New Issue: HSE FixedReset 4.45%+173

March 10th, 2011

Husky Energy Inc. has announced:

that it has agreed to issue to a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and BMO Capital Markets (collectively the “Underwriters”) for distribution to the public 10,000,000 Cumulative Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series 1 (the “Series 1 Shares”). The Series 1 Shares will be issued at a price of $25.00 per Series 1 Share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $250 million. Holders of the Series 1 Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.45% annually for the initial period ending March 31, 2016. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 1.73%.

Holders of Series 1 Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Cumulative Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series 2 (the “Series 2 Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on March 31, 2016 and on March 31 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series 2 Shares will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 1.73%.

Husky Energy has granted the Underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part prior to closing, to purchase up to an additional 2,000,000 Series 1 Shares at the same offering price. The Series 1 Shares will be offered by way of prospectus supplement to the short form base shelf prospectus of Husky Energy dated November 26, 2010.

The prospectus supplement will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in all provinces of Canada.

The net proceeds from this offering will be used for repayment of existing indebtedness, capital expenditures, corporate and asset acquisitions and for general corporate purposes. The offering is expected to close on or about March 18, 2011, subject to customary closing conditions and required regulatory approvals.

Nice to see a new investment grade issuer in the market – although some might take it as an indication that the market is overvalued.

Update: Rated Pfd-2(low) by DBRS:

DBRS has today assigned a rating of Pfd-2 (low) with a Stable trend to Husky Energy Inc.’s (Husky) Cumulative Redeemable Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 1 (Series 1 Preferred Shares), with a dividend rate of 4.45% per annum, payable quarterly for the initial five-year period ending March 31, 2016.

The DBRS rating is based on the expectation that the Series 1 Preferred Shares will remain the most highly ranked preferred shares issued by Husky.

March 9, 2011

March 10th, 2011

The day started with rumours that some of the owners of Alpha Trading Systems don’t want big brother to get married:

Four of the country’s six largest banks are lining up to raise red flags about the planned merger of the parent companies of the Toronto Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange, saying the country risks losing clout as a financial centre.

The banks plan to lay out their concerns this week in a public letter. The wording of the letter, tentatively titled “Let’s build on a Canadian success story,” has not been finalized, nor has the list of signatories, but sources said Tuesday that the banks that were on side as of then included Toronto-Dominion Bank, which is co-ordinating the effort, as well as Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and National Bank of Canada.

Hey, if you can’t compete, run home crying to mommy, that’s what I always say! Boyd Erman comments:

There’s no doubt that on some level, Alpha may be factoring into the calculations, but the web of conflicting behaviour suggests that Alpha is not the driving factor behind whether banks support or oppose the TMX-LSE deal.

The last argument is the old small-town one, that the banks would like to remain the big fish in a small pond. It may be that the banks are being parochial, and want to keep control of the TMX within walking distance of their own head offices. This one probably has the most weight.

How are you going to keep the boys on the farm, once they’ve seen the City? And the furrinners might not have the proper reverence for Canadian banks, or might send in their resumes once their regulatory stint is over. Another mouth to feed!

As it turns out the Financial Post has published the letter. It’s vagueness, incoherence and prediliction for sweeping fearmongery make it clear to me that whatever they’re talking about, it’s not the merits of the deal.

Bloomberg reports on today’s testimony to a parliamentry committee. Caldwell has a number of fish to fry with respect to exchange mergers, but had the right idea:

“Of course they’re against it because it provides real competition for Alpha,” said Brendan Caldwell, Chief Executive Officer of Caldwell Investment Management Ltd., a money manager that owns shares in TMX. “They banks don’t like real competition, they like the little oligopoly where they divvy up the financial pie of Canada amongst themselves. It’s quite incestuous.”

The Globe plays up support for the deal from the Toronto Financial Services Alliance. I confess I don’t know much about this group, but they repeat that hoary canard about the WEF ranking of banks around the world on the front page of their website, so their opinions can’t be worth much.

