September 11, 2012

September 12th, 2012

There’s a new wrinkle in the financial repression chronicles:

JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and Bank of America Corp. are helping clients find an extra $2.6 trillion to back derivatives trades amid signs that a shortage of quality collateral will erode efforts to safeguard the financial system.

Starting next year, new rules designed to prevent another meltdown will force traders to post U.S. Treasury bonds or other top-rated holdings to guarantee more of their bets. The change takes effect as the $10.8 trillion market for Treasuries is already stretched thin by banks rebuilding balance sheets and investors seeking safety, leaving fewer bonds available to backstop the $648 trillion derivatives market.

The solution: At least seven banks plan to let customers swap lower-rated securities that don’t meet standards in return for a loan of Treasuries or similar holdings that do qualify, a process dubbed “collateral transformation.” That’s raising concerns among investors, bank executives and academics that measures intended to avert risk are hiding it instead.

Adding to the concern is the reaction of central clearinghouses, which collect from losers on derivatives trades and pay off winners. Some have responded to the collateral shortage by lowering standards, with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange accepting bonds rated four levels above junk.

The potential reward for revenue-starved banks is an expanded securities-lending market that could generate billions of dollars in fees. JPMorgan and Bank of America, which have the biggest derivatives businesses among U.S. bank holding companies with a combined $140 trillion of the instruments, are already marketing their new collateral-transformation desks, people with knowledge of the operations said.

As discussed on August 31, directed lending to the government is a form of financial repression.

The US has to force people to buy its bonds! The outlook isn’t getting any better:

Moody’s warned Tuesday it could strip the United States of its coveted triple-A credit rating if Congress fails to produce a budget that will bring down the federal debt burden.

“Budget negotiations during the 2013 Congressional legislative session will likely determine the direction of the U.S. government’s Aaa rating and negative outlook,” the ratings firm said in a statement.

If the negotiations lead to specific policies that produce a stabilization and then downward trend in the ratio of federal debt to GDP over the medium term, the rating will likely be affirmed and the outlook returned to stable, it said.

“If those negotiations fail to produce such policies, however, Moody’s would expect to lower the rating, probably to Aa1.”

Moody’s said it was unlikely it would keep the Aaa rating with a negative outlook into 2014.

“The only scenario that would likely lead to its temporary maintenance would be if the method adopted to achieve debt stabilization involved a large, immediate fiscal shock – such as would occur if the so-called ‘fiscal cliff’ actually materialized – which could lead to instability,” it said.

There was very little movement in the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualPremiums and FixedResets both gaining 3bp; DeemedRetractibles were off 2bp. Volatility was average. Volume improved a little, but was still below what I would call ‘average’ levels; but on a brighter note, RBC owned the board today, with no other dealer mentioned in the Volume Highlights.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5726 % 2,406.6
FixedFloater 4.52 % 3.87 % 35,084 17.53 1 0.0952 % 3,522.5
Floater 3.02 % 3.07 % 55,251 19.46 3 -0.5726 % 2,598.5
OpRet 4.63 % 3.28 % 60,557 1.47 4 0.3644 % 2,548.4
SplitShare 5.48 % 5.07 % 75,233 4.60 3 -0.1065 % 2,799.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3644 % 2,330.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % 3.60 % 87,231 0.45 28 0.0271 % 2,279.5
Perpetual-Discount 4.91 % 4.94 % 95,317 15.48 3 0.4430 % 2,546.8
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.07 % 167,093 4.08 70 0.0266 % 2,421.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 3.68 % 121,414 1.85 46 -0.0187 % 2,365.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-11
Maturity Price : 24.11
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-11
Maturity Price : 23.35
Evaluated at bid price : 25.69
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
FTS.PR.E OpRet 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.64
Bid-YTW : 0.16 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 104,462 RBC crossed two blocks of 50,000 each, both at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.63
Bid-YTW : 2.76 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 100,830 RBC crossed 100,000 at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.23
Bid-YTW : 2.87 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 96,980 RBC crossed 70,000 at 24.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-11
Maturity Price : 23.38
Evaluated at bid price : 24.89
Bid-YTW : 2.69 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 54,565 RBC crossed 50,000 at 26.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.39
Bid-YTW : 2.67 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 53,635 RBC crossed 50,000 at 26.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 2.73 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 49,600 RBC crossed 48,700 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-11
Maturity Price : 23.59
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 17.15 – 17.50
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2483

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-11
Maturity Price : 17.15
Evaluated at bid price : 17.15
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 25.02 – 25.20
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1164

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-11
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %

SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.10 – 24.28
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1199

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.41 – 25.67
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.2074

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-11
Maturity Price : 23.65
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %

SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.26 – 24.40
Spot Rate : 0.1400
Average : 0.0899

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.26
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %

CM.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 26.77 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1702

