RBT.PR.A to Mature on Schedule

May 8th, 2009

R Split II Corp. has announced:

The Capital Shares and Preferred Shares will be redeemed by the Company on May 29, 2009 (the “Redemption Date”) in accordance with the redemption provisions of the shares. Pursuant to these provisions, the Preferred Shares will be redeemed at a price per share equal to the lesser of $30.50 and the Net Asset Value per Unit. The Capital Shares will be redeemed at a price for every share equal to the amount (for every two capital shares) by which the Net Asset Value per Unit exceeds $30.50.

A further press release will be issued by the Company in connection with the redemption prices on May 28, 2009. Payment of the amounts due to holders of Capital Shares and Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on May 29, 2009.

Given that asset coverage is currently 2.8+:1 there cannot be much doubt that maturity will be at par.

RBT.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog with respect to last year’s partial call for redemption. RBT.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Update, 2009-06-01: Redemption completed.

RBS.PR.A: Capital Unit Dividend Policy Revised

May 8th, 2009

R Split III Corp has announced:

The Company has revised its Capital Share dividend policy and has determined that it will not pay a dividend on the Capital Shares if the net asset value per Unit at the time of declaration, after giving effect to the dividend, would be less than or equal to the original issue price of the Preferred Shares. In such circumstance, any excess dividends received on the common shares of the Royal Bank of Canada (“Royal Bank Shares”) minus the dividends payable on the Preferred Shares and all administrative, operating and income tax expenses will be reinvested in short-term debt securities or Royal Bank Shares. However, as long as net asset value per Unit at the date of declaration exceeds such amount, the Company intends to pay a dividend on the Capital Shares equal to the excess of the dividends received on the Royal Bank Shares minus the Preferred Share dividends and all administrative, operating and income tax expenses.

The prior policy was:

It will be the policy of the Board of Directors to declare and pay quarterly dividends on the Capital Shares in an amount equal to the dividends received by the Company on the Royal Bank Shares minus the distributions payable on the Preferred Shares and all administrative and operating expenses.

Given that the asset coverage of the preferred shares is now 1.5-:1, the change has no immediate implications.

RBS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was downgraded to Pfd-4(low) by DBRS. RBS.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

PPL.PR.A: Name Change, New Ticker BK.PR.A

May 7th, 2009

On April 21, Prime Rate Plus Corp announced:

a name change to Canadian Banc Recovery Corp. The management of the Company believes the name change better reflects the underlying holdings of the Company and its view of the ability of the underlying holdings to recover in price over the time frame remaining until the Company is scheduled to wind up in 2012.

An application has been made with the TSX for new TSX trading symbols. The Preferred Share will change from PPL.PR.A to BK.PR.A and the Class A Share will change from PPL to BK. All other features and attributes of the Company and the applicable shares remain unchanged.

and today it was confirmed that trading has commenced under the new symbols.

SLF 1Q09 Results

May 7th, 2009

Sunlife has released its 1Q09 results, so we can take a quick look at their exposures.

Earnings suffered with the markets:

Sun Life Financial Inc.2 reported a net loss attributable to common shareholders of $213 million for the quarter ended March 31, 2009, compared with net income of $533 million in the first quarter of 2008. The Company incurred operating losses of $186 million for the first quarter of 2009 compared with operating earnings of $533 million in the first quarter of 2008. First quarter 2009 earnings were unfavourably impacted by $65 million from changes in the value of the Canadian dollar. Results in the first quarter of 2008 include earnings of $43 million or $0.08 per share from the Company’s 37% ownership interest in CI Financial, which the Company sold in the fourth quarter of 2008. The operating loss for the first quarter of 2009 does not include after-tax charges of $27 million for restructuring costs taken as part of the Company’s efforts to reduce expense levels and improve operational efficiency.

Net losses in the first quarter of 2009 were driven primarily by reserve strengthening, net of hedging, of $325 million related to equity market declines, reserve increases of $167 million for downgrades on the Company’s investment portfolio, equity impairments of $42 million and net credit impairments of $34 million. The Company’s equity hedging program operated as planned, offsetting some of the impact of reserve strengthening related to segregated fund and variable annuity guarantees as a result of volatility in capital markets during the quarter. First quarter results were also unfavourably impacted by increases in actuarial reserves related to the very low interest rate environment reflecting current and prior period experience.

Exposures:

SLF Exposures
Tangible Holdco Equity*
CAD Millions
7,725
Other Tier 1 34.2%
Stock Leverage 106%
Bond Leverage 1,422%
Seg Fund Leverage 847%
Effect of +1% Interest Rates 3.7%
Effect of -10% Equity Market 3.7%
Tangible Holdco Equity is Common Shareholders’ Equity (15,450) less Goodwill (6,724) and Intangibles (1,001).
Other Tier 1 = SLEECS and PCS (1,150) + Preferred Shareholders’ Equity (1,495) = 2,645 / THE
Stock Leverage is gross notional value of forwards (93) + futures (2773) + swaps (136) + options written (1,017) + Stocks-trading (3,256) + Stocks-AFS (913) = 8,188, divided by Tangible Holdco Equity
Bond Leverage is gross notional value of futures contracts (1,205) + swap contracts (26,985) + options written (200) + bonds-trading (48,963) + bonds-AFS (10,205) + mortgages & corporate loans (22,311) = 109,869 divided by Tangible Holdco Equity
Interest rate effect = 287.5 / THE; oddly, this is the same as the Equity effect.

Sources: Financial Supplement,
It is recognized that the derivatives may serve as hedges and should thus be subtracted; but the nature of the positions held is not specified and thus they are added as a conservative estimate. When they provide better disclosure, I will provide better analysis.

This bit from the Shareholders’ Report is rather interesting:

The estimated impact from these obligations of an immediate parallel increase of 1% in interest rates as at March 31, 2009, across the yield curve in all markets, would be an increase in net income in the range of $125 million to $175 million. Conversely, an immediate 1% parallel decrease in interest rates would result in an estimated decrease in net income in the range of $250 million to $325 million. Interest rate sensitivities increased from prior quarter levels as a result of a number of factors, including increases in actuarial reserves, reflecting current and prior period experience, related to the very low interest rate environment as well as changes in market levels and interest rate hedging during the quarter.

In the first place, the effect is in the opposite direction from that expected, implying that the duration of their assets is less than the duration of their offsetting liabilities. In the second place, figures for 4Q08 were +100 to +150 and -150 to -200, respectively, implying they have increased their mismatch.

Despite including this post in the “Regulatory Capital” category of PrefBlog, I will not discuss MCCSR. This figure is useless for analytical purposes, since:

  • Corresponding US calculations are not disclosed
  • As preferred share investors we are interested in the publicly issued preferred shares, at the holdco level

As noted by DBRS:

The incurrence of debt at the holding company to provide equity capital to operating subsidiaries constitutes double leverage, the use of which should be conservative. The analysis of double leverage requires a review of the unconsolidated financial statements of the holding company, which are generally not in the public domain.

ABCP: Accumulate Bank of Canada Power!

May 6th, 2009

The Canadian Press reports that Mark Carney has proposed yet another regulator (while, I suspect, coughing and pointing at himself):

The central bank governor told a Senate committee that the country’s regulatory fiefdoms need a new mechanism to ensure individual financial watchdogs do not have blinders on that prevents them from seeing the bigger picture.

Carney said the central bank had warned years in advance about the risks involved with the $32-billion non-bank asset-backed commercial paper market, but its cautions were ignored.

“We view ourselves as having an advocacy role identifying problems and making them known,” he said.

“The advice has not always been followed, and in some cases problems have been repeatedly identified.

“In one case, the issue was really the only serious capital market problem we have had in this crisis (and) had been identified by the bank some years in advance.”

Carney’s argument for what he called a new “mechanism” that would require individual regulators to consider the wider implications of their actions came at the conclusion of a two-hour hearing with the Senate banking committee.

Unfortunately, there is no mention of such a thing in the Official Opening Remarks.

Let’s recapitulate, shall we?

The seeds of the ABCP fiasco were sown long ago, when OSFI required that banks put up capital for undrawn, guaranteed lines of credit (“Global Liquidity”). They did not require capital for undrawn vague committments, such as the General Market Disruption clause. I consider this to have been an entirely prudent ruling. For this reason, the ABCP market in Canada relied on GMD agreements, since Global Liquidity cost too much extra.

In the States, the Fed did not require capital for Global Liquidity; since it did not require capital it was cheap; since it was cheap that’s what ABCP issuers chose.

Later, the Fed changed their rules to be more consistent with the Canadian approach. At that time, the US ABCP market was sufficiently well-established that the extra costs were absorbed. Canadian issuers did not change their ways because there was no point: there would have been extra costs for whoever went first with no competitive advantage.

In 2003 the Bank of Canada published a warning about ABCP – well done BoC and I hope Paula Toovey and John Kiff get bonuses!

By 2007, the market was a little bit rigged: an enormous fraction of outstanding Canadian ABCP was held by accounts controlled/advised by entities that also had ownership interests in producers. There has never been a satisfactory explanation – public and satisfactory to me, anyway – of whether the portfolio managers responsible for the accounts holding the paper were motivated solely by concerns about the best interests of the accounts they were managing.

In mid/late 2007 the market collapsed. It became apparent that there were many holders of ABCP who were enormously concentrated in the asset class, if not a single name within that asset class. As far as I know, not a single PM has lost his license due to over-concentration. The regulatory response has concentrated on investment suitability, which I don’t understand at all. Even with hindsight, I consider non-Bank Canadian ABCP to be a suitable money-market investment that, unfortunately went bad. Please note that the word “suitable” means “on the list”. It means “sure, consider this stuff for inclusion in a diversified portfolio”. It does not mean “back up the trucks, guys, and load up 100% in this paper”. If that’s what the word “suitable” meant, NOTHING would be “suitable”.

I have not yet heard of anybody losing their license – or even being charged – for concentration risk.

Some people got burned and got burned badly, sure. That’s what happens when you load up on a single sure-fire can’t-miss investment. The only systemic implications I have seen is that some financial institutions were forced for reputational reasons to take the defaulted paper onto their books at par, without this reputational risk having been accounted for as part the financial institutions’ capital requirements.

This reputational risk needs to be addressed in Basel 3, if not sooner. As I have urged, for instance, the assets held by bank-sponsored money market funds should be included in Risk-Weighted Assets for capital calculation purposes. I have not yet heard any argument as to why such a course of action is not both necessary and sufficient.

May 6, 2009

May 6th, 2009

To my mind, one of the more fascinating fields of research in the financial sector is market design. I’ve posted about Pegged Orders, proposed regulation of the retail bond market and the BoC’s analysis of bond auction formats, among others. So I was highly entertained – and educated! – by a piece on VoxEU by Trevon D. Logan, Information and Illegal Market Mechanisms:

This column studies the online (illegal) market for male sex work. It shows that participants find ways to get the prices right, even in the absence of formal enforcement mechanisms, using technology to share and disseminate information. The risk of fraud is disciplined by client reviews and demand for photos in escorts’ advertisements.

While previous empirical work has looked at how information technology improves market functions (Brown and Goolsbee 2002, Jensen 2007, Lewis 2009, Goyal 2008), we provide the first evidence that an illegal online market is just as responsive to information as a legal online market. We believe that this work suggest that, irrespective of the institutions involved, market participants find ways to get the prices right if they have access to technology that allows them to share and disseminate information even in the absence of formal enforcement. Even in markets with formal contracts and enforcement, the types of forums created by the clients of male sex workers are common (e.g., AngiesList.com). In this illegal market, we found that the participants are quite good at policing the market themselves. This informal policing, we believe, is critical to the functioning of this market. While formal institutions in general are undoubtedly important, large economic gains could be made in short order by allowing market participants better access to technology and information, allowing participants to share information and police themselves until formal institutions are well developed enough for contracts to be formalised and enforced.

Speaking of market structure, it is my understanding that there is at least one discount brokerage that will process iceberg orders for retail – not on-line, but when you speak to a “trader” anyway. Where there’s one, there’s probably more … if anybody wants to do the legwork for a survey of discount brokerages, I’ll publish it with credit.

PerpetualDiscounts experienced an interuption of their run-up today and Fixed-Resets were able to catch up a little in performance following a very good month – and Month-to-Date – for the market in general, amidst continued heavy volume. PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.60%, equivalent to 9.24% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates are on a tear as well, returning 2.13% month-to-date (6.68% year-to-date) and now yield about 7.2-7.3%, meaning the the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 194-204bp … it hasn’t been that low for a while!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5629 % 1,014.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5629 % 1,639.9
Floater 3.71 % 4.41 % 72,922 16.56 3 -0.5629 % 1,266.8
OpRet 5.08 % 4.31 % 141,867 2.62 15 -0.0453 % 2,143.7
SplitShare 6.03 % 7.38 % 46,771 4.28 3 0.1109 % 1,780.0
Interest-Bearing 6.00 % 6.59 % 27,957 0.63 1 0.8065 % 1,987.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1574 % 1,677.4
Perpetual-Discount 6.52 % 6.60 % 150,122 13.10 71 -0.1574 % 1,544.8
FixedReset 5.77 % 4.91 % 555,834 4.53 36 0.2822 % 1,962.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -4.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 8.78
Evaluated at bid price : 8.78
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -3.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 16.62
Evaluated at bid price : 16.62
Bid-YTW : 7.03 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -3.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 9.01
Evaluated at bid price : 9.01
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -2.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 18.67
Evaluated at bid price : 18.67
Bid-YTW : 6.90 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -2.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 16.85
Evaluated at bid price : 16.85
Bid-YTW : 7.98 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -2.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 21.97
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 23.02
Evaluated at bid price : 23.28
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 6.91 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset -1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 18.50
Evaluated at bid price : 18.50
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.42
Bid-YTW : 6.95 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 19.42
Evaluated at bid price : 19.42
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 15.25
Evaluated at bid price : 15.25
Bid-YTW : 7.90 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 23.45
Evaluated at bid price : 25.89
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 17.55
Evaluated at bid price : 17.55
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 24.30
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 22.96
Evaluated at bid price : 23.11
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 4.75 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 16.61
Evaluated at bid price : 16.61
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 18.46
Evaluated at bid price : 18.46
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 18.98
Evaluated at bid price : 18.98
Bid-YTW : 6.67 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 24.57
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 23.96
Evaluated at bid price : 24.25
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 24.58
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 2.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 21.18
Evaluated at bid price : 21.18
Bid-YTW : 6.55 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 19.85
Evaluated at bid price : 19.85
Bid-YTW : 6.52 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 3.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 14.01
Evaluated at bid price : 14.01
Bid-YTW : 2.83 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 116,070 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 24.30
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 113,942 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 17.63
Evaluated at bid price : 17.63
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 109,951 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 100,904 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-05-06
Maturity Price : 18.01
Evaluated at bid price : 18.01
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 85,361 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.17
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 55,770 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
There were 59 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

DBRS Rates Empire Life

May 6th, 2009

Well … this is interesting enough to rate its own post, even though Empire Life has no publicly issued preferred shares … although its parent does: ELF.PR.F & ELF.PR.G.

DBRS is assigning:

a Claims Paying Rating of IC-2 to policy obligations issued by The Empire Life Insurance Company (Empire or the Company). DBRS has also assigned an Issuer Rating of “A” and a Subordinated Debt rating of A (low) to Empire. All ratings have a Stable trend.

While capitalization has traditionally been very conservative, the recent deterioration in equity market performance has forced it to raise additional capital in the form of $125 million of subordinated debt issued to E-L Financial Corporation Limited (E-L), which brings the Company’s financial leverage ratios closer to those of its industry peers at around 16%.

The underlying exposure of Canadian life insurance companies to equity markets has become apparent following the recent deterioration in global equity markets. The Company realized that it must reduce its direct holdings in common equities and completed steps to begin this reduction in 2006, recognizing that it is also indirectly exposed to equity markets through segregated fund guarantees and the fees earned on assets under management (AUM). The Company is currently managing its overall equity exposure (ownership of common stock and exposure to segregated fund guarantees) in order to remain consistent with the overall equity exposure level of industry peers. The Company’s asset mix is otherwise more conservative than that of industry peers, with lower exposure to mortgages and real estate and a greater portion of its mix in domestic government bonds.

One can only speculate as to whether we shall see any direct issuance from Empire Life in the future!

PrefLetter Now Available in Alberta!

May 6th, 2009

I am pleased to announce that PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share (two of them recently added); the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

Preferred share dividends enjoy a privileged position with respect to taxes in Alberta.

The next edition of PrefLetter will be prepared as of the close on Friday, May 8, and be eMailed to subscribers in PDF format prior to the opening of the Toronto Stock Exchange on May 11.

Marginal Tax Rates: Alberta

May 6th, 2009

E&Y have analyzed current Alberta tax rates and we may draw some conclusions from these data:

Investors Taxable Income Marginal Rate on Interest Marginal Rate on Dividends Equivalency Factor
Widows & Orphans $30,000 25.00% 0.01% 1.33
Professionals $75,000 32.00% 4.41% 1.41
Plutocrats $150,000 39.00% 14.56% 1.40

It is interesting to note that the equivalency factors have increased slightly since my 2006 post on this topic.

BNS Tier 1 Issue: 7.802%+705

May 6th, 2009

I mentioned on May 1:

I understand that Scotia has done an Innovative Tier 1 Capital deal, described as “650 million deal June 30, 2019-2108 … at 7.804%”, but have no further details, no press release, nothing on SEDAR.

Well, still no press release, but the prospectus is on SEDAR, dated May 1, 2009:

From the date of issue to, but excluding, June 30, 2019 the interest rate on the Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 will be fixed at 7.802% per annum. Starting on June 30, 2019 and on every fifth anniversary of such date thereafter until June 30, 2104 (each such date, an “Interest Reset Date”), the interest rate on the Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 will be reset at an interest rate per annum equal to the Government of Canada Yield (as defined herein) plus 7.05%. The Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 will mature on June 30, 2108. Holders of Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 may, in certain circumstances, be required to invest interest paid on the Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 in a series of newly-issued preferred shares of the Bank with non-cumulative dividends (each such series is referred to as “Bank Deferral Preferred Shares). See “Description of the Trust Securities — Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 — Deferral Right”.

The Bank will covenant for the benefit of holders of Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 (the “Dividend Stopper Undertaking”) that, in the event of an Other Deferral Event (as defined herein), the Bank will not declare dividends of any kind on any preferred shares of the Bank (“Bank Preferred Shares”) or, failing any Bank Preferred Shares being outstanding, on all of the outstanding common shares of the Bank (“Bank Common Shares” and, collectively with the Bank Preferred Shares, the “Dividend Restricted Shares”) until the 6th month (the “Dividend Declaration Resumption Month”) following the relevant Deferral Date (as defined herein).

On or after June 30, 2014 the Trust may, at its option, with the prior approval of the Superintendent, on giving not more than 60 nor less than 30 days’ notice to the holders of the Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1, redeem the Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1, in whole or in part. The redemption price per $1,000 principal amount of Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 redeemed on any day that is not an Interest Reset Date will be equal to the greater of par and the Canada Yield Price, and the redemption price per $1,000 principal amount of Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 redeemed on any Interest Reset Date will be par, together in either case with accrued and unpaid interest to but excluding the date fixed for redemption, subject to any applicable withholding tax. The redemption price payable by the Trust will be paid in cash.

It is expected that the closing date will be on or about May 7, 2009 (the “Closing Date”)

On or after June 30, 2014 the Trust may, at its option, with the prior approval of the Superintendent, on giving not more than 60 nor less than 30 days’ notice to the holders of the Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1, redeem the Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1, in whole or in part. The redemption price per $1,000 principal amount of Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 redeemed on any day that is not an Interest Reset Date will be equal to the greater of par and the Canada Yield Price, and the redemption price per $1,000 principal amount of Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 redeemed on any Interest Reset Date will be par, together in either case with accrued and unpaid interest to but excluding the date fixed for redemption.

Canada Yield Price means the price per $1,000 principal amount of Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 calculated by the Bank to provide an annual yield thereon from the applicable date of redemption to, but excluding, the next Interest Reset Date equal to the GOC Redemption Yield plus (i) 1.17% if the redemption date is any time prior to June 30, 2019 or (ii) 2.35% if the redemption date is any time on or after June 30, 2019.

GOC Redemption Yield means, on any date, the average of the annual yields at 12:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on the Business Day immediately preceding the date on which the Trust gives notice of the redemption of the Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 as determined by two Canadian registered investment dealers, each of which will be selected by, and must be independent of, the Bank, as being the annual yield from the applicable date of redemption to, but excluding, the next Interest Reset Date which a non-callable Government of Canada bond would carry, assuming semi-annual compounding, if issued in Canadian dollars at 100% of its principal amount on the date of redemption and maturing on the next Interest Reset Date.

Government of Canada Yield means, on any Interest Reset Date, the average of the annual yields as at 12:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on the third Business Day prior to the applicable Interest Reset Date as determined by two Canadian registered investment dealers, each of which will be selected by, and must be independent of, the Bank, as being the annual yield to maturity on such date which a non-callable Government of Canada bond would carry, assuming semiannual compounding, if issued in Canadian dollars in Canada at 100% of its principal amount on such date with a term to maturity of five years.

Interest Reset Date means June 30, 2019 and every fifth anniversary of such date thereafter until June 30, 2104 on which dates the interest rate on the Scotia BaTS III Series 2009-1 will be reset as described in this prospectus.

There hasn’t been a new BNS Fixed-Reset since January and the market has changed a lot since then, so let’s do a quick comparison with the more recent RY.PR.Y 6.10%+413:

  • The preferred dividend is equivalent to 8.54% interest, so there’s a give up of about 75bp to move to the Tier 1 issue. Mind you, RY.PR.Y closed last night with a 25.90 bid to yield 5.40% until its first call at the end of 2014, which eliminates the yield differential quite handily
  • The Tier 1 issue does not reset the rate for 10 years
  • If the Tier 1 issue is called prior to 2019-6-30, holders get a whacking great premium
  • The Tier 1 issue is slightly senior to Preferreds

It would appear that this issue is greatly superior to equivalent bank preferred issues.