The Kansas City Financial Stress Index is at its lowest level since June 2007:


Click for big

Another mixed day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 22bp, FixedResets gaining 3bp and DeemedRetractibles slipping 4bp. Only one entry – which barely made it – in the Performance Highlights table. Volume remained high.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.64%, equivalent to 7.33% interest at the new standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 5.6% (ok, maybe a tiny bit less) so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 175bp, a slight (and perhaps spurious) decline from the 180bp reported on March 2.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1428 % 2,399.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1428 % 3,608.1
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 44,728 21.54 4 0.1428 % 2,590.3
OpRet 4.87 % 3.49 % 56,958 0.38 9 0.1204 % 2,392.7
SplitShare 5.09 % 3.02 % 208,689 1.03 5 0.0640 % 2,485.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1204 % 2,187.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.56 % 135,565 6.24 10 0.0496 % 2,033.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.51 % 5.64 % 125,895 14.37 14 0.2190 % 2,117.2
FixedReset 5.21 % 3.54 % 202,236 2.98 54 0.0307 % 2,280.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.23 % 5.27 % 360,715 8.27 53 -0.0359 % 2,078.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.14
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 89,987 RBC crossed 80,000 at 22.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.33
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 67,888 Desjardins crossed blocks of 26,600 and 30,000, both at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.72
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium 45,874 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 50.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-09
Maturity Price : 46.98
Evaluated at bid price : 50.31
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 38,901 TD crossed 19,700 at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 38,125 RBC crossed 30,000 at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 38,089 Scotia crossed 20,000 at 25.25 and bought 10,000 from anonymous at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
There were 53 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.20 – 25.50
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1971

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %

TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 23.00 – 23.79
Spot Rate : 0.7900
Average : 0.6877

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-09
Maturity Price : 22.71
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 2.27 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.63 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2665

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.63
Bid-YTW : 5.43 %

GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.80 – 25.07
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1811

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %

BMO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.22 – 25.47
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1690

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %

TD.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 27.26 – 27.49
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1512

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.26
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %

BA (sub) New Issue Closing Delayed

March 9th, 2011

Bell Alliant has announced:

that Bell Aliant Preferred Equity Inc. has filed a final prospectus with securities regulators in each of the provinces and territories of Canada for its previously announced offering of 10,000,000 Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series A (the “Series A Preferred Shares”) at a price of $25.00 per share for gross proceeds of $250 million. The offering is now scheduled to close on or about March 15, 2011, subject to certain conditions. The syndicate of underwriters, led by BMO Capital Markets and Scotia Capital Inc., has been granted an over-allotment option, exercisable up to 30 days after closing, to purchase an additional 1,500,000 Series A Preferred Shares at the offering price.

There’s not much detail in that, but it looks like a box-ticking foul up. On SEDAR, under “Bell Aliant Preferred Equity Inc. Mar 7 2011 Material incorporated by reference not previously filed – English” is the Material Change Report noting the initial press release regarding the issue.

The issue is a 4.85%+209 FixedReset announced February 22.

March 8, 2011

March 9th, 2011

Alarms are sounding about a possible Chinese bank crisis:

China faces a 60 percent risk of a banking crisis by mid-2013 in the aftermath of record lending and surging property prices, according to a Fitch Ratings gauge.

The assessment is from a macro-prudential monitor used by the ratings company, Richard Fox, a London-based senior director, said in a phone interview on March 4.

The indicator signaled crises in Iceland and Ireland and has been tested back to the 1980s, Fox said.

The indicator’s failures have included not sounding an alarm about the banking system in Spain, he added.

Banking systems in emerging markets are vulnerable to systemic stress when credit growth exceeds 15 percent annually over two years with real property prices rising more than 5 percent, according to Fitch. Credit growth in China averaged 18.6 percent annually over 2008 and 2009 as house prices jumped, according to the ratings company.

The fallout from China’s lending spree may be bad loans totaling $400 billion, according to Hong Kong-based advisory firm Asianomics Ltd.

