MAPF

MAPF Performance: December 2011

The fund probably underperformed in December, although comparators are not yet available.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close December 30 was $10.0793 after distribution of $0.162247 dividends and $0.299965 capital gains.

Returns to December 30, 2011
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +0.87% +1.48% +1.35%
Three Months +2.63% +2.50% +2.29%
One Year +1.78% +7.80% +5.23%
Two Years (annualized) +8.80% +8.95% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +25.33% +15.38% +12.29%
Four Years (annualized) +17.29% +6.44%  
Five Years (annualized) +13.24% +3.79%  
Six Years (annualized) +12.15% +3.87%  
Seven Years (annualized) +11.24% +3.87%  
Eight Years (annualized) +11.51% +4.13%  
Nine Years (annualized) +13.77% +4.48%  
Ten Years (annualized) +12.44% +4.47%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.13%, +2.19% and +5.55%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +13.35%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.04%, +1.91% and +3.43% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.22%, +1.80% & +4.66%, respectively
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.61%, +2.57% & +6.36%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

My assumption that the fund underperformed in December is based on the performance of the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index (TXPR) Total Return Index, for which preliminary figures show a return of +1.37% for the month (although the quarter was OK, with the fund gaining 2.63%, vs. +2.35% for TXPR). However, this return is based on the closing price, not the closing bid, and these figures were significantly different this year.

Closing Prices vs. Last Bid for Some Preferred Share Positions Held by MAPF
Ticker Proportion of MAPF Holdings Last Bid Closing Price
BNA.PR.C 9.9% 21.98 22.10
GWO.PR.H 9.3% 23.70 23.92
MFC.PR.C 8.5% 21.66 21.74
GWO.PR.I 8.5% 22.55 22.56
SLF.PR.D 7.8% 20.81 20.85

In all, the difference in valuation for the whole fund is about $25,000, or about 0.5% of fund value.

Naturally, this is not a full explanation – ideally, we would know what the difference was at November month-end and compare the two differences. I will say, however, that in the course of valuing the fund I was surprised at the size of the discrepency, which is a number I usually just glance at and discard, since it has no real meaning.

Fund returns in December were dragged down by poor performance in low-coupon DeemedRetractibles. SLF, in particular, has been afflicted in recent months by relatively poor financial results and bouts of selling (see Who’s Selling all the SLF Preferreds? and Moody’s puts SLF on Review-Negative) and has not yet shown significant signs of recovery.

SLF issues may be compared with PWF and GWO:


Click for Big

Click for Big

Now, I certainly agree that GWO is a better credit than SLF and deserves a little bit of premium pricing – but the current situation goes far beyond what I consider reasonable. What is also very interesting is the observation that the market is sharply differentiating between SLF and GWO, but not between GWO and its unregulated parent, PWF.

The import of the above charts becomes more clear when we examine the December performance for the same issues:


Click for Big

While the SLF issues did fairly well when compared against other insurance and insurance-related Straight Perpetuals, there was a clear bias towards higher returns for the higher coupon issues – and the fund is concentrated in the low-coupon issues.

Further, I consider the comparison between SLF and WN to be absolutely fascinating:

SLF vs WN
Straight Perpetuals
2011-12-30
Ticker Dividend Bid Current
Yield
SLF.PR.A 1.1875 22.07 5.38%
SLF.PR.B 1.20 22.20 5.41%
SLF.PR.C 1.1125 20.81 5.35%
SLF.PR.D 1.1125 20.81 5.35%
SLF.PR.E 1.125 21.04 5.35%
WN.PR.A 1.45 25.46 5.70%
WN.PR.C 1.30 25.01 5.20%
WN.PR.D 1.30 24.95 5.21%
WN.PR.E 1.1875 23.93 4.96%

Aside from the outlier WN.PR.A, which is currently redeemable at 25.00, it is clear that the WN issues are trading at lower Current Yields than the SLF issues (there’s minimal jiggery-pokery regarding the next dividend; the SLF issues go ex-dividend on about February 21, while WN.PR.A is at the end of February and the other WN issues go ex in mid-March).

In order to rationalize the relationship between the Current Yields we are asked to believe:

  • That the additional credit quality of SLF is worthless
    • It is possible, of course, to argue that WN is actually a better credit than SLF, or that the scarcity value of a non-financial preferred outweighs the difference in credit. I have not yet heard these arguments being made
  • The option value of the issuer’s call is worthless
    • This can be phrased as ‘The potential capital gain for the SLF issues prior to a call, relative to that of the WN issues, is worthless’
  • The potential of a regulatory inspired call for the SLF issues is worthless
    • the SLF issues are currently Tier 1 Capital at the holding company level, but do not have an NVCC clause

All in all, this is a good indication of what I don’t understand about what the market has been doing this year and a big factor in the fund’s underperformance.