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.77
Bid-YTW : 2.53 %

BAF Downgraded to Pfd-3 by DBRS

September 12th, 2012

DBRS has announced that it:

has today downgraded Bell Aliant Regional Communications, Limited Partnership’s (Bell Aliant’s or the Company’s) Commercial Paper rating to R-2 (middle) from R-1 (low), Senior Unsecured Debt to BBB from BBB (high) and Preferred Shares to Pfd-3 from Pfd-3 (high), all with Stable trends. This action removes the ratings from Under Review with Negative Implications. This downgrade follows DBRS’s reassessment of the risks associated with the Company’s transformational strategy while the Stable trends reflect DBRS’s view that the Company’s fibre strategy presents a viable initiative with strong potential.

On August 2, 2012, DBRS noted that it recognizes the merits of Bell Aliant’s fibre expansion; however, it acknowledges that the transition will also not be without risk. In its review, DBRS focused on (1) Bell Aliant’s growth prospects within its new business lines; (2) the size and pace of the Company’s capital program and overall financing requirements, in light of management’s commitment to its dividend; and (3) the competitive environment, including pricing strategies and the threat of product innovation.

Although Bell Aliant continues to grow its fibre footprint and increase its IP subscriber base, the long-term effects of the rollout on consolidated revenue and EBITDA growth remain difficult to gauge. The Company’s FibreOP services are just beginning to generate positive EBITDA, while declining traditional local and long distance revenue still account for the majority of Bell Aliant’s current operating profits.

The Review Negative announcement was reported on PrefBlog.

The text of press release doesn’t mention their preferred share issuing arm, Bell Aliant Preferred Equity Inc., specifically, but its preferred shares are specifically placed under Review-Negative in the appended table.

Bell Aliant Preferred Equity Inc. has two issues outstanding: BAF.PR.A and BAF.PR.C. Both are FixedResets, both are relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

New Issue: AX FixedReset 5.25%+446 US PAY

September 11th, 2012

Artis Real Estate Investment Trust (TSX: AX.UN) has announced:

a marketed public offering (the “Financing”) of approximately US$50 million Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Trust Units, Series C (the “Series C Units”) at a price of US$25 per Series C Unit. The Financing is being led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC and Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd. (the “Underwriters”). Artis has also granted the Underwriters an over-allotment option, exercisable at any time up to 30 days after the closing of the Financing, to purchase additional Series C Units, up to an amount equal to 15% of the number of Series C Units sold pursuant to the Financing. The Financing will be priced in the context of the market with the final terms of the Financing to be determined at the time of pricing.

The Series C Units will pay fixed cumulative preferential distributions, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, for the initial approximately five and a half-year period ending March 31, 2018. The first quarterly distribution, if declared, shall be payable on December 31, 2012. The distribution rate will be reset on March 31, 2018 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year United States Government bond yield and a spread which will be set upon pricing of this Financing. The Series C Units are redeemable by Artis, at its option, on March 31, 2018 and on March 31 of every fifth year thereafter.

Holders of Series C Units will have the right to reclassify all or any part of their Series C Units as Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Trust Units, Series D (the “Series D Units”), subject to certain conditions, on March 31, 2018 and on March 31 of every fifth year thereafter. Such reclassification privilege may be subject to certain tax considerations (to be disclosed in the prospectus supplement). Holders of Series D Units will be entitled to receive a floating cumulative preferential distribution, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, at a rate equal to the sum of the then 3-month United States Government Treasury Bill yield plus a spread which will be set upon pricing of this Financing.

The Financing is being made pursuant to the REIT’s base shelf prospectus dated June 15, 2012. The terms of the offering will be described in a prospectus supplement to be filed with Canadian securities regulators.

Artis intends to use the net proceeds from the Financing to repay indebtedness, fund future acquisitions, and for general trust purposes.

They also announced:

that is has priced its previously announced marketed public offering (the “Financing”) of Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Trust Units, Series C (the “Series C Units”). Artis will issue 3.0 million Series C Units at a price of US$25 per Series C Unit for gross proceeds to Artis of US$75,000,000.

The Financing is being led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC and Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd. (the “Underwriters”).

The Series C Units will pay fixed cumulative preferential distributions of US$1.3125 per unit per annum, yielding 5.25% per annum, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, for the initial approximately five and a half-year period ending March 31, 2018. The first quarterly distribution, if declared, shall be payable on December 31, 2012 and shall be US$0.3740 per unit, based on the anticipated closing of the offering of Series C Units of September 18, 2012. The distribution rate will be reset on March 31, 2018 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five year United States Government bond yield and 4.46%. The Series C Units are redeemable by Artis, at its option, on March 31, 2018 and on March 31 of every fifth year thereafter.

