Data Changes

BCE.PR.E Added to HIMIPref™ Database

I have added BCE.PR.E to the HIMIPref™ database (I needed to have the data in standard format for the upcoming edition of PrefLetter!).

Prices and dividends have been added back to 2007-2-1, when the issue was listed after being exchanged for BC.PR.A.

There are only 1.4-million odd shares outstanding, which is why I haven’t previously bothered. BCE.PR.E is a RatchetRate preferred, interconvertible with the FixedFloater BCE.PR.F commencing 2010-2-1. There have been relatively large secondary offerings of BCE.PR.F earlier this month and in January.

BCE.PR.E will continue to be tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on both credit and volume concerns.

Issue Comments

S&P Downgrades YLO Debt; Preferreds Downgraded to "D"

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • The prospect of near-term debt restructuring at Montreal-based Yellow Media Inc. has increased, in our opinion.
  • As a result, we are lowering our long-term corporate rating on Yellow Media to ‘CCC’ from ‘B-‘.
  • We are also lowering our issue-level rating on the company’s senior debt to ‘CCC’ from ‘B-‘ and lowering our rating on the subordinated debt to ‘CC’ from ‘CCC’; the recovery ratings on these debt obligations are unchanged.
  • Finally, we are keeping all the ratings on Yellow Media on CreditWatch, where they had been placed with negative implications Dec. 5, 2011.
  • The CreditWatch listing reflects our concern about the increased likelihood of near-term debt restructure, which is aimed at aligning the company’s capital structure to deteriorating operations as well as addressing the refinancing of sizable debt maturities in 2013 and beyond.

At the same time, Standard & Poor’s lowered its issue-level rating on the company’s senior unsecured debt to ‘CCC’ (the same as the corporate credit rating on Yellow Media) from ‘B-‘. The recovery rating on the debt is unchanged at ‘4’, indicating our expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of a default. Standard & Poor’s also lowered its issue-level rating on Yellow Media’s subordinated debt to ‘CC’ (two notches below the corporate credit rating on the company) from ‘CCC’. The recovery rating on this debt is unchanged at ‘6’, indicating our expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in a default situation.

In addition, we lowered the ratings on the company’s preferred shares outstanding to ‘D’ (default) from ‘C’, owing to the nonpayment of dividends on these securities when due.

“The downgrade primarily reflects Yellow Media’s heightened risk of a near-term debt restructure given the significant refinancing risk for its debt maturities in 2013 and beyond,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Madhav Hari. “The downgrade also reflects our view that the company’s current capital structure is unsustainable against the backdrop of deteriorating revenue and cash flow trends,” Mr. Hari added.

YLO has four series of preferred shares outstanding: YLO.PR.A, YLO.PR.B, YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D.

Market Action

May 9, 2012

European politicians are talking about a Greek exit:

From the monetary fortress of the European Central Bank to the pro-European duchy of Luxembourg, policy makers are beginning to air their doubts that Greece can stay in the euro.

Post-election tumult in Athens has put the once-taboo subject of an exit from the 17-country currency union on the agenda, lifting the veil on possible scenario planning afoot behind the scenes.

“If Greece decides not to stay in the euro zone, we cannot force Greece,” German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble said at a conference sponsored by German broadcaster WDR in Brussels today. “They will decide whether to stay in the euro zone or not.”

But until that happens, they’re happy to throw good money after bad:

The European Financial Stability Facility’s Board of Directors confirmed the release of 5.2 billion euros ($6.7 billion) from a first installment of 39.4 billion euros by the end of June, the EFSF said in an e-mailed statement today.

An amount of 4.2 billion euros will be disbursed May 10 and the remaining 1 billion euros aren’t needed before June and will be disbursed depending on Greece’s financing needs, according to the statement.

However, this attitude is not shared globally:

China Investment Corp. has stopped buying European government debt because of an economic crisis on the continent, though it continues to look for new investments there, said CIC President Gao Xiqing.

“What is happening in Europe right now is of course of concern,” Gao said yesterday in an interview in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, during the World Economic Forum on Africa. “We still have our people looking at opportunities in Europe, even though we don’t want to buy any government bonds.”

There has been a victory for shareholder rights:

Telus Corp. … has withdrawn its share-consolidation proposal, conceding its plan faces certain defeat due to the staunch opposition of an activist U.S. hedge fund.

The Vancouver-based telecommunications giant announced that it was nixing its proposal well after midnight (ET) on Wednesday, just hours before it was scheduled to be put to a shareholder vote at the company’s annual general meeting in Edmonton.

This is all the more noteworthy because the Telus proposal was so beloved of the Precious Purveyors of Pusillanimous Punditry.

Julie Dickson, Superintendent of OSFI, gave a speech today titled Being Lulled into a False Sense of Security filled with the usual platitudes. I was, however, interested in the mention of centralized clearing:

Work is underway to achieve centralized derivatives clearing.

Many parties advocate that new measures have fixed the problems that led to the global financial crisis. The false sense of security that such a position signifies does not take into account the new vulnerabilities that are likely to arise as a result of the changes we are making to the system today. We must constantly be on our guard to identify these vulnerabilities. An example: Centralized derivatives clearing, which I referenced at the start of my remarks. This is a critical initiative, but also one that poses risks if central counterparties are not appropriately risk proofed. Thus, risk-proofing will be a focus of efforts on all fronts. Another risk is the shadow banking sector. If our focus is only on banks, if we, as regulators, are smug and believe we have everything covered off, we might overlook risks associated with shadow banking. Thus, the Financial Stability Board is also focusing on this important sector.