Another factor, for the year and for December, has been the performance of the YLO issues. These performed poorly in December and reduced the fund’s return for the month by about 36bp. I continue to be surprised at just how poorly these issues are surprising: I will certainly agree that YLO was never the best of all possible credits, and will also agree that their financial position has deteriorated over the year – but the company remains significantly profitable (on an operating basis) and cash-flow positive; but the preferreds are trading as if they are on the steps of bankruptcy court.

According to me, the worst-case realistic scenario for YLO is not bankruptcy court, but a reorganization in which the bond holders take over the company. This will be bad news for the common shareholders, and for holders of the two issues which can be converted by the company into common (YLO.PR.A and YLO.PR.B), but the prospects for the two FixedResets (YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D) are much less clear even given further financial deterioration and angry bondholders.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works – and in 2011 circumstances were closer to the third possibility than they have generally been in the past. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to December, 2011, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on December 30; all of the former and most of the latter currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position in SplitShare issues (mainly BNA.PR.C) and an OperatingRetractible Scrap (YLO.PR.B) which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par, a somewhat dubious assumption in the latter case.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.69% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: December 2011 analysis (which is greater than the 5.12% index yield on November 30). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be ($10.0793 + 0.162247) * 0.0569 = $0.5827 (note the adjustment for the dividend distribution, which makes the figure more comparable to November’s), down somewhat from the $10.4511 * 0.0579 / 1.0298 = 0.5876 (note the adjustment for capital gains reinvestment) reported for November.

Still, I am pleased that although the market value of the portfolio has not kept up with expectations, the sustainable income per unit (adjusted for capital gains) did increase by $0.02 over the year … do that often enough and eventually market value will reflect the underlying performance!

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition: December, 2011

Turnover remained low in December, at about 4%.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on December 30 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2011-12-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 9.8% (0) 6.61% 5.90
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 7.9% (-1.2) 5.69% 14.40
Fixed-Reset 13.1% (+1.2) 2.77% 2.71
Deemed-Retractible 56.1% (-3.0) 6.13% 7.81
Scraps (Various) 10.0% (+0.3) 7.27% (see note) 9.22 (see note)
Cash +3.1% (+2.7) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.63% 7.39
Yields for the YLO preferreds have been set at 10% for calculation purposes, and their durations at 5.00. The extraordinarily low price of these issues has resulted in extremely high calculated yields; I feel that substitution of these values results in a more prudent total indication.
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

The increase in cash is due to client subscriptions for year end which have not yet been invested.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2011-12-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 46.8% (-0.6)
Pfd-2(high) 21.5% (-1.1)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 18.7% (-1.3)
Pfd-3(high) 3.1% (+0.4)
Pfd-3 3.0% (+1.0)
Pfd-4 2.3% (-0.2)
Pfd-4(low) 1.7% (-0.8)
Cash +3.1% (+2.7)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end.
A position held in ELF preferreds has been assigned to Pfd-2(low)
A position held in CSE preferreds has been assigned to Pfd-3

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2011-12-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 2.4% (-2.9)
$50,000 – $100,000 29.0% (+9.5)
$100,000 – $200,000 26.0% (-3.0)
$200,000 – $300,000 37.1% (-4.7)
>$300,000 2.3% (-1.7)
Cash +3.1% (+2.7)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2011, and published in the October, 2011, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a higher
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower
Administration

100,100 Spam Comments Deleted from PrefBlog

One of the great curses of internet blogs is spam comments.

On PrefBlog, I have an ‘open comment’ policy – you have to sign in, but comments are posted immediately (they are not held for approval). If anybody wants to comment, I say, then what’s the big deal?

Many dubious characters take advantage of this and post links to their malware sites, scraper sites, ad-sites, you name it. There are various ‘bulk pinging’ sites on the net that makes this easy for script-kiddies. It’s annoying and if there’s too much spam on the site then Google et al. will assume that the site itself is spam – not something I want for PrefBlog.

So my blog software allows for the automatic checking of posted comments, blacklisting some and holding others for moderation, depending on whether it matches anything in a specified list of keywords. One of my daily tasks is to clean out the comments and update my keyword lists.

And today I reached a milestone: over 100,000 spam comments have been posted since PrefBlog began publishing. And today I’ve greatly reduced the size of the database by permanently deleting all comments marked as spam.

Other statistics of interest: 4,302 posts in 32 categories; 6,833 approved comments (mostly trackbacks, in which one post refers to another and leaves a track-back comment. I like this feature).

