Issue Comments

PFR.UN Rated STA-2(middle) by DBRS

DBRS has announced that it:

has today assigned a stability rating of STA-2 (middle) to the retractable units (the Units) issued by Advantaged Preferred Share Trust (the Trust). The previous rating of Pfd-2 (low) has been discontinued as the DBRS preferred share rating scale will no longer be applied to the Trust.

Proceeds from the Trust’s offerings have been used to enter into a forward agreement with Royal Bank of Canada in order to gain exposure to a diversified portfolio (the Portfolio) of preferred shares. The forward agreement provides unitholders with a return equivalent to a direct investment in the Portfolio. The Portfolio is passively managed by RBC Dominion Securities Inc. (the Administrator).

On May 11, 2010, DBRS published a methodology for rating structured income funds. Prior to the release of the methodology, DBRS had applied its stability ratings only to income trusts, but with the release of the methodology, the stability rating scale now also applies to Canadian investment income funds. A stability rating provides an opinion on both the stability and sustainability of a fund’s cash distributions per unit.

A stability rating of STA-2 (middle) has been assigned to the Units issued by the Trust. This rating is mainly based on the strong credit quality of the Trust’s preferred share portfolio and the limited flexibility for the Administrator to invest in riskier assets. Also, the Trust’s current net income (including a regular additional payment under the forward agreement to offset operating expenses) covers the full distribution paid out to unitholders. The main constraints to the rating are the interest rate risk of the Portfolio and the potential for capital losses and reductions in income resulting from underlying securities being called for redemption by their respective issuers.

DBRS believes that a stability rating reflecting an opinion on the stability of the fund’s distributions will be useful to the Trust’s investors. The rating is based on factors such as the asset composition, credit quality and diversification of the Trust’s portfolio, among others. For more information on the rating factors considered by DBRS in its analysis, refer to the Structured Income Fund methodology that was published on May 11, 2010.

Issue Comments

DPS.UN Rated STA-3(high) by DBRS

Dominion Bond Rating Service has announced that it:

has today assigned a stability rating of STA-3 (high) to the retractable units (the Units) issued by Diversified Preferred Share Trust (the Trust). The previous rating of Pfd-2 (low) has been discontinued as the DBRS preferred share rating scale will no longer be applied to the Trust.

Proceeds from the Trust’s offerings have been used to invest in a diversified portfolio (the Portfolio) of preferred shares and securities. The Portfolio is passively managed by Sentry Select Capital Inc. (the Administrator).

On May 11, 2010, DBRS published a methodology for rating structured income funds. Prior to the release of the methodology, DBRS had applied its stability ratings only to income trusts, but with the release of the methodology, the stability rating scale now also applies to Canadian investment income funds. A stability rating provides an opinion on both the stability and sustainability of a fund’s cash distributions per unit.

A stability rating of STA-3 (high) has been assigned to the Units issued by the Trust. This rating is mainly based on the strong credit quality of the Trust’s preferred share portfolio and the limited flexibility for the Administrator to invest in riskier assets. The main constraint to the rating is the current shortfall in portfolio income relative to the distribution paid out to the Trust’s unitholders. The Trust’s net income can currently cover approximately 83% of the distributions paid out to unitholders. Other constraints to the rating include the interest rate risk of the Portfolio and the capital losses that may result from underlying securities being called for redemption by their respective issuers.

DBRS believes that a stability rating reflecting an opinion on the stability of the fund’s distributions will be useful to the Trust’s investors. The rating is based on factors such as the asset composition, credit quality and diversification of the Trust’s portfolio, among others. For more information on the rating factors considered by DBRS in its analysis, refer to the Structured Income Fund methodology that was published on May 11, 2010.

The statement The Trust’s net income can currently cover approximately 83% of the distributions paid out to unitholders is, I think, a little misleading: a large proportion of the fund’s holdings are FixedResets, which may well be called in the short term; a chunk of the fund’s dividend income is, in fact, return of capital.

Sector allocation (unaudited)
Sector %
Perpetual Preferred Shares 52.91
Fixed / Floater Preferred Shares 27.85
Retractable Preferred Shares 18.43
Floating Rate Preferred Shares 9.11
Other assets and liabilities -1.13
Bank Loan -8.09
Cash and cash equivalents 0.92
% Total 100.00

However, it must be remembered that in the fall of 2006, I predicted disaster for preferred share closed end fund distributions on the basis that all of them PerpetualPremium thingies were in danger of being called in the short term. Guess what happened next!

Additionally, I will quibble about the unqualified use of the word “passive” given the variation in the degree of leverage indulged in by the fund:

As at December 31, 2009, the Facility drawn down using bankers’ acceptances and prime rate loans was $Nil (2008 – $Nil) and $13,850,000 (2008 – $11,000,000), respectively. The interest and other charges on the Facility for the year was $407,608 (2008 – $810,482). During 2009, the minimum and maximum Facility balance was $6,000,000 (2008 – $11,000,000) and $13,850,000 (2008 – $25,000,000), respectively. As of December 31, 2009, the Fund is in compliance with the Facility’s covenants.

I am pleased to see that the fund is now publishing monthly performance numbers although it is not immediately clear whether the performance is based on market price or NAV.

Market Action

August 25, 2010

As I have previously noted, I am very pleased to see that we are finally having a debate on the cost of bank regulation. Less, more, whatever … but let’s get some idea of the cost before swallowing OSFI’s Kool-Aid and saying more is always better. I’ve highlighted the BoC study and the BIS report … so our first debater is Terence Corcoran, who wrote a column titled The high cost of bank regulation … the web version is encouragingly headed by:

CORRECTION: Terence Corcoran’s column, The High Cost of Bank Regulation, contained several factual errors regarding a Bank of Canada report on increased bank capital ratios.

An increase in capital of 2% results in a long-run annual impact on the level of GDP of -0.3%, or cumulative -6.0 % (or $92-billion) in present value terms, not -0.5 or -13.0% (or $200-billion). If the increase is 4%, the costs are -10% (or $153-billion) in present value terms , which does not equal $300-billion.