Holders of Series C Units will have the right to reclassify all or any part of their Series C Units as Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Trust Units, Series D (the “Series D Units”), subject to certain conditions, on March 31, 2018 and on March 31 of every fifth year thereafter. Such reclassification privilege may be subject to certain tax considerations (to be disclosed in the prospectus supplement).

Holders of Series D Units will be entitled to receive a floating cumulative preferential distribution, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, at a rate equal to the sum of the then 3-month United States Government Treasury Bill yield plus a spread of 4.46%.

The Financing is being made pursuant to the REIT’s base shelf prospectus dated June 15, 2012.

The terms of the offering will be described in a prospectus supplement to be filed with Canadian securities regulators. The Financing is expected to close on or about September 18, 2012 and is subject to regulatory approval.

Artis intends to use the net proceeds from the Financing to repay indebtedness, fund future acquisitions, and for general trust purposes.

It is my understanding that the shares are not rated and that there is no current intention to rectify this matter.

September 10, 2012

September 11th, 2012

There are rising expectations for low rates forever:

Just six months ago, money market traders expected the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates by the end of 2013. Now, they see borrowing costs staying at record lows for about three more years as the economic outlook worsens.

Bond market measures from overnight index swaps, which indicate no increase in the federal funds rate until mid-2015, to a 62 percent decline in a measure of volatility in government bonds signal that rates will stay near zero for longer. The gap between two- and five-year Treasury yields, which decreases when traders expect benchmark rates to remain subdued, is more than 50 percent narrower than its average since 2008.

It was an off day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums and FixedResets down 7bp, while DeemedRetractibles lost 9bp. Volatiltiy was average, all on the downside. Volume continued at holiday levels.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6532 % 2,420.4
FixedFloater 4.52 % 3.88 % 35,161 17.52 1 -1.8692 % 3,519.1
Floater 3.01 % 3.06 % 52,909 19.51 3 0.6532 % 2,613.4
OpRet 4.65 % 3.20 % 59,626 0.78 4 -0.5531 % 2,539.1
SplitShare 5.47 % 4.89 % 74,124 4.61 3 -0.0665 % 2,802.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5531 % 2,321.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % 3.79 % 90,607 1.05 28 -0.0694 % 2,278.9
Perpetual-Discount 4.93 % 4.99 % 98,633 15.40 3 -0.0830 % 2,535.6
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.09 % 165,280 4.08 70 -0.0730 % 2,421.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 3.64 % 122,853 1.95 46 -0.0909 % 2,366.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.E OpRet -2.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 2.19 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-10
Maturity Price : 21.75
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-10
Maturity Price : 23.69
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 277,305 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 227,300 (nice ticket!) and 47,900, both at 24.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.39
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 113,500 National crossed blocks of 82,000 and 26,700.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 2.08 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 62,000 TD crossed 62,000 at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.39 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 52,706 Nesbitt crossed 47,900 at 23.86.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.78
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 42,829 RBC sold 13,200 to Nesbitt at 25.70, then crossed 15,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset 37,900 RBC crossed 20,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
There were 16 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.15 – 24.50
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2175

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-10
Maturity Price : 23.87
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.70 – 26.11
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.2800

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %

IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.07 – 26.49
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.2910

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.07
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.26 – 26.59
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2108

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 2.19 %

PWF.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 26.05 – 26.40
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2503

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.39 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.86 – 26.23
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2893

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %

September 7, 2012

September 8th, 2012

US Payrolls weren’t very encouraging:

Payrolls rose less than projected in August and the unemployment rate was unexpectedly driven down by Americans leaving the labor force, boosting the odds of additional Federal Reserve easing to spur a faltering recovery.

The economy added 96,000 workers after a revised 141,000 increase in July that was smaller than initially estimated, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. The median estimate of 92 economists surveyed by Bloomberg called for a gain of 130,000. The jobless rate fell to 8.1 percent.

European banks still aren’t doing very well:

ECB President Mario Draghi said yesterday the central bank will lend against assets in dollars, pounds and Japanese yen, as well as in euros, reopening a program that ran for two years following the September 2008 bankruptcy of the U.S. investment bank. The ECB also eased borrowing against government-issued or guaranteed assets by dropping rating requirements.

Investors’ reluctance to lend to banks in countries where bond yields soared has forced those banks to fund at the ECB. Spanish banks borrowed 375.5 billion euros ($476 billion) from the central bank as of the end of July, sucking collateral out of a government bond market that totals about 690 billion euros, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The ECB’s 1 trillion-euro longer-term refinancing operations in December and February took collateral out of the market, in particular in Spain and Italy, whose banks were the biggest borrowers. ECB bond buying as part of its new Outright Monetary Transactions program will pile more pressure onto a market that is already “highly illiquid,” said Chris Clark, a strategist at ICAP Plc, the largest broker of transactions between banks.