Market Action

December 30, 2011

A Financial Times article titled Flash Crash Threatens to Return with a Vengeance leads me to a paper by Dave Cliff and Linda Northrop titled The Global Financial Markets: an Ultra Large Scale Systems Perspective. The jargon in the abstract is priceless:

We argue here that, in recent years, the global financial markets have become a complex adaptive ultra-large-scale socio-technical system-of-systems, and that this has important consequences for how the financial markets should be engineered and managed in future. The very high degree of interconnectedness in the global markets means that entire trading systems, implemented and managed separately by independent organizations, can rightfully be considered as significant constituent entities in the larger global super-system: that is, the global markets are an instance of what is known in the engineering literature as a system-of-systems (SoS). The sheer number of human agents and computer systems connected within the global financial-markets SoS is so large that it is an instance of an ultra-large-scale system, and that largeness-of-scale has significant effects on the nature of the system. Overall system-level behaviour may be difficult to predict, for two reasons. First, the constituent (sub-) systems may change their responses over time, either because they involve human agents as key “components” within the system (that is, the system is actually socio-technical), or because they involve software systems that evolve over time and “learn from experience” (that is, the system is adaptive). Second, even when given perfect knowledge of the constituent systems that combine to make up the SoS, the overall system-level behaviour may be difficult or impossible to predict; that is, the SoS may exhibit emergent behaviour. For these reasons, the global financial markets SoS can also rightly be considered as a complex adaptive system. Major failures in the financial markets SoS can now occur at super-human speeds, as was witnessed in the “Flash Crash” of May 6th 2010. Events such as the Flash Crash may become more commonplace in future, unless lessons are learned from other fields where complex adaptive socio-technical systems of systems have to be engineered for high-integrity, safety-critical applications. In this document we review the literature on failures in risky technology and high-integrity approaches to safety-critical SoS engineering. We conclude with an argument that, in the specific case of the global financial markets, there is an urgent need to develop major national strategic modelling and predictive simulation capabilities, comparable to national-scale meteorological monitoring and modelling capabilities. The intent here is not to predict the price-movements of particular financial instruments or asset classes, but rather to provide test-rigs for principled evaluation of systemic risk, estimating probability density functions over spaces of possible outcomes, and thereby identifying potential “black swan” failure modes in the simulations, before they occur in real life, by which time it is typically too late.

To my gratification, the authors highlight the inadequacy of the official SEC report:

The SEC/CFTC report was met with very mixed responses. Many readers concluded that it left more questions unanswered than resolved, and a subsequent much more detailed analysis of the time-series “tapes” of market event data conducted by Nanex Corp.1 offered an alternative story that many market practitioners found more plausible: see Meerman et al. (2010) and Easley et al. (2011) for further details of the extent to which the CFTC/SEC version of events is disputed.

The times they are a-changin’! The Meerman reference is:

M. Meerman, et al., (2011). Money and Speed: Inside the Black Box. Documentary produced by VPRO (Dutch public broadcaster), available as an iPad application. http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/money-speed-inside-black-box/id424796908?mt=8&ls=1#

I don’t recall ever seeing a citation of an iPad application in a scholarly text before! The Easely paper has been previously mocked on PrefBlog.

The Hungarians have nerve, whatever else might be the case!

Hungary’s chances of obtaining a bailout receded after lawmakers approved new central bank regulations that prompted the International Monetary Fund and the European Union to break off talks this month.

Parliament in Budapest stripped central bank President Andras Simor of his right to name deputies, expanded the rate- setting Monetary Council and created a position for a third vice president. A separate law approved earlier today makes it possible to demote the central bank president if the institution is combined with the financial regulator.

Hungary received its second sovereign credit downgrade to junk in a month when Standard and Poor’s followed Moody’s Investors Service in taking the country out of its investment grade category on Dec. 21. The forint has fallen 15 percent against the euro since June 30, making it the world’s worst- performing currency in the period.

The new central bank regulations “seriously harm” the country’s national interests, allow for political intervention in monetary policy and threaten economic stability, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank said today. The laws have led to the “indefinite postponement” of talks on a financial aid package, the central bank said in a statement posted on its website.

While a possible Hungarian agreement with the IMF and the EU on an assistance package would boost confidence, the Cabinet can do without it, [Prime Minister Viktor] Orban told MR1 radio in an interview today.

“If we have an IMF safety net, then we face the coming period with greater self-confidence and greater security,” Orban said. “If we don’t reach an agreement, we’ll still stand on our own feet.”

It’s always helpful to have your own currency that can be devalued at will!

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 24bp, FixedResets up 5bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 27bp. Volatility was reasonable. Volume was pathetic.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.12%, equivalent to 6.66% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield 4.6%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 205bp, unsurprisingly unchanged from the figure reported December 28.

And that’s it for another year!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3040 % 2,093.3
FixedFloater 4.87 % 4.62 % 38,521 17.04 1 0.0000 % 3,163.2
Floater 3.18 % 3.45 % 68,894 18.62 3 0.3040 % 2,260.2
OpRet 4.94 % 1.68 % 64,206 1.37 6 0.1164 % 2,470.5
SplitShare 5.44 % 2.10 % 71,194 0.94 4 0.0257 % 2,572.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1164 % 2,259.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.48 % -4.07 % 82,902 0.09 18 0.1124 % 2,190.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.23 % 5.12 % 105,854 14.88 12 -0.2374 % 2,328.0
FixedReset 5.08 % 2.85 % 207,032 2.38 64 0.0538 % 2,359.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.99 % 3.70 % 191,490 2.92 46 0.2664 % 2,254.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.35
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-30
Maturity Price : 24.17
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.07
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.66
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.15
Bid-YTW : 2.59 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.95
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 27,101 TD crossed 17,800 at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.23
Bid-YTW : 2.25 %
BMO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 26,079 TD crossed 25,000 at 27.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.20
Bid-YTW : 2.60 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 15,464 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-29
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.23
Bid-YTW : -8.27 %
IFC.PR.C FixedReset 12,401 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 11,601 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-29
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.37
Bid-YTW : -6.23 %
SLF.PR.I FixedReset 11,600 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
There were 3 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 26.02 – 26.72
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.5193