By avoiding future financial crises, the economy will benefit anywhere from 21.6% to 32.0% in present value terms, which is $332-billion to $492-billion. The chances of a financial crisis elsewhere is every 20 to 25 years if the probability is 4.5%, not every 60 years. The benefits to Canada were based on the reduced chance of a foreign crisis.

The impact of a Canadian crisis was based on the lower probability (1.7%) of a Canadian crisis. Finally, bank capital is made of equity, retained earnings, reserves, etc.

The Post regrets the errors.

Next debater, please!

The Congressional Oversight Panel has released – with very little press attention – its report The Global Context and International Effects of the TARP:

The dealings of Goldman Sachs with respect to the CDSs on CDOs that were eventually acquired by Maiden Lane III provide a compelling example of the effect of counterparty relationships on the flow of funds across borders, as 96.9 percent of the cash received by Goldman effectively flowed to non-U.S. institutions. (footnote) (These institutions, as well as other indirect foreign beneficiaries of the AIG rescue – entities that sold hedges on AIG to Goldman and benefited from not having to make good on that protection – are listed in Annex II.)

Footnote reads: According to recently released documents, there were 32 Goldman CDS counterparties that benefited directly from government assistance provided through the Maiden Lane III facility, and 31 of these entities are foreign. Each of the foreign entities listed below held a CDO for which Goldman had written CDS protection and entered into contracts with AIG laying off that risk. While Goldman was required to perform under its contracts whether or not AIG performed, when the government made the decision to pay AIG‟s counterparties at par –including Goldman – the following foreign entities were direct beneficiaries:…

And in Annex 2:

As the following data make clear, taxpayer aid to AIG became aid to Goldman, and aid to Goldman became aid to a number of domestic and foreign investors. In some cases, the aid was in the form of repayment in full of obligations that, without government help, could have ended in default. In other cases, the aid was in the form of guarantees that other parties did not have to pay because the government prevented any defaults.

AIG provided credit default swap (CDS) protection on a number of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which were the source of continuing collateral demands on AIG. As part of the AIG rescue, the CDOs underlying the CDSs were acquired by a special-purpose vehicle primarily funded by the government, Maiden Lane III. The entities set out in the table below held CDSs written by Goldman against the CDOs that were eventually acquired by Maiden Lane III. In order to sell those CDOs to Maiden Lane III, in most cases Goldman had to obtain them from these counterparties, so the Maiden Lane III funds effectively flowed to Goldman‟s counterparties. Nearly all of these second-level counterparties, both by number and dollar amount, were non-U.S. institutions, with European banks making up by far the largest contingent.

It will be remembered that the US Congress is almost the opposite of a sausage factory … what comes out of it may certainly be deprecated, but the research that goes into it is first rate (at some point I want to take a look for myself at exactly what they had in front of them when voting to invade Iraq – but that was an issue that never had the slightest amount of fact-motivation from the beginning).

It’s very odd, but I have not been able to find the conclusions regarding Goldman Sachs’ hedging reported on any of the lunatic fringe sites. I tried searching for the phrase “Investigation has concluded that Goldman Sachs was indeed well hedged in its dealings with AIG. Its risk management process was robust even to the events of September 2008, and if all financial firms had been half as competent in managing their exposures, the Panic of 2007 would have been a mere bad spell, a footnote in the history of banking.”, but I have not yet been able to find such a statement. I will post further on this subject when I find such a sentiment, or something approximating it, expressed on the sites of any of Goldman’s erstwhile critics.

There was heavy volume today and minimal overall movement in the market indices masked a surprisingly large amount of volatility in individual issues. MFC prefs were hurt again today – just look at that MFC.PR.D FixedReset, now yielding close to 5% to the call date from the bid price; there are currently five issues trading more than 200bp through that level! You can tell me that BMO is a better credit than MFC and I won’t blink; tell me it’s worth a spread of 200bp for four year money and we might have something to discuss! The strong performance by IAG is a little odd … not that there’s anything wrong with IAG, but those issues went ex-dividend today and it appears nobody noticed.

Nesbitt had a good day, volume-wise, but there is no information available to me regarding what kind of crosses they did … if they were internal crosses, for instance, (between different accounts under the same investment manager), then they won’t have got much commission out of it.

PerpetualDiscounts squeaked out a gain of 1bp, while FixedResets were up 9bp. The median average weighted yield-to-maturity on FixedResets is now a mere 3.16%.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.77%, equivalent to 8.08% interest at the standard 1.4x equivalency factor. Long corporates now yield about 5.3% (!), so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 275bp, up marginally – and perhaps spuriously – from the 270bp reported on August 18.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1459 % 2,051.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1459 % 3,108.1
Floater 2.55 % 2.17 % 34,733 21.92 4 0.1459 % 2,215.3
OpRet 4.91 % 3.44 % 97,065 0.26 9 0.0863 % 2,345.2
SplitShare 6.05 % -26.48 % 65,325 0.09 2 -0.0209 % 2,327.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0863 % 2,144.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.41 % 100,608 5.56 7 -0.1573 % 1,959.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.73 % 5.77 % 186,462 14.12 71 0.0145 % 1,897.0
FixedReset 5.28 % 3.16 % 278,187 3.37 47 0.0878 % 2,247.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset -1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : 4.97 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-25
Maturity Price : 21.60
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-25
Maturity Price : 24.56
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 5.90 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-25
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-25
Maturity Price : 18.55
Evaluated at bid price : 18.55
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-25
Maturity Price : 22.03
Evaluated at bid price : 22.27
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-25
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.11
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-25
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet 382,365 Nesbitt crossed three blocks: 150,000 shares, 15,000 and 200,000, all at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 184,400 TD crossed 22,000 at 25.16; Nesbitt crossed 150,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-25
Maturity Price : 24.72
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 177,830 TD bought 28,900 from RBC at 25.91. Nesbitt crossed three blocks, of 25,000 shares, 50,000 and 25,000, all at 25.85. TD crossed 12,500 at 25.91.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 4.71 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 171,625 TD crossed 21,700 at 27.75; Nesbitt crossed 136,000 at 27.53.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 171,524 Nesbitt crossed 150,000 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 152,227 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.85; Scotia bought 21,000 from Dundee at 26.50. Nesbitt crossed another 38,000 at 26.47.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : 4.97 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 101,300 RBC crossed blocks of 47,200 and 50,000, both at 21.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
There were 56 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Market Action

