June 25, 2010

June 25th, 2010

It looks like tranche retention will become law, as proposed by the SEC and supported by John Hull, among others:

Private lenders will be required to keep at least a 5 percent stake in loans they package and sell under an agreement reached by House and Senate lawmakers who are negotiating the financial-regulatory bill.

Lawmakers said the goal of the risk retention rule, also known as the skin-in-the-game provision, is to raise the quality of loans by keeping companies tied to the loans they make. Lax underwriting on subprime mortgages helped fuel the mortgage market collapse in 2007.

The measure would affect credit-card debt, auto loans, mortgages and other securitized debt. Issuers of asset-backed debt and the originators who supply them with pools of loans would be forced to retain at least 5 percent of the credit risk.

Lawmakers exempted many mortgages from the rules after lobbying by brokers and community banks, who said forcing lenders to keep loans on their books would tie up capital and lead to higher interest rates.

So higher interest rates is OK for credit-card debt, auto loans and other things, but not for Holy Mortgages? Haven’t I heard this song before?

The basic problem with the proposal is that tranche retention was the actual problem during the crisis – if the investment banks had be forced to sell their holdings to arms-length third parties, price discovery and lack of appetite would have been apparent much, much sooner.

I have even more disdain for the proposed underwriting rules:

Dodd proposed adding language based on the Merkley-Levin proposal to curb conflicts of interest by preventing firms that underwrite an asset-backed security from placing bets against the security.

The conflict-of-interest provision is aimed at addressing the fraudulent activity alleged in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s lawsuit against Goldman Sachs Group Inc. The SEC is alleging the bank created and sold collateralized debt obligations linked to subprime mortgages without disclosing that hedge fund Paulson & Co. helped pick the underlying securities and bet against the vehicles.

Every time a dealer sells me something as principal, he’s betting against it. Every single time! What’s the big deal here?

The congressional panel has approved a reconciled bill; most is as reported above, but there’s another thing:

An amendment introduced by Senator Susan Collins, the Maine Republican who joined Democrats in voting for the broader bill, will bar bank holding companies from keeping less capital than their bank subsidiaries. That will have an impact on the use of trust preferred securities, known as TruPS. Lawmakers bowed to pressure from banks, agreeing to a transition period for large firms and grandfathering of the securities for smaller lenders.

Banks with assets of at least $15 billion will get five years to replace TruPS with common stock or other securities that count as capital. Community banks that have raised cash through TruPS since 2000 will, in effect, get 20 years to make the switch because most of the securities have 30-year maturities. Smaller lenders sold roughly $45 billion of the $150 billion in TruPS issued by U.S. banks, which packaged them into collateralized debt obligations.

I’m not sure yet, but I think that this outlaws double leverage, at least as far as banks are concerned.

Importantly, there is a job-creation scheme for ex-regulators:

Large hedge and private equity funds will be forced to register with the SEC, subjecting them to mandatory federal oversight for the first time. Venture capital funds were exempted from the registration rule.

Any firm with $150 million or more in assets, such as ESL Investments Inc. and Soros Fund Management, will be covered by the law. Funds also must hire a chief compliance officer and set up policies to avoid conflicts of interest.

Complying with registration rules may cost hedge funds as much as $500 million in the first year, said Judith Gross, founder of JG Advisory Services LLC, a New York-based consulting firm to the hedge-fund industry. The estimate is based on 2,000 new registrants and reflects the cost of implementing necessary compliance procedures.

Salesmen are still salesmen, at least for a while:

Lawmakers scrapped a proposal that would have made securities firms more accountable to individual investors. Instead, the SEC is required to study whether changes are necessary.

The debate focused on whether stock brokers who offer clients investment advice should have a fiduciary duty that requires disclosure of all conflicts and restricts marketing to products that are in customers’ best interests. Currently, brokers must only ensure that a stock or bond is suitable before selling it to a client.

There is a States-rights turf battle brewing over insurance:

The bill creates a new Federal Insurance Office within the Treasury to monitor insurers, and requires a study that will recommend ways to further overhaul regulation of the industry. Industry groups say a new layer of oversight may complicate compliance and increase costs.

Insurers, which are mainly regulated by states, will now have to deal with a national watchdog. State insurance commissioners are concerned federal oversight will interfere with rules already in place. Insurers are concerned that they will have to devote more resources to answer to multiple officials.

Morningstar is rating fundcos on how precious they are. To hell with performance!

Today’s lesson is on “getting it”, as explained by Kenneth Feinberg:

New government oversight should avert a return to the “good old days” of outsize bonuses and lavish perks on Wall Street even if bankers still don’t “get it,” Obama administration paymaster Kenneth Feinberg said.

Earlier this week, Feinberg said he will step down from his Treasury Department pay post by the end of August to focus on his new job as the government-appointed administrator of BP Plc’s $20 billion fund to pay claims stemming from the Gulf of Mexico oil spill.

Feinberg gets it!

Turkey has announced that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s reputation is so dubious it requires special protection:

Furious over Internet insults of the country’s beloved founder, Turkey has gone on the offensive against Google, tightening a ban on YouTube and cutting public access to a host of Google-owned sites.

The country began blocking access to websites in 2007, after parliament adopted an a law against cyber crime in an effort to curb child porn, prevent the dissemination of terrorist propaganda and stamp out illegal gambling. Websites deemed to be disrespectful of Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and of religious beliefs were also outlawed.

Under court order, Turkey’s telecommunications authority banned access to YouTube, the video-sharing site, in May 2008, after users complained that some videos insulted Ataturk. Earlier this month, Turkey expanded the ban to include some Google pages that use the same Internet Protocol addresses as YouTube, to prevent users from circumventing the ban. The search giant Google Inc. is YouTube’s parent company.

Volume was light today as all the part-timers stayed home to play with their dollies (though, to be fair, it is possible that somebody might be wearing a T-shirt with a slogan that might have made them uncomfortable (see May 18)). PerpetualDiscounts made another gain, 7bp this time, to keep the streak alive, while FixedResets gained 8bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.73 % 2.79 % 30,017 20.48 1 0.0000 % 2,097.6
FixedFloater 5.11 % 3.27 % 21,388 19.86 1 0.1881 % 3,134.9
Floater 2.40 % 2.80 % 80,158 20.24 3 0.0000 % 2,260.5
OpRet 4.86 % 1.86 % 85,166 0.08 11 -0.0845 % 2,340.0
SplitShare 6.31 % 6.16 % 91,670 3.48 2 0.1089 % 2,197.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0845 % 2,139.7
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0657 % 1,913.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.94 % 6.01 % 195,599 13.93 77 0.0657 % 1,811.4
FixedReset 5.42 % 3.99 % 323,227 3.47 45 0.0816 % 2,185.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-25
Maturity Price : 22.73
Evaluated at bid price : 23.02
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-25
Maturity Price : 18.96
Evaluated at bid price : 18.96
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 35,560 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.56
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 33,747 TD bought 13,100 from Nesbitt at 27.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.61
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 25,685 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 23,824 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.44
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 22,148 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-25
Maturity Price : 20.56
Evaluated at bid price : 20.56
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 16,062 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-25
Maturity Price : 20.85
Evaluated at bid price : 20.85
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
There were 21 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

June 24, 2010

June 24th, 2010

How ’bout them Greek swaps, eh?:

Credit-default swaps on Greece rose 38 basis points to an all-time high of 970 basis points, according to CMA DataVision. Contracts on Portuguese government securities climbed 16 basis points to a two-week high of 336.5, while Spain rose 4 to 269.

The politicians have come up with a solution of how to solve their GSE mess: make the banks pay:

Bank executives were panicking last night over a proposed fix to Title II of financial reform literally penciled in at the last minute. The fear is that that the proposed change to the orderly liquidation authority could leave banks on the hook for a possible wind-down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that could cost as much as $400 billion. In the House counter-offer below, Fannie and Freddie are penciled in as falling under the definition of ‘financial company,’ meaning they could be resolved by the orderly liquidation process. This process is paid for by the sale of the failing company’s assets and/or through assessments on other financial companies, possibly putting the Street in line to pay for the liquidation of the troubled housing giants.

Competition between Treasury and the FDIC to deal with private equity purchasers of banks was mentioned on April 30. That trend is continuing:

Buyout firms thwarted by regulators from taking over failed banks have found a solution: Acquire lenders that are still in business.

Moelis Capital Partners LLC, Thomas H. Lee Partners LP and the Carlyle Group are among firms that agreed to buy stakes in at least five U.S. banks since April. While most are small, with assets of less than $1 billion, their status as banks means they can buy more distressed lenders that can be merged and sold later — a tactic that made some private-equity investors billionaires in the 1990s.

In at least three cases, the shift in tactics requires approval from the Treasury, which owns stakes in small banks through its injection of U.S. bailout funds. Capital infusions for Pacific Capital, Hampton Roads and Sterling are all contingent on the government writing down its investment.

