Marginal Tax Rates: Manitoba 2010

May 19th, 2010

E&Y have analyzed Manitoba tax rates as of 2010-3-31 and we may draw some conclusions from these data:

Investors Taxable Income Marginal Rate on Interest Marginal Rate on Dividends Equivalency Factor
Widows & Orphans $30,000 25.80% 0.00% 1.35
Professionals $75,000 39.40% 15.02% 1.40
Plutocrats $150,000 46.40% 25.10% 1.40

Equivalency factors have declined marginally since my 2006 post on this topic.

Two nuances should be noted. Firstly, E&Y appears to have put a floor of 0.00% on the published marginal tax rate for dividends; in fact, the tax on dividends can be negative if the taxpayer has other income available to soak up the excess dividend tax credit. This will increase the equivalency factor for “Widows & Orphans”.

Secondly, if the taxpayer is subject to OAS clawback, the equivalency factor will decline by about 0.1. It should be noted that this figure is an extremely rough estimate and is based solely on the direct income tax effect – there may be other net-income-tested benefits to the taxpayer, such as drug plans, which will exacerbate the decline.

Marginal Tax Rates: Alberta 2010

May 19th, 2010

E&Y have analyzed Alberta tax rates as of 2010-3-31 and we may draw some conclusions from these data:

Investors Taxable Income Marginal Rate on Interest Marginal Rate on Dividends Equivalency Factor
Widows & Orphans $30,000 25.00% 0.00% 1.33
Professionals $75,000 32.00% 5.80% 1.39
Plutocrats $150,000 39.00% 15.88% 1.38

Equivalency factors have declined marginally since my 2006 post on this topic.

Two nuances should be noted. Firstly, E&Y appears to have put a floor of 0.00% on the published marginal tax rate for dividends; in fact, the tax on dividends can be negative if the taxpayer has other income available to soak up the excess dividend tax credit. This will increase the equivalency factor for “Widows & Orphans”.

Secondly, if the taxpayer is subject to OAS clawback, the equivalency factor will decline by about 0.1. It should be noted that this figure is an extremely rough estimate and is based solely on the direct income tax effect – there may be other net-income-tested benefits to the taxpayer, such as drug plans, which will exacerbate the decline.

May 18, 2010

May 18th, 2010

One of the guys who ran Basis Yield Alpha Fund (mocked on PrefBlog on April 30 is haranguing the regulators for a crusade:

THE man who blew the whistle on Wall Street banking giant Goldman Sachs has urged Australia’s corporate watchdog to follow the lead of the US Securities and Exchange Commission in suing the investment bank for fraud.

David Mapley, a former non-executive director of the local Basis Yield Alpha Fund, said the Australian Securities & Investments Commission should closely examine the role of the investment bank’s local arm, Goldman Sachs JBWere, in marketing a mortgage-related investment product that ultimately led to the fund’s demise in August 2007.

He confirmed that he had approached the SEC with his concerns shortly after the decision was made to place the fund in liquidation.

“Myself and a colleague examined the trade and we had a strong belief that that the security was fraudulently concocted and then sold to us,” Mr Mapley said.

Maybe Mr. Mapley and his colleague should have examined the trade before plunking their clients’ money down!

BIS has released a working paper by Nikola Tarashev, Claudio Borio and Kostas Tsatsaronis titled Attributing systemic risk to individual institutions. Their conclusion supports PrefBlog’s notion of progressive capital surcharges on risk-weighted assets:

The analysis also suggests that, once risk characteristics have been controlled for, charges imposed on financial institutions would need to increase faster than their size.

but, I confess, I have not reviewed the paper in sufficient detail to determine whether the premises that lead to this conclusion are supportable.

OSFI’s Ted Price gave a speech at the Centre for Monetary and Financial Economics Conference at Carleton University titled Developments in Bank Supervision – a Canadian Perspective. Nothing new, just a reiteration of the party line. That’s one superiority of the US system of bank regulation, which is run by the Fed, which is run by a Board of Governors who are independently selected for the board by the regional banks. This means that there is not only a diversity of opinion at the table, it means that these guys’ speeches can be much more informative as they engage in public diplomacy, at least to some extent.

Quick! What’s more important – knowledge or political correctness?

“Some of Professor Katz’s controversial writings have become a distraction from the critical work of addressing the oil spill,” Stephanie Mueller, a spokeswoman for the Energy Department, said in an e-mail today. “Professor Katz will no longer be involved in the department’s efforts.”

