Market Action

February 10, 2012

Astonishing! There is a continued Greek crisis:

In Athens, unions struck for the second time this week and police used tear gas to counter protesters. George Karatzaferis, who heads one of the three parties supporting interim Prime Minister Lucas Papademos, said he wouldn’t support austerity measures worked out for a rescue. He spoke hours after German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble told lawmakers in Berlin that Greece was missing deficit targets.

“What has particularly bothered me is the humiliation of the country,” Karatzaferis, whose Laos party has 16 members in the 300-seat parliament, said in televised comments. “Clearly Greece can’t and shouldn’t do without the European Union but it could do without the German boot.”

“The Greek offer is not sufficient and they have to go away to come up with a revised plan,” Bertrand Benoit, a spokesman for the German Finance Ministry, said by telephone.

Assiduous Readers will be accustomed to my occasional rants about bond market structure and auction design – these are usually triggered by ignorant whining about exchange trading of bonds, but now the Fed has become involved:

The Federal Reserve secretly selected a handful of banks to bid for debt securities acquired by taxpayers in the U.S. bailout of American International Group Inc., and the rest of Wall Street is wondering what happened to the transparency the central bank said it was committed to upholding.

“The exclusivity by which the process has shut out smaller dealers is a little un-American,” said David Castillo, head of sales and trading at broker Further Lane Securities LP in San Francisco, who said he would have liked to participate. “It seems odd that if you want to get the best possible price that it wouldn’t be open to anyone who wants to put in the most competitive bid.”

After inviting more than 40 broker-dealers to take part in a series of auctions last year, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York asked only Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN) and Barclays Plc (BARC) to bid on the full $13.2 billion of bonds offered in two sales over the past month. The central bank switched to a less open process after traders blamed the regular, more public disposals for damaging prices in 2011. This week, Goldman Sachs bought $6.2 billion of bonds in an auction.

“The purpose should be to get the best price for the taxpayer,” said Robert Eisenbeis, a former research director at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta who’s now chief monetary economist for Sarasota, Florida-based Cumberland Advisors. “Anybody knows the more bidders the better, so it’s a little hard to understand why they would essentially pick potential winners and losers. That smacks of crony capitalism.”

The New York Fed was criticized for damaging credit markets with the regular sales, and halted them in June after disposing of about $10 billion in face value of the assets.

It resumed the sales on Jan. 19, when it unloaded about $7 billion of assets in one block to Credit Suisse, after receiving an unsolicited bid for the securities from Goldman Sachs. Only Barclays and Bank of America were invited to also participate in that auction. Goldman Sachs won the auction for $6.2 billion of bonds this week after Credit Suisse placed an unsolicited bid for the assets. Barclays, Morgan Stanley (MS) and RBS Securities Inc. were also included in that sale. Barclays presented the second- highest offer in both auctions this year, according to a person familiar with the process.

The New York Fed didn’t announce either auction until after they closed, and said the broker-dealers it included were chosen based on the strength of previous bids. The Wall Street firms, and their clients who wished to bid on the assets, were required to sign non-disclosure agreements forbidding them from discussing the offerings. At least one investor opted not to participate for that reason.

Now, I’m not going to state that the Fed did things in the best possible way. I’m not even going to state that the auction method they chose is better than a fully public process! But I will state that calling the process “un-American” or stating that “Anybody knows the more bidders the better” is just plain pig-ignorant.

The Canadian preferred share market took a thumping today, as the very attractive GWO 5.40% Straight issue announced – and later upsized – today sucked all the money out of the market. PerpetualPremiums were down 34bp, FixedResets off 10bp and DeemedRetractibles lost 59bp. There is a very lengthy list of losers – and no winners – in the Performance Highlights table, overwhelmingly comprised of insurance DeemedRetractibles. Volume was a little on the light side.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.7057 % 2,445.4
FixedFloater 4.55 % 3.91 % 39,241 17.48 1 0.7229 % 3,430.6
Floater 2.73 % 2.97 % 63,110 19.77 3 -0.7057 % 2,640.4
OpRet 4.84 % -0.06 % 63,024 1.26 6 -0.3279 % 2,514.6
SplitShare 5.28 % -0.41 % 80,622 0.83 4 -0.0597 % 2,650.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3279 % 2,299.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.33 % -0.48 % 117,923 0.12 26 -0.3430 % 2,223.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.03 % 4.88 % 196,096 15.66 4 -0.2157 % 2,457.3
FixedReset 5.02 % 2.62 % 217,705 2.30 65 -0.1002 % 2,395.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.89 % 3.45 % 225,376 1.64 45 -0.5940 % 2,314.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium -2.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -2.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.88
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible -2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -2.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible -2.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.64
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-10
Maturity Price : 17.39
Evaluated at bid price : 17.39
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Premium -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %
GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible -1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.22
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.48
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %
FTS.PR.E OpRet -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 27.61
Bid-YTW : -0.06 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 80,188 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 24.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium 55,401 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : -7.57 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 53,027 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : -5.64 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 39,861 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
BNS.PR.N Deemed-Retractible 39,722 RBC crossed 20,200 at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-29
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.72
Bid-YTW : 2.29 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 39,202 RBC crossed 36,400 at 27.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 2.60 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 27.13 – 27.48
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2316

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-26
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.13
Bid-YTW : 1.84 %

TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.03 – 26.36
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2185

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.03
Bid-YTW : -6.94 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.40 – 25.70
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2185

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : -8.72 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.15 – 26.38
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1500

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-10
Maturity Price : 23.59
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 2.88 %

PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.51 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1614

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : -4.72 %

BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 17.39 – 17.70
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2356

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-10
Maturity Price : 17.39
Evaluated at bid price : 17.39
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %

New Issues

New Issue: GWO 5.40% Straight!

Great-West Lifeco has announced:

Great-West Lifeco Inc. (“Lifeco” or the “Company”) has today entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters co-led by BMO Capital Markets, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank under which the underwriters have agreed to buy, on a bought deal basis, 6,000,000 Non-Cumulative First Preferred Shares, Series P (the “Series P Shares”) from Lifeco for sale to the public at a price of $25.00 per Series P Share, representing aggregate gross proceeds of $150 million.

Lifeco has granted the underwriters an underwriters’ option to purchase an additional 2,000,000 Series P Shares at the same offering price. Should the underwriters’ option be fully exercised, the total gross proceeds of the Series P Shares offering will be $200 million.

The Series P Shares will yield 5.40% per annum, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of the Company. The Series P Shares will not be redeemable prior to March 31, 2017. On or after March 31, 2017, the Company may, on not less than 30 nor more than 60 days’ notice, redeem the Series P Shares in whole or in part, at the Company’s option, by the payment in cash of $26.00 per Series P Share if redeemed prior to March 31, 2018, of $25.75 per Series P Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2018 but prior to March 31, 2019, of $25.50 per Series P Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2019 but prior to March 31, 2020, of $25.25 per Series P Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2020 but prior to March 31, 2021 and of $25.00 per Series P Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2021, in each case together with all declared and unpaid dividends up to but excluding the date fixed for redemption.

The Series P Shares offering is expected to close on February 22, 2012. The net proceeds will be used for general corporate purposes and to augment Lifeco’s current liquidity position.

It has been almost two years since the last Straight offering, which was GWO.PR.M, listed on 2010-3-4. Mind you, the market doesn’t seem too thrilled – comparable issues have dropped substantially since the announcement earlier this morning.

Update: Upsized to $250-million, no greenshoe.

Market Action

February 9, 2012

Greece claims to have reached agreement:

“Discussions between the Greek government and the troika were successfully completed this morning,” Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos’s office said in an e-mailed statement today in Athens. “Political leaders have agreed with the result of those negotiations. Therefore there is a general agreement in the context of the new program ahead of tonight’s euro group meeting.” The statement didn’t include any details.

But PIMCO notes potential resistance of Greeks:

“It is very unlikely to lead to growth, jobs, financial stability and new investments,” El-Erian, chief executive and co-chief investment officer of the world’s biggest manager of bond funds, said in a radio interview today on “Bloomberg Surveillance” with Tom Keene and Ken Prewitt. “This agreement will be very difficult to sell when the principals, those who have agreed, have to go to their constituents.”

The question on my mind is still: will Greek politicians sell the deal to Greek voters? I supported the idea of a referendum when the idea was floated – very briefly! – last fall. We continue to live in interesting times.

Meanwhile, the guys with the money say “Show me!”:

European finance chiefs are set to defer ratifying a 130 billion-euro ($173 billion) rescue for Greece, pressing the government in Athens to put a newly struck austerity plan into action.

“It’s up to the Greek government by concrete actions — through legislation, other actions — to convince its European partners that the second program can be made to work,” European Union Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn said today as he arrived for an emergency meeting of euro-area finance ministers in Brussels.

And how many stories like this are we going to see?

Greek doctors are fighting a new invisible foe every day at their hospitals: a pneumonia-causing superbug that most existing antibiotics can’t kill.

The culprit is spreading through health centers already weighed down by a shortage of nurses. The hospital-acquired germ killed as many as half of people with blood cancers infected at Laiko General Hospital, a 500-bed facility in central Athens.

The drug-resistant K. pneumoniae bacteria have a genetic mutation that allows them to evade such powerful drugs as AstraZeneca Plc (AZN)’s Merrem and Johnson & Johnson’s Doribax. A 2010 survey found 49 percent of K. pneumoniae samples in Greece aren’t killed by the antibiotics of last resort, known as carbapenems, according to the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network. Many doctors have even tried colistin, a 50-year-old drug so potent that it can damage kidneys.

“We’re not used to seeing people die of an untreatable infection,” said John Rex, vice president for clinical infection at London-based AstraZeneca, which is developing a new generation of antibiotics. “That’s like something in a novel of 200 years ago.”

The Bank of Canada has provided another nail in the coffin of Efficient Market Theory:

This paper develops and estimates a model to explain the behaviour of house prices in the United States. The main finding is that over 70% of the increase in house prices relative to trend during the increase of house prices in the United States from 1995 to 2006 can be explained by a pricing mechanism where market participants are ‘Fooled by Search.’ Trading frictions, also known as search frictions, have been argued to affect asset prices, so that asset markets are constrained efficient, with shocks to liquidity causing prices to temporarily deviate from long run fundamentals. In this paper a model is proposed and estimated that combines search frictions with a behavioural assumption where market participants incorrectly believe that the efficient market theory holds. In other words, households are ‘Fooled by Search.’ Such a model is potentially fruitful because it can replicate the observation that real price growth and turnover are highly correlated at an annual frequency in the United States housing market. A linearized version of the model is estimated using standard OLS and annual data. In addition to explaining over 70% of the housing bubble in the United States, the model also predicts and estimation confirms that in regions with a low elasticity of supply, price growth should be more sensitive to turnover. Using the lens of turnover, a supply shock is identified and estimated that has been responsible for over 80% of the fall in real house prices from the peak in 2006 to 2010.

Search costs are important!

This paper examines the impact of bank consolidation on mortgage rates in order to evaluate the extent to which mortgage markets are competitive. Mortgage markets are decentralized and so rates are determined through a search and negotiation process. The primary effect of a merger therefore is to reduce the number of partners available with whom to negotiate, although it can also change the characteristics of the product, and impact the search effort of consumers. Using a Canadian merger as a case study, we find that, overall, consolidation had little effect on rates suggesting that, on average, the mortgage market is fairly competitive. However, a decomposition of the aggregate treatment effect reveals important heterogeneity in the impact of the merger. We find that consumers gathering multiple quotes are affected by the merger, while those who do not search are not. These results suggest that market power originates in large part from the presence of asymmetric search costs.

Woo-Hoo, we’re saved! The CSA is bringing in new Money Market Fund regulations:

Canadian securities regulators have slapped new rules on money market funds in a move that could push already puny yields on these investments even lower.

Under the new regulations, these funds, which typically pay investors around 1 per cent a year, will need to hold at least five per cent of their assets in cash or in securities that can easily be converted into cash within a day. In addition, they must hold at least another 15 per cent of their assets in securities that can be converted within a week.

As I have pointed out until I’m sick to bloody death of saying it, the problem is not liquidity (although that can become a factor in an extreme case, just like any other extreme case) the problem is credit quality – and these rules do absolutely nothing to improve credit quality, which requires mandatory support from the sponsor. But why would a regulator worry about what might actually work?

It was a weak day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums down 8bp, FixedResets off 12bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 20bp. Volatility was average, skewed to the downside. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.0259 % 2,462.8
FixedFloater 4.58 % 3.94 % 39,741 17.43 1 -1.1905 % 3,405.9
Floater 2.71 % 2.96 % 63,663 19.80 3 1.0259 % 2,659.1
OpRet 4.82 % -1.13 % 65,615 1.27 6 -0.3331 % 2,522.9
SplitShare 5.28 % -0.40 % 80,670 0.83 4 0.2945 % 2,651.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3331 % 2,307.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.31 % -3.74 % 109,618 0.09 26 -0.0766 % 2,230.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.02 % 4.84 % 196,708 15.69 4 0.0205 % 2,462.6
FixedReset 5.01 % 2.60 % 217,262 2.30 65 -0.1234 % 2,397.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.87 % 2.28 % 224,056 1.19 45 -0.1979 % 2,328.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.70
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
FTS.PR.C OpRet -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-10
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : -5.85 %
BNS.PR.J Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.38
Bid-YTW : 2.06 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 24.56
Evaluated at bid price : 24.79
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 2.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 85,884 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 70,251 Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 23.52
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 66,301 Nesbitt crossed 65,000 at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium 65,196 RBC crossed a block of 39,700 and two of 10,300 each, all at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : -12.30 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 56,140 Anonymous bought two blocks of 10,000 each from RBC at 25.17 and one block of 10,600 from Nesbitt at 25.19.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 43,661 RBC crossed 39,400 at 27.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.32
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 26.10 – 26.47
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2555

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %

FTS.PR.C OpRet Quote: 26.00 – 26.30
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1898

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-10
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : -5.85 %

RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 27.16 – 27.45
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1973

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.16
Bid-YTW : 1.74 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.22 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1999

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %

BNA.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 26.65 – 26.91
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1930

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-10
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.65
Bid-YTW : -8.18 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.55 – 25.84
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2270

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %

Issue Comments

BAM: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative

S&P has announced:

  • We are revising our outlook on Brookfield Asset Management Inc. to negative from stable.
  • At the same time, we are affirming our ratings on the company, including our ‘A-‘ long-term corporate credit and ‘A-2’ short-term ratings.
  • We base the outlook revision on our view that Brookfield’s corporate adjusted debt and remitted operating cash flows (OCF) in 2012 will result in credit measures that would be either below or very tight to our target levels for the rating.
  • Our base case projection for Brookfield’s 2012 OCF is high single-digit growth, driven by steady performance in its core sectors and modest growth in the opportunities sectors.
  • We believe that the debt levels will increase in 2012 by about 3% from September 2011 levels.


The negative outlook reflects our view that the key credit measures, operating cash flows (OCF) to debt and OCF coverage of debt service, will be under pressure for the rating and that there is little capacity at the current rating for further cash flow deterioration or higher adjusted debt, which would include preference shares at 50%. We could lower the rating if remitted OCF interest coverage and debt coverage remain below 5x and 30%, respectively, in the next 12 months or if we believe Brookfield is becoming more aggressive with its use of project-level or subsidiary leverage, such as increases in its use of recourse debt, guarantees to its subsidiaries, or other measures that would materially commit the parent resources. It is unlikely that we would raise the rating in the near term.

BAM has a plethora of preferred share issues outstanding: BAM.PR.B (Floater), BAM.PR.E (RatchetRate), BAM.PR.G (FixedFloater), BAM.PR.H, BAM.PR.I & BAM.PR.J (OperatingRetractible), BAM.PR.K (Floater), BAM.PR.M & BAM.PR.N (PerpetualDiscount), BAM.PR.O (OperatingRetractible), BAM.PR.P, BAM.PR.R, BAM.PR.T, BAM.PR.X & BAM.PR.Z (FixedReset).

Issue Comments

YLO Suspends Preferred Dividends

Yellow Media has announced:

Net earnings per share from continuing operations before the impairment charge for 2011 were $0.29 compared to net earnings per share from continuing operations of $0.42 in 2010. Adjusted earnings per common share from continuing operations for the year were $0.53 versus $0.84 last year due to lower EBITDA and increased cash taxes.

Revenues decreased 5.2% from $1.40 billion to $1.33 billion, due to lower print revenues as well as lower revenues associated with the Company’s U.S. operations. This was partly offset by higher organic online revenues and revenues generated from Canpages and Mediative. Online revenues in 2011 were $346.1 million representing growth of 30% versus last year’s results.

Income from operations before the impairment charge was $484.9 million in 2011 compared to $514.9 million in 2010. EBITDA for the year declined from $757.1 million to $679.7 million and the EBITDA margin for 2011 was 51.1% compared to 54.0% last year. The decrease is mainly attributable to print revenue pressure, lower margins associated with Canpages, investments in the national digital division Mediative and in support of the Company’s transformation.

EBITDA for the fourth quarter declined from $161.3 million to $147.2 million while EBITDA margin was approximately 47.0% for the fourth quarter of 2011 and 2010.

The Company has begun evaluating alternatives to refinance maturities in 2012 and beyond. A broad range of alternatives will be considered and may involve the issuance of secured or unsecured debt, equity or other securities or other transactions. At this time, the Board of directors has decided to suspend the dividends on the outstanding series of preferred shares.

In connection with this review, the Board of directors of Yellow Media has established a committee of independent directors to serve as the Financing Committee of the Board (the “Financing Committee”) that will oversee this process with the objective of completing any transaction or transactions during the current fiscal year.

The Financing Committee is comprised of directors Anthony G. Miller, Michael T. Boychuk, John R. Gaulding and Bruce K. Robertson. Mr. Robertson will serve as Chair of the Financing Committee.

The Company also announced this morning three new appointments to its Board of Directors. David G. Leith, Bruce K. Robertson and Craig Forman will bring extensive knowledge of corporate finance, and corporate development and strategy within the technology, media and communications industries.

The new directors have dealmaking experience:

David G. Leith is Chair of MTS Allstream and Manitoba Telecom Services. Mr. Leith is also a trustee of TransGlobe Apartment REIT and a member of the Economic Advisory Panel of the Government of Ontario. Mr. Leith spent over 25 years at CIBC World Markets and its predecessors where he retired as Deputy Chairman of CIBC World Markets and Managing Director and Head of CIBC World Markets’ Investment, Corporate and Merchant Banking in 2009. Mr. Leith has a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Toronto and a Masters of Arts from Cambridge University.

Bruce K. Robertson serves as Principal at Grandview Capital, a Canadian merchant bank. Prior to Grandview Capital, Mr. Robertson was a senior officer at AbitibiBowater Inc. Mr. Robertson also served as Senior Managing Partner of Brookfield Asset Management Inc., a specialty asset management company. Mr. Robertson received his Bachelor of Commerce (Honours) from Queen’s University and is a Chartered Accountant.

I will provide more commentary in this month’s edition of PrefLetter, which will be prepared as of the close tomorrow for delivery to clients prior to the opening on Monday, February 13. But I will say that it is highly unusual for a profitable, cash-flow positive, company to suspend its preferred dividend.

YLO has four issues of preferreds outstanding: YLO.PR.A and YLO.PR.B (OperatingRetractible) and YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™; all are relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Market Action

February 8, 2012

ITG claims that high frequency trading in Canada is becoming less frequent:

“This quarter’s analysis of message traffic data reveals changes in trading behaviour that may signal the begginings of a new regime,” ITG’s analysts wrote. “Improvements in our metric for the quality of order flow, combined with a decline in fleeting orders points to a structural change amongst HFT participants.”

Why are HFTs backing away? Money.

Study author Doug Clark, a managing director at ITG, said that other markets are showing similar trends. That suggests that the business of high-frequency trading is so competitive that some players weren’t making money.

Also, brokerage houses are doing a better job of offering clients algorithms and routers that handle trading in ways that combat high frequency traders and cut their profits.

Zerohedge continues to whine about HFT. Institutional Investor breathlessly tells us of how some “real money” investors’ agents have attempted to remain competitive by the unheard of strategy of getting better at their jobs:

The electronic-trading team at RBC decided to fight back against the problem of “phantom” or “disappearing liquidity,” which they blamed on a subset of high frequency traders using “predatory” tactics. That is how they came up with THOR, a system to help clients such as institutional money managers combat predatory HFT strategies and complete trades at the desired price.

The system has been in use for a year, and Steiner says it has greatly improved liquidity for RBC and its clients — allowing them to execute orders at the desired price.

The real reason behind the fashionability of deprecating HFT can be found in the recent IIAC publication Securities Industry Performance 11Q3:

Even though trading revenue only accounts for about 10% of overall revenue, the severe collapse in net trading revenue of nearly 50% in the year, reflecting substantial losses for equity market-makers, put a significant dent in overall earnings.

The industry’s prop-traders are having their lunch eaten by HFT practitioners who didn’t even go to the right schools! The horror!

Lucas van Praag, world’s greatest corporate spokesman, is leaving Goldman Sachs:

Lucas van Praag, who became one of the public faces of the U.S. financial industry as Goldman Sachs Group Inc.’s global head of corporate communications, is leaving the firm after 12 years.

Van Praag, a 62-year-old British citizen, will retire at the end of March and continue to provide strategic advice as a consultant to the company, according to an internal memo signed by Chief Executive Officer Lloyd C. Blankfein and President Gary D. Cohn. The memo’s contents were confirmed by Michael DuVally, a spokesman. Van Praag was promoted to partner, the highest rank in the New York-based company, in 2006.

The Canadian preferred share market resumed its winning ways today, with PerpetualPremiums winning 18bp, FixedResets gaining 9bp and DeemedRetractibles up 18bp. Volatility was good and highly skewed to the upside, with SLF notable among the winners. Volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts (those few that are left; only four issues from two issuers) now yield 4.80%, equivalent to 6.24% interest at the standard 1.3x equivalency factor. Long corporates now yield a hair under 4.6%, so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread is now about 165bp, a sharp decline from the 190bp reported on February 1.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3490 % 2,437.8
FixedFloater 4.52 % 3.88 % 40,123 17.53 1 1.2048 % 3,447.0
Floater 2.74 % 2.96 % 61,095 19.80 3 0.3490 % 2,632.1
OpRet 4.81 % -1.35 % 68,310 1.27 6 0.0818 % 2,531.3
SplitShare 5.29 % -0.29 % 80,436 0.84 4 -0.1396 % 2,644.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0818 % 2,314.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % -9.32 % 108,483 0.09 26 0.1840 % 2,232.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.02 % 4.80 % 194,744 15.75 4 0.2782 % 2,462.1
FixedReset 5.00 % 2.56 % 214,256 2.30 65 0.0885 % 2,400.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.86 % 2.03 % 223,536 1.03 45 0.1828 % 2,333.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-08
Maturity Price : 23.94
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.74
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-08
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-08
Maturity Price : 24.65
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.88
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 2.62 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 243,630 Nesbitt crossed 140,000; RBC crossed 50,000; and TD crossed 30,200; all at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 104,416 RBC crossed 49,900 and TD crossed 48,200, both at 27.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.43
Bid-YTW : 2.52 %
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 81,000 TD crossed 25,000 and bought two blocks of 10,000 each from RBC, all at 26.10; RBC crossed blocks of 13,900 and 16,300 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-09
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.09
Bid-YTW : -2.13 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 59,407 TD crossed 49,900 at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.02
Bid-YTW : 2.56 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 58,821 Desjardins bought 30,000 from anonymous at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.08
Bid-YTW : 2.61 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 53,109 RBC crossed 47,300 at 27.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.17
Bid-YTW : 2.29 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.50 – 24.97
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3361