Gloominess on Europe:

Some countries in the euro region may have their credit ratings cut further while a Greece debt default is a “possibility,” said Moritz Kraemer, managing director of European sovereign ratings at Standard & Poor’s.

Asked if the worst was over for the region’s sovereign credit-rating outlook, Kraemer said: “I wish I could say yes, but the answer is no.”

“We still have a number of countries with a negative outlook or CreditWatch negative, indicating their credit ratings may be going down further,” Kraemer said in an interview in London. “Trigger points for that could be slippage in fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, but also decisions that will be taken at the European level later this month.”

S&P said on March 1 it kept Portugal’s A-long-term, A2 short-term and Greece’s BB+ long-term ratings on CreditWatch with a negative outlook. It cited Portugal’s “high external financing need and limited funding sources.” Moody’s Investors Service downgraded Greece’s government bond ratings yesterday to B1 from Ba1 , and assigned a negative outlook to the rating.

And more gloom on US mortgages:

Bank of America Corp. (BAC), the biggest U.S. lender by assets, is segregating almost half its 13.9 million mortgages into a “bad” bank comprised of its riskiest and worst-performing “legacy” loans, said Terry Laughlin, who is running the new unit.

The legacy portfolio will hold 6.7 million of loans with outstanding principal balance of about $1 trillion, according to a presentation to investors today. The split leaves home loan President Barbara Desoer with about half her previous portfolio, as well as new lending going forward.

Laughlin’s portfolio will include loans that are currently 60 or more days delinquent as well as riskier types of loans the bank no longer originates, such as subprime, Alt-A, interest- only and option adjustable-rate mortgages, he said. He said the portfolios will be completely split by March 31 and that his will be liquidated over time. Of the 13.9 million loans Bank of America services, about 3.5 million are held by the company on its balance sheet. The rest are owned by other investors.

There’s a rather odd perspective on the Charlie Sheen spectacle:

Second, he’s the talent. A hedge fund wouldn’t fire the star trader if he was a drug user or an alcoholic. It would have to get rid of half the staff if it did.

Which is why hedge funds blow up with such amazing regularity. I think it’s just sad: we have a guy who has achieved enormous success and can’t handle it. After pondering whether he was lucky or smart, he’s not just chosen “smart”, but gone beyond, into “completely irreplacable and personally indestructible.” It happens all the time, not just in Hollywood and Wall Street, but everywhere, sometimes with a definitions of “enormouse success” that most of us would consider “a good start”, causing an immense amount of pain and waste of talent.

If any employee of mine were ever to be found doing coke, he’d be out on his ass instantly, lawsuits and employer accomodation of addictions be damned. It’s cheaper in the end, as the Bishop said to the choir-boy.

Here’s some sense:

A top jurist has condemned plea bargaining as a form of coercion that tempts an intolerable number of innocent people into pleading guilty to avoid a harsh sentence.

Mr. Justice Marc Rosenberg of the Ontario Court of Appeal urged a thorough review of plea bargaining – a system that has become so entrenched in the past three decades that 90 per cent of criminal cases result in a guilty plea.

We can get rid of negotiated settlements in the securities industry while we’re at it.

Hats off to the Proceeds of Crime Act! Another way to build up slush funds like Brampton’s:

The Peel Police Services Board has bought tens of thousands of dollars worth of tickets to private mayoral galas in Brampton and Mississauga, using “proceeds of crime” that in Ontario typically go to victim and crime prevention programs.

The tickets were purchased over the years while Brampton Mayor Susan Fennell and a fundraising organizer of Mississauga Mayor Hazel McCallion sat on the board — and with the approval of Peel Region chair Emil Kolb, who also heads the police board.

Minutes show, for example, that the board approved buying a $4,000 table at Fennell’s gala on Feb. 20 last year, on Fennell’s invitation. A month before the gala took place, then-board member Jim Murray put forward a motion to buy a second table. It was approved.

[Peel Region chair Emil] Kolb, who has chaired the police board since 1996, acknowledged that the board routinely approves such purchases, but points out that it’s not tax-generated dollars being spent.

“It’s funds that come from crime funds. Not one red cent is taxpayer dollars.”

Kolb should be fired – not just for reckless misuse of funds, but for general stupidity. Once it’s in the coffers, pal, it’s taxpayer’s money. Every goddam penny, regardless of whether it’s taxes, fees, fines, gifts or proceeds of crime. It’s not yours to do political favours for your buddies. Asshole.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 10bp, FixedResets flat and DeemedRetractibles gaining 16bp. Volatility was subdued with only one entry in the Performance Highlights table. Volume was heavy.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1669 % 2,395.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1669 % 3,603.0
Floater 2.50 % 2.26 % 45,011 21.56 4 0.1669 % 2,586.6
OpRet 4.88 % 3.58 % 57,856 1.01 9 -0.0945 % 2,389.8
SplitShare 5.09 % 3.01 % 211,851 1.03 5 0.2862 % 2,484.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0945 % 2,185.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.55 % 128,593 6.16 10 0.0318 % 2,032.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.53 % 5.65 % 126,574 14.34 14 -0.1003 % 2,112.6
FixedReset 5.21 % 3.52 % 189,320 2.98 54 -0.0049 % 2,280.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.23 % 5.27 % 363,399 8.27 53 0.1565 % 2,078.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 7.27 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 125,321 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 23.20; Nesbitt crossed 18,200 at 23.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 66,330 RBC crossed 49,900 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.43
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 65,850 Desjardins crossed 36,000 at 27.42; TD crossed 23,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.39
Bid-YTW : 3.40 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 53,825 TD crossed 25,000 at 26.25; then anouther 25,000 at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 53,676 TD crossed 49,400 at 25.89.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 45,701 TD crossed 15,800 at 27.37.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.37
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
There were 50 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 24.40 – 24.85
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3368

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %

BAM.PR.H OpRet Quote: 25.40 – 25.74
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2526

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.45 – 25.79
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2541

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.45 – 21.74
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2105

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-08
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %

ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.00 – 25.19
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1305

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-08
Maturity Price : 24.68
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %

CM.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 27.70 – 27.95
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1933

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.70
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %

BoE Deputy Governor Tucker Supports High Trigger for CoCos

March 8th, 2011

Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, made a speech at the Clare Distinguished Lecture in Economics, Cambridge, 18 February 2011 titled Discussion of Lord Turner’s lecture, “Reforming finance – are we being radical enough?”:

But none of what I have said makes a case for placing all of our eggs in the resolution basket. Switching metaphors, we need belt and braces. Which is why the G20 agreed that the so-called Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) should carry greater loss absorbing capacity (or GLAC) than implied by Basel III.

First best would be equity. Indeed, Adair has argued this evening that ideally Basel 3 would have set a higher equity requirement. But that did not happen. In practice, we are going to have to be open-minded, but also principled, about quasi-equity instruments contributing to GLAC for SIFIs (sorry about the acronyms!). Currently, the leading candidate is so-called Contingent Capital bonds (CoCos), which convert from debt into equity in certain states of the world. It seems to me that to serve the purpose of GLAC for large and complex firms, such instruments would need to convert when a firm was still fundamentally sound, which is to say that they should have high capital triggers. For a large and complex firm, a low capital trigger would be dangerous, as funders and counterparties would be likely to flee before reaching the point at which the firm would be recapitalised through the CoCos’ conversion.

Moreover, high-trigger CoCos would presumably get converted not infrequently which, in terms of reducing myopia in capital markets, would have the merit of reminding holders and issuers about risks in banking.

Lord Turner’s speech discusses a particular hobby-horse of mine:

It is therefore crucial that our answers to the SIFI problem cover also the more difficult but more likely scenario of multiple bank systemic stress. And in such conditions, bail-inable bonds will only enable us to avoid the dilemma of Autumn 2008, if the following vital conditions are met:

  • • If regulators could be confident that those bonds are held outside the banking system; and
  • • in addition, confident that the bonds are held by investors who have so arranged their assets and liabilities that they could face the imposed losses without that in turn inducing systemic effects.

