July 8, 2010

July 8th, 2010

There’s some criticism of the European stress tests:

Regulators have told lenders the tests may assume a loss of about 17 percent on Greek government debt, 3 percent on Spanish bonds and none on German debt, said two people briefed on the talks who declined to be identified because the details are private.

“This isn’t a stress test,” said Jaap Meijer, a London- based analyst at Evolution Securities Ltd. It’s “merely the current valuation of government bonds.”

Credit markets are pricing in losses of about 60 percent on Greek bonds should the government default, more than three times the level said to be assumed by CEBS. Derivatives known as recovery swaps are trading at rates that imply investors would get back about 40 percent in a Greek default or restructuring.

“I wonder how much these stress tests are reverse- engineered to inspire confidence in the market” and banks, said Bruce Packard, an analyst at Seymour Pierce Ltd. in London.

Reverse engineering? Surely not! That’s done by evil bonus-seeking bankers underwriting sub-prime, not by Holy Regulators!

American banks are hoping to generate investor opposition to fair value accounting:

The American Bankers Association opposes the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s plan to apply fair-value rules to all financial instruments, including loans, rather than just to securities. The group says the rule could make strong banks appear undercapitalized.

The association’s website, noting that FASB’s stated mission is to serve investors, provides a sample letter for people writing to the board and suggests they focus on why the proposal isn’t “useful for investors.”

The ABA has devoted a whole page to the campaign.

State Street reached for yield – and suffered:

State Street Corp., the third-largest U.S. custody bank, reported second-quarter earnings that missed analysts’ estimates because of a $251 million after-tax charge related to its securities lending business.

State Street recorded the charge, which reduced earnings by 50 cents a share, to replenish funds that managed money on behalf of securities lenders. The funds invest cash deposited as collateral by securities borrowers. The injection allows State Street to lift redemption restrictions placed on clients in the fall of 2008 after the funds suffered losses.

Pensions & Investments has some interesting background:

It could be argued that the U.S. pension fund sector had historically engaged proportionately more in leveraged finance — by lending securities to raise cash collateral that can be reinvested for returns — than securities lending over recent years and that pension funds only very recently adopted a profile more in line with the U.S. mutual fund sector. That profile has maturity and liquidity more in line with the underlying loan transaction, that is, short term.

The mean return of the total return to lendable securities in a portfolio generated by the U.S. pension fund sector is almost double than that of the U.S. mutual fund sector over the three-year period under consideration. What should really worry the pension fund sector now is that the difference is at its historic low. The pension fund sector has reined in reinvestment guidelines and reduced its return expectations to reduce risk.

AIG writ small!

It was a good day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 16bp and FixedResets gaining 3bp. Volume was moderate.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.83 % 2.94 % 23,320 20.28 1 0.0000 % 2,048.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1860 % 3,099.6
Floater 2.32 % 1.98 % 45,470 22.44 4 0.1860 % 2,209.2
OpRet 4.88 % 1.08 % 80,223 0.08 11 0.0849 % 2,341.7
SplitShare 6.39 % 6.32 % 87,945 3.45 2 0.0882 % 2,171.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0849 % 2,141.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.97 % 5.61 % 117,537 1.85 4 0.0497 % 1,919.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.92 % 5.96 % 180,568 13.97 73 0.1553 % 1,826.3
FixedReset 5.36 % 3.74 % 317,257 3.49 47 0.0271 % 2,203.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 23.49
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 20.55
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.60
Evaluated at bid price : 23.18
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 106,516 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 22.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 106,016 RBC crossed 50,000 at 26.80; Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 87,830 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
PWF.PR.J OpRet 75,950 Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 25.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-08-07
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 1.08 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 64,593 RBC crossed 55,000 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.37
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 58,000 Nesbitt crossed 44,200 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 25.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

July 7, 2010

July 7th, 2010

There’s some doubt about the EU stress tests:

Investors say they don’t know if some banks are hiding bad loans, whether they have enough capital to withstand a debt default by a European state and whether governments can afford to rescue them. The European Union still hasn’t disclosed the tests’ criteria, including if they contain a sovereign default.

Protecting the senior bonds of 11 U.S. banks from default using credit default swaps costs an average of about 144 basis points, according to data compiled by CMA DataVision. In Europe, the average cost has climbed to about 224 basis points this year, the data show.

Europe’s largest banks are trading at a discount to their book value while their U.S. counterparts trade at a premium. Europe’s 20 largest lenders are trading at about 10 percent less than the net value of their assets. The 20 biggest U.S. banks trade at a 10 percent premium, Bloomberg data show.