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-30
Maturity Price : 23.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.45 – 25.18
Spot Rate : 0.7300
Average : 0.5657

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-30
Maturity Price : 24.17
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 19.50 – 20.00
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3671

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %

BNS.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 25.77 – 26.13
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2520

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.77
Bid-YTW : 2.28 %

PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 25.25 – 25.65
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3018

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %

BNS.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 25.80 – 26.09
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2107

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %

Market Action

December 29, 2011

Italy sold some debt – possibly with some assistance:

Italy auctioned 7 billion euros ($9 billion) of debt to bring the total raised this week to almost 20 billion euros, underscoring how the European Central Bank is helping the world’s fourth-biggest borrower tap markets.

Today’s sale by the Treasury in Rome fell short of the 8.5 billion-euro target even as borrowing costs declined from last month. Italy sold 9 billion euros in bills yesterday at about half the rate of the previous sale last month in its first auction since the ECB loaned 489 billion euros to banks to ease credit amid the region’s debt crisis.

The euro fell to its lowest against the dollar since September 2010 and 10-year Italian notes slid after today’s sale, keeping their yield above 7 percent, the level that led Greece, Ireland and Portugal to seek bailouts. Short-term securities rose.

The Frankfurt-based central bank bought Italian bonds today, according to two people with knowledge of the transactions who declined to be identified because the trades are confidential. An ECB spokesman declined to comment when contacted by phone.

Italian 10-year bonds (.IT10) stayed lower after the auction. The 10-year yield was 7.01 percent at 3:41 p.m. Rome time, pushing the difference with German bunds to 514 basis points. The five- year yield was down seven basis points at 6.16 percent, as investors pointed to the ECB as buoying the shorter-term debt.

The Treasury sold today 2.5 billion euros of securities due in 2014, less than the 3 billion euro maximum for the sale, to yield 5.62 percent. That was down from 7.89 percent at the previous sale on Nov. 29. The Treasury priced 2.5 billion euros of its 5 percent 2022 bond to yield 6.98 percent, compared with 7.56 percent on Nov. 29. Italy also sold about 2 billion euros of bonds due 2021 and a floating-rate security due 2018.

Thailand is contemplating monetizing its bank bail-out debt:

Thailand’s government will today press the central bank chief to take on $35 billion of legacy debt from bank bailouts as Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra looks for fiscal scope to finance flood defenses.

Bank of Thailand Governor Prasarn Trairatvorakul meets with cabinet members in Bangkok over the proposal to shift the debt to the BOT’s balance sheet. Deputy Prime Minister Kittiratt Na- Ranong said yesterday the step would save the government as much as 65 billion baht ($2 billion) in annual interest costs that could be used to fund anti-flood measures.

Japan is being more sensible:

Japan’s ruling party compromised on a plan to double the sales tax by 2015 to help reduce the world’s largest public debt, delaying implementation by six months to help lawmakers meet a campaign pledge.

The proposal by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda would raise the sales tax from 5 percent to 8 percent in April 2014 and to 10 percent in October 2015. The agreement, reached late yesterday, must be approved by a government panel led by Finance Minister Jun Azumi before discussion with the opposition.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 11bp, FixedResets winning 13bp and DeemedRetractibles down 12bp. Volatility was good. Volume continued to be lousy – not surprisingly, given the time of year.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7143 % 2,087.0
FixedFloater 4.87 % 4.62 % 40,108 17.04 1 1.1936 % 3,163.2
Floater 3.19 % 3.47 % 71,770 18.57 3 0.7143 % 2,253.4
OpRet 4.95 % 1.68 % 65,599 1.38 6 0.1684 % 2,467.7
SplitShare 5.44 % 2.20 % 73,632 0.94 4 0.0924 % 2,572.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1684 % 2,256.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.49 % -2.90 % 86,190 0.09 18 -0.0130 % 2,187.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.22 % 5.11 % 106,403 15.16 12 0.1093 % 2,333.6
FixedReset 5.08 % 2.89 % 214,054 2.43 64 0.1327 % 2,358.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.00 % 3.75 % 193,832 2.92 46 -0.1183 % 2,248.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
W.PR.J Perpetual-Premium -1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : -2.90 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.87
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
BMO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.97
Bid-YTW : 2.33 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-29
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.86
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.34
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-29
Maturity Price : 15.10
Evaluated at bid price : 15.10
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.33
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.81
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 44,622 Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 26.41.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-28
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : -5.27 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 34,050 Desjardins crossed two blocks of 15,000 each, both at 25.62.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : -7.08 %
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 18,461 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.94
Bid-YTW : 2.44 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 16,965 Desjardins crossed 15,000 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-28
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : -5.94 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 15,980 RBC crossed 11,300 at 25.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 13,300 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.04
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %
There were 6 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 27.23 – 27.95
Spot Rate : 0.7200
Average : 0.4428

