Index Construction / Reporting

Index Performance: October 2010

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for October, 2010, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
October 2010
Three Months
to
October 29, 2010
Ratchet +1.81% *** +5.11% ***
FixFloat +1.81% ** +5.11% **
Floater +1.81% +5.11%
OpRet +0.13% +1.38%
SplitShare +1.50% +7.48%
Interest +0.13%**** +1.38%****
PerpetualPremium +1.07% +4.06
PerpetualDiscount +2.31% +8.70%
FixedReset +0.71% +2.17%
** The last member of the FixedFloater index was transferred to Scraps at the June, 2010, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index
*** The last member of the RatchetRate index was transferred to Scraps at the July, 2010, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index
**** The last member of the InterestBearing index was transferred to Scraps at the June, 2009, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the OperatingRetractible index
Passive Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD +1.40% +4.73%
DPS.UN +0.17% +5.92%
Index
BMO-CM 50 +2.02% +5.84%
TXPR Total Return +1.55% +5.16%

CPD again took a good hit on its tracking error against TXPR, down 15bp on the month and 43bp on the quarter. The advertised MER of 0.48% implies these figures should be 4bp and 12bp in the absence of trading frictions. I’m happy! One man’s market impact cost is another man’s market-making gain, and if Claymore is incurring market impact costs in the neighborhood of 100bp p.a., that’s over $5-million on the table to be divvied up by guys like me.

The pre-tax interest equivalent spread of PerpetualDiscounts over Long Corporates (which I also refer to as the Seniority Spread) ended the month at 235bp, a significant decline from the 265bp reported at September month-end. Long corporate yields declined to 5.2% from 5.3% during the period while PerpetualDiscounts had a larger decline in dividend terms, from 5.69% to 5.41%, which became from 7.97% to 7.57% in interest-equivalent terms at the standard conversion factor of 1.4x. I would be happier with long corporates in the 6.00-6.25% range with a seniority spread in the range of 100-150bp, but what do I know? The market has never shown any particular interest in my happiness.

Long Corporates reached a plateau in October:


Click for Big

Charts related to the Seniority Spread and the Bozo Spread (PerpetualDiscount Current Yield less FixedReset Current Yield) are published in PrefLetter.

The trailing year returns are starting to look a bit more normal.


Click for big

Floaters have had a wild ride; the latest decline is presumably due to the idea that the BoC will be slower rather than faster in hiking the overnight rate. I’m going to keep publishing updates of this graph until the one-year trailing return for the sector no longer looks so gigantic:


Click for big

Volumes are on their way back up Volume may be under-reported due to the influence of Alternative Trading Systems (as discussed in the November PrefLetter), but I am biding my time before incorporating ATS volumes into the calculations, to see if the effect is transient or not.



Click for big

Compositions of the passive funds were discussed in the September, 2010, edition of PrefLetter.

Claymore has published NAV and distribution data (problems with the page in IE8 can be kludged by using compatibility view) for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to October 29, 2010
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
July 30, 2010 16.66    
August 26 16.76 0.069 +1.01% +1.12%
August 31 16.78   +0.11%
September 27 17.12 0.069 +2.44% +2.14%
September 30 17.07   -0.29%
October 26 17.21 0.069 +1.22% +1.40%
October 29, 2010 17.24   +0.17%
Quarterly Return +4.73%

Claymore currently holds $559,641,405 (advisor & common combined) in CPD assets, up about $24-million from the $486,846,162 reported at August month-end and up about $186-million from the $373,729,364 reported at year-end. Their tracking error does not seem to be affecting their ability to gather assets!

The DPS.UN NAV for September 1 has been published so we may calculate the approximate August returns.

DPS.UN NAV Return, September-ish and October-ish 2010
Date NAV Distribution Return for sub-period Return for period
September 1, 2010 20.57      
September 28 21.17 ** 0.30 +4.38%  
September 29 21.12   -0.23%  
October 27 21.12   0.00%  
Estimated September Beginning Stub +0.24% *
Estimated September Ending Stub 0.0% ***
Estimated October Ending Stub +0.17% *****
Estimated September Return +4.39% ****
Estimated October Return +0.17% ******
*CPD had a NAVPU of 16.82 on September 1 and 16.78 on August 31, hence the total return for the period for CPD was +0.24%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal.
**CPD had a NAVPU of 17.11 on September 28 and 17.07 on September 29, therefore the return for the day was -0.23%. The reported NAV of DPS.UN was 21.12 on September 29, so, assuming returns were approximately equal for the day, the NAV would have been 21.17
***CPD had a NAVPU of 17.07 on September 29 and 17.07 on September 30, hence the total return for the period for CPD was +0.00%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal.
**** The estimated September return for DPS.UN’s NAV is therefore the product of four period returns, +0.24%, +4.38%, -0.23% and 0.00% to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month of +4.39%
*****CPD had a NAVPU of 17.21 on October 27 and 17.24 on October 29, hence the total return for the period for CPD was +0.17%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal.
**** The estimated October return for DPS.UN’s NAV is therefore the product of three period returns, +0.00%, +0.00%, +0.17% to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month of +0.17%

Note that Sentry Select claims September performance of 3.7%, but I believe this is price-based, whereas my calculations are NAV-based. DPS.UN currently trades at a discount of about 4% to its NAV.

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for August:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-October-ish, 2010
August-ish +1.29%
September-ish +4.39%
October-ish +0.17%
Three-months-ish +5.92%

Sentry Select is now publishing performance data for DPS.UN, but this appears to be price-based, rather than NAV-based. I will continue to report NAV-based figures.

Regulation

OSFI Releases New Seg Fund Risk Guidelines

The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions has released Revised Guidance for Companies that Determine Segregated Fund Guarantee Capital Requirements Using an Approved Model. This is the change we were told to expect in August.

The guts of the change appears to be distribution and correlation requirements for equity indices:

New minimum quantitative calibration criteria are mandated for the scenarios used to model the returns of the following total return equity indexes (henceforth referred to as “listed indexes”):

  • TSX
  • Canadian small cap equity, mid cap equity and specialty equity
  • S&P 500
  • US small cap equity, mid cap equity and specialty equity
  • MSCI World Equity and MSCI EAFE

The actual investment return scenarios for each of the listed indexes used in the determination of total requirements must meet the criteria specified in the following table.

Furthermore, the arithmetic average of the actual investment return scenarios for each listed index over any one-year period (including the one-year period starting on the valuation date) cannot be greater than 10%. All of these criteria must be met for the scenarios of a listed index to be in accordance with the new minimum calibration criteria.

Modeled scenarios of TSX total return indexes must continue to satisfy the CIA calibration criteria at all percentiles over the five- and ten-year time horizons as published in the CIA’s March 2002 report, in addition to the criteria above. Modeled scenarios of S&P 500 total return indexes must satisfy the American Academy of Actuaries’ calibration criteria for equities [footnote] at all percentiles over the five-, ten- and twenty-year time horizons, in addition to the criteria above.

The scenarios used to model returns of an equity index that is not one of the listed indexes need not meet the same calibration criteria, but must still be consistent with the calibrated scenarios used to model the returns of the listed indexes.

Correlation: The scenarios used to model returns for different equity indexes should be positively correlated with one another. Unless it can be justified otherwise, the correlation between the returns generated for any two equity indexes (whether or not they are listed) should be at least 70%. If scenarios are generated using a model that distinguishes between positive and negative trend market phases (e.g. the regime-switching lognormal model with two regimes) then, unless it can be justified otherwise, the scenarios should be such that there is a very high probability that different equity indexes will be in the same market phase at the same time, and a very low probability that different equity indexes will be in different phases at the same time.

Footnote: For example, as published in the June 2005 document entitled “Recommended Approach for Setting Regulatory Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Variable Annuities and Similar Products”.

The table excised from the quotation above is:

  Time Period
  6 Months 1 Year
Left Tail Criteria    
2.5th percentile of return not greater than -25% -35%
5th percentile of return not greater than -18% -26%
10th percentile of return not greater than -10% -15%
Right Tail Criteria    
90th percentile of return not less than 20% 30%
95th percentile of return not less than 25% 38%
97.5th percentile of return not less than 30% 45%

These criteria equate, very approximately, to a mean expected return of 8% and a standard deviation of 20.5%. Interested readers can fiddle with the variables and log-normal distributions in the comments.

The American Academy of Actuaries’ Recommended Approach for Setting Regulatory Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Variable Annuities and Similar Products notes:

Short period distributions of historic equity returns typically show negative skewness, positive kurtosis (fat tails) with time varying volatility and increased volatility in bear markets. The measure of kurtosis declines when looking at returns over longer time horizons and successive application of a short-term model with finite higher moments will result in longer horizon returns that converge towards normality. Ideally the distribution of returns for a given model should reflect these characteristics. Of course, due to random sampling, not every scenario would show such attributes.

Unfortunately, at longer time horizons the small sample sizes of the historic data make it much more difficult to make credible inferences about the characteristics of the return distribution, especially in the tails. As such, the calibration criteria are derived from a model (fitted to historic S&P500 monthly returns) and not based solely on empirical observations. However, the calibration points are not strictly taken from one specific model for market returns; instead, they have been adjusted slightly to permit several well known and reasonable models (appropriately parameterized) to pass the criteria. Statistics for the observed data are offered as support for the recommendations.

… and they also provide a table:

Table 1: Calibration Standard for Total Return Wealth Ratios
Percentile 1 Year 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years
2.5% 0.78 0.72 0.79 n/a
5.0% 0.84 0.81 0.94 1.51
10.0% 0.90 0.94 1.16 2.10
90.0% 1.28 2.17 3.63 9.02
95.0% 1.35 2.45 4.36 11.70
2.5% 1.42 2.72 5.12 n/a

where:

The ‘wealth factors’ are defined as gross accumulated values (i.e., before the deduction of fees and charges) with complete reinvestment of income and maturities, starting with a unit investment. These can be less than 1, with “1” meaning a zero return over the holding period.

To interpret the above values, consider the 5-year point of 0.72 at the α = 2.5th percentile. This value implies that there is a 2.5 percent probability of the accumulated value of a unit investment being less than 0.72 in 5-years time, ignoring fees and expenses and without knowing the initial state of the process (i.e., this is an unconditional probability). For left-tail calibration points (i.e., those quantiles less than 50%), lower factors after model calibration are required. For right-tail calibration points (quantiles above 50%), the model must produce higher factors.

To my astonishment, I was able to find a copy of CIA Document 202012 (sounds like an analysis of the Mayan calendar) via the World Bank. I will refer to it as Final Report of the CIA Task Force on Segregated Fund Investment Guarantees. Ths calibration is:

Table 1
Accumulation Period 2.5th percentile 5th percentile 10th percentile
One Year 0.76 0.82 0.90
Five Years 0.75 0.85 1.05
Ten Years 0.85 1.05 1.35

The new standard has a significantly nastier left-tail than the prior standards:

Comparison of Left Tails
One Year Horizon
Standard 2.5th %-ile 5th %-ile 10th %-ile
OSFI New -35% -26% -15%
American -22% -16% -10%
Canadian -24% -18% -10%

However, in the absence of information regarding the insurers’ models together with detailed data, it is impossible to determine how capital requirements will be affected by the change. This could be a welcome first step towards rationalizing seg fund capital requirements; it could also be window-dressing that OSFI knows will have no effect but makes them look tough. As suggested by Desjardins, we will simply have to wait for commentary in the coming batch of quarterly reports. It will be noted that GWO, SLF and MFC have all warned about the potential for adverse change.

For myself, I am disappointed that while OSFI is addressing intricacies of model calibration, it is not mandating additional disclosures or reviewing their highly politicized cover-up from the Fall of 2008. It became quite apparent during the Panic of 2007 that the currently mandated disclosure of the effect of a 10% decline in equity prices is nowhere near good enough to allow investors to take an informed view on the adequacy of capitalization. Would it really be so difficult and so invasive to mandate a table showing the effects on capital and comprehensive income of the effects of 10%, 20% and 30% declines?

Issue Comments

SPL.A Wound Up

Mulvihill Pro-AMS RSP Split Share Corp. has announced:

that its shareholders approved a special resolution amending the Articles of the Fund to terminate the Fund in advance of the redemption date originally scheduled for December 31, 2013. As a result of such approval, the Fund will redeem all Class A Shares and Class B Shares on October 29, 2010 for the redemption amounts to which holders are entitled. It is expected that the last trading day for the shares will be October 28, 2010 and the proceeds from the redemption of the Class A Shares and Class B Shares are expected to be paid in approximately 10 business days from the redemption date. No action need be taken by holders of Class A Shares or Class B Shares to receive their redemption amounts.

Given the small size of the Fund, operating costs are becoming a greater burden on the net asset value while
trading liquidity has been significantly reduced. Redeeming all Class A Shares and Class B Shares on October 29, 2010 will preserve value for shareholders. As a result of the redemption, the Class A Shares and Class B Shares of the Fund will be de-listed by the Toronto Stock Exchange.

The NAV of SPL.A was 8.49 as of October 29. As of the June 30, 2010, financial statements the fund value was $8.92-million.

SPL.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when its credit rating was discontinued by DBRS. SPL.A was tracked by HIMIPref&trades;, but was relegated to the Scraps index at the October 2002 rebalancing on volume concerns. It was downgraded to Pfd-3 by DBRS as of April 9, 2003.

Market Action

November 1, 2010

Fabulous Fab’s trial is progressing … slowly:

U.S. District Judge Barbara S. Jones today dismissed Tourre’s motion seeking a judgment in the case. He had argued that the SEC can’t sue him over a Goldman Sachs deal involving collateralized debt obligations because the transaction didn’t take place in the U.S.

In the same order, Jones said the SEC can file an amended complaint by Nov. 22.

“Defendant Tourre’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to renew after plaintiff has filed its amended complaint,” Jones wrote.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in June that U.S. securities laws don’t apply to claims of foreign buyers of non-U.S. securities on foreign exchanges, lawyers for the Goldman executive director said in a court filing in September. The collateralized debt obligations, known as Abacus, at issue in the SEC’s complaint weren’t listed on any exchange and the sole investor in the notes was a foreign bank that bought them overseas, according to the filing.

Never waste a crisis – even if it wasn’t really a crisis:

In a speech at Notre Dame University, CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton said the agency already has the authority to impose limits on how many financial futures contracts any one market player can hold, although he didn’t offer any details on what kind of limits might be appropriate.

“I think we need some sort of boundary on financial futures as well as futures on commodities of finite supply like energy, metals and agriculture,” he said in prepared remarks. “How and what those confines are I don’t know at this time, but it seems only prudent to institute some type of restrictions to ensure we don’t again see another flash crash, or even a miniflash crash.”

“I’m talking about sensible, well-calibrated limits to give us a handle on these markets,” he said.

He said he would like to see limits imposed on “robotic algo-trading” and “high-frequency trading,” although he noted that “like financial futures, it isn’t clear how it would be best achieved.”

Meanwhile, on Friday, a joint advisory committee to the SEC and CFTC will meet to discuss the flash-crash report and come up with some recommendations. Mr. Gensler previously has outlined some areas he would like to explore, including new obligations for brokers executing algorithms for their clients and greater transparency in the public listing at exchanges of bids and offers.

Hurray! All we have to do is support the regulators and investors will never, ever have to worry about losing money again!

The Lancet has taken a strong stand against candy:

One of the world’s most influential medical journals is accusing UNICEF Canada of selling out its values by allowing candy giant Cadbury to use its logo to sell Halloween candy.

In an editorial published online Saturday, the Lancet slammed UNICEF Canada for accepting $500,000 from Cadbury Adams Canada Inc. over a three-year period for construction of schools in Africa in exchange for allowing the company to plaster the iconic – and valuable – UNICEF logo on millions of product packages a year.

UNICEF Canada has made a serious error in judgment by allowing a candy company to use its name to sell high-fat, high-sugar and overall unhealthy products under the guise of raising money for African programs, the editorial states.

In Canada, a country with serious health and obesity problems, “encouraging products which are undeniably unhealthy is irresponsible,” the editorial says.

I was about to buy a bag of Cadbury stuff until I saw the logo, at which point I replaced it on the shelf; but that was because UNICEF is a sleazy organization, not because I’m a precious little doorknob. I bought other brands of chocolate instead; for next year I’m considering cigarettes.

The Canadian preferred share market had yet another good day today, wth PerpetualDiscounts gaining 24bp and FixedResets winning 17bp. Volume continued to be quite good.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5190 % 2,196.3
FixedFloater 5.06 % 3.64 % 26,623 19.07 1 0.4673 % 3,325.5
Floater 2.71 % 2.38 % 56,186 21.30 4 0.5190 % 2,371.5
OpRet 4.81 % 3.36 % 77,747 1.89 9 0.1582 % 2,378.5
SplitShare 5.88 % -16.99 % 67,524 0.09 2 0.0000 % 2,396.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1582 % 2,174.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.66 % 5.11 % 153,386 3.10 24 -0.1005 % 2,013.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.38 % 5.41 % 255,171 14.77 53 0.2364 % 2,029.2
FixedReset 5.22 % 3.00 % 338,201 3.23 50 0.1700 % 2,280.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Premium -2.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-01
Maturity Price : 24.02
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-01
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.57
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-01
Maturity Price : 22.89
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 136,639 TD crossed two blocks of 25,000 each, both at 27.89. Nesbitt crosse blocks of 48,800 and 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.86
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 132,068 RBC crossed 97,400 at 26.55; National crossed 25,000 at 26.57.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.57
Bid-YTW : 2.39 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 107,129 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-01
Maturity Price : 22.99
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 106,125 National crossed 50,000 at 27.63; Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.62
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 67,650 Desjardins bought 36,100 from Nesbitt at 25.50 and crossed 23,600 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 63,734 Desjardins crossed 45,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 2.36 %
There were 40 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Index Construction / Reporting

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: October 2010

HIMI Index Changes, October 29, 2010
Issue From To Because
IGM.PR.B PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
PWF.PR.H PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
FTS.PR.H Scraps FixedReset Credit
FTS.PR.G Scraps FixedReset Credit
FTS.PR.F Scraps PerpetualDiscount Credit
FTS.PR.E Scraps OpRet Credit
CM.PR.R Scraps OpRet Volume
TRI.PR.B Scraps Floater Volume
BAM.PR.G Scraps FixFloat Volume
TCA.PR.X PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
TCA.PR.Y PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
IAG.PR.F PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
GWO.PR.M PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price

It’s very nice to see that there is now an issue in the FixFloat index! It became empty as of the June, 2010, rebalancing.

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during October 2010
Issue Action Index Because
FFH.PR.I Add Scraps New Issue
BPO.PR.P Add Scraps New Issue
BAM.PR.T Add FixedReset New Issue
Issue Comments

Best & Worst Performers: October 2010

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

October 2010
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “October 29”)
BAM.PR.O OpRet Pfd-2(low) -1.59% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.60% based on a bid of 26.00 and optionCertainty 2013-6-30 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.A Floater Pfd-1(low) -1.13%  
BAM.PR.R FixedReset Pfd-2(low) -0.84% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.35% based on a bid of 26.00 and a limitMaturity.
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Pfd-2(high) -0.54% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.35% based on a bid o 25.76 and a call 2011-7-1 at 25.25.
SLF.PR.G FixedReset Pfd-1(low) -0.51% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.45% based on a bid of 25.28 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +4.32% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 22.46 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +4.55% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.02% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +4.78% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 21.03 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +5.17% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.07% based on a bid of 23.75 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(high) +6.49% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.91% based on a bid of 22.89 and a limitMaturity.
Issue Comments

BAM.PR.T Debuts Soft on Subdued Volume

Brookfield Asset Management has announced:

the completion of its previously announced Preferred Shares, Series 26 issue in the amount of CDN$250-million. The offering was underwritten by a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Capital Markets, Scotia Capital Inc. and TD Securities Inc.

Brookfield Asset Management issued 10,000,000 Preferred Shares, Series 26 at a price of $25.00 per share, for aggregate gross proceeds of CDN$250,000,000. Holders of the Preferred Shares, Series 26 will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.50% annually for the initial period ending March 31, 2017. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.31%. The Preferred Shares, Series 26 will commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange on October 29, 2010 under the ticker symbol BAM.PR.T.

The net proceeds of the issue will be added to the general funds of Brookfield Asset Management and be used for general corporate purposes.

BAM.PR.T is a FixedReset, 4.50%+231, announced October 21. The issue traded 229,985 shares in a range of 24.60-90 before closing at 24.83-86, 300×200.

Vital statistics are:

BAM.PR.T FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-29
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
Interesting External Papers

Inflation Risk Premia

Joseph G. Haubrich, Peter H. Ritchken, George Pennacchi wrote a paper released in March 2009 titled Estimating Real and Nominal Term Structures Using Treasury Yields, Inflation, Inflation Forecasts, and Inflation Swap Rates:

This paper develops and estimates an equilibrium model of the term structures of nominal and real interest rates. The term structures are driven by state variables that include the short term real interest rate, expected inflation, a factor that models the changing level to which inflation is expected to revert, as well as four volatility factors that follow GARCH processes. We derive analytical solutions for the prices of nominal bonds, inflation-indexed bonds that have an indexation lag, the term structure of expected inflation, and inflation swap rates. The model parameters are estimated using data on nominal Treasury yields, survey forecasts of inflation, and inflation swap rates. We find that allowing for GARCH effects is particularly important for real interest rate and expected inflation processes, but that long-horizon real and inflation risk premia are relatively stable. Comparing our model prices of inflation-indexed bonds to those of Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) suggests that TIPS were underpriced prior to 2004 but subsequently were valued fairly. We find that unexpected increases in both short run and longer run inflation implied by our model have a negative impact on stock market returns.

Of most interest to me is the conclusion on the inflation risk premium:

We can also examine how these risk premia varied over time during our sample period. Figure 8 plots expected inflation, the real risk premium, and the inflation risk premium for a 10-year maturity during the 1982 to 2008 period. Interestingly, while inflation expected over 10 years varied substantially, the levels of the real and inflation risk premia did not. The real risk premium for a 10-year maturity bond varied from 150 to 170 basis points, averaging 157 basis points. This real risk premium is consistent with the substantial slope of the real yield curve discussed earlier. The inflation risk premium for a 10-year maturity bond varied from 38 to 60 basis points and averaged 51 basis points. These estimates of the 10-year inflation risk premium fall within the range of those estimated by other studies.[Footnote]

Footnote: For example, a 10-year inflation risk premium averaging 70 basis points and ranging from 20 to 140 basis points is found by Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005). Using data on TIPS, Adrian and Wu (2008) find a smaller 10-year inflation risk premium varying between -20 and 20 basis points.

and

For example, D’Amico et al. (2008) find a large “liquidity premium” during the early years of TIPS’s existence, especially before 2004. They conclude that until more recently, TIPS yields were difficult to account for within a rational pricing framework. Shen (2006) also finds evidence of a drop in the liquidity premium on TIPS around 2004. He notes that this may have been due to the U.S. Treasury’s greater ssuance of TIPS around this time, as well as the beginning of exchange traded funds that purchased TIPS. Another contemporaneous development that may have led to more fairly priced TIPS was the establishment of the U.S. inflation swap market beginning around 2003. Investors may have arbitraged the underpriced TIPS by purchasing them while simultaneously selling inflation payments via inflation swap contracts.

and additionally:

Our estimated model also suggests that shocks to both short run and longer run inflation coincide with negative stock returns. An implication is that stocks are, at best, an imperfect hedge against inflation. This underscores the importance of inflation-linked securities as a means for safeguarding the real value of investments.

Joseph G. Haubrich of the Cleveland Fed provides a primer on the topic at A New Approach to Gauging Inflation Expectations, together with some charts:

The first chart is the model’s 1-month real interest rate

Click for big

 
Click for big

The methodology is used in the Cleveland Fed Estimates of Inflation Expectations:

The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland reports that its latest estimate of 10-year expected inflation is 1.53 percent. In other words, the public currently expects the inflation rate to be less than 2 percent on average over the next decade.

The Cleveland Fed’s estimate of inflation expectations is based on a model that combines information from a number of sources to address the shortcomings of other, commonly used measures, such as the “break-even” rate derived from Treasury inflation protected securities (TIPS) or survey-based estimates. The Cleveland Fed model can produce estimates for many time horizons, and it isolates not only inflation expectations, but several other interesting variables, such as the real interest rate and the inflation risk premium. For more detail, see the links in the See Also box at right.

On October 15, ten-year nominal treasuries yielded 2.50%, while 10-Year TIPS yielded 0.46%, so the Cleveland Fed has decomposed the Break-Even Inflation Rate of 204bp into 1.53% expected inflation and 0.51% Inflation Risk Premium.

I find myself in the uncomfortable position of being deeply suspicious of this decomposition without being able to articulate specific objections to the theory. The paper’s authors claim:

Comparing our model’s implied yields for inflation-indexed bonds to those of TIPS suggests that TIPS were underpriced prior to 2004 but more recently are fairly priced. Hence, the ‘liquidity premium’ in TIPS yields appears to have dissipated. The recent introduction of inflation derivatives, such as zero coupon inflation swaps, may have eliminated this mispricing by creating a more complete market for inflation-linked securities.

but I have great difficulty with the concept that there is no significant liquidity premium in TIPS. The estimation of the 1-month real rate looks way, way too volatile to me. I suspect that the answer to my problems is buried in the estimation methods between the market price of inflation swaps and the forecasts of estimated inflation, but I cannot find it … at least, not yet!

Interesting External Papers

Flash Crash: Order Toxicity?

As reported by Bloomberg, David Easley, Marcos Mailoc Lopez de Prado and Maureen O’Hara have published a paper titled The Microstructure of the ‘Flash Crash’: Flow Toxicity, Liquidity Crashes and the Probability of Informed Trading:

The ‘flash crash’ of May 6th 2010 was the second largest point swing (1,010.14 points) and the biggest one-day point decline (998.5 points) in the history of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. For a few minutes, $1 trillion in market value vanished. In this paper, we argue that the ‘flash crash’ is the result of the new dynamics at play in the current market structure, not conjunctural factors, and therefore similar episodes are likely to occur again. We highlight the role played by order toxicity in affecting liquidity provision, and we provide compelling evidence that the collapse could have been anticipated with some degree of confidence given the increasing toxicity of the order flow in the hours and days prior to collapse. We also show that a measure of this toxicity, the Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed Trading (the VPIN* informed trading metric), Granger-causes volatility, while the reciprocal is less likely, and that it takes on average 1/10 of a session’s volume for volatility to adjust to changes in the VPIN metric. We attribute this cause-effect relationship to the impact that flow toxicity has on market makers’ willingness to provide liquidity. Since the ‘flash crash’ might have been avoided had liquidity providers remained in the marketplace, a solution is proposed in the form of a ‘VPIN contract’, which would allow them to dynamically monitor and manage their risks.

They make the point:

Providing liquidity in a high frequency environment introduces new risks for market makers. When order flows are essentially balanced, high frequency market makers have the potential to earn razor thin margins on massive numbers of trades. When order flows become unbalanced, however, market makers face the prospect of losses due to adverse selection. The market makers’ estimate of the toxicity (the expected loss from trading with position takers) of the flow directed to them by position takers now becomes a crucial factor in determining their participation. If they believe that this toxicity is too high, they will liquidate their positions and leave the market.

In summary, we see three forces at play in the recent market structure:

  • Concentration of liquidity provision into a small number of highly specialized firms.
  • Reduced participation of retail investors resulting in increased toxicity of the flow received by market makers.
  • High sensitivity of liquidity providers to intraday losses, as a result of the liquidity providers low capitalization, high turnover, increased competition and small profit target.

Quick! Sign up the big banks to provide liquidity through proprietary trading! Oh … wait ….

Further, they make the point about market-making:

To understand why toxicity of order flow can induce such behavior from market makers, let us return to the role that information plays in affecting liquidity in the market. Easley and O’Hara (1992) sets out the mechanism by which informed traders extract wealth from liquidity providers. For example, if a liquidity provider trades against a buy order he loses the difference between the ask price and the expected value of the contract if the buy is from an informed trader. On the other hand, he gains the difference between the ask price and the expected value of the contract if the buy is from an uninformed trader. This loss and gain, weighted by the probabilities of the trade arising from an informed trader or an uninformed trader just balance due to the intense competition between liquidity providers.

[Formula]

If flow toxicity unexpectedly rises (a greater than expected fraction of trades arises from informed traders), market makers face losses. Their inventory may grow beyond their risk limits, in which case they are forced to withdraw from the side of the market that is being adversely selected. Their withdrawal generates further weakness on that side of the market and their inventories keep accumulating additional losses. At some point they capitulate, dumping their inventory and taking the loss. In other words, extreme toxicity has the ability of transforming liquidity providers into liquidity consumers.

The earlier paper by these authors, detailing the calculation of VPIN, was titled Measuring Flow Toxicity in a High Frequency World:

Order flow is regarded as toxic when it adversely selects market makers, who are unaware that they are providing liquidity at their own loss. Flow toxicity can be expressed in terms of Probability of Informed Trading (PIN). We present a new procedure to estimate the Probability of Informed Trading based on volume imbalance (the VPIN* informed trading metric). An important advantage of the VPIN metric over previous estimation procedures comes from being a direct analytic procedure which does not require the intermediate estimation of non-observable parameters describing the order flow or the application of numerical methods. It also renders intraday updates mutually comparable in a frequency that matches the speed of information arrival (stochastic time clock). Monte Carlo experiments show this estimate to be accurate for all theoretically possible combinations of parameters, even for statistics computed on small samples. Finally, the VPIN metric is computed on a wide range of products to show that this measure anticipated the ‘flash crash’ several hours before the markets collapsed

Although the calibration is interesting and perhaps valuable, the underlying theory is pretty simple:

classify each transaction as buy or sell initiated:[Footnote]
a. A transaction i is a buy if either:
i. [Price increases], or
ii. [Price unchanged] and the [previous transaction] was also a buy.
b. Otherwise, the transaction is a sell.

Footnote: According to Lee and Ready (1991), 92.1% of all buys at the ask and 90.0% of all sells at the bid are correctly classified by this simple procedure. See Lee, C.M.C. and M.J. Ready (1991): “Inferring trade direction from intraday data”, The Journal of Finance, 46, 733-746. Alternative trade classification algorithms could be used.

and VPIN is simply the absolute value of the difference between buy-volume and sell-volume, expressed as a fraction of total volume. Yawn.

The VPIN indicator is very similar to Joe Granville’s Technical Analysis indicator On-Balance Volume. While Easley, Lopez de Prado and O’Hara have dressed it up with a little math and illustrated it in the glorious TA tradition of anecdotal cherry picking, they have neither provided anything particularly new nor proved their case.

Market Action

October 29, 2010

The EU is now openly discussing mechanisms for sovereign default:

European Union leaders endorsed German calls for a rewrite of EU treaties to create a permanent debt-crisis mechanism, while sparring over whether to force bondholders to help pay the bill for rescuing financially distressed states.

As the biggest contributor to this year’s hastily arranged 860 billion euros ($1.2 trillion) in loans and pledges to stem the debt crisis, Germany won backing to set up a permanent system by 2013. Deficit-strapped Spain warned that provisions to reschedule or cancel some debts would expose its markets to renewed selling pressure.

“We won’t allow only the taxpayers to bear all the costs of a future crisis,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel told a press conference in Brussels today after a summit of EU leaders. There is “a justified desire to see that it’s not just taxpayers who are on the hook, but also private investors.”

Germany rules out extending this year’s emergency taxpayer- funded financial assistance mechanisms when they expire in 2013. Merkel’s follow-up system would extend debt maturities, suspend interest payments and waive creditor claims, Handelsblatt newspaper reported yesterday, citing an unidentified government official.

Assiduous Readers will remember that on July 23 I reported:

But the best line in the farce comes from a central banker:

ECB Vice President Vitor Constancio called the tests “severe” and explained they didn’t include a scenario of a national default because “we don’t believe there will be a default.”

That’s just great, Vitor! Maybe you’ll be put in charge of the government run credit rating agency the Europeans are thinking about, you know, the ones that will be much nicer to sovereigns than those mean old-style CRAs!

There is no word yet regarding whether Vitor Constancio has resigned.

The Bank of Canada has released a working paper by Ali Dib titled Capital Requirement and Financial Frictions in Banking: Macroeconomic Implications:

The author develops a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with an active banking sector, a financial accelerator, and financial frictions in the interbank and bank capital markets. He investigates the importance of banking sector frictions on business cycle fluctuations and assesses the role of a regulatory capital requirement in propagating the effects of shocks in the real economy. Bank capital is introduced to satisfy the regulatory capital requirement, and serves as collateral for borrowing in the interbank market. Financial frictions are introduced by assuming asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers that creates moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the interbank and bank capital markets, respectively. Highly leveraged banks are vulnerable and therefore pay higher costs when raising funds. The author finds that financial frictions in the interbank and bank capital markets amplify and propagate the effects of shocks; however, the capital requirement attenuates the real impacts of aggregate shocks (including financial shocks), reduces macroeconomic volatilities, and stabilizes the economy.

Commissioner Elisse B. Walter of the SEC delivered an interesting speech regarding the SEC review of the US Municipal market. A lot of familiar cross currents – exchanges for bonds! the Credit Rating Agencies are no good! brokers should tell us what to buy! – and discussion of the move from the Municipal rating scale to the global scale:

Three participants endorsed the principle of a global rating scale. However, one pointed out that during this time — where some rating agencies are moving to a global scale — investors may find it increasingly difficult to compare municipal credits against each other. Further, he thinks that despite recalibration, investors will continue to have a hard time comparing munis to corporates because municipal risk remains overstated relative to corporate risk.

Several others were critical of the notion of a global rating scale, arguing that municipal bonds and corporate securities are just not comparable. One panelist stated that munis should not be rated on a scale that focuses on default risk and recovery, since governments rarely default. Some of the participants would prefer a new rating scale for governments that could be tailored to the unique characteristics of governmental entities. We heard suggestions for a simple pass/fail scale, a three-part scale or a scale of 1-100.

Another area of concern was the impact of ratings on the cost of issuance. One panelist pointed out that higher ratings lead to lower borrowing costs and lower ratings lead to higher borrowing costs. He and a co-panelist highlighted the consequence of lower ratings: increased costs to taxpayers for financing critical infrastructure projects.

That last panelist should take a tip from the Europeans: set up a new rating agency with a mandate to be chipper and upbeat at all times.

Themis Trading points out signs of a high-level regulatory battle, with the NYSE opining:

NYSE Euronext Chief Executive Officer Duncan Niederauer said regulators will probably respond to the May 6 stock-market crash by extending obligations to buy and sell shares to more traders.

Niederauer, speaking in Washington today, said too many traders reap the benefits of making markets without responsibilities to keep providing liquidity when stocks are plunging. New rules may be in place as soon as January, he said.

Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Mary Schapiro called on the agency in September to examine whether the loss of “old specialist obligations” has hurt investors after measures such as trading stocks in penny increments cut the number of market makers. With the facilitation of trading now dominated by hundreds of automated firms with few rules for when they must buy and sell, the SEC is considering ways to keep the biggest from abandoning the market at the first sign of trouble.

The astonishing part is in the third paragraph. Imagine! The regulators made it less profitable to be a specialist … and fewer firms wanted to be specialists. Well, who woulda thunk it?

NASDAQ takes the other view:

The head of Nasdaq OMX Group Inc (NasdaqGS:NDAQ – News) said on Friday he does not expect any new obligations or privileges for U.S. “market-makers” until 2012 at the earliest, calling any regulatory change “a slippery slope.”

“I don’t think something will happen in 2011,” Nasdaq OMX Chief Executive Officer Robert Greifeld said on a conference call, adding it would be “a difficult road to try to properly define what responsibility and privileges to give participants.”

Mervyn King made an excellent point in a speech at the Second Bagehot Lecture:

Second, the Basel approach calculates the amount of capital required by using a measure of “risk-weighted” assets. Those risk weights are computed from past experience. Yet the circumstances in which capital needs to be available to absorb potential losses are precisely those when earlier judgements about the risk of different assets and their correlation are shown to be wrong. One might well say that a financial crisis occurs when the Basel risk weights turn out to be poor estimates of underlying risk. And that is not because investors, banks or regulators are incompetent. It is because the relevant risks are often impossible to assess in terms of fixed probabilities. Events can take place that we could not have envisaged, let alone to which we could attach probabilities. If only banks were playing in a casino then we probably could calculate appropriate risk weights. Unfortunately, the world is more complicated. So the regulatory framework needs to contain elements that are robust with respect to changes in the appropriate risk weights, and that is why the Bank of England advocated a simple leverage ratio as a key backstop to capital requirements.

He also mentioned the Too Big To Fail problem:

But in most other countries, identifying in advance a group of financial institutions whose failure would be intolerable, and so are “too important to fail”, is a hazardous undertaking. In itself it would simply increase the subsidy by making it explicit. And it is hard to see why institutions whose failure cannot be contemplated should be in the private sector in the first place. But if international regulators failed to agree on higher capital requirements in general, adding to the loss-absorbing capacity of large institutions could be a second-best outcome.

… which has been a hot issue lately:

“Are we a systemically important bank in the world? I think (we’re) not. Nothing in my strategy is trying to make us that,” Toronto-Dominion Bank CEO Ed Clark said last week, although he also acknowledged that regulators may not agree with him.

“It’s not obvious that there will be no impact on us, and I don’t know that and I can’t get any assurance on that,” he said at a presentation in Toronto. TD is Canada’s No. 2 bank.

Rick Waugh, CEO of third-ranked Bank of Nova Scotia , has also said his bank is not systemically important.

Gord Nixon, head of Royal Bank of Canada , which is considered the Canadian bank most likely to be deemed “too big to fail,” said at a presentation Wednesday that the whole debate was “ridiculous” and suggested labeling a bank “too big” might compel it to shed assets to shrink.

It’s so far unclear how many banks will fit the bill, with some speculating regulators could name 30 or more lenders.

Canada’s bank regulator, which has objected to the idea of singling out large banks, is also pushing the point that Canadian banks should be left off the list.

“I’d say that 80 per cent of global financial intermediation goes through 20 institutions … and no Canadian financial institutions fit that bill,” said Julie Dickson, Canada’s Superintendent of Financial Institutions.

It is precisely to avoid such irresolvable arguments that I propose that regulation eschew the TBTF label; what should happen is that there should be a progressive surcharge on Risk-Weighted-Assets, so that the first 100-billion is requires less capital than the next 100-billion and so on.

The SEC has $450-million available for paid informers! Denounce your neighbor today!

Alackaday! TMX DataLinx has advised:

The daily Toronto Stock Exchange and TSX Venture Exchange Trades & Quotes files for Friday October 29, 2010 will be delayed due to systems testing and are expected to be available by 5:00 AM, Sunday October 31, 2010. We regret any inconvenience this may cause.

They like to do this on PrefLetter weekends and monthends. So we’re all gonna hafta wait. I will update with the day’s action when I can.

Update, 2010-10-31: The Canadian preferred share market closed the month with a small gain, PerpetualDiscounts up 3bp and FixedResets winning 2bp. Volume continued at elevated levels.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.41%, equivalent to 7.57% at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield about … oh, call it a hair over 5.2%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 235bp, a slight (and perhaps meaningless) increase from the 230bp reported on October 27, but a sharp decline from the 260bp reported on September 30. The tightening was driven on both sides, as PerpetualDiscount yields fell while long corporate yields rose modestly; the performance of the BMO Long Corporate ETF shows how returns on the asset class plateaued in October.


Click for Big
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0911 % 2,184.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0911 % 3,308.9
Floater 2.87 % 3.17 % 88,576 19.29 3 0.0911 % 2,358.4
OpRet 4.90 % 3.60 % 94,867 0.73 9 -0.0086 % 2,374.7
SplitShare 5.88 % -17.20 % 67,984 0.09 2 -0.3030 % 2,396.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0086 % 2,171.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.70 % 5.05 % 152,219 5.33 19 0.0639 % 2,015.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.40 % 5.41 % 246,879 14.71 58 0.0324 % 2,024.4
FixedReset 5.26 % 3.00 % 379,806 3.24 48 0.0227 % 2,276.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.10
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-29
Maturity Price : 24.49
Evaluated at bid price : 24.77
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 229,985 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-29
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 108,075 RBC crossed 100,000 at 25.53.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.46
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 104,900 RBC crossed 100,000 at 26.53.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.54
Bid-YTW : 2.43 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 62,665 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-29
Maturity Price : 23.55
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 48,161 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 20,000 each, both at 16.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-29
Maturity Price : 16.61
Evaluated at bid price : 16.61
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 45,660 RBC sold 11,200 to Nesbitt at 26.89 and 11,000 to TD at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.93
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.