more painful) than it was in America. That would put paid to the ‘Canadian financial stability due to wise regulation’ argument, which I consider ridiculous.

Louis Vachon, CEO of National Bank, the man who led the bank while it was stuffing its Money Market Fund to the nuts with ABCP issued by related companies, is now touting his Capital Markets unit:

The knock on National Bank has long been that it is too Quebec-focused, and that its capital markets earnings, which comprise 38 per cent of its net income, are inherently volatile. For these reasons, the bank trades at a lower price-earnings multiple than its Big Six peers.

Mr. Vachon is now on a crusade of sorts to “demystify” the financial markets arm. While he is realistic about his efforts – “we cannot turn lead to gold” – he argues a major point: “All we’re saying is [the unit] does not deserve the extensive discount” it receives relative to the retail operation.

Prior to 2004, he elaborates, there was never a discount for wholesale banking. And although it is understandable why the financial crisis altered that, much has changed since those tumultuous years. Any argument in favour of a discount is “passé,” he said. “If you look forward now, we’re back to more normal times and client-driven activities,” like corporate lending.

It was another negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 24bp, FixedResets flat and DeemedRetractibles off 14bp. A lengthy Performance Highlights table is dominated by losers. Volume was low.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.57%, equivalent to 7.24% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates continue to yield about 4.8% (OK, a smidgen more), so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 245bp, with everything basically unchanged from the October 2 report.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.1845 % 2,492.0
FixedFloater 4.28 % 3.60 % 30,776 18.08 1 1.1384 % 3,882.1
Floater 2.71 % 2.94 % 63,781 19.90 5 -1.1845 % 2,690.7
OpRet 4.63 % 3.16 % 61,098 0.63 3 -0.1156 % 2,636.4
SplitShare 4.78 % 5.05 % 65,829 4.01 6 -0.3453 % 2,935.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1156 % 2,410.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 0.26 % 105,518 0.10 8 -0.1071 % 2,278.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.59 % 5.57 % 158,188 14.46 30 -0.2430 % 2,329.4
FixedReset 4.96 % 3.71 % 234,017 3.60 85 -0.0013 % 2,452.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.15 % 4.49 % 187,711 6.83 43 -0.1358 % 2,372.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 22.07
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 2.35 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 22.18
Evaluated at bid price : 22.47
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 17.80
Evaluated at bid price : 17.80
Bid-YTW : 2.96 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 22.82
Evaluated at bid price : 23.11
Bid-YTW : 5.36 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 17.73
Evaluated at bid price : 17.73
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.29
Bid-YTW : 6.60 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 23.34
Evaluated at bid price : 23.83
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.21
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 21.03
Evaluated at bid price : 21.03
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 95,200 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 48,800 and 40,000, both at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 86,551 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 40,000 each, both at 24.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 24.29
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 60,083 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 17.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 17.94
Evaluated at bid price : 17.94
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 54,359 Will reset at 3.5595%.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 38,583 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 26,955 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.19
Bid-YTW : 2.07 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 22.30 – 23.30
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.7840

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 22.07
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 2.35 %

CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.77 – 21.21
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3020

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-09
Maturity Price : 20.77
Evaluated at bid price : 20.77
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %

GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.40 – 24.67
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1636

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 24.45 – 24.74
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1844

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %

TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.67 – 25.92
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1464

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-11-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 21.29 – 21.64
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2512

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.29
Bid-YTW : 6.60 %

New Issue: VSN FixedReset, 5.00%+301

October 9th, 2013

Veresen Inc. has announced:

it has agreed to issue 6,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Shares, Series C (“Series C Preferred Shares”) at a price of $25.00 per share (the “Offering”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $150 million on a bought deal basis. The Series C Preferred Shares will be offered to the public through a syndicate of underwriters co-led by Scotiabank,TD Securities Inc. and CIBC.

The holders of Series C Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive fixed cumulative dividends at an annual rate of 5.00%, representing $1.25 per share, payable quarterly for an initial period up to but excluding March 31, 2019, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Veresen. The first quarterly dividend payment date is scheduled for December 31, 2013. The dividend rate will reset on March 31, 2019 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 3.01%. The Series C Preferred Shares are redeemable by Veresen, at its option, on March 31, 2019 and on March 31 of every fifth year thereafter at a price of $25.00 per share plus accrued and unpaid dividends.