Canadian banks have an enviable position. It is important we all continue to work hard to maintain that position, recognize the risks to stability in Canada, avoid complacency and not allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of security.

I am very pleased that Canadian regulators have discovered a method whereby risk can be eliminated. Hurrah!

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 5bp, FixedResets off 3bp and DeemedRetractibles up 1bp. The Performance Highlights table is comprised entirely of Floaters, which got nailed. Volume was well below average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.04%, equivalent to 6.55% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.45%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now 210bp, a slight widening from the 200bp reported April 30.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.3894 % 2,472.6
FixedFloater 4.45 % 3.81 % 28,084 17.72 1 0.0000 % 3,544.6
Floater 2.92 % 2.93 % 56,227 19.87 3 -1.3894 % 2,669.8
OpRet 4.76 % 2.76 % 50,667 1.10 5 -0.2674 % 2,505.4
SplitShare 5.24 % 2.70 % 60,731 0.60 4 0.1039 % 2,698.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2674 % 2,290.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.44 % 2.03 % 74,213 0.09 25 0.0477 % 2,230.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.07 % 5.04 % 160,118 15.33 8 0.0875 % 2,444.4
FixedReset 5.04 % 2.95 % 183,225 2.15 68 -0.0282 % 2,401.6
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.57 % 178,208 1.57 45 0.0122 % 2,330.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-09
Maturity Price : 17.92
Evaluated at bid price : 17.92
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-09
Maturity Price : 18.01
Evaluated at bid price : 18.01
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-09
Maturity Price : 18.01
Evaluated at bid price : 18.01
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.L FixedReset 85,652 Desjardins crossed blocks of 19,700 and 20,000, both at 26.86. TD crossed 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.82
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 79,924 RBC crossed blocks of 24,900 and 25,000, both at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 59,850 TD crossed 12,200 at 25.93 and 37,200 at 25.94.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-06-08
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : -20.30 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 56,700 Desjardins crossed 20,000 at 26.77 and 25,000 at 26.76.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 44,093 TD crossed blocks of 19,400 and 20,000, both at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 41,263 RBC crossed 35,000 at 26.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.71
Bid-YTW : 2.76 %
There were 21 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 18.01 – 18.28
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1739

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-09
Maturity Price : 18.01
Evaluated at bid price : 18.01
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 17.92 – 18.25
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2398

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-09
Maturity Price : 17.92
Evaluated at bid price : 17.92
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.76 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1638

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 2.76 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.43 – 25.69
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1851

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %

CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.93 – 26.18
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1848

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-06-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : -33.79 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 26.05 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1373

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %

Market Action

May 8, 2012

The CMHC Annual Report is out. Of particular interest is the table of 5-year financial highlights on page 98 of the PDF … in 2007, there was $345-billion of insurance in force; at the end of fiscal 2011, there is $567-billion. Thanks for inflating the bubble and subsidizing your pals at the banks, guys! To put the figure in perspective, consider this factoid from the Canadian Housing Observer 2011, Chapter 4:

With a contribution of about $330 billion to the Canadian economy, housing-related spending accounted for 20.3% of GDP in 2010, up from 20.1% in 2009.

Gee, it sure is a good thing we’re so much better regulated than those dumb old Americans, eh?

Meanwhile an unfootnoted citation by the G&M states:

CMHC estimates that roughly 25 per cent of condominiums in the Greater Toronto Area are sold but sitting vacant — shades of Miami at the height of its collapsed condo bubble in 2007. Other analysts say the 25 per cent figure may be too low.

Nope, no bubble at all, no sir! Not with Spend-Every-Penny keeping a firm hand at the tiller! For anecdotal support for the phenomenon, try driving along the Gardiner and looking at all the see-through condominiums that now line it. However, if you are driving, DO NOT make notes while discussing your findings on your cell ‘phone! Remember, Smokey the Bear says “Only you can prevent forest fires!”

Meanwhile, the political theatre in Greece continues:

Greece’s Syriza party leader Alexis Tsipras, charged with forming a government, told his pro-bailout counterparts they must renounce support for the European Union- led rescue if there is to be any chance of forging a coalition.

Tsipras said he expected Antonis Samaras of New Democracy and Evangelos Venizelos, the former finance minister who leads the Pasok party, to send a letter to the EU revoking their pledges to implement austerity measures by the time he meets with them tomorrow to discuss forming a coalition. Samaras said he would not do so, and would support a minority government if necessary.

If Tsipras fails to build a working majority, the onus on forming a government will pass to Pasok. Each mandate can last for three days. If the process still fails to yield a coalition, President Papoulias must try to broker a government of national unity, the constitution says. If that fails, new elections will be held.

“A Greek return to the polls in mid-June looks increasingly likely,” Malcolm Barr, an economist at JPMorgan Chase & Co, wrote in a note. “There is little doubt that the drop in support for New Democracy, Pasok has raised the probability of an eventual euro exit.”

