US Payrolls weren’t very encouraging:
Payrolls rose less than projected in August and the unemployment rate was unexpectedly driven down by Americans leaving the labor force, boosting the odds of additional Federal Reserve easing to spur a faltering recovery.
The economy added 96,000 workers after a revised 141,000 increase in July that was smaller than initially estimated, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. The median estimate of 92 economists surveyed by Bloomberg called for a gain of 130,000. The jobless rate fell to 8.1 percent.
European banks still aren’t doing very well:
ECB President Mario Draghi said yesterday the central bank will lend against assets in dollars, pounds and Japanese yen, as well as in euros, reopening a program that ran for two years following the September 2008 bankruptcy of the U.S. investment bank. The ECB also eased borrowing against government-issued or guaranteed assets by dropping rating requirements.
Investors’ reluctance to lend to banks in countries where bond yields soared has forced those banks to fund at the ECB. Spanish banks borrowed 375.5 billion euros ($476 billion) from the central bank as of the end of July, sucking collateral out of a government bond market that totals about 690 billion euros, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
The ECB’s 1 trillion-euro longer-term refinancing operations in December and February took collateral out of the market, in particular in Spain and Italy, whose banks were the biggest borrowers. ECB bond buying as part of its new Outright Monetary Transactions program will pile more pressure onto a market that is already “highly illiquid,” said Chris Clark, a strategist at ICAP Plc, the largest broker of transactions between banks.
“There’s so little Spanish paper that hasn’t been lodged at the ECB that pretty much every single bond has gained a very significant premium to borrow,” he said. “If the ECB buys more bonds, it may dry up liquidity in the Spanish government bond market even more. These looser collateral rules will help.”
Apropos of which, Fitch Ratings has a most interesting report titled U.S. Money Fund Exposure and European Banks: Shift to Japan Continues:
U.S. prime money market funds (MMF) continued to increase their exposure to Japanese banks, which as of end-July represent 12.3% of total MMF holdings or a 118% increase on a dollar basis since end-May 2011 (see Shift to Japan Continues chart and Change in Exposure [on a Dollar Basis] table). This exposure exceeds aggregate MMF allocations to eurozone banks, which increased moderately since the prior reporting period and now constitute 8.5% of total MMF assets, still 76% below end-May 2011 levels on a dollar basis. This “disengagement” between MMFs and eurozone banks appears to be persisting, as MMF risk aversion continues and both eurozone banks and their regulators seem cautious towards this potentially volatile form of funding. Aggregate MMF allocations to European banks outside of the eurozone also grew with allocations to Nordic, Swiss, and U.K. banks all rising since end-June on a dollar basis. Outside of Europe, MMF allocations to Canadian banks declined slightly, while exposures to Australian banks remained constant over the same period. However, since end-January 2012, MMF exposures to Australian banks have declined by roughly 25%, consistent with efforts by these banks to gradually reduce their use of short-term wholesale funding. U.S. banks remain the largest single-country exposure at 12.4% of MMF assets as of end-July.
I am pleased to announce the existence of a prominent adult investor:
Mark Cuban, owner of the Dallas Mavericks basketball team, wrote a post on his blog in response to a column in which Andrew Ross Sorkin of the New York Times pinned the blame on David Ebersman, Facebook’s chief financial officer. Cuban said:
“I bought and sold FB shares as a TRADE, not an investment. I lost money. When the stock didn’t bounce as I thought/hoped it would, I realized I was wrong and got out. It wasn’t the fault of the FB CFO that I lost money. It was my fault. I know that no one sells me shares of stock because they expect the price of the stock to go up. So someone saw me coming and they sold me the stock. That is the way the stock market works. When you sit at the trading terminal you look for the sucker. When you don’t see one, it’s you. In this case it was me.”
Amazing, isn’t it?
There’s a (very US-centric) article on preferred shares in the Wall Street Journal, titled Playing ‘Preferred’ Shares.
DBRS confirmed MFC:
DBRS has today confirmed its ratings on Manulife Financial Corporation (Manulife or the Company) and its affiliates, including The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, its primary operating company. The rating trend is Stable.
…
While DBRS is prepared to acknowledge that, barring a major economic crisis, the Company has probably hit its nadir, it does not believe that the lost profitability associated with the U.S. operation will recover quickly, especially since the former earnings levels benefited from favourable equity markets and a more favourable interest rate environment. DBRS is also mindful that the Company’s core earnings performance is dampened by hedging costs, reduced earnings opportunities related to potential recovery in capital markets, and more competitive market conditions. The Company has indicated that it also expects to take another material charge in Q3 2012 related to changes in actuarial assumptions driven by new standards of practice and the ambient macroeconomic environment, though much of this specific charge will relate to products and policy liabilities that are not part of the Company’s current growth plans. Other sources of potential earnings volatility relate to the indeterminate policyholder behaviours that are not addressed by current hedging activity, and a possible additional write down of goodwill reflecting the adverse interest rate environment.At the Company’s current level of core earnings as DBRS defines them, fixed charge coverage ratios are below 5x with a core return on equity (ROE) of about 10%, well below the greater than 10x coverage and greater than 15% ROE reported prior to the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. Without the heft of the Company’s business franchises in Canada, Asia and the United States, such ratios and the accompanying earnings volatility would not be consistent with the DBRS quantitative criteria for Company’s rated at the current levels. Should these business franchises deteriorate, there could be negative rating implications.
…
To meet its regulatory capital requirements over the same period of market disruption, the Company has raised over $14 billion in net capital through market issues of common and preferred shares, reduced cash dividends and senior and subordinated debt issues. Correspondingly, the Company has consistently reported strong regulatory capital ratios, as its financial leverage ratios (total debt plus preferred as a proportion of capitalization) have increased to 32.2% from 17.1% in 2007, and remain above the Company’s 25% target. The Company reported an MCCSR ratio of 213% for the period ending June 30, 2012, which is among the strongest ratios in the industry and well above a reasonable minimum level, especially given the Company’s risk-mitigating hedges for which the regulatory ratio gives no credit. However, given the unstable economic environment regulatory uncertainty associated with Solvency II, IFRS accounting for Insurance Contracts and Employee Benefits and OSFI’s and the Canadian Institute of Actuaries requirements regarding required capital for variable annuity guarantees, DBRS feels that the relatively high regulatory capital ratios are prudent at this time.
DBRS also confirmed GWO:
DBRS has today confirmed the ratings of Great-West Lifeco Inc. (GWO or the Company) and its affiliated operating subsidiaries, including the Claims Paying Ratings at The Great-West Life Assurance Company, The Canada Life Assurance Company and London Life Insurance Company; all trends are Stable. The existing ratings for the Company and its operating subsidiaries reflect the continuing strong financial performance and the notable absence of earnings volatility associated with recent exogenous market factors. Stable earnings are a testament to the Company’s diversification by product and geography, as well as its conservatism with respect to embedded product risks, actuarial assumptions and asset quality.
Like its major peers, the Company is anchored by Canadian operations that benefit from an oligopolistic industry structure, which limits the worst of price competition.
…
The MCCSR ratio of the Company’s major regulated operating subsidiary has hovered just over 200% for the last two years. While this is lower than that of some major competitors, it reflects the Company’s lower-risk asset portfolio and insurance liabilities, and does not include $825 million of cash at the holding company that could easily be advanced to the regulated entities in the form of capital, if required. With longer experience as a shareholder-owned company, GWO has traditionally operated with higher financial leverage than most of its Canadian peers, a reflection of its debt-financed mergers and acquisitions activity and the historical attention paid to the efficient use of shareholder capital. At 32.2% at the end of June 2012, the Company’s total debt plus preferred has come into alignment with that of the peer group, as Great-West has reduced financial leverage and de-mutualized competitors have increased theirs. Fixed-charge coverage ratios at GWO nevertheless remain healthier than those of its peers, reflecting stronger profitability. The Company is actively retiring capital instruments issued at its operating companies in order to have a higher proportion of capital issuance at the holding company level, which will serve to reduce its double leverage ratio. In short, DBRS considers the Company’s financial leverage and capital position to be consistent with the current rating category, as long as it continues to operate conservatively.As an integral component of Power Financial Corporation’s group of companies, GWO benefits from its parent’s financial support and its strong governance and risk management controls and procedures, which reinforce the conservative bottom-line focus of the Company.
It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 6bp, FixedResets off 2bp and DeemedRetractibles up 4bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume remained at holiday levels.
| HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
| Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
| Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.0960 % | 2,404.7 |
| FixedFloater | 4.44 % | 3.80 % | 32,635 | 17.70 | 1 | 0.0000 % | 3,586.2 |
| Floater | 3.03 % | 3.07 % | 53,733 | 19.47 | 3 | -0.0960 % | 2,596.5 |
| OpRet | 4.62 % | 3.00 % | 36,315 | 0.77 | 4 | 0.0000 % | 2,553.2 |
| SplitShare | 5.47 % | 4.88 % | 74,982 | 4.61 | 3 | 0.1465 % | 2,804.4 |
| Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0000 % | 2,334.7 |
| Perpetual-Premium | 5.29 % | 3.43 % | 89,921 | 0.46 | 28 | 0.0645 % | 2,280.4 |
| Perpetual-Discount | 4.93 % | 4.97 % | 99,356 | 15.45 | 3 | -0.1381 % | 2,537.7 |
| FixedReset | 4.99 % | 3.01 % | 165,353 | 4.09 | 70 | -0.0243 % | 2,423.1 |
| Deemed-Retractible | 4.94 % | 3.52 % | 123,984 | 1.86 | 46 | 0.0357 % | 2,368.3 |
| Performance Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
| PWF.PR.K | Perpetual-Premium | 1.19 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-10-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.43 Bid-YTW : 4.38 % |
| Volume Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
| SLF.PR.B | Deemed-Retractible | 115,751 | Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 24.40. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.40 Bid-YTW : 5.12 % |
| BMO.PR.Q | FixedReset | 86,946 | RBC crossed 65,000 at 25.45. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.45 Bid-YTW : 2.90 % |
| BNS.PR.Q | FixedReset | 43,151 | Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.42. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.42 Bid-YTW : 3.13 % |
| SLF.PR.D | Deemed-Retractible | 41,292 | Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 23.20. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 23.25 Bid-YTW : 5.40 % |
| RY.PR.I | FixedReset | 36,701 | Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.75. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-02-24 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.74 Bid-YTW : 3.07 % |
| ENB.PR.F | FixedReset | 31,019 | RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.20. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2042-09-07 Maturity Price : 23.17 Evaluated at bid price : 25.15 Bid-YTW : 3.72 % |
| There were 14 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. | |||
| Wide Spread Highlights | ||
| Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
| MFC.PR.H | FixedReset | Quote: 25.64 – 25.99 Spot Rate : 0.3500 Average : 0.2303 YTW SCENARIO |
| HSB.PR.C | Deemed-Retractible | Quote: 25.84 – 26.14 Spot Rate : 0.3000 Average : 0.2163 YTW SCENARIO |
| GWO.PR.I | Deemed-Retractible | Quote: 23.70 – 23.96 Spot Rate : 0.2600 Average : 0.1825 YTW SCENARIO |
| POW.PR.D | Perpetual-Premium | Quote: 25.30 – 25.49 Spot Rate : 0.1900 Average : 0.1201 YTW SCENARIO |
| BAM.PR.Z | FixedReset | Quote: 25.61 – 25.89 Spot Rate : 0.2800 Average : 0.2141 YTW SCENARIO |
| BAM.PR.P | FixedReset | Quote: 26.86 – 27.09 Spot Rate : 0.2300 Average : 0.1647 YTW SCENARIO |