Holders of Series C Preferred Shares will have the right to convert all or any part of their shares into Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Shares, Series D (“Series D Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on March 31, 2019, and on March 31 of every fifth year thereafter. The holders of Series D Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating rate cumulative dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Veresen, at a rate equal to the sum of the then 90-day Government of Canada treasury bill rate plus 3.01%.

Veresen has granted the underwriters an option to purchase at the offering price an additional 2,000,000 Series C Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per share exercisable in whole or in part at any time up to 6:30 AM (Calgary time) on the date that is two business days prior to closing. Should the option be fully exercised, the total gross proceeds of the Offering will be $200 million.

The Offering is expected to close on or about October 21, 2013, subject to customary closing conditions. Net proceeds from the Offering will be used to reduce indebtedness, partially fund capital expenditures and for other general corporate purposes.

The Series C Preferred Shares will be issued pursuant to a prospectus supplement that will be filed with the securities regulatory authority in each of the provinces of Canada under Veresen’s short form base shelf prospectus dated September 20, 2013. An application has been made to list the Series C Preferred Shares and the Series D Preferred Shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The Offering is subject to receipt of all necessary regulatory and stock exchange approvals.

Update: This issue is somewhat overpriced. I calculate the Yield-to-Worst on the new issue as 4.81% to perpetuity at issue price, while VSN.PR.A (FixedReset, 4.40%+292) which commenced trading in February, 2012, is bid at 23.75 to yield 4.92% to perpetuity. The new issue should yield more to account for negative convexity (see the comments), but doesn’t … the issuer and underwriters are hoping everybody looks at the Initial Rate rather than the very similar Issue Reset Spreads.

October 8, 2013

October 8th, 2013

Geez, maybe I should open a managed future fund:

Brokers have an incentive to keep clients in managed-futures funds because they receive commissions annually of up to 4 percent of assets invested, prospectuses show. Investors pay as much as 9 percent in total fees each year, including charges by general partners and fund managers.

Amazing – somebody actually took a quantitative look at the spread between downtown and suburban house prices:

No question, you’ll find house prices are cheaper outside big cities. Toronto Real Estate Board numbers suggest a spread of almost $250,000 between city homes and those in the neighbouring suburbs. But as shown in a spreadsheet created by Mr. Hughes, suburban living loses its cost advantage if you have two adults commuting by car each day. Add the effect of stress and time spent in gridlock, and suburbia looks even more costly.

It was another negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 28bp, FixedResets down 9bp and DeemedRetractibles off 6bp. There was a surprisingly lengthy list of losers in the Performance Highlights table. Volume was above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0612 % 2,521.9
FixedFloater 4.33 % 3.65 % 31,143 17.99 1 -0.2272 % 3,838.4
Floater 2.68 % 2.92 % 65,162 19.96 5 -0.0612 % 2,723.0
OpRet 4.62 % 2.67 % 61,816 0.63 3 0.2576 % 2,639.5
SplitShare 4.76 % 5.05 % 62,160 3.73 6 0.0602 % 2,946.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2576 % 2,413.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.79 % 1.04 % 106,098 0.10 8 -0.0219 % 2,280.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.58 % 5.56 % 158,413 14.51 30 -0.2845 % 2,335.1
FixedReset 4.95 % 3.69 % 235,148 3.61 85 -0.0862 % 2,452.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.14 % 4.45 % 189,415 6.87 43 -0.0554 % 2,376.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -4.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 19.66
Evaluated at bid price : 19.66
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount -1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.11
Evaluated at bid price : 20.11
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.78
Evaluated at bid price : 20.78
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.76
Evaluated at bid price : 20.76
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 25.04
Bid-YTW : 4.73 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.08
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.13
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 19.45
Evaluated at bid price : 19.45
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 98,437 RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 40,775 National crossed 23,800 at 22.38.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 21.96
Evaluated at bid price : 22.31
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 40,526 Will reset at 3.5595%.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 35,310 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 34,068 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 22.76
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount 26,030 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 21.99
Evaluated at bid price : 22.28
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
There were 41 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 19.66 – 20.66
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.7071