While Katz’s early work focused on astrophysics, he now consults on a variety of physics puzzles, he said. Katz wrote articles on his personal website, including, “What Is Political Correctness,” “In Defense of Homophobia” and “Why Terrorism Is Important.”

He was fired from the panel this morning, he said. He declined to specify which articles triggered the dismissal.

Fed up with the spectacle of mere investors taking a view on economics, BaFin will introduce short-selling bans:

Germany’s BaFin financial-services regulator said that it will introduce a temporary ban on naked short-selling and naked credit-default swaps of euro-area government bonds starting at midnight.

The ban will also apply to naked short-selling in shares of 10 banks and insurers including Allianz SE and Deutsche Bank AG, BaFin said today in an e-mailed statement.

The markets instantly panicked:

Credit-default swaps soared as a move by German Chancellor Angela Merkel to ban speculation on European government bonds with the contracts sparked anxiety among investors about increasing government regulation

“The market sees an inadequate policy such as this as an act of desperation and a refusal to address the fundamental problems at hand,” said Brian Yelvington, head of fixed-income strategy at broker-dealer Knight Libertas LLC in Greenwich, Connecticut.

Prohibiting speculation in the contracts may cause trading in the market for swaps tied to Europe government bonds to freeze up, possibly increasing borrowing costs or limiting the flow of capital, said Tim Backshall, the chief strategist at Credit Derivatives Research LLC in Walnut Creek, California.

Same thing as I always think when reading about bloggers being jailed for “disrespecting the state” or “insulting the president” (or even just cutting funding to a parade because the word “Apartheid” makes the boo-hoo-hoo brigade feel uncomfortable; geez, I wish those morons would spend less time sucking up to foreign governments and more time trying to figure out how to license a souvlaki cart in less than three years), as often happens in the Mid-east: if you have to make criticism illegal, then maybe you simply have no better answer.

There’s more!

The proposal backed by finance ministers at the European Council calls for fund managers to be authorized by national governments. National authorities will also review the trading activities of funds and approve their internal risk-management practices.

The SEC & CFTC have rushed out a preliminary report on the bungee jump:

At this point, we are focusing on the following working hypotheses and findings–

(5)
the use of market orders, stop loss market orders and stop loss limit orders that, when coupled with sharp declines in prices, for both equity and futures markets, might have contributed to market instability and a temporary breakdown in orderly trading;

Stop Loss Market Orders. An additional hypothesis as to why some securities suffered more severe declines than the broader market on May 6 is that they were particularly affected by stop loss market orders. These orders have stop prices that, for sell orders, are lower than current prices. When the stop price is reached, such orders turn into market orders to sell. In fast-falling market conditions, stop loss market orders could potentially trigger a chain reaction of automated selling if they are in place in significant quantity for a particular stock. We are investigating whether such a chain reaction led to abnormally large declines for some stocks on May 6.

There was continued heavy volume today, as PerpetualDiscounts edged downwards another 2bp, while FixedResets continued to impress, gaining 21bp. The Floating Rate sector continued its recent slide, so there are conflicting signals being emitted!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.68 % 2.77 % 46,774 20.64 1 -0.1900 % 2,064.4
FixedFloater 5.24 % 3.30 % 40,147 19.97 1 -1.6106 % 3,056.9
Floater 2.14 % 2.46 % 104,241 21.13 3 -0.0544 % 2,266.0
OpRet 4.90 % 3.88 % 94,200 1.75 11 -0.0426 % 2,302.4
SplitShare 6.36 % 6.30 % 119,205 3.52 2 0.3523 % 2,144.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0426 % 2,105.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.53 % 4.78 % 25,081 15.80 1 0.0000 % 1,823.5
Perpetual-Discount 6.33 % 6.38 % 215,849 13.33 77 -0.0174 % 1,689.4
FixedReset 5.51 % 4.26 % 493,756 3.57 44 0.2087 % 2,150.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -2.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-18
Maturity Price : 16.63
Evaluated at bid price : 16.63
Bid-YTW : 7.25 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-18
Maturity Price : 21.56
Evaluated at bid price : 21.56
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.77
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-18
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 6.63 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.23
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-18
Maturity Price : 19.01
Evaluated at bid price : 19.01
Bid-YTW : 7.08 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 2.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-18
Maturity Price : 19.70
Evaluated at bid price : 19.70
Bid-YTW : 6.55 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.M FixedReset 84,715 Desjardins crossed 38,900 at 27.21, then blocks of 22,000 and and 20,000 at 27.24.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.25
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 55,734 TD bought 16,700 from RBC at 16,700 at 27.25, then crossed 15,700 at the same price. RBC crossed 20,100 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.24
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 41,277 Nesbitt crossed 16,000 at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 32,706 TD crossed 15,000 at 25.35 and 12,300 at 25.36.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 27,695 Desjardins crossed 10,100 at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 4.44 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 25,955 Desjardins crossed 15,000 at 18.63.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-18
Maturity Price : 18.62
Evaluated at bid price : 18.62
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
There were 44 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

May 17, 2010

May 17th, 2010

Government financial problems are all the dealers’ fault!

The state’s securities division sent letters today to 10 underwriters of municipal bonds, asking them to detail their trading of credit-default swaps linked to state and local government bonds they’ve underwritten in Massachusetts since 2003. Recipients have until May 28 to respond. The letter asked each bank to “identify the entity that purchased CDS from your firm for each Massachusetts state or municipal bond offering.”

The probe follows a similar inquiry in California, where Treasurer Bill Lockyer asked banks to say whether they bet against the state with credit-default swaps. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is also exploring conflicts of interest for banks that sold municipal bonds and bet the securities would fail, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing people familiar with the matter who it didn’t name.

IIROC has released a a new version of the consolidated UMIR, with updated annotations.

Somehow, you just knew that Greek deficits are the banks’ fault, didn’t you?

Greece is considering taking legal action against U.S. investment banks that might have contributed to the country’s debt crisis, Prime Minister George Papandreou said.

“I wouldn’t rule out that this may be a recourse,” Papandreou said, in response to questions about the role of U.S. banks in the crisis, in an interview on CNN’s “Fareed Zakaria GPS.” The program, scheduled to air tomorrow, was taped on May 13. Neither Papandreou nor Zakaria mentioned any banks by name.

Papandreou said the decision on whether to go after U.S. banks will be made after a Greek parliamentary investigation into the cause of the crisis.

“Greece will look into the past and see how things went,” Papandreou said. “There are similar investigations going on in other countries and in the United States. This is where I think, yes, the financial sector, I hear the words fraud and lack of transparency. So yes, yes, there is great responsibility here.”

Pity he couldn’t think of anything suspicious! I suggest that his parliamentary investigation focus on Mr. Micawber’s Principle:

Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen nineteen six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.

Meanwhile, European banks are having trouble raising funds:

Banks were locked out of the credit markets as the eurozone debt crisis escalated this month. A week after the European Union and International Monetary Fund’s €750bn ($935bn) bailout was announced, concerns remain.
The shockwaves from the debt woes in Europe mean that all but a few highly rated banks will find bond issuance tougher over the rest of the year, according to bankers.

Following a strong first quarter when European banks sold $243.5bn in bonds, so far this month they have sold bonds worth only $879m, according to data provider Dealogic.

Domestic banks in Greece, Portugal and Spain have been hit over the past six weeks by movements in spreads on their governments’ bonds. For example, credit default swap spreads on National Bank of Greece more than doubled between April 5 and May 6, climbing to a high of 890bp.

James Hamilton of Econbrowser passes on some fascinating observations on the European shadow economy:

Aruoba’s paper notes some interesting regularities in a data set of 118 different countries. One measure he looks at is the size of the underground economy in different countries. If you carry out your business in the underground economy, you will benefit by avoiding taxation, but you lose the legal and contract protection that you would have had if you’d instead been working in the formal sector. If only the first effect mattered, you’d expect to see countries with higher tax rates have a greater role for the informal sector. But Aruoba finds just the opposite– the bigger the informal sector, the lower tax receipts as a percent of formal-sector GDP. Aruoba attributes this to the fact that in countries with better legal institutions, the benefits of conducting business above board outweigh the taxation costs, and the governments can afford to raise more of their revenue through traditional taxation.

Mind you, banks are already being punished for Greece:

Royal Bank of Scotland Plc and Barclays Plc led financial firms punished by rising borrowing costs, British Bankers’ Association data show. The cost to hedge against losses on European bank bonds is 63 percent higher than a month earlier. Investment-grade corporate debt sales in the region plummeted 88 percent last week to $1.2 billion from the prior period, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The rate banks say they charge each other for three-month loans in dollars is the highest in nine months, even after a government-led rescue designed to prevent Greece from defaulting on its debt and a new financial crisis. The euro is trading at its weakest level versus the dollar since the aftermath of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s collapse, and stocks tumbled.

