April 10, 2012

April 10th, 2012

A mention in the Globe & Mail led me to an IMF publication (Chapter 3 of of the April, 2012, World Economic Outlook) titled Dealing with Household Debt:

Does household debt amplify downturns and weaken recoveries? Based on an analysis of advanced economies over the past three decades, we find that housing busts and recessions preceded by larger run-ups in household debt tend to be more severe and protracted. These patterns are
consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models. Based on case studies, we find that government policies can help prevent prolonged contractions in economic activity by addressing the problem of excessive household debt. In particular, bold household debt restructuring programs such as those implemented in the United States in the 1930s and in Iceland today can significantly reduce debt repayment burdens and the number of household defaults and foreclosures. Such policies can therefore help avert self-reinforcing cycles of household defaults, further house price declines, and additional contractions in output.

Macroeconomic policies are a crucial element of forestalling excessive contractions in economic activity during episodes of household deleveraging. For example, monetary easing in economies in which mortgages typically have variable interest rates, as in the Scandinavian countries,
can quickly reduce mortgage payments and avert household defaults. Similarly, fiscal transfers to households through social safety nets can boost households’ incomes and improve their ability to service debt, as in the Scandinavian countries.

Clearly, it is better to avoid such a situation in the first place, but there is only ineffective policy in place in Canada to do so at this time. Buying a larger house (or a small house or condominium instead of renting) is a means of capital formation, which is encouraged by low interest rates. That’s what lower interest rates are supposed to do, for heaven’s sake! However, housing is non-productive capital; so much so that it can almost be considered consumption.

So the question really is: in times of economic downturns, how should policy act to promote “good” capital formation as opposed to “bad” capital formation?

I suggest that both monetary and fiscal policy are very blunt tools – too blunt to address the issue. Instead, a regulatory response is required:

  • Don’t be so damn eager to raise the limits on explicitly (Canada) or implicitly (US) government guarantees of mortgage debt. Set a limit, based on historical experience and rising with nominal GDP, of the amount of such guarantees. In 2006, CMHC insurance outstanding was $291-billion. In 2010 the plan was to have total outstanding of $533-billion. Why? Why do What-debt? and Spend-Every-Penny want to create a housing bubble? I can only assume that it is because this will give them more opportunity to micro-manage the economy, with credit-rationing and rule changes by government fiat, rather than the unexciting process of raising insurance prices when a reasonable limit is approached.
  • Impose a capital surcharge the banks when their loan books get distorted. Mortgages are now 40% of the balance sheets; they used to be 30% not so very long ago. Such a sudden change indicates to me a strong possibility that this is simply regulatory arbitrage (why lend to Jimmy’s Barber Shop, with a risk-weighting of 100%, when you can lend to Jimmy himself as a mortgage, with a 35% risk-weight or maybe even a government guarantee with an even lower risk-weight?). So, in this case of distortion, and in every other case of material distortion, impose a surcharge. An extra 10% risk-weight (to 45% on mortgags) on loan book elements in material excess of their historical norms is my prescription.

Three cheers for offshore wind power!

Offshore wind costs about $232 a megawatt-hour of power generated, according to data from Bloomberg New Energy Finance. That compares with about $80 for onshore wind, $62 for gas-fired plants and $77 for coal. The government supports the industry with incentives for power produced by renewable energy sources.

It’s not clear if the price figures include provisions for back-up power and demand-timing differences (the wind tends to blow at night, when demand is relatively low, can sometimes die at highly inconvenient moments and electricity can’t be stored very well. This has a huge effect on honest cost assessment, and no effect on – shall we say – other assessments).

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums losing 4bp, FixedResets gaining 2bp and DeemedRetractibles down 2bp. Volatility was low. Volume was a little below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2858 % 2,399.3
FixedFloater 4.42 % 3.83 % 37,343 17.57 1 1.0818 % 3,527.4
Floater 3.01 % 3.01 % 47,315 19.71 3 -0.2858 % 2,590.6
OpRet 4.75 % 2.74 % 48,136 1.16 5 0.1609 % 2,509.4
SplitShare 5.26 % -4.66 % 81,958 0.68 4 -0.1387 % 2,687.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1609 % 2,294.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.48 % 1.26 % 85,762 0.15 23 -0.0417 % 2,217.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.17 % 5.10 % 133,510 15.24 10 0.2902 % 2,412.4
FixedReset 5.02 % 3.00 % 185,702 2.20 67 0.0155 % 2,392.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.97 % 3.95 % 205,560 3.06 46 -0.0223 % 2,301.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.J FixedReset -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-10
Maturity Price : 22.31
Evaluated at bid price : 21.49
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 299,184 Nesbitt crossed 290,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 90,363 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-10
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 72,214 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.97
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 57,652 RBC crossed 49,000 at 26.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-25
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.58
Bid-YTW : 2.47 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 54,167 Nesbitt crosed 11,600 at 25.55; RBC crossed 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 41,810 TD crossed 20,700 at 25.77; RBC crossed 15,000 at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.23 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1879

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.11 – 25.35
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1694

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : -0.69 %

BAM.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 27.15 – 27.39
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1785

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.15
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %

GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.00 – 25.21
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1553

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 5.25 %

CM.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 26.70 – 26.88
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1271

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %

BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 17.29 – 17.54
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1977

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-10
Maturity Price : 17.29
Evaluated at bid price : 17.29
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %

CF.PR.C Closing a Disaster for Underwriters

April 10th, 2012

Canaccord Financial has announced:

the completion of its previously announced offering of 4,000,000 Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series C ( the “Series C Preferred Shares”) at a purchase price of CAD$25.00 per Series C Preferred Share, for aggregate gross proceeds of CAD$100 million. The Series C Preferred Shares are expected to commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange on April 10, 2012 under the trading symbol “CF.PR.C”.

The offering was underwritten on a bought deal basis by a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, Canaccord Genuity Corp. and RBC Capital Markets, and included BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., National Bank Financial Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., GMP Securities L.P., Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd., Raymond James Ltd., Cormark Securities Inc., Desjardins Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Ltd., Mackie Research Capital Corporation and Manulife Securities Incorporated.

Canaccord has granted the underwriters an over-allotment option, exercisable, in whole or in part, for a period of 30 days following today’s closing, to purchase up to an additional 600,000 Series C Preferred Shares which, if exercised in full, would increase the gross proceeds of the offering to CAD$115 million.
The net proceeds of the offering will be used to reduce outstanding borrowings under the CAD$150 million senior secured credit facility (the “Acquisition Credit Facility”) entered into by the Company, as borrower, and provided by Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, as lender.

The Acquisition Credit Facility was entered in order to fund a portion of the cash consideration for the Company’s previously announced acquisition of Collins Stewart Hawkpoint plc, which closed on March 21, 2012.

CF.PR.C is a FixedReset, 5.75%+403, announced March 22. The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

CF.PR.C traded a derisory 33,890 shares in a range of 23.50-48, before closing at 23.40-55, 2×4. Vital statistics are:

CF.PR.C FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-10
Maturity Price : 22.48
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %

Boston Fed Releases 11H2 Research Review

April 10th, 2012

The Boston Fed has released the 11H2 Research Review highlighting:

  • Public Policy Discussion Papers
    • An Economic Analysis of the 2010 Proposed Settlement between the Department of Justice and Credit Card Networks
    • Classroom Peer Effects and Student Achievement
    • Securitization and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Lender Cutoff Rules
    • Quantifying the Role of Federal and State Taxes in Mitigating Income Inequality
    • Economic Literacy and Inflation Expectations: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
    • Do Borrower Rights Improve Borrower Outcomes? Evidence from the Foreclosure Process
    • Account-to-Account Electronic Money Transfers: Recent Developments in the United States
  • Working Papers
    • House Price Growth When Kids Are Teenagers: A Path to Higher Intergenerational Achievement?
    • Customer Recognition and Competition
    • On the Distribution of College Dropouts: Household Wealth and Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risk
    • Trade Adjustment and Productivity in Large Crises
    • Trends in U.S. Family Income Mobility, 1969–2006
    • The Role of Expectations in U.S. Inflation Dynamics
    • Further Investigations into the Origin of Credit Score Cutoff Rules
    • Core Competencies, Matching, and the Structure of Foreign Direct Investment
    • Managing Self-Confidence: Theory and Experimental Evidence
    • Games with Synergistic Preferences
    • The Great Recession and Bank Lending to Small Businesses
    • The Great Recession and Bank Lending to Small Businesses
    • Inflation Dynamics When Inflation Is Near Zero
    • Designing Formulas for Distributing Reductions in State Aid
    • Childhood Lead and Academic Performance in Massachusetts
  • Public Policy Briefs
    • Potential Effects of an Increase in Debit Card Fees
    • Inflation Expectations and the Evolution of U.S. Inflation
  • Research Reports
    • State Foreclosure Prevention Efforts in New England: Mediation and Financial Assistance

New Issue: ENB FixedReset 4.00%+305 US PAY

April 10th, 2012

Enbridge Inc. has announced:

that it has entered into an agreement with a group of underwriters to sell 8 million cumulative redeemable preference shares, series J (the “Series J Preferred Shares”) at a price of US$25.00 per share for distribution to the public. Closing of the offering is expected on April 19, 2012.

The holders of Series J Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive fixed cumulative dividends at an annual rate of US$1.00 per share, payable quarterly on the 1st day of March, June, September and December, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Enbridge, yielding 4.00 per cent per annum, for the initial fixed rate period to but excluding June 1, 2017. The first quarterly dividend payment date is scheduled for September 1, 2012. The dividend rate will reset on June 1, 2017 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year United States Government bond yield plus 3.05 per cent. The Series J Preferred Shares are redeemable by Enbridge, at its option, on June 1, 2017 and on June 1 of every fifth year thereafter.

The holders of Series J Preferred Shares will have the right to convert their shares into cumulative redeemable preference shares, series K (the “Series K Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on June 1, 2017 and on June 1 of every fifth year thereafter. The holders of Series K Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating rate cumulative dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Enbridge, at a rate equal to the sum of the then 3-month US Treasury Bill rate plus 3.05 per cent.

The offering is being made only in Canada by means of a prospectus. Proceeds will be used to partially fund capital projects, to reduce existing indebtedness and for other general corporate purposes of the Corporation and its affiliates.

The syndicate of underwriters is led by Scotiabank.

As this issue is USD denominated, it will not be tracked by HIMIPref™.

Update, 2013-9-19: The symbol is ENB.PR.U

April 9, 2012

April 10th, 2012

The US jobs number was disappointing:

Employers in the U.S. added fewer jobs than forecast in March, underscoring Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke’s concern that recent gains may not be sustained without a pickup in growth.