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-08
Maturity Price : 23.94
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.17 – 52.50
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2309

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.17
Bid-YTW : 3.03 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.30 – 52.54
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1862

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.30
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %

ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.45 – 26.64
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1365

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.45
Bid-YTW : -44.83 %

IFC.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.68 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1696

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.68
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %

TD.PR.S FixedReset Quote: 25.96 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.1400
Average : 0.0902

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 2.43 %

Market Action

February 7, 2012

This looks better than a government programme as a way to address delinquent underwater mortgages:

Banks, accelerating efforts to move troubled mortgages off their books, are offering as much as $35,000 or more in cash to delinquent homeowners to sell their properties for less than they owe.

Lenders have routinely delayed or blocked such transactions, known as short sales, in which they accept less from a buyer than the seller’s outstanding loan. Now banks have decided the deals are faster and less costly than foreclosures, which have slowed in response to regulatory probes of abusive practices. Banks are nudging potential sellers by pre-approving deals, streamlining the closing process, forgoing their right to pursue unpaid debt and in some cases providing large cash incentives, said Bill Fricke, senior credit officer for Moody’s Investors Service in New York.

What’s more, it seems like there is a direct connection with auto loans:

Three years ago, credit was so tight that the owner of a legal firm with a $400,000 salary and a very good credit score of more than 700 couldn’t get financed to buy the car he wanted from Michael Mosser’s dealership.

“The world is upside-down compared to then,” said Mosser, general manager of Chevrolet and Cadillac stores in Ann Arbor, Michigan. “Today, somebody with a 500 credit score, I can get approved and in a Malibu,” which starts at $22,110.

Lenders resisted extending credit to car buyers when the mortgage market collapsed in 2008, helping push General Motors Corp. and Chrysler LLC into bankruptcy and sending U.S. sales to the lowest point in almost three decades. Amid a slow housing market, auto demand is rebounding, spurring lenders from Bank of America Corp. to Capital One Financial Corp. to approve buyers faster and at better rates to compete for a piece of an expanding market.

Amazingly, another Greek deadline has been missed:

Greek political parties delayed yet again on Tuesday making the tough choice of accepting painful reforms in return for a new international bailout to avoid a chaotic default, seemingly deaf to EU warnings that the eurozone can live without Athens.

With a series of deadlines come and gone, leaders of the three parties in the coalition of Prime Minister Lucas Papademos postponed what was supposed to be a crunch meeting until Wednesday.

S&P affirmed AltaGas, proud issuer of ALA.PR.A:

  • AltaGas Ltd. has announced it is acquiring SEMCO Holding Corp., the sole shareholder of SEMCO Holding Corp. from Continental Energy Systems LLC for about C$1.1 billion.
  • We are affirming our ratings, including our ‘BBB’ long-term corporate credit rating, on AltaGas.
  • In our view, SEMCO has an excellent business risk profile and a highly leveraged financial risk profile.
  • We have revised AltaGas’ business risk profile to strong from satisfactory and financial risk profile to significant from aggressive, assuming the transaction closes as expected. The stable outlook reflects our assessment of the company’s business mix, which is increasingly diverse with a greater contribution from fee-based and regulated utility cash flows.

It was another down day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums off 16bp, FixedResets down 14bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 18bp. Volatility was minor. Volume was a little below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0873 % 2,429.3
FixedFloater 4.58 % 3.94 % 40,384 17.43 1 1.7157 % 3,405.9
Floater 2.75 % 2.96 % 60,470 19.81 3 0.0873 % 2,623.0
OpRet 4.81 % -1.55 % 67,518 1.28 6 -0.1570 % 2,529.3
SplitShare 5.28 % 0.17 % 80,213 0.84 4 -0.1095 % 2,647.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1570 % 2,312.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.31 % -8.57 % 109,187 0.09 26 -0.1643 % 2,228.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.04 % 4.86 % 194,681 15.66 4 0.1134 % 2,455.3
FixedReset 5.01 % 2.58 % 221,449 2.31 65 -0.1355 % 2,398.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.86 % 2.12 % 222,967 1.18 45 -0.1850 % 2,328.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-01
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.67
Bid-YTW : 1.64 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.13
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-07
Maturity Price : 21.70
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 114,960 Desjardins crossed 108,900 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-07
Maturity Price : 23.56
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 2.58 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 86,379 Desjardins bought 31,200 from Nesbitt at 25.15 and 20,000 from RBC at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 3.06 %
BNS.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 36,400 TD crossed 20,000 at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-27
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.24
Bid-YTW : 2.53 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 28,122 TD crossed 20,500 at 27.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.29
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 26,659 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.28
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 26,487 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-07
Maturity Price : 24.20
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 20.75 – 21.40
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.4235