And it may be very difficult to be confident that those conditions we met.

There are two ways to gain that confidence – the first relies on empirical observation, the second on an assumption of fully informed investor rationality. Neither route may be entirely robust.

  • • The first way to seek such confidence, would be for regulators to understand, or to regulate, which investors hold bank medium-term debt. Our information on this today is imperfect. We believe a significant proportion is initially held by other banks, and a larger proportion still by a broadly defined group of ‘fund managers’. (Slide 7). But ownership after secondary market trading could be significantly different. And some of these ‘fund managers’ may be in turn financed by banks (e.g. hedge funds by prime brokers), or linked to the banking system by complex repo and derivative relationship so that losses suffered by one bank, could indirectly impose losses or confidence shocks on others. And our ability to track these complex inter-connections, and as a result to predict the knock-on consequences of initial losses in conditions of systemic fragility is imperfect today and likely to remain so. We need to improve our understanding of the complex interconnections of our financial system: but it is unclear that understanding will ever be good enough for us confidently to impose large losses simultaneously on the senior debt of multiple large banks (or indeed multiple small banks), in conditions of macro-systemic stress.
  • • The other route to confidence, would be based on faith in market and investor rationality, assuming axiomatically that investors who buy bail-inable bonds will only do so on the basis of rational assessments of their ability to absorb risks in all possible future states of the world, including those of macroeconomic stress. As Section 3 will discuss, this axiomatic assumption was at the core of the pre-crisis conventional wisdom, the reason why public authorities thought they could sleep easy in the face of an explosive growth in financial scale, complexity and interconnectedness. But it relies on an assumption of fully informed rationality, which may be simply untrue, and indeed impossible. For as Andrei Shleifer et al (2010) have argued in an extremely perceptive recent paper, it may be inherent to human nature that in the good times investors systematically fail to take rational account of the tail of low probability adverse events.

A bail-inable bond will have a highly skewed probability distribution of pay-outs. (Slide 8 ) Over a long period of time, only the zero-loss segment of the distribution will be observed. A low probability of significant loss continues to exist, but Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishay argue that that low probability will be wholly discounted through a behavioural process which they label ‘local thinking’ – the reality, deeply rooted in human nature, that not all contingencies are represented in decision makers’ thought processes. After a period of good times, investors will assume that senior bank debt is effectively risk-free: as indeed they did, in the years before the crisis (Slide 9). Regulators cannot therefore rely on free-market discipline to ensure that the debt is only held by investors who can suffer loss without that causing knock-on systemic disruption.

If therefore we can neither perfectly and continuously monitor or regulate who owns bail-inable debt, nor rely on free-market discipline to ensure that it is always appropriately held, contractually bail-inable debt and technical resolvability will be valuable but still imperfect solutions to the ‘too big to fail’ problem. We can only be sure that losses can be smoothly absorbed if we are sure that the investors who provide funds do not suffer from ‘local thinking’ but remain perpetually aware of the full distribution of possible results. Subordinated debt which can convert to equity well before potential failure (‘early trigger CoCos’) may approach what is required since the price will presumably vary with probabilistic expectations of future conversion. But only with pure equity can we be fully confident that the dangers of ‘local thinking’ will not creep in over time, and that investors, facing day-by-day price movements up and down will remain continually aware that they hold a potentially loss absorbing instrument. The implication of Shleifer’s ‘local thinking’ theory is that if investors are to remain continuously aware of the full frequency distribution of objectively possible results the observed frequency distribution of returns needs to include negatives and well as positives. This is achieved by equity returns but not by low risk debt.

OSFI, in its infinite wisdom, is going in entirely the opposite direction: the lowest possible conversion triggers for CoCos, and seeking to include CoCos in the regular bond indices so that investors will be fooled into buying them.

March 7, 2011

March 7th, 2011

There are threats of inflation in Asia:

The Bank of Thailand and Bank of Korea will each raise key interest rates this week by a quarter percentage point, median estimates in Bloomberg News surveys of economists show. Malaysia may also be approaching the end of its pause in boosting borrowing costs, as four of 12 analysts polled see a March 11 move, the highest such share since the last increase, in July.
….
The region’s economies are strong enough to withstand the impact of faster inflation, the Asian Development Bank said last week.

“The region is particularly prone to food and oil price shocks as a greater percentage of household income is spent on food and transportation,” said Vishnu Varathan, an economist in Singapore at Capital Economics (Asia) Pte.

Diminished resistance to currency gains in China may have a knock-on effect throughout Asia as the continent’s biggest economy also seeks to contain price pressures. People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan said last month in Paris that his nation may use means “including rates and currency” to curb increases in food and home prices.

WordPress.org was attacked by hackers in China recently. I wondered how one defends against this and found a paper by S S Nagamuthu Krishnan and Dr. V. Saravanan titled DDoS Defense Mechanism by applying stamps. Precious in places (‘Oh, do be a good netizen while munching your granola’) and, naturally enough, veering occasionally into jargon, but they do achieve one of their major objectives in the paper addressing a major problem:

This was a major event, covered in the major news media. They have done an excellent job in their coverage; as far as it has gone, their coverage has been accurate. The problem is, their coverage hasn’t been sufficiently detailed to explain why we cannot track down the people committing these attacks, and why we can’t defend against them. There’s a good reason for these omissions: the attack is subtle, and understanding how it works well enough to understand why we can’t cope today, and what will have to change before we can, requires a more detailed explanation of how the Internet is constructed than the mass media are prepared to deliver to their audiences.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, as PerpetualDiscounts gained 6bp, FixedResets lost 8bp and DeemedRetractibles were down 11bp. Volume was average, but there were some nice blocks changing hands – all courtesy of Nesbitt, which shut out the rest of the street on the Volume Highlights table.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1666 % 2,391.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1666 % 3,597.0
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 45,299 21.54 4 -0.1666 % 2,582.3
OpRet 4.87 % 3.80 % 60,227 0.39 9 -0.0815 % 2,392.1
SplitShare 5.10 % 3.35 % 220,566 1.03 5 -0.2826 % 2,477.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0815 % 2,187.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.61 % 130,664 6.17 10 -0.0099 % 2,032.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.52 % 5.64 % 123,239 14.36 14 0.0608 % 2,114.7
FixedReset 5.21 % 3.48 % 191,942 2.98 54 -0.0752 % 2,280.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.24 % 5.27 % 366,176 8.27 53 -0.1125 % 2,075.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Deemed-Retractible -1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.22
Bid-YTW : 7.48 %
NA.PR.L Deemed-Retractible -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.28
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.67
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 185,833 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 100,000, both at 24.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 159,745 Nesbitt crossed three blocks of 50,000 each, all at 23.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 115,335 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 47,800, both at 23.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 110,994 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 106,700 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 22.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-07
Maturity Price : 22.58
Evaluated at bid price : 22.74
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 106,673 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 24.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 103,684 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 22.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.39
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
There were 35 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.50 – 23.99
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.2860

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %

ELF.PR.G Deemed-Retractible Quote: 20.22 – 20.75
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3418

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.22
Bid-YTW : 7.48 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.20 – 26.64
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3026

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2016-08-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.81 – 26.24
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2937

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %

ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.42 – 22.89
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3514

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.42
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %

RY.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 27.09 – 27.35
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1871

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.09
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %

New Issue: MFC FixedReset 4.20%+141

March 7th, 2011

Manulife Financial has announced:

a Canadian public offering of Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class 1 Shares Series 3 (“Series 3 Preferred Shares”). Manulife will issue eight million Series 3 Preferred Shares priced at $25 per share to raise gross proceeds of $200 million. The offering will be underwritten by a syndicate of investment dealers led by Scotia Capital Inc. and RBC Dominion Securities Inc. and is anticipated to qualify as Tier 1 capital for Manulife. The expected closing date for the offering is March 11, 2011. Manulife intends to file a prospectus supplement to its September 3, 2010 base shelf prospectus in respect of this issue.

Holders of the Series 3 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive a non-cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.20% annually, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Manulife, for the initial period ending June 19, 2016. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 1.41%.

Holders of Series 3 Preferred Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class 1 Shares Series 4 (“Series 4 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on June 19, 2016 and on June 19 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series 4 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive non-cumulative quarterly floating dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Manulife, at a rate equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 1.41%.

The net proceeds from the offering will be utilized for general corporate purposes, which may include investments in subsidiaries.

In setting up this issue on HIMIPref™ I have assumed that it will not have a non-viability contingent capital clause, and therefore will be subject to the declining cap on non-qualifying Tier 1 Capital that I anticipate will be applied to Insurance Holding Companies and that therefore it should have a hardMaturity in its call schedule for 2022-1-31.

I hate this. The most important thing in preferred share analysis nowadays is … guessing what OSFI’s going to do. So much for Pillar 3.

MAPF Performance: February 2011

March 6th, 2011

The fund continued its good start to the year by outperforming its benchmark in February.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close January 31 was $11.2375.

Returns to February 28, 2011
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +1.21% +0.82% +0.96%
Three Months +4.01% +2.41% +1.81%
One Year +20.51% +11.69% +9.00%
Two Years (annualized) +36.17% +19.40% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +22.75% +5.96% +3.56%
Four Years (annualized) +17.64% +3.33%  
Five Years (annualized) +15.36% +3.56%  
Six Years (annualized) +13.68% +3.63%  
Seven Years (annualized) +13.03% +3.63%  
Eight Years (annualized) +15.07% +4.39%  
Nine Years (annualized) +13.42% +4.14%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.76%, +2.20% and +10.04%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +4.95%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.22%, +0.22% & +5.53% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.81%, +1.62% & +6.76%, respectively
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF are not yet available (inception date 2010-11-23)

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.2857 0.3628
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.2857 0.3885
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.2857 0.4112
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.2857 0.4672
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.2857 $0.4112
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.2857 $0.4672
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.2857 $0.5737
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.2857 $0.6046
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.2857 $0.6029
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.2857 $0.5802
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0819 $0.5714
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0819 $0.5759
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.0819 $0.5850
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.0819 $0.5832
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0000 $0.5822
February, 2011 11.2375 5.66% 1.014 5.739% 1.0000 $0.6449
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
Analysis of yields changed in February 2011 to include the concept of DeemedRetractible issues. DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital and the January & February, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. This deemed maturity has a significant effect on calculated yields.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on February 28; all of the former and most of the latter currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position in a SplitShare (BNA.PR.C) which also has its yield calculated with the expectation of a maturity.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.67% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: February 2011 analysis (which is in excess of the 5.62% index yield on February 28). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $11.2375 * 0.0567 = $0.6371, a significant increase from the $11.1030 * 0.0546 = $0.6062 reported last month.

Note that there will be a drag on the calculation in up-markets due to presence of shorter-term issues (or, at least, presumed shorter term issues!); the question is whether the positive effect of these issues in down markets will outweight their negative effect in up-markets – all I can say is … that’s what I keep working towards!

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: February 2011

March 6th, 2011

Turnover picked up again in February, to about 70%

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may be thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2011-1-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 1.8% (-0.2) 6.11% 6.53
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (-25.5) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 11.2% (-37.1) 5.67% 14.34
Fixed-Reset 10.4% (-9.4) 3.50% 2.94
Deemed-Retractible 65.3% (+65.3) 5.98% 8.21
Scraps (Various) 9.8% (+5.0) 6.59% 9.85
Cash +1.4% (+1.8) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.66% 8.36
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from January month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital and the January & February, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2011-2-28
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 39.7% (-18.7)
Pfd-2(high) 26.2% (+8.2)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 22.8% (+3.5)
Pfd-3(high) 4.8% (+1.5)
Pfd-3 3.3% (+1.8)
Pfd-3(low) 1.6% (+1.6)
Cash 1.4% (+1.8)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from January month-end.
A position held in ELF preferreds has been assigned to Pfd-2(low)

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2011-2-28
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 1.6% (+1.6)
$50,000 – $100,000 23.5% (+12.4)
$100,000 – $200,000 24.0% (+10.9)
$200,000 – $300,000 +13.3% (-33.1)
>$300,000 36.1% (+6.3)
Cash 1.4% (+1.8)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from January month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2010, and published in the September, 2010, PrefLetter. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a higher
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to Straight Perpetuals
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is slightly more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

MUH.PR.A to Liquidate, Default

March 4th, 2011

Mulvihill Asset Management’s MCM Split Share Corp. has announced:

that it will voluntarily dissolve and distribute to shareholders the proceeds to be received from the liquidation of the assets, less all liabilities and all expenses to be incurred in connection with the dissolution and winding up of the Fund. This dissolution is in advance of the scheduled termination date of February 1, 2013. The Fund expects that proceeds from the liquidation will be payable to holders of the Priority Equity Shares on or about March 31, 2011.

In late 2007, the Fund adopted a strategy (the “Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan”) to assist the Fund with payment of the original issue price of the priority equity shares (the “Priority Equity Shares”) on the redemption date originally scheduled for February 1, 2013. Given the steep market sell-off in November 2008, the Fund was required to implement the Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan and raised its cash levels to ensure compliance with the plan. Since that time, the Fund has been invested in cash and cash equivalents with no equity exposure. For the year ended January 31, 2011, the Fund’s total return was negative 1.3%. Distributions amounting to $0.83 per Priority Equity Share were paid during the year ended January 31, 2011, contributing to an overall decline in the net asset value (“NAV”) of the Fund from $14.24 per Unit (each notional Unit consisting of one Priority Equity Share and one Class A Share) as at January 31, 2010 to $13.23 as at January 31, 2011. The Fund believes that holders of the Priority Equity Shares may be better off reinvesting the proceeds from the voluntary dissolution than by remaining invested in the Fund as a result of the returns available on the Fund’s existing investments.

Given that the Priority Equity Shares rank ahead of the Class A Shares, the Fund expects that holders of the Priority Equity Shares will receive the entire amount of the liquidation proceeds to be paid to shareholders because they are entitled to the first $15.00 of NAV of the Fund per share in priority to other shareholders. As the amount of such liquidation proceeds will be less than $15.00 per Priority Equity Share, the Fund does not expect to be in a position to make any payment to holders of Class A Shares upon dissolution.

The NAV was $13.23 on February 28, according to Mulvihill. There are just over 1.1-million shares outstanding, according to TMXMoney. The fund had been scheduled to wind up on 2013-2-1 but had problems:

The Fund adopted a strategy (the “Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan”) to protect holders of the Priority Equity Shares by assisting the Fund with the payment of the original issue price of $15.00 per share on termination date. With the steep market sell off in November 2008 we had to raise our cash levels to ensure compliance with the above feature. The Fund is now in cash and cash equivalents with no equity exposure. During the fiscal year ended January 31, 2010, the annual total rate of return of the Fund was negative 1.42 percent. Distributions amounting to $0.83 per share to Priority Equity shareholders and $0.01 per share to Class A shareholders were paid during the year, contributing to the overall decline in the net asset value from $15.29 per Unit as at January 31, 2009 to $14.24 per Unit as at January 31, 2010.

This portfolio insurance strategy didn’t work out too well for XCM.PR.A or XMF.PR.A, either … at least as far as the sponsors were concerned.

MUH.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when they announced they were contemplating a reorg. MUH.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.