Some European lenders used accounting-rule changes made in October 2008, about a month after Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s collapse, to allow them to avoid writedowns on assets based on plunging market values, unless a default was deemed likely. Under pressure from EU leaders, the International Accounting Standards Board approved changes letting financial institutions in more than 100 countries that use International Financial Reporting Standards to reclassify some investments so they no longer had to book paper gains and losses as credit markets fluctuated.

Deutsche Bank, for example, used the change to shift about 38 billion euros of assets, including commercial real estate and leveraged finance, into its loan book from the third quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009, saving it a net 3.2 billion euros in markdowns based on valuation gains and losses through the first quarter of 2010. ING Groep NV, the biggest Dutch financial-services company, reclassified 24.4 billion euros and Societe Generale SA shifted 25.3 billion euros in assets, escaping about 2.8 billion euros in losses.

Perhaps in response (yes, OSFI, sometimes regulators respond to investor outcry! How ’bout dat?), C-EBS has released some details:

The macro-economic scenarios include a set of key macro-economic variables (e.g. the evolution of GDP, of unemployment and of the consumer price index), differentiated for EU Member States, the rest of the EEA countries and the US. The exercise also envisages adverse conditions in financial markets and a shock on interest rates to capture an increase in risk premia linked to a deterioration in the EU government bond markets.

On aggregate, the adverse scenario assumes a 3 percentage point deviation of GDP for the EU compared to the European Commission’s forecasts over the two-year time horizon. The sovereign risk shock in the EU represents a deterioration of market conditions as compared to the situation observed in early May 2010.

Mr Joseph S Tracy, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, spoke at the Westchester County Bankers Association, Tarrytown, New York, 25 June 2010, drawing parallels between the Credit Crunch and the Panic of 1907.

There’s an interesting trend in bond underwriting:

Borrowers are obtaining credit from banks competing for a pool of bond deals that dropped to $1.18 trillion in the first half from $1.92 trillion a year earlier as Europe’s sovereign debt crisis pared sales, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The number of banks on each high-yield deal has almost tripled since 2000, cutting fees by an average of 57 percent per firm.

“We’ve been very clear with our banking business partners that we’ll take care of those who are good to us,” said Martin of London-based Virgin, which enlisted a record 14 banks to sell debt in January. “If you want to be in the bond, we need you to give us your balance sheet as well.”

Martin included Credit Suisse, Citigroup, Barclays Capital and HSBC Holdings Plc in Virgin Media’s bond offering, along with 10 other managers, after they agreed to join a 1.925 billion-pound ($2.9 billion) credit facility. The four banks, whose spokesmen declined to comment, ultimately weren’t needed on the loan.

There’s a big TIPS sale tomorrow and speculation there will be a big concession:

Barclays Plc’s Michael Pond, the top-rated analyst of Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, said the U.S. may struggle to sell a record-tying $12 billon of the securities tomorrow with the government likely to bolster the size of future auctions and inflation expectations low.

“We are concerned that the market will have difficulty absorbing this much supply given other headwinds and believe a significant concession is needed for the auction to go well,” Pond said in a note to clients dated July 2. “The level of real yields combined with the size presents a high hurdle for a good auction.”

The $12 billion of 10-year TIPS will match the record amount sold in January 2004. The U.S. will sell $30 billion of the security during the second half of 2010, based on the size of tomorrow’s auction and the Treasury’s plans to reopen the issue twice, Pond wrote. That amount is up from $15 billion worth of sales during the second half of last year and the historical high of $21 billion during the first half of 2004, he wrote.

Real yields, which take into account inflation or deflation, have fallen to 1.218 percent on 10-year Treasuries, from 1.685 percent April 2, according to Bloomberg Data. Current real yield levels, only 30 basis points away from the 91 basis point yield experienced in March of 2008 during the deflation scare, leaves the security with “limited upside,” Pond wrote. “At current levels, this would be the lowest yield at a 10-year TIPS auction.

I was briefly quoted in the Globe, deprecating GICs:

So why would anyone choose a government bond?

“The main thing is liquidity,” says James Hymas, president of Hymas Investment Management in Toronto.

With most GICs (cashable GICs being the major exception), you agree to lock in your money for a certain period. In exchange, you earn a higher return. Bonds can be sold at any time, but you earn a lower return.

“I don’t really recommend GICs at the best of times because of the liquidity issue,” he says.

The semi-annual TXPR index rebalancing should be announced soon – last year’s announcement was on Friday, July 10.

PerpetualDiscounts were flat on the day, while FixedResets rose by 15bp on average volume.

PerpetualDiscounts now show a median-weighted-average yield of 5.99%, equivalent to 8.39% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long corporates now yield about 5.50%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 290bp, unchanged from June 30.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.83 % 2.93 % 24,289 20.29 1 0.0000 % 2,048.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1592 % 3,093.8
Floater 2.33 % 1.97 % 45,911 22.46 4 -0.1592 % 2,205.1
OpRet 4.88 % 2.37 % 81,254 0.08 11 -0.0428 % 2,339.7
SplitShare 6.39 % 6.22 % 88,649 3.45 2 -1.0037 % 2,169.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0428 % 2,139.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.97 % 5.80 % 118,453 1.85 4 0.1437 % 1,918.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.93 % 5.99 % 181,718 13.94 73 -0.0048 % 1,823.5
FixedReset 5.36 % 3.71 % 320,116 3.49 47 0.1463 % 2,202.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.27
Bid-YTW : 8.25 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 21.21
Evaluated at bid price : 21.21
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 18.73
Evaluated at bid price : 18.73
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.84
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 23.79
Evaluated at bid price : 23.98
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 22.25
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 106,615 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 22.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 55,375 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 51,954 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 45,870 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-07
Maturity Price : 19.87
Evaluated at bid price : 19.87
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 34,840 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 33,400 RBC bought 10,000 from anonymous at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.77
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

July 6, 2010

July 6th, 2010

There’s some interesting speculation about credit spreads:

Executives who run big companies and big funds expect to be dealing with sovereign debt problems for years to come.

That’s one of the big conclusions from a survey of executives commissioned by Royal Bank of Canada’s capital markets unit.

Some of the most striking findings were a high degree of concern that a Group of Twenty country would default in the coming three years (Italy was voted most likely), skepticism that the euro-zone would survive that period intact, and a belief that high quality corporate bonds might be safer than some government bonds.

A full 40 per cent of respondents said that they expected yields on the highest level of corporate debt to drop below yields on sovereign debt of the countries where they are based, according to the poll of about 440 executives around the world.

Geez … you mean we have to re-write the textbooks again? We haven’t even finished rewriting the sections on monetary policy!

A good day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 32bp and FixedResets gaining 7bp, with good volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.82 % 2.93 % 25,298 20.30 1 0.0000 % 2,048.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0398 % 3,098.7
Floater 2.32 % 1.97 % 47,770 22.47 4 0.0398 % 2,208.6
OpRet 4.87 % 2.85 % 76,683 0.09 11 0.1415 % 2,340.7
SplitShare 6.33 % 6.33 % 89,679 3.45 2 0.3943 % 2,191.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1415 % 2,140.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.96 % 5.70 % 120,189 1.85 4 0.1092 % 1,915.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.91 % 5.98 % 185,432 13.96 73 0.3160 % 1,823.6
FixedReset 5.36 % 3.80 % 319,266 3.49 47 0.0745 % 2,199.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 22.25
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 18.20
Evaluated at bid price : 18.20
Bid-YTW : 6.59 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 23.57
Evaluated at bid price : 23.85
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 20.17
Evaluated at bid price : 20.17
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 22.81
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 20.42
Evaluated at bid price : 20.42
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 18.95
Evaluated at bid price : 18.95
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 23.72
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.70
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 21.49
Evaluated at bid price : 21.49
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 24.19
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 24.22
Evaluated at bid price : 24.44
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.83
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 131,715 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 23.11
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 75,914 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 53,600 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 23.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 22.81
Evaluated at bid price : 23.09
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 51,607 Desjardins crossed two blocks of 10,000 each at 18.47 and 18.48. Nesbitt crossed 12,300 at 18.48.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-06
Maturity Price : 18.47
Evaluated at bid price : 18.47
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
PWF.PR.J OpRet 38,220 TD crossed 16,300 at 25.76.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-08-05
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 36,821 TD crossed 25,000 at 27.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.70
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

New Issue: Subsidiary of NPI, FixedReset 5.25%+280

July 6th, 2010

Northland Power Income Fund has announced:

that Northland Power Preferred Equity Inc. (the “Corporation”), an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of the Fund, will issue in Canada a total of 4 million Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 1 (the “Series 1 Preferred Shares”) guaranteed by the Fund, at a price of $25.00 per share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $100 million, on a bought deal basis to a syndicate of underwriters in Canada led by CIBC.