The three-month London interbank offered rate in dollars, or Libor, rose to 0.445 percent last week, the highest level since August, from 0.428 percent on May 7 and 0.252 at the end of February, according to the British Bankers’ Association.

This is why the Fed has restarted the dollar swap lines, as noted May 10.

A Bloomberg story illustrates one of the hazards of contingent capital: if it converts, there might be tears:

A JPMorgan Chase & Co. reverse- convertible note paying 64 percent annualized interest plunged in value on May 14, three days after being sold, showing the risks of these products usually bought by individual investors.

The structured notes offered 10.7 percent in interest payments over their two-month term and a return of principal, as long as shares of TiVo Inc. didn’t fall more than 25 percent, according to a prospectus. TiVo dropped 42 percent on May 14 after an adverse court ruling, triggering a provision that will leave investors holding the possibly depressed stock at maturity.

Banks including JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley and Barclays Plc sold $656 million of reverse convertibles in the U.S. last month, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The securities, which combine features of bonds and stock options, are often sold to individuals who don’t understand the risks, said Jake Zamansky, a New York-based attorney who represents investors.

“It’s being sold as a bond, an income-generating product, and I don’t think it’s being explained to people that you can get stuck with the stock,” the securities lawyer at Zamansky & Associates said in a telephone interview on May 14. He has represented investors in lawsuits related to the products.

The Canadian preferred share market resumed its slide today, with PerpetualDiscounts down 17bp and FixedResets down 10bp, with a return to highly elevated volume. Equity markets were enlivened by the scheduling and subsequent cancellation of the end of the world.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.68 % 2.76 % 46,273 20.65 1 -2.0930 % 2,068.4
FixedFloater 5.15 % 3.22 % 40,125 20.07 1 -0.4245 % 3,106.9
Floater 2.14 % 2.46 % 105,774 21.12 3 -0.0181 % 2,267.2
OpRet 4.90 % 3.84 % 93,612 1.01 11 0.1209 % 2,303.4
SplitShare 6.39 % 6.46 % 119,891 3.52 2 0.3314 % 2,137.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1209 % 2,106.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.53 % 4.78 % 26,119 15.81 1 -0.0399 % 1,823.5
Perpetual-Discount 6.32 % 6.38 % 213,824 13.33 77 -0.1652 % 1,689.7
FixedReset 5.52 % 4.33 % 497,129 3.57 44 -0.0965 % 2,145.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.E Ratchet -2.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 21.68
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 2.76 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 23.45
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
IAG.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 22.59
Evaluated at bid price : 22.71
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.44
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 17.69
Evaluated at bid price : 17.69
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 23.94
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 6.55 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 19.25
Evaluated at bid price : 19.25
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 19.91
Evaluated at bid price : 19.91
Bid-YTW : 6.67 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 17.46
Evaluated at bid price : 17.46
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.99
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 7.09 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 82,218 RBC crossed blocks of 36,000 shares, 12,100 and 10,000, all at 17.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 17.30
Evaluated at bid price : 17.30
Bid-YTW : 6.55 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 53,100 RBC crossed 40,000 at 27.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 51,300 RBC crossed blocks of 27,900 and 12,500 at 24.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 24.58
Evaluated at bid price : 24.63
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 44,150 Nesbitt crossed 30.000 at 23.18.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.16
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 43,935 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 38,441 RBC crossed 27,000 at 17.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-17
Maturity Price : 17.28
Evaluated at bid price : 17.28
Bid-YTW : 6.55 %
There were 49 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

PWC.PR.B May Get Bigger

May 17th, 2010

Pacific & Western Bank has announced:

that it plans to raise up to $15 million in Canada through the issuance of additional Class B preferred shares, common shares, or a combination of both, by way of short form prospectus (the “Offering”).

Byron Securities Limited (“Byron”) will be the lead manager for the Offering and will be responsible for creating a selling group for this issue. A decision as to what securities to offer under the prospectus will be decided by PWC prior to filing the preliminary prospectus based on market demand and through discussions with Byron.

The Offering will be conducted in each province and territory of Canada (other than Quebec) and is subject to all necessary regulatory approval.