The 120,000 increase in payrolls, the fewest in five months, followed a revised 240,000 gain in February that was bigger than first estimated, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. The March increase was less than the most pessimistic forecast in a Bloomberg News survey in which the median estimate called for a 205,000 rise. Unemployment fell to 8.2 percent, the lowest since January 2009, from 8.3 percent.

Stock lending can be profitable!

The other day on Bloomberg (the paid version), I came across several ETFs with incredibly rich dividends. One of them — Guggenheim’s Solar ETF (TAN/NYSE) — far outshined the others. TAN holds about 30 solar energy companies. Its dividend yield is 9.2%, reports Bloomberg and others. Indeed, its dividend of US$2.11, adjusted for a 1:10 reverse split, divided by its price of US$23.02 works out to 9.2%. But is that possible in what should be a high-growth sector?

Digging deeper, only seven of the companies in the ETF, representing about 28% of the total allocation, have ever paid a dividend. Two have postponed dividends for 2012 and another has cut its dividend by more than half. The weighted average yield on the seven companies is under 1%.

Since holdings can change every quarter, I also checked the holdings as of February 2011. The picture was the same: seven dividend payers with an average yield of below 1%.

Where then did most of TAN’s dividend come from? The answer, as revealed by the fund’s prospectus, is securities lending. Nearly 90% of TAN’s investment income for the 12 months ending last August came from lending about half its shares to short sellers.

Who needs retirement in Florida, when you can retire to sunny Spain?

Banks trying to offload billions of euros of property left on their hands by bankrupt developers are selling new apartments at rock-bottom prices with bargain-basement mortgage deals.

Santander, the eurozone’s largest bank, was responsible for the frenzy in Sesena. It offered two-bedroom apartments around a communal swimming pool for 65,000 euros (US$86,100), with 100% mortgages over 40 years, costing as little as 242 euros a month to service, about a sixth of the average Spaniard’s monthly income.

At the peak of the decade-long property boom that preceded the crash, similar apartments would have sold for at least twice that, and for properties it isn’t selling, a Santander mortgage would cover 80% of the property price over 25 years.

Those with an interest in YLO will be happy to learn there is a market for the assets:

AT&T Inc. (T) agreed to sell a majority stake in its Yellow Pages directory division to Cerberus Capital Management LP for about $950 million as part of an effort to dispose of units that are holding back revenue growth.

AT&T will receive $750 million in cash and a $200 million note, according to a statement from the Dallas-based phone carrier today. AT&T will keep a 47 percent stake in the business, which had about $3.3 billion in revenue in 2011.

Sales at the Yellow Pages business declined 16 percent last year, compared with revenue growth of about 2 percent for AT&T as a whole.

So $950-million for 53% of a print company with $3.3-billion revenue …. YLO had revenue of $1.3-billion in 2011, but a buyer will have to assume the debt …

Boyd Erman opines in the Globe:

But giving Cerberus the benefit of the assumption that its people have some idea of what they’re doing, the purchase has set a bar for what Yellow Media bondholders, who are now mobilizing, will expect to receive in a restructuring. While the valuation is not enough to create any real recoveries for stockholders, or even preferred shareholders, it is enough to suggest there are gains in store for bondholders gutsy enough to buy Yellow Media paper at distressed levels.

Broadly speaking, Yellow Media has about $1.5-billion of debt that has been trading at about 50 cents on the dollar. If there’s $1-billion of value, that suggests the bonds should be closer to 67 cents on the dollar.

Some bondholders argue there’s more. Applying market multiples to the free cash flow generated from Yellow Media’s old-line and online operations, some bondholders argue you can get to a range of $1.4-billion to $2.2-billion.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 5bp, FixedResets down 1bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 15bp. Volatility was negligible. Volume was ridiculously low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4740 % 2,406.2
FixedFloater 4.47 % 3.88 % 36,935 17.48 1 1.1899 % 3,489.6
Floater 3.00 % 3.01 % 47,568 19.72 3 -0.4740 % 2,598.0
OpRet 4.76 % 2.90 % 47,539 1.16 5 0.2304 % 2,505.4
SplitShare 5.25 % -5.45 % 82,164 0.69 4 -0.0594 % 2,691.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2304 % 2,290.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.48 % -0.39 % 89,170 0.15 23 0.0477 % 2,218.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.19 % 5.13 % 133,545 15.18 10 0.1578 % 2,405.4
FixedReset 5.02 % 3.06 % 187,413 2.20 67 -0.0132 % 2,391.6
Deemed-Retractible 4.97 % 3.90 % 199,280 3.06 46 -0.1540 % 2,301.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-09
Maturity Price : 17.51
Evaluated at bid price : 17.51
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-09
Maturity Price : 22.17
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 124,740 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-09
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 94,930 Desjardins crossed 90,400 at 25.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-09
Maturity Price : 23.45
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset 63,380 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-09
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.13
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset 45,865 Scotia Capital crossed 40,000 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset 31,638 RBC bought 15,000 from Scotia at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 27,366 TD crossed 25,000 at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.82
Bid-YTW : 2.43 %
There were 7 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.88 – 26.45
Spot Rate : 0.5700
Average : 0.3564

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.40 – 26.90
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.4069

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.40
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.95 – 26.29
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2697

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %

BNS.PR.J Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.80 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1332

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.04 – 52.49
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3839

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.04
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %

BNS.PR.N Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.25 – 26.49
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1765

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-29
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %

April 5, 2012

April 5th, 2012

Julie Dickson’s speech was not very interesting – just a shopping list of aspirations for a board. Of passing interest was:

This leads me to explain why OSFI’s draft guideline (B-20) on Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices and Procedures, which we made public on March 19th, begins with the statement that boards must establish real estate underwriting policies. In fact, most boards have already established such policies. This makes sense; housing is the largest asset class exposure of banks – almost 42 per cent of total bank assets.