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 19.66
Evaluated at bid price : 19.66
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.42 – 21.03
Spot Rate : 0.6100
Average : 0.3766

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.42
Evaluated at bid price : 20.42
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.62 – 22.98
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2535

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.62
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %

TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.85 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1520

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 23.03 – 23.54
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.4336

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 23.03
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %

PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.45 – 23.68
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1589

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 23.45
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %

October 7, 2013

October 7th, 2013

Lawrence Schembri, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada is assiduously sucking up to the politicians:

From my perspective, the FSB is a unique international organization that has certain qualities that many associate with Canadians, qualities I believe will help ensure its success in making the global financial system more resilient. A resilient global financial system is not an end in itself, but a necessary foundation for strong, sustainable and balanced global economic growth, leading to higher employment and improved living standards.

The FSB was born of necessity in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Its raison d’être stems from one overarching fact: the global financial system is highly integrated.2 Financial institutions and markets are interconnected and interdependent within and across various sectors, including banking, insurance, and pension and investment funds, and, increasingly, across national jurisdictions.

Thus, to achieve a comprehensive and coherent approach to the financial regulation and oversight necessary to attain the global public good of financial stability, coordination is essential across countries, across all of the elements of the reforms, and across many different regulators and supervisors. Failure to coordinate would lead to the fragmentation of the financial system, which would impede the global recovery. This need for effective coordination is why the G-20 established the FSB in 2009.

Can’t blame him, really – it worked for Lapdog Carney!

There’s some apocalyptic commentary on the potential for a US default:

Anyone who remembers the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. little more than five years ago knows what a global financial disaster is. A U.S. government default, just weeks away if Congress fails to raise the debt ceiling as it now threatens to do, will be an economic calamity like none the world has ever seen.
Failure by the world’s largest borrower to pay its debt — unprecedented in modern history — will devastate stock markets from Brazil to Zurich, halt a $5 trillion lending mechanism for investors who rely on Treasuries, blow up borrowing costs for billions of people and companies, ravage the dollar and throw the U.S. and world economies into a recession that probably would become a depression. Among the dozens of money managers, economists, bankers, traders and former government officials interviewed for this story, few view a U.S. default as anything but a financial apocalypse.

While none of the people interviewed for this story expect the world’s largest economy to default this time either, most say the chances of it happening now are higher than in the past.
“It would be insane to default, but it’s no longer a zero-percent probability,” said Simon Johnson, a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund who teaches economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is a columnist for Bloomberg View.

I consider it all a little hysterical – but hey! In the financial markets, the hysterics are sometimes right!

I’ve lost a lot of business over the years by admitting there are things I don’t understand – financial guys are supposed to know just precisely how the price of eggs in Spain relates to Brazilian interest rates. But I’m in good company:

Ben S. Bernanke, the world’s most-powerful central banker, says he doesn’t understand gold prices. If his peers had paid attention, they might have stopped expanding reserves that lost $545 billion in value since bullion peaked in 2011.

Bernanke, who holds economics degrees from Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and led the Federal Reserve through the biggest financial disaster since the Great Depression, told the Senate Banking Committee in July that “nobody really understands gold prices and I don’t pretend to really understand them either.”

I generally have a lot of respect for the OTPP. Not this time:

The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan is urging the province’s securities regulator to require all public companies have at least three women on their boards, or else risk being delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange.

Teachers outlines the proposal in a letter submitted to the Ontario Securities Commission in response to its call for comments on a possible new “comply or explain” disclosure rule to boost the number of women on boards. The OSC proposal would require companies to report annually on their efforts to improve board diversity or else explain why they have opted not to make the disclosure.

This is just political nonsense. If Teachers’ really believed that more diverse boards produced better results than less diverse boards and if they were truly interested in outperforming on behalf of their beneficiaries – they would promote a laissez faire in which there were all sorts of boards and they invested in those with more diverse boards on the grounds that these companies would kick the asses of those that were less diverse. You know, in the marketplace. I am very disappointed that Teachers’ is pursuing a political agenda.