The Canadian preferred share market continued to move ahead on lower than average volume today, with PerpetualDiscounts and FixedResets both gaining 7bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.72 % 2.79 % 31,245 20.49 1 0.0000 % 2,097.6
FixedFloater 5.12 % 3.27 % 21,669 19.86 1 0.4726 % 3,129.0
Floater 2.40 % 2.80 % 78,917 20.24 3 0.7369 % 2,260.5
OpRet 4.86 % 2.47 % 88,391 0.43 11 0.1938 % 2,342.0
SplitShare 6.32 % 6.21 % 95,256 3.49 2 -0.2173 % 2,195.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1938 % 2,141.5
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0739 % 1,912.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.94 % 6.02 % 196,472 13.92 77 0.0739 % 1,810.2
FixedReset 5.42 % 4.03 % 327,124 3.47 45 0.0722 % 2,183.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-24
Maturity Price : 23.85
Evaluated at bid price : 24.04
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.53
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.40
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-24
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 1.82 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-24
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 2.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 138,025 Desjardins crossed 30,200 at 19.88.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-24
Maturity Price : 19.82
Evaluated at bid price : 19.82
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 127,971 Nesbitt crossed 11,000 at 21.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-24
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.30
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 68,060 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-24
Maturity Price : 19.64
Evaluated at bid price : 19.64
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 55,790 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 44,752 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.56
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 33,710 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.19
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

June 23, 2010

June 23rd, 2010

American real estate agents are going hungry:

Purchases of U.S. new homes fell in May to the lowest level on record after a tax credit expired, showing the market remains dependent on government support.

Sales collapsed an unprecedented 33 percent from April to an annual pace of 300,000, less than the median estimate of economists surveyed by Bloomberg News and the fewest in data going back to 1963, figures from the Commerce Department showed today in Washington. Demand in prior months was revised down.

Like the Fed says:

Business spending on equipment and software has risen significantly; however, investment in nonresidential structures continues to be weak and employers remain reluctant to add to payrolls. Housing starts remain at a depressed level. Financial conditions have become less supportive of economic growth on balance, largely reflecting developments abroad. Bank lending has continued to contract in recent months.

The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period.

But fear not! Fannie Mae is tightening standards:

Borrowers who have the means to make mortgage payments and don’t work with lenders to restructure loans will be banned from obtaining new mortgages backed by Fannie Mae for seven years from the date of foreclosure, the company said today in a statement.

Homeowners walking away from mortgages they can afford accounted for about 12 percent of U.S. mortgage defaults in February, New York-based Morgan Stanley said in an April report.

It would be much more to the point if non-recourse mortgages carried a penalty rate; but that would be too logical.

Argentina is showing Greece how it’s done:

The results of Argentina’s debt swap offer exceeded the government’s expectations and will help close a chapter on the country’s record $95 billion default in 2001, Economy Minister Amado Boudou said.

Creditors holding about $12.1 billion of $18.3 billion in defaulted debt tendered their securities in the restructuring, which Boudou said was the result of “hard” negotiating on the part of Argentina. Combined with the results of a 2005 restructuring, a total of 92.4 percent of the defaulted debt has been swapped for a mix of new bonds, he said.

The government has no fiscal need to issue debt and can wait until it is able to sell bonds that yield less than 10 percent, Boudou said.

Yields on the country’s benchmark dollar bonds due in 2015 rose 11 basis points, or 0.11 percentage point, to 12.86 percent at 10:59 a.m. New York time.

The question is … will a serial defaulter ever be able to issue bonds at less than 10%?

All the money that’s being dropped on the G-20 is having an effect.

PerpetualDiscounts kept the streak alive in the Canadian preferred share market, gaining 11bp, while FixedResets were down 11bp. Volume was moderate.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.02%, equivalent to 8.43% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates are now at about 5.55% so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 290bp, a significant widening from the +270bp reported on June 16 due to the sharp decline in long yields.


Click for big
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.72 % 2.78 % 32,522 20.51 1 -0.9302 % 2,097.6
FixedFloater 5.14 % 3.29 % 21,636 19.84 1 0.2369 % 3,114.3
Floater 2.42 % 2.79 % 76,717 20.26 3 -0.2939 % 2,243.9
OpRet 4.86 % 2.45 % 89,246 0.08 11 0.2081 % 2,337.5
SplitShare 6.30 % 6.25 % 95,689 3.49 2 0.1088 % 2,200.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2081 % 2,137.4
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1109 % 1,911.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.94 % 6.02 % 196,645 13.88 77 0.1109 % 1,808.9
FixedReset 5.42 % 4.01 % 331,957 3.46 45 -0.1098 % 2,182.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-23
Maturity Price : 19.21
Evaluated at bid price : 19.21
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-23
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-23
Maturity Price : 17.95
Evaluated at bid price : 17.95
Bid-YTW : 6.66 %
GWO.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-23
Maturity Price : 24.20
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 87,336 RBC crossed 72,200 at 18.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-23
Maturity Price : 18.34
Evaluated at bid price : 18.34
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 57,838 Desjardins crossed 30,200 at 19.88.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-23
Maturity Price : 19.82
Evaluated at bid price : 19.82
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 42,768 TD bought 13,100 from Nesbitt at 27.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.28
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 38,545 RBC crossed 30,000 at 26.48.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 37,730 Desjardins crossed 20,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-23
Maturity Price : 24.78
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 32,700 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 7.65 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Swiss Support Progressive Bank Capital Requirements

June 22nd, 2010

Mr Thomas Jordan, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, provided introductory remarks at the half-yearly media news conference, Geneva, 17 June 2010:

It is essential that capital requirements be significantly increased and that they rise in line with the degree of systemic importance of a bank. This is the only way to ensure that the banks internalise the risks which, until now, they have been able to pass on to the general public, to some extent. Moreover, progressive capital requirements should create an incentive for banks to reduce their systemic importance, with its associated risk potential.

Bravo! Capital surchages have long been advocated on PrefBlog and will serve not just to discourage banks from becoming too big, but will also act as a countercyclical buffer … and the question of countercyclical buffers is one that seems to have been relatively neglected lately.

Bank capital surcharges were last discussed on PrefBlog in the post Bank Capital Surcharge Proposals Gaining Ground.

June 22, 2010

June 22nd, 2010

Nothing happened today.

The Canadian preferred share market was fairly well-behaved today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 7bp to keep the streak alive (only six more trading days until month-end!) and FixedResets down 6bp. Volume was slighly above average, but there is only one entry in the performance highlights.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.69 % 2.84 % 33,679 20.66 1 0.0000 % 2,117.3
FixedFloater 5.15 % 3.30 % 21,307 19.84 1 0.0474 % 3,106.9
Floater 2.41 % 2.78 % 76,325 20.28 3 -0.0551 % 2,250.6
OpRet 4.87 % 1.79 % 92,282 0.08 11 0.0741 % 2,332.6
SplitShare 6.31 % 6.26 % 97,080 3.49 2 -0.0435 % 2,197.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0741 % 2,133.0
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0669 % 1,908.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.94 % 6.02 % 197,370 13.86 77 0.0669 % 1,806.9
FixedReset 5.41 % 3.99 % 342,951 3.47 45 -0.0557 % 2,184.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-22
Maturity Price : 22.32
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.S FixedReset 148,120 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 10,000, both at 25.95. GMP bought blocks of 31,200 at 26.00 and 20,400 at 25.95, both from anonymous.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 84,164 RBC crossed 50,000 at 27.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.31
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 59,500 RBC crossed 58,200 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 49,078 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-22
Maturity Price : 20.28
Evaluated at bid price : 20.28
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 35,875 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-22
Maturity Price : 21.39
Evaluated at bid price : 21.39
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 33,500 Nesbitt bought 11,300 from Scotia at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Repo 105 and the Next Crisis

June 22nd, 2010

Remember Repo 105, which was discussed March 12? The Examiner in the Lehman bankruptcy explained it:

Unlike an ordinary repo transaction, Lehman did not record the borrowing of cash from a Repo 105 transaction even though Lehman was obliged to repay the borrowing. Instead, Lehman established a long inventory derivative asset representing the obligation under a forward contract to repurchase the full amount of securities “sold.”3009 As Lehman’s internal Repo 105 Accounting Policy explained, assuming Lehman borrowed $100 cash in exchange for a pledge of $105 of fixed income collateral, Lehman booked a $5 derivative, which represented Lehman’s obligation to repurchase the securities at the end of the term of the repo transaction. The $5 arose from the fact that when it came time to repurchase the pledged securities, Lehman paid $100 cash for $105 worth of securities. The transaction therefore had a $5 value to Lehman reflecting the market value of the “overcollateralization” amount of the Repo 105 transaction. Because it had a positive fair value of $5, the derivative was recorded as an asset under SFAS 133.

My continued irritation with the Bank of Canada’s Central Clearing cheerleading has led me into another thought … Canadian repos are going to settle with central clearing … derivatives are going to settle with central clearing, as discussed on May 11, tangentially on March 17, by John Hull, December 16 and October 5. Lots before then, of course, but those links carry enough information to make the point.

Anyway, the objective of Central Clearing is to increase the chance that no trades at all wil fail, increase the chance that all trades will fail, increase the potential for contagion in the financial system and increase the number of really good jobs available for ex-regulators. I feel quite certain it will do all of those things.

But … what happens when a firm goes down, or is on the ropes? It is overwhelmingly likely that all of its centrally cleared derivative and repo trades will settle in full. That’s the whole point, right? But what if it goes down? The fact that all of these trades settled in full means there will be less money in the kitty to pay off debt holders and commercial paper holders.

Risks to holders of debt and commercial paper have therefore increased, and there may be other implications as well. Remember Confederation Life? When it went down, all of its profitable FX trades settled tootsy-sweetsy, while all of the unprofitable ones (i.e., about half, given hedging) were delayed while the receiver decided who was going to get paid.

The next crisis will see some very strange games being played. Why would you buy commercial paper from a bank or brokerage, when instead you can pay $99 for the future right to sell them a 1-day T-Bill at $200?

Has there been any discussion or analysis of the reordering of creditor priority inherent in wholesale central clearing? I haven’t seen any, but I’d like to. Here in Canada, of course, it’s impossible even to determine the relative seniority of a BA vs. a BDN!

FRBKC Publishes 2Q10 Economic Review

June 22nd, 2010

The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City has released its 2Q10 Economic Review with articles:

  • The Efficacy of Large-Scale Asset Purchases at the Zero Lower Bound
  • What Is the Effect of Financial Stress on Economic Activity?
  • Taylor Rule Deviations and Financial Imbalances
  • The Changing Nature of U.S. Card Payment Fraud: industry and Public Policy Options

The Taylor Rule paper by George A. Khan is most interesting and concludes that the “strongest and most robust relationship is between house price indicators and Taylor Rule deviations”. Unfortunately, the PDF is locked (why do they do this?) so I won’t quote from it.

FFN.PR.A: Capital Units Dividend Suspended

June 22nd, 2010

Financial 15 Split Corp. II has announced:

There will not be a distribution paid to Financial 15 II Class A Shares for June 30, 2010 as per the Prospectus which states no regular monthly dividends or other distributions will be paid on the Class A Shares in any month as long as the net asset value per unit is equal to or less than $15.00. The net asset value as of June 15, 2010 was $14.47.

FFN.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the capital unit dividend was suspended in February (it was reinstated in March). FFN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Contingent Capital: Canada a Laughing-stock?

June 22nd, 2010

The Globe & Mail reports:

Finance Minister Jim Flaherty is edging away from his alternative to a global bank tax, acknowledging in an interview that it’s “debatable” whether enough countries can be won over to make Canada’s contingent capital plan work on a global scale.

It’s still too early to write off the idea, which would require banks to sell debt that would convert to equity at times of stress. Mr. Flaherty stressed that he remains a fan of the concept, which he sees as a form of self-insurance that would make financial institutions less likely to rely on taxpayers to bail them out in future.

But the proposal has run into a wall of doubt in financial markets, where investors are skeptical that enough buyers could be found to make the securities affordable for banks to issue.

“I like the contingent capital idea, but I understand some of the concerns that have been expressed about it. It needs more work, more discussion.”

As far as Canada is concerned, it might be a good idea to try some work, some discussion; any work, any discussion.

As I have complained in the past, Canada’s efforts to provide a coherent plan have been limited to an off-the-cuff remark from the Central Bank (promoting an insane extension to the idea that has the intent of eliminating creditors’ rights) together with an intellectually dishonest speech and childish essay by the head of bank regulation. There is no evidence of any money being spent whatsoever on research, discussion, or thought.

Canada may not just have blown its own credibility with these antics, but, such are the vagaries of politics, have made the entire idea more difficult to achieve.

What did we ever do to deserve a clown like Spend-Every-Penny as Finance Minister?

Pairs Equivalency Calculator

June 21st, 2010

I discussed the concept during my seminar on Floating Rate Issues; prepared a spreadsheet that was linked in my essay on Preferred Share Interconvertibility; and have finally linked it in a “PrefPick” in Canadian Moneysaver … so it’s time to link to it publicly.

The Pairs Equivalency Calculator allows for easy valuation comparison between elements of a Strong Pair. ‘Nuff said?