February 5, 2010

February 5th, 2010

BofA / Merrill Lynch Plot Thickens!

When Bank of America Corp.’s board met to approve the acquisition of an investment bank on Sept. 15, 2008, members thought they were going to buy Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., not Merrill Lynch & Co., according to New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo.

However, the story has some support for my thesis that large corporations are riskier than smaller ones, on the grounds that you get ahead by telling your boss what he wants to hear:

[Company eMails and notes] also show Merrill kept [BofA ex-Chief Financial Officer Joe] Price informed of the losses as they grew, yet he resisted pressure from his lawyers to disclose them to shareholders.

When Price asked for a review of whether the [October 2008] losses — then $5 billion after taxes — should be disclosed to shareholders, his general counsel Timothy Mayopoulos said they should.

Mayopoulos was later fired by Price and replaced by Brian Moynihan, who later became CEO, Cuomo said.

This is just a hair off-topic, but I’ve often wondered what the big deal is about atmospheric CO2 levels. I mean, assuming they’re causing problems, why not just fix it? Genetically engineer some yeast cells, or other bug, so that they eat CO2 and excrete sugar, put them in a tank and Bob’s your uncle! If you want to get fancy, put some other bugs in the tank that eat sugar and excrete polysaccharides; if you want to make some money, sell the kits in one-liter sizes so that Mr. & Mrs. Precious can reduce their carbon footprint. Why can’t this be done? Converting CO2 to sugar is no big deal – plants do it all day long and have time left over for sex with bees.

So it was a great relief to read Neil Reynolds column today, Profit motive is the solution to CO2 emissions:

A Santa Barbara, Calif., company called Carbon Sciences Inc. provides a convenient prototype. The company announced last week that it has developed a “breakthrough technology” that converts atmospheric carbon dioxide into commercial-grade gasoline, diesel fuel and jet fuel. Founded in 2006, Carbon Sciences had previously converted CO-2 into low-grade methanol using an enzyme-based technology. Now, it said, it has combined chemical and biological engineering in a bio-catalytic process that transforms carbon emissions into “a cost-efficient” energy resource.

Is the process really commercially viable, or at least on the way there? Is Carbon Sciences (OTCBB: CABN) a decent investment? I don’t know and I’d need to hire some expertise before I ventured an opinion. But I’m just glad I’m not the only person in the world who’s thought of this.

PerpetualDiscounts continued to slide today, losing 27bp on a day with sharply reduced volume. FixedResets were able to squeak out a gain of 2bp. There were only three entries for the Performance Highlights table!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.10 % 3.79 % 27,647 20.08 1 -0.7613 % 1,781.5
FixedFloater 5.72 % 3.79 % 34,880 19.23 1 0.0000 % 2,762.3
Floater 2.09 % 1.76 % 41,381 23.12 4 0.2128 % 2,199.4
OpRet 4.86 % -3.26 % 109,178 0.09 13 0.0770 % 2,316.3
SplitShare 6.33 % 6.30 % 152,629 3.73 2 0.0655 % 2,122.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0770 % 2,118.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.76 % 5.45 % 80,742 2.02 7 0.0000 % 1,893.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.83 % 5.87 % 171,328 14.08 69 -0.2659 % 1,809.3
FixedReset 5.43 % 3.61 % 318,475 3.80 42 0.0157 % 2,179.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -2.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-05
Maturity Price : 19.52
Evaluated at bid price : 19.52
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-05
Maturity Price : 21.02
Evaluated at bid price : 21.02
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-05
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 100,016 RBC crossed blocks of 40,000 shares, 35,000 and 20,800, all at 28.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.13
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 78,516 RBC crossed blocks of 40,000 and 35,000, both at 28.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.02
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 61,100 RBC crossed blocks of 40,000 and 21,000, both at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.25
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 48,048 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-05
Maturity Price : 19.94
Evaluated at bid price : 19.94
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 45,400 RBC crossed 38,100 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 45,010 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-05
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

February 4, 2010

February 4th, 2010

Deutsche Bank is using the compensation hysteria to put golden handcuffs on the peons:

A significant proportion of compensation will, where applicable, be deferred. Deferred compensation will be a combination of restricted equity awards (75%) and restricted incentive awards (25%).