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.23
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %

BAM.PR.J OpRet Quote: 26.00 – 26.57
Spot Rate : 0.5700
Average : 0.3915

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %

BAM.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 25.00 – 25.44
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2635

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-29
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %

BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 14.85 – 15.35
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3294

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-29
Maturity Price : 14.85
Evaluated at bid price : 14.85
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.20 – 52.94
Spot Rate : 0.7400
Average : 0.5803

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.20
Bid-YTW : 2.80 %

RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.70 – 27.30
Spot Rate : 0.6000
Average : 0.4533

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %

Issue Comments

FTN.PR.A: DBRS Downgrades to Pfd-4(high)

Dominion Bond Rating Service has announced that it:

has today downgraded the rating of the Preferred Shares issued by Financial 15 Split Corp. (the Company) to Pfd-4 (high) from Pfd-3.

On September 6, 2011, DBRS confirmed the ratings on the Preferred Shares at Pfd-3 due to the fairly stable level of downside protection available to holders of the Preferred Shares, despite the NAV and downside protection decreasing gradually in the months leading up to the confirmation. However, since the rating confirmation, the NAV has continued to decline, with downside protection falling from 28.3% on August 31, 2011, to 23.4% on November 30, 2011. The dividend coverage ratio is currently around 0.68, but the Company has also written covered call options in order to generate additional income for distributions. However, the current level of downside protection available to the Preferred Shares, together with its trend, is not commensurate with the previously assigned Pfd-3 rating, and as a result of the downside protection dropping below acceptable levels for a sustained period of time, the rating has been downgraded to Pfd-4 (high).

The scheduled final maturity date of the Preferred Shares is December 1, 2015.

The NAV per $10 preferred share is 12.83 as of December 15.

Update: Oddly, the very similar FFN.PR.A, with a NAV per $10 preferred share of 12.10, continues to be rated Pfd-3(low) by DBRS – which doesn’t make any sense at all.

Market Action

December 28, 2011

Fairfax isn’t having much luck with its lawsuit:

James Chanos’s Kynikos Associates LP and Daniel Loeb’s Third Point LLC won dismissal from an $8 billion lawsuit accusing the two hedge funds of spreading negative information to drive down Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. (FFH)’s stock price.

In September, Hansbury dismissed billionaire Steven A. Cohen and his Stamford, Connecticut-based SAC Capital Advisors LP from the case.

“One must establish that the defendants purposely availed themselves of the State of New Jersey and that the alleged improper conduct was expected or intended to be felt within the State of New Jersey,” Hansbury wrote. He said Fairfax didn’t do that.

Fairfax said the funds coaxed John Gwynn, a former insurance analyst at Morgan Keegan & Co. in Memphis, Tennessee, into giving them his negative Fairfax reports before they were published. It also said they hired an outside analyst, Spyro Contogouris, to spread false Fairfax information.

I don’t know. Obviously, there needs to be some way to get legal redress for libel, if libel has occured. But mainly, my reaction to this is the same as my reaction to things like criminalizing Armenian genocide denial, criminalizing criticism of the Egyptian armed forces and criminalizing criticism of the Thai monarchy, to name but a few: if you need to go to law, it implies you don’t believe your facts and arguments are sufficient.

How about that ECB balance sheet, eh?:

The European Central Bank’s balance sheet soared to a record 2.73 trillion euros ($3.55 trillion) after it lent financial institutions more money last week to keep credit flowing to the economy during the debt crisis.

Lending to euro-area banks jumped 214 billion euros to 879 billion euros in the week ended Dec. 23, the Frankfurt-based ECB said in a statement today. The balance sheet increased by 239 billion euros in the week and was 553 billion euros higher than three months ago.

Those keeping score may wish to compare this number to the evolution of the Fed balance sheet.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 14bp, FixedResets up 12bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 18bp. Volatility was quite good, with a lot of variety in terms of both issuers and preferred share types. Volume was pathetic, as might be expected for the Christmas-New Year’s period.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.11%, equivalent to 6.64% at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.60%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority spread) is now about 205bp, unchanged from December 21.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.8023 % 2,072.2
FixedFloater 4.93 % 4.69 % 40,157 16.96 1 0.8373 % 3,125.9
Floater 3.21 % 3.52 % 72,008 18.47 3 0.8023 % 2,237.4
OpRet 4.96 % 1.70 % 66,655 1.38 6 -0.2971 % 2,463.5
SplitShare 5.44 % 2.19 % 76,645 0.94 4 -0.0975 % 2,569.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2971 % 2,252.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.48 % -2.13 % 89,620 0.09 18 0.1247 % 2,187.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.21 % 5.11 % 106,933 15.15 12 -0.1373 % 2,331.0
FixedReset 5.08 % 2.94 % 217,386 2.42 64 0.1223 % 2,355.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.99 % 3.44 % 194,706 1.35 46 0.1849 % 2,251.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-27
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : -6.27 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-28
Maturity Price : 22.80
Evaluated at bid price : 23.22
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-28
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.45
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.02
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Premium 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : -24.10 %
BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-25
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.68
Bid-YTW : 2.65 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-28
Maturity Price : 14.90
Evaluated at bid price : 14.90
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 2.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-28
Maturity Price : 14.90
Evaluated at bid price : 14.90
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 2.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.97
Bid-YTW : 1.90 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 23,147 Nesbitt bought 10,000 from TD at 21.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 21,750 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
BNS.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 15,029 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 2.56 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 14,399 RBC crossed 13,000 at 26.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.56
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 13,337 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-27
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : -0.44 %
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 12,265 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.83
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
There were 2 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.48 – 24.89
Spot Rate : 1.4100
Average : 0.8516

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.48
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.26 – 52.96
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.4529

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.26
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %

GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 23.02 – 23.70
Spot Rate : 0.6800
Average : 0.4677

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.02
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.86 – 26.44
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.4037

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 5.43 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.22 – 52.80
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.4052

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.22
Bid-YTW : 2.77 %

FTS.PR.C OpRet Quote: 25.75 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2784

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-27
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : -1.76 %

Market Action

December 23, 2011

John Paulson, the hedgie whose incisive analysis of the economy and uncanny ability to lay his finger on the pulse of the market made him and his clients billions during the subprime episode, has run out of luck:

John Paulson, the billionaire money manager mired in the worst slump of his career, lost 10.5 percent in his Gold Fund this year even as the metal heads for its 11th straight annual gain, according to people familiar with the fund’s performance.

The fund, which invests in mining stocks and other gold- related securities, remains the best performer in Paulson’s $28 billion fund family this year. His Paulson Advantage Fund, which seeks to profit from corporate events such as takeovers and bankruptcies, has fallen about 35 percent.

DBRS has confirmed Fairfax at Pfd-3:

DBRS has today confirmed the Senior Unsecured Debt rating of Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited (Fairfax or the Company) at BBB and its Preferred Shares rating at Pfd-3. The trends are Stable. The confirmation reflects the fact that the Company has continued to enjoy strong earnings despite negative underwriting results stemming from ongoing competitive market conditions in commercial insurance markets and adverse catastrophic claims from the tsunami in Japan, earthquakes and storm activity. Strong investment results, including both interest and dividends and gains on investments, continue to distinguish Fairfax’s unique in-house investment management operation, funded through premiums taken in by its insurance operating subsidiaries, although maintaining underwriting profitability is a strategic priority. With an investment bias, Fairfax is able to avoid the worst of the cyclicality inherent in the property and casualty (P&C) insurance industry by choosing not to write policies where inadequate pricing would only give rise to additional underwriting losses.

Financial leverage is increasingly taking the form of more tax-efficient preferred share capital and borrowings at the holding company rather than at the operating subsidiaries. With 100% control of its major operating subsidiaries, the holding company’s cash position is more secure since the upstream dividend flow from its operating subsidiaries has become more predictable, albeit subject to regulatory approvals, especially given excess regulatory capital at all its major operating subsidiaries. Financial leverage, given the Company’s cash position, excellent liquidity and underlying strong regulatory capital ratios, is well within the limits of the assigned rating category.

Nevertheless, despite the strong investment management track record of the Company, accompanied by growing sophistication around enterprise risk management, the underlying competitive and volatile nature of the underlying insurance business, including the increasing risk of catastrophic claims, suggests that the upside potential for Fairfax’s ratings remains limited.

Fairfax is the proud issuer of FFH.PR.C, FFH.PR.E, FFH.PR.G and FFH.PR.I, all FixedResets.

It was a strong day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 23bp, FixedResets gaining 11bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 29bp. Volatility was quite good, well-skewed to the upside. Volume was light.

I’ve been taking a correspondence course in Conversational Furrin for the past while so here goes! Police nab your dad! And Poppa swears anew when your niece is bad!*

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.5883 % 2,055.7
FixedFloater 4.97 % 4.74 % 40,255 16.91 1 -1.6975 % 3,099.9
Floater 3.24 % 3.58 % 72,842 18.35 3 1.5883 % 2,219.6
OpRet 4.94 % 1.69 % 63,424 1.39 6 0.2525 % 2,470.8
SplitShare 5.44 % 1.45 % 77,715 0.96 4 0.4173 % 2,572.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2525 % 2,259.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.47 % -4.47 % 89,442 0.09 18 0.2583 % 2,185.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.21 % 5.09 % 108,396 15.15 12 0.2339 % 2,334.2
FixedReset 5.09 % 2.92 % 218,747 2.46 64 0.1072 % 2,352.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.00 % 3.66 % 196,774 2.70 46 0.2904 % 2,247.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.72
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.11
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.05
Bid-YTW : 6.43 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-22
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : -24.14 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-23
Maturity Price : 14.55
Evaluated at bid price : 14.55
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 2.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-23
Maturity Price : 14.66
Evaluated at bid price : 14.66
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 3.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.91
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 94,754 Nesbitt crossed 90,000 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.39
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 30,875 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.91
Bid-YTW : 5.43 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 30,521 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 29,836 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-22
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 2.02 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 29,069 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 27,515 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 20.67 – 21.39
Spot Rate : 0.7200
Average : 0.5330

