GBA.PR.A Cuts Preferred Dividend; DBRS Review-Negative

December 19th, 2008

Globalbanc Advantaged 8 Split Corp. has announced:

a distribution of $0.07 per Preferred Share for the quarter ending December 31, 2008. The distribution will be paid on January 13, 2009 to holders of record on December 31, 2008. No distribution will be paid on the Class A Shares for the quarter ending December 31, 2008.

The Company has determined that, as a result of anticipated changes in the dividend payments to be paid by the banks included in the Bank Portfolio, future dividend payments to be received by the Company may not generate sufficient yield to pay in full the fixed cumulative quarterly dividends in the amount of $0.1125 per Preferred Share (as established by the share conditions relating to the Preferred Shares) and the expenses of the Company. Accordingly, the Company has determined to pay during 2009 a quarterly dividend amount of one-quarter of the Bloomberg Dividend Forecast of the dividends to be paid by the banks comprising the Bank Portfolio in the upcoming 12 months, less an estimate of the expenses of the Company. The Board of Directors will monitor these estimates and may revise the amount of dividends paid on the Preferred Shares in the future, up or down, to take in to account changes in these estimates and changes in the Company’s expenses.

Assuming dividends are paid by the Bank Portfolio at least consistent with these estimates over the coming 12 months, the Company will maintain sufficient cash flow to make dividend payments in accordance with the revised dividend policy and to fund current operating expenses. If the Company were to pay dividends and incur operating expenses in excess of these cash flows it may be necessary to dispose of a portion of the securities comprising the Bank Portfolio. The Board of Directors believes it is in the best interests of the Company to pay dividends at a level which avoids a sale of assets at this time.

The shortfall below the prescribed amount of the Preferred Share dividend will accumulate and, in accordance with the terms of the Preferred Shares and the Class A Shares, will be paid in priority to any payments on the Class A Shares.

In response, DBRS announced:

has today placed the Preferred Shares issued by GlobalBanc Advantaged 8 Split Corp. (the Company) Under Review with Negative Implications following the Company’s announcement of a revised dividend policy.

The Preferred Shares are entitled to fixed cumulative quarterly dividend payments of $0.1125 per share, yielding 4.5% per annum on the initial share price of $10. The Company has reduced the December 31 distribution to $0.07 per Preferred Share. For 2009, the Company plans to pay a quarterly dividend amount of one-quarter of the forecasted dividends to be received by the Company less an estimate of the expenses of the Company, in order for the Company to avoid a sale of assets to pay Preferred Share distributions.

As a result of the deterioration of the Company NAV and the decision by the Company to reduce the Preferred Shares dividend, DBRS has placed its rating of Pfd-5 (low) on the Preferred Shares Under Review with Negative Implications.

Asset coverage is 0.5+:1 as of December 18, according to the company.

GBA.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when DBRS downgraded it to Pfd-5(low). GBA.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Is There Really a Credit Crunch?

December 19th, 2008

Menzie Chinn of Econbrowser highlights an exchange between researchers sponsored by the Minneapolis Fed and some sponsored by the Boston Fed.

The Minneapolis group, Patrick J. Kehoe, V.V. Chari and Lawrence J. Christiano, have published Facts and Myths about the Financial Crisis of 2008; this paper has been rebutted in a paper by the Boston Fed’s Ethan Cohen-Cole, Burcu Duygan-Bump, Jose Fillat, and Judit Montoriol-Garriga in a paper titled Looking Behind the Aggregates: A reply to “Facts and Myths about the Financial Crisis of 2008”.

  • Bank lending to nonfinancial corporations and individuals has declined sharply
    • Minneapolis claims that:
      • Bank assets less vault cash have remained constant through the crisis
      • Loans and leases by US commercial banks have been constant
      • Commercial and Industrial Loans have been constant
      • Consumer loans have been constant
    • Boston claims that
      • Securitization has declined
      • There has been a significant increase in drawdowns from previously committed loans.
      • Unused lending commitments at commercial banks, especially for commercial and industrial loans, have contracted since the last quarter of 2007.
      • The price of loans (presumed to be related to LIBOR) has increased; spreads between jumbo and conforming mortgages have increased.
  • Interbank lending is essentially nonexistent.
    • Minneapolis claims that:
      • Interbank lending has been constant
    • Boston claims that:
      • Data appears to be from Federal Reserve report H8
      • Anecdotal evidence suggest that interbank lending has become largely comprised of overnight loans secured by Treasuries, but H8 is silent on the subject
      • Cash assets of banks have skyrocketted, due to cash hoarding by big banks.
  • Commercial paper issuance by non-financial corporations has declined sharply, and rates have risen to unprecedented levels.
    • Minneapolis claims that:
      • Commercial paper outstanding by financial corporations has declined, but non-financial paper has been constant.
      • Financial and lower-grade non-financial rates have increased, but high-grade non-financial rates have been constant.
    • Boston claims that:
      • New issuance by lower-grade non-financial corporations (the lion’s share of the total market) has plumetted since the Lehman default
      • The proportion of “overnight” (1-4 day maturity) paper has increased dramatically