PWC’s Class B Preferred shares trade on the TSX under the symbol PWC.PR.B and its common shares trade on the TSX under the symbol PWC.

PWC.PR.B was last mentioned on PrefBlog when a tranche was issued in January. PWC.PR.B is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

May Edition of PrefLetter Released!

May 17th, 2010

The May, 2010, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The May edition contains an appendix discussing analytical implications of the behaviour of individual FixedReset issues during the recent slump in that class. There is a review of the previous month and a listing of FixedResets currently trading thrown in.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the May 2010, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the June, 2010, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close June 11 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on June 14.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

May Edition of PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

May 14th, 2010

The markets have closed and the April edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The May edition will contain an appendix discussing various analytical approaches to FixedResets and examining how well these approaches explain relative price changes during the recent slump in the FixedReset market.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The May issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the May issue.

RBS.PR.A: Partial Call for Redemption

May 14th, 2010

R Split III Corp. has announced:

that it has called 559,447 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on May 31, 2010 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 25.690% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the annual retraction of 1,118,894 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on May 28, 2010 will have approximately 25.690% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $29.22 per share.

In addition, holders of a further 1,996 Capital Shares and 998 Preferred Shares have deposited such shares concurrently for retraction on May 31, 2010. As a result, a total of 1,120,890 Capital Shares and 560,445 Preferred Shares, or approximately 25.7239% of both classes of shares currently outstanding, will be redeemed.

Holders of Preferred Shares that are on record for dividends but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including May 31, 2010.

Payment of the amount due to holders of Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on May 31, 2010. From and after May 31, 2010 the holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any rights in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

R Split III Corp. is a mutual fund corporation created to hold a portfolio of common shares of Royal Bank of Canada.

RBS.PR.A is scheduled to mature 2012-5-31. RBS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was upgraded to Pfd-3 by DBRS. RBS.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

May 14, 2010

May 14th, 2010

Econbrowser‘s James Hamilton writes a good piece on Greece:

I suspect that the key fear has to do with the consequences of a default or restructuring of the debt itself. Willem Buiter estimates that French and German banks have &#8364 110 billion exposure to Greek debt, and total exposure to a potential domino effect could be huge. The WSJ today has further breakdowns, and Dow Jones reports that JP Morgan’s holdings of non-U.S. government bonds increased by $36.5 billion in 2009, while Citigroup’s increased by almost $40 B.

And, as was the case in the 2008 difficulties, one can either view this primarily as a liquidity problem, for which we simply need the central banks to step in boldly to arrest the jitters, or as a solvency problem, in which case the policy decision is how to allocate the unavoidable capital losses among bank owners, bank creditors, and the government so as to minimize collateral damage to innocent bystanders. The fundamentals facing Greece suggest there is an overwhelming solvency component to the current problems. And the policy response so far seems to be choosing to allocate 100% of losses to the European and U.S. taxpayers.

Chatter about the potential disintegration of the Euro is starting to be heard from respected sources:

“You have the great problem of a potential disintegration of the euro,” former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, 82, said yesterday in London. “The essential element of discipline in economic policy and in fiscal policy that was hoped for” has “so far not been rewarded in some countries.”

That story, by the way, leads off with an anecdote about dairy products:

Romano Prodi recalls how he persuaded Germany to allow debt-swamped Italy into the euro: support our membership and we’ll buy your milk, he said.

When Prodi toured Germany’s agricultural heartland after becoming Italian leader in 1996, he pitched “a big milk pipeline from Bavaria,” pointing to a three-year, 40 percent plunge in the Italian lira that was hurting dairy sales.

See? That’s the source of the problem! Here in smug Canada, we know how to do it properly … charge single mums and their kids extortionate prices for dairy products, so quota owners may continue to enjoy a bucolic lifestyle.


Click for Big

OSFI’s Mark White gave a speech reviewing the P&C industry.

A little more detail has emerged regarding the futures sale suspected to be the proximate cause of last week’s bungee jump.

Comrade Peace Prize’s administration has made it clear that it regards Swap pricing to be a public utility and that the role of government is to ensure that incompetent portfolio managers may continue to earn a good living:

Removing the Derivatives Trading Requirement to Protect Wall Street Profits. Under the current bill, standard derivatives would have to be traded on exchanges or other electronic trading platforms. Expect amendments to eliminate this trading requirement. Why? Because not everyone likes transparency. Today, the big derivatives dealers make big profits by charging end-users extra spreads and hidden fees, and they don’t want that to change.

This administration has learned nothing from TRACE. As soon as you get transparency, liquidity disappears. An ultimately, you will create more bungee jumps. On a positive note, however, it appears that regulatory capture is becoming an issue, albeit in a different field:

Obama said the federal government also shares some of the blame [for the Gulf of Mexico underwater oil blowout]. He faulted the Minerals Management Service for having too close a relationship with the industry it regulates. BP got an exclusion from a National Environmental Policy Act review by the agency for its damaged well in the Gulf.

“It seems as if permits were too often issued based on little more than assurances of safety from the oil companies,” Obama said. “That cannot and will not happen anymore.”

He ordered Interior Secretary Ken Salazar to “conduct a top-to-bottom reform” of the agency, including a review of its procedures for assessing the environmental impact of an offshore drilling plans.

Salazar said in a statement that will be “an important part of the ongoing comprehensive and thorough investigation of this incident.”

Obama previously announced plans to split the service’s responsibilities, which now include both enforcing rig safety rules and joining with companies such as BP and Exxon Mobil Corp. to develop oil and gas reserves while collecting royalties.

Volume on the Canadian preferred share market was way down today, reaching normal levels, as PerpetualDiscounts gained 4bp and FixedResets lost 8bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.62 % 2.77 % 42,832 20.86 1 0.0000 % 2,112.6
FixedFloater 5.13 % 3.19 % 40,557 20.11 1 -0.1413 % 3,120.2
Floater 2.14 % 2.46 % 105,392 21.13 3 -1.2710 % 2,267.6
OpRet 4.91 % 4.15 % 94,607 1.76 11 -0.1349 % 2,300.6
SplitShare 6.41 % 6.40 % 120,294 3.53 2 0.4661 % 2,130.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1349 % 2,103.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.53 % 4.77 % 24,187 15.82 1 0.0000 % 1,824.2
Perpetual-Discount 6.31 % 6.38 % 212,539 13.36 77 0.0360 % 1,692.5
FixedReset 5.51 % 4.27 % 513,929 3.58 44 -0.0775 % 2,147.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -2.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-14
Maturity Price : 16.10
Evaluated at bid price : 16.10
Bid-YTW : 2.46 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset -2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-14
Maturity Price : 16.04
Evaluated at bid price : 16.04
Bid-YTW : 2.47 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-14
Maturity Price : 18.50
Evaluated at bid price : 18.50
Bid-YTW : 7.27 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-14
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 6.59 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 58,915 RBC crossed blocks of 17,000 and 15,000, both at 17.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-14
Maturity Price : 17.33
Evaluated at bid price : 17.33
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 39,150 Desjardins crossed 24,000 at 24.16.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-14
Maturity Price : 23.96
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 19,480 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-14
Maturity Price : 19.61
Evaluated at bid price : 19.61
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 19,345 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-14
Maturity Price : 16.04
Evaluated at bid price : 16.04
Bid-YTW : 2.47 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 18,646 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 4.45 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 18,495 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-05-14
Maturity Price : 24.58
Evaluated at bid price : 24.63
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

SBC.PR.A to Get Bigger

May 14th, 2010

Brompton Split Banc Corp. has announced:

that it has filed a preliminary prospectus relating to an offering of warrants to Class A shareholders of the Company. Each Class A shareholder will receive one half warrant for each Class A share held on a record date which will be set upon filing of the final prospectus.

One warrant will entitle the holder to purchase a Unit (consisting of one Class A share and one Preferred share of the Company) upon payment of the subscription price, which will be determined as the lesser of: (i) $22.36 (which is the sum of (a) the most recently calculated NAV per Unit prior to the date hereof and (b) the estimated per Unit fees and expenses of the offering), and (ii) the most recently calculated NAV per Unit prior to the date of filing the final prospectus plus the estimated per Unit fees and expenses of the offering. The Company has applied to list the warrants and the Class A shares and Preferred shares issuable on the exercise thereof on the TSX.

Successful completion of the warrants offering will provide the Company with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities and it is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A shares and Preferred shares and reduce the ongoing management expense ratio of the Company.

A 50% increase in size – if the offering is fully subscribed – will be a welcome addition to the $53-million-odd outstanding at year end according to the fund’s 2009 Annual Report.

SBC.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when I reported the April 2009 reinstatement of the Capital Units dividend. SBC.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.