Now that Ontario has bought up all the expensive solar panels Mexico is getting the cheap ones:

Mexico, poised to allow foreign oil extraction for the first time in 75 years, is finding its abundant natural resources also appeal to investors in a much cleaner energy: sunshine.

First Solar Inc. (FSLR) of the U.S. has bought its first projects in Mexico, while more than a dozen other developers including Germany’s Saferay GmbH and Spain’s Grupotec Tecnologia Solar SL own licenses there. Local investor Gauss Energia opened Latin America’s largest photovoltaic plant in the country last month.

Gauss and Portugal’s Martifer SGPS SA opened a 30-megawatt plant in La Paz, Baja California, on Sept. 12 with funding from International Finance Corp. and Nacional Financiera SNC bank. While Mexico doesn’t subsidize large solar, the $100 million project offered an economic alternative to fossil-fueled power in the area, where solar radiation exceeds the national average.

No subsidies and lots of investments! Gee, Mexico must have one of those ‘competitive advantage’ thingamajigs over Ontario when it comes to sunshine! Whoever woulda thunk it?

It was a poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 12bp, FixedResets off 6bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 19bp. The Performance Highlights table was surprisingly short – below average even by long-term standards. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2045 % 2,523.5
FixedFloater 4.32 % 3.64 % 32,450 18.01 1 0.0455 % 3,847.2
Floater 2.68 % 2.92 % 64,982 19.96 5 0.2045 % 2,724.6
OpRet 4.64 % 3.14 % 60,639 0.64 3 -0.0901 % 2,632.7
SplitShare 4.77 % 5.23 % 60,019 4.02 6 -0.2293 % 2,944.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0901 % 2,407.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 4.04 % 109,207 0.11 8 0.1883 % 2,281.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.55 % 5.56 % 157,971 14.44 30 -0.1192 % 2,341.8
FixedReset 4.95 % 3.68 % 233,882 3.61 85 -0.0580 % 2,454.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.14 % 4.49 % 191,697 6.74 43 -0.1934 % 2,377.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 23.53
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 74,616 Nesbitt crossed 28,500 at 24.83; TD crossed 20,000 at 24.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 68,605 Desjardins crossed 57,800 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 37,805 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 34,977 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.79
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 32,200 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 23.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 27,134 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.60 – 26.18
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.3626

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 22.67 – 23.13
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3053

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 22.29
Evaluated at bid price : 22.67
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 24.29 – 24.75
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3104

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 24.29
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 23.50 – 23.89
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2677

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %

CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.15 – 21.58
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3086

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 21.15
Evaluated at bid price : 21.15
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %

PWF.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 25.45 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1788

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %

MAPF Performance, September 2013

October 6th, 2013

The fund outperformed in September, due to its low weighting in junk FixedResets, which underperformed (as indicated by the performance difference between TXPR (+0.48%) and TXPL (-0.10%)).

There was a modest recovery in the Canadian preferred share market in September, but there was a sharp turnaround commencing with seven consecutive gains commencing August 22 and still continuing, as shown in the following charts:


Click for Big


Click for Big

To a certain extent, the (modest, so far) recovery may reflect an acceptance of my belief that the decline in the preferred share market has been overdone; the following table shows the increase in yields since May 22 of some fixed income sectors:

Yield Changes
May 22, 2013
to
September 30, 2013
Sector Yield
May 22
Yield
October 2
Change
Five-Year Canadas 1.38% 1.86% +48bp
Long Canadas 2.57% 3.09% +52bp
Long Corporates 4.15% 4.8% +65bp
FixedResets
Investment Grade
(Interest Equivalent)
3.51% 4.78% +127bp
Perpetual-Discounts
Investment Grade
(Interest Equivalent)
6.34% 7.23% +89bp
The change in yield of PerpetualDiscounts is understated due a massive influx of issues from the PerpetualPremium sub-index over the period, which improved credit quality. When the four issues that comprised the PerpetualDiscount sub-index as of May 22 are evaluated as of September 30, the interest-equivalent yield is 7.66% and thus the change is +132bp.