I’ll give game, set and match to the Boston group (especially since Minneapolis ignored the securitization angle), but it’s an interesting exercise in seeing just how complicated things really are; I recommend the papers to any Assiduous Reader who doesn’t mind learning just how superficial is his understanding of the data!

Dr. Chinn also presents some conclusions from Tong & Wei, 2008:

First, we classify each non-financial stock (other than airlines, defense and insurance firms) along two dimensions: whether its degree of liquidity constraint at the end of 2006 (per the value of the Whited-Wu index) is above or below the median in the sample, and whether its sensitivity to a consumer demand contraction is above or below the median. Second, we form four portfolios on July 31, 2007 and fix their compositions in the subsequent periods: the HH portfolio is a set of equally weighted stocks that are highly liquidity constrained and highly sensitive to consumer demand contraction; the HL portfolio is a set of stocks that are highly liquidity constrained, but relatively not sensitive to a change in consumer confidence; the LH portfolio consist of stocks that are relatively not liquidity constrained but highly sensitive to consumer confidence; and finally, the LL portfolio consists of stocks that are neither liquidity constrained nor sensitive to consumer confidence. Third, we track the cumulative returns of these four portfolios over time and plot the results in Figure 6.

Dr. Chinn remarks that

They conclude that about half of the decline in stock prices is due to the credit crunch, with the other half attributable to the decline in consumer confidence

Well, I haven’t read the whole paper! But I will suggest that in using stock prices as a metric, Tong & Wei are not measuring “harm”; they are measuring “investor confidence”, which is not the same thing (Assiduous Readers will be all too well aware of my contempt for the Efficient Market Hypothesis!). However, I may well be in agreeement with Tong & Wei on this point, who state merely:

If subprime problems disproportionately harm those non-financial firms that are more liquidity constrained and/or more sensitive to a consumer demand contraction, could financial investors earn excess returns by betting against these stocks (relative to other stocks)? This is essentially another way to gauge the quantitative importance of these two factors.

December 18, 2008

December 19th, 2008

There’s an amusing story today about bonus policies at Credit Suisse:

Credit Suisse Group AG’s investment bank has found a new way to reduce the risk of losses from about $5 billion of its most illiquid loans and bonds: using them to pay employees’ year-end bonuses.

The bank will use leveraged loans and commercial mortgage- backed debt, some of the securities blamed for generating the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, to fund executive compensation packages, people familiar with the matter said. The new policy applies only to managing directors and directors, the two most senior ranks at the Zurich-based company, according to a memo sent to employees today.

Credit Suisse is the first to use the debt to pay employees. Outside investors may also be permitted to invest in the facility, according to the people familiar with the matter, who declined to be identified because the plan hasn’t been made public. The bank will boost the potential for returns by providing leverage to the facility, and will be paid back first, according to the people.

If I am correct – with the support of the BoE – and bank assets have, in general, been written down to far below fundamental value, this is a clever way for the executives to (a) earn brownie points, and (b) give themselves enormous bonuses.

In sad news for bond investors, General Electric’s debt ratings are at risk. This is particularly grievous because GE has long had a well-deserved AAA rating but has yielded like a single-A … and any time you can pick up free credit quality is a Good Time.

Allan Greenspan opines in an Economist op-ed Banks need more capital:

As recently as the summer of 2006, with average book capital at 10%, a federal agency noted that “more than 99% of all insured institutions met or exceeded the requirements of the highest regulatory capital standards.”