* The restricted equity award will vest in nine equal instalments over 3¾ years, while the restricted incentive award will vest in three equal instalments over three years.

* All restricted equity and restricted incentive awards will continue to be subject to claw-back in the case of policy/regulatory breach.

And, of course, if they don’t feel like living up to their side of the bargain, inventing a policy/regulatory breach is easy enough. The best job of the brave new world? Employment contract litigator.

Some players are reducing their risk:

Two Citigroup Inc. executives running a proprietary-trading unit quit to join hedge fund Moore Capital Management LP, amid concern the government might order U.S. banks to exit trading businesses that don’t cater to customers, people briefed on the matter said.

Matthew Carpenter, a 15-year Citigroup veteran who had assembled the unit over the past three years, is leaving the bank along with his deputy, Matthew Newton, Citigroup spokesman Alex Samuelson said. The group trades U.S. stocks in several industries, Samuelson said.

In yet another instance of regulatory extortion, the SEC has admitted that State Street did nothing wrong but is paying $300-million anyway. Nobody’s been fired, nobody’s lost their license, back to business as usual. The trend towards bureaucratic ursurpation of the role of the courts, in all aspects of life, continues.

PerpetualDiscounts continued to slide today, losing 17bp, while FixedResets were down slightly less than 1bp. Volume continued to be on the heavy side.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.08 % 3.75 % 28,727 20.12 1 1.8837 % 1,795.1
FixedFloater 5.72 % 3.79 % 35,338 19.24 1 3.2048 % 2,762.3
Floater 2.09 % 1.76 % 41,224 23.12 4 0.4408 % 2,194.7
OpRet 4.86 % -3.97 % 110,416 0.09 13 -0.1360 % 2,314.5
SplitShare 6.33 % 6.29 % 154,966 3.74 2 1.7559 % 2,120.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1360 % 2,116.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.76 % 5.46 % 81,605 2.02 7 0.1114 % 1,893.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.81 % 5.84 % 172,907 14.10 69 -0.1741 % 1,814.1
FixedReset 5.43 % 3.61 % 318,933 3.80 42 -0.0071 % 2,179.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 21.31
Evaluated at bid price : 21.31
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 20.08
Evaluated at bid price : 20.08
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 21.21
Evaluated at bid price : 21.21
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.78
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.52
Bid-YTW : 7.99 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.39
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare 1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 3.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount 95,345 RBC crossed 84,700 at 24.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 24.58
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 63,500 CIBC sold 25,000 to National at 27.80, then another 19,400 to Desjardins at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.78
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 50,760 Desjardins crossed 48,000 at 27.71.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.70
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 41,870 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 27.27.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.10
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 33,907 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 29,565 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 19.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 19.12
Evaluated at bid price : 19.12
Bid-YTW : 5.90 %
There were 46 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

February 3, 2010

February 3rd, 2010

In yet another example of PrefBlog’s trendsetting nature, Citigroup has started a blog.

The market responded to my deprecating remarks about FixedResets by selling off PerpetualDiscounts, which lost 28bp on the day and buying FixedResets, which gained 5bp, on fairly heavy volume.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.83%, equivalent to 8.16% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long corporates continue to yield about 5.8%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 235bp, which is where it was at month-end.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.14 % 3.85 % 29,741 20.01 1 -0.2762 % 1,762.0
FixedFloater 5.91 % 3.96 % 35,743 19.02 1 -4.9070 % 2,676.5
Floater 2.10 % 1.78 % 38,620 23.08 4 -0.1867 % 2,185.1
OpRet 4.85 % -4.11 % 107,957 0.09 13 -0.1887 % 2,317.6
SplitShare 6.45 % 6.81 % 149,412 3.73 2 -1.7042 % 2,084.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1887 % 2,119.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.57 % 80,086 2.21 7 -0.0338 % 1,891.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.80 % 5.83 % 172,105 14.13 69 -0.2837 % 1,817.3
FixedReset 5.42 % 3.61 % 318,524 3.80 42 0.0525 % 2,179.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -4.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.41
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare -2.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 21.80
Evaluated at bid price : 22.16
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 21.51
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 20.16
Evaluated at bid price : 20.16
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.38
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 15.50
Evaluated at bid price : 15.50
Bid-YTW : 2.55 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 105,335 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 28.09; RBC crossed 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.07
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 85,645 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.78; RBC crossed 10,000 at 27.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.78
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 50,475 RBC crossed 45,600 at 24.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 24.37
Evaluated at bid price : 24.71
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 45,700 Dundee sold 10,000 to anonymous at 27.72; Desjardins crossed blocks of 10,100 and 10,000, both at 27.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.75
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 44,406 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.81
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 43,799 Nesbitt crossed 11,600 at 27.88 and 23,000 at 27.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.87
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
There were 50 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