Venizelos has also refused to sign:

Venizelos said Pasok’s proposal for a national unity government with the participation of all parties with a pro- European orientation was the only solution. Greece must remain “safely” within the euro while pursuing changes to the bailout accord to boost growth, he said.

The movement of talent from the banks to hedge funds continues:

The rest, earned by betting on companies from American International Group Inc. to MBIA Inc., was locked up in deferred stock and euros, according to people familiar with the matter, who asked not to be identified because they aren’t authorized to discuss compensation. In September, Silvetz, 37, jumped to hedge fund BlueCrest Capital Management LLP. He was the last of a trio of New York debt traders who departed after making $1 billion for the German lender in two years, the people said.

Wall Street’s biggest banks have lost almost two dozen of their most-profitable credit traders in the past 13 months as regulators limit the kind of risk-taking that amplified the housing crisis four years ago. As banks slash or defer pay and reduce the amount they’re willing to wager, the traders are seeing better opportunities at hedge funds and investment firms that seek to profit in markets lenders are retreating from.

Note that by “talent”, I mean the ability to make deals, which is not the same thing as asset management. Different business. This trend may be a good thing … it may be a bad thing. Nobody knows, nobody cares. The world’s regulators have decided to encourage the change without getting too fussed by details.

The downside? Hedge funds are intrinsically less stable than banks – investors are a lot more willing to redeem. The implication is that it may become easier for a market panic to lead to a lock-up in trading.

Husky Energy, proud issuer of HSE.PR.A, was confirmed at Pfd-2(low) by DBRS:

DBRS has today confirmed the Senior Unsecured Notes and Debentures and the Preferred Shares of Husky Energy Inc. (Husky or the Company) at A (low) and Pfd-2 (low), respectively, both with Stable trends. The rating actions are based on DBRS’s review of Husky’s progress to date on its long-term plans, which incorporate its major strategic growth initiatives, upstream operational targets and financial targets through 2015.

Husky maintains a conservative financial profile. Its debt-to-capital and debt-to-cash flow ratios improved to 19% and 0.85 times, respectively, at March 31, 2012 from 22% and 1.39 times, respectively, at year-end 2010. Common and preferred share issuance totaling $2.2 billion (including dividends paid in shares) strengthened its key credit metrics and liquidity position, with $3.3 billion of bank facility availability and $2.7 billion of cash at March 31, 2012.

DBRS expects Husky to maintain its conservative financial profile, with only modest weakening of its key credit metrics relative to year-end 2010 levels during the high capex period through 2015, as well as making significant progress on its upstream operational targets over the period in order to maintain the current ratings.

There was a slight downdraft in the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualPremiums losing 6bp, while both FixedResets and DeemedRetractibles were off 3bp. Volatility was very low. Volume was well below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1825 % 2,507.5
FixedFloater 4.45 % 3.81 % 29,228 17.72 1 0.7072 % 3,544.6
Floater 2.88 % 2.90 % 55,549 19.97 3 -0.1825 % 2,707.4
OpRet 4.75 % 2.47 % 52,678 1.11 5 0.1837 % 2,512.1
SplitShare 5.24 % 5.18 % 63,220 1.98 4 -0.0396 % 2,695.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1837 % 2,297.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.44 % 2.64 % 76,695 0.09 25 -0.0605 % 2,229.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.08 % 5.07 % 158,992 15.30 8 0.2513 % 2,442.3
FixedReset 5.04 % 3.00 % 185,523 2.15 68 -0.0328 % 2,402.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.63 % 179,409 1.56 45 -0.0287 % 2,330.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-08
Maturity Price : 23.32
Evaluated at bid price : 23.59
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 103,568 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 25.10; TD crossed 40,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 52,068 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.09.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.09
Bid-YTW : 2.70 %
ENB.PR.D FixedReset 43,330 Nesbitt crossed 38,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 40,295 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 25.88; TD crossed 10,000 at 25.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 1.72 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 40,198 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 24.02.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 34,550 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 26.74.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.71
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
There were 19 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.82 – 26.97
Spot Rate : 1.1500
Average : 0.8134

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.41 – 52.74
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2436

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.41
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.60 – 24.95
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2650

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-08
Maturity Price : 24.30
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 25.92 – 26.18
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1781

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-08
Maturity Price : 23.51
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.79 – 23.08
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2249

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-08
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 22.79
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %

BNS.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 25.71 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1263

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %

Market Action

May 7, 2012

France has a new president:

Francois Hollande defeated French President Nicolas Sarkozy as voters handed control of the second-biggest European economy to the Socialists for the first time in 17 years.

The 57-year-old Hollande got about 52 percent against about 48 percent for Sarkozy, according to estimates by four pollsters. The campaign isn’t over. France elects its lower house of parliament in five weeks, prompting calls from backers of both candidates to keep fighting.

While Socialists stand ready to dominate policy making for the first time since 1993 — holding both the presidency and the Cabinet — bond yields suggest Hollande may maintain market confidence. Ten-year French debt yields 124 basis points more than comparable German securities. That’s down from 145 basis points after he won the first round April 22 and lower than the 133 basis points at the start of the year.

Concern of a Franco-German cleavage undermining economic policy making in the euro region is “exaggerated,” Morgan Stanley chief economist Joachim Fels wrote in a note today.

Greek politics is a Gordian knot – and that’s scary!

New Democracy leader Antonis Samaras began trying to put together a government after a Greek election that raised fresh questions about the country’s euro membership and triggered the biggest stock-market rout in four years.

Samaras was given three days from today to put together a coalition from an assembly split down the middle on whether to renege on the terms of bailout agreements negotiated since May 2010. New Democracy and the socialist Pasok party, rivals until the country’s crisis threw them into a national government together this year, are two seats short of the 151 seats needed for a parliamentary majority.

New Democracy led in the election, receiving 19 percent of the vote and 108 seats in the 300-seat Parliament. Syriza got 17 percent to score 52 seats; Pasok came third with 13 percent and 41 seats.

Should Samaras fail to get the necessary number of seats, the onus on forming a government will fall to bailout opponent Syriza, a coalition of left parties, which has vowed to cancel the bailout terms. After that, Pasok takes the baton.

If the nine-day process fails to yield a coalition, President Papoulias may then try to broker a government of national unity. Should that process fail, new elections may be a possibility.

And, in fact, there is now a report that the baton has passed to the anti-austerity Syriza party:

Greek political leaders will meet for a second day today in a bid to form a government, with the mandate for the task being handed to the second-biggest party after New Democracy leader Antonis Samaras said he failed to forge agreement after an election that raised questions about the country’s euro membership.

Samaras gave up his bid after nearly six hours of talks in Athens yesterday. The attempt to form a government will pass to Alexis Tsipras, the head of Syriza, the second biggest party, which has vowed to cancel the bailout terms. Tsipras will see President Karolos Papoulias today at 2 p.m. Athens time.

As voters across Europe rebel against austerity measures imposed to stamp out the debt crisis, Citigroup Inc. said yesterday the risk of Greece leaving the euro by the end of 2013 has risen as high as 75 percent. The election on May 6 propelled into Parliament a party that wants to put land mines on the border with Turkey and another that wants Germany, the country’s biggest donor, to pay World War II reparations. The benchmark ASE Stock index plunged 6.7 percent in Athens yesterday, its biggest drop in six months.

YLO released its results a day early:

Yellow Media Inc. (YLO-T0.100.0111.11%) reported a first-quarter loss of $2.9-billion as the struggling directory publisher wrote down the value of its assets.

The company also cancelled its annual meeting planned for Tuesday in Montreal after it said the number of shareholder votes received would not be enough to reach quorum.

Farcical, but more to the point is that print revenues declined more than expected and digital substitution was lower than expected.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums losing 12bp, FixedResets up 3bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 6bp. Volatility was minimal, with no themes apparent. Volume was quite low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2561 % 2,512.1
FixedFloater 4.48 % 3.84 % 30,418 17.67 1 -2.7064 % 3,519.7
Floater 2.87 % 2.89 % 55,724 19.99 3 0.2561 % 2,712.4
OpRet 4.76 % 2.69 % 51,818 1.11 5 -0.1452 % 2,507.5
SplitShare 5.24 % 4.74 % 63,956 0.61 4 -0.1432 % 2,696.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1452 % 2,292.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.43 % -2.51 % 77,625 0.15 25 -0.1208 % 2,231.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.08 % 5.11 % 90,682 15.23 8 -0.4312 % 2,436.2
FixedReset 5.03 % 3.02 % 187,307 2.15 68 0.0349 % 2,403.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.53 % 180,410 1.42 45 0.0617 % 2,331.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -2.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-07
Maturity Price : 22.12
Evaluated at bid price : 21.21
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-07
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-07
Maturity Price : 18.20
Evaluated at bid price : 18.20
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 75,501 Desjardins crossed 75,000 at 26.64.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.63
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 62,600 TD crossed blocks of 35,000 and 23,600, both at 27.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 60,301 RBC crossed 57,000 at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 3.03 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 54,673 Desjardins crossed 49,300 at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 50,101 Desjardins sold 47,900 to anonymous at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 47,915 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.15 – 24.90
Spot Rate : 0.7500
Average : 0.4373

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 21.21 – 21.86
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.4013

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-07
Maturity Price : 22.12
Evaluated at bid price : 21.21
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.85 – 26.47
Spot Rate : 0.6200
Average : 0.4443

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %

W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.40 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2300

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.31 – 23.64
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2147

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-07
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %

CU.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.81 – 26.08
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1848

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : -7.97 %

MAPF

MAPF Performance: April 2012

The fund underperformed in April, for reasons that remain unclear – see the discussion below.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close April 30, 2012, was 10.4438.

Returns to April, 2012
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD
according to
Blackrock
One Month +0.48% +0.96% +0.73% +0.69%
Three Months -1.18% +0.57% +0.20% +0.18%
One Year +3.96% +6.58% +5.28% +4.79%
Two Years (annualized) +13.41% +11.08% +9.49% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +18.17% +12.87% +10.23% +9.51%
Four Years (annualized) +18.40% +7.11% +5.41% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +14.56% +4.43%   +2.19
Six Years (annualized) +13.20% +4.39%    
Seven Years (annualized) +12.20% +4.26%    
Eight Years (annualized) +11.89% +4.44%    
Nine Years (annualized) +13.31% +4.65%    
Ten Years (annualized) +12.11% +4.78%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +12.47% +4.42%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.75%, +0.44% and +5.48%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +11.06%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.47%, -0.34% and +3.35% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performnce is +7.71%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.47%, +0.14% & +5.26%, respectively. Three Year performnce is +6.61%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.29%, +1.97% & +5.64%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

The underperformance of MAPF during the month is difficult to understand given the relative index total returns in April:

HIMIPref™ Index Returns
April, 2012
Index Total Return
RatchtRate N/A
FixedFloater +3.03%
Floater +5.08
OpRet +0.65%
InterestBearing N/A
PerpetualPremium +0.81%
PerpetualDiscount +2.04%
FixedReset +0.80%
DeemedRetractible +0.96%

The biggest component of the fund – by far – is DeemedRetractibles, while the biggest component ofthe index – also by far – is FixedResets. Even allowing for the index to have outperformed due to its higher weighting in the Floating Rate Sector and PerpetualDiscounts, the gap seems too large to be explicable in this manner – and it also seems that the fund return of +0.48% is lower than it should have been.

In cases such as this it is often possible to explain deviations through a change in the Implied Volatility of the embedded call option in StraightPerpetuals – as was the case in June 2008. Accordingly, the first step is to compare the month’s performance of individual DeemedRetractible issues with their Dividend Rate:


Click for Big

Well, that didn’t work at all – perhaps there will be a correlation with end-price (the closing bid on April 30)?


Click for Big

Nope. Current Yield?


Click for Big

Nope. This is getting serious – we need to try some weirder stuff. How about “Ending YTW”?


Click for Big

Nope. Next ex-Date?


Click for Big

Try as I might, I am unable to to come up with a simple relationship between instrument attributes. To illustrate the effect of the performance distribution on the fund’s relative performance, I prepared the following chart which divides DeemedRetractibles into four groups, depending on their incorporation into the index and the fund’s portfolio:


Click for Big

Clearly, the fund’s securities did worse than the index’s securities. But I can figure out why! This is particularly bizarre in the case of the SLF preferreds:

SLF DeemedRetractibles
Ticker April 2012
Total Return
Current
Yield
4/30
YTW
4/30
SLF.PR.A +1.15% 4.99% 5.47%
SLF.PR.B +1.79% 5.02% 5.46%
SLF.PR.C +0.13% 4.88% 5.71%
SLF.PR.D +0.09% 4.87% 5.69%
SLF.PR.E -0.04% 4.90% 5.68%

SLF.PR.A and SLF.PR.B are incorporated in the index; SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E are in the fund.
SLF

SLF DeemedRetractibles may be compared with PWF and GWO:



Click for Big

It is quite apparent that that the market continues to treat regulated issues (SLF, GWO) no differently from unregulated issues (PWF). It will also be noted that the slope of the regression line did not change significantly over the month: 0.0243 in March vs. 0.0247 in April.

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. The relationship is still far too large to be explained by Implied Volatility – the numbers still indicate an overwhelming degree of directionality in the market’s price expectations.

In short, the underperformance of the fund in April appears to be due to random factors. When these random factors work in the fund’s favour, trades are generated as issues that are held become expensive relative to issues not held. This month, unfortunately, things worked the other way. However, I am pleased to observe that a large chunk of the underperformance of SLF.PR.C/D/E relative to SLF.PR.A/B has been recovered in the first four days of May.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
April, 2012 10.4438 5.10%
Note
1.001 5.105% 1.0000 $0.5332
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. Commencing February, 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on March 30; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position in SplitShare issues (BNA.PR.C) which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I will no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as there are currently only eight such issues of investment grade, from only four issuer groups. Additionally, the fund has only negligible holdings of these issues.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition: April 2012

Turnover declined sharply in April, to about 5%.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on April 30 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2012-4-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 9.6% (-0.2) 5.96% 5.67
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 0.3% (-0.5) 5.08% 15.31
Fixed-Reset 18.8% (-1.6) 2.89% 1.99
Deemed-Retractible 61.6% (+2.1) 5.44% 7.33
Scraps (Various) 9.6% (-0.4) 6.42% (see note) 11.86 (see note)
Cash +0.1% (+0.5) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.10% 6.62
Yields for the YLO preferreds have been set at 0% for calculation purposes, and their durations at 0.00, to the the company’s decision to suspend preferred dividends.
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from March month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2012-4-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 51.9% (-1.3)
Pfd-2(high) 28.4% (+1.7)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 10.0% (-0.6)
Pfd-3(high) 1.0% (-0.1)
Pfd-3 2.4% (-3.5)
Pfd-4(high) 3.5% (+3.5)
Pfd-4 2.3% (-0.2)
Pfd-5(low) 0.3% (-0.1)
Cash -0.4% (-0.3)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from March month-end.
A position held in CSE preferreds has been assigned to Pfd-4(high)

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2012-4-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 10.5% (+10.4)
$50,000 – $100,000 19.2% (-9.2)
$100,000 – $200,000 27.2% (+1.2)
$200,000 – $300,000 27.1% (+7.8)
>$300,000 15.9% (-10.6)
Cash +0.1% (+0.5)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from March month-end.

The increase in holdings of issue with Average Daily Trading Values(ADTVs) of 50,000-100,000 is due mostly to migration, rather than trading: IAG.PR.A, for instance, had an ADTV of about 54,000 last month and only 44,000 this month.

Similarly, the increase in the 200,000-300,000 bracket is due to migration: MFC.PR.B, for example, had an ADTV of 318,000 last month, which has now declined to 240,000.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2011, and published in the October, 2011, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower
Market Action

May 4, 2012

There are tentative advances in exchange trading for corporate bonds:

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) will start an electronic trading system for corporate bonds this month as the fifth-biggest U.S. bank adapts to regulatory changes and competition, according to a person familiar with the plans.

The platform, called GSessions, has been under development for a year, said the person, who declined to be identified because the New York-based firm isn’t making details public yet. The Wall Street Journal reported the initiative late yesterday on its website.

The move comes three weeks after BlackRock Inc. (BLK), the world’s largest money manager, said it was planning its own bond-trading platform called Aladdin Trading Network that would allow clients to bypass Wall Street firms such as Goldman Sachs.

The profitability of Wall Street firms is being challenged by regulations requiring that they hold more capital as a buffer against potential losses from assets such as corporate debt. A U.S. law that seeks to prohibit federally insured banks from making bets with their own money may also hinder lenders’ ability to commit money to buy securities from clients, according to analysts including Brad Hintz at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.

GSessions will start by offering two five-minute trading sessions a day, one in an investment-grade bond and another in a high-yield, high-risk security, the person said. Speculative- grade, or junk, bonds are rated below Baa3 by Moody’s Investors Service and lower than BBB- at Standard & Poor’s.

At the start of each session, Goldman Sachs will post a bid and offer price and notify clients of the maximum amount of liquidity the firm is willing to provide to fill orders, according to the person.

Rather than matching trades between clients, Goldman Sachs will act as the counterparty to all trades and collect the spread, or difference, between the bid and offer prices, the person said. That gap will be lower than what Goldman Sachs earns on non-computerized trades, the person said.

As I have said many, many times on this blog, exchange trading for corporate bonds will lead to tighter, more brittle markets and be bad for capital formation – to the extent that instruments are listed. In the States, especially, the action has moved into the private-placement and CDS markets, to avoid regulatory bullshit and get on with the job. However, the regulator who cares about the actual purpose of capital markets has not yet been born.

I have often criticized the entire concept of a B.Comm. degree (a guy with a B.Comm. is a guy who wanted to learn about business, so he went to school. Strike one.). Seems that others share my disdain:

Yahoo! Inc. (YHOO) is under pressure from Third Point LLC, one of its largest investors, to dismiss Chief Executive Officer Scott Thompson after his academic computer science credentials were misrepresented.

Martin McGovern, a spokesman for Stonehill in Easton, Massachusetts, said that Thompson received a bachelor’s of science in business administration, with a major in accounting on May 20, 1979. He declined to comment further.

Loeb said that Patti Hart, a Yahoo board member who chairs the search committee, inflated her degree too. Hart, who also serves as CEO of International Game Technology (IGT), is listed in filings as holding a “bachelor’s degree in marketing and economics” from Illinois State University, Loeb said. “However, we understand that Ms. Hart’s degree is in business administration. She received a degree in neither marketing nor economics.”

Today’s PrefBlog Precious Little Do-Gooder Zinger is about donating eye-glasses:

In a paper published in March in the journal Optometry and Vision Science, four researchers compare the full costs of delivering used glasses to the costs of instead delivering ready-made glasses in standard powers (like my drugstore readers, but for myopia as well). The authors find that recycled glasses cost nearly twice as much per usable pair.

Rob Carrick has a piece up titled Preferred shares: How to navigate rising rates, but I’m not quoted.

There was a slight pullback in the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualDiscounts off 1bp, FixedResets down 7bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 8bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was extremely low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.4780 % 2,505.6
FixedFloater 4.36 % 3.72 % 29,490 17.89 1 -0.2288 % 3,617.6
Floater 2.88 % 2.88 % 56,038 20.02 3 -1.4780 % 2,705.4
OpRet 4.75 % 2.36 % 52,294 1.12 5 0.0765 % 2,511.1
SplitShare 5.23 % 4.04 % 64,168 0.62 4 -0.2119 % 2,700.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0765 % 2,296.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.43 % -1.15 % 78,783 0.09 25 -0.0078 % 2,233.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.06 % 5.06 % 89,733 15.20 8 0.0359 % 2,446.7
FixedReset 5.03 % 3.04 % 189,110 2.16 68 -0.0715 % 2,402.2
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 3.61 % 181,430 1.43 45 -0.0825 % 2,329.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater -2.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-04
Maturity Price : 17.90
Evaluated at bid price : 17.90
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 97,745 TD crossed 12,300 at 25.60. Nesbitt corssed 74,800 at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 71,310 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.14 and sold 16,500 to GMP at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset 52,005 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.32 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset 51,100 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 22,495 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-04
Maturity Price : 23.27
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 20,677 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-04
Maturity Price : 18.36
Evaluated at bid price : 18.36
Bid-YTW : 2.88 %
There were 14 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 17.90 – 18.49
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.3627

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-04
Maturity Price : 17.90
Evaluated at bid price : 17.90
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %

BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.66 – 26.06
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3044

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-06-03
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.66
Bid-YTW : -1.97 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 25.01 – 25.25
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1563

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-04
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.06 – 26.39
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2516

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.25 – 52.49
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1718

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.25
Bid-YTW : 2.48 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 26.09 – 26.30
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1420

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-04
Maturity Price : 23.58
Evaluated at bid price : 26.09
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %

Market Action

May 3, 2012

What a great solution for the TMX / Maple deal! More rules!

The Ontario Securities Commission will impose share ownership restrictions and require an independent board of directors as conditions of its approval of the takeover of the Toronto Stock Exchange.

Among its proposed conditions for approving the bid, the OSC rules would prohibit any person or company from owning more than 10 per cent of the voting shares of Maple Group without OSC prior approval.

The original shareholders of Maple Group are also required to certify annually to the OSC that they are not acting “jointly or in concert with any other investor” in respect to Maple’s voting shares.

The rules also require Maple’s board to have at least 50 per cent of its directors unrelated to the original Maple shareholders and unrelated to management of the company. One director must represent an independent, non-bank owned investment dealer, and the chairman of the board must be both independent and unrelated to the original Maple shareholders.

Maple’s shareholders are a group of 13 major Canadian financial institutions and pension funds.

Why would the banks bother to act in concert? Their interests are identical anyway. There is some oohing and ahhing over the cost recovery model:

Even if Maple succeeds in buying TMX and CDS, it will still be forced to continue paying rebates. What’s more, Maple will have to share some of the synergies it expects to get from the transaction with market users, according to the pricing model, which is now being made public for the first time by the OSC.

Starting on Nov. 1, a Maple-owned CDS will split any annual revenue gains on the current suite of CDS clearing services 50-50 with users. That continues indefinitely.

On top of that, the so-called “integration rebate” to market users starts at $2.75-million and rises to $4-million by 2016. The fee will be capped at that level after 2016, but it will continue in future years.

It’s supposed to reflect the cost-savings Maple extracts. But interestingly, it’s not conditional on Maple actually saving money. So CDS users get paid no matter whether Maple manages to find synergies or not.

All of this means Maple will have to really deliver on its original promise — to make money from CDS not by raising fees for existing services but by creating new services that it can charge for. Those new services won’t be subject to the revenue sharing. However, even there, regulators are not making it easy on Maple.

Buddy, what it probably means is that fees will be charged so that fixed costs for participants are higher and marginal costs are lower. This will enlarge the moat that protects the oligopoly.

I often feel like Cassandra when worrying about the risks of the Canadian financial system, so it’s nice to know that somebody shares my views:

Canada’s biggest banks likely are “too big to fail,” and therefore pose a risk to the country’s financial system, says Malcolm Knight, a former No. 2 at the Bank of Canada.

Canada’s five biggest banks hold combined assets worth $2.8-trillion, twice the size of the country’s gross domestic product.

That outsized economic weight makes them a threat to financial stability because the collapse of any of them would take a toll on hundreds of thousands of customers, on competition in financial services, and on the country’s reputation as a safe place to invest, Mr. Knight says.

Canada’s strict regulatory system makes the banks “less likely to fail,” but failure isn’t impossible, no matter how well the country weathered the financial crisis.

“Canada’s strict regulatory system”. We’re always hearing about that. The main thing is that OSFI simply sticks a little extra onto regulatory capital requirements – there’s nothing clever about that. What would be clever is is there was ever any accounting made for the costs of this – and I don’t mean picayune things like the service fees that help pay for all that capital. There’s things like mortgage spreads, the preponderance of short term mortgages, subsidies of tail risk by the CMHC, the stultifying effect of the oligopoly … there are many costs, none of which are ever examined.

I sent an eMail recently:

Sirs,

The Toronto Star recently published an article titled “Pediatricians in Canada discharging unvaccinated children” (April 25, on-line at http://www.thestar.com/living/article/1167428–pediatricians-in-canada-discharging-unvaccinated-children)

In this article it is alleged that the behaviour highlighted by the headline is indulged in by Dr. Fatima Kamalia and condoned by Dr. Hirotaka Yamashiro, who holds a position with the Ontario Medical Association. The CPSO is stated to take the position that “Doctors have the right to end a relationship with a patient when there is a ‘breakdown of trust and respect'”.

The arrogance shown by these medical personnel shows that they have confused the award of a medical diploma with ascension to divinity. Their interpretation of CPSO policies in a manner that equates the right to refuse medical treatment with a ‘breakdown of trust and respect’ is breathtaking; it makes a mockery of CPSO Policy #4-05 “Consent to Medical Treatment”.

Additionally, the attitude of these so-called professionals that they are infallible on pediatric care may well be misplaced, although the consensus is currently in their favour. As one who was born in England in June, 1961, I am keenly aware that consensus can be incorrect even with respect to something so straightforward as morning sickness; I remain grateful that my mother ignored doctor’s advice regarding remediation for the condition. I am pleased to pursue an occupation and lifestyle that, astonishingly, does not increase my risk of contracting peptic ulcer disease.

The desire of Drs. Kamalia & Yamashiro to restrict their practice to include only those individuals who show proper reverence for their pronouncements ex cathedra is understandable; if they wish to pick and choose their clientele, I suggest they make a living in a competitive environment – not in Ontario, where rationing effectively provides them with a very nice job for life on the taxpayers’ nickel.

I strongly urge the CPSO to initiate an investigation of the abuse of privilege endorsed or indulged in by these doctors, to condemn in the strongest possible manner the bizarre interpretation of the ‘breakdown in trust and respect’ guideline and to uphold the right to refuse treatment.

Sincerely,

I also see that there is an unsigned opinion piece in The Star:

While the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario has no specific policy on the immunization issue, it does have one on severing ties. “In general, a physician should not end the physician-patient relationship because the patient chooses not to follow the physician’s advice,” it says. That’s the patient’s right.

The American Academy of Pediatrics and its bioethics committee have developed guidelines on dealing with these vexing cases.

“In general, pediatricians should avoid discharging patients from their practices solely because a parent refuses to immunize his or her child,” the guideline states.

“Families with doubts about immunization should still have access to good medical care, and maintaining the relationship in the face of disagreement conveys respect and at the same time allows the child access to medical care. Furthermore, a continuing relationship allows additional opportunity to discuss the issue of immunization over time.”

Veresen, proud issuer of VSN.PR.A, was confirmed at Pfd-3(high) / Stable by DBRS:

DBRS has today confirmed the Senior Unsecured Notes and the Preferred Shares of Veresen Inc. (Veresen or the Company) at BBB (high) and Pfd-3 (high), respectively, both with Stable trends. The confirmation reflects (1) relatively stable cash flow from the Company’s regulated pipeline businesses, which accounted for approximately 56% of Veresen’s 2011 cash distributions received from its subsidiaries; (2) diversification benefits from its midstream (35% of cash distributions) and power generation businesses (9% of cash distributions), supported by long-term contracts with mostly investment-grade counterparts; and (3) solid non-consolidated cash flow ratios – albeit high non-consolidated leverage – at the parent level following the closing of the $920 million acquisition of the Hythe/Steeprock complex (the Acquisition) from Encana Corporation (Encana) in February 2012, which DBRS viewed as a credit neutral event for Veresen.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 6bp, FixedResets down 6bp and DeemedRetractibles up 2bp. Volatility was non-existent. Volume was quite low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0722 % 2,543.2
FixedFloater 4.35 % 3.71 % 29,759 17.91 1 0.2294 % 3,625.9
Floater 2.84 % 2.85 % 51,857 20.10 3 0.0722 % 2,746.0
OpRet 4.75 % 2.58 % 52,983 1.12 5 -0.0612 % 2,509.2
SplitShare 5.22 % 1.47 % 64,595 0.62 4 0.4107 % 2,705.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0612 % 2,294.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.43 % -2.47 % 81,437 0.09 25 0.0561 % 2,233.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.06 % 5.03 % 90,848 15.30 8 0.3194 % 2,445.8
FixedReset 5.03 % 2.98 % 191,583 2.12 68 -0.0580 % 2,403.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.34 % 180,703 1.03 45 0.0217 % 2,331.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
No individual gains or losses exceeding 1%!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 158,102 RBC crossed blocks of 100,000 and 51,500, both at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 140,905 TD crossed 34,600 at 25.80; Nesbitt crossed 99,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.79
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 102,571 RBC crossed 49,000 at 26.50; TD crossed 48,200 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.53
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 86,767 National crossed 79,200 at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 65,086 Desjardins crossed two blocks of 25,000 each, both at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 55,841 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
There were 19 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.85 – 26.24
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2590

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-03
Maturity Price : 23.63
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 2.96 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.42 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2159

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-06-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : -11.04 %

NA.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.80 – 27.10
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2013

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 2.35 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.71 – 25.95
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1568

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-05-03
Maturity Price : 23.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %

BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.30 – 26.48
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1094

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-25
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 2.43 %

BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.72 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1995

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-06-02
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.72
Bid-YTW : -4.92 %

Issue Comments

BCE.PR.F Secondary Offering

I am advised by multiple authoritative sources that there is a secondary offering under way (or is it “under weigh”? You can find much furious discussion of this on the web) for 2-million shares of BCE.PR.F, offered at 23.75.

The issue closed today at 23.95-98, 12×177. This is a wonderful issue for analysis, because there are so many ways of looking at comparators, but the easiest is its Strong Pair BCE.PR.E, a RatchetRate preferred. The two issues are interconvertible on 2015-2-15 and every five years thereafter. Until then BCE.PR.F pays a fixed 4.541% of par. while BCE.PR.E pays 100% of Canadian Prime, although this may be reduced if the price goes above 25.00.

BCE.PR.E closed today at 22.40-50 on less than a board lot traded; we can use this price for comparison purposes since it is close to the other BCE RatchetRates. The Pairs Equivalency Calculator (quick method) tells us that given a price of 22.40 on BCE.PR.E and 23.75 on BCE.PR.F, Canada Prime should average 2.32% until the February, 2015, Exchange Date for the total return on the two issues to be equal.

Seeing as Canada Prime is now 3.00% and is forecast to rise, if anything, over the next three years, BCE.PR.F looks grossly expensive at 23.75. I suspect that it is trading on the basis of its Current Yield of 4.78% and that the market is, as usual, ignoring conversion and dividend reset probabilities.

BCE.PR.F was last mentioned on PrefBlog when there was a secondary offering three-odd months ago. BCE.PR.F is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.