“There’s so little Spanish paper that hasn’t been lodged at the ECB that pretty much every single bond has gained a very significant premium to borrow,” he said. “If the ECB buys more bonds, it may dry up liquidity in the Spanish government bond market even more. These looser collateral rules will help.”

Apropos of which, Fitch Ratings has a most interesting report titled U.S. Money Fund Exposure and European Banks: Shift to Japan Continues:

U.S. prime money market funds (MMF) continued to increase their exposure to Japanese banks, which as of end-July represent 12.3% of total MMF holdings or a 118% increase on a dollar basis since end-May 2011 (see Shift to Japan Continues chart and Change in Exposure [on a Dollar Basis] table). This exposure exceeds aggregate MMF allocations to eurozone banks, which increased moderately since the prior reporting period and now constitute 8.5% of total MMF assets, still 76% below end-May 2011 levels on a dollar basis. This “disengagement” between MMFs and eurozone banks appears to be persisting, as MMF risk aversion continues and both eurozone banks and their regulators seem cautious towards this potentially volatile form of funding. Aggregate MMF allocations to European banks outside of the eurozone also grew with allocations to Nordic, Swiss, and U.K. banks all rising since end-June on a dollar basis. Outside of Europe, MMF allocations to Canadian banks declined slightly, while exposures to Australian banks remained constant over the same period. However, since end-January 2012, MMF exposures to Australian banks have declined by roughly 25%, consistent with efforts by these banks to gradually reduce their use of short-term wholesale funding. U.S. banks remain the largest single-country exposure at 12.4% of MMF assets as of end-July.

I am pleased to announce the existence of a prominent adult investor:

Mark Cuban, owner of the Dallas Mavericks basketball team, wrote a post on his blog in response to a column in which Andrew Ross Sorkin of the New York Times pinned the blame on David Ebersman, Facebook’s chief financial officer. Cuban said:

“I bought and sold FB shares as a TRADE, not an investment. I lost money. When the stock didn’t bounce as I thought/hoped it would, I realized I was wrong and got out. It wasn’t the fault of the FB CFO that I lost money. It was my fault. I know that no one sells me shares of stock because they expect the price of the stock to go up. So someone saw me coming and they sold me the stock. That is the way the stock market works. When you sit at the trading terminal you look for the sucker. When you don’t see one, it’s you. In this case it was me.”

Amazing, isn’t it?

There’s a (very US-centric) article on preferred shares in the Wall Street Journal, titled Playing ‘Preferred’ Shares.

DBRS confirmed MFC:

DBRS has today confirmed its ratings on Manulife Financial Corporation (Manulife or the Company) and its affiliates, including The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, its primary operating company. The rating trend is Stable.

While DBRS is prepared to acknowledge that, barring a major economic crisis, the Company has probably hit its nadir, it does not believe that the lost profitability associated with the U.S. operation will recover quickly, especially since the former earnings levels benefited from favourable equity markets and a more favourable interest rate environment. DBRS is also mindful that the Company’s core earnings performance is dampened by hedging costs, reduced earnings opportunities related to potential recovery in capital markets, and more competitive market conditions. The Company has indicated that it also expects to take another material charge in Q3 2012 related to changes in actuarial assumptions driven by new standards of practice and the ambient macroeconomic environment, though much of this specific charge will relate to products and policy liabilities that are not part of the Company’s current growth plans. Other sources of potential earnings volatility relate to the indeterminate policyholder behaviours that are not addressed by current hedging activity, and a possible additional write down of goodwill reflecting the adverse interest rate environment.

At the Company’s current level of core earnings as DBRS defines them, fixed charge coverage ratios are below 5x with a core return on equity (ROE) of about 10%, well below the greater than 10x coverage and greater than 15% ROE reported prior to the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. Without the heft of the Company’s business franchises in Canada, Asia and the United States, such ratios and the accompanying earnings volatility would not be consistent with the DBRS quantitative criteria for Company’s rated at the current levels. Should these business franchises deteriorate, there could be negative rating implications.

To meet its regulatory capital requirements over the same period of market disruption, the Company has raised over $14 billion in net capital through market issues of common and preferred shares, reduced cash dividends and senior and subordinated debt issues. Correspondingly, the Company has consistently reported strong regulatory capital ratios, as its financial leverage ratios (total debt plus preferred as a proportion of capitalization) have increased to 32.2% from 17.1% in 2007, and remain above the Company’s 25% target. The Company reported an MCCSR ratio of 213% for the period ending June 30, 2012, which is among the strongest ratios in the industry and well above a reasonable minimum level, especially given the Company’s risk-mitigating hedges for which the regulatory ratio gives no credit. However, given the unstable economic environment regulatory uncertainty associated with Solvency II, IFRS accounting for Insurance Contracts and Employee Benefits and OSFI’s and the Canadian Institute of Actuaries requirements regarding required capital for variable annuity guarantees, DBRS feels that the relatively high regulatory capital ratios are prudent at this time.