Today, fearful investors clearly require a far larger capital cushion to lend, unsecured, to any financial intermediary. When bank book capital finally adjusts to current market imperatives, it may well reach its highest levels in 75 years, at least temporarily (see chart). It is not a stretch to infer that these heightened levels will be the basis of a new regulatory system.

Note that the chart shows “Book equity as % of book assets”. I believe that this is equal to the FDIC’s ratio “Equity capital to assets”. The FDIC defines this as “Total equity capital as a percent of total assets”, whereas the more commonly referenced “Leverage Ratio” is

Tier 1 (core) capital as a percent of average total assets minus ineligible intangibles.

Tier 1 (core) capital includes: common equity plus noncumulative perpetual preferred stock plus minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries less goodwill and other ineligible intangible assets. The amount of eligible intangibles (including mortgage servicing rights) included in core capital is limited in accordance with supervisory capital regulations. Average total assets used in this computation are an average of daily or weekly figures for the quarter.

The equity capital ratio for all FDIC insured institutions was reported in their 3Q08 Report to be 9.63%, compared to 10.45% (3Q07); 10.25% (3Q05); and 9.13% (3Q03). Note that Mr. Greenspan’s chart forecasts a massive increase in this ratio without this forecast being justified in the text.

Moody’s cut Citigroup from Aa3 to A2:

Moody’s Investors Service lowered the debt ratings of Citigroup Inc. (senior debt to A2 from Aa3) and the ratings on its lead bank, Citibank N.A. (long-term bank deposits to Aa3 from Aa1). The financial strength rating on the bank was lowered three notches to C from B, which translates to a change in the baseline credit assessment to A3 from Aa3. The outlook on the bank financial strength rating is negative and the rating outlooks on the deposit and debt ratings at both the bank and the holding company are stable.

Moody’s said that its downgrade of Citigroup’s debt and deposit ratings was moderated by Moody’s opinion that Citigroup enjoys a very high probability of systemic support from the U.S. government. The benefits of this systemic support partially offset the deterioration in Citigroup’s stand-alone credit quality, which is driven by worsening asset quality and the likelihood that Citigroup could see further decline in its tangible capital base in the next two years.

This had immediate contagion effects, with HSBC getting hammered in Hong Kong. Look out below!

Holy smokes, what a day. Very heavy volume and the market tanked. An Assiduous Reader wrote in:

Another dismal day for PerpetualDiscounts on fairly big volume. Could this downward momentum be caused by margin calls…forced selling…or panicking investors and their advisors?

I’m ready to pull the sell trigger myself….Clients will be in disbelief with Dec 31st statements.

Well … I still like the tax-loss-selling hypothesis. It fits with the season, volume and direction. Margin calls and forced selling, not so much, because I don’t think a lot of prefs are bought on margin, or are held in margin accounts that are levered to the max (I could be wrong. It would be interesting to see some figures). Panicking clients? I would think that any client with the guts to hang in this long will consider recent declines to be a mere bagatelle, but panicking advisors sounds more possible. There will be a fair number of clients who haven’t received a statement since September and things …. are a little different now.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30.
The Fixed-Reset index was added effective 2008-9-5 at that day’s closing value of 1,119.4 for the Fixed-Floater index.
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 8.56% 8.74% 123,030 11.89 7 -6.8574% 615.9
Floater 9.92% 10.00% 87,719 9.59 2 -5.6942% 326.8
Op. Retract 5.59% 7.05% 161,126 4.12 15 -1.2140% 973,7
Split-Share 6.77% 12.78% 93,946 3.94 15 -0.6757% 910.4
Interest Bearing 10.04% 20.69% 58,158 2.65 3 -2.5488% 738.5
Perpetual-Premium N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Perpetual-Discount 8.12% 8.26% 234,276 11.15 71 -1.7264% 683.0
Fixed-Reset 6.03% 5.38% 1,185,392 13.83 18 -0.3100% 1,001.8
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.F FixFloat -12.7857%  
BAM.PR.J OpRet -12.1374% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 17.40% based on a bid of 11.51 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. Closing quote of 11.51-99, 1×10. Day’s range of 10.71-13.50 (!).
BCE.PR.S FixFloat -9.1544%  
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing (for now!) -9.0703% Asset coverage of 0.8-:1 as of December 12, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a (currently dubious) yield of 26.12% based on a bid of 4.01 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at (a currently dubious value of) 10.00. Closing quote of 4.01-10, 5×1. Day’s range of 4.00-41.
BAM.PR.K Floater -8.7019%  
BCE.PR.R FixFloat -8.6207%  
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -7.8125% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.54% based on a bid of 14.75 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.75-35, 6×5. Day’s range of 14.75-16.25.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat -7.1429%  
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -6.5772% Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of December 15 according to TD Securities. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 18.59% based on a bid of 6.96 and a hardMaturity 2011-12-15 at 10.00. Closing quote of 6.96-20, 45×10. Day’s range of 6.90-35.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -6.2676%  
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat -6.2500%  
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -6.1856% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.82% based on a bid of 14.56 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.56-89, 4×4. Day’s range of 14.51-50.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat -5.9761%  
BAM.PR.H OpRet -5.8680% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 14.89% based on a bid of 19.25 and a softMaturity 2012-3-30 at 25.00. Closing quote of 19.25-89, 2×5. Day’s range of 18.30-20.75 (!).
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -5.4328% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.67% based on a bid of 15.84 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.84-09, 2×5. Day’s range of 15.75-16.80.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -5.1355% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.6584% based on a bid of 13.30 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 13.30-74, 15×15. Day’s range of 13.00-14.19.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
RY.PR.N FixedReset 255,145 Royal bought 163,700 from National in five blocks at 26.00.
MFC.PR.A OpRet 173,150 Desjardins crossed 60,000 at 24.25; Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.67% based on a bid of 24.19 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 129,905 TD crossed 100,000 at 16.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.64% based on a bid of 16.02 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.I FixedReset 90,270 RBC crossed 19,700 at 22.00.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 88,372 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.53% based on a bid of 14.10 and a limitMaturity.