XCM.PR.A Approves Reorganization

February 3rd, 2010

Commerce Split Corp. has announced:

that a proposed capital reorganization plan for the Company was approved at the special meeting of Shareholders held earlier today. The Company believes this reorganization has the potential to significantly increase the value attributed to all shareholders.

The reorganization will provide all shareholders with the ability to elect to:

  • 1. Maintain the current investment characteristics of their existing shares (a status quo option), through the Original Commerce Split Fund, or
  • 2. Have their existing Priority Equity and/or Class A shares reorganized into a new series of shares (the New Commerce Split Fund) that would potentially provide greater distribution and capital growth potential, especially if the common shares of CIBC increase over the remaining 5 year term of the Fund.

Under the New Commerce Split Fund, holders of the existing Priority Equity Shares that elect to transfer into the New Commerce Split Fund will receive the following securities for each Priority Equity share held at the close of business on the record date (to be determined):

One $5.00 Class I Preferred Share – paying fixed cumulative preferential monthly dividends to yield 7.50% per annum on the $5.00 notional issue price and having a repayment objective on December 1, 2014 or such other date as the Company may be terminated (the “Termination Date”) of $5.00;

One $5.00 Class II Preferred Share – paying distributions to yield 7.50% per annum on the $5.00 notional issue price if and when the net asset value per Unit exceeds $12.50 and having a repayment objective on the Termination Date of $5.00;

One-half 2011 Warrant – each full 2011 Warrant can be exercised to purchase one Unit for an exercise price of $10.00 at specified times until February 28, 2011; and

One 2012 Warrant – each 2012 Warrant can be exercised to purchase one Unit for an exercise price of $12.50 at specified times until February 28, 2012.

Holders of the existing Class A Shares would receive a Capital share for each share held and would continue to participate in any net asset value growth over $10.00 per Unit.

It is expected that Class I Preferred Shares, Class II Preferred Shares, Capital Shares, 2011 Warrants and 2012 Warrants will be issued sometime in March 2010 and will commence trading on the TSX at the opening of trading on such date.

The Company will issue shortly a further press release including all key dates related to the election process and capital reorganization.

I had previously recommended against the plan but nobody ever listens to me. Undeterred, I will now recommend that holders of XMF.PR.A elect to receive holdings in the “Original” group. I challenge all comers to show me a scenario of prices of CIBC common (“CM”) which show that the “New” plan is superior to assigning extant holdings to the “bond” part of their portfolios and buying a few CM shares directly.

XCM.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

XMF.PR.A Approves Reorganization

February 3rd, 2010

M-Split Corp. has announced:

that a proposed capital reorganization plan for the Company was approved at the special meeting of Shareholders held earlier today. The Company believes this reorganization has the potential to significantly increase the value attributed to all shareholders.

Holders of the existing Priority Equity Shares will receive the following securities for each Priority Equity share held at the close of business on the record date (to be determined):

One $5.00 Class I Preferred Share – paying fixed cumulative preferential monthly dividends to yield 7.50% per annum on the $5.00 notional issue price and having a repayment objective on December 1, 2014 or such other date as the Company may be terminated (the “Termination Date”) of $5.00;

One $5.00 Class II Preferred Share – paying distributions to yield 7.50% per annum on the $5.00 notional issue price if and when the net asset value per Unit exceeds $12.50 and having a repayment objective on the Termination Date of $5.00;

One 2011 Warrant – each 2011 Warrant can be exercised to purchase one Unit for an exercise price of $10.00 at specified times until February 28, 2011; and

One 2012 Warrant – each 2012 Warrant can be exercised to purchase one Unit for an exercise price of $12.50 at specified times until February 28, 2012.

Holders of the existing Class A Shares would receive a Capital share for each share held and would continue to participate in any net asset value growth over $10.00 per Unit.

It is expected that Class I Preferred Shares, Class II Preferred Shares, Capital Shares, 2011 Warrants and 2012 Warrants will be issued sometime in March 2010 and will commence trading on the TSX at the opening of trading on such date.

The Company will issue shortly a further press release including all key dates related to the capital reorganization.

I had previously recommended against the reorganization, but does anybody every listen to me? I believe the preferred shareholders have given up a perfectly good, well secured fixed income investment for more speculative securities; they would have been better off reallocating their holdings to the “bond” part of their portfolio and buying better preferreds … but that isn’t what happened.

XMF.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

January 2010 Top Publication Downloads

February 3rd, 2010

It’s interesting:

1. Preferred Shares and GICs (1)

2. Perpetual and Retractible Preferred Shares (2)

3. Why Invest in Preferred Shares? (5)

4. A Brief Introduction to Preferred Shares (6)

5. Corporate Bonds … or Preferred Shares? (3)

6. Trading Preferreds (8)

7. Interest Bearing Preferreds (4)

8. Modified Duration (9)

9. Break-Even Rate Shock (-)

10. The Bond Portfolio Jigsaw Puzzle (-)

The bracketted numbers give the positions on the December Top 10 List – there’s not much change!

Boston Fed Examines Fair Value Accounting and Asset Fire Sales

February 3rd, 2010

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has released a working paper by Sanders Shaffer titled Fair Value Accounting: Villain or Innocent Victim: Exploring the Links between Fair Value Accounting, Bank Regulatory Capital and the Recent Financial Crisis:

There is a popular belief that the confluence of bank capital rules and fair value accounting helped trigger the recent financial crisis. The claim is that questionable valuations of long term investments based on prices obtained from illiquid markets created a pro-cyclical effect whereby mark to market adjustments reduced regulatory capital forcing banks to sell off investments which further depressed prices. This ultimately led to bank instability and the credit effects that reached a peak late in 2008. This paper analyzes a sample of large banks to attempt to measure the strength of the link between fair value accounting, regulatory capital rules, pro-cyclicality and financial contagion. The focus is on large banks because they value a significant portion of their balance sheets using fair value. They also hold investment portfolios that contain illiquid assets in large enough volumes to possibly affect the market in a pro-cyclical fashion. The analysis is based on a review of recent historical financial data. The analysis does not reveal a clear link for most banks in the sample, but rather suggests that there may have been other more significant factors putting stress on bank regulatory capital.

After a discussion of Fair Value Accounting and the criticism that has been leveled against it, the author points out:

Fair value is applied to investment securities depending on how they are classified. Investment securities classified as available for sale are measured at fair value each reporting period. The resulting adjustments are termed unrealized gains or losses. These adjustments are recorded in an equity account called Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income. An important point here is that fair value adjustments related to debt securities and unrealized gains on equity securities are excluded when computing Tier 1 regulatory capital.

The author hypothesizes:

This analysis does not address whether raising capital through the sale of investments in a distressed market would be a first choice or last resort. However, one may be able to infer that if banks were actually being forced into distressed sales, they would first try to reduce more discretionary items. Dividends on common stock are discretionary and can be reduced or suspended as a method to maintain capital ratios.

Further, it does not appear that losses were realized in practice:

To summarize, this analysis looked at the largest financial institutions. It then isolated the impacts that critics have linked to capital destruction, namely the application of fair value to banks’ investment portfolios. The analysis shows that the impact on regulatory capital was quite small and does not appear to be large enough to be considered the driver of the pro-cyclical dynamic whereby declining asset prices lead to lower capital, then on to sales of assets to replenish capital, creating further pressure on prices and so on. In addition, there was no evidence found in reported financial data which would be indicative of distressed selling activity during the crisis period of 2008.

So if mark-to-market wasn’t the villain, what was?:

Based on further analysis of 2008 financial results, it was noted that loan loss provision had a significant impact on regulatory capital for most institutions in the sample.

An example is supplied:

At the height of the crisis, State Street stock fell 59 percent in one day when it was announced that unrealized losses had doubled, and analysts noted that TCE was approaching zero based on pro-forma calculations that added in the impact of consolidating certain off-balance sheet investment conduit programs.

The Simple TCE Ratio is calculated as STCE/tangible assets. Tangible assets = total assets – goodwill – intangible assets (excluding Mortgage Servicing Rights). It is not known how much emphasis was placed on TCE versus other significant factors that were also affecting bank stocks at the same time. That being said, State Street and BNYM are two possible examples in this analysis where fair value accounting may have contributed to bank instability based on the significant affect on TCE. It should be noted though that State Street and BNYM did not sell investment assets in response to capital depletion or market stress. They were able to rely on debt and equity issuances as well as participation in government capital programs. So although fair value may have contributed to some instability, the link between fair value and pro-cyclicality did not necessarily come to fruition here, at least partially due to government intervention.

The author concludes:

Based on this simple analysis it would appear that fair value accounting had a minimal impact on the capital of most banks in the sample during the crisis period through the end of 2008. Capital destruction was due to deterioration in loan portfolios and was further depleted by items such as proprietary trading losses and common stock dividends. These are a result of lending practices and the actions of bank management, not accounting rules. Furthermore, the data suggests that banks were not raising significant capital through distressed asset sales; rather they were relying on government programs as well as debt and equity markets.

This paper is of particular interest given the recent BoC Paper on Systemic Capital Requirements and its concern regarding the contagion effect of Asset Fire Sales.

James Hymas Interviewed by Globe & Mail

February 3rd, 2010

A very nice piece by John Heinzl in today’s Globe: An Investor with a Preference for Preferreds.

Update: Finally got a heckler in the Globe’s comments section! An individual who was too ashamed to sign his name wrote:

There is a problem with the authors comment about firs loss protection. Pref Shares are equity from a balance sheet stand point, and the financial regulators treat them as such.

Pref Shares are equity investments with stated yield that must be paid before the common share dividend. THIS IS THE ONLY protection. It is not a bond, meaning the issuer does not have to make good on it to stay in business, nor do pref shareholders have any stake in the event of an insolvent company.

For reference, Please read p. 58 of Benjamin Graham’s book The Outstanding Investor. Or have a read at this study of preferred shares. http://www.pallas-athena.ca/Income_Investing_Preferred_Shares.html

Firstly, I don’t understand the author’s problem with my statement regarding first-loss protection. I was not referring to the balance sheet treatment specified by accountants or the regulatory treatment specified by Basel II – I was referring to the investment characteristic of first-loss protection.

  • 1 – How much money did CIBC lose in 2008-2009?
  • 2 – How much of this loss was borne by common shareholders?
  • 3 – How much of this loss was borne by preferred shareholders?
  • 4 – What conclusions may be drawn regarding first loss protection?

I am not aware of any book authored by Benjamin Graham titled The Outstanding Investor and neither is Wikipedia. The commentator may possibly be referring to The Intelligent Investor; I commented on an extract from this book dealing with preferred shares in my early 2009 post, Benjamin Graham et al. on Preferred Stocks. Briefly, Mr. Graham was writing in another time, under a very different tax regime; I agree that under the conditions described, it would be highly unusual for an individual investor to find an attractively priced preferred share – but those conditions no longer apply.

The essay published on the Pallas Athena Investment Counsel website, titled Preferred Shares: A Tutorial again references page 58 of the mysterious book The Outstanding Investor and quotes an extract from it that appears to be a verbatim copy of part of the passage from The Intelligent Investor discussed briefly above.

To be brutally frank, I do not consider the Pallas Athena analysis to be worthy of much detailed comment. Their first example assumes:

the dividend increases by only 27% over the next 4 years to $2.54.

Therefore, $2.54 / 4% = $63.50. This is the price that the common shares should be worth at a 4% yield if the Royal Bank dividend on common shares will be $2.54 in 2013. A 27% dividend increase over the next four years is a very likely scenario; especially when we look at the past.

Given these assumptions, why would one ever invest in anything but Royal Bank common?

PA’s second example differs only in the starting price for the common.

