Issue Comments

BPO to Reshuffle Assets, Become Pure Office Play

Brookfield Properties has announced:

a strategic repositioning plan to transform itself into a global pure-play office property company. The plan includes the acquisition of an interest in a significant portfolio of premier office properties in Australia from Brookfield Asset Management (BAM: NYSE, TSX, Euronext) as well as the divestment of Brookfield Properties’ residential land and housing business.

Brookfield Properties has agreed to enter into a transaction with Brookfield Asset Management whereby Brookfield Properties will pay Brookfield Asset Management A$1.6 billion (US$1.4 billion) for an interest in 16 premier Australian office properties comprising 8 million square feet in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth which are 99% leased. The properties have a total value of A$3.8 billion (US$3.4 billion).

Brookfield Properties will fund the transaction from available liquidity of US$1.3 billion and from a US$750 million subordinate bridge acquisition facility from Brookfield Asset Management, which will be repaid from the completion of some or all of the following: asset sales, including a sell down of Brookfield Properties’ equity interest in its publicly-listed company Brookfield Office Properties Canada (TSX: BOX.UN), or other financing or capital activities.

A supplemental information package relating to this transaction is available on Brookfield Properties’ website at www.brookfieldproperties.com.

As a further step in the strategy of converting Brookfield Properties into a global pure play office company, the company announced that it intends to divest of its residential land and housing division. To this end, Brookfield Properties intends to commence discussions with Brookfield Homes Corporation (NYSE: BHS) regarding the possible merger of these operations with Brookfield Homes. Should the merger proceed, Brookfield Properties’ equity interest in the residential business would be converted into a listed security in the merged entity which Brookfield Properties would then dispose of through an offering to its shareholders. Brookfield Asset Management would commit to acquire any shares of the merged entity that are not otherwise subscribed for in the offering, thereby ensuring that Brookfield Properties will successfully dispose of its residential interests and receive full proceeds.

The pricing supplement is titled Australia Office Portfolio Transaction and is of great interest:

BPO’s interest in the Portfolio will be acquired through a Total Return Swap entitling BPO to the net cash flows and any changes in the value of the properties

  • This structure preserves the benefit of property-level financing and will allow for efficient transfer of this Portfolio at a future date into a different ownership entity, e.g. public vehicle or private fund in order to continue BPO’s asset management strategy
  • BPO will be property manager for the portfolio and will make or approve all significant decisions relating to the properties, including refinancingsand other decisions relating to the property debt
  • BPO will be responsible for additional capital requirements and will be entitled to any proceeds from refinancings from the properties
  • BPO will have an option to acquire the properties at anytime

The total return swap concept is fascinating, but I haven’t yet thought through all the implications, particularly since the contract is with the parent.

On the whole, the deal seems to me to be a continuation of the basic Brookfield philosophy of accumulating assets at the parent level and then pushing them into subsidiaries; attracting co-investors and increasing (non-recourse!) leverage along the way. It hasn’t been too long since they last did this, with the BPP conversion to a REIT.

BPO has several series of preferreds outstandng: BPO.PR.F, BPO.PR.H, BPO.PR.I, BPO.PR.J, BPO.PR.K, BPO.PR.L and BPO.PR.N.

Update: This is credit-neutral, according to DBRS:

The rating confirmation also takes into consideration that, from a financial risk perspective, the Acquisition is expected to have a neutral impact on the Company’s balance sheet ratios. DBRS expects Brookfield to fund the Acquisition with available liquidity, including un-drawn bank facilities ($788 million) and a cash balance ($475 million) totalling approximately $1.3 billion and from a $750 million bridge facility provided by BAM. Over the next several quarters, DBRS expects Brookfield to repay this bridge facility with a combination of proceeds from the following: a sell-down of the Company’s interest in Brookfield Office Properties Canada (the REIT; of which the Company currently owns a 91% interest), asset sales and other capital activities. As a result, DBRS estimates that the Company’s debt-to-capital ratio will remain close to 55% (including preferred shares) and EBITDA interest coverage should modestly improve to the 2.35 times range (including capitalized interest). This level of interest coverage remains at the low end of the range for the current rating category. However, DBRS takes comfort in the fact that Brookfield has made good progress in improving its overall financial flexibility position and that office fundamentals in the Company’s core markets are showing signs of improvement.

Overall, DBRS believes that the Acquisition complements Brookfield’s existing high-quality office portfolio and offers an immediate and sizeable presence in a new market. Over time, DBRS expects Brookfield to grow this platform, which should further benefit leasing initiatives and tenant retention rates.

Market Action

July 29, 2010

The Europeans are taking a look at High Frequency Trading:

High-frequency trading will be investigated by regulators to “better understand any risks,” Europe’s top market watchdog said in a report on proposed industry rules.

A planned European Union market regulator should also have the power to set standards for the tools used by high-frequency traders, such as the practice of placing computer servers close to trading venues to speed up market access, the Committee of European Securities Regulators told the European Commission.

Powers for the proposed European regulator should keep pace “with new technological advances, increasingly fragmented equity markets” and “shortcomings” in post-trade information, Sally Dewar, a managing director at the U.K. Financial Services Authority, said in an e-mailed statement today.

There’s nothing wrong with them familiarizing themselves with the issue – the rules-makers should know how the game is played! – but the Europeans have come up with so much wierd stuff lately that it will be most interesting to see what comes of it.

The bill to encourage banks to extend small-business credit has stalled in the Senate:

Senate Republicans blocked a measure that would cut taxes and ease credit for small businesses, saying they objected that Democrats refused to consider their amendments to extend expiring tax breaks.

The Senate voted 58-42 today to end debate on the bill, falling short of the 60 votes required to consider the legislation for passage.

The legislation was faulted by Republicans such as Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama for being a government rescue similar to the $700 billion bank bailout of 2008. The program might induce banks to make risky loans, lawmakers said.

“The lack of credit for small businesses is a problem that needs to be addressed,” Shelby said during Senate debate last week. “I do not, however, believe that we should try and solve this problem with another expensive and bureaucratic government program.”

There will be congressional hearings into Basel III, which should satisfy my desire to understand the changes better. I mean, we’re certainly not going to see any discussion by OSFI or the Ottawa Mickey Mouse League, are we?

Christopher Dodd and Barney Frank, authors of the U.S. financial overhaul, plan hearings on the status of global talks to revise bank-capital standards amid worries that proposed rules are being watered down.

The Senate Banking Committee, chaired by Dodd, will hold the discussions on the Basel process in September, said Sean Oblack, a spokesman for the Connecticut Democrat. Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who heads the House Financial Services Committee, also plans to hold a hearing on the subject, said spokesman Steven Adamske. Neither panel has set a date nor decided who will be asked to testify.

Say what you like about what comes out of Congress – and I do! – the research that goes into these hearings is first-rate.

TD Bank has issued 5-year covered bonds in USD at 2.20%:

DBRS has today finalized the rating of AAA on the Covered Bonds, Series 1 (the Covered Bonds) issued under The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD) EUR 10 billion Global Public Sector Covered Bond Programme (the Programme). The Covered Bonds (USD 2 billion) have a coupon rate of 2.20% and a hard-bullet maturity date of July 29, 2015.

The ratings are based on several factors. First, the Covered Bonds are senior unsecured direct obligations of TD, which is the second largest bank in Canada and rated AA and R-1 (high) with a Stable trend by DBRS. Second, in addition to a general recourse to TD’s assets, the Covered Bonds are supported by a diversified collateral pool (the Cover Pool) of prime credit home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) insured by Canada Mortgage & Housing Corporation (CMHC). CMHC is an agent of Her Majesty in right of Canada and is rated AAA by DBRS. The Cover Pool was approximately $10.7 billion as of April 19, 2010. Third, the Covered Bonds benefit from several structural features, such as a reserve fund, when applicable; a minimum rating requirement for swap counterparties, servicer and cash manager; and, lastly, the funding of pre-maturity liquidity if TD’s rating falls below certain thresholds.

Little of interest happened on reasonably good volume today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 2bp and FixedResets about as close to flat as you can get.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.88 % 2.96 % 23,452 20.16 1 0.0000 % 2,078.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0914 % 3,148.4
Floater 2.52 % 2.15 % 39,083 21.96 4 -0.0914 % 2,244.0
OpRet 4.89 % 3.57 % 92,120 0.34 11 -0.0814 % 2,339.0
SplitShare 6.22 % 1.71 % 76,900 0.08 2 0.0429 % 2,229.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0814 % 2,138.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.93 % 5.66 % 106,845 1.79 4 -0.1871 % 1,939.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.82 % 5.89 % 184,222 14.05 73 0.0155 % 1,861.7
FixedReset 5.32 % 3.47 % 312,437 3.43 47 0.0016 % 2,225.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -2.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-29
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.30
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-29
Maturity Price : 21.31
Evaluated at bid price : 21.31
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.H OpRet 59,500 TD crossed blocks of 40,000 and 18,600 shares, both at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 1.81 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 44,685 TD crossed blocks of 15,000 and 11,000 shares, both at 27.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 43,723 Nesbitt crossed 15,200 at 21.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-29
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 35,085 TD crossed 20,000 at 27.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.55
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 27,030 RBC crossed 20,000 at 27.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 26,672 TD crossed 15,900 at 27.91.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.78
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

FFN.PR.A Releases Semi-Annual Report

Financial 15 Split Corp. II has released its semi-annual statements to May 31, 2010.

Dividend receipts declined to about $1.3-million in 1H10 from about $2.1-million in 1H09, while expenses rose to $461,000 from $390,000 due to higher valuations and a small expense for Service Fees. Accordingly, Income Coverage for the Preferred Shares dropped to 0.6-:1 in 1H10 from 1.0+:1 in 1H09.

FFN.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the Capital Unit Distribution was suspended in June (hah! No Service Fees to pay this quarter!). FFN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

FTN.PR.A Releases Semi-Annual Report

Financial 15 Split Corp. has announced:

that its semi-annual financial statements and management report of fund performance for the period ended May 31, 2010 are now available at www.sedar.com and the Company’s website at www.financial15.com.

The Report (to 2010-5-31) states:

During April 2010, the Company issued 1,980,000 Class A and Preferred shares at a unit price of $20 for total net proceeds after the payment of agents fees of $37.5 million. As a result of this offering, one time issue costs and agents fees in connection with the offering increased the expense ratio during the period. The Company did not immediately invest the proceeds into the financial services stocks as reflected by the higher cash position as at May 31,2010 thus benefiting from the opportunity to purchase the core stocks at lower levels than those in April.

Net investment income was $1.1-million, while distributions on preferred shares amounted to $2.1-million, so income coverage for the six months to May 31, 2010, was 0.5+:1, a huge reduction from the 1.2+:1 recorded in 1H09.