There were one hundred and twelve other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Cleveland Fed Releases December "Economic Trends"

December 18th, 2008

The Cleveland Fed has released the December issue of Economic Trends, with articles:

  • October Price Statistics
  • The Yield Curve, November 2008
  • Japan’s Quantitative Easing Policy
  • Industrial Production, Commodity Prices, and the Baltic Dry Index
  • GDP: Third Quarter Preliminary Estimate
  • The Employment Situation, October 2008
  • Metro-Area Differences in Home Price Indexes
  • Fourth District Employment Conditions, October 2008
  • Fourth District Community Banks

One table and one chart are of particular interest:

Deflation is always a possibility, but for now it looks like a simple unwind of the commodity boom.

Houses, ditto.

Cities like Miami, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Washington, D.C. all saw tremendous growth in home prices during the boom and have all subsequently seen massive declines in values. On the other hand, cities like Denver and Charlotte saw little to no unusual home price appreciation during the boom and have seen home prices decline only modestly during the bust.

More Theory on Bank Sub-Debt Spreads

December 18th, 2008

Bank Sub-Debt has been in the news lately, with Deutsche Bank’s refusal to execute a pretend-maturity, and I have dug up another theoretical paper: What does the Yield on Subordinated Bank Debt Measure, by Urs W. Birchler (Swiss National Bank) & Diana Hancock (Federal Reserve):

We provide evidence that the yield spread on banks’ subordinated debt is not a good measure of bank risk. First, we use a model with heterogeneous investors in which subordinated debt is primarily held by investors with superior knowledge (i.e., the“informed investor hypothesis”). Subordinated debt, by definition, coexists with non-subordinated, or “senior,” debt. The yield spread on subordinated debt thus must not only compensate investors for expected risk (i.e., to satisfy their participation constraint), but also offer an “incentive premium” above a “fair” return to induce informed investors to prefer it to senior debt (i.e., to satisfy an incentive constraint). Second, we test the model using data we collected on the timing and pricing of public debt issues made by large U.S. banking organizations in the 1986-1999 period. Findings with respect to issuance decisions lend strong support for the informed investor hypothesis. But rival explanations for the use of subordinated debt, such as differences in investor risk aversionor such as the signaling of earnings prospects by the bank, are rejected.A sample selection model on observed issuance spreads provides evidence for the existence of the postulated subordinated incentive premium. In line with predictions from the model, the influence of sophisticated investors’ information on the subordinated yield spread became weaker after the introduction of prompt corrective actions and depositor preference regulatory reforms, while the influence of public risk perception grew stronger. Finally, our model explains some results from the empirical literature on subordinated debt spreads and from market interviews — such as limited spread sensitivity to bank specific-risk or of the “ballooning” of spreads in bad times.

