BoE's Tucker Supports Contingent Capital, Love, Peace & Granola

November 18th, 2009

Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability at the Bank of England, has delivered a speech to the SUERF, CEPS & Belgian Financial Forum Conference: Crisis Management at the Cross‐Road, Brussels containing a rather surprising rationale for investment in Contingent Capital:

Almost no amount of capital is enough if things are bad enough. Which is why contingent capital might potentially be an important element in banks’ recovery plans, as the Governor set out recently in Edinburgh.

This would not be the kind of hybrid capital that mushroomed in the decade or so leading up to the crisis. The familiar types of subordinated debt can absorb losses only if a bank is put into liquidation, and so really has no place in regulatory capital requirements as we cannot rely on liquidation as the only resolution tool. It has been a faultline in the design of the financial system as a whole that banks issued securities that counted as capital for regulatory purposes, and on which they could therefore leverage up, but with institutional investors treating them as very low risk investments backing household pension and annuity savings.

By contrast, contingent capital would be debt that converted into common, loss-absorbing equity if a bank hit turbulence. It is, in effect, a form of catastrophe insurance provided by the private sector.

Why should long-term savings institutions and asset managers be prepared to provide such insurance? One possible reason is that if enough of them were to do so for enough banks, it might well help to protect the value of their investment portfolios more generally. If ever it needed to be demonstrated,the current crisis has surely put it beyond doubt – not only for our generation but for the next one too – that serious distress in the banking system deepens an economic downturn and so impairs pretty well all asset values. By taking a hit in one part of their portfolio by providing equity protection to banks, institutions might well be able to support the value of their investments more widely. And the trigger for conversion from debt into equity could be at a margin of comfort away from true catastrophe; say, a percentage point or so above the minimum regulatory capital ratio.

Of course, this would entail a structural shift over time in investment portfolios. But the system might be able to manage that adjustment. After all, it managed the all together less desirable adjustment to the development of the existing hybrid capital markets. But demand for contingent capital is, inevitably, uncertain at this stage. As are the terms on which it will be provided. We welcome the growing private sector focus on this.

That has to be the craziest rationale I’ve seen yet for investment.

Contingent Capital will succeed only if it designed so that its risk/reward profile makes it sufficently attractive that investors include it in their portfolio in order to make money – some investors, some of the time, for some purposes.

To suggest that it be held in order to make the bond allocation of the portfolio be more bond-like – which is what I think he’s saying – is ludicrous.

Assiduous Readers will by now be sick of hearing this, but I thoroughly dislike the idea of making the trigger dependent upon regulatory capital ratios; this makes the investor – and, to some extent, the bank – hostage to future unknown changes in regulation. It may also make the regulator hostage to the market, if they want to make a change but have to consider the effect on triggering conversion. Making the trigger dependent upon the price of the common – if the common declines by 50% from its price on the contingent capital’s issue date, for instance – will provide a market-based conversion trigger that can be hedged or synthesized on the options market in a familiar and reproducible manner.

November 17, 2009

November 17th, 2009

Patric Edspar is now running the investment banking unit of Citadel Investment Group; there are two reasons that the Bloomberg story is instructive. The first is the mere existence of an investment banking unit at a hedge fund; this is good for the financial system and bad for the regulators. The second is his nickname “Juggernaut” and its origins:

People who know Edsparr describe him as outspoken, with a forceful personality. He earned the nickname “juggernaut” during his first job at Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., where one of his tasks in the research unit was to collect daily price data from senior traders, one of the people said. Most of his predecessors failed because they were too intimidated to interrupt the traders, who would shout at them. Edsparr would stand behind them, often for up to two hours, until they gave him the data.

This is indicative of horrible management practices that are endemic in the industry. Anyone with a brain doesn’t hire a guy with three degrees to stand behind a trader for two hours begging for information. A well run firm will decide whether or not information transfer needs to take place and if it does, transfer it. As well, a well run firm does not permit any of its employees to treat other employees like that – as I recall, that was one of the major reasons why RT Capital blew up.

William C Dudley of FRBNY made a speech at the Center for Economic Policy Studies (CEPS) Symposium. Nothing particularly new, but I was very pleased to see him note that all these wonderful stabilizing ideas have a cost:

Higher capital requirements work to reduce the risk of liquidity runs, but potentially at the cost of making the process of financial intermediation much more expensive. In particular, a requirement that firms must hold more capital increases intermediation costs. Moreover, banks may respond to higher capital requirements by taking on greater risk. If an increase in risk-taking were to occur, the movement of the probability distribution to the right in Figure 2 might be offset by an increase in the degree of dispersion. Thus, higher capital requirements might not necessarily be sufficient to push all of the probability distribution above zero.

Second, regulators could require greater liquidity buffers. These buffers would help protect the firm against having to liquidate assets under duress, and would therefore help prevent the probability distribution from sliding left toward the zero line in Figure 2. But there is a cost to the firm from holding greater liquidity buffers in terms of lower returns on capital. So, requiring greater liquidity buffers would also tend to drive up intermediation costs. And, just as in the case of higher capital requirements, banks could respond by taking greater risks.

It doesn’t happen very often, but occasionally there’s a glimmer of sense in the world:

The U.K. government will oppose a European Union plan to impose the same pay restrictions on hedge-fund managers and private-equity firms that it proposed for bankers, the Treasury said.

The EU last week added the pay rules to alternative investment fund legislation that under review in the European Council and European Parliament. It suggests that senior managers defer a minimum of 40 percent of bonuses for at least three years and a “substantial amount” is paid in shares.

A spokesman for the Treasury said the last-minute addition to the rules failed to properly distinguish between funds and banks. He said regulation should be proportionate to the risk funds pose to the financial system. Hedge funds don’t take retail deposits and haven’t required bailouts despite a number of failures, the Treasury said.

Still no word on the results of the DFN / DFN.PR.A Rights Issue. The unit value was 18.98 on November 13, compared with the exercise price of 19.75, so success seems a little dubious … but there’s a twist: DFN closed at 12.51 on the announcement date, October 16, and stayed above $10 for the next two weeks, trading about 350,000 shares in the interim. One strategy might have been to short the hell out of the capital units (which were well above NAV at the time), aiming to replace with either a subscription to the rights or taking the chance. Still, I’ll bet a nickel that exercise was negligible.

A good solid day for preferreds, with PerpetualDiscounts up 15bp and FixedResets gaining 13bp. Volume continued to be relatively light, without much volatility.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0661 % 1,497.8
FixedFloater 6.02 % 4.13 % 43,603 18.64 1 -0.7688 % 2,588.8
Floater 2.60 % 3.03 % 93,584 19.60 3 -0.0661 % 1,871.2
OpRet 4.81 % -5.08 % 119,351 0.09 14 -0.0137 % 2,304.5
SplitShare 6.34 % 6.35 % 335,257 3.88 2 -0.0219 % 2,085.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0137 % 2,107.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.92 % 5.57 % 125,266 2.41 4 -0.3478 % 1,856.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.88 % 5.97 % 184,386 13.96 70 0.1485 % 1,764.7
FixedReset 5.47 % 3.95 % 387,638 3.94 41 0.1300 % 2,134.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-17
Maturity Price : 19.34
Evaluated at bid price : 19.34
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-17
Maturity Price : 24.49
Evaluated at bid price : 24.72
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
TRI.PR.B Floater -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-17
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 2.04 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-17
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-17
Maturity Price : 22.25
Evaluated at bid price : 22.40
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.X OpRet 464,383 Desjardins crossed 388,400 at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.67
Evaluated at bid price : 26.12
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 120,730 Nesbitt crossed 120,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-17
Maturity Price : 24.59
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 73,415 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.63
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 64,143 Nesbitt crossed 42,100 at 20.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-17
Maturity Price : 20.21
Evaluated at bid price : 20.21
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 48,170 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 30,000 and 15,000, both at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 43,170 RBC crossed 15,000 at 17.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-17
Maturity Price : 17.54
Evaluated at bid price : 17.54
Bid-YTW : 6.90 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

SLA SLEECS: 5.863%+340

November 17th, 2009

Sun Life has announced:

that Sun Life Capital Trust II, a trust established by Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (“SLA”), will issue in Canada $500 million principal amount of Sun Life ExchangEable Capital Securities Series 2009-1 due December 31, 2108 (“SLEECS Series 2009-1”) under a final prospectus that it intends to file with the Canadian securities regulators as soon as possible. The SLEECS Series 2009-1 are expected to qualify as regulatory capital of SLA. The net proceeds of the issue will be used by SLA for general corporate purposes, including investments in subsidiaries.

Interest on the SLEECS Series 2009-1 will be payable semi-annually. The interest rate on the SLEECS Series 2009-1 from the date of issue to but excluding December 31, 2019 will be 5.863% per annum. On that date and thereafter on each fifth anniversary of that date, the interest rate on the SLEECS Series 2009-1 for the ensuing five years will be reset at a rate equal to 3.40% above the then-yield on a Government of Canada bond having a term to maturity of five years.

As described further in the prospectus, the SLEECS Series 2009-1 may in certain circumstances be automatically exchanged for a series of SLA preferred shares, and in certain other circumstances a series of SLA preferred shares may be issued in lieu of interest payable on the SLEECS Series 2009-1.

On or after December 31, 2014, subject to certain conditions, the SLEECS Series 2009-1 may be redeemed in whole or in part at the option of Sun Life Capital Trust II.

The issue of SLEECS Series 2009-1 is underwritten by a syndicate co-led by Scotia Capital Inc. and RBC Dominion Securities Inc., and is expected to close on November 20, 2009.

Note that these are issued at the level of SLA, the OpCo, which is intrinsically a better credit than SLF (the holdco), and in times of trouble they will convert to SLA prefs. DBRS rates existing SLEECS at A(high), the same as SLF sub-debt.

The following is from the preliminary prospectus:

From the Closing Date to but excluding •, 2019, the interest rate on the SLEECS will be fixed at •% per annum. Assuming the SLEECS are issued on •, 2009, the first interest payment due on the SLEECS on •, 2009 will be $• per $1,000 principal amount of SLEECS. Each interest payment on the SLEECS after the first interest payment (subject to the reset of the interest rate from and after •, 2019) will be in the amount of $• per $1,000 principal amount of SLEECS. Starting on •, 2019, and on every 5th anniversary of such date thereafter until •, 2104 (each such date, an “Interest Reset Date”), the interest rate on the SLEECS will be reset at an interest rate per annum equal to the Government of Canada Yield plus •%. The SLEECS will mature on •, 2108

On or after •, 2014, the Trust may, at its option, with the prior approval of the Superintendent, on giving not more than 60 nor less than 30 days’ notice to the holders of the SLEECS, redeem the SLEECS, in whole or in part. The redemption price per $1,000 principal amount of SLEECS redeemed on any day that is not an Interest Reset Date will be equal to the greater of par and the Canada Yield Price, and the redemption price per $1,000 principal amount of SLEECS redeemed on any Interest Reset Date will be par, together in either case with accrued and unpaid interest to but excluding the date fixed for redemption, subject to any applicable withholding tax. The redemption price payable by the Trust will be paid in cash. See “Description of the Trust Securities — SLEECS—Trust Redemption Right”.

Interest Reset Date means •, 2019, and every fifth anniversary of such date thereafter until •, 2104, on which dates the interest rate on the SLEECS and the SLA Debenture will be reset as described in this prospectus.

In bad times, the SLEECS convert to SLA preferred shares paying 30-Year Canadas + •

The SLF sub-debt, 5.4 of pretend-2037, are quoted by Perimeter to yield 6.24% (which will almost certainly assume a call at par in 2037, but I haven’t checked that), while the ENB 7.22 of 2030 are quoted at 5.73. … so the SLEECS seem kind of expensive to me. However, they will be quoted, traded and indexed as pretend-ten-years, and if anything goes wrong, who cares?

TIPS: GAO vs. TBAC

November 16th, 2009

The United States Government Accountability Office released a September report to Treasury, Treasury Inflation Protected Securities Should Play a Heightened Role in Addressing Debt Management Challenges:

Treasury faces two near-term challenges in managing the growing government debt: the rise in total outstanding debt and the shortening of the average maturity of the debt profile.3 Treasury’s total outstanding debt increased by $2.3 trillion (25 percent increase in federal debt) since the onset of the economic recession in December 2007. In actions Treasury described as in accordance with normal operating procedures, Treasury increased short-term borrowing to address its massive and immediate borrowing needs. As a result, the average maturity of Treasury’s debt decreased as the percentage of marketable debt maturing within 1 year increased from 35.6 percent to 41.1 percent between September 2007 and June 2009.


Click for big

Click for big.

Another ex-ante study, noted that if the TIPS program were as liquid as the market for off-the-run nominal Treasuries, Treasury would have realized total cost savings from the TIPS program of $22 billion to $32 billion. Over the short run, economists recognize that an assessment of TIPS program’s relative costs depends on whether Treasury or the investor is the beneficiary from differences in expected and actual inflation. The time horizon of the analysis affects the results since, over the long run, the average amount by which actual inflation exceeds expected inflation will roughly equal the average amount when the opposite is true.

23William C. Dudley, Jennifer Roush, and Michelle Steinberg Ezer, “The Case for TIPS: An Examination of the Costs and Benefits,” FRBNY Economic Policy Review (July 2009); and Dean Croushore, “An Evaluation of Inflation Forecasts From Surveys Using Real-Time Data,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Papers (December 2008).

The next part is interesting … I didn’t know that!

In addition, technical market factors closely linked to liquidity effects appear to have contributed to the decline in breakeven inflation rates. Lehman Brothers owned TIPS as part of repo trades or posted TIPS as counterparty collateral. Because of Lehman’s bankruptcy, the court and its counterparty needed to sell these TIPS, which created a flood of TIPS on the market. There appeared to be few buyers and distressed market makers were unwilling to take positions in these TIPS. As a result, the TIPS yields rose sharply.

The conclusion is:

GAO recommends that, in the context of projected sustained increases in federal debt, the Secretary of the Treasury take steps to increase TIPS liquidity and reduce their cost to Treasury: increase issuance, issue longer-dated maturities, and conduct more frequent auctions. Also, the Secretary should continually review the appropriate composition of the TIPS program and consider: the impact of Treasury’s public statements and TIPS issuance on TIPS liquidity, how different analytical perspectives are valuable for evaluating cost, how TIPS can diversify Treasury’s investor base, and how TIPS impact the cost of nominal securities.

However, the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee stated in its November 4th Report:

There was lively debate among the Committee members regarding the GAO Report published September 2009 entitled “Treasury Inflation Protected Securities Should Play a Heightened Role in Addressing Debt Management Challenges.” Committee members could not come to broad agreement on the findings of the report. While Committee members acknowledged the benefits of TIPS as a debt management tool, some members reiterated their higher cost to date versus nominal Treasury securities.

So take your choice.

I have previously highlighted the slides for the TBAC presentation.

November 16, 2009

November 16th, 2009

Take that! How long will it be before official Chinese pronouncements include the phrase ‘Helicopter Ben’?

China’s banking regulation chief joined Hong Kong’s leader in blaming the Federal Reserve’s interest-rate policy for fueling speculative capital flows that may spur asset-price inflation.

“The continuous depreciation in the dollar, and the U.S. government’s indication that, in order to resume growth and maintain public confidence, it basically won’t raise interest rates for the coming 12 to 18 months, has led to massive dollar arbitrage speculation,” Liu Mingkang, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, said in Beijing yesterday.

“I’m scared and leaders should look out,” [Chief Executive of Hong Kong Donald] Tsang said in Singapore Nov. 13. “America is doing exactly what Japan did last time,” he said, adding that Japan’s zero interest rate policy contributed to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and U.S. mortgage meltdown.

Bernanke himself points out that bubbles are a little easier to spot in hindsight:

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said it’s “not obvious” that asset prices in the U.S. are out of line with underlying values after a 64 percent jump in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index from its March low.

“It is inherently extraordinarily difficult to know whether an asset’s price is in line with its fundamental value,” he said today in response to audience questions after a speech in New York. “It’s not obvious to me in any case that there’s any large misalignments currently in the U.S. financial system.”

“The best approach here if at all possible is to use supervisory and regulatory methods to restrain undue risk-taking and to make sure the system is resilient in case an asset-price bubble bursts in the future,” Bernanke said.

His prescription is entirely sensible and will therefore be ignored.

DBRS has published an amusing letter to the SEC:

The Commission initially put these proposals out for comment last year. With very few exceptions, the proposals elicited an overwhelmingly negative response from the public commenters, including DBRS. The Commission recently adopted the few proposed rule changes that the public found unobjectionable. However, instead of heeding the cogent arguments the commenters put forth regarding the rest of the proposals, the Commission has asked for more comments, hoping this time to elicit a different response.

Footnote: For example, with regard to the proposed elimination of NRSRO references from Regulation M, the Commission says, “In light of the uniform opposition in the comment letters and the Commission’s remaining concern regarding the undue influence of NRSRO ratings, the Commission is seeking additional comment.” Re-proposing Release, at 6, 74 Fed. Reg. at 52375.

No word yet on the DFN / DFN.PR.A Rights Issue. Maybe tomorrow.

The preferred share market continued its rally today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 8bp and FixedResets gaining 17bp. Not much price volatility, volume was lukewarm.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.8437 % 1,498.8
FixedFloater 5.97 % 4.09 % 43,737 18.69 1 0.8864 % 2,608.9
Floater 2.60 % 3.05 % 94,019 19.56 3 0.8437 % 1,872.4
OpRet 4.81 % -4.83 % 120,693 0.09 14 -0.0628 % 2,304.8
SplitShare 6.34 % 6.37 % 340,439 3.88 2 0.0875 % 2,085.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0628 % 2,107.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.90 % 5.57 % 126,100 1.14 4 0.2990 % 1,863.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.89 % 5.95 % 183,829 13.98 70 0.0769 % 1,762.1
FixedReset 5.48 % 3.97 % 393,460 3.94 41 0.1655 % 2,131.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 18.93
Evaluated at bid price : 18.93
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-12-16
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : -13.64 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.77
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 19.11
Evaluated at bid price : 19.11
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 12.80
Evaluated at bid price : 12.80
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 13.01
Evaluated at bid price : 13.01
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 269,711 Nesbitt crossed 230,000 at 27.00; RBC crossed 35,800 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet 146,619 TD crossed 131,400 at 26.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-12-16
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : -13.64 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 56,250 RBC crossed 50,000 at 27.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.99
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 53,329 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 40,610 RBC crossed 20,000 at 19.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 19.12
Evaluated at bid price : 19.12
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 38,858 Desjardins crossed 31,900 at 17.86.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-16
Maturity Price : 17.77
Evaluated at bid price : 17.77
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

November Edition of PrefLetter Released!

November 16th, 2009

The November, 2009, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The November edition contains an appendix examining the rise of Alternative Trading Systems in Canada and discusses two order types that may become possible with increased automation and competition.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the November, 2009, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the December, 2009, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close December 11 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on December 14.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: A recent enhancement to the PrefLetter website is the Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

TBAC Claims Real Rates Bigger Problem Than Inflation

November 15th, 2009

My attention was drawn to the latest efforts of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee by a Bloomberg story:

The 13-member committee of bond dealers and investors that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner depends on for advice, and includes officials of Pacific Investment Management Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc., highlighted the surge on page 36 of a 67-page report on Nov. 3. On the same page, they showed inflation expectations are subdued based on gauges watched by the Federal Reserve. In their discussions, the group noted that a second year of government debt sales approaching $2 trillion may weigh on investors as the Fed stops buying notes and bonds.

The presentation is on-line. Lots of fascinating charts, including the two highlighted ones:

Option Skew…

…and forward inflation…

This looks like good stuff – and I believe I’ve highlighted some of their work before, in the context of five-year TIPS elimination – that I want to chew on for a while … but I’m knee-deep in PrefLetter at the moment … and then there’s some urgent programming … then a couple of letters …

How might an investor exploit a high-real-rate-low-inflation scenario? Answer that, win a kewpie doll.

Update: The report to the Treasury Secretary is online:

With regard to TIPS, the Committee recommends increasing TIPS issuance from $58 billion in 2009 to $70-$80 billion in 2010. The auction schedules for both 5 and 10-year TIPS would be maintained, although sizes would increase. However, 20-year TIPS issuance would be replaced with 30-year TIPS, on the same auction schedule, with larger sizes. The Committee felt that this would both lengthen the average maturity of Treasury’s debt, while attracting investors interested in longer duration inflation protection. In the medium term, the Committee felt that the market could support increases in both auction sizes and frequency, growing gross TIPS issuance to $100-$130 billion per annum. These actions maintain, if not increase, the proportion of TIPS to total marketable debt outstanding.

November Edition of PrefLetter Now in Preparation

November 13th, 2009

The markets have closed and the November edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The November edition will contain an appendix examining the advent of Alternative Trading Systems, their importance to the preferred share market and a note on order types.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

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The November issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the November issue.

November 13, 2009

November 13th, 2009

A good solid day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 15bp while FixedResets gained 4bp … reasonably close to a parallel shift in yields, given the difference in their weighted-median average modified duration. Not a lot of price volatility, not a lot of volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5582 % 1,486.3
FixedFloater 6.02 % 4.14 % 43,467 18.63 1 1.3476 % 2,585.9
Floater 2.62 % 3.09 % 94,418 19.45 3 0.5582 % 1,856.8
OpRet 4.81 % -7.44 % 114,939 0.09 14 0.1082 % 2,306.2
SplitShare 6.35 % 6.34 % 352,496 3.89 2 -0.0219 % 2,084.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1082 % 2,108.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.92 % 5.67 % 126,864 1.15 4 -0.2486 % 1,857.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.89 % 5.95 % 182,981 13.97 70 0.1509 % 1,760.7
FixedReset 5.49 % 4.03 % 399,738 3.95 41 0.0418 % 2,128.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 19.78
Evaluated at bid price : 19.78
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 22.90
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.05
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 12.82
Evaluated at bid price : 12.82
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.62
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 22.40
Evaluated at bid price : 22.56
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.P FixedReset 99,550 RBC bought three blocks of 10,000 shares each from HSBC, all at 27.25, then crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.21
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 54,220 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 27.30; RBC crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 44,215 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 43,180 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 19.78
Evaluated at bid price : 19.78
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 36,695 RBC crossed 25,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 32,600 RBC crossed 31,000 at 19.74.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-11-13
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 2.02 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Utilities and Preferred Shares

November 13th, 2009

This is way out of date, but I ran across it and thought I’d pass it along anyway.

The following is from the Alberta Energy & Utilities Board Decision 2006-100, regarding Atco Utilities [AU]:

AU submitted that its preferred shares have ensured that its customers have enjoyed the benefits of the lowest cost financing on the most flexible terms available in the Canadian financial market because AU’s existing preferred shares provide support to its credit rating.

The Board notes that AU provided an analysis indicating that replacing preferred shares with debt would provide initial savings but the cumulative savings would become negative within four years due to the cumulative higher costs of new debt issued each year.

The Board notes that the approach used by both AU and CG to determine the cost effectiveness of preferred shares is dependent on AU’s specific debt requirement needs, with a focus on the next four to six years. However, all debt would eventually be refinanced and accordingly would be affected by any lower credit rating. In the Board’s view, the cost effectiveness of using preferred shares should be evaluated on a more generic basis that considers the long-run steady state impacts and that is not dependent on the particular immediate borrowing needs of AU. This can best be accomplished by comparing the total yearly cost of non-common equity financing with and without preferred shares at current market rates for debt and preferred shares. In this context “current” refers to the most current market figures available on the record of this proceeding.

AU’s updated evidence indicated that preferred shares had a current market cost of 4.60% and that AU’s income tax rate was currently 31.37%. This translates to a pre-tax cost of (4.60/ (1-0.3137)) 6.70%. AU’s updated evidence indicated that the current market cost for long-term debt was 5.75%. As a result, preferred shares were estimated to have a current market cost that was 95 basis points higher than the current market cost of debt, at the time of that estimate.

The ATCO Utilities proposed a preferred equity ratio of 6% and a debt ratio that approximates 57% across the four ATCO Utilities, which would then approximate 63% if the preferred shares were replaced with debt. In these proportions, the debt portion of capital is approximately 10 times larger than the preferred equity portion of capital. On this basis, the Board calculates that if the debt costs were to rise by any more than approximately 10 ( i.e. 95/10) basis points, due to the replacement of preferred shares with debt, then the added cost of the (then) approximately 63% debt component would outweigh the approximate 95 basis points savings on the current 6% preferred share component. The Board notes that, in keeping with its steady-state approach, this calculation assumes that the added cost would apply to both existing and new debt.

AU’s expert, Mr. Neysmith indicated that replacing AU’s preferred shares with debt would lead to a debt credit rating downgrade of at least one to two notches. AU estimated that this would increase its debt interest costs by 30 to 60 basis points. AU also provided a letter from a financial market advisor, Mr. Engen, which indicated that AU’s interest costs would rise by 5 to 10 basis points if the market viewed CU’s regulatory environment to be largely unchanged and 20 to 40 basis points if the market viewed CU’s regulatory environment as having worsened because of the Board’s decision to remove the preferred shares. Both of these estimates were based on current market conditions. Mr. Engen indicated that in a less attractive spread environment, the differential could be expected to widen.

It is not clear how many basis points would be added to AU’s debt costs if preferred shares were replaced with debt. However, the Board accepts that directionally it should expect some increase in debt costs in such a scenario. The Board accepts AU’s submission that the debt cost impact would vary depending on market conditions. In the Board’s view, a 10 basis points or greater increase in debt costs for AU resulting from the discontinuance of the use of preferred shares in AU’s capital structure would be sufficient to demonstrate the continued cost effectiveness of employing preferred shares. The Board considers the evidence provided by AU and its experts persuasive that the discontinuance of the use of preferred shares could be expected in the present market conditions to increase AU’s debt costs by approximately 10 basis points. The Board also notes that AU’s evidence indicated that the impact could be as high as 60 basis points. Therefore the Board finds that the continued use of preferred shares is cost effective at this time.

Under cross-examination by Board Counsel, AU indicated the optimum amount of preferred shares had been estimated by AU to be within a range of 5% to 10%.

It should be noted that the Alberta Utilities Commission sets Return-on-Equity allowances for the utilities it regulates based on common equity:

In addition, in Decision 2009-216, 2009 Generic Cost of Capital, issued today, the AUC set a new return-on-equity (ROE) level of nine per cent for all the utilities for 2009 and 2010, and established moderately higher individual equity ratios for each of the firms. The changes were in part to address pressures stemming from the global credit crunch.

The changes apply to all regulated utilities in Alberta serving the electricity and natural gas sectors. These include distribution and transmission providers. The uniform, or generic, ROE is applied to the portion of a utility’s rate base financed by common equity to determine the utility’s return on equity capital.