While these policies will have to be updated to reflect the new guidance, going forward senior management will have to provide a declaration to the board that the financial institution is in compliance with the OSFI guideline. This was added because we had noticed cases where board approved polices were not being followed.

Seems to me that if I was on a board that set a policy and that policy was not followed, I’d simply ensure that somebody senior got fired at every board meeting until it did get followed. But perhaps that’s just another reason why I’m not on a big-shot board.

Another, related, reason is my antiquated idea that boards are in place to set policies and hire staff to carry them out. The modern view is that boards exist to provide jobs to unqualified women – despite that fact that it does not work:

A recent study released by the German central bank found that risk taking within the banking industry increases with more women on an executive board. The same goes for younger executives. In contrast, men who are graying at the temples and executives with Ph.D. degrees reduce the level of risk.

Tomorrow’s US jobs number is expected to be encouraging:

Employers probably added more than 200,000 workers to payrolls in March for a fourth straight month as U.S. companies gained confidence sales will keep improving, economists said before a government report today.

Hiring increased by 205,000 after rising by 227,000 in February, according to the median projection of 80 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News. The last time employment advanced at a similar pace for as many months was late 1999 into 2000. The jobless rate probably held at a three-year low of 8.3 percent.

Cowboys will have 45 minutes to settle their bets:

While stock markets around the world are shut for Good Friday, the Labor Department will publish its monthly employment report at 8:30 a.m. New York time. Equity traders will have 45 minutes to react, as trading of futures linked to the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index and Dow Jones Industrial Average will continue until 9:15 a.m. on CME Group Inc. (CME)’s Chicago Mercantile Exchange.

The Canadian jobs number was good:

Canada’s labour market has finally perked up after half a year in the doldrums as a commodities boom and a firmer U.S. economy give employers the confidence to hire.

The economy churned out 82,300 jobs last month, the most since 2008, with many of the positions created in full-time work. The hiring spree sent the country’s jobless rate down two notches to 7.2 per cent in March, matching the lowest rate seen in the recovery.

First National, proud issuer of FN.PR.A, was confirmed at Pfd-3 by DBRS:

DBRS has today confirmed the Senior Secured – Guaranteed Debt and Class A Preference Shares ratings of First National Financial Corporation (FNFC) at BBB and Pfd-3, respectively, and the Issuer Rating of First National Financial LP (FNFLP) at BBB; all trends remain Stable.

The ratings and trends reflect FNFC’s status as Canada’s largest non-bank mortgage originator, with just under $60 billion in mortgages under administration (MUA) as of December 31, 2011; its strong asset quality profile, with all assets secured by real estate and a substantial portion insured; and its high-quality, low-cost servicing capabilities.

The rating on FNFC’s Senior Secured – Guaranteed Debt is based on a senior guarantee from FNFLP and an Intercreditor Agreement between Computershare Trust Company of Canada as the debenture trustee and the lenders under a credit facility. The Intercreditor Agreement ranks the indebtedness created under the debentures equally and ratably with the indebtedness created under FNFLP’s credit facility.

It was another mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums winning 13bp, FixedResets off 2bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 11bp. Only one issue made it to the Performance Highlights table. Volume was pathetic.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1329 % 2,417.6
FixedFloater 4.52 % 3.92 % 37,353 17.38 1 -0.0951 % 3,448.6
Floater 2.99 % 3.01 % 46,771 19.73 3 0.1329 % 2,610.4
OpRet 4.93 % 3.42 % 68,027 1.17 6 0.0451 % 2,499.6
SplitShare 5.25 % -4.84 % 85,019 0.70 4 -0.0890 % 2,693.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0451 % 2,285.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.48 % -3.53 % 89,888 0.16 23 0.1273 % 2,217.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.20 % 5.17 % 135,476 15.18 10 0.0946 % 2,401.6
FixedReset 5.02 % 2.99 % 186,121 2.21 67 -0.0155 % 2,392.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.96 % 3.88 % 201,950 2.02 46 0.1088 % 2,305.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-05
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : -11.38 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Premium 86,210 Scotia crossed 45,000 at 25.40; TD crossed 25,000 at the same price. TD bought 11,000 from Nesbitt at 25.39.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 68,981 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-05
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium 20,965 RBC crossed 10,000 at 25.12.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-05
Maturity Price : 24.57
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
NA.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 20,945 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : -8.41 %
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 20,430 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.48
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 20,300 RBC crossed 12,000 at 27.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.01
Bid-YTW : 2.73 %
There were 12 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 17.71 – 19.00
Spot Rate : 1.2900
Average : 0.7519

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-05
Maturity Price : 17.71
Evaluated at bid price : 17.71
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %

BAM.PR.J OpRet Quote: 26.85 – 27.35
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3062

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.01 – 52.48
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3115

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.01
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %

SLF.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.25 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2686

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 21.01 – 21.59
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.5029