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-07
Maturity Price : 21.70
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %

TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.67 – 27.03
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2280

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-01
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.67
Bid-YTW : 1.64 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.01 – 23.59
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.4601

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-07
Maturity Price : 22.60
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.61 – 24.87
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1615

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-07
Maturity Price : 24.16
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %

RY.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.84 – 27.10
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1639

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.84
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.60 – 26.85
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1640

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %

Issue Comments

CZP.PR.A & CZP.PR.B: Ticker Change to AZP.PR.A & AZP.PR.B

Atlantic Power has announced:

Capital Power Income L.P. (the Partnership) and CPI Preferred Equity Ltd. (TSX: CZP.PR.A and CZP.PR.B) (the Corporation), subsidiaries of Atlantic Power Corporation (Atlantic Power), announced that the Partnership has changed its name to “Atlantic Power Limited Partnership” and the Corporation has changed its name to “Atlantic Power Preferred Equity Ltd.”.

In connection with the Corporation’s name change, the Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Shares, Series 1 of the Corporation and the Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 2 of the Corporation (which prior to the name change traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols “CZP.PR.A” and “CZP.PR.B”, respectively), will begin trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols “AZP.PR.A” and “AZP.PR.B”, respectively. It is expected that the preferred shares of the Corporation will begin trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the new symbols at the opening of business on or about February 7, 2012.

The name changes were made in connection with the acquisition of the Partnership by Atlantic Power completed on November 5, 2011.

These issues were last mentioned on PrefBlog when they were downgraded to P-4(low) by S&P. I also noted the DBRS update on January 31.

Both these issues are tracked by HIMIPref™ but are relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Market Action

February 6, 2012

Bloomberg has an interesting story about the legal snarl of an effective Greek default:

Hedge funds seeking to wring profits from a Greek debt restructuring are underestimating the will of policy makers to impose losses on them, according to investors who say trying to beat the politicians is too risky.

European banks own most of the 200 billion euros ($263 billion) of Greek debt held by non-government investors. Hedge funds, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and other “non- regulated investors,” own a further 60 billion euros, according to estimates by Pavan Wadhwa, JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s head of global interest-rate strategy.

Because hedge funds and other holders could collectively keep the participation rate below that level, Greece has said it may approve legislation that imposes losses on investors who don’t support the voluntary swap by adding a retroactive collective action clause into its bond documentation. Such a provision would give a majority of bondholders the ability to force holdouts to accept the same terms as everyone else.

It will be difficult for holdouts to assemble enough votes to block any collective action clause, because European banks have an incentive to support the provision, fund managers said.

A lawsuit against a collective-action clause legislated by the Greek government may also be difficult to win, because it would probably have to be filed in Greece, said a hedge-fund executive whose firm holds the country’s debt and has examined the legal options.

Never play poker with somebody who can change the rules! The question is: will anybody in their right minds ever buy Greek debt again? Or any European’s?

DBRS confirmed GMP.PR.B at Pfd-3(low):

DBRS has confirmed the Pfd-3 (low) rating on the Preferred Share obligations of GMP Capital Inc. (GMP or the Company) with a Stable trend. The rating reflects the strength of the Company’s business franchise as a premier provider of investment banking and capital markets products and services to its targeted market of mid-sized Canadian companies, most of whom operate in the resource and energy sectors. Following the issue of preferred shares in early 2011, the Company’s capitalization has become relatively more aggressive as a result of $66 million in share buybacks completed during the first nine months of 2011. At current levels of financial leverage, the Company’s financial flexibility is somewhat impaired. A continued slump in underwriting and trading activities, which DBRS does not expect to recover in the short to medium term given the weak global economic outlook and continued absence of investor confidence, will prevent a material improvement in this condition in the medium term. Nevertheless, DBRS remains comfortable with the Pfd-3 (low) rating, given the Company’s flexible cost base and its excess regulatory capital at its operating subsidiaries.

The recent run-up in the Canadian preferred share market took a pause today, with PerpetualPremiums down 7bp, FixedResets off 2bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 13bp. Volatility was significant and fairly evenly distributed between asset classes, winners and losers. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1917 % 2,427.2
FixedFloater 4.66 % 4.03 % 38,353 17.30 1 0.7407 % 3,348.5
Floater 2.75 % 2.96 % 61,127 19.81 3 -0.1917 % 2,620.7
OpRet 4.80 % -1.38 % 66,427 1.28 6 0.0566 % 2,533.2
SplitShare 5.28 % -0.29 % 79,904 0.84 4 0.3447 % 2,650.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0566 % 2,316.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % -8.51 % 109,775 0.09 26 -0.0691 % 2,232.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.04 % 4.88 % 192,811 15.62 4 -0.1545 % 2,452.5
FixedReset 5.00 % 2.48 % 225,863 2.31 65 -0.0250 % 2,402.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.86 % 1.58 % 225,221 0.96 45 -0.1266 % 2,333.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible -2.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium -1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-07
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : -9.16 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Premium -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.64
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 2.48 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.69
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.42
Bid-YTW : 1.82 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.52
Bid-YTW : 5.43 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 313,461 Desjardins crossed 101,000 at 25.10. RBC and Nesbitt both crossed 100,000 at 25.15 each.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 74,740 Nesbitt crossed 62,300 at 24.68.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-06
Maturity Price : 23.98
Evaluated at bid price : 24.48
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 47,629 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.29
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
BMO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 42,930 Desjardins sold 11,300 to National at 27.65 and another 10,000 to TD at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.62
Bid-YTW : 0.52 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 30,498 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.38
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 29,950 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 2.35 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 21.75 – 22.60
Spot Rate : 0.8500
Average : 0.6074