ZPR, is a relatively new ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues, with a very high proportion of junk issues, which returned -0.29% for the month, and -2.46% over the past three months (according to my calculations from the fund’s NAV data and distribution data; our regulators are hard at work protecting you from performance data since the fund has been extant for less than a year), versus returns for the TXPL index of -0.10% and -2.30%, respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $825.9-million in the ten and a half months since inception; a gain of $3.0-million in September despite losing approximately $0.8-million due to performance. This indicates that a (very modest!) inflow of funds occurred in September – perhaps implying a (very modest!) return of confidence among retail investors. I feel that the flows into and out of this fund are very important in determining the performance of its constituents.

TXPR had returns over one- and three-months of +0.48% and -1.57%, respectively

Returns for the HIMIPref™ investment grade sub-indices for September were as follows:

HIMIPref™ Indices
Performance to September 30, 2013
Sub-Index 1-Month 3-month
Ratchet N/A N/A
FixFloat -1.61% -2.35%
Floater -3.11% -2.00%
OpRet +0.49% +0.90%
SplitShare -0.57% -0.64%
Interest N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium +1.11% 0.00%
PerpetualDiscount +2.50% -1.26%
FixedReset +0.23% -0.89%
DeemedRetractible +1.73% -0.16%

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close September 30, 2013, was 10.0296 after a distribution of 0.137064 per unit.

Returns to September 30, 2013
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month +0.87% +0.52% +0.48% +0.43%
Three Months -1.54% -0.82% -1.57% -1.61%
One Year -1.17% +0.51% -0.96% -1.43%
Two Years (annualized) +5.52% +3.44% +2.70% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +4.61% +4.92% +3.55% +3.01%
Four Years (annualized) +7.23% +6.15% +4.88% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +16.44% +6.95% +5.70% +5.04%
Six Years (annualized) +12.80% +4.55% +3.28%  
Seven Years (annualized) +11.06% +3.59%    
Eight Years (annualized) +10.41% +3.64%    
Nine Years (annualized) +10.04% +3.82%    
Ten Years (annualized) +10.57% +3.94%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +12.36% +4.23%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +10.82% +4.15%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.73%, -0.52% and +0.12%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +3.88%; five year is +5.89%
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.02%, -1.85% and -1.80% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +1.28%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.21%, -2.76% & -3.70%, respectively. Three Year performance is +1.77%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.77%, -0.53% & +0.43%, respectively.
Figures for Altamira Preferred Equity Fund are +0.25% and -1.99% for one- and three- months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is -0.29% and -2.46% for one- and three-months. [calculation by JH]

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past two years has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund occasionally finds an attractive opportunity to trade between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons (but in which trading is now hampered by the fact that the low-coupon issues are trading near par and are callable at par in the near term), but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains particularly in May, 2013, when the three lowest-coupon SLF DeemedRetractibles (SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were the worst performing DeemedRetractibles in the sub-index!

DeemedRetractibles had relatively uncorrelated performances in September:

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Oddly, Straight Perpetuals did a little better than DeemedRetractibles in September.


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A side effect of the downdraft has been the return of measurable Implied Volatility:


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Implied Volatility of
Three Series of Straight Perpetuals
September, 2013
Issuer Pure Yield Implied Volatility
GWO 4.12% (-0.58) 27% (+4)
PWF 4.78% (-0.44) 20% (+2)
BNS 0.01% (0) 40% (0)
Bracketted figures are changes since August month-end

In the September, 2013, edition of PrefLetter, I extended the theory of Implied Volatility to FixedResets – relating the option feature of the Issue Reset Spreads to a theoretical non-callable Market Spread.


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Implied Volatility of
Two Series of FixedResets
September, 2013
Issuer Market Reset Spread
(Non-Callable)
Implied Volatility
BPO 188bp 18%
FFH 295bp 16%

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in well over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. As has been previously noted, very high levels of Implied Volatility (in the 40% range) imply a very strong expectation of directionality in future prices – i.e, an expectation that all issues will be redeemed at par. The decline in Implied Volatility – which is still at elevated levels – implies more uncertainty regarding this prediction.

It is significant that the preferred share market knows no moderation. I suggest that a good baseline estimate for Volatility over a three year period is 15% but the observed figure is generally higher in a rising market and lower in a declining one … with, of course, a period of adjustment in between, which I suspect we are currently experiencing.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is very often irrational and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September, 2013 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible, SplitShare and FixedReset issues on July 31; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies). This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds positions in various SplitShare issues which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as the fund has only a very small position in these issues.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas (set at 1.87% for the September 30 calculation) to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Portfolio Yield” of 4.49% as of September 30, 2013 and notes:

Portfolio yield is calculated as the most recent income received by the ETF in the form of dividends interest and other income annualized based on the payment frequently divided by the current market value of ETFs investments.

In other words – it’s the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF is 5.17% as of September 30, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to accord it any prominence in portfolio reporting is misleading.

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


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The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

October 4, 2013

October 4th, 2013

No jobs number today!

The absence of jobs data leaves economists and their investor clients without the month’s most important numbers on which to place bets, ranging from friendly office pools to million-dollar wagers on the health of the world’s largest economy. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which typically issues the report on the first Friday of each month at 8:30 a.m. in Washington, yesterday said a government shutdown now in its fourth day means the latest data aren’t ready.

Shades of Enron! Investment analysis isn’t the only field where fraud flourishes in a lazy culture:

A Bangladeshi factory that produces garments for The Gap and Old Navy kept two sets of books to conceal how it is coercing employees to perform 17-hour shifts every day of the week, a new report says, underlining the inability of clothing retailers to improve working conditions among their suppliers.

“It is easy, because auditors and buyers never come around late at night to check these things,” the factory manager said in an interview. “Sometimes, it is the only way to meet the orders on time.”

The report said it was easy to fool retailers visiting the factory, which is located outside the capital, Dhaka, and employs 3,750 people.

Earlier this summer, the report said, “white foreigners” – buyers from Gap and Old Navy – visited the factory late in the morning of June 22.

A loudspeaker alerted the workers ahead of the visit. They were instructed to respond to questions by claiming that conditions were good and that they needed to do “just two hours of overtime a day.”

There was an interesting wrinkle in the GM bankruptcy:

In 2005, GM lost $10 billion. Researching Nova Scotia notes that year, Truong, the Fortress analyst, called the treasurer of GM Canada and learned that GM Nova Scotia Finance had made intercompany loans to its parent, Truong testified.

Such knowledge would prove useful. Under the 1900 Nova Scotia Companies Act, a company’s owner is obligated to pay the debts of all subsidiaries. Such unlimited liability companies, or ULCs, confer tax advantages on their parents.

Truong believed that GM Nova Scotia Finance’s ULC status would allow creditors to reach up to its parents to collect repayment in the event of a bankruptcy, he wrote in a Dec. 10, 2008, e-mail presented at the trial.

I find it rather odd that an oil-linked currency is a reserve currency, but perhaps that’s the whole point:

Canada now boasts the world’s fifth-largest reserve currency.

According to an International Monetary Fund report this week, central banks boosted their holdings of Canadian money to $108.9-billion in the second quarter of this year, up from $94.9-billion in the first three months of the year and $90.1-billion in the final quarter of 2012.

It was a negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 10bp, FixedResets off 8bp and DeemedRetractibles flat. Losing FixedResets were notable in the Performance Highlights table. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2855 % 2,518.3
FixedFloater 4.32 % 3.64 % 31,736 18.01 1 1.8047 % 3,845.4
Floater 2.68 % 2.92 % 65,689 19.96 5 -0.2855 % 2,719.1
OpRet 4.63 % 2.90 % 60,110 0.48 3 0.0901 % 2,635.1
SplitShare 4.75 % 5.02 % 60,706 4.03 6 0.1500 % 2,951.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0901 % 2,409.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.76 % 2.77 % 107,655 0.11 8 0.0000 % 2,276.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.54 % 5.56 % 146,264 14.39 30 -0.1003 % 2,344.5
FixedReset 4.94 % 3.66 % 236,746 3.62 85 -0.0845 % 2,455.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.13 % 4.41 % 192,233 6.89 43 0.0011 % 2,381.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.77
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 22.60
Evaluated at bid price : 23.11
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 21.26
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 5.36 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 20.52
Evaluated at bid price : 20.52
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 22.42
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.L FixedReset 103,537 RBC crossed blocks of 49,500 and 50,000, both at 25.53.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 2.41 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 57,593 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.97.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 2.68 %
GWO.PR.R Deemed-Retractible 56,881 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 22.50; TD crossed 16,900 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 54,980 Desjardins crossed 49,500 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 51,965 Desjardins crossed blocks of 30,000 and 15,000, both at 25.72.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 2.40 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 51,232 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 2.26 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 22.50 – 23.39
Spot Rate : 0.8900
Average : 0.5794

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %

FTS.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 24.25 – 24.74
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3169

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.25
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %

TD.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.29 – 25.59
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1770

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 19.80 – 20.08
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1871

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 18.05 – 18.32
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1799

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 18.05
Evaluated at bid price : 18.05
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %

ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 25.10 – 25.40
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2104

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 24.88
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %

S&P Puts BPO on Watch-Developing

October 4th, 2013

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • Brookfield Property Partners L.P. (BPY) announced a proposal to acquire Brookfield Office Properties (BPO) by way of tender offer for any or all of the common shares it does not presently own.
  • We placed our ratings for BPO on CreditWatch with developing implications, including our ‘BBB-‘ corporate credit, ‘BB+’ unsecured debt, and ‘BB’ preferred stock ratings. The developing CreditWatch listing means the ratings could be raised, lowered, or affirmed.
  • We do not currently rate BPY, a large, diversified, recently listed and globally focused real estate company, which is majority owned and externally managed by Brookfield Asset Management (BAM).
  • To resolve the CreditWatch, we will seek to meet with BPY management in the coming month to ascertain the impact, if any, of the proposed acquisition on BPO’s credit profile.


BPY’s proposal has stated that BPO’s rated unsecured debt securities would remain in place, but that some convertible preferred shares could be exchanged for equivalent shares of a BPY subsidiary. It is not clear to us whether the debt securities would be guaranteed by BPY and the extent to which BPO’s current operating and financial strategies as well as its legal structure could change once absorbed into the BPY platform.

We currently see downside risk to ratings as somewhat less likely, given the potential benefits of BPY’s larger, more diverse platform. However, the expected growth and financing strategies for BPY’s other operating platforms is at this time unknown to us. We will seek to meet with management of BPY in the coming month to gain clarity on these issues, so as to ascertain the impact, if any, of the proposed acquisition on BPO’s credit profile.

The bid was previously reported on PrefBlog.

BPO was downgraded to P-3 by S&P in July, 2013. I remain concerned about the knock-on effects on BAM’s credit rating if the flow of dividends from the subsidiaries to the parent should be considered less reliable as a result of increased leverage at the subsidiary level.

The ultimate parent, Brookfield Asset Management, has the following preferred shares outstanding:
FixedResets BAM.PF.A, BAM.PF.B, BAM.PR.P, BAM.PR.R, BAM.PR.T, BAM.PR.X, BAM.PR.Z
Floaters BAM.PR.B, BAM.PR.C, BAM.PR.K
RatchetRate BAM.PR.E
FixedFloater BAM.PR.G
OperatingRetractible BAM.PR.J
Straight Perpetual BAM.PR.M, BAM.PR.N, BAM.PF.C

BPO has the following preferred share issues outstanding:
OperatingRetractible BPO.PR.H, BPO.PR.J, BPO.PR.K,
FixedReset BPO.PR.L, BPO.PR.N, BPO.PR.P, BPO.PR.R, BPO.PR.T,
Floaters BPO.PR.W, BPO.PR.X, BPO.PR.Y

In the event of a successful bid, the BPO Operating Retractibles might be the object of an exchange offer.