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-05
Maturity Price : 21.80
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %

SLF.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 24.15 – 24.40
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1810

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %

CSE.PR.A Downgraded to P-4(high) by S&P

April 5th, 2012

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • We are lowering our long-term corporate credit rating on Capstone Infrastructure Corp. to ‘BB+’ from ‘BBB-‘.
  • We are also lowering our global scale preferred stock rating on Capstone to ‘B+’ from ‘BB’, and our Canada scale preferred stock rating to ‘P-4(High)’ from ‘P-3’.
  • In addition, we are placing the ratings on the company on CreditWatch with developing implications.
  • The downgrade reflects our view that Capstone’s liquidity is ‘less-than-adequate’; as per our criteria, a company with ‘less-than-adequate’ liquidity cannot have a corporate credit rating higher than ‘BB+’.
  • We believe the CreditWatch resolution could result in a return to investment-grade status for Capstone.
  • Although we consider it unlikely, if the company is unable to either pay down or extend its C$119 million bank revolver maturing in June, a multinotch downgrade could occur.


Standard & Poor’s views the company’s revenues and cash flow from long-term power purchase agreements with provincial government agencies and investment-grade off-takers as stable. In addition, we believe there is a track record of sustained high availability and operating performance of Capstone’s generation assets. We believe that offsetting these strengths are modest asset and geographic diversity, recontracting risks for two of its material generating facilities, and our expectation that the company would increase debt in executing its growth strategy. Evidence of this includes the acquisition of Bristol Water Holdings UK Ltd. While we believe that this acquisition will help to stabilize revenue in the long term, its financing has challenged liquidity.

The company has outlined several initiatives to address its liquidity position. These include refinancing some of the hydro projects under MPT Hydro L.P. and using the net proceeds to reduce debt outstanding under the CPC facility; recapitalizing Varmevarden AB (a company, which Capstone purchased in March 2011, that owns and operates a portfolio of 11 district heating businesses in Sweden) and using proceeds to reduce the amount outstanding on the senior credit facility; and other options, including a new corporate credit facility. To date, the company has completed the Varmevarden refinancing and realized proceeds of approximately C$50 million, which it used to pay down a portion of the senior credit facility.

We believe the CreditWatch resolution, which we expect to come within the next 90 days, could result in a return to investment-grade status for Capstone. Although we consider it unlikely, if the company is unable to either pay down or extend its C$119 million bank revolver maturing in June, a multinotch downgrade could occur.

Capstone is not rated by DBRS. CSE.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it dived following a common dividend warning. CSE.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Update, 2016-2-24: S&P later affirmed the company and revised the outlook to Stable from Positive:

    •We are also affirming our ratings on the company, including our ‘BB+’ long-term corporate credit rating.

  • •The outlook revision reflects our assessment of Capstone’s stable cash flow.
  • •In addition, Capstone has taken on some additional parent-level debt in conjunction with its purchase of Renewable Energy Developers Inc., which has negatively affected parent-level credit metrics.


The outlook revision reflects our view of Capstone’s stable, albeit reduced cash flow resulting from the new contract for its power plant at Cardinal, and the company’s continued cash flow that is commensurate with the ‘BB+’ rating.

“In addition, Capstone has taken on some additional parent-level debt in conjunction with its purchase of Renewable Energy Developers Inc., which has negatively affected parent-level credit metrics,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Stephen Goltz.

April 4, 2012

April 5th, 2012

There are rumours about Rona, too:

In corporate news, Rona Inc. (TSX:RON) has denied that the company is up for sale after stock in the home renovation retailer jumped more than 12 per cent in heavy trading Tuesday on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

The Quebec-based retailer issued the denial in response to movement in its stock after Robert Hull, chief financial officer of Lowe’s Companies Inc., said his U.S.-based rival might be interested if Rona put itself up for sale. On Wednesday, Rona shares lost 42 cents, or four per cent, to $10.06.

The pain in Spain is starting to gain:

Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy said Spain’s situation is one of “extreme difficulty” and signaled that his budget cuts are less painful than a bailout would be, as demand for the nation’s debt slumped at an auction.

Spain sold 2.59 billion euros ($3.4 billion) of bonds today, just above the minimum amount it planned for the auction and below the 3.5 billion-euro maximum target. The average yield on the bonds due in October 2016, which act as the five-year benchmark, rose to 4.319 percent from 3.376 percent at last month’s sale. Secondary-market yields rose to 4.48 percent.

Spain’s 10-year borrowing costs are approaching the levels seen in December, before the European Central Bank said it would make unlimited three-year loans to bank.

The BoC has published a paper by Bruno Feunou, Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Abderrahim Taamouti and Roméo Tédongap titled Risk Premium, Variance Premium and the Maturity Structure of Uncertainty:

Expected returns vary when investors face time-varying investment opportunities. Longrun risk models (Bansal and Yaron 2004) and no-arbitrage affine models (Duffie, Pan, and Singleton 2000) emphasize sources of risk that are not observable to the econometrician. We show that, for both classes of models, the term structure of risk
implicit in option prices can reveal these risk factors ex-ante. Empirically, we construct the variance term structure implied in SP500 option prices. The variance term structure reveal two important drivers of the bond premium, the equity premium, and the variance premium, jointly. We also consider the term structure of higher-order risks as measured by skewness and kurtosis and still find that two factors are sufficient to summarize the information content from the term structure of risks. Overall, our results bode well for the ability of structural models to explain risk-returns trade-offs across different markets using only very few sources of risk.