The conclusions are consistent with those of other researchers.

There’s a good line in the discussion:

These results are consistent with the “informed investor hypothesis” that claims that banking organizations would issue debt of different priority status to separate investors with different, yet unobservable, beliefs on the probability of bank failure.

I claim that a good definition of an “informed investor”, suitable for ex ante assignment of investors into different groups is: “one who knows that there is a difference”. The authors would not, I think, disagree too violently with this definition:

Paradoxically, the quality of the subordinated debt spread to measure banking organizations’ risks as they are perceived by most sophisticated investors has deteriorated after the introduction of FDICIA or, more precisely, of depositor preference rules. With depositor preference rules, the risk characteristics of senior debt have become more similar to those of subordinated debt; at the same time, the subordinated debt spread has become (even) more dependent on factors influencing the senior spread.

The deterioration of the risk measurement quality of the subordinated spread after the introduction of depositor preference, however, is likely to understate the longer term virtues of the reform. Once senior debtors realize that their claims are subordinated to depositors, senior spreads may well more fully reflect specialist information. Therefore, we expect that senior debt will be held by more sophisticated investors in the future.

Assiduous Readers will remember that in my essay on Fixed-Reset Analysis I pointed out a very low spread between deposit notes and sub-debt in February 2007.

US Bank Deposits Increasing

December 18th, 2008

The FDIC has released its December edition of the FDIC Quarterly, which contains an article on Highlights from the 2008 Summary of Deposits Data:

To better understand the industry’s level of expansion, it is useful to look at various measures of deposit and office growth in relation to demographic trends. For example, trends in deposit growth and population can be compared to the number of bank offices. As shown in Chart 2, banks continue to expand their retail presence at a faster pace than population growth at the national level. Both the number of offices per million people and the volume of deposits per office continue to increase. However, the pace of this growth is slowing. Indeed, the annual growth in both domestic deposits per office and offices per million people were below their respective five-year averages.

This will be another data point to support the thesis of Banks’ Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk.

Convertible Preferreds? In Canada?

December 18th, 2008

Another hot tip from Assiduous Reader tobyone leads to more musings from Barry Critchley of the Financial Post:Flurry of Share Offerings:

And it seems OSFI is interested in other types of securities that would constitute Tier 1 capital. In yesterday’s column we mused the market was speculating that soft retractable pref shares — which used to count as Tier 1 capital before OSFI ruled to make them Tier 2 capital — would be on the list. The chance of such a return is low if issuers are talking about the former type of soft retractables. (OSFI ruled against them in part because of the potentially huge increase in common shares outstanding, in the rare event that the issuer opted to pay in stock and not cash.) However, if they come with new bells and whistles, then OSFI may be interested — but only after the security has undergone the normal review process. “Part of OSFI’s mandate is to see what they come up with and figure out if it works or not,” said the OSFI spokesperson.

One type of pref share that may cut the mustard is convertible pref shares.

An OSFI spokesperson said it would be interested in such a security counting as Tier 1 capital “if it had the right kind of features for capital. Convertibles is something that’s been floated. It has been discussed,” added the spokesperson, noting that issues of mandatory convertible prefs, are part of Tier 1 capital in some countries.

What else could OSFI be looking at?

Underwriters report that issuers would like an increase in the percentage of Tier 1 capital allocated to innovative instruments. Currently 15% of Tier 1 capital can be in the form of such securities. But that percentage hasn’t changed — despite the recent 10-percentage-point increase, to 40%, in the share of preferred shares in Tier 1 capital. (At the start of the year, the percentage was 25%, meaning a 15-percentage-point increase for the year.)

“Investors are more interested in taking the 15% stake up to 25% because the innovative Tier 1 market is an institutional market,” said one market participant, noting that the change would allow larger issues, certainly larger than issues of rate reset preferred shares which are largely bought by retail investors.

Mandatory convertibles have certain advantages for all issuers:

A relatively large proportion of convertibles are currently issued as mandatory convertibles. A mandatory convertible is automatically converted into equity at a specific maturity date, thus removing the optionality for the buyer of the convertible. The transfer of risk to the buyer is usually compensated by a higher yield. Companies want to issue mandatory
convertibles in order to avoid their experiences of 1999 and 2000, when many telecoms companies issued convertibles in the expectation that they would be converted into equity at the time of redemption. In most cases the conversion did not take place due to the sharp decline in equity prices, leaving them with much higher than expected debt/equity ratios. Another attractive feature for the issuer of mandatory convertibles is that they are in general not treated by the rating agencies as pure debt. The biggest mandatory convertible issues in the
first quarter of 2003 were a €2.3 billion offering by Deutsche Telekom and one of ¥345 billion ($2.9 billion) by Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group.

As far as BIS is concerned, banking implications of convertible preferreds are (largely?) limited to the United States

Cumulative preference shares, having these characteristics, would be eligible for inclusion in [Tier 2]. In addition, the following are examples of instruments that may be eligible for inclusion: long-term preferred shares in Canada, titres participatifs and titres subordonnés à durée indéterminée in France, Genusscheine in Germany, perpetual subordinated debt and preference shares in the United Kingdom and mandatory convertible debt instruments in the United States.

… but I note a recent issuance by UBS:

At UBS, the government package provided significant relief to the balance sheet from the burden of illiquid positions particularly affected by the crisis. With this package, the SNB made it possible for UBS to transfer illiquid positions to a special purpose vehicle. The UBS provided this special purpose vehicle with equity amounting to USD 6 billion. The Confederation compensated UBS for the capital requirement arising for this purpose by subscribing to mandatory convertible notes (MCN). Since the announcement of the package, the UBS liquidity situation has stabilised.

The recent issue by Morgan Stanley gives an important clue as to the value of Convertible Preferreds in times of stress:

Under the revised terms of the transaction, MUFG has acquired $7.8 billion of perpetual non-cumulative convertible preferred stock with a 10 percent dividend and a conversion price of $25.25 per share, and $1.2 billion of perpetual non-cumulative non-convertible preferred stock with a 10 percent dividend.

Half of the convertible preferred stock automatically converts after one year into common stock when Morgan Stanley’s stock trades above 150 percent of the conversion price for a certain period and the other half converts on the same basis after year two. The non-convertible preferred stock is callable after year three at 110 percent of the purchase price.

With other examples from Citigroup, we may conclude that Convertible Preferreds can be very useful in times when the common dividend is in doubt, or is otherwise thought to be insufficient for the risk of holding the common.

The Federal Reserve allows inclusion of convertible preferreds in Tier 1 in a manner analogous to the Canadian treatment of perpetuals:

The Board has also decided to exempt qualifying mandatory convertible preferred securities from the 15 percent tier 1 capital sub-limit applicable to internationally active BHCs. Accordingly, under the final rule, the aggregate amount of restricted core capital elements (excluding mandatory convertible preferred securities) that an internationally active BHC may include in tier 1 capital must not exceed the 15 percent limit applicable to such BHCs, whereas the aggregate amount of restricted core capital elements (including mandatory convertible preferred securities) that an internationally active BHC may include in tier 1 capital must not exceed the 25 percent limit applicable to all BHCs.

Qualifying mandatory convertible preferred securities generally consist of the joint issuance by a BHC to investors of trust preferred securities and a forward purchase contract, which the investors fully collateralize with the securities, that obligates the investors to purchase a fixed amount of the BHC’s common stock, generally in three years. Typically, prior to exercise of the purchase contract in three years, the trust preferred securities are remarketed by the initial investors to new investors and the cash proceeds are used to satisfy the initial investors’ obligation to buy the BHC’s common stock. The common stock replaces the initial trust preferred securities as a component of the BHC’s tier 1 capital, and the remarketed trust preferred securities are excluded from the BHC’s regulatory capital [footnote].

Allowing internationally active BHCs to include these instruments in tier 1 capital above the 15 percent sub-limit (but subject to the 25 percent sub-limit) is prudential and consistent with safety and soundness. These securities provide a source of capital that is generally superior to other restricted core capital elements because they are effectively replaced by common stock, the highest form of tier 1 capital, within a few years of issuance. The high quality of these instruments is indicated by the rating agencies’ assignment of greater equity strength to mandatory convertible trust preferred securities than to cumulative or noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, even though mandatory convertible preferred securities, unlike perpetual preferred securities, are not included in GAAP equity until the common stock is issued.

Nonetheless, organizations wishing to issue such instruments are cautioned to have their structure reviewed by the Federal Reserve prior to issuance to ensure that they do not contain features that detract from its high capital quality.

Footnote: The reasons for this exclusion include the fact that the terms of the remarketed securities frequently are changed to shorten the maturity of the securities and include more debt-like features in the securities, thereby no longer meeting the characteristics for capital instruments includable in regulatory capital.

Section 4060.3.9.1 of the Fed’s Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual extends this treatment to convertible preferreds that convert to perpetual non-cumulative preferreds.

I have no problem from a public policy perspective of allowing the inclusion of Convertible Preferreds into Tier 1 capital, provided they meet the basic requirements of subordination and the potential for having their income suspended on a non-cumulative basis without recourse for the holders.

If such are issued, however, they will almost certainly not be included in the HIMIPref™ database, as there is considerable potential for such issues to “sell off the stock”. In fact, I would consider such issues – in the absence of even more innovation – to be equivalent to common stock with a bonus dividend; not fixed income at all.

I have a much bigger problem with the second proposal in Mr. Critchley’s column – the expansion of the Innovative Tier 1 limit to 25% from its current 15%. I will not accept that further debasement of bank credit quality is justified by prior debasement; let’s see a little more analysis and stress-testing than that!

December 17, 2008

December 18th, 2008

Ha-ha! Gone fishin’!

Toronto Stock Exchange and TSX Venture Exchange will not resume trading today due to continuing technical issues with its data feeds.

The market will be put into a Pre-Open state from 3:00PM to 5:00PM to allow participants the option of cancelling, adding or changing orders.

The company intends to open the exchanges tomorrow morning.

Additional information on the nature of the problem will be provided when the investigation is complete.

and:

TMX Group technology team has isolated the issue that resulted in the halt of trading on Toronto Stock Exchange and TSX Venture Exchange. Remedial action was taken to restore all data feeds at 3:41PM, and the company confirms that the Exchanges will open on Thursday, December 18, 2008 as per normal.

Initial findings indicate a network firmware issue resulted in complications with data sequencing, which impacted the delivery of the Level 1 data feeds.

Liquidity & Credit Limitations in FX Market

December 17th, 2008

I forget where I read it, but sombody at sometime held up the forwards market on foreign exchange as being the most efficient market anywhere. Plug in the spot rate and the two relevant risk-free rates for any two currencies and presto! you have the forward rate to as many decimal places as you want.

Like everything else in this market, this model is no longer as valid as it used to be: the implicit assumptions in the model are infinite liquidity and counterparty strength, neither of which are as very nearly true as they used to be. The Bank for International Settlements has released Working Paper #267 titled Interpreting deviations from covered interest parity during the financial market turmoil of 2007–08:

This paper investigates the spillover effects of money market turbulence in 2007–08 on the short-term covered interest parity (CIP) condition between the US dollar and the euro through the foreign exchange (FX) swap market. Sharp and persistent deviations from the CIP condition observed during the turmoil are found to be significantly associated with differences in the counterparty risk between European and US financial institutions. Furthermore, evidence is found that dollar term funding auctions by the ECB, supported by dollar swap lines with the Federal Reserve, have stabilized the FX swap market by lowering the volatility of deviations from CIP.

Our finding bears similarities with the Japan premium episode in the late 1990s. At that time, due to a substantial deterioration of their creditworthiness relative to that of other financial institutions in advanced nations, Japanese banks found it extremely difficult to raise dollars in global money markets, and a so-called Japan premium arose between dollar cash rates paid by Japanese banks and by other banks (Covrig, Low, and Melvin 2004; and Peek and Rosengren 2001). As suggested in Nishioka and Baba (2004) and Baba and Amatatsu (2008), Japanese banks then turned to the FX swap and longer-term cross-currency markets for dollar funding, which resulted in substantial deviations from the CIP condition in its traditional sense. The dislocations in the FX swap market that have been triggered by the turmoil may be understood in a similar context.

finding is consistent with the view that the demand for dollar liquidity in FX swap markets under the turmoil came from a wider array of financial institutions than just dollar Libor panel banks. A similar observation can be made for the Libor-OIS (euro-dollar) variable: it always has a significantly positive effect on the FX swap deviation under the turmoil but not so in all cases before the turmoil. The estimated coefficients during the period of turmoil are larger, more significant, and closer to the value of 1 suggested by the earlier decomposition (equation (3)). This is consistent with the view that relative liquidity conditions in the Libor funding markets mattered more to FX swap markets during the turmoil than before.

This paper has empirically investigated spillovers to the FX swap market from the money market turbulence that began in the summer of 2007. As documented in Baba, Packer, and Nagano (2008), an important aspect of the turmoil was a shortage of dollar funding for many financial institutions, particularly European institutions that needed to support US conduits for which they had committed backup liquidity facilities. At the same time, financial institutions on the dollar-lending side became more cautious because of their own growing needs for dollar funds and increased concerns over counterparty risk. Facing these unfavourable conditions in interbank markets, non-US institutions turned to the FX swap market to convert euros into dollars.

Our empirical results show a striking change in the relationship between perceptions of counterparty risk and FX swap prices after the onset of financial turmoil. That is, CDS spread differences between European and US financial institutions have a positive and statistically significant relationship with the deviations from [Covered Interest Parity] observed in the FX swap market. The result holds when we consider the CDS spreads of a range of financial institutions wider than that of the Libor panel. Our findings suggest that concern over the counterparty risk of European financial institutions was one of the important drivers of the deviation from covered interest parity in the FX swap market.

While not significantly reducing the level of FX swap deviations over the period, the ECB’s US dollar liquidity-providing operations to Eurosystem counterparties do appear to have lowered the volatility (and thus the associated uncertainty) of the FX swap deviations. Our estimation results thus support the view that the dollar term funding auctions conducted by the ECB, supported by dollar swap lines with the Federal Reserve, played a positive role in stabilizing the euro/dollar FX swap market.

This study covers a period that ends in September 2008 shortly before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. After the Lehman failure, the turmoil in many markets become much more pronounced. In currency and money markets, what had principally been a dollar liquidity problem for European banks deepened into a phenomenon of global dollar shortage. The provision of dollar funds by central banks, supported in some cases by unlimited dollar swap lines with the Federal Reserve, expanded greatly. One promising line of research would focus on the effectiveness of the diverse array of policy measures taken in this recent, more severe stage of the financial crisis.

OSFI to Consider New Bank Soft-Retractibles?

December 17th, 2008

Barry Critchley writes in today’s Financial Post:

Are so-called soft retractable preferred shares — a security that allows the issuer, at maturity, to pay in common shares or cash– the next type of Tier 1 capital financial institutions will be allowed to issue as part of the overall thrust of strengthening their balance sheets?

There is talk that the federal regulator, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), has been approached.

Soft retractables come with features that make them akin to Tier 1 or permanent capital: They are noncumulative in relation to dividends, and they have a term to maturity that can be extended to perpetuity if the issuer decides to pay not in cash but in common shares. (If that did happen, the pref share issue would be dilutive.) And they have the ability to absorb losses. But rule changes a few years back mean the capital raised now counts as Tier 2 capital. Accordingly, they receive the same treatment as debt securities. Since those changes were implemented, no financial institution has issued soft retractables. “If you have soft retractables that count as debt and are dilutive, it’s the worst of both worlds,” noted one underwriter, who added OSFI has “never really liked soft retractables.”

So how could OSFI make soft retractables more attractive for financial institutions to issue? The easiest way would be to overlook recent accounting changes and have the capital raised count as equity, not as debt.

Certainly institutional investors would like the regulators to change the rules to allow soft retractables to count as Tier 1 capital. Institutions would be buying a term security, a feature that allows them to match the investment against a liability.

The crux of the issue is the last paragraph: pretend-managers wanting securities with pretend-maturities … just like Deutsche Bank’s sub-debt! I will certainly not deny that, should there be new bank OpRet issues, they will be included in the HIMIPref™ portfolio and they will be considered for recommendation to clients.

But from a public policy perspective, these issues would be a disaster. In times of trouble they will be dilutive to the shareholders and get the bank into even more trouble – as has happened recently with the Quebecor World issue, IQW.PR.C. This is not what tier 1 capital is supposed to do!

Tier 1 Capital must participate in losses and must not be procyclical – that seems to me to be quite intuitive. There has been quite enough debasement of bank capital quality recently, with the recent approval of a rule to allow cumulative innovative Tier 1 Capital.

Such tinkering may well meet the objective of decreasing the probability of trouble, by increasing the funding sources available for Tier 1 capital. But the piper must eventually be paid: the corollary is that in times of trouble you increase the potential for crowded trades and cliff risk.

Hat Tip: Assiduous Reader tobyone.