This assumption is repeated in the third example. The preferred share used in the example is RY.PR.W at its lowest price, but the authors display their lack of familiarity with the preferred share market with the statement:

We will assume that we the shares are held until the end 2013, a few months prior to the scheduled $25.00 redemption in February 2014. For this reason, we’ll assume that the value of the Series W shares will be $25.00 at the end of 2013.

There is no “scheduled $25.00 redemption in February 2014”. That is when the shares become callable at par, which implies only a ceiling to the potential price, not a floor. This is, of course, favourable to the preferred share, but is inexcusable anyway. Naturally, the authors make the same assumptions about the future common as they do in the other examples (only the purchase price is different), leaving one to wonder yet again: why would anybody ever invest in anything but RY common if these assumptions are to be regarded as solid?

The authors conclude, in part:

The reality is that preferred shares are a tool for companies to increase their profits which is to the benefit of common shareholders or it is a tool for companies to solidify their balance sheet which is to the benefit of the lenders and bond holders.

Certainly, that’s as good a one-sentence explanation of the existence of preferred shares as any, but the authors neglect to inqure as to what price the company is prepared to pay for these benefits.

Preferred shares form a region on the continuum between debt and equity that will be attractive to many. That’s about the only general statement I can make!

I was not able to find composite performance numbers for Pallas-Athena Investment Counsel; if anybody has more luck, please let me know!

MAPF Performance: January 2010

February 2nd, 2010

The fund performed well in January, outperforming the indices and the closed end funds by a most satisfactory margin.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close January 29 was $10.7610.

Returns to January 29, 2010
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +1.84% +0.61% +%
Three Months +7.27% +5.05% +%
One Year +53.33% +25.22% +%
Two Years (annualized) +26.80% +3.87% +% *
Three Years (annualized) +17.39% +0.71%  
Four Years (annualized) +14.31% +1.58%  
Five Years (annualized) +12.55% +1.96%  
Six Years (annualized) +12.40% +2.39%  
Seven Years (annualized) +14.40% +3.26%  
Eight Years (annualized) +12.88% +3.21%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses. CPD returns to January 29, 2010, are not yet available on the Claymore website.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns. The figure shown is the product of the current one-year return and the similar figure reported for January 2009.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.8%, +4.7% and +23.3%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.46%, +3.93 & N/A, respectively, according to Morningstar and the Globe and Mail
Figures for AIC Preferred Income Fund (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +-0.1%, +3.1% & N/A, respectively

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

I am very pleased with the returns over the past year, but implore Assiduous Readers not to project this level of outperformance for the indefinite future. The year in the preferred share market was filled with episodes of panic and euphoria, together with many new entrants who do not appear to know what they are doing; perfect conditions for a disciplined quantitative approach.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There have been a lot of strongly motivated market participants in the past year, generating a lot of noise! The conditions of the past year may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. Just don’t expect the current level of outperformance every year, OK? While I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform, it should be borne in mind that beating the index by 500bp represents a good year, and there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.1883 0.3926
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.1883 0.4203
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.1883 0.4448
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.1883 0.4389
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.1883 $0.4449
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.1883 $0.5054
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.1883 $0.6206
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.1883 $0.6423
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.1883 $0.6524
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.1883 $0.6278
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0000 $0.6182
January 2010 10.7610 5.81% 1.001 5.804% 1.0000 $0.6246
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.

As has been previously discussed, the fund has a position in the high-yielding split-share BNA.PR.C, about half of which was sold in November in a swap for the slightly lower-yielding PerpetualDiscount BAM.PR.N. Additionally, the fund has a position in the high-yielding Operating Retractible YPG.PR.B, about half of which was swapped into the lower-yielding YPG.PR.D in January. Both BNA.PR.C and YPG.PR.B are scheduled to mature (or to be retracted) in the future, hence the sustainability of sustainable yield calculated while incorporating their contribution is somewhat suspect, as discussed in August, 2008.

Significant positions were also held in Fixed-Reset issues on January 29; all of which currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par at the first possible opportunity. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.89% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: January 2010 analysis(which is in excess of the 5.81% index yield on January 29). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $10.7610 * 0.0589 = $0.6338 whereas a similar calculation for December results in $10.5662 * 0.0597 = $0.6308.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

February 2, 2010

February 2nd, 2010

Paul Krugman writes an op-ed in the New York Times, Good and Boring, lauding the resilience of Canadian banks:

Canada has an independent Financial Consumer Agency, and it has sharply restricted subprime-type lending.

Above all, Canada’s experience seems to support those who say that the way to keep banking safe is to keep it boring — that is, to limit the extent to which banks can take on risk.

More specifically, Canada has been much stricter about limiting banks’ leverage, the extent to which they can rely on borrowed funds. It has also limited the process of securitization, in which banks package and resell claims on their loans outstanding — a process that was supposed to help banks reduce their risk by spreading it, but has turned out in practice to be a way for banks to make ever-bigger wagers with other people’s money.

Actually, the financial reform bill that the House of Representatives passed in December would significantly Canadianize the U.S. system. It would create an independent Consumer Financial Protection Agency, it would establish limits on leverage, and it would limit securitization by requiring that lenders hold on to some of their loans.

I suggest that Dr. Krugman has selected features of Canada’s system to further his domestic political arguments. The IMF has published suggestions that a critical factor is the stable deposit base of Canadian banks – which, I believe, is related to their national scope and oligopolistic position. Another major factor has been the banks’ control over the mortgage market – limited competition (no GSE’s here in Canada!) has allowed them to extract rents from hapless Canadian mortgagees, leaving much less necessity of reaching for yield. The sole Canadian bank that did fail during the crisis, Dundee Bank, failed because its lack of mortgage distribution channels encouraged it to go out on a limb provided by ABCP.

Paul Volcker testified to the Senate banking committee today:

Given strong legislative direction, bank supervisors should be able to appraise the nature of those trading activities and contain excesses. An analysis of volume relative to customer relationships and of the relative volatility of gains and losses would go a long way toward informing such judgments. For instance, patterns of exceptionally large gains and losses over a period of time in the “trading book” should raise an examiner’s eyebrows. Persisting over time, the result should be not just raised eyebrows but substantially raised capital requirements.

This is much more in line with my thinking than a flat prohibition, which will be subject to interpretation.

More generally, proprietary trading activity should not be able to profit from knowledge of customer trades.

That’s what the SEC’s supposed to be worrying about.

Mr. Volcker also noted that he had attached an essay to his official testimony, but I can’t find it!

A relatively directionless day for Canadian preferred shares, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 5bp and FixedResets gaining 1bp on moderate volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.13 % 3.83 % 28,844 20.03 1 2.0869 % 1,766.8
FixedFloater 5.62 % 3.69 % 35,458 19.36 1 0.5714 % 2,814.6
Floater 2.10 % 1.76 % 39,883 23.13 4 0.6847 % 2,189.2
OpRet 4.84 % -4.75 % 105,842 0.09 13 0.0797 % 2,322.0
SplitShare 6.34 % 3.81 % 146,621 0.08 2 -0.3917 % 2,120.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0797 % 2,123.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.57 % 74,172 2.21 7 0.0564 % 1,892.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.79 % 5.82 % 170,031 14.16 69 -0.0541 % 1,822.4
FixedReset 5.43 % 3.63 % 317,616 3.80 42 0.0122 % 2,178.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-02
Maturity Price : 22.59
Evaluated at bid price : 23.28
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-02
Maturity Price : 20.99
Evaluated at bid price : 20.99
Bid-YTW : 5.58 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-02
Maturity Price : 20.02
Evaluated at bid price : 20.02
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-02
Maturity Price : 21.82
Evaluated at bid price : 22.06
Bid-YTW : 1.76 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-02
Maturity Price : 15.70
Evaluated at bid price : 15.70
Bid-YTW : 2.52 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 2.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.10
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.E OpRet 199,230 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 170,000 and 25,000 shares, both at 25.61.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : -0.21 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 113,800 RBC crossed 60,100 at 24.93, then Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 24.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-02
Maturity Price : 24.51
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 61,901 Nesbitt crossed 34,000 at 20.24.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-02
Maturity Price : 20.02
Evaluated at bid price : 20.02
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 49,200 RBC crossed 18,000 at 27.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.71
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 48,514 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 24.10 and bought 22,100 from Desjardins at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-02
Maturity Price : 23.77
Evaluated at bid price : 24.07
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 33,352 Nesbitt crossed 17,000 at 26.02.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
There were 35 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.