Somebody complained to me today that they were getting spam from my company domain, himivest.com. So I found a good article about eMail spoofing:

When this simplistic method is used, you can tell where the mail originated (for example, that it did not come from thewhitehouse.com) by checking the actual mail headers. Many e-mail clients don’t show these by default. In Outlook, open the message and then click View | Options to see the headers, as shown in Figure 3.

In this example, you can see that the message actually originated from a computer named XDREAM and was sent from the mail.augustmail.com SMTP server.

Unfortunately, even the headers don’t always tell you the truth about where the message came from. Spammers and other spoofers often use open relays to send their bogus or malicious messages. An open relay is an SMTP server that is not correctly configured and so allows third-parties to send e-mail through it that is not sent from nor to a local user. In that case, the “Received from” field in the header only points you to the SMTP server that was victimized.

BAM issued ten year CAD notes at 3.95% to pay off a maturing USD obligation.

Enbridge Gas Distribution, proud issuer of ENB.PR.A, ENB.PR.B, ENB.PR.D, ENB.PR.F and ENB.PR.H, was confirmed at Pfd-2(low) by DBRS:

DBRS has today confirmed the Unsecured Debentures & Medium-Term Notes, Commercial Paper, and Cumulative & Cumulative Redeemable Convertible Preferred Share ratings of Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. (EGD or the Company) at “A”, R-1 (low) and Pfd-2 (low), respectively, all with Stable trends. The rating confirmation is based on EGD’s low business risk operations, stable regulatory environment in Ontario, strong franchise area and stable financial profile.

EGD’s financial profile remained stable in 2011, with all credit metrics being commensurate with DBRS’s “A” rating guidelines. DBRS notes that the Company requires significant liquidity to finance working capital (mostly gas inventory for winter distributions). Given the low gas price environment, EGD’s liquidity remains adequate to meet its operational needs. Over the medium term, moderate cash flow deficits are expected, due to a large capex program. However, EGD’s current debt leverage is well below the regulatory capital structure of 36% equity, providing EGD with significant financial flexibility. DBRS expects the Company to remain prudent in funding its cash shortfalls and maintaining its credit metrics within the “A” rating category. In August 2011, the Company financed its $66 million acquisition of 15-megawatt (MW) solar power assets from its parent, Enbridge Inc., with equity, which was viewed as positive to the financial profile.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums flat, FixedResets gaining 9bp and DeemedRetractibles down 3bp. Volatility was low. Volume was slightly below average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.17%, equivalent to 6.72% interest at the current conversion factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.6%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 215bp, a dramatic drop from the 230bp reported March 30.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5476 % 2,414.4
FixedFloater 4.52 % 3.91 % 38,876 17.39 1 -2.1860 % 3,451.9
Floater 2.99 % 3.00 % 46,437 19.76 3 -0.5476 % 2,606.9
OpRet 4.93 % 3.59 % 66,569 1.20 6 0.1614 % 2,498.5
SplitShare 5.24 % -5.34 % 86,294 0.70 4 0.0099 % 2,695.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1614 % 2,284.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.46 % 1.37 % 90,986 0.16 23 -0.0008 % 2,214.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.19 % 5.17 % 134,456 15.10 10 0.1120 % 2,399.3
FixedReset 5.02 % 2.98 % 191,208 2.20 67 0.0942 % 2,392.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.97 % 3.88 % 205,549 2.02 46 -0.0315 % 2,302.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -2.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-04
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 21.03
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-04
Maturity Price : 17.60
Evaluated at bid price : 17.60
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-01
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.59
Bid-YTW : 0.48 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 118,797 Desjardins crossed blocks of 48,200 and 30,400, both at 26.00. TD crossed 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-04
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.78
Bid-YTW : -0.79 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Premium 78,659 Nesbitt sold 10,000 to TD at 25.41, then sold blocks o 10,000 and 19,800 to Scotia at 25.40, and finally crossed 29,700 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.38
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 63,030 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-04
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 55,160 TD crossed 48,500 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 2.60 %
RY.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 48,675 Desjardins crossed 40,000 at 25.79.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 47,630 Desjardins crossed 40,000 at 26.12.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 21.03 – 21.60
Spot Rate : 0.5700
Average : 0.4184

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-04
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 21.03
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.04 – 26.55
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.4202

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.04
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %

BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.55 – 25.84
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2091

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-28
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 1.29 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.25 – 26.70
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3759

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %

SLF.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.35 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1793

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.36 – 26.65
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2233

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %

YLO: The Jostling Starts, the Rumours Swirl

April 4th, 2012

There are rumours of restructuring jostling at YLO:

Yellow Media’s creditors want to take over the troubled phone directory company in a bid to salvage their investments.

The company’s senior-ranking bondholders organized a call last week to discuss a plan to encourage the company to restructure through the Canadian Business Corporations Act, according to a bondholder who participated in the call. The result would be a debt-for-equity swap that would give the bondholders ownership control.

There’s more colour in a later story:

“If, for some reason, we get paid in equity, it’s never optimal, but it’s probably acceptable because it’s got a value,” said Paul Gardner, a portfolio manager at Avenue Investment Management who participated in the bondholder discussions.

They also believe that it is better to put together a plan before the Montreal company hits a financial wall. “It’s much better to have everything in place in an orderly restructuring than putting a gun to the debt holders’ heads,” Mr. Gardner said, adding that it can get “nasty in court.”

Other investors, however, are skeptical. Glen Bradford, chief executive officer of ARM Holdings, which holds about 250,000 of the company’s preferred shares, said bondholders “purposefully” leaked news of their meetings to increase the value of their holdings.

“As an equity holder, I am still failing to see how the creditors have any say in the matter as long as the company continues to meet its debt obligations as they come due,” Mr. Bradford said.

After analyzing the company’s finances under several scenarios, RBC Dominion Securities analyst Andrew Calder determined that it would be able to pay its debts through 2013. By 2014, however, he said the company would likely need to refinance to meet its obligations.

There doesn’t seem to be much on the web about Glen Bradford or ARM Holdings by way of performance numbers, but I dug up his resume. Avenue Investment Management commented in their latest performance report:

Another reason for the relative underperformance of the Avenue Bond portfolio was our exposure to Yellow Media Bonds. However, we still believe that we will earn an enhanced rate of return between now and maturity in 2015. We believe that over the long term the $500-$600 million of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) they make per year will allow them to pay down debt more quickly which should result in a higher valuation for the bond.

Avenue Investment makes GIPS compliant composites available on request, which is a good sign, but are a bit shy regarding putting numbers on the web.

It’s way too early to draw any conclusions regarding the status of preferred shares in a restructuring, but the mention of using the Canadian Business Corporations Act implies a few things:

  • They’re not thinking of a debt-for-equity swap alone (e.g., a tender) as that wouldn’t require judicial involvement
  • the plans involve the rights of the preferred shareholders
  • Preferred shareholders will get a vote

Norton Rose points out:

In Mega Brands, the company sought to restructure the company’s debt while injecting $225 million in new capital by public and private financing. In exchange for their consent, guaranteed creditors, debentureholders and shareholders were to receive a
combination of cash payments, shares in a new Mega Brands company and warrants.

In Mega Brands, the Court’s reasoning was twofold. First, it had no issue with the applicant utilizing a section 192 CBCA arrangement to transfer the quasi-totality of property from one company to another, as this is commonly done under CBCA plans of arrangement. Second, relying on a Policy Statement of Industry Canada” and on judicial precedents (including Abitibi), the Court concluded that section 192 of the CBCA was an appropriate way to restructure debt.

Second, the company seeking an arrangement must not be insolvent.

In Mega Brands, the Court found that the arrangement was fair and reasonable. Specifically, the Court pointed out the following factors as evidence that the arrangement was fair and reasonable:” a fair negotiation process took place; an independent committee of the I3oard of Directors was appointed; a fairness opinion was rendered by a reputable financial institution stating that the arrangement was fair, from a financial point of view,
to Mega and the shareholders, and that the holders of secured debt and convertible debentures and the shareholders would be in a better financial position under the recapitalization than if Mega were liquidated; the Board of Directors unanimously approved and recommended the arrangement; the full disclosure of the arrangement was set out in the circular; approval was given by the shareholders and lenders as required by the interim order; and finally, no one filed a Notice of Appearance or contestation with respect to the final order hearing.

I pointed out to a journalist today that YLO.PR.A and YLO.PR.B can be converted to common at the option of company without getting any permissions at all, judicial or otherwise – and if I was a debt-holder, I would make such a conversion a pre-condition of any arrangement. YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D holders are in a better position to negotiate.

And, of course, there is no guarantee that the company will even talk to the bondholder group, or that any proposal will be made to security holders if they do talk.

April 3, 2012

April 4th, 2012

The David Berry saga continues to drag on:

A hearing was originally scheduled before a Hearing Panel of the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC), in the matter of David Berry for April 10 to April 23, 2012. The hearing was adjourned to June 13, 2012.

The hearing concerns allegations that Mr. Berry solicited client orders during the distribution of new issues by Scotia Capital contrary to UMIR 7.7(5) (as it existed prior to May 2005), and conducted off-marketplace trades that were not printed on a marketplace or recognized exchange as required by UMIR 6.4.

Assiduous Readers will remember that David Berry was a superb trader of preferred shares, who was assigned significant capital by Scotia at a time when the market was starved for liquidity. He made ridiculous potfulls of money for the bank and in so doing, a pretty good pile for himself. The bank’s executives got upset that a mere peon was making so much and, when he wouldn’t accept a voluntary pay cut, unleashed an army of accountants and lawyers on his trading to uncover instances where a rule had been broken – I have also heard that clients were swept up in this witchhunt and required to cooperate voluntarily with the investigation as a condition of doing business with Scotia.

Naturally, they found a few picayune transgressions, pretended to be shocked and fired him. He’s suing for $100-million. IIROC is an eager participant in this charade.

Royal Bank is scooping up full control of RBC-Dexia:

Royal Bank of Canada (RY-T57.04-1.70-2.89%) is buying the 50-per-cent stake in RBC Dexia Investor Services that it doesn’t already own from its struggling European partner.

Canada’s largest bank said Tuesday morning it will purchase the 50 per cent stake of RBC Dexia partnership from Banque Internationale à Luxembourg SA for $1.1-billion in cash.

The deal will give RBC full control of the European business, which advises institutional investors and administers large pensions and investment funds. The assets went on the block last year when Banque Internationale à Luxembourg, formerly known as Dexia Banque Internationale, was hit hard by the European banking crisis and forced to jettison assets to stabilize its operations.