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.67
Bid-YTW : 6.96 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.60 – 26.09
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3044

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.51 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 19.40 – 19.97
Spot Rate : 0.5700
Average : 0.3927

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-23
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %

PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.95 – 25.40
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2850

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-23
Maturity Price : 24.68
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 14.66 – 15.11
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2863

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-23
Maturity Price : 14.66
Evaluated at bid price : 14.66
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %

BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.31 – 26.69
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2423

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-25
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.31
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %

* That’s furrin for Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!

Market Action

December 22, 2011

The national securities regulation pipe-dream is over:

The Supreme Court of Canada has stopped the federal government’s initiative for a single national securities regulator in its tracks. While the court suggested that the door remained open to a single national regulator achieved through federal-provincial co-operation, the near-total victory achieved by the provinces gives the scheme’s provincial opponents no incentive to participate.

A national securities regulator would be nice. It would also be nice if it rained soup and snowed marshmallows.

Part of the problem – as far as I’m concerned – is that the idea was oversold. Various idiots claimed that things like the ABCP market freeze would never have happened if only we had a national regulator, which is egregious nonsense. A national regulator would make the system more efficient, by making it possible for issuers and other market participants (such as myself) to get national clearance with one filing and one fee. Full stop.

Long ago, I suggested it would make far more sense for interested provinces to combine their regulatory activities – a modest goal, but one with the potential for actually happening. If the OSC were to merge with, say, the PEI Securities Commission then I would be better off. Marginally, yes, but measurably, also yes.

Leaks from the talks on the voluntary-ha-ha Greek debt writedown are getting interesting:

Greece’s creditors are resisting pressure from the International Monetary Fund to accept bigger losses on holdings of the indebted nation’s government bonds, said three people with direct knowledge of the discussions.

Lenders want the 70 billion euros ($91 billion) of new bonds the government will issue in return for existing securities to carry a coupon of about 5 percent, said the people, who declined to be identified because the negotiations are private.

The IMF is pushing for creditors to accept a smaller coupon in order to reduce Greece’s debt-to-gross domestic product ratio to 120 percent by 2020, a key element of the Oct. 27 agreement by European Union leaders, the people said.

As part of Greece’s 130 billion-euro second bailout, investors would take a 50 percent hit on the nominal value of 206 billion euros of privately owned debt. Exchanging bonds for securities with a 5 percent coupon would leave investors with a 65 percent loss in the net present value of their holdings of Greek government debt, the people said.

The sides have also agreed that the deal should include collective action clauses that would ensure lenders participate in the swap, the people said.

Vega Asset Management LLC resigned this month from a committee of Greek creditors negotiating the debt swap with European authorities, because the Madrid-based hedge fund refused to accept a net present value loss exceeding 50 percent, according to a Dec. 7 e-mail sent to other panel members, which was obtained by Bloomberg News.

It will be interesting to see how a collective action clause will be worded in order to preserve the fiction that the participants are volunteers!

Someone at the Financial Times points out:

The European Central Bank’s lending of €489-billion to more than 500 banks was nothing short of a feeding frenzy.

The money — and there is another three-year loan offer in February — should ease the pressure on banks to dump assets at firesale prices to raise cash.

But the hoarding suggests the funds will instead flow to that traditional parking space for spare cash; euro zone government bonds.

There is of course an irony in the fact that banks’ ditching of their sovereign holdings in the last year is partly to blame for the rise in government borrowing costs. There is then further irony in that the market freeze which produced Thursday’s feeding frenzy was in part the result of worries about banks’ exposure to sovereign debt. Buying more government bonds does nothing to square this vicious circle, it just buys some breathing space to repair balance sheets and restore public finances. Investors and taxpayers can only hope politicians and bankers use the time wisely.

Fed action on mortgage bonds is showing some benefits:

Mortgage rates for 30-year U.S. loans dropped to the lowest level on record amid signs the housing market may be set for a turnaround.

The average rate for a 30-year fixed loan fell to 3.91 percent in the week ended today, the lowest in data dating to 1971, from 3.94 percent, Freddie Mac said in a statement. The average 15-year rate matched last week’s previous all-time low of 3.21 percent, according to the McLean, Virginia-based mortgage-finance company.

The U.S. housing market, under pressure from tight lending standards and foreclosures that depress values, is showing signs of improvement. Purchases of previously owned homes rose to a 10-month high in November as the inventory of unsold properties shrank to the lowest level in six years, the National Association of Realtors reported yesterday.

Whether those benefits are worth the cost is, of course, a matter for debate, but at least there are some benefits!

It was another strong day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 6bp, FixedResets winning 29bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 20bp. Good volatility – all winners, including a healthy contingent from the insurance sector, which has been badly beaten down lately. Volume was on the high side of average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1252 % 2,023.5
FixedFloater 4.89 % 4.64 % 38,926 17.04 1 0.6211 % 3,153.5
Floater 3.29 % 3.67 % 72,395 18.14 3 -0.1252 % 2,184.9
OpRet 4.95 % 1.68 % 62,636 1.39 6 -0.1422 % 2,464.6
SplitShare 5.46 % 2.16 % 80,911 0.96 4 0.4035 % 2,561.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1422 % 2,253.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.48 % -2.27 % 90,757 0.09 18 0.1284 % 2,179.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.22 % 5.10 % 109,034 15.09 12 0.0610 % 2,328.8
FixedReset 5.09 % 2.91 % 218,482 2.45 64 0.2921 % 2,350.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.01 % 3.71 % 196,282 2.94 46 0.2012 % 2,240.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 6.61 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.14
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.70
Bid-YTW : 1.98 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
SLF.PR.I FixedReset 3.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 4.64 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 45,186 RBC crossed 24,700 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 37,332 Recent clearance sale.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.86
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 28,091 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 25,975 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 25,615 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.02
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Premium 24,680 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.68
Bid-YTW : 2.87 %
There were 35 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CM.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.53 – 26.39
Spot Rate : 0.8600
Average : 0.4891

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : 2.28 %

MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 20.51 – 21.10
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.3280

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.51
Bid-YTW : 7.06 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.00 – 26.78
Spot Rate : 0.7800
Average : 0.5263

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.03 – 26.88
Spot Rate : 0.8500
Average : 0.6347

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.03
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 23.21 – 23.79
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.3716

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.21
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.37 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3681

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.37
Bid-YTW : 4.81 %

Market Action

December 21, 2011

The ECB is bailing out Europe:

The European Central Bank will lend euro-area banks a record amount for three years in its latest attempt to keep credit flowing to the economy during the sovereign debt crisis.

The Frankfurt-based ECB awarded 489 billion euros ($645 billion) in 1,134-day loans today, the most ever in a single operation and more than economists’ median estimate of 293 billion euros in a Bloomberg News survey. The ECB said 523 banks asked for the funds, which will be lent at the average of its benchmark interest rate — currently 1 percent — over the period of the loans. They start tomorrow.

Yields on government bonds in Italy and Spain fell in the days after the ECB announced the loans on Dec. 8 as banks bought the securities to use them as collateral in today’s tender. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has suggested banks could use the loans to buy even more government debt.

Simon Derrick, chief currency strategist at Bank of New York Mellon Corp, said the loans amount to quantitative easing “through the backdoor.”

It was a strong day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 13bp, FixedResets gaining 11bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 30bp. Volatility was good. Volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.11%, equivalent to 6.64% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.6% so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 205bp, a slight tightening from the 210bp reported December 14.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6429 % 2,026.1
FixedFloater 4.92 % 4.67 % 39,407 17.00 1 -1.0753 % 3,134.0
Floater 3.29 % 3.68 % 72,312 18.13 3 -0.6429 % 2,187.6
OpRet 4.95 % 1.68 % 62,991 1.40 6 -0.0194 % 2,468.1
SplitShare 5.48 % 2.15 % 78,245 0.96 4 0.6194 % 2,551.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0194 % 2,256.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.48 % 0.34 % 91,561 0.09 18 0.0426 % 2,176.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.22 % 5.11 % 108,458 15.11 12 0.1260 % 2,327.4
FixedReset 5.10 % 2.97 % 220,343 2.46 64 0.1082 % 2,343.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.02 % 3.78 % 194,079 2.95 46 0.2968 % 2,236.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -2.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-21
Maturity Price : 14.26
Evaluated at bid price : 14.26
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-21
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.32
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.82
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.78
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-21
Maturity Price : 23.58
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 2.71 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare 2.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 6.57 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 2.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.96
Bid-YTW : 6.94 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 328,707 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 60,800 Nesbitt bought 25,400 from RBC at 25.05; Desjardins crossed 14,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 41,970 RBC crossed 16,900 at 23.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.78
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 35,400 Recent fire sale.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.78
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 30,987 Desjardins crossed blocks of 10,000 and 15,000, both at 19.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-21
Maturity Price : 19.39
Evaluated at bid price : 19.39
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 29,970 Scotia crossed 13,500 at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.00 – 26.65
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.3986

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 23.00 – 23.80
Spot Rate : 0.8000
Average : 0.6104

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 6.57 %

BMO.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.92 – 27.35
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2689

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.92
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %

CM.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 26.68 – 27.20
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3698

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.68
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 26.05 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3441

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-21
Maturity Price : 23.51
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.20 – 26.55
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2481

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %