PrefBlog

Bank of England Governor Mervyn King had some apocalyptic things to say:

two British banks got within hours of a liquidity shortfall on Oct. 6, 2008, and the day after as the U.K. financial system came to the brink of collapse.

“Two of our major banks which had had difficulty in obtaining funding could raise money only for one week then only for one day, and then on that Monday and Tuesday it was not possible even for those two banks really to be confident they could get to the end of the day,” the BBC cited King as saying in an interview to be broadcast later today.

King was referring to Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc and HBOS Plc, the BBC said. Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s government pledged to invest about 50 billion ($82 billion) pounds in the banking system on Oct. 8, 2008, to save it from meltdown in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s bankruptcy declared that September.

This meltdown-through-funding scenario ties in the the IMF conclusions on the resiliency of Canadian banks, but I confess that the entire mechanism of such a failure is somewhat opaque to me.

It was to prevent such crises of funding that Central Banking was invented; the Federal Reserve was created explicitly due to the funding difficulties that were at the centre of the panic of 1907 – so why should funding, in and of itself, be such a critical element?

This brings us back to the Northern Rock episode, where the announcement of liquidity support by the BoE actually made matters worse; I have previously speculated that this reflects public distrust of public institutions. If this is the case, then the fundamental assumptions of Central Banking will have to be revised – the discount window has been the most important tool in their box.

What? Public Institutions, civil servants and policitians at fault? Can’t be! It must be the fault of the Credit Rating Agencies:

Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings face scrutiny today by insurance regulators examining the role of the firms in evaluating fixed- income securities.

State insurance regulators are meeting in Maryland to examine the firms’ role in rating bonds held by insurance companies. A second hearing scheduled today, by Edolphus Towns, chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, was postponed to Sept. 30. The panel will look at ratings companies amid allegations of continued conflicts of interest from a former Moody’s analyst.
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“The fundamental issue is if the bar is always moving, that makes it very difficult,” Connecticut insurance Commissioner Thomas Sullivan said in a telephone interview. “Magically overnight, what we thought was AAA is no longer AAA. That’s a big problem.”

Assiduous Readers will remember that actual market participants felt that a volatility scale would be a good adjunct to ratings, but this solution was disdained by regulators. Of some interest in the Bloomberg story was:

Moody’s originally declined to participate in the [NAIC] meeting but relented after New York’s regulator suggested scaling back the rating firm’s authorization if it skipped the session.

Congressional Hearing

The congressional hearing was postponed after the panel obtained an internal Moody’s staff memo written by Eric Kolchinsky, a former analyst at the firm, expressing his concern with how the company rated securities, said committee chairman Edolphus Towns. The panel didn’t have enough time to incorporate the information into the hearing, he said.

A Moody’s representative was invited to the session but didn’t come, Towns said.

“They basically didn’t show up, they ignored us” Towns said in an interview, referring to Moody’s. “I guess they didn’t realize we have subpoena power.”

See? Congressional sessions have subpoena power, but regulators have something even better: extortion.

The Fed has released the Shared National Credits Report:

Credit quality declined sharply for loan commitments of $20 million or more held by multiple federally supervised institutions, according to the 32nd annual review of Shared National Credits (SNC).
The credit risk of these large loan commitments was shared among U.S. bank organizations, foreign bank organizations (FBO), and nonbanks such as securitization pools, hedge funds, insurance companies, and pension funds. Credit quality deteriorated across all entities, but nonbanks held 47 percent of classified assets in the SNC portfolio, despite making up only 21.2 percent of the SNC portfolio. U.S. bank organizations held 30.2 percent of the classified assets and made up 40.8 percent of the SNC portfolio.

The 2009 review covered 8,955 credits totaling $2.9 trillion extended to approximately 5,900 borrowers. Loans were reviewed and categorized by the severity of their risk–special mention, substandard, doubtful, or loss–in order of increasing severity. The lowest risk loans, special mention, had potential weaknesses that deserve management attention to prevent further deterioration at the time of review. The most severe category of loans, loss, includes loans that were considered uncollectible.

Treasury’s wish-list of bank capitalization rules included many references to Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies, a concept I criticized – special status will only cause problems, I said. It would seem that Paul Volcker agrees:

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker criticized the Obama administration’s plan to subject “systemically important” financial firms to more stringent regulation by the Fed.

Volcker told lawmakers today that such a designation would imply government readiness to support the firms in a crisis, encouraging even more risky behavior in a phenomenon known as “moral hazard.”
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“The danger is the spread of moral hazard could make the next crisis much bigger,” said Volcker, who serves as an outside economic adviser to Obama. Volcker has criticized key elements of the Obama administration regulatory plan in recent public statements, and his remarks today largely reprised those criticisms.

I am particularly impressed by his reference to the next crisis … it is rare to fin a figure with any political clout not subscribing to the view that the New Millennium will arrive as soon as we get those pesky Credit Rating Agencies under control.

Good volume, soft returns in the preferred market today, with PerpetualDiscounts down 11bp on the day while FixedResets lost 8bp. This may be related to all the new issuance … there are, presumably, people still selling to make room for the monster TRP FixedReset settling September 30 and there was a (long awaited) new straight issue announced by GWO.

Today was Equity Through Education Day, a day on which institutional investors are encouraged to trade through BMO Capital Markets with commissions donated to charity. So far CAD 6.6-million in commissions has been skimmed off the hapless beneficiaries of participating institutional accounts, enabling institutional PMs to feel good about themselves.

Sadly, the website – again! – does not explain how discretionary participation (the kind they are attempting to encourage with their ads) can be squared with a PM’s duty to his client, or regulatory requirement to seek best execution. I’ve never understood that.

Realpoint, a CMBS credit rating agency last discussed on September 9, has been approved by NAIC:

The ruling by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners means state regulators can rely on Realpoint in determining how much capital must be held by insurers, Scott Holeman, spokesman for the group, said today. Realpoint provides analysis to bond buyers through subscription, while S&P and Moody’s are paid by companies that issue securities.

Realpoint started the process as reported June 15, when fears of a mass downgrade of CMBS by S&P led insurance companies to seek their ‘license to invest’ from more optomistic firms.

And there’s even more news on the credit rating front! First, William Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachussets is checking the quality of some ratings:

Massachusetts is reviewing DBRS Ltd.’s grades on investments tied to life insurance policies because they might be inflated like the discredited mortgage bonds at the center of the recession.
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“Bundling the policies to create another investment opportunity closely parallels the subprime mortgage market and subsequent meltdown, whose effects investors are still reeling from,” said Galvin, the state’s chief financial regulator, in the statement.

Regulators have said ratings companies were too generous in assigning top credit grades to securities comprised of bundled subprime mortgages before the financial crisis showed many of them were more prone to default than the ratings suggested.

Well, with respect to the last paragraph, hold on a minute! That’s certainly been implied, but I’m not sure whether the regulators have actually gone so far as to state definitely that the ratings were too high. Galvin’s quote, besides conflating two unrelated securities, is also ungrammatical. Was he drunk?

However, help is at hand: Government-Developed Credit Ratings:

“We at the National Association of Insurance Commissioners are studying the viability of creating our own rating agency, a not-for-profit one,” Connecticut Insurance Commissioner Thomas Sullivan said in a telephone interview today.
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“The fundamental issue is if the bar is always moving, that makes it very difficult,” Sullivan said. “Magically overnight, what we thought was AAA is no longer AAA. That’s a big problem.”
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Insurers, which are suffering from downgrades of their holdings, have urged regulators to seek alternatives. Rating cuts to structured securities in insurance portfolios have triggered increased capital requirements.

The American Council of Life Insurers has asked the NAIC to ease its standards after RMBS rating cuts pushed up carriers’ capital needs fivefold to $11 billion in the six months ended June 30. The ACLI is proposing regulators use “third party” predictions of credit losses on RMBS in place of their reliance on ratings firms.

The NAIC currently conducts some credit analysis on insurers’ investments through the group’s Securities Valuation Office in New York. The deliberations for a new ratings business at the NAIC are still preliminary.

“We’re in the formative stages,” Sullivan said. “Anything’s possible. Financing, legal hurdles, structure; all those things need to be dealt with and we’re examining all of them.”

I can’t wait.

Volume was very good today (possibly quarter end window-dressing / rebalancing, possibly triggered by the YPG.PR.C closing, maybe even clearing the decks for the massive forthcoming TRP settlement), with FixedResets seeing a good spike in volume with lots of blocks. That didn’t do prices much good, though, with PerpetualDiscounts down 11bp on the day and FixedResets losing 2bp.

PerpetualDiscounts closed with a weighted mean average YTW of 5.77%, equivalent to 8.08% at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates have backed up to just over 6.0%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 205bp, a very slight – and possibly completely technical – tightening from the September 16 value and well within its September and Credit Crunch range.

YPG.PR.C, the 6.75%+417 FixedReset announced September 8 and promptly upsized to 7.5-million shares + greenshoe 1.125-million shares (I don’t know whether or not the greenshoe was exercised) has settled with results that many will find disappointing.

The issue traded 245,490 shares in a range of 24.50-75, before closing at 24.47-55, 6×83.

Vital statistics are:

The issue is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

To nobody’s surprise, the banks are starting to harness the hysteria over bonuses to alter the balance of power with their traders:

Canada’s biggest bank, Royal Bank of Canada, is changing the way its investment bankers and traders are paid, according to a memo it sent to employees Tuesday.
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The bank’s aim is not to decrease the amount its employees are paid, but rather to ensure that their pay packages are structured in a way that does not encourage them to take excessive risks.

That last paragraph should have been published as “The Morning Smile”.

For instance, a greater proportion of Royal Bank employees’ compensation will now be deferred, and managing directors will be required to own a certain amount of shares in the bank.

So RBC gets to slap the golden handcuffs on their traders for free, and managing directors will have their pay dependent on whether or not some bozo in the president’s office has lent $20-billion to Argentina. Cross your fingers, boys!

When it comes to calculating bonuses, the bank intends to pay more attention to how employees reached their results, not just what their results were. The bank is paying more attention to non-financial measures in part so it can take into account the amount of risk employees take on to achieve their financial goals.

Non-financial measures like ‘Did you suck enough management arse?’

ln addition, RBC told employees it is in the process of finalizing a claw back policy, for cases where misconduct or a failure to abide by proper procedures results in a loss or the need to restate financial results.

Opening up the gates for more abuse of the regulatory process. David Berry can tell you all about that one.

The paper also mentions changes at Scotia, but I haven’t heard much about that. The last major round of compensation rejigging I know of was at CIBC, where changes resulted in a flood of resumes hitting the streets and the institutional sales desks hastily restaffed by high school students.

All this, by the way, is just after the relevation (to me) that RBC routinely spies on its employees:

She accused another of using the made-up word “sensy” rather than “sexy” so that RBC’s monitoring system would not pick up his language.

What a charming example of the Thought Police kicking out any manager with a rational world view.

But where are the RBC guys going to go? Thanks to the Canadian oligarchy, there are very few opportunities to work as a prop trader – with good capital availability and good order flow – at a non-bank trading firm. I continue to believe that the Achilles heel of the Canadian banking sector is the potential for contagion between vanilla banking, wealth management and trading … and we’ll just have to hope it never takes effect, because OSFI won’t do anythng useful about it.

The CME is introducing a new US long bond futures contract, which will have a lower negative convexity that the current contract:

The “ultra” Treasury bond future will begin trading in the first quarter of next year, Chicago-based CME said today in a statement. The contract, designating Treasuries with maturities of 25 years or more for delivery, won’t replace the current 30-year bond future, which allows government bonds that mature in 15 years or more.
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“With the increased issuance because of the deficit over the last year and a half we now have an ample deliverable basket” of long-term bonds to underpin the futures contract, [CME managing director of interest-rate products Robin] Ross said. Two to three years ago there wasn’t enough supply of U.S. bonds maturing in 25 years or more to make the futures contract deliverable, she said.

The big excitement today was the new TRP 4.60+192 FixedReset; PerpetualDiscounts gained 3bp total return on the day while FixedResets were down about 22bp. Floaters continued yesterday‘s pop. There were no huge volume outliers, but volume was quite good across the board.