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-06
Maturity Price : 21.49
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 2.38 %

GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.51 – 25.84
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2229

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %

RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.10 – 26.38
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1733

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.26 %

PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.46 – 25.79
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2253

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-07
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : -14.92 %

RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 27.21 – 27.53
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2207

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.21
Bid-YTW : 1.58 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 28.08 – 28.50
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.3317

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 28.08
Bid-YTW : -1.38 %

MAPF

MAPF Performance: January 2012

The fund strongly outperformed in January as the fund’s long-standing overweighting in insurance company Straight Perpetuals finally paid off.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close January 31, 2012, was 10.6827.

Returns to January 31, 2012
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +5.99% +1.70% +1.68%
Three Months +6.50% +3.63% +3.16%
One Year +4.60% +7.88% +6.08%
Two Years (annualized) +10.99% +9.53% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +23.61% +14.53% +11.72%
Four Years (annualized) +18.63% +6.66%  
Five Years (annualized) +14.79% +4.15%  
Six Years (annualized) +13.20% +4.17%  
Seven Years (annualized) +12.10% +4.07%  
Eight Years (annualized) +12.04% +4.13%  
Nine Years (annualized) +13.64% +4.63%  
Ten Years (annualized) +12.50% +4.44%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.90%, +3.25% and +6.24%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +12.74%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.04%, +1.91% and +3.43% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.55%, +2.96% & +5.57%, respectively
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.61%, +2.75% & +6.36%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Fund returns in January were helped substantially by a very dramatic narrowing of the difference between bank-issued Straight Perpetuals and those issued by insurers and others. The following chart shows the difference in bid price between CM.PR.J and GWO.PR.I, which pay the same annual dividend. No correction has been made for the difference in ex-Dividend dates:


Click for Big

SLF, in particular, has been afflicted in recent months by relatively poor financial results and bouts of selling (see Who’s Selling all the SLF Preferreds? and Moody’s puts SLF on Review-Negative) but is showing signs of recovery.

SLF issues may be compared with PWF and GWO:


Click for Big

Click for Big

It is quite apparent that the pricing difference between SLF and similar issues has narrowed – and also that the market continues to treat regulated issues (SLF, GWO) no differently from unregulated issues (PWF).

The extent of the remaining SLF exceptionalism is better illustrated by a chart showing the current yield against the bid price:


Click for Big

Now, I certainly agree that GWO is a better credit than SLF and deserves a little bit of premium pricing – but the current situation goes far beyond what I consider reasonable.

Amazingly, SLF continues to trade cheaper than WN:


Click for Big

In order to rationalize the relationship between the Current Yields we are asked to believe:

  • That the additional credit quality of SLF is worthless
    • It is possible, of course, to argue that WN is actually a better credit than SLF, or that the scarcity value of a non-financial preferred outweighs the difference in credit. I have not yet heard these arguments being made
  • The option value of the issuer’s call is worthless
    • This can be phrased as ‘The potential capital gain for the SLF issues prior to a call, relative to that of the WN issues, is worthless’
  • The potential of a regulatory inspired call for the SLF issues is worthless
    • the SLF issues are currently Tier 1 Capital at the holding company level, but do not have an NVCC clause

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works – and in 2011 circumstances were closer to the third possibility than they have generally been in the past. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
January, 2012 10.6827 5.04%
Note
1.00 5.040% 1.0000 $0.5384
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on January 31; all of the former and most of the latter currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position in SplitShare issues (mainly BNA.PR.C) and an OperatingRetractible Scrap (YLO.PR.B) which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par (capped at 10% for the latter issue), a somewhat dubious assumption in the latter case.

The decline in the calculated sustainable yield is due to a significant shortening of term over the month – the recent run-up in the prices of longer-term issues has made it prudent to increase the investment in shorter-term, better-credit, lower-yielding FixedResets, although the weighting in this asset class remains well below index levels.

I will no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as there are currently only four such issues of investment grade, from only two issues. Additionally, the fund has substantially reduced its holdings of these issues.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.