Cash on the balance sheet represented 17% of total assets, but this does not explain the sharp decline in income coverage – the secondary offering closed in mid-April, so the cash was only there for about six weeks.

Instead, it appears that several other factors had dominance:

  • Dividend receipts declined from about $3-million to about $2-million
  • Management and Service fees increased to about $670,000 in 1H10 from about $340,000 (net) in 1H09

Note 6 to the financials reads in part:

The Company is responsible for all expenses incurred in connection with the operation and administration of the Company, including, but not limited to, ongoing custodian, transfer agent, legal and audit expenses.

Pursuant to the administration agreement, the Manager is entitled to an administration fee payable monthly in arrears at an annual rate of 0.10% of the transactional net assets of the Company, which includes the outstanding Preferred shares, calculated as at each monthly valuation date and an amount equal to the service fee payable to dealers on the Class A shares at a rate of 0.50% per annum. No service fee will be paid in any calendar quarter if regular dividends are not paid to holders of Class A shares in respect of each month in such calendar quarter.

Pursuant to the terms of the investment management agreement, Quadravest is entitled to a base management fee payable in arrears at an annual rate equal to 0.65% of the transactional net assets of the Company, which include the outstanding Preferred shares, calculated as at each monthly valuation date. In addition, Quadravest is entitled to receive a performance fee subject to the achievement of certain pre-established total return thresholds.

Total management fees of $519,631 (May 31, 2009-$373,315), incurred during the period, include the administration fee and base management fee. No performance fees were paid in 2010 or 2009.

Clearly, the Service Fee increased because the capital unitholders received all their dividends in the first half so all Service Fees were payable. In 1H09, no service fees were payable – there was even a rather odd recovery!

Management fees increased due to the increase in assets of the fund.

So it looks like the expenses are probably here to stay – provided the NAV holds up above $15.00 and the capital unit distributions are made – but it is rather odd that dividend receipts have declined so precipituously despite the increase in assets. At some point it will be most interesting to attempt to reconcile these data with the disclosed holdings – how much of this is the result of actual dividend cuts for the common shares held, and how much due to selection of lower yielding securities?

However, the income coverage should improve to some extent in the second half as the cash on the balance sheet is invested.

Issue Comments

FFH.PR.G Settles

This should have been posted yesterday, July 28. Sorry!

Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. has announced that it:

has completed its previously announced public offering of Preferred Shares, Series G (the “Series G Shares”) in Canada. As a result of the underwriters’ exercising in full their option to purchase an additional 2,000,000 Series G Shares, Fairfax has issued 10,000,000 Series G Shares for gross proceeds of $250 million. Net proceeds of the issue, after commissions and expenses, are approximately $242 million.

Fairfax intends to use the net proceeds of the offering to augment its cash position, to increase short term investments and marketable securities held at the holding company level, to retire outstanding debt and other corporate obligations from time to time, and for general corporate purposes.

The Series G Shares were sold through a syndicate of Canadian underwriters led by BMO Capital Markets, CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and Scotia Capital, and that also included TD Securities, National Bank Financial, Cormark Securities, GMP Securities, Canaccord Genuity, Desjardins Securities and HSBC Securities (Canada).

FFH.PR.G is a FixedReset, 5.00%+256, announced July 20.

Vital statistics are:

FFH.PR.G FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-28
Maturity Price : 24.80
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %

FFH.PR.G will be tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

NPP.PR.A Settles

This should have been posted yesterday, July 28. Sorry!

Northland Power Income Fund has announced:

the closing of the previously announced offering of Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 1 (the “Series 1 Preferred Shares”) by Northland Power Preferred Equity Inc. (the “Corporation”), an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of the Fund. The Series 1 Preferred Shares are guaranteed by the Fund. The Corporation issued a total of 6 million Series 1 Preferred Shares at $25.00 per share for gross proceeds of $150 million. The offering was made on a bought deal basis through a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC.

The Series 1 Preferred Shares commence trading on the TSX today under the symbol NPP.PR.A.

The Corporation intends to loan the net proceeds of the offering to NPIF Holdings L.P., a subsidiary of the Fund, which will use the funds to: (i) finance the remaining $51 million equity infusion in North Battleford Power L.P.; (ii) finance the $26 million equity infusion in Mount-Louis Wind L.P.; and (iii) repay certain non-recourse project debt in the amount of $40 million. The remainder of the loan will be used by NPIF Holdings L.P. for general corporate purposes.

NPP.PR.A is a FixedReset, 5.25%+280, announced July 6.

Vital statistics are:

NPP.PR.A FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %

NPP.PR.A will be tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Market Action

July 28, 2010

The migration from bank prop desks to hedge funds is continuing:

Citigroup Inc. may move a team of proprietary traders into its hedge-fund unit, one of at least three alternatives the U.S. bank is studying to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act, people briefed on the matter said.

Traders in the Citi Principal Strategies unit, led by Sutesh Sharma, would be reassigned to Citi Capital Advisors, which mostly oversees money for outside investors, said the people, speaking anonymously because the talks are preliminary. The bank would set up the traders as hedge-fund managers and seed their funds, then raise money from outside investors to redeem its stakes, the people said.

Good thing? Bad thing? Who knows? Who cares? This particular Volcker Rule is simply knee-jerk feel-goodism and the implications have never been studied.

Maybe the Citigroup guys can move to Singapore!

Singapore hedge fund startups are on the rise after the central bank approved new rules that didn’t impose a licensing requirement on most funds.

Seven new hedge funds set up in May and June, according to Eurekahedge Pte, after the Monetary Authority of Singapore said in April that small funds can keep operating without a license as part of its review.

“Singapore did not shoot itself in the foot by putting up proposals that will kill off the business,” said Kher Sheng Lee, a senior associate in the financial services group at Philadelphia-based law firm Dechert LLP in Hong Kong. “While some places are moving towards over-regulation with rigid rules and increase in compliance costs, Singapore has attempted to go for sensible regulation.”

Singapore is vying with Hong Kong for a slice of the global $1.7 trillion hedge-fund industry as the region’s growth leads the world. Singapore has made it easier for hedge funds to set up shop on the island than in other Asian cities such as Hong Kong, where hedge-fund managers face the same licensing requirements as mutual-fund managers.

Plans are being drawn up for Bernanke’s hagiography:

In a new paper, the economists argue that without the Wall Street bailout, the bank stress tests, the emergency lending and asset purchases by the Federal Reserve, and the Obama administration’s fiscal stimulus program, the nation’s gross domestic product would be about 6.5 percent lower this year.

In addition, there would be about 8.5 million fewer jobs, on top of the more than 8 million already lost; and the economy would be experiencing deflation, instead of low inflation.

The paper, by Alan S. Blinder, a Princeton professor and former vice chairman of the Fed, and Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, represents a first stab at comprehensively estimating the effects of the economic policy responses of the last few years.

If the fiscal stimulus alone had been enacted, and not the financial measures, they concluded, real G.D.P. would have fallen 5 percent last year, with 12 million jobs lost. But if only the financial measures had been enacted, and not the stimulus, real G.D.P. would have fallen nearly 4 percent, with 10 million jobs lost.

The combined effects of both sets of policies cannot be directly compared with the sum of each in isolation, they found, “because the policies tend to reinforce each other.”

A day of moderate volume in the Canadian preferred share market, with the volume totally dominated by FixedResets. PerpetualDiscounts were up 4bp and FixedResets gained 11bp on the day, with little volatility.

Update, 2010-7-29: PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.90%, equivalent to 8.26% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates yield 5.6%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 265bp, unchanged from the figure reported on July 21.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.87 % 2.95 % 22,859 20.18 1 0.2471 % 2,078.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0914 % 3,151.3
Floater 2.51 % 2.15 % 39,515 21.98 4 -0.0914 % 2,246.1
OpRet 4.88 % 1.18 % 92,327 0.26 11 0.0885 % 2,340.9
SplitShare 6.22 % -2.21 % 71,193 0.08 2 0.4527 % 2,228.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0885 % 2,140.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.92 % 5.34 % 106,717 1.79 4 0.0319 % 1,943.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.82 % 5.90 % 181,411 14.01 73 0.0350 % 1,861.4
FixedReset 5.32 % 3.50 % 318,525 3.44 47 0.1056 % 2,225.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-28
Maturity Price : 21.09
Evaluated at bid price : 21.09
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-28
Maturity Price : 21.49
Evaluated at bid price : 21.77
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 123,076 Scotia crossed 75,000 at 26.30; TD crossed 24,400 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 103,635 Desjardins bought 12,300 from National at 26.20; 50,000 from anonymous at the same price; and 35,500 from TD at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.19
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 101,700 RBC crossed blocks of 78,500 and 18,000, both at 27.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 54,392 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 27.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.55
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 36,347 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-28
Maturity Price : 24.59
Evaluated at bid price : 24.64
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 32,470 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.78
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Market Action

July 27, 2010

Life has become a little more annoying for ETF investors:

Recently, BlackRock stopped publishing the management expense ratio for its ETFs on the iShares Canada website. Instead, investors are shown the management fee for iShares ETFs.

Management fees are just one component of the costs that investors pay to own ETFs and mutual funds. There are also operating expenses (administrative and legal costs, for example), and taxes.

Bank of Montreal and Claymore Investments publish management fee info on their websites. To find out about MERs, you have to look at their semi-annual management reports on fund performance (download them at sedar.com).

The Bank of Canada has released a working paper by Emanuella Enenajor, Alex Sebastian, and Jonathan Witmer titled An Assessment of the Bank of Canada’s
Term PRA Facility
:

This paper empirically assesses the effectiveness of the Bank of Canada’s term Purchase and Resale Agreement (PRA) facility in reducing short-term bank funding pressures, as measured by the CDOR-OIS spread. It examines the behaviour of this spread around both term PRA announcement dates and term PRA operation dates, using an event-study methodology to control for developments in other money markets (i.e., using the U.S. LIBOR-OIS spread) as well as proxies for Canadian banking sector credit risk. Overall, there is robust evidence that the term PRA announcements reduced bank funding costs at both 1-month and 3-month terms, whereas we find no evidence of an impact from term PRA operations. However, given the small number of term PRA announcements in our sample, caution should be taken in attributing the reduction in the CDOR-OIS spread solely to the term PRA announcements, since other concurrent events (including other announcements by the Bank of Canada) may have also contributed to a compression in the CDOR-OIS spread.

There’s some speculation that the European stress test actually worked:

The gap between European and U.S. benchmark credit-default swap indexes, used to hedge against losses or speculate on creditworthiness, narrowed to 0.7 basis point today, the lowest since June 4, prices from Markit Group Ltd. show. That premium soared to a record 23 basis points on May 7 on concern that budget deficits in southern Europe would infect credit markets worldwide.

Bond investors are turning their attention to the global economic recovery’s sustainability after European banks and regulators provided a better view into balance sheets of the region’s lenders and Spain sold 3.4 billion euros ($4.42 billion) of debt in an auction. Stress test results released July 23, which showed 84 of 91 banks passing, reassured investors by detailing their sovereign debt holdings.

However, this could just as well be relief over the softening of the Basel III proposals which was disussed yesterday:

Banks worldwide applauded changes to proposed capital and liquidity standards that relaxed aspects of the rules and gave lenders as much as eight years to comply.

Lobbying groups in Europe and the U.S. praised the changes announced July 26 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as steps in the right direction, while firms including Deutsche Bank AG and UBS AG welcomed the softening of rules proposed by the committee in December. European and Japanese bank stocks surged.

The 54-member Bloomberg Europe Banks and Financial Services Index rose 4.5 percent to 121.14, the biggest gain since European leaders crafted a 750 billion-euro ($973 billion) rescue package on May 10.

Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc., Japan’s second- largest bank by market value, led banks higher in Tokyo. Sumitomo Mitsui rose 2.8 percent to 2,587 yen, the most in more than two weeks. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc., the nation’s largest bank, gained 2.5 percent, while Mizuho Financial Group Inc. climbed 2.2 percent.

U.S. bank stocks hardly budged.

The Canadian preferred share market had another good day on moderate volume, with PerpetualDiscounts up 12 bp and FixedResets gaining 1bp. Hardly any volatility.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.86 % 2.95 % 23,801 20.14 1 0.0000 % 2,073.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0914 % 3,154.2
Floater 2.51 % 2.13 % 41,136 22.02 4 0.0914 % 2,248.2
OpRet 4.89 % 1.93 % 95,487 0.26 11 -0.0884 % 2,338.9
SplitShare 6.25 % 5.48 % 71,938 0.08 2 0.2377 % 2,218.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0884 % 2,138.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.90 % 5.33 % 106,561 1.80 4 0.1770 % 1,942.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.82 % 5.91 % 183,256 13.98 73 0.1219 % 1,860.8
FixedReset 5.32 % 3.52 % 321,653 3.44 47 0.0087 % 2,223.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-27
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.30
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-27
Maturity Price : 21.38
Evaluated at bid price : 21.38
Bid-YTW : 5.90 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 2.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-27
Maturity Price : 24.61
Evaluated at bid price : 24.84
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.A FixedReset 123,800 Desjardins bought three blocks from RBC, one of 23,000 and two of 10,000, all at 26.20. Desjardins crossed 50,000, and RBC crossed 25,000, both at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 84,354 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 25,000, both at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 44,898 Desjardins bought two blocks from National, 11,000 at 26.19 and 12,200 at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.17
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 39,334 TD crossed 27,400 at 27.72.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.72
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 35,790 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-27
Maturity Price : 24.57
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 28,456 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-27
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Contingent Capital

BIS Outlines Basel III

The Bank for International Settlements has announced:

the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, met on 26 July 2010 to review the Basel Committee’s capital and liquidity reform package. Governors and Heads of Supervision are deeply committed to increase the quality, quantity, and international consistency of capital, to strengthen liquidity standards, to discourage excessive leverage and risk taking, and reduce procyclicality. Governors and Heads of Supervision reached broad agreement on the overall design of the capital and liquidity reform package. In particular, this includes the definition of capital, the treatment of counterparty credit risk, the leverage ratio, and the global liquidity standard. The Committee will finalise the regulatory buffers before the end of this year. The Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed to finalise the calibration and phase-in arrangements at their meeting in September.

The Basel Committee will issue publicly its economic impact assessment in August. It will issue the details of the capital and liquidity reforms later this year, together with a summary of the results of the Quantitative Impact Study.

The Annex provides vague details, vaguely:

Instead of a full deduction, the following items may each receive limited recognition when calculating the common equity component of Tier 1, with recognition capped at 10% of the bank’s common equity component:

  • Significant investments in the common shares of unconsolidated financial institutions (banks, insurance and other financial entities). “Significant” means more than 10% of the issued share capital;
  • Mortgage servicing rights (MSRs); and
  • Deferred tax assets (DTAs) that arise from timing differences.

A bank must deduct the amount by which the aggregate of the three items above exceeds 15% of its common equity component of Tier 1 (calculated prior to the deduction of these items but after the deduction of all other deductions from the common equity component of Tier 1). The items included in the 15% aggregate limit are subject to full disclosure.

There’s at least some recognition of the riski of single point failure:

Banks’ mark-to-market and collateral exposures to a central counterparty (CCP) should be subject to a modest risk weight, for example in the 1-3% range, so that banks remain cognisant that CCP exposures are not risk free.

1-3%? Not nearly high enough.

The Committee agreed on the following design and calibration for the leverage ratio, which would serve as the basis for testing during the parallel run period:

  • For off-balance-sheet (OBS) items, use uniform credit conversion factors (CCFs), with a 10% CCF for unconditionally cancellable OBS commitments (subject to further review to ensure that the 10% CCF is appropriately conservative based on historical experience).
  • For all derivatives (including credit derivatives), apply Basel II netting plus a simple measure of potential future exposure based on the standardised factors of the current exposure method. This ensures that all derivatives are converted in a consistent manner to a “loan equivalent” amount.
  • The leverage ratio will be calculated as an average over the quarter.

Taken together, this approach would result in a strong treatment for OBS items. It would also strengthen the treatment of derivatives relative to the purely accounting based measure (and provide a simple way of addressing differences between IFRS and GAAP).

When it comes to the calibration, the Committee is proposing to test a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period.

A leverage of 33x on Tier 1? It’s hard to make comparisons … the definition of exposures appear to be similar to Canada’s, but Canada uses total capital with a leverage pseudo-cap of 20x – this can be increased at the discretion of OSFI, without disclosure by either OSFI or the bank as to why the increase is considered prudent and desirable.

I suspect that Canadian banks, in general, will have about the same relationship to the new leverage cap as they have to the extant leverage cap, but will have to wait until those with access to more data have crunched the numbers.

US comparisons are even harder, as their leverage is capped at 20x Tangible Common Equity, but uses only on-balance-sheet adjustments.

The vaguest part of the Annex is:

In addition to the reforms to the trading book, securitisation, counterparty credit risk and exposures to other financials, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed to include the following elements in its reform package to help address systemic risk:

  • The Basel Committee has developed a proposal based on a requirement that the contractual terms of capital instruments will allow them at the option of the regulatory authority to be written-off or converted to common shares in the event that a bank is unable to support itself in the private market in the absence of such conversions. At its July meeting, the Committee agreed to issue for consultation such a “gone concern” proposal that requires capital to convert at the point of non-viability.
  • It also reviewed an issues paper on the use of contingent capital for meeting a portion of the capital buffers. The Committee will review a fleshed-out proposal for the treatment of “going concern” contingent capital at its December 2010 meeting with a progress report in September 2010.
  • Undertake further development of the “guided discretion” approach as one possible mechanism for integrating the capital surcharge into the Financial Stability Board’s initiative for addressing systemically important financial institutions. Contingent capital could also play a role in meeting any systemic surcharge requirements.

The only form of contingent capital that will actually serve to prevent severe problems from becoming crises is “going concern” CC – which is regulator-speak for Tier 1 capital. The “conversion at the point of non-viability” “at the option of the regulatory authority” is merely an attempt by the regulators to short-circuit the bankruptcy process and should be considered a debasement of creditor rights.

There are a number of adjustments to the proposals for the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio on which I have no opinion – sorry folks, I just plain haven’t studied them much!

Bloomberg comments:

France and Germany have led efforts to weaken rules proposed by the committee in December, concerned that their banks and economies won’t be able to bear the burden of tougher capital requirements until a recovery takes hold, according to bankers, regulators and lobbyists involved in the talks. The U.S., Switzerland and the U.K. have resisted those efforts.

Update, 2010-07-27: The Wall Street Journal fingers Germany as the dissenter:

Germany refused—at least for now—to sign on to parts of an agreement on the latest round of an evolving international accord on bank-capital standards being negotiated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, according to officials close to the talks.

But a footnote to the news release said: “One country still has concerns and has reserved its position until the decisions on calibration and phase-in arrangements are finalized in September.” That one country wasn’t identified in the release by the Basel Committee.

Market Action

July 26, 2010

Senator Phil Grassley, well known for his eagerness to support legislated subsidies for Alternative Fool lobbyists, does some more grandstanding with his questions regarding the Goldman-AIG pseudo-scandal:

The fifth largest amount listed is about $175 million that Lehman Brothers would have owed Goldman Sachs on CDS protection. However, given Lehman’s financial position at the time (September 15, 2008), isn’t it true that the real value of this hedge to Goldman would have been much less than $175 million? Wouldn’t it have only been worth the approximate value of any collateral that Lehman had already posted to Goldman up to that date?

2. Similarly, is it possible that financial health of the other institutions on the list may have prevented them from being able to pay Goldman in the event of an AIG default? Does this undermine Goldman’s claim that it was “fully collateralized and hedged” with regard to the risk of an AIG default, and thus demonstrate that Goldman did, in fact, receive a direct benefit from the government’s assistance to AIG?

3. Will the Panel be seeking additional details about these transactions in order evaluate Goldman’s claim to have been indifferent to whether AIG went bankrupt? If so, please describe the scope of your additional requests and inform the Committee if you do not receive complete cooperation.

In other words … ‘I don’t care whether you’ve got battery back-up, a fuel generator and three month’s worth of diesel stockpiled! Is it not true that in the event of the complete collapse of civilization, your electricity supply will fail to function?’

Attachment 1 (“Confidential Treatment requested by Goldman Sachs”) shows that Goldman bought a net value of USD 1.7-billion in CDSs on AIG. Canadian entries are Royal Bank (London Branch) $76-million; BNS, $36-million; BMO (London), $25-million; BMO (Chicago), $18-million; and Royal Bank [$43-million] [sold to] – that’s a net of about $100-million from Canadian banks. Naturally, there is no way of telling whether these positions were laid off against other investors.

Attachment 2 (“Confidential Treatment requested by Goldman Sachs”) shows the collateral shortfall on Goldman’s AIG deals – total of about $1.3-billion. So they were, it appears, over-hedged.

Despite all this, various analysts are still pointing out that Goldman would have lost money had an AIG bankruptcy coincided with a giant asteroid hitting New York City:

Joshua Rosner, an analyst at research firm Graham Fisher & Co. in New York, said the list of counterparties indicates that Goldman Sachs may have had difficulty collecting on those swaps.

“Clearly Goldman’s calculation was more tied to their expectation of the political dynamics of forcing moral hazard than the fundamental realities of the financial strength of counterparties,” Rosner said.

“The financial institutions from whom we purchased protection were required to post collateral to settle their net exposure to us on a daily basis,” Lucas van Praag, a spokesman for New York-based Goldman Sachs, said yesterday. “A default by any particular counterparty would not reduce the effectiveness of a hedge provided by that entity if adequate collateral had already been posted. This was the case with the protection we bought, even during the most stressed periods of the fall of 2008.”

“There’s a question about Citigroup’s ability to pay Goldman if AIG failed, given it had major problems,” said Ed Grebeck, CEO of Stamford, Connecticut-based debt-consulting firm Tempus Advisors and an instructor on derivatives at New York University.

The document shows only the “notional” amount of money Goldman Sachs was owed by its counterparties, Cambridge Winter’s Date said. The firm is likely to have written down the value of at least some of the protection, he said.

Goldman Sachs “should have been haircutting the valuation of that protection pretty significantly as the viability of those firms looked more and more suspect,” Date said.

At least Goldman’s won something – the anti-Goldmanites have shifted their position from ‘an AIG bankruptcy would have killed Goldman’ to ‘an AIG bankruptcy and the simultaneous collapse of more than one other major global financial institution would have killed Goldman, provided they’re lying about the collateral, and even if they’re not lying about the collateral it was probably junk anyway.’

I once did some career mentoring for a young and idealistic high school student who wanted to get into the business – it was probably one of the most cynical mentoring sessions ever presented. But, for free, gratis and for nothing I will present to other idealists the lesson behind the Goldman debate: DON’T GIVE A SHIT AND DON’T EVER BOTHER DOING ANYTHING RIGHT. Goldman’s taking more grief for competently managing their AIG exposure than any of the clown-firms is taking for reckless idiocy.

But then … politicians across North America have shown a breathtaking disregard for creditors rights throughout this crisis – as best exemplified by the General Motors leapfrogging discussed on June 9, 2009. And if you have no rights, why would you want to protect them? The lunatic fringe even turns Goldman’s insistence on collateral into evidence of a dark plot:

Goldman wanted their counterparties to post collateral so they would have protection against corporate downgrades. The monolines refused to have collateral posting requirements in their CDS contracts. The rating agencies supported them in this position on the argument that maintaining their AAA rating was “fundamental to their business”.

AIG, on the other hand, agreed to collateral posting requirements. in fact, they used this as a competitive advantage – they got more business because of it and marketed their flexibility on this issue to the banks.

All of the other banks got comfortable with the monolines not having to post collateral for CDS trades because of their AAA ratings. Goldman never did.

Of course, Goldman was one of the few banks that clearly set out to profit from shorting CDOs. They obviously realized that if their CDS counterparty was on the hook for a lot of ABS CDOs that were going to blow up, the insurance provider would likely get downgraded. If the downgrade of the insurer was very likely, the only way the short-CDO strategy worked was if the insurer would post collateral.

So Goldman only used AIG, who would provide protection against their downgrade, which Goldman knew would happen because they were stuffing AIG with toxic ABS CDOs.

I hate to get sucked into the vampire squid line of thinking about Goldman, but the only explanation i can think of for why AIG got rescued and the monolines did not is because Goldman had significant exposure to AIG and did not have exposure to the monolines.

I spent a little time looking into the woes of CalPERS after reading a brief mention in the Economist:

That [range of benefits improvements], however, is not what outrages Mr Schwarzenegger, a Republican, or his brainy economic adviser David Crane, a Democrat. Rather, it is that the pension plans—above all the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the largest such scheme in America—pretended that this generosity would not cost anything. In 1999 the dotcom bubble was still inflating, and the plans’ actuaries predicted that their retirement funds would gain enough value to pay the increased pensions. By implication, they assumed that the Dow Jones Industrial Average would reach 25,000 in 2009 and 28m in 2099. It is currently at around 10,300.

Remember, CalPERS is the enormous pension fund that don’t do their own credit analysis. In 1999…:

According to CaLPERS, employer retirement costs have been declining over the last 10 years as the result of significant investment returns and changes in actuarial assumptions. The members and retirees of CaLPERS have not benefited from these returns. As a result, CaLPERS contends that the new retirement formulas provided by this bill mark the first significant improvement in retirement benefits for most state and school members’ in approximately 30 years. It is anticipated that the increase in liability for these new benefits can be funded by the excess retirement assets that have been generated through investment income and changes in actuarial assumptions resulting in no immediate increase in costs to the employer.

2001 Actuarial assumptions of net investment returns between 7.50% and 8.25%. Current assumptions are:

Critics who argue that the current level of retirement benefits are “unsustainable” and should be reduced for new hires say CalPERS is too optimistic about its expected investment earnings, an annual average of 7.75 percent.

Among the experts who think average earnings will be less than 7.75 percent in the years ahead is Laurence Fink, chairman of BlackRock, the world’s largest money managing firm, who spoke to the CalPERS board last summer.

The CalPERS chief investment officer, Joe Dear, addressed the earnings issue last week during his monthly report to the board. He said 5.25 percent of the earnings assumption is “real” and 2.5 percent is inflation.

Dear said the 7.75 percent earnings assumption is below the national average for pension funds, 8 percent, and below the earnings average of CalPERS during the last two decades, 7.9 percent.

He said CalPERS believes, among other things, that stocks will yield 3 to 4 percent more on average than bonds and that private equity investments will average 3 percent more than domestic stocks.

Comrade Peace Prize is seeking to distort the economy even more:

President Barack Obama is on the verge of creating as much as $300 billion in credit for small businesses as bankers raise doubt about whether there’s demand for new loans and how much will be repaid.

The U.S. Senate may vote this week on a bill to funnel $30 billion of capital to community banks, whose business customers typically are small firms. Banks could leverage the sum to make $300 billion in loans that create jobs, according to a Senate summary. That could more than double the commercial and industrial loans at eligible banks as of the first quarter, according to data compiled by KBW Inc.

Bankers say the problem isn’t scarce credit, it’s lack of demand from creditworthy firms in a weak economy.

Banks will be charged an initial interest rate of 5 percent, declining to 1 percent if they increase small-business loans or rising as high as 7 percent if the loans stay the same or decrease, according to Richard Carbo, spokesman for the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship committee.

Wells Fargo & Co., which says it’s the biggest small- business lender, is “sitting here with tons of liquidity and we’re marching double time in search of more loans,” Chief Executive Officer John Stumpf said in an interview. “In most cases when I hear stories about small businesses not getting loans, it’s the case that more credit will not help them. They need more equity, they need more profitability.”

Interesting paper from the FRB-Boston Public Policy series by Scott Schuh, Oz Shy, and Joanna Stavins, Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations:

Merchant fees and reward programs generate an implicit monetary transfer to credit card users from non-card (or “cash”) users because merchants generally do not set differential prices for card users to recoup the costs of fees and rewards. On average, each cash- using household pays $151 to card-using households and each card-using household receives $1,482 from cash users every year. Because credit card spending and rewards are positively correlated with household income, the payment instrument transfer also induces a regressive transfer from low-income to high-income households in general. On average, and after accounting for rewards paid to households by banks, the lowest-income household ($20,000 or less annually) pays $23 and the highest-income household ($150,000 or more annually) receives $756 every year. We build and calibrate a model of consumer payment choice to compute the effects of merchant fees and card rewards on consumer welfare. Reducing merchant fees and card rewards would likely increase consumer welfare.

I was surprised by the following:

The limited available data suggest that a reasonable, but very rough, estimate of the per-dollar merchant effort of handling cash is  = 0:5 percent. Available data suggest that a reasonable estimate of the merchant fee across all types of cards, weighted by card use, is  = 2 percent.

I would have thought cash handling costs would be higher – particularly for high-cash operations, such as grocery stores – given bank charges for cash deposits, security on cash movements, employee theft and bookkeeping problems. The footnote reads:

Garcia-Swartz, Hahn, and Layne-Farrar (2006) report that the marginal cost of processing a $54.24 transaction (the average check transaction) is $0.43 (or 0.8 percent) if it is a cash transaction and $1.22 (or 2.25 percent) if it is paid by a credit/charge card. The study by Bergman, Guibourg, and Segendorf (2007) for Sweden found that the total private costs incurred by the retail sector from handling 235 billion Swedish Crown (SEK) worth of transactions was 3.68 billion SEK in 2002, which would put our measure of cash handling costs at  = 1:6 percent. For the Norwegian payment system, Gresvik and Haare (2009) estimates that private costs of handling 62.1 billion Norwegian Crown (NOK) worth of cash transactions incurred by the retailers was 0.322 billion NOK in 2007, which would imply  = 0:5 percent.

Fed Governor Tarullo doesn’t think we’ll see contingent capital any time soon:

The Basel Committee has a number of initiatives and work programs related to capital requirements that go beyond the package of measures that we expect to be completed by the fall. These efforts include, among others, ideas for countercyclical capital buffers, contingent capital, and development of a metric for capital charges tied to systemic risk. Each of these ideas has considerable conceptual appeal, but some of the difficulties encountered in translating the ideas into practical rules mean that work on them is likely to continue into next year.

The BIS proposal for countercyclical buffers was discussed on July 19.

There was relaxed volume in the Canadian preferred share market today, as PerpetualDiscounts gained 16bp and FixedResets lost 4bp, taking the median weighted-average yield on the latter class back above the magic 3.5% figure. Not much volatility.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.85 % 2.94 % 22,701 20.17 1 0.0000 % 2,073.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0392 % 3,151.3
Floater 2.51 % 2.15 % 41,731 21.98 4 -0.0392 % 2,246.1
OpRet 4.88 % -1.20 % 95,895 0.08 11 -0.1307 % 2,340.9
SplitShare 6.27 % 6.18 % 71,398 3.40 2 0.2817 % 2,213.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1307 % 2,140.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.91 % 5.58 % 139,699 5.62 4 -0.1472 % 1,938.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.83 % 5.89 % 181,866 14.00 73 0.1562 % 1,858.5
FixedReset 5.32 % 3.52 % 324,672 3.44 47 -0.0395 % 2,222.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount -2.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-26
Maturity Price : 23.99
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-26
Maturity Price : 19.69
Evaluated at bid price : 19.69
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-26
Maturity Price : 19.62
Evaluated at bid price : 19.62
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 84,500 RBC crossed 15,000 at 26.85; National crossed 25,000 at 26.88; Scotia crossed 37,500 at 26.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.90
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 47,550 RBC crossed 15,000 at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.68
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 24,640 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-26
Maturity Price : 21.59
Evaluated at bid price : 21.59
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 21,000 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-26
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 19,502 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-26
Maturity Price : 24.75
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 18,384 National crossed 10,000 at 23.33.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-26
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
There were 24 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.