August 24, 2010

The Bank of Canada has released a discussion paper by Zhongfang He titled Evaluating the Effect of the Bank of Canada’s Conditional Commitment Policy:

The author evaluates the effect of the Bank of Canada’s conditional commitment regarding the target overnight rate on longer-term market interest rates by taking into account the relationship between interest rates, inflation, and unemployment rates. By using vector autoregressive models of monthly interest rates, month-over-month inflation, and unemployment rates for Canada and the United States, the author finds that the Canadian 1-year treasury bill rates and 1-year forward 3-month rates have generally been lower than their model-implied values since April 2009, while the difference between the U.S. realized rates and their model-implied values has been much smaller. The author also studies the effect of the conditional commitment on longer-term government bond yields with maturities of 2, 5, and 10 years, and finds lower actual Canadian longer-term interest rates than their model-implied values, though their difference diminishes as the maturities become longer. The evidence appears to suggest that the Bank of Canada’s conditional commitment likely has produced a persistent effect in lowering Canadian interest rates relative to what their historical relationship with inflation and unemployment rates would imply. However, this finding is not statistically strong and is subject to caveats such as possible in-sample model instability and the dependence of the results on the choice of inflation variable.

Ontario will tinker with pension guarantees:

The fund, which provides pensioners with up to $1,000 a month if their private-sector plan fails to provide its full benefit, has been an albatross for the governing Liberals, who have repeatedly warned that it hasn’t been funded properly since its inception 30 years ago.

That looming threat came to a head last year during the global recession, when the government was faced with a fund that didn’t have enough cash to help thousands of workers at corporate giants like General Motors of Canada Ltd. and Nortel Networks Corp. that were poised to collapse into bankruptcy.

“These rules will help reduce – hopefully eliminate – the kind of moral hazard that I would associate with companies and employee groups agreeing to benefits without properly funding them.”

Mr. Duncan is also proposing some temporary relief for certain pension plans in the broader public sector by offering them more time to pay down solvency deficits, as long as they meet certain conditions, and a review of the pension system every five years.

This may be related politically to Nortel’s pension status:

On Sept. 30, 2010, the Nortel Defined Benefit Pension Plans will become orphans. The Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) will then take over as required by current law.

Unless the Ontario government takes prompt action, Nortel’s pensioners will then lose 36% of their pensions and possibly even more. A major part of their loss occurs because, under current regulations, FSCO will simply wind-up the pension funds by converting them to annuities. This forever locks-in the existing pension deficit and it adds major penalties, because the cost of annuities is presently at the worst they have even been in 25 years with no relief in sight.

In 2001 Nortel’s plan went from half a billion surplus to one billion deficit; to $1.8-billion in 2002 …

Manulife common (MFC-TO) got hammered today:

Manulife Financial Corp., North America’s third-largest insurer, decreased 5.4 percent to a 17-month low of $11.71. Bank of America Corp. analyst Steve Theriault yesterday increased his third-quarter loss estimate for the company to 94 cents a share from 37 cents a share, excluding certain items. Sun Life Financial Inc., Canada’s third-biggest insurance company, dropped 4.3 percent to C$24.17.

Fitch affirmed MFC:

Fitch Ratings has assigned an ‘A-‘ rating to Manulife Financial Corporations (MFC’s) recently issued C$900 million 4.079% medium-term notes due Aug. 20, 2015. At the same time Fitch affirmed all of MFC’s existing ratings. (A full list of rating actions follows at the end of this release.) The Rating Outlook is Stable.

Within Fitch’s rating rationale are multiple considerations. If MFC were to materially deviate from any of these items, especially for an extended period, the ratings could be impacted. Included within these key rating rationale factors are the following:

–The annual 3Q’10 actuarial experience and methods adjustments of at least C$1 billion;
–MFC adjusted earnings of C$3 billion a year;
–Operating company Minimum Continuing Capital and Surplus Requirements (MCCSR) ratio above 190%;
–Holding company financial leverage not exceeding 20% on Fitch’s equity adjusted leverage basis;
–Current sensitivity to equity markets;
–Current volatility in earnings


–C$$350 million 4.1% class A, series 1, preferred stock at ‘BBB’;
–C$350 million 4.65% class A, series 2, preferred stock at ‘BBB’;
–C$300 million 4.5% class A, series 3, preferred stock at ‘BBB’;
–C$450 million 6.6% non-cumulative, preferred class A, series 4 stock at ‘BBB’;
–C$350 million 5.60% non-cumulative rate reset, preferred class 1, series 1 stock at ‘BBB’.

S&P says Ireland needs a little more green:

Ireland’s long-term sovereign credit rating was cut one step to AA- from AA by Standard & Poor’s, which cited the projected cost of supporting the nation’s financial sector.

“The negative outlook reflects our view that a further downgrade is possible if the fiscal cost of supporting the banking sector rises further, or if other adverse economic developments weaken the government’s ability to meet its medium- term fiscal objectives,” S&P said today in a statement.

S&P said its new projections suggest that Ireland’s net general government debt will rise toward 113 percent of gross domestic product in 2012. That’s more than 1.5 times the median for the average of euro zone sovereign nations, and “well above” the debt burdens the New York-based firm said it projects for similarly rated countries in the region such as Belgium at 98 percent and Spain at 65 percent.