DBRS comments:

RBC will take an after-tax charge of approximately $200 million, with $170 million (after tax) of that owing primarily to a write-down of intangibles as a result of revaluing the 50% of RBC Dexia that is already owns. The other $30 million (after tax) represents RBC’s share of a loss related to an exchange of securities at RBC Dexia.

Courtesy of the US housing market, here’s another illustration of the law of unintended consequences:

As many as 1.25 million of America’s least cared for homes are headed for auction after a year-long probe into foreclosure practices kept them off the market.

Sales of repossessed properties probably will rise 25 percent this year from 1 million in 2011, according to Moody’s Analytics Inc. Prices for the homes could drop as much as 10 percent because they deteriorated as they were held in reserve during investigations by state officials resolved in February, according to RealtyTrac Inc. That month, 43 percent of foreclosures were delinquent for two or more years, from a 21 percent share in 2010, according to Lender Processing Services Inc. in Jacksonville, Florida.

Homes stockpiled less than a year sell for about 35 percent below the value set by lenders, according to a March 15 report by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. At two years, the loss is close to 60 percent.

The Fed’s confidence in the US economy is increasing:

The Federal Reserve is holding off on increasing monetary accommodation unless the U.S. economic expansion falters or prices rise at a rate slower than its 2 percent target.

“A couple of members indicated that the initiation of additional stimulus could become necessary if the economy lost momentum or if inflation seemed likely to remain below” 2 percent, according to minutes of their March 13 meeting released today in Washington. That contrasts with the assessment at the FOMC’s January meeting in which some Fed officials saw current conditions warranting additional action “before long.”

There are many pairs of words that, when seen in the same sentence, alert the reader that some insane logic based on infantile assumptions is about to result in nonsensical verbiage. One such pair is “Privacy” and “Commissioner”. Another is “Internet” and “Regulators”:

Google Inc. (GOOG), owner of the world’s most-popular search engine, misled Australian consumers in 2007 by including paid advertisements from competitors in search results for businesses, an appeal court ruled.

The Federal Court of Appeal in Sydney today overturned a lower court decision and ordered the Mountain View, California- based company to set up a protocol to avoid repeating the practice.

The ACCC appealed, citing four advertisements, including those that showed up in a search for the Australian company Harvey World Travel, that it said Google should have known would contravene the law.

A search for a business name would include results from competitors who paid to have their ads placed in a column beside the search results.

A user who sought information about Harvey World Travel was instead given the web address of one of its competitors, the panel said.

“Google tells the user that the URL provided below is the contact information about Harvey World Travel,” the panel wrote. “The enquiry is made of Google and it is Google’s response which is misleading.”

So my question is: why does it matter whether Google’s respons is misleading, assuming that a rational person would consider it misleading, which is by no means obvious? The user isn’t paying Google anything for the service, zip, zero, zilch! How does Google owe some kind of duty to the user? As far as I’m concerned, Google can answer queries of any type with pictures of naked women without breaching any duty; if they aren’t pretty enough, I’ll use a different search engine.

If any user of the Internet can run crying boo-hoo-hoo to the courts to get something fixed – and, doubtless, to get some kind of pecuniary benefit out of the whimpering – I’ve got a long list of websites that I know contain demonstrably false statements about preferred shares …

It was another positive day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 10bp, and both FixedResets and DeemedRetractibles gaining 12bp. Volatility was good, but surprisingly skewed to the downside. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3950 % 2,427.7
FixedFloater 4.42 % 3.83 % 38,772 17.59 1 -0.0465 % 3,529.0
Floater 2.97 % 3.00 % 46,933 19.76 3 -0.3950 % 2,621.3
OpRet 4.94 % 3.89 % 67,518 1.20 6 -0.1611 % 2,494.5
SplitShare 5.24 % -5.32 % 87,088 0.70 4 0.3525 % 2,695.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1611 % 2,281.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.46 % 1.10 % 92,358 0.16 23 0.0994 % 2,214.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.19 % 5.21 % 136,524 15.12 10 0.2246 % 2,396.6
FixedReset 5.01 % 3.01 % 190,426 2.22 67 0.1175 % 2,390.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.96 % 3.93 % 206,753 2.02 46 0.1164 % 2,303.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-03
Maturity Price : 23.97
Evaluated at bid price : 24.26
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-03
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-03
Maturity Price : 17.55
Evaluated at bid price : 17.55
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.87
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-03
Maturity Price : 22.48
Evaluated at bid price : 22.85
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-03
Maturity Price : 22.45
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 167,400 Recent new issue
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-03
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 124,756 Recent new issue
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-03
Maturity Price : 24.59
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 5.52 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset 55,895 Recent new issue
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-03
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
ENB.PR.D FixedReset 37,485 TD crosssed 27,000 at 25.54.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 29,090 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2012-05-03
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 6.72 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium 28,806 RBC crossed 23,900 at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.66
Bid-YTW : -4.04 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ENB.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 25.29 – 25.74
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3145

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-04-03
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %

PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.41 – 25.76
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2527

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-03
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : -1.86 %

TD.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.56 – 26.81
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1544

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.56
Bid-YTW : 2.65 %

TD.PR.S FixedReset Quote: 26.05 – 26.29
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1522

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 2.46 %

RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.92 – 27.20
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.2105

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.92
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.00 – 26.39
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.3217

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %