Market Action

July 13, 2011

This is cool: Capital Structure Arbitrage-Implied Index Trading:

In this paper, we develop long-short trading strategies derived from the work of Merton [1974], which provides theoretical relationships between equity, equity volatility, and credit. We then apply the strategies to index products structured primarily based on U.S. investment grade assets.

We find that an optimized Merton-based strategy results in significant trading profits when applied over the span of time for which data is available. Furthermore, we find that trading profits can be enhanced by incorporating information derived from short-term volatility. Given the unlimited number of index combinations spanning different asset classes, geographies and tranche levels, we recommend that further work be allocated to the promising area of capital-structure arbitrage implied index trading.


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Figure 2 shows a graphical summary of the relationship among the CDX Investment Grade index, S&P 500, and the VIX. There are a few general qualitative observations from this graph. First of all, high levels of CDX IG are typically accompanied by high levels of volatility. This suggests that volatility may be a reasonable predictor for the credit spread. Another important observation is that the slope of CDX.IG as a function of SPX changes over time and over different market conditions. The time-varying relationship is expected, since credit spread is fundamentally a stationary process, while the equity index is obviously non-stationary. This time-varying relationship makes it difficult to directly use the slope as the hedge ratio in the credit-index index arbitrage.

Overview of Merton Model

In a seminal paper, Merton [1974] proposed a structural model that provides a theoretical relationship between a firm’s equity value and its credit risk. The key concept behind the Merton model is that default occurs when the firm’s asset value falls below its debt value. Hence, investment in a firm’s equity can be viewed as purchasing a call option on the firm’s assets, with the value of the debt as the strike price. The Merton model makes the same assumptions as in the Black-Scholes options pricing framework, such as the log-normal distribution of asset value.

Italian regulators are ratcheting up pressure on short-sellers:

Italy’s market regulator has recommended to stakeholders who have lent shares in Italian companies to retrieve them, Consob head said on Wednesday, confirming reports of a move aimed at curbing short-selling. “Yes, we’ve exercised moral suasion by asking all those who have lent shares to retrieve them,” Consob Chairman Giuseppe Vegas told journalists on the sideline of a conference.

He added the request was not binding.

More opinions on the Yellow / Trader / Apax deal:

Moody’s has trouble wrapping its head around the [Trader] company’s strength as it moves into the digital environment.

“While this is a plausible proposition that has been successfully executed in the U.K. and elsewhere using the Trader brand, there is some uncertainty that the same formula can be applied in Trader’s circumstances in Canada,” the rating agency noted.

“Trader will have to grow its per digital customer yield and increase market penetration, neither of which is a given.”

Moody’s ultimately slapped a B3 rating on the name.

Speaking of Moody’s they put the US on Review Negative:

Moody’s Investors Service put the U.S. under review for a credit rating downgrade as talks to raise the government’s $14.3 trillion debt limit stall, adding to concern that political gridlock will lead to a default.

The Aaa ratings of financial institutions directly linked to the U.S. government, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and the Federal Farm Credit Banks, were also put on review for cuts, Moody’s said in a statement today.

The U.S., rated Aaa since 1917, was put on review for the first time since 1995 on concern the debt limit will not be raised in time to prevent a missed payment of interest or principal on outstanding bonds and notes even though the risk remains low, Moody’s said. The rating would likely be reduced to the Aa range and there is no assurance that Moody’s would return its top rating even if a default is quickly cured.

DBRS has released its Split Share Funds Quarterly Report – Q2 2011:

Q2 2011 was the first quarter since Q2 2010 that the average downside protection for split shares rated by DBRS decreased. Notwithstanding the declines over the past three months, the average downside protection of DBRS-rated preferred shares was about 51% at the end of Q2 2011, a signifi cant increase over the 45% and 40% averages at the end of Q2 2010 and Q2 2009, respectively. As a result of the additional buffer of downside protection built up over time, it is expected that the negative performance during Q2 2011 will generally not result in negative rating actions for preferred shares or securities rated by DBRS.

It was a mixed day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 25bp, FixedResets up 16bp and DeemedRetractibles down 8bp. Not much volatility. Volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.45%, equivalent to 7.08% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.2% (!) so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 190bp, a significant widening from the 175bp reported on July 6, as preferreds did not participate in the extraordinary 15bp week’s decline in long corporate yields.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1650 % 2,441.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1650 % 3,671.7
Floater 2.48 % 2.32 % 42,413 21.41 4 -0.1650 % 2,635.9
OpRet 4.86 % 2.06 % 63,754 0.22 9 -0.0171 % 2,444.7
SplitShare 5.24 % 2.02 % 55,511 0.62 6 -0.0287 % 2,508.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0171 % 2,235.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.69 % 5.15 % 133,485 0.78 13 0.0748 % 2,090.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.44 % 5.45 % 110,902 14.72 17 0.2466 % 2,199.1
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.15 % 212,031 2.67 58 0.1606 % 2,323.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.10 % 4.87 % 261,071 8.09 47 -0.0828 % 2,153.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-13
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 2.32 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.I FixedReset 207,525 Nesbitt crossed five blocks: 50,000 shares, 54,000 shares, 40,000 shares, 20,000 shares and 30,000 shares; all at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 140,800 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 116,473 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.58; Desjardins crossed blocks of 40,00 and 10,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 51,900 TD crossed 40,000 at 27.25; Desjardins crossed 10,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.22
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 45,290 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.43
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 41,630 RBC crossed 29,200 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
NA.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.86 – 25.15
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1944

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %

GWO.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 26.90 – 27.25
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2557

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.90
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %

SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.68 – 22.97
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2149

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.68
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 24.16 – 24.44
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.2053

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %

GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.24 – 25.43
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1260

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %

RY.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 27.46 – 27.70
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1819

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %

Interesting External Papers

Fixed Income Strategies of Insurance Companies and Pension Funds

The Committee on the Global Financial System, a unit of the Bank for International Settlements, has released a Working Group Report titled Fixed income strategies of insurance companies and pension funds:

Insurance companies will be affected to a greater extent by the introduction of Solvency II, a comprehensive risk-based regulatory framework to be phased in from 2013. Solvency II and other risk-based regulatory regimes in Europe require that assets should be marked to market and that liabilities be discounted at risk-free rates (possibly augmented by an illiquidity premium). Solvency II also requires insurers to hold loss-absorbing capital against the full range of risks on both their asset and liability side to weather unexpected losses with a probability of 99.5% over a one-year horizon. While the latest quantitative impact study by European insurance regulators suggests that the majority of insurance companies will not face an imminent need to raise new equity, they may rebalance their asset portfolios in line with the new risk charges. The proposed changes tend to make it more expensive to hold equity-like instruments, structured products, and long-term or low-rated corporate bonds, whereas government bonds and covered bonds will receive relatively favourable capital treatment.

A related concern is whether life insurers and pension funds can maintain a long-term investor perspective. Factors contributing to this concern among market participants include the steep regulatory risk charges and short horizons to be used for assessing solvency and for addressing funding shortfalls. Prospective volatility in financial statements under international accounting rules may also limit the scope for taking long-term or illiquid positions without any concern for short-term fluctuations in their value. As is the case for institutional investors more generally, these factors tend to encourage a shift away from long term investing in risky assets, in addition to the ongoing trend toward more conservative asset allocations in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This could alter the traditional role of life insurance companies and pension funds as global providers of long-term risk capital. A partial retreat of institutional investors from the long-term and/or illiquid segment of the credit market could reduce the private and social benefits the sector generates through long-term investing, and the extent to which it mitigates the procyclicality of the financial system.

In Solvency II, both assets and liabilities are marked to market, ie fair valued. The present value of liabilities, or technical provision, is defined as the amount an insurer would have to pay to transfer its insurance obligations immediately to another willing buyer. It consists of the best estimate, the present value of the expected future cash flows (net payments to policyholders), calculated on a specified discount rate curve (term structure), and the risk margin, which is an additional premium above the best estimate. How the discount rate is constructed is of considerable importance given that the risk margin, and the present value of liabilities, will increase when this rate decreases.

The current expectation of how this rate will be constructed, is the swap curve (excluding credit risk), augmented by an illiquidity premium for those obligations coming due more than a year ahead. (This was also the discount rate used in Quantitative Impact Study 5.) In addition, an extrapolation (technique) towards a fixed rate (ultimate forward rate) will be used to get the discount rates for longer maturities than those available from market rates in different countries.

The motivation for adding an illiquidity premium, according to the proponents, is that there is general acceptance that the valuation of corporate bonds should take into account risk spreads in the discounting of future cash flows.35 Bond spreads during the crisis far exceeded the cost of credit risk mitigation (CDS spreads), and therefore included a substantial component pricing in illiquidity. The important role the illiquidity premium played in the valuation of assets, while liability cash flows continued to be discounted at the risk free rate, was largely responsible for a substantial shortfall in insurers’ balance sheets. The application of the illiquidity premium on the liability side would aim to reduce this valuation mismatch to avoid situations where insurers are forced to dispose of illiquid assets. The financial condition of insurers would be improved by allowing them to discount liabilities at a higher rate when markets are illiquid. Such a countercyclical mechanism might even mean that insurers would be willing to take on additional illiquid assets in a period of market distress, depending on whether the change in their net asset-liability position would improve their capital position.

Government bonds. Since European government bonds in domestic currency are classified as risk-free under Solvency II, there is a clear regulatory incentive to increase exposure to this asset class, including to euro area periphery debt. However, major insurance companies also rely on internal risk models that account for spread and default risk on sovereign debt. As in the case of banks, this would tend to moderate the incentive to shift toward high-yield sovereign debt even if the overall demand for sovereign debt is likely to rise. On balance, however, one may expect greater demand for long-dated sovereign debt which, all else equal, will further contribute to low long-term interest rates. In addition, insurers’ efforts to reduce their duration gaps tend to reinforce the demand for long-dated government debt from an ALM perspective.

Any sizeable shifts in the government bond space may lead to noticeable financial market implications, given the volume of government bonds on the balance sheets of insurers (as well as on those of pension funds, see Section 2.4). Depending on initial conditions and current bond holdings, further shifts into government bonds may well produce downward pressure on yields, although differentiation across issuer countries is likely to occur.

Corporate and covered bonds. The impact of Solvency II on the corporate bond market is also potentially significant. Historically, insurance companies constitute a key investor base, holding more than 30% of the corporate bond supply.48 Solvency II will impose capital charges on corporate and covered bonds that did not exist under Solvency I, although internal models at large insurers had taken into account credit risk before Solvency II was developed.

Under the standard formula, Solvency II capital charges have relatively steep duration and credit slopes which can be expected to lead to some portfolio adjustments. The capital requirements for corporate and covered bonds are calculated by multiplying a rating-induced shock factor with the duration of the bonds. A BBB-rated bond with a duration of 10 therefore requires 25% (=2.5%*10) in equity capital before diversification benefits. This formula appears to penalise long-term bonds since credit spreads at the long end are less volatile than those at the short end. The credit slope is similarly steep.49 Corporate bonds with a low rating effectively attract a capital charge similar to that of equities.

Under the instrument-specific capital requirements in Solvency II, the following
investment allocations generate the same capital requirement under the standard formula:

  • 100% in covered bonds (AAA-rated) with a duration of one year,
  • 20% in covered bonds (AAA-rated) with a duration of five years, and the rest in EEA government bonds,
  • 13.3% in corporate bonds, AAA-rated, with a duration of five years, and the rest in EEA government bonds,
  • 8.6% in corporate bonds, A-rated, with a duration of five years, and the rest in EEA government bonds,
  • 1.6% in corporate bonds, B-rated, with a duration of five years, and the rest in EEA government bonds,
  • 1.5% in “global equities” and the rest in EEA government bonds,
  • 1.2% in “other equities” and the rest in EEA government bonds.

What it looks like to me is that the net effect will be to shift funding risk from the financial economy to the real economy. Once this is in place look for the next financial crisis to be propogated much more thoroughly to the real economy, with lots of firms finding they have debt coming due that cannot be rolled.

Market Action

July 12, 2012

Trader Corporation is issuing USD junk bonds:

One deal has launched in the high-yield market this morning as issuance remains slow. Trader Corporation, a Canadian online automotive marketplace, announced a US$275m seven-year non-call three senior secured offering via RBC sole books. The roadshow begins tomorrow with pricing expected late next week. Proceeds will fund the acquisition of Trader Corp by Apax Partners.

So what’s the better bet for junk? Yellow Media, Trader Corp, or Ireland?:

A late-day rally in U.S. stocks faded after Ireland’s debt rating was cut to junk at Moody’s Investors Service, overshadowing signs the Federal Reserve had not ruled out further stimulus efforts.

The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index lost 0.1 percent to 1,318.06 at 3:33 p.m. in New York after climbing as much as 0.6 percent. The benchmark gauge tumbled 2.5 percent in the previous two days, its worst back-to-back slump since March. Moody’s cut Ireland’s government bond rating one notch to Ba1 from Baa3, spurring concern Europe’s debt crisis is worsening.

DBRS confirmed CM:

CIBC’s current strategy should contribute to earnings stability and improved capital levels, thereby better positioning the Bank for future downturns. As capital is freed up from the reduction in the run-off book, DBRS would like to see resources deployed in less volatile businesses that are a natural extension of existing capabilities. The latest financial crisis provided CIBC with the opportunity to purchase CITI Cards Canada Inc.’s Canadian MasterCard portfolio which DBRS believes is consistent with CIBC’s desire to accelerate growth in its core banking business by strengthening its number one position in credit cards and being a dual credit card issuer in Canada.

DBRS assigned some Allied Irish notes as Default:

In respect of the Notes, the High Court has declared that the subordinated liabilities order (SLO) issued by the High Court on 14 April 2011 under the Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Act 2010 is effective as of 22 April 2011. The SLO amends the terms of the subordinated debt, including interest due, so that it is payable only at the option of AIB; and the maturity date of the Notes has been extended to June 2035. Additionally, in accordance with the amendments, AIB announced that no payment of interest that would have been due to holders of the Notes on 25 June 2011 will be made by AIB.

The downgrade reflects the halting of interest payments on the Notes by AIB and DBRS’s expectation that the future interest payments of these outstanding subordinated instruments will be halted, as allowed by the High Court. Further, the downgrade considers the aforementioned extension of the final maturity date. Given that bondholders are unlikely to receive interest as agreed upon and that the expected maturity has been extended, DBRS views these actions as disadvantageous to bondholders, which is considered a default under DBRS policy.

Thre was similar action on Irish Life & Permanent:

DBRS Inc. (DBRS) today has downgraded the Dated Subordinated Debt rating of Irish Life & Permanent plc (IL&P or the Group) to “D” from “C”. Today’s downgrade follows the execution of the Group’s note tender offer.

The default status for the purchased and now-extinguished notes reflects DBRS’s view that bondholders were offered limited options and that a distressed exchange has now occurred, which is considered a default under DBRS policy, as discussed in DBRS’s press release dated 8 June 2011.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 12bp, FixedResets up 1bp and DeemedRetractibles down 8bp. Volatility was good. Volume remained very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.7512 % 2,445.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.7512 % 3,677.7
Floater 2.48 % 2.29 % 43,048 21.50 4 1.7512 % 2,640.3
OpRet 4.86 % 2.25 % 64,666 0.22 9 0.0514 % 2,445.2
SplitShare 5.24 % 2.01 % 55,517 0.62 6 -0.0055 % 2,508.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0514 % 2,235.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.69 % 5.06 % 134,358 0.78 13 0.0580 % 2,089.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.46 % 5.46 % 114,555 14.70 17 0.1222 % 2,193.6
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.19 % 208,976 2.67 58 0.0073 % 2,319.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.10 % 4.86 % 264,688 8.10 47 -0.0793 % 2,155.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.47
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.25 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 6.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-12
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 2.29 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 542,720 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 136,070 Nesbitt crossd 100,000 at 26.20; RBC crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 87,661 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 64,775 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.18
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 58,435 TD bought three blocks from Nesbitt, of 10,300 shares, 19,900 and 15,500, all at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 56,900 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.25
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.46 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.5400
Average : 0.3362

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-12
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.00 – 25.45
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3360

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-12
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %

RY.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 26.20 – 26.59
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2859

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %

HSB.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 27.40 – 27.69
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1913

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.40
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.90 – 26.30
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3032

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %

RY.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 27.45 – 27.70
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1588

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %

Issue Comments

IFC.PR.A Above Par on Excellent Volume

Intact Financial Corporation has announced:

that it has closed its bought deal offering (the “Offering”) of Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class A Shares Series 1 (the “Series 1 Preferred Shares”) underwritten by a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Capital Markets, Scotia Capital Inc. and TD Securities Inc., and including BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., National Bank Financial Inc., Canaccord Genuity Corp., GMP Securities L.P., Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd., HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc. and Raymond James Ltd. (the “Underwriters”), resulting in gross proceeds (including the over-allotment option proceeds) to IFC of $250,000,000.

IFC entered into an underwriting agreement dated June 27, 2011 with the Underwriters under which the Underwriters agreed to purchase from IFC and sell to the public 9,000,000 Series 1 Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per Series 1 Preferred Share for gross proceeds to IFC of $225,000,000. The Underwriters have exercised their over-allotment option and purchased an additional 1,000,000 Series 1 Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per Series 1 Preferred Share for gross proceeds to IFC of $25,000,000.

The net proceeds from the Offering, together with borrowings under acquisition credit facilities previously arranged by IFC, the proceeds of a previously announced subscription receipt offering, the net proceeds from a previously announced private placement of medium term notes and a portion of IFC’s existing cash resources are intended to be used by IFC to fund the purchase price for its previously announced acquisition of all of the issued and outstanding shares of AXA Canada Inc. (the “Acquisition”). The closing of the Acquisition is expected to occur in the fall of 2011 and is subject to receipt of required competition and insurance regulatory approvals and the satisfaction of certain closing conditions. The Offering is not conditional upon closing of the Acquisition; if the Acquisition is not completed, the net proceeds of the Offering will be used for general corporate purposes.

The holders of Series 1 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive fixed non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of IFC, on a quarterly basis (with the first quarterly dividend to be paid on September 30, 2011), for the initial fixed rate period ending on December 31, 2017, based on an annual rate of 4.20%. The dividend rate will be reset on December 31, 2017 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 1.72%.

Holders of the Series 1 Preferred Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their Series 1 Preferred Shares into Non-cumulative Floating Rate Class A Shares Series 2 (the “Series 2 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on December 31, 2017 and on December 31 every five years thereafter. The holders of Series 2 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive floating rate non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of IFC, at a rate equal to the 90-day Canadian Treasury Bill rate plus 1.72%.

DBRS Limited has assigned a rating of Pfd-2(low) with a Stable trend for the Series 1 Preferred Shares.

The Series 1 Preferred Shares will commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange on July 12, 2011 under the symbol IFC.PR.A.

IFC.PR.A is a FixedReset, 4.20%+172 announced June 22. The issue traded 542,720 shares today in a range of 24.95-17 before closing at 25.08-15.

IFC.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been assigned to the FixedReset index. As Intact Financial is an insurance holding company and the issue does not have an NVCC clause, a DeemedMaturity entry has been added to the call schedule for this issue – see the January, February, March and June editions of PrefLetter for discusion.

Vital Statistics are:

IFC.PR.A FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
Market Action

July 11, 2011

Is your country falling apart? Blame the short sellers!

Italy’s financial-market regulator moved to curb short selling after the country’s benchmark stock index fell the most in almost five months and bonds tumbled on investor concern Italy would be the next victim of the region’s debt crisis.

The regulator known as Consob ordered last night that short sellers must reveal their positions when they reach 0.2 percent or more of a company’s capital and then make additional filings for each additional 0.1 percent. The measure takes effect today and lasts until Sept. 9.

Another good technique is to bury the critics in paperwork:

Credit-ratings companies may be forced to disclose the internal analyses they use when they decide to cut a European Union government’s rating, the region’s financial services commissioner said.

Nations may win the right to check the data used by the companies in advance of downgrades of their sovereign ratings, Michel Barnier said in the text of a speech in Paris speech today. The measures may be included in legislation to rein in the ratings firms, he said.

But life is tough when you’re squaring the circle:

European finance chiefs clashed over how to dig Greece out of its financial hole just as markets battered the bonds of Spain and Italy, opening a new front in the debt crisis.

Finance ministers weighed how to get private bondholders to maintain their exposure to Greek debt in a way that doesn’t prompt credit-rating companies to declare a formal default.

Forcing bondholders to chip in would be “fatal,” Austrian Finance Minister Maria Fekter told reporters before a crisis meeting in Brussels today.

Late news is that maybe the taxpayers will foot the bill:

European finance ministers revived the prospect of bond buybacks to ease Greece’s plight and declined to rule out a temporary default, struggling to contain the debt crisis as investors pounded Italy, the continent’s third-largest economy.

Prodded by investors and the European Central Bank, the euro’s guardians said a bailout fund set up last year may be used to buy bonds in the secondary market or enable Greece to retire its debt at a discount. They offered another cut in rates on its emergency loans.

For all their recent problems, US brokerages have always been a far better and far more profitable place to work than those in Canada. Here’s why:

A headhunter put Muller in touch with Morgan Stanley, which was then looking for a quant strategist to drum up business. Muller had bigger aspirations and cut a deal with Derek Bandeen, a prop-trading executive. Muller had two years to get a profitable trading system running. If he failed, he would perform the strategist’s job. PDT was born.

The CSA has released a staff notice titled MARKETING PRACTICES OF PORTFOLIO MANAGERS:

We identified a number of deficiencies in the preparation, review and use of marketing materials by the PMs we reviewed.
Generally, the deficiencies were grouped into one of the following areas:
1. Preparation and use of hypothetical performance data
2. Exaggerated and unsubstantiated claims
3. Policies, procedures and internal controls
4. Use of benchmarks
5. Performance composites
6. Holding out and use of names
7. Other performance return issues
8. Disclosure related issues

Interesting piece on ETFs:

Using Deutsche Bank’s numbers, and then comparing them to a recent McKinsey & Co. analysis of Europe’s fund management industry, the Financial Times found that ETF’s likely account for 13 per cent of the Europe’s €9-billion in fund profits. More importantly, the profit margins on ETFs are sky high — 55.5 basis points of assets under management for ETFs versus 12.5 basis points for traditional funds.

And within ETFs, there’s a difference in profit margins between synthetic ETFs and physically replicated ETFs. The first type posts profit margins of 69 per cent, while the latter has profit margins of 64 per cent.

Past studies have found that over 50 per cent of assets under management in European ETFs are now placed in synthetic ETFs.

Makes sense. All the MER on funds goes to the salesman.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 13bp, FixedResets ahead 1bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 9bp. Volatility was good. Volume was extremely light.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.4539 % 2,403.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.4539 % 3,614.4
Floater 2.52 % 2.47 % 43,153 21.09 4 -1.4539 % 2,594.9
OpRet 4.87 % 2.33 % 62,558 0.22 9 0.1116 % 2,443.9
SplitShare 5.24 % 1.35 % 55,283 0.63 6 -0.2567 % 2,508.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1116 % 2,234.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.69 % 5.21 % 135,384 0.86 13 0.0657 % 2,087.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.46 % 5.46 % 115,635 14.70 17 0.1274 % 2,191.0
FixedReset 5.17 % 3.16 % 211,446 2.68 57 0.0126 % 2,319.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.09 % 4.87 % 265,887 8.10 47 -0.0939 % 2,157.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -5.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-11
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 2.47 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.52
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-11
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.05
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.92
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 60,576 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 53,400 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 51,710 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 30,760 Nesbitt crossed 12,000 at 24.94.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 29,090 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.09.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 25,228 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
There were 16 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 21.41 – 23.20
Spot Rate : 1.7900
Average : 1.2050

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-11
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 2.47 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.55 – 27.24
Spot Rate : 0.6900
Average : 0.4677

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.39 – 25.92
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3299

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %

SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.30 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.5742

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %

PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.31 – 23.75
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3226

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-11
Maturity Price : 23.05
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.85 – 26.29
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3227

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %

Issue Comments

BCE.PR.I: Rate Change to 4.15%; Exchangeable to Ratchets

BCE announced earlier:

Beginning on June 17, 2011 and ending on July 22, 2011, holders of Series AI Preferred Shares will have the right to choose one of the following options with regards to their shares:

1. To retain any or all of their Series AI Preferred Shares and continue to receive a fixed quarterly dividend; or
2. To convert, on a one-for-one basis, any or all of their Series AI Preferred Shares into BCE Inc. Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AJ (the “Series AJ Preferred Shares”) and receive a floating monthly dividend.

Effective August 1, 2011, the fixed dividend rate for the Series AI Preferred Shares will be set for a five-year period as explained in more detail in paragraph 5 of the attached Notice of Conversion Privilege. Should you wish to continue receiving a fixed quarterly dividend for the five-year period beginning August 1, 2011, you do not need to take any action with respect to this notice. However, should you wish to receive a floating monthly dividend, you must elect to convert your Series AI Preferred Shares into Series AJ Preferred Shares as explained in more detail in the attached Notice of Conversion Privilege.

Today BCE announced the chosen rate:

BCE Inc. will, on August 1, 2011, continue to have Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AI outstanding if, following the end of the conversion period on July 22, 2011, BCE Inc. determines that at least two million Series AI Preferred Shares would remain outstanding. In such a case, as of August 1, 2011, the Series AI Preferred Shares will pay, on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE Inc., a fixed cash dividend for the following five years that will be based on an annual fixed dividend rate equal to 4.15%.

If converted, the symbol for the Ratchet Rate issue will be BCE.PR.J, which does not currently exist.

PrefLetter

July PrefLetter Released!

The July, 2011, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The July edition contains a short appendix reviewing yield calculations; some of the assumptions inherent in the calculations; and notes about how those assumptions can become invalid.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the July, 2011, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the August, 2011, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close August 12 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on August 15.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

Issue Comments

SBN.PR.A Annual Report 2010

S Split Corp. has released its Annual Report to December 31, 2010.

SBN / SBN.PR.A Performance
Instrument One
Year
Three
Years
Whole Unit +8.65% +3.20%
SBN.PR.A +5.38% +5.38%
SBN +11.71% +1.45%
BNS (underlying) +20.4% +8.99%

Figures of interest are:

MER: 2.26% of the whole unit value

Average Asset Value: $82-million

Underlying Portfolio Yield: When fully invested will be equal to BNS common: 3.63%

Income Coverage: 0.5:1 – they have often kept a lot of cash on the books.

Market Action

July 8, 2011

IOSCO would like to protect incompetent traders from evil High Frequency players, but has not yet found a plausible excuse:

In a new consultation paper, the International Organization of Securities Commissions lays out what it knows about high frequency traders, and the upshot is not much — but the regulatory body is voicing some significant concerns. Chief among them is that the technological advantage of high-frequency traders gives them an unfair edge, causing other investors to drop out of markets, and whether their speed and sophistication make it too hard for regulators to ensure they aren’t gaming markets.

The full report notes that the comment period closes August 12, 2011.

In a similar vein, Europe is hoping to punish rating agencies for being independent:

The head of the European Commission says the practices of the three top credit rating agencies will come under scrutiny and that Europe could benefit from having its own agency.

Rating agencies have had a central role in warning about Europe’s debt crisis, though many politicians have criticized them for fanning fears.

Jose Manuel Barroso said the Commission “will come up with some proposals in the autumn” on regulating the agencies, but did not give any detail.

He said the agencies sometimes anticipate risks but can also “overrate” them.

There was a nice jobs number in the US … nice for bonds:

American employers added jobs at the slowest pace in nine months in June and the unemployment rate unexpectedly climbed to 9.2 percent, sending global stocks tumbling on concern the world’s biggest economy is faltering.

Employers increased payrolls by 18,000 workers, less than the most pessimistic forecast in a Bloomberg News survey of economists, which called for growth of 105,000. The increase followed a 25,000 gain that was less than half the initial estimate. Hiring by companies was the weakest since May 2010.

What a difference a day makes!

[Yesterday]

Treasuries ended a two-day rally as a private report said U.S. companies added more jobs than forecast and economists said government data tomorrow will show nonfarm payrolls gained, fueling bets economic growth is accelerating.

Ten-year yields rose from a one-week low as stocks climbed after the European Central Bank signaled it will ease Portugal’s access to emergency funds. ADP Employer Services said U.S. firms’ payrolls increased by 157,000 jobs in June, and unemployment claims fell for the first time in three weeks. The U.S. said it will sell $66 billion in notes and bonds next week.

DBRS confirmed GWO:

Like its major peers, the Company is anchored by its Canadian operations which benefit from an oligopolistic industry structure which limits the worst of price competition. Increasing scale in the U.S. retirement saving administration and focused niches in Europe, primarily in the United Kingdom, represent stable sources of earnings contributions. The Company avoided the adverse reserve development which was experienced by a number of competitors on account of Guaranteed Minimum Withdrawal Benefits (GMWB) segregated funds inasmuch as GWO did not begin to offer the product until it had arrived at an efficient and effective hedging strategy which complemented its conservative product design.

Fixed charge coverage ratios at GWO nevertheless remain healthier than those of its peers, reflecting stronger profitability, albeit lower than historical. GWO also continues to employ a higher proportion of innovative/hybrid capital instruments which keep its adjusted debt ratio (giving equity treatment to certain capital instruments) relatively low. The Company is actively retiring capital instruments issued at its operating companies in order to have a higher proportion of capital issuance at the holding company level which will serve to reduce its double leverage ratio. In short, DBRS considers the Company’s financial leverage and capital position to be consistent with the current rating category as long as it continues to operate conservatively. However, financial flexibility is limited at this rating category.

As an integral component of the Power Financial group of companies, GWO benefits from its parent’s financial support and its strong governance and risk management controls and procedures, which reinforce the conservative bottom-line focus of the Company.

DBRS also confirmed BMO:

BMO’s capital ratios were solid and the quality of capital was strong relative to its Canadian bank peers at the end of Q2 2011. However, the acquisition of M&I resulted in a reduction in the pro forma Basel II tangible common equity (TCE) and Tier 1 ratios to 9.4% and 11.9% (based on April 30, 2011), respectively, which are at the low end of BMO’s Canadian bank peer group, albeit still well in excess of regulatory requirements. On a Basel III basis (also based on April 30, 2011), the pro forma TCE and Tier 1 ratios were 6.9% and 9.2%, respectively.

BMO’s long-term Deposits & Senior Debt rating at AA is composed of an intrinsic assessment of AA (low) and a support assessment of SA2 (reflecting the expectation of systemic and timely external support by the government of Canada). The SA2 status results in a one-notch benefit to the senior debt and deposits and subordinated debt ratings.

What happened to Yellow this week? TD Newcrest doesn’t like the common any more, which is important to some:

TD Newcrest analyst Scott Cuthbertson threw in the towel on Yellow Media Inc. (YLO-T2.40-0.29-10.78%), slashing his price target by half to $2 and downgrading it to “sell” after having recommended investors hold it since the beginning of March 2010, when the stock traded around $6.

YLO Issues, 2011-7-8
Ticker Quote
6/30
Quote
7/8
Bid YTW
7/8
YTW
Scenario
7/8
Performance
6/30 – 7/8
(bid/bid)
YLO.PR.A 22.55-69 22.03-38 13.50% Soft Maturity
2012-12-30
-2.31%
YLO.PR.B 15.14-15 15.00-70 15.68% Soft Maturity
2017-06-29
-0.92%
YLO.PR.C 15.21-48 15.02-11 10.83% Limit Maturity -1.24%
YLO.PR.D 15.50-77 15.22-45 10.92% Limit Maturity -1.81%

It was an uneven day in the Canadian Preferred Share Market, with PerpetualDiscounts flat (exactly!), FixedResets up 1bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 16bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0473 % 2,438.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0473 % 3,667.8
Floater 2.48 % 2.30 % 43,552 21.49 4 -0.0473 % 2,633.1
OpRet 4.87 % 2.40 % 62,729 0.23 9 -0.1286 % 2,441.2
SplitShare 5.23 % 1.33 % 53,553 0.63 6 0.0540 % 2,515.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1286 % 2,232.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.70 % 5.11 % 135,961 0.79 13 0.0031 % 2,086.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.47 % 5.45 % 116,606 14.73 17 0.0000 % 2,188.2
FixedReset 5.17 % 3.16 % 217,908 2.68 57 0.0113 % 2,319.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.09 % 4.82 % 268,911 8.12 47 0.1596 % 2,159.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -3.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.49
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
NA.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 4.77 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 2.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.48
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 2.19 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.S FixedReset 119,100 RBC crossed 116,100 at 25.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 43,150 Scotia crossd 23,600 at 27.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.19
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 34,770 RBC crossed 25,000 at 24.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 33,600 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 24.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 4.71 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 27,100 Scotia crossed 19,000 at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.19
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
FTS.PR.C OpRet 26,050 RBC bought 12,500 from Nesbitt at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-08-07
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : -4.67 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 22.75 – 23.60
Spot Rate : 0.8500
Average : 0.5635

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.49
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %

SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.30 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.4363

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.50 – 24.90
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2599

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.30 – 25.68
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2549

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.47 – 22.90
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3065

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.17
Evaluated at bid price : 22.47
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %

PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.61 – 24.07
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3459

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 23.61
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %

Indices and ETFs

TXPR Rebalancing: July 2011

Standard & Poor’s has announced the current revision to the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index, reflecting their updated methodology:

Standard & Poor’s Canadian Index Operations announces the following index changes as a result of the quarterly S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index Review. These changes will be effective at the open on Monday, July 18, 2011

TXPR Revision 2011/7
Additions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
DBRS
Rating
Last
Index
Action
BCE.PR.B  
SJR.PR.A  

TXPR Revision 2011/7
Deletions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
DBRS
Rating
Last
Index
Action
BCE.PR.Y  
BPO.PR.I  
DC.PR.B  
EMA.PR.A  
GWO.PR.F  
IAG.PR.F  
L.PR.A  
TCL.PR.D  
WN.PR.D  

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