The Canadian preferred share market edged a little higher today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 6bp and FixedResets gaining 10bp. Volume was above average. MFC’s preferreds were not immune to the woes of the common, with two issues figuring in the performance highlights – which were all losses today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3305 % 2,048.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3305 % 3,103.6
Floater 2.55 % 2.17 % 36,162 21.92 4 -0.3305 % 2,212.1
OpRet 4.91 % 4.11 % 97,880 0.90 9 -0.3526 % 2,343.2
SplitShare 6.05 % -32.87 % 67,451 0.09 2 0.1044 % 2,328.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3526 % 2,142.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.76 % 5.22 % 101,904 1.75 7 0.0450 % 1,963.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.72 % 5.77 % 186,794 14.11 71 0.0585 % 1,896.7
FixedReset 5.28 % 3.24 % 274,303 3.37 47 0.0975 % 2,245.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-24
Maturity Price : 14.89
Evaluated at bid price : 14.89
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.63
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-24
Maturity Price : 18.76
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 169,174 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 19.00; RBC crossed 45,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-24
Maturity Price : 18.76
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 166,030 TD crossed blocks of 29,900 and 30,000, both at 25.20. Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.21.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 91,861 RBC crossed 84,100 at 24.07.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-24
Maturity Price : 22.96
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 85,029 Nesbitt crossed 10,000 at 25.85; RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 83,911 RBC crossed blocks of 37,700 and 40,000, both at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.26
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 74,040 RBC crossed 69,100 at 19.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-24
Maturity Price : 18.93
Evaluated at bid price : 18.93
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
There were 45 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Market Action

August 23, 2010

I should have mentioned this earlier … but it just seemed so trivial! S&P has announced:

the S&P/TSX North American Preferred Stock Index. The Index seeks to provide investors with the opportunity to achieve broad diversification and exposure to North American preferred stocks.

Preferred stocks are a class of securities that combine the characteristics of debt and common stocks. Their returns have low correlations with common stock returns and with bond returns, making them good diversifiers. While their expected volatility and returns lie between those of common stocks and bonds, their yields are typically higher than that of common stock, the bond market and the money market.
“Preferred stocks are attractive to investors in today’s low interest rate environment, due to their higher yields,” says Steve Rive, Managing Director at S&P Indices. “The S&P/TSX North American Preferred Stock Index will provide investors with a diversified and broadly representative exposure to this important segment of the market.”

The S&P/TSX North American Preferred Stock Index is comprised of a 50% equal weighting in the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index and S&P U.S. Preferred Stock Index. The S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index is comprised of preferred stocks trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange that meet criteria relating to minimum size, liquidity, issuer rating, and exchange listing. The S&P U.S. Preferred Stock Index measures the yield and price performance of preferred stocks in the U.S. equity universe by using a rules-driven methodology. It is comprised of preferred stocks issued by U.S. entities that meet a set of defined criteria.

I don’t see the point of this. The US and Canadian preferred share markets are very different animals, with very different taxation profiles. My guess is that there will be an ETF announcement in the very near future. Thanks to Assiduous Readers MP and like_to_retire for reminding me that I’m supposed to report EVERYTHING about Canadian preferred shares, not just the news that investors might consider interesting or useful.

The FRBNY has released a staff report about a fascinating idea by Marco Del Negro, Fabrizio Perri, and Fabiano Schivardi titled Tax Buyouts:

The paper studies a fiscal policy instrument that can reduce fiscal distortions, without affecting revenues, in a politically viable way. The instrument is a private contract (tax buyout), offered by the government to each individual citizen, whereby the citizen can choose to pay a fixed price up front in exchange for a given reduction in her tax rate for a prespecified period of time. We consider a dynamic overlapping-generations economy, calibrated to match several features of the U.S. income and wealth distribution, and show that, under simple pricing, the introduction of the buyout is revenue neutral and at the same time can benefit a significant fraction of the population and lead to sizable increases in labor supply, income, consumption, and welfare.

The baseline buyout we consider is a reduction in the marginal tax rate of at most 5% offered at a price of roughly $4500, which ensures revenue neutrality.

The FRBNY also released a staff report by James Vickery and Joshua Wright titled TBA Trading and Liquidity in the Agency MBS Market:

Most mortgages in the United States are securitized through the agency mortgage-backedsecurities (MBS) market. These securities are generally traded on a “to-be-announced,” or TBA, basis. This trading convention significantly improves agency MBS liquidity, leading to lower borrowing costs for households. Evaluation of potential reforms to the U.S. housing finance system should take into account the effects of those reforms on the operation of the TBA market.

Consistent with the view that liquidity effects were important during this period, the timing of the increase in the jumbo-conforming spread corresponds closely to the collapse in non-agency MBS liquidity and mortgage securitization during the second half of 2007. Furthermore, this spread remains significantly elevated even today, despite normalization in many measures of credit risk premia.

I know a man who considers one thing to be an infallible contrarian indicator: when the little guy gets in … :

The amount of money flowing into bond funds is poised to exceed the cash that went into stock funds during the internet bubble, stoking concern that fixed- income markets are headed for a fall.

Investors poured $480.2 billion into mutual funds that focus on debt in the two years ending June, compared with the $496.9 billion received by equity funds from 1999 to 2000, according to data compiled by Bloomberg and the Washington-based Investment Company Institute.

Concern that the global economic recovery is faltering, with the U.S. growing at a slower-than-forecast 2.4 percent pace in the second quarter, is prompting investors to pile into fixed-income securities of all types even with some yields at record lows. The new cash has helped fuel a rally and drove yields on investment-grade U.S. corporate debt down to a record 3.79 percent last week, while two-year U.S. Treasury yields fell to an all-time low of less than 0.5 percent.

There’s increased chatter about century bonds:

“With credit spreads rallying, it’s the perfect environment for issuers to get away with 100-year bonds,” said one banker who has been selectively pitching the idea to institutional investors. “There is a natural trend to go long, so the obvious extension of that is to move past the 30-year bucket.”

As investors move “out on the curve” to longer-dated issues, the amount of three-year corporate debt offerings has fallen by 50% compared to 2009. The pace of 30-year issuance has risen by 30%, according to Dealogic.

New York State may be reducing return assumptions for its pension funds:

New York state’s $132.6 billion pension fund, the nation’s third-largest, will cut the assumed rate of return on its investments to less than the 8 percent it has used for a decade.

A reduction to 7.5 percent or 7.75 percent is likely, said Robert Whalen, a spokesman for Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli. The move “will increase the required contributions from the state and local governments but will keep the fund as strong as it is now,” Whalen said.

The plan, which covers 1 million current and retired workers, had assets equal to about 107 percent of its future liabilities, according to the fund. New York was one of only four states with pension systems in 2008 that fully funded their future obligations, according to a study by the Washington-based Pew Center on the States.

By way of comparison, the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan states:

A typical teacher retiring in 2009 has 26 years of pension credit and is expected to receive a pension for 30 years, plus a survivor may be paid after that. Working teachers can expect to collect their pensions for longer than they contributed to the plan.

FUNDING VALUATION ASSUMPTIONS (percent)
  2009 Filed 2009 Preliminary
Rate of return 5.00 4.90
Inflation rate 1.35 1.35
Real rate of return 3.65 3.55

The assumptions for 2010 are nominal 5.5% less inflation 2.55% equals real 2.95%. Since:

The OTF and the Ontario government adopted a Funding Management Policy in 2003. Under the policy:

  • If assets are equal to or up to 10% greater than liabilities, the plan is in balance and no change is required.
  • If assets are more than 10% greater than liabilities, the plan has a surplus that can be used to reduce contribution rates or improve benefits.
  • If liabilities are greater than assets, the plan has a shortfall. The OTF and the government can address a shortfall by increasing contributions, invoking conditional inflation protection for pension credit earned after 2009, changing other benefits members will earn in the future, or adopting a combination of these measures.

… one cannot help but wonder if the relatively low return assumptions are simply yet another way of back-dooring some extra benefits to the plan members.

BIS has commenced publishing property price statistics. Oddly, there are no data available for Canada.

The Bank of Canada has released a working paper by Hajime Tomura titled Liquidity Transformation and Bank Capital Requirements:

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model where asymmetric information about asset quality leads to asset illiquidity. Banking arises endogenously in this environment as banks can pool illiquid assets to average out their idiosyncratic qualities and issue liquid liabilities backed by pooled assets whose total quality is public information. Moreover, the liquidity mismatch in banks’ balance sheets leads to endogenous bank capital (outside equity) requirements for preventing bank runs. The model indicates that banking has both positive and negative effects on long-run economic growth and that business-cycle dynamics of asset prices, asset illiquidity and bank capital requirements are interconnected.

The model, however, also shows that if a deterioration in asymmetric information in the asset market increases the illiquidity of bank assets significantly, then banks need to raise more bank capital during the liquidity crisis to prevent self-fulfilling bank runs. This result implies that the counter-cyclical capital buffer will not help to free up bank capital as designed in a liquidity crisis.

The (alleged) G-20 protesters had their day in court today:

Over 300 people facing G20-related charges appeared at a Toronto courthouse Monday, a legal tidal wave resulting from the largest mass arrests in Canadian history.

The court’s hallways are only designed to hold 176 people. Officers have been tasked with regulating the intake of defendants to ensure the building doesn’t break fire code. The court’s legal aid office brought in extra staff, including French-speakers.

I don’t know the name of the petty, vindictive ratshit who decided to make the scheduling an extra-judicial punishment … but I have a message for him: You have held the courts in contempt, and you have done more damage to the rule of law than any of those charged. Asshole.

It was a mixed day on good volume for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 23bp and FixedResets losing 5bp; the change narrowed the Bozo Spread (Current Yield PerpetualDiscounts less Current Yield FixedResets) slightly to 44bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1059 % 2,055.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1059 % 3,113.8
Floater 2.54 % 2.17 % 36,708 21.93 4 0.1059 % 2,219.4
OpRet 4.90 % -1.52 % 99,311 0.19 9 0.0301 % 2,351.5
SplitShare 6.05 % -30.77 % 68,049 0.09 2 -0.3121 % 2,325.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0301 % 2,150.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.20 % 100,766 5.57 7 0.1351 % 1,962.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.73 % 5.78 % 185,006 14.13 71 0.2302 % 1,895.6
FixedReset 5.29 % 3.28 % 278,289 3.37 47 -0.0537 % 2,243.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 6.83 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.71
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-23
Maturity Price : 21.49
Evaluated at bid price : 21.76
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 86,943 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 12,000 and 40,000, both at 19.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-23
Maturity Price : 18.95
Evaluated at bid price : 18.95
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 80,435 TD crossed 19,800 at 26.18. RBC crossed blocks of 25,000 and 20,000, both at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-09-22
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : -10.45 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 51,115 RBC crossed 44,700 at 26.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.45
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 49,890 TD crossed 30,000 at 20.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-23
Maturity Price : 20.70
Evaluated at bid price : 20.70
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 46,055 RBC crossed 30,100 at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 43,575 RBC crossed blocks of 21,900 and 11,600, both at 22.48.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-23
Maturity Price : 22.24
Evaluated at bid price : 22.40
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Regulation

BIS Assesses Effects of Increasing Bank Capitalization

This paper was referenced in the recent BoC analysis of capital ratio cost/benefits as the “LEI Report”.

The Bank for International Settlements has released a report titled An assessment of the long-term economic
impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements
:

This simple mapping yields two key results, with the central tendency across countries measured by the median estimate. First, each 1 percentage point increase in the capital ratio raises loan spreads by 13 basis points. Second, the additional cost of meeting the liquidity standard amounts to around 25 basis points in lending spreads when risk-weighted assets (RWA) are left unchanged; however, it drops to 14 basis points or less after taking account of the fall in RWA and the corresponding lower regulatory capital needs associated with the higher holdings of low-risk assets.

Their approach relies heavily on the theory that output losses due to bank crises may be ascribed entirely to the crisis (although they do acknowledge that “that factors unrelated to banking crises, and not well controlled for in these studies, may also influence the output losses observed in the data.”):

Why should the effects of banking crises be so long-lasting, and possibly even permanent? One reason is that banking crises intensify the depth of recessions, leaving deeper scars than typical recessions. Possible reasons for why banking related crises are deeper include: a collapse in confidence; an increase in risk aversion; disruptions in financial intermediation (credit crunch, misallocation of credit); indirect effects associated with the impact on fiscal policy (increase in public sector debt and taxation); or a permanent loss of human capital during the slump (traditional hysteresis effects).

One of the papers they quote in support of their approach is Carlos D. Ramirez, Bank Fragility, ‘Money Under the Mattress,’ and Long-Run Growth: U.S. Evidence from the ‘Perfect’ Panic of 1893:

This paper examines how the U.S. financial crisis of 1893 affected state output growth between 1900 and 1930. The results indicate that a 1% increase in bank instability reduces output growth by about 5%. A comparison of the cases of Nebraska, with one of the highest bank failure rates, and West Virginia, which did not experience a single bank failure reveals that disintermediation affected growth through a portfolio change among savers – people simply stop trusting banks. Time series evidence from newspapers indicate that articles with the words “money hidden” significantly increase after banking crises, and die off slowly over time.

Ramirez continues:

The intuition behind the explanation of why financial disintermediation affects
growth is straightforward. In the absence of deposit insurance or any other institutional arrangement that restores confidence on the banking system, depositors who experience losses or whose money becomes illiquid, even temporarily, may become reluctant to keep their money in the banking system. They simply stop “trusting” banks. This lack of trust may affect all depositors, including those that did not experience losses. With a high enough degree of risk aversion and a high enough probability of a bank run or failure depositors may be induced to reshuffle their liquid asset portfolio away from the banking system. To the extent that the panic induces a portfolio change in asset holdings away from the banking system and into more rudimentary forms of savings, such as keeping the money “under the mattress,” financial intermediation, and thus, growth are adversely affected.

According to me, this raises a red flag about the use of these data to determine the the severity of bank crises in the current environment, even without considering the difficulty of disentangling the degree of recession actually caused by the Panic versus the degree of economic stupidity that was merely brought to light. The Nebraskans kept their money “under the mattress” due to a lack of deposit insurance – just how relevant are the mechanics to what is going on now?

Additionally, the underlying rationale behind the desire to avoid banking crises points to an alternative solution to the problem: rather than reducing the chance of a systemic banking crisis, why not increase the range of alternative intermediation pathways?

Currently, regulators are doing everything they can – by way of Sarbox, completely random regulatory punishment for having been involved in the underwriting and distribution of investments that went bad, TRACE, costs of prospectus preparation, etc. – to deprecate the direct capital markets. A concious effort should be made in the other direction; the option of issuing public debt should be made more attractive to companies, not less.

Additionally, I have previously proposed that Investment Banks be treated differently from Vanilla Banks, not by a strick separation such as Glass-Steagall, but by imposing differing schedules for different types of banks, so that the latter would be penalized for holding assets while the former would be penalized for trading them (where “penalized” refers to higher capital requirements). The idea can be extended: bring back the Trust Company, which would get a preferential capital rate for first mortgages with loan-to-value of less than 75% and a penalty rate of everything else.

In the financial system as in the financial investments, bad investments (bad banks) can hurt you: it is concentration that kills you. And the point is related to my other big complaint about the regulatory response to the crisis: right in the age of networking, regulators are emphasizing systems which are vulnerable to single point failure.

Just as an example, the BIS paper notes:

The final approach used in this exercise relies on the Bank of Canada’s stress testing framework. This methodology is based on the idea that the failure of a bank arises from either a macroeconomic shock or spillover effects from other distressed banks. Spillover effects arise either because of counterparty exposures in the interbank market or because of asset fire sales that affect the mark to market value of banks’ portfolios. In this context, a greater buffer of liquid assets can only be beneficial insofar as it helps the bank to avoid asset fire sales, which would otherwise lead to losses.

You could get the same benefit by reducing the degree of interbank holdings, but such a solution is not even considered. BIS, it appears, will continue to risk-weight bank paper according to the credit rating of the sovereign – if you want an example of moral hazard, that’s a good one right there.

Anyway, BIS comes up with a figure of 13bp per point of capital ratio:

Column A of Table 6 reports the results of this exercise. In order to keep ROE from changing, each percentage point increase in the ratio of TCE to RWA results in a median increase in lending spreads across countries of 13 basis points.

… but this is subject to four major problems acknowledged by BIS:

  • The existing literature, which is the basis for this report’s estimates of the costs of banking crises, may overestimate the costs of banking crises. Possible reasons include: overestimation of the underlying growth path prior to the crises; failure to account for the temporarily higher growth during that phase; and failure to fully control for factors other than a banking crises per se that may contribute to output declines during the crisis and beyond, including a failure to accurately reflect causal relationships.
  • Capital and liquidity requirements may be less effective in reducing the probability of banking crises than suggested by the approaches used in the study. This would reduce the overall net benefits for a given level of the requirements. However, to the extent that net benefits remain positive, it would also imply that the requirements would need to be raised by more in order to achieve a given net benefit.
  • Shifting of risk into the non-regulated sector could reduce the financial stability benefits.
  • The results of the impact of regulatory requirements on lending spreads are based on aggregate balance sheets within individual countries, so that they do not consider the incidence of the requirements across institutions. They implicitly assume that theinstitutions that fall short of the requirements (ie, that are constrained) do not react more than those with excess capital or liquidity (ie, that are unconstrained). These effects may not be purely distributional.

I consider the third point most important. To the extent that higher capital ratios imply higher spreads implies a greater role for the shadow banking industry, then the real effect of higher capital levels will be to shift important economic activity from the somewhat flawed regulated sector to a sector with no regulation at all.

I certainly support the idea that we should have layers of regulation – a strong banking system surrounded by a less regulated / less systemically important investment banking sector, surrounded in turn by a wild-n-wooly hedge fund/shadow bank sector … but regulators are, as usual fixing yesterday’s problem with little thought for the implications.

New Issues

New Issue: INE FixedReset 5.00%+279

Innergex Renewable Energy Inc. has announced:

that it will be issuing 3,400,000 Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series A (the “Series A Preferred Shares”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $85 million on a bought deal basis to a syndicate of underwriters led by BMO Capital Markets and TD Securities Inc.

The Series A Preferred Shares will pay cumulative dividends of $1.25 per share per annum, yielding 5.00% per annum, payable quarterly, for the initial five year period ending January 15, 2016. The dividend rate will be reset on January 15, 2016 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.79%. The Series A Preferred Shares will be redeemable by Innergex on or after January 15, 2016, in accordance with their terms.

Holders of the Series A Preferred Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series B, (the “Series B Preferred Shares”) subject to certain conditions, on January 15, 2016 and on January 15 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series B Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 2.79%.

As stated by Michel Letellier, President and Chief Executive Officer of Innergex: “With this transaction, Innergex’s capital structure is more diversified and will appeal to a broader investor base”. Net proceeds resulting from the sale of the Series A Preferred Shares will be used by Innergex to enhance its financial flexibility, to reduce indebtedness and for general corporate purposes.

The Series A Preferred Shares will be offered for sale to the public in each of the provinces of Canada pursuant to a short form prospectus of Innergex to be filed with Canadian securities regulatory authorities in all Canadian provinces. The offering is scheduled to close on or about September 14, 2010, subject to certain conditions, including obtaining all necessary regulatory approvals.

Furthermore, Innergex will be filing a revised Annual Information Form which takes into account the previously completed combination of the Corporation with Innergex Power Income Fund.

Innergex Renewable Energy Inc. is a leading developer, owner and operator of run-of-river hydroelectric facilities and wind energy projects in North America. Innergex’s management team has been involved in the renewable power industry since 1990. Innergex owns a portfolio of projects which consists of: i) interests in 17 operating facilities with an aggregate net installed capacity of 326 MW; ii) interests in 7 projects under development with an aggregate net installed capacity of 203 MW for which power purchase agreements have been secured; and iii) prospective projects of more than 2,000 MW (net).

The issue is rated P-3 by S&P and Pfd-3(low) by DBRS. The first dividend, if declared, shall be payable on January 17, 2011, the first business day after January 15, 2011 for $0.42123 per Series A Preferred Share, based on closing September 14, 2010.

More junk!

Update: DBRS comments:

While the Company’s existing assets would be expected to produce reasonable financial results and credit metrics under a steady-state scenario, the capital program will require significant financing beyond internally generated cash flow, expected to consist largely of debt. Furthermore, DBRS expects that Innergex will maintain a high common dividend payout ratio (in excess of 100% of net income) throughout the medium term. As such, consolidated credit metrics are expected to remain tight for the rating category through the medium term, with EBITDA-to-interest in the area of 2.5 times (x) and cash flow-to-debt in the 8% to 10% range. DBRS would expect future modest improvement in coverage metrics when assets under development are completed and enter service. Debt-to-capital, currently 62%, would be expected to migrate upward over time, given the significant common dividends.

The proceeds from the intended $85 million preferred share offering will be used to refinance existing debt and to fund future capital expenditures. While the amount of preferred shares will comprise a material portion of the capital structure, particularly in relation to the book value of shareholders’ equity, DBRS is comfortable with the provisional Pfd-3 (low) rating given the stability of the underlying business (largely attributable to the young generating fleet and strong PPAs), as well as the significant financial cushion that the common dividends provide.

Eight of the Company’s 14 operating assets have non-recourse debt totalling approximately $320 million; while selective use of project financing can serve to isolate business risk at the individual asset level, the asset-level debt obligations rank ahead of Innergex’s obligations.

Update, 2010-9-8: DBRS has finalized the rating at Pfd-3(low) with a stable trend.

Issue Comments

PIC.PR.A Proposes Term Extension

Premium Income Corporation has announced:

that its Board of Directors has approved a proposal to extend the term of the Fund for an additional seven years.

The final redemption date for the Class A Shares and Preferred Shares of the Fund is currently November 1, 2010 and the Fund proposes to implement a reorganization (“Reorganization”) that will allow shareholders to retain their investment in the Fund until at least November 1, 2017.

In connection with the Reorganization, holders of Class A Shares will continue to receive ongoing leveraged exposure to a high-quality portfolio consisting principally of common shares of Bank of Montreal, The Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada and The Toronto-Dominion Bank, as well as attractive quarterly cash distributions. Currently, the Fund is paying quarterly distributions at a rate of $0.60 per year. The Fund intends to continue to pay distributions at this rate until the net asset value (“NAV”) per Unit (a “Unit” being considered to consist of one Class A Share and one Preferred Share) reaches $22.50. At such time, quarterly distributions paid by the Fund will vary and will be calculated as approximately 8.0% per annum of the NAV of a Class A Share. If the Reorganization is approved and implemented, holders of Preferred Shares are expected to continue to benefit from fixed cumulative preferential quarterly cash dividends in the amount of $0.215625 per Preferred Share ($0.8625 per year) representing a yield of 5.75% per annum on the original issue price of $15.00.

As part of the Reorganization, the Fund is also proposing other changes including changing its authorized share capital by adding new classes of shares issuable in series, changing the monthly retraction prices for the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares so that they are calculated by reference to market price in addition to NAV and changing the dates by which notice of monthly retractions needs to be provided and by which the retraction amount will be paid. The Fund will also allow for the calculation of a diluted NAV in the event the Fund should ever issue warrants or rights to acquire additional Class A Shares or Preferred Shares.

The Fund believes that the Reorganization will allow shareholders to maintain their investment in the Fund on a basis that will better enable it to meet its investment objectives for both classes of shares.

If the Reorganization is approved and implemented, shareholders will be given a special retraction right to retract their Class A Shares or Preferred Shares at NAV on November 1, 2010. The redemption date of the shares will automatically be extended for successive seven-year terms after November 1, 2017, the Board of Directors will be authorized to set the dividend rate on the Preferred Shares for any such extension of term and shareholders will be able to retract their Class A Shares or Preferred Shares at NAV prior to any such extension.