DBRS also confirmed GWO:

DBRS has today confirmed the ratings of Great-West Lifeco Inc. (GWO or the Company) and its affiliated operating subsidiaries, including the Claims Paying Ratings at The Great-West Life Assurance Company, The Canada Life Assurance Company and London Life Insurance Company; all trends are Stable. The existing ratings for the Company and its operating subsidiaries reflect the continuing strong financial performance and the notable absence of earnings volatility associated with recent exogenous market factors. Stable earnings are a testament to the Company’s diversification by product and geography, as well as its conservatism with respect to embedded product risks, actuarial assumptions and asset quality.

Like its major peers, the Company is anchored by Canadian operations that benefit from an oligopolistic industry structure, which limits the worst of price competition.

The MCCSR ratio of the Company’s major regulated operating subsidiary has hovered just over 200% for the last two years. While this is lower than that of some major competitors, it reflects the Company’s lower-risk asset portfolio and insurance liabilities, and does not include $825 million of cash at the holding company that could easily be advanced to the regulated entities in the form of capital, if required. With longer experience as a shareholder-owned company, GWO has traditionally operated with higher financial leverage than most of its Canadian peers, a reflection of its debt-financed mergers and acquisitions activity and the historical attention paid to the efficient use of shareholder capital. At 32.2% at the end of June 2012, the Company’s total debt plus preferred has come into alignment with that of the peer group, as Great-West has reduced financial leverage and de-mutualized competitors have increased theirs. Fixed-charge coverage ratios at GWO nevertheless remain healthier than those of its peers, reflecting stronger profitability. The Company is actively retiring capital instruments issued at its operating companies in order to have a higher proportion of capital issuance at the holding company level, which will serve to reduce its double leverage ratio. In short, DBRS considers the Company’s financial leverage and capital position to be consistent with the current rating category, as long as it continues to operate conservatively.

As an integral component of Power Financial Corporation’s group of companies, GWO benefits from its parent’s financial support and its strong governance and risk management controls and procedures, which reinforce the conservative bottom-line focus of the Company.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 6bp, FixedResets off 2bp and DeemedRetractibles up 4bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume remained at holiday levels.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0960 % 2,404.7
FixedFloater 4.44 % 3.80 % 32,635 17.70 1 0.0000 % 3,586.2
Floater 3.03 % 3.07 % 53,733 19.47 3 -0.0960 % 2,596.5
OpRet 4.62 % 3.00 % 36,315 0.77 4 0.0000 % 2,553.2
SplitShare 5.47 % 4.88 % 74,982 4.61 3 0.1465 % 2,804.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,334.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % 3.43 % 89,921 0.46 28 0.0645 % 2,280.4
Perpetual-Discount 4.93 % 4.97 % 99,356 15.45 3 -0.1381 % 2,537.7
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.01 % 165,353 4.09 70 -0.0243 % 2,423.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.52 % 123,984 1.86 46 0.0357 % 2,368.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Premium 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 115,751 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 24.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 86,946 RBC crossed 65,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 43,151 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.42.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 41,292 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 23.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 5.40 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 36,701 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.74
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 31,019 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-07
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
There were 14 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.64 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2303

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.64
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.84 – 26.14
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2163

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-07
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.84
Bid-YTW : 0.15 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.70 – 23.96
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1825

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.30 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1201

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %

BAM.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 25.61 – 25.89
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.2141

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-07
Maturity Price : 23.33
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %

BAM.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.86 – 27.09
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1647

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.86
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %

DBRS Reviews 13 Split Shares

September 8th, 2012

DBRS has announced that it:

has today taken a range of rating actions on 13 structured preferred shares issued by 12 split share companies and trusts (collectively, the Issuers).

DBRS Review Announced 2012-9-7
Ticker Old
Rating
Asset
Coverage
Last
PrefBlog
Post
HIMIPref™
Index
New
Rating
CGI.PR.B Pfd-1(low) 3.9-:1
2012-6-30
Capital Unit Dividend Worries Scraps Pfd-1(low)
CGI.PR.C Pfd-1(low) 3.9-:1
2012-6-30
Capital Unit Dividend Worries Scraps Pfd-1(low)
NEW.PR.C Pfd-2 3.4-:1
2012-9-6
Partial Redemption Scraps Pfd-2(high)
CBU.PR.A Pfd-2 3.7-:1
2012-9-6
Normal Course Issuer Bid Not tracked Pfd-2
BBO.PR.A Pfd-2(low) 2.0+:1
2012-9-7
Gets Bigger Not tracked Pfd-2 [Review Negative]
BSC.PR.B Pfd-2(low) 2.5+:1
2012-9-6
Partial Call for Redemption Scraps Pfd-2(low)
SBC.PR.A Pfd-3(high) 2.1+:1
2012-9-6
Annual Report Scraps Pfd-3(high)
BK.PR.A Pfd-3(high) 1.9+:1
2012-8-31
Annual Report Scraps Pfd-3
DFN.PR.A Pfd-3(high) 1.8+:1
2012-8-31
Annual Report Scraps Pfd-3
SBN.PR.A Pfd-3 1.8-:1
2012-9-6
Annual Report Scraps Pfd-3
DF.PR.A Pfd-3 1.5+:1
2012-8-31
Annual Report Scraps Pfd-3(low)
FCS.PR.B Pfd-3(low) 1.4+:1
2011-12-31
1.4-:1
2012-9-6
(My calculation)
Warrant Offering Scraps Pfd-3(low)
LBS.PR.A Pfd-3 1.5+:1
2012-9-6
Annual Report Scraps Pfd-3(low)