The holders of Series 1 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive fixed cumulative dividends at an annual rate of $1.3125 per share, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of the Corporation. The Series 1 Preferred Shares will yield 5.25% annually at the issue price, for the initial five-year period ending September 30, 2015 with the first dividend payment date scheduled for September 30, 2010, based on an anticipated closing date of July 28, 2010. The dividend rate will reset on September 30, 2015 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the then five-year Government of Canada Bond yield plus 2.80%. The Series 1 Preferred Shares are redeemable on or after September 30, 2015.

The holders of Series 1 Preferred Shares will have the right to convert their shares into Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series 2 (the “Series 2 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2015 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter. The holders of Series 2 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating rate cumulative dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors, at a rate equal to the then three month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 2.80%.

The Corporation has granted the underwriters an over-allotment option exercisable up to 30 days after closing to purchase up to an additional 600,000 Series 1 Preferred Shares at the issue price on the same terms, for additional gross proceeds of up to $15 million.

The Corporation intends to lend the net proceeds of the offering to NPIF Holdings L.P., a subsidiary of the Fund, which will use the funds in the construction of advanced development projects of the Fund, to repay certain debt and for general corporate purposes.

The Fund’s proposed conversion to a corporation has received unitholder approval and the approval of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and is expected to be completed on January 1, 2011. Under the terms of the conversion as approved, the Corporation will amalgamate with the successor of the Fund and the Series 1 Preferred Shares will become an equal number of preferred shares having the same attributes as the successor to the Fund, which will be called “Northland Power Inc.”. If the Corporation does not amalgamate with, or otherwise become, the successor, the successor entity will assume all the obligations of the Fund under the guarantee of the Series 1 and Series 2 Preferred Shares.

The Series 1 and Series 2 Preferred Shares will be offered to the public in Canada pursuant to a short form prospectus that will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in each of the provinces of Canada.

This issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™, but with a provisional rating of P-3 from S&P will be relegated to the Scraps index.

Update: DBRS discontinued the fund’s stability rating, presumably because the fund discontinued paying:

DBRS has today elected to discontinue the stability rating of Northland Power Income Fund (the Fund).

DBRS notes this action is unrelated to the Fund’s stability profile.

July 7, 2010

July 5th, 2010

Lobbying against end-user margin requirements for OTC derivatives (mentioned on June 30) appears to have had some effect, according to Jim Hamilton’s World of Securities Regulation in a discussion of a letter from senators Dodd & Lincoln:

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act does not authorize regulators to impose margin on end users that use derivatives to hedge or mitigate commercial risk, said Senator Chris Dodd and Senator Blanche Lincoln, who have instructed the SEC and CFTC not to make hedging so costly that it becomes prohibitively expensive for end users to manage their risks. In a letter to the Chairs of the House Financial Services and Agriculture Committees, the senators emphasized that Congress does not intend to regulate end users as major swap participants or swap dealers just because they use swaps to hedge or manage the commercial risks associated with their business. Just as Congress has heard the end user community, they said, regulators must carefully consider the impact of regulation and capital and margin on end users.

We’ll see how this works out, but the camel’s got his nose in the tent!

There’s an entertaining scuffle between Themis Trading:

A gift received by a sixth rate player. Now, we didn’t expect to be showered with gifts from the LSE but a simple “thank you” would have been nice. After all, a paper written by “two or three guys” managed to accomplish something that an organization headed by commercial director, Natan Tiefenbrun, couldn’t do by themselves.

So this brings us to the rubbish which was written by that previously mentioned commercial director. If you care to read his piece, here it is: http://tradeturquoise.blogspot.com/

It seems like Natan is tired because he read a piece written by Kate Welling about Themis Trading ([link]). If reading 16 pages gets him tired, maybe he should get some Red Bull. Much of Natan’s rant against Themis Trading sounds like a defense of HFT. Maybe that’s because he also has a very conflicted ownership structure with brokers owning almost half of his MTF.

Natan’s piece is titled Luddites Unite:

One again these self-proclaimed defenders of “fair markets” make dozens of claims about how exchanges, brokers and high-frequency traders are conniving to screw both retail and institutional investors. Here are some of my favourite excerpts:…

By me, the fundamental difference is one of philosophy, explained by Themis principal Sal Arnuk early on in the article that started the spat (which is copy protected, so no quotes for you!). He’s worried about what happened in the Flash Crash to those who panicked and those who had stop-loss orders in place. I suggest that the fact that these people lost money is a good thing. The less stupid money there is in the market, the better.

Much of the hand-wringing regarding securitization revolves around adverse selection – the idea that originators will securitize their worst loans. Credit Sights is alleging an interesting twist on that story:

Spanish savings banks may be hiding losses on home loans by taking non-performing mortgages out of securitized transactions, according to CreditSights Inc.

By carrying the bad loans on their own books the so-called cajas sidestep downgrades to their mortgage-backed securities, the independent bond research firm said in a report.

CreditSights follows a sample of 143 Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities collateralized by 136 billion euros ($170 billion) of loans, with about 45 percent originated by cajas. While the savings banks give little information about the state of their loan books, investor reports on the performance of the securitized debt suggest asset quality is weaker than at commercial lenders, CreditSights said.

“Caja-originated mortgages are performing much worse than those extended by Spain’s commercial banks,” analysts David Watts, John Raymond and Hana Galetova wrote. By buying mortgages out of the pools “they could have been artificially reducing the level of bad loans in RMBS while simultaneously undermining the quality of the cajas’ own assets,” they wrote.

Over a million people attended the Pride Parade in a stunning rebuke to nasty backstairs whisperers and grandstanding politicians (presumably under the influence of foreign governments). Left to itself, the City of Toronto can’t run a souvlaki cart; I suggest that in future it recognizes its total incompetence and stops interfering with the internal decisions of groups who actually bring money into the city.

Yet another power outage today … and the clowndorks are discussing who should march in somebody else’s parade.

It was a strong day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 25bp and FixedResets up 23bp, on light volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.82 % 2.92 % 26,350 20.31 1 0.0000 % 2,048.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3307 % 3,097.5
Floater 2.32 % 1.97 % 49,728 22.46 4 -0.3307 % 2,207.8
OpRet 4.87 % 3.46 % 77,056 0.40 11 0.1307 % 2,337.4
SplitShare 6.35 % 6.31 % 88,433 3.45 2 0.4179 % 2,183.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1307 % 2,137.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.97 % 5.91 % 121,841 1.85 4 0.1491 % 1,913.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.93 % 6.00 % 186,915 13.91 73 0.2547 % 1,817.8
FixedReset 5.35 % 3.82 % 320,924 3.49 47 0.2320 % 2,197.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater -1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-05
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 1.86 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.80
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-05
Maturity Price : 24.38
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-05
Maturity Price : 22.92
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-05
Maturity Price : 18.40
Evaluated at bid price : 18.40
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 69,950 RBC bought 10,000 from Scotia at 18.78; TD crossed 47,700 at 18.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-05
Maturity Price : 18.73
Evaluated at bid price : 18.73
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 68,974 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-05
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 63,995 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-05
Maturity Price : 23.11
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 60,300 RBC sold blocks of 10,000 and 15,000 to anonymous at 23.60; RBC crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-05
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 1.86 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 60,230 RBC crossed 35,000 at 26.00; Desjardins crossed 10,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 42,600 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-05
Maturity Price : 19.71
Evaluated at bid price : 19.71
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
There were 18 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BSC.PR.A Refunding Approved

July 5th, 2010

BNS Split Corp. II has announced:

that holders of its Class A Capital Shares have approved a share capital reorganization (the “Reorganization”) allowing holders of Class A Capital Shares, at their option, to retain their investment in the Company after the scheduled redemption date of September 22, 2010. The Reorganization will permit holders of Class A Capital Shares to extend their investment in the Company beyond the redemption date of September 22, 2010 for an additional 5 years. The Class A Preferred Shares will be redeemed on the same terms originally contemplated in their share provisions and will be called for redemption on or about September 22, 2010. In order to maintain the leveraged “split share” structure of the Company, a new class of shares to be known as the Series 1 Preferred Shares will be created and issued.

Holders of Class A Capital Shares who do not wish to continue their investment in the Company after September 22, 2010 must give notice that they wish to exercise their special retraction right and how they wish to be paid for their shares on or prior to July 30, 2010. Holders of Class A Capital Shares who retract their Class A Capital Shares will be paid on or about September 22, 2010. The Reorganization will become effective provided that holders of at least 1,433,500 Class A Capital Shares retain their Class A Capital Shares and do not exercise the special retraction right.

BSC.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog in the post BSC.PR.A Proposes Term Extension. BSC.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

MAPF Performance: June 2010

July 3rd, 2010

The fund had a very good month in June, outperforming all the relevant indices and passive funds as the Seniority Spread (interest-equivalent PerpetualDiscount yield less the yield on long corporates) declined significantly from 315bp on May 31 to 290bp on June 30. The spread narrowing was not the only part of the story, however, as long corporate yields declined from 5.65% to 5.45%.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close June was $10.5770 after a dividend distribution of $0.143686 per unit.

Returns to June 30, 2010
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +5.49% +2.87% +2.59%
Three Months +4.60% +1.17% +1.33%
One Year +20.72% +12.67% +9.02%
Two Years (annualized) +31.02% +6.05% +4.17%*
Three Years (annualized) +17.96% +2.47% +0.44%
Four Years (annualized) +14.64% +1.77%  
Five Years (annualized) +12.55% +1.96%  
Six Years (annualized) +12.09% +2.71%  
Seven Years (annualized) +13.24% +2.93%  
Eight Years (annualized) +12.45% +3.55%  
Nine Years (annualized) +12.78% +3.50%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns. The figure shown is the square root of product of the current one-year return and the similar figure reported for June 2009.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +3.01%, +1.35% and +11.46%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +2.74%, +0.66% & +7.33% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for AIC Preferred Income Fund (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +3.12%, +0.20% & +7.08%, respectively

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

I am very pleased with the returns over the past year (which, now that the market and the fund’s returns have moderated, are now merely superb, as opposed to “ridiculous” or “nonsensical”), but implore Assiduous Readers not to project this level of outperformance for the indefinite future. The year in the preferred share market was filled with episodes of panic and euphoria, together with many new entrants who do not appear to know what they are doing; perfect conditions for a disciplined quantitative approach.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There have been a lot of strongly motivated market participants in the past year, generating a lot of noise! The conditions of the past two years may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. Just don’t expect the current level of outperformance every year, OK? While I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform, it should be borne in mind that beating the index by 500bp represents a good year, and there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.1883 0.3926
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.1883 0.4203
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.1883 0.4448
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.1883 0.4389
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.1883 $0.4449
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.1883 $0.5054
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.1883 $0.6206
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.1883 $0.6423
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.1883 $0.6524
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.1883 $0.6278
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0000 $0.6182
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0000 $0.6231
June 2010 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.0000 $0.6329
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.

Significant positions were held in Fixed-Reset issues on June 30; all of which (with the exception of YPG.PR.C) currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par at the first possible opportunity. A split-share issue (BNA.PR.C) is also held; since this has a maturity date, the yield cannot be regarded as permanently sustainable. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 6.11% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: June 2010 analysis (which is in excess of the 5.97% index yield on June 30). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $10.5770 * 0.0611 = 0.6463, whereas a similar calculations for March results in $0.6457 (figures for April and May are not comparable due to distributions of dividends to unitholders).

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: June 2010

July 3rd, 2010

Turnover picked up substantially in June to about 53%. It’s about time we saw some useful volatility!

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may the thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2010-6-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 2.9% (-1.1) 7.97% 6.79
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 82.4% (+1.1) 6.11% 13.77
Fixed-Reset 9.8% (+0.6) 3.86% 3.44
Scraps (FixedReset) 4.4% (-0.5) 7.01% 12.53
Cash 0.4% (-0.1) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.96% 12.45
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from May month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

I recently received a question from a potential investor:

I just had a look at MAPF’s portfolio composition and noticed that it is very heavily in perpetual preferreds at a discount. I’m a bit surprised. I would think the general expectation is that interest rates will rise, which would reduce prices for perpetuals. What is the transient mispricing in the market for perpetuals that you are seeing now? Thanks very much in advance and best wishes,

I replied:

HIMIPref assigns a valuation to each issue which may be approximated as

V = Y + D

where Y is yield and D is Disparity.

Since PerpetualDiscounts yield so much more than FixedResets, there is somthing of a hurdle the latter class must get over before they are valued sufficiently highly to be included in a portfolio, but this effect is relatively small (see http://www.prefshares.com/overview/valuation.php)

Disparity is calclated according to the individual issue’s distance from the self-consistent yield curve. Fitting the yield curve provides several normalization factors, so that, for instance, the average disparity of all FixedResets will be zero, of all PerpetualDiscounts to be zero, of all issues rated Pfd-1(low) to be zero, etc. Note, however that the yield curve fitting is done with squared error, so that this will not be precisely true.

PerpetualDiscounts are far more widely dispersed about their mean than FixedResets; for instance, there is very obvious evidence of Credit Stratification (see http://www.prefblog.com/?p=2340) in this class, whereas the market appears to treat all FixedResets of like credit identically (see last two issues of PrefLetter).

Thus, the issues with the highest Valuation will tend to be PerpetualDiscounts.

When you write “the general expectation is that interest rates will rise”, I have to ask: which interest rates? Long, short, corporate, government? Long Corporates have been on wheels lately, fuelled by increasing speculation regarding deflation.

I guess I didn’t really answer one part of his question in detail: What is the transient mispricing in the market for perpetuals that you are seeing now? However, I show a sequence of trades below in which the fund was able to improve credit quality at what may be considered to be a low cost.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2010-6-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 69.2% (+8.2)
Pfd-2(high) 11.8% (-5.5)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 14.1% (-2.2)
Pfd-3(high) 4.4% (-0.5)
Cash 0.4% (-0.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from Junel month-end.

The increase in credit quality was due in part to swaps from POW.PR.D (Pfd-2(high)) to GWO.PR.I (Pfd-1(low)):

MAPF Trades, POW.PR.D to GWO.PR.I
Date POW.PR.D GWO.PR.I
5/31 19.77
bid
6.43%
Yield
17.64
bid
6.39%
Yield
6/18 Sold
21.01
Bought
18.70
6/23 Sold
20.78
Bought
18.74
6/25 Sold
20.87
Bought
18.85
6/30 20.69
bid
6.07%
Yield
18.81
bid
6.02%
Yield
Dividends Ex 6/21
0.3125
 
Only major trades are shown. Not all trades affecting credit quality are reported. Details are incomplete and approximate. All trades wil be published at the time the Semi-annual report is released.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2010-6-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.0% (0)
$50,000 – $100,000 2.9% (+2.9)
$100,000 – $200,000 40.8% (+13.4)
$200,000 – $300,000 32.0% (-18.5)
>$300,000 24.0% (+0.4)
Cash 0.4% (-0.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from May month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 17, 2009, and published in the September, 2009, PrefLetter. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a little lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to PerpetualDiscounts
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

July 2, 2010

July 2nd, 2010

The US jobs number was poor:

Employment at companies rose 83,000, less than the 110,000 gain forecast by economists in a Bloomberg News survey. Including government, payrolls fell for the first time this year because of a drop in federal census workers. The jobless rate dropped to 9.5 percent from 9.7 percent as the labor force shrank, the Labor Department reported today in Washington.

OSFI has published a presentation by Michel Montambeault, Director, to the Canada Institute of Actuaries (CIA) Annual Meeting, on the topic of “Canadian Mortality Experience”, 29 June 2010, Vancouver, British Columbia. In related news, a cluster of longevity genes has been identified:

U.S. scientists say they have discovered the genetic signature of an exceptionally long life, and with nothing more than a DNA sample they can predict – with 77 per cent accuracy – those biologically built to live beyond a century.

They also predict that such a test, based on a set of 150 genetic markers, will be available to the curious by summer’s end.

“It’s really quite revolutionary,” said Thomas Perls, associate professor of medicine at Boston University and senior author of a research paper published online Thursday by the journal Science. “With the accuracy we’ve demonstrated, companies are going to pick this up. We’ll see it on the market in a month.”

Adverse selection just became a bigger risk for the insurance companies!

I sent an eMail to the Toronto Stock Exchange:

On June 30, MFC.PR.B traded 5,792 shares on the TSX in a range of 19.63-80 and closed at 19.01-66, 10×12. The last trade was at 3:58pm, 300 shares at 19.66.

I have a number of questions:
i) Who is the market maker for this issue?
ii) Which firm employs the market maker?
iii) What committments were made regarding spreads by the market maker?
iv) How have these committments been kept over the past year?
v) How have other committments made by this market maker been kept over the past year?
vi) How have other committments made by the market maker’s firm been kept over the past year?

We’ll see what happens with that! (Fearless prediction: Nothing).

On an extremely quiet day in the Canadian preferred share market, PerpetualDiscounts lost 4bp while FixedResets gained 14bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.82 % 2.92 % 26,768 20.33 1 0.0000 % 2,048.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.0732 % 3,107.8
Floater 2.32 % 1.97 % 46,034 22.46 4 -1.0732 % 2,215.1
OpRet 4.87 % 3.59 % 79,627 0.88 11 -0.0671 % 2,334.3
SplitShare 6.38 % 6.36 % 87,888 3.46 2 -0.2195 % 2,173.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0671 % 2,134.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.98 % 5.88 % 121,604 1.86 4 -0.2973 % 1,910.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.94 % 6.01 % 188,996 13.90 73 -0.0418 % 1,813.2
FixedReset 5.37 % 3.90 % 325,073 3.49 47 0.1434 % 2,192.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -2.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-02
Maturity Price : 14.99
Evaluated at bid price : 14.99
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-02
Maturity Price : 15.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.00
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-08-01
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 1.24 %
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-02
Maturity Price : 21.75
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 1.97 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-02
Maturity Price : 23.58
Evaluated at bid price : 23.76
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-02
Maturity Price : 23.26
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.77 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.99
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.94
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-02
Maturity Price : 19.55
Evaluated at bid price : 19.55
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.R FixedReset 31,130 Desjardins crossed 27,400 at 27.37.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 25,703 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-02
Maturity Price : 19.56
Evaluated at bid price : 19.56
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 19,477 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 14,275 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-02
Maturity Price : 23.11
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 13,990 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-02
Maturity Price : 22.42
Evaluated at bid price : 22.55
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 13,735 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.78
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
There were 5 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Index Performance: June 2010

July 2nd, 2010

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for June, 2010, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
June 2010
Three Months
to
June 30, 2010
Ratchet -1.41% -5.25%
FixFloat +1.88% -2.05%
Floater -0.44% -8.10%
OpRet +1.41% +1.09%
SplitShare +1.33% +1.90%
Interest +1.41%**** +1.09%****
PerpetualPremium +5.32%* +3.08%*
PerpetualDiscount +5.32% +4.14%
FixedReset +1.59% -0.34%
* The last member of the PerpetualPremium index was transferred to PerpetualDiscount at the May, 2010, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the PerpetualPremium index
**** The last member of the InterestBearing index was transferred to Scraps at the June, 2009, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the OperatingRetractible index
Passive Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD +2.58% +1.33%
DPS.UN +3.42% +1.09%
Index
BMO-CM 50 +2.87% +1.17%
TXPR Total Return +2.64% +1.40%

The pre-tax interest equivalent spread of PerpetualDiscounts over Long Corporates (which I also refer to as the Seniority Spread) ended the month at 290bp a significant decline from the +315bp recorded on May 31. The big story was the decline in long corporate yields, from 5.65% to 5.45%, as increased chatter about deflation has the market timers all excited.

I would be happier with long corporates in the 6.00-6.25% range, but what do I know? The market has never shown any particular interest in my happiness.

Charts related to the Seniority Spread and the Bozo Spread (PerpetualDiscount Current Yield less FixedReset Current Yield) are published in PrefLetter.

The trailing year returns are starting to look a bit more normal.


Click for big

Floaters have had a wild ride


Click for big

FixedReset volume declined during the month after their burst of activity in April when they performed poorly. Volume may be under-reported due to the influence of Alternative Trading Systems (as discussed in the November PrefLetter), but I am biding my time before incorporating ATS volumes into the calculations, to see if the effect is transient or not.


Click for big

Compositions of the passive funds were discussed in the September, 2009, edition of PrefLetter.

Claymore has published NAV and distribution data (problems with the page in IE8 can be kludged by using compatibility view) for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to June, 2010
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
March 31, 2010 16.46 0.00    
April 30 16.11     -2.13%
May 31 16.26     +0.93%
June 25 16.47 0.21 +2.58% +2.58%
June 30, 2010 16.47 0.00 0.00%
Quarterly Return +1.33%

Claymore currently holds $444,847,391 (advisor & common combined) in CPD assets, up about $13-million from the $431,929,434 reported last month and up about $71-million from the $373,729,364 reported at year-end. The monthly increase in AUM of about 2.99% is larger than the total return of +2.58%, implying that the ETF experienced small net subscriptions in May.

The DPS.UN NAV for June 30 has been published so we may calculate the approximate May returns.

DPS.UN NAV Return, June-ish 2010
Date NAV Distribution Return for sub-period Return for period
Estimated May Ending Stub -0.74% **
May 26, 2010 19.34      
June 28 19.85 * 0.30   +4.19%
June 30, 2010 19.85     0.00%
Estimated June Return +3.42% ***
*CPD had a NAVPU of 16.47 on June 28 and 16.47 on June 30, hence the total return for the period for CPD was +0.00%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal, hence the estimated NAV for DPS.UN on June 28 is presumed to be equal to the June 30 value.
**CPD had a NAVPU of 16.14 on May 26 and 16.26 on May 31, hence the total return for the period for CPD was +0.74%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal.
*** The estimated June return for DPS.UN’s NAV is therefore the product of three period returns, -0.74%, +4.19% and 0.00% to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month of +3.42%

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for April and May:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-June-ish, 2010
April-ish -2.47%
May-ish +0.22%
June-ish +3.42%
Three-months-ish +1.09%