A special meeting of holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares has been called and will be held on September 29, 2010 to consider and vote upon the proposal. Further details of the proposal will be outlined in an information circular to be prepared and delivered to holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares in connection with the special meeting. The Reorganization is also subject to all required regulatory approvals.

A fascinating part of this press release is the section As part of the Reorganization, the Fund is also proposing other changes including changing its authorized share capital by adding new classes of shares issuable in series, changing the monthly retraction prices for the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares so that they are calculated by reference to market price in addition to NAV and changing the dates by which notice of monthly retractions needs to be provided and by which the retraction amount will be paid.

So it sounds like they want to go the route taken by CGI and BNA (there may be others) and have what is essentially permanent capital units leveraged by a variety of preferreds. Changing the monthly retraction price sounds like it could be scary, but we will just have to wait for details.

Another item of interest is their intention to provide a partial NAV test on capital unit distributions, so that these distributions will be relatively low until Asset Coverage exceeds 1.5x.

However, the problem with this proposal is that preferred shareholders are being asked to provide a term extension for junk. The NAV on August 12 is only $19.94 implying Asset Coverage of only 1.3+:1. That’s pretty skimpy. On the other hand, the promoters are proposing to continue the dividend rate of 5.75%, which is relatively good.

Comparators are:

PIC.PR.A Comparators
Ticker Asset Coverage Yield Notes
FFN.PR.A 1.4-:1 5.42% Full NAV Test
LFE.PR.A 1.3+:1 5.45% Full NAV Test
WFS.PR.A 1.1+:1 16.27%
to June 30, 2011
Full NAV Test
LCS.PR.A 1.2+:1 5.25% Full NAV Test
BSD.PR.A 1.2+:1 9.51%
Interest
Abusive management

Well, you can make what you like of it, but I say that a measly 5.75% isn’t enough to compensate seven-year money for low Asset Coverage and the lack of a full NAV test (in which Capital Unitholders get NOTHING, zip, zero, zilch, for as long as Asset Coverage is below 1.5:1).

This is particularly true since Income Coverage in 1H10 was only 0.8-:1 … coverage of the distributions to both preferred share and capital unitholders was 0.5-:1.

We want more! At least one of:

  • Full NAV Test
  • Higher Coupon
  • Higher Asset Coverage (by consolidation of Capital units / partial redemption of preferreds)

Otherwise – and subject to the potential for very pleasant, but unlikely, surprises in the final documents … VOTE NO!

PIC.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was Upgraded to Pfd-4(high) by DBRS. PIC.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Market Action

August 20, 2010

Was the Panic of 2007 bogus? I have previously highlighted doubts about the ABX index validity (as has, famously, Fabulous Fab) … Richard Stanton and Nancy Wallace supply another interesting paper, The Bear’s Lair: Indexed Credit Default Swaps and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis:

ABX.HE indexed credit default swaps on baskets of mortgage-backed securities are now the main benchmark used by financial institutions to mark their subprime mortgage portfolios to market. However, we find that current prices for the ABX.HE indices are inconsistent with any finite assumption for mortgage default rates, and that ABX.HE price changes are uncorrelated with changes in the credit performance of the underlying loans. These results cast serious doubt on the suitability of the ABX.HE indices as valuation benchmarks. We also find that ABX.HE price changes are significantly related to short-sale activity in the option and equity markets of the publicly traded builders, the commercial banks, the investment banks and the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). This suggests that capital constraints, limiting the supply of ABS insurance, may be playing a role here similar to that identified by Froot (2001) in the market for catastrophe insurance.

We collect detailed credit and prepayment histories from 2006{2008 for all of the roughly 360,000 individual loans underlying the ABX.HE indices, and use these data, plus current prices, to infer the market’s expectations for future defaults. Using both a simple, “back-of-the-envelope” model (in which all defaults and insurance payments occur instantaneously) and a full CDS valuation model calibrated to the historical loan-level performance data, we find that recent price levels for ABX.HE index CDS are inconsistent with any reasonable forecast for the future default performance of the underlying loans. For example, assuming a recovery rate of 21%, the AAA ABX.HE prices on June 30, 2009 imply default rates of 100% on the underlying loans. In other words, if recovery rates exceed 21% (a value well below anything ever observed in U.S. mortgage markets), there is no default rate high enough to support observed prices. We also find that changes in the credit performance of the underlying loans explain almost none of the observed price changes in the ABX.HE indices. These results cast serious doubt on the use of the ABX.HE indices for marking mortgage portfolios to market.

The Canadian preferred share market advanced modestly on good volume today, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 2bp and FixedResets up 7bp.

MFC issues maintained their presence in the volume highlights; probably continuing portfolio rebalancing after the DBRS downgrade.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4480 % 2,053.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4480 % 3,110.6
Floater 2.55 % 2.17 % 36,998 21.93 4 -0.4480 % 2,217.1
OpRet 4.90 % -2.64 % 102,983 0.19 9 0.1249 % 2,350.8
SplitShare 6.03 % -25.10 % 67,997 0.09 2 0.1459 % 2,333.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1249 % 2,149.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.49 % 101,002 5.58 7 -0.1405 % 1,959.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.74 % 5.78 % 183,793 14.07 71 0.0161 % 1,891.3
FixedReset 5.28 % 3.28 % 287,612 3.38 47 0.0676 % 2,244.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-20
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 23.35
Bid-YTW : 2.05 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 210,890 TD crossed 187,800 at 20.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-20
Maturity Price : 20.63
Evaluated at bid price : 20.63
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 77,674 Scotia crossed 11,000 at 24.97; Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-20
Maturity Price : 24.92
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 49,579 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-20
Maturity Price : 18.90
Evaluated at bid price : 18.90
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 43,971 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-20
Maturity Price : 22.25
Evaluated at bid price : 22.40
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 42,436 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-20
Maturity Price : 20.03
Evaluated at bid price : 20.03
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 37,773 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 4.44 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.