SLF: DBRS Calls "Review-Negative"

September 8th, 2012

DBRS has announced that it:

has today placed its ratings of the debt and preferred share instruments of Sun Life Financial Inc. (Sun Life or the Company) and its affiliates Under Review with Negative Implications. The Claims Paying Ability rating of IC-1 assigned to The Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada has been confirmed. The rating action reflects the Company’s recent weak profitability and earnings volatility associated with exogenous market factors over the past several years. While these exposures are not unique to Sun Life, DBRS regards the current ratings, following a review of the industry, as being out of alignment with the Company’s recent earnings track record and those of its peers. The action also reflects uncertainty associated with the Company’s strategic transition as it attempts to restore profitability and earnings stability by pursuing more profitable products with fewer embedded risks and lower capital requirements. Sun Life faces a number of challenges in this regard, including associated execution challenges and the continuing weak economic and interest rate environment aggravated by evolving regulatory and accounting regimes.

The strength of the Company’s Canadian franchise, a growing appetite for its products and services, a reasonable level of diversification in attractive market niches in the United States and Asia, and conservative risk management are nevertheless not sufficient for Sun Life to maintain its current ratings in the absence of a recovery in core earnings and reduced earnings volatility to levels that are at least consistent with its 2015 earnings target of $2 billion (with a return on equity of between 12% and 14%). The resolution of the Under Review with Negative Implications status therefore hinges largely on an imminent return to reasonable profitability which would cover the Company’s fixed charges by at least 5.0 times. However, DBRS regards as ambitious the revenue growth assumptions underlying the achievement of such earnings.

The Company’s financial performance in recent years suggests that its enterprise risk management platform, while regarded as superior, has mitigated but not eliminated earnings volatility tied to recent market conditions. In addition, hedging costs have put downward pressure on earnings. The requirement for additional regulatory capital at its operating subsidiaries in the wake of the financial crisis and the transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) increased the Company’s consolidated financial leverage to 31% at June 30, 2012, from just over 21% five years ago. Without earnings to support the associated debt service costs, the five-year average fixed-charge coverage ratio has dropped to below 2.0 times from 8.0 times for the period prior to the financial crisis. The core fixed-charge coverage ratio, excluding volatile market-related factors, has similarly fallen to below 5.0 times from over 8.0 times, which is below the level expected for a company with the current ratings.

DBRS intends to resolve the Under Review status within the next few months, following its annual review with the Company’s management team.

DBRS maintains its rating of Pfd-1(low) for the preferreds. S&P has them at P-2(high) [Outlook Negative]; the Outlook Negative was assessed in February, 2012. Moody’s downgraded the preferreds to Baa3(hyb) in January, 2012 and they remain at that level.

SLF has the following issues outstanding: SLF.PR.A, SLF.PR.B, SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D & SLF.PR.E (DeemedRetractible) and SLF.PR.F, SLF.PR.G, SLF.PR.H & SLF.PR.I (FixedReset).

IAG: DBRS Says Trend Negative

September 7th, 2012

DBRS has announced that it:

has today confirmed the ratings on Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc. (IAG or the Company) and its affiliate, Industrial Alliance Capital Trust, but has assigned a Negative trend. The debt and preferred shares ratings have been removed from Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were placed on June 15, 2012. The Negative trend reflects the Company’s reduced financial flexibility as it has continued to shore up its regulatory capital ratios through the issuance of additional preferred shares, taking its total debt-to-capitalization ratio to 37.8% which is above the ratio expected by DBRS for an “A”-rated company in the Canadian life insurance industry. While this ratio is somewhat overstated, given the Company’s generally conservative actuarial reserve assumptions and the absence of any meaningful goodwill and intangibles, the Company’s fixed-charge coverage ratio has nevertheless also fallen below the 5.0 times lower limit, which delineates a lower rating category in the DBRS rating methodology.

The resolution of the Company’s Negative rating trend hinges to some degree on a return to a more sustainable interest rate environment which would take away some of the overhanging downward pressure on earnings. Should earnings start to be negatively affected over the next 12 months by low interest rates or by deterioration in top-line growth following recent strategic decisions, DBRS would likely convert its Negative trend into a downgrade. The trend will revert to Stable if a planned reduction in new business strain, among other initiatives, is reflected in a sustained improvement in profitability, which would be signaled by a return to a fixed-charge coverage ratio in excess of 5.0 times and a reduction in the total debt ratio.

Given the longer-than-expected period of low interest rates, however, the Company’s management team is now being forced to take more dramatic offsetting actions through repricing, redesign and withdrawal of products and business lines that would otherwise aggravate the Company’s earnings exposure to low interest rates through continued high new business strain and increased required regulatory capital. To limit market risk, the Company is also enhancing asset liability management through term extensions, rebalanced asset portfolios and intersegment notes.

S&P has called “Outlook Negative” since June and this remains effective.

IAG has the following preferred shares outstanding: IAG.PR.A, IAG.PR.E and IAG.PR.F (DeemedRetractible) and IAG.PR.C & IAG.PR.G (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™ and all are assigned to the indicated indices.

BAM To Slow Balance Sheet Deterioration?

September 7th, 2012

Brookfield Asset Management has announced:

an offering of C$425 million of medium term notes (unsecured) (“notes”) with a March 2023 maturity and a yield of 4.546%.

The notes have been assigned a credit rating of Baa2 (stable outlook) by Moody’s; A – (negative outlook) by Standard & Poor’s; BBB (stable outlook) by Fitch; and A low (stable outlook) by DBRS. The notes are being offered through a syndicate of agents led by CIBC World Markets Inc., Scotia Capital Inc. and TD Securities Inc.

The company intends to use the net proceeds of the issue to redeem or repurchase $350 million of 8.95% notes that mature on June 2, 2014 and for general corporate purposes.

However, the item that most caught my eye was the rating announcement from DBRS (bolding added):

DBRS has today assigned a rating of A (low) to the $425 million Unsecured Medium-Term Notes (MTN) maturing March 31, 2023, issued today by Brookfield Asset Management Inc. (Brookfield). The trend is Stable.

The MTN will rank pari passu with all of Brookfield’s other senior unsecured debt obligations. The Company intends to use the net proceeds to redeem or repurchase $350 million of its 8.95% MTNs that will mature June 2, 2014 and for general corporate purposes.

The new issue will result in a modest increase in Brookfield’s long-term debt. As expressed in our Rating Report published April 24, 2012, DBRS considers that the current corporate-level financial measures at Brookfield are weak for its ratings and believes that there is currently minimal room for further deterioration without pressuring the ratings. We re-iterate our expectation (as expressed in our Rating Report published on April 24, 2012) that Brookfield will improve its cash flow coverage metrics to their 2010 level by the end of 2012. These levels are: funds from operation (FFO) coverage of debt of 30% and FFO coverage of interests of 5.0x. We understand that Brookfield intends to achieve a lower debt level mainly through reducing its outstanding commercial paper issuance and drawdown in credit facilities.

If one of the following scenarios were to materialize, DBRS will review and base our rating decision on an assessment of the contributing causes, the Company’s remedial plan and other relevant circumstances. These scenarios are: (1) material increase in the proportion of BAM’s invested capital in less-stable opportunistic investments and private equity, leading to debt increases; (2) material deterioration or rating downgrade in one or more of the core businesses in renewable power, property investments and infrastructure; (3) inability to improve cash flow coverage metrics (which could include FFO-to-debt and FFO fixed charge coverage) to their 2010 levels by the end of 2012.

This is new information, as far as I can tell. The only mention of commercial paper in the 12Q2 Financials is:

We completed the refinancing of the majority of our corporate level, $2.2 billion committed revolving term credit facilities subsequent to the end of the quarter. At June 30, 2012, approximately $1.6 billion of the facilities was utilized in respect of short-term bank or commercial paper borrowings and $0.2 billion utilized for letters of credit issued to support various business initiatives. Approximately $1.9 billion of the new facilities have a five-year term, and the remaining $300 million have a three-year term.

This is good news, because BAM is skating pretty near the water in terms of maintaining an investment-grade rating on its preferreds. The negative outlook from S&P is still in place.

BAM has a plethora of preferred share issues outstanding: BAM.PR.B & BAM.PR.C (Floater), BAM.PR.E (RatchetRate), BAM.PR.G (FixedFloater), BAM.PR.I (called for redemption) & BAM.PR.J (OperatingRetractible), BAM.PR.K (Floater), BAM.PR.M & BAM.PR.N (PerpetualDiscount), BAM.PR.O (OperatingRetractible), BAM.PR.P, BAM.PR.R, BAM.PR.T, BAM.PR.X, BAM.PR.Z and BAM.PF.A (FixedReset) … and one in the oven (FixedReset).

September 6, 2012

September 7th, 2012

The European Central Bank is going to purchase sovereigns:

As announced on 2 August 2012, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) has today taken decisions on a number of technical features regarding the Eurosystem’s outright transactions in secondary sovereign bond markets that aim at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy. These will be known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and will be conducted within the following framework:

Transactions will be focused on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years.

No ex ante quantitative limits are set on the size of Outright Monetary Transactions.

Creditor treatment The Eurosystem intends to clarify in the legal act concerning Outright Monetary Transactions that it accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds issued by euro area countries and purchased by the Eurosystem through Outright Monetary Transactions, in accordance with the terms of such bonds.

Sterilisation The liquidity created through Outright Monetary Transactions will be fully sterilised.

Transparency Aggregate Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and their market values will be published on a weekly basis. Publication of the average duration of Outright Monetary Transaction holdings and the breakdown by country will take place on a monthly basis.

Pari passu treatment for ECB holdings would be a pleasant change … provided one can count on the Europeans to keep their word.

Jason Heath writes a piece in the Financial Post regarding a CDHowe report on Annuities:

But the C.D. Howe report is really interest-rate agnostic — focused more on reasons other than interest rates that Canadians are not opting for annuities. Among those reasons: poor annuity market infrastructure and pricing; non-integration of insurance, banking, pension and tax regulations; insufficient annuity product options; and a lack of government websites and resources to assist in our decisionmaking.

The CDHowe commentary by Norma L. Nielson is titled Annuities and Your Nest Egg: Reforms to Promote Optimal Annuitization of Retirement CapitalRetiring. I’ve scanned it – it follows the basic Financial Economist reasoning that Liquidity Value = 0, therefore Annuities = Good. I was particularly struck by the suggestion:

In some cases, public policymakers decide there is a need to subsidize one group at the expense of another. State social security systems may incorporate a significant element of wealth transfer from the rich to the poor, for example. In the case of decumulation products, it may be determined that it is socially desirable to provide gender-neutral annuities; i.e., for men to subsidize women.

Interesting report from a relatively free-market airline business:

Qantas Airways Ltd. (QAN)’s decision to drop a 17-year pact with British Airways (IAG) in favor of a deal with Dubai-based Emirates reveals the potential for fast-growing Gulf carriers to shatter the established airline order.

The 10-year accord, announced yesterday, will lead Qantas to scrap its revenue-sharing pact with British Airways to gain access to 70 Emirates destinations. While the Australian carrier will carry on code-sharing with BA, the move puts in doubt the standing of the Oneworld global alliance the pair helped form.

Too bad we won’t even let Emirates fly here as much as they like! But it’s just another example of the extent to which competition and efficiency is stifled in Canada. When politicians (such as Junior Minister Carney) say “Productivity!”, I say “Milk.”

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 1bp, FixedResets down 8bp and DeemedRetractibles off 2bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume remained very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2107 % 2,407.0
FixedFloater 4.44 % 3.80 % 33,969 17.70 1 0.0000 % 3,586.2
Floater 3.02 % 3.06 % 55,888 19.49 3 -0.2107 % 2,599.0
OpRet 4.62 % 3.26 % 33,629 0.77 4 -0.0286 % 2,553.2
SplitShare 5.48 % 4.99 % 75,176 4.61 3 -0.0533 % 2,800.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0286 % 2,334.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % 3.22 % 90,564 0.36 28 0.0132 % 2,279.0
Perpetual-Discount 4.92 % 4.94 % 99,434 15.50 3 -0.2480 % 2,541.2
FixedReset 4.99 % 3.03 % 167,059 4.09 70 -0.0773 % 2,423.6
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 3.51 % 123,576 1.87 46 -0.0246 % 2,367.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.07
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-06
Maturity Price : 23.35
Evaluated at bid price : 23.62
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.H FixedReset 81,901 National crossed 25,000 at 25.81; RBC crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.69
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 79,040 National crossed 75,500 at 26.01.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 75,812 TD crossed 74,300 at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-06
Maturity Price : 23.47
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 2.58 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 75,258 Nesbitt crossed 47,200 at 24.40; RBC crossed 25,000 at 24.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.43
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 56,012 National crossed 50,000 at 23.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 54,725 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.66
Bid-YTW : 2.50 %
There were 13 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.91 – 26.27
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2235

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.67 – 23.98
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1869

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.67
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %

BAM.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 25.37 – 25.69
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.1993

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-06
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.37
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.62 – 23.99
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2566

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-09-06
Maturity Price : 23.35
Evaluated at bid price : 23.62
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.51 – 25.84
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2447

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : -8.99 %

ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.91 – 26.15
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1622

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %