Issue Comments

S&P Downgrades BCE – Preferreds Unaffected

S&P has announced:

it lowered its long-term corporate credit ratings on Montreal, Que.-based holding company BCE Inc. and wholly owned subsidiary Bell Canada to ‘BB-‘ from ‘A-‘. The ratings on both companies remain on CreditWatch with negative implications where they were placed April 17, 2007.

The ratings on BCE’s C$2.77 billion preferred shares are also unchanged because we expect these to be redeemed as well. Once the tender is completed, we will withdraw these ratings. However, the ratings on these securities could
be lowered if they are not redeemed as planned.

In addition, we lowered the ratings on about C$4.9 billion of Bell Canada senior unsecured debentures outstanding (which we do not expect will be redeemed) to ‘BB+’ from ‘A-‘, reflecting what we think is the best possible outcome based on publicly available information on the LBO.

The multinotch downgrade reflects our view that BCE no longer possesses an investment-grade financial policy given the high degree of certainty that the LBO will be finalized shortly. On a pro forma basis, the company will have a highly leveraged capital structure, weakened credit measures, and significantly reduced cash flow-generating capability owing to its LBO and associated heavy interest burden.

S&P has had BCE on Credit Watch negative for quite some time. The BCE/Teachers deal was last reviewed here on August 10.

Regulation

IMF Calls for New Credit Rating Scale

As reported today by Bloomberg:

The IMF, which is charged with promoting global economic stability and lends to financially distressed nations, blamed the crisis on “benign economic and financial conditions” which “weakened incentives to conduct due diligence on borrowers and counterparties.”The fund also said the methodology of credit-rating companies, some of which gave high ratings to subprime mortgage securities that have plummeted in value, needs to be examined. The complexity of many of these securities may have made it difficult for investors to assess their worth based on the assigned ratings.

“In the case of complex structured credit products, investors need to look behind the ratings,” the report said.

Regulators and investors will have to work together to strengthen financial markets to prevent a recurrence, and develop ways to improve the spread of accurate and timely information to help markets assess risk, the report said.

Parts of this report are available at the IMF site. In Chapter 1 they urge:

The need for a differentiated scale of credit ratings has
again been made apparent.

The fallout in the mortgage market has drawn attention to the role of credit ratings agencies in structured credit markets. Less sophisticated investors, who were content to delegate the risk assessment of their positions to the credit ratings agencies, were negatively surprised by the intensity of downgrades. Previous GFSRs have pointed out that structured credit products are likely to suffer more severe, multiple-notch downgrades relative to the typically smoother downgrade paths of corporate bonds (IMF, 2006). The experience of the past year has underscored the need for further efforts to inform investors of these risks, but better still would be the introduction by ratings agencies of a more differentiated scale for structured credit products. For example, a special rating scale for structured credits could be introduced to highlight to investors that they should expect a higher speed of migration between ratings than on a traditional corporate bond.

The section (page 37 of the PDF) ends with some sound advice for institutional investors; sadly, it does not advocate that institutional investors who bought CDOs without understanding them seek retraining as ditch diggers. The closest they get to advocating this urgently needed market reform is elsewhere in the document:

Finally, credit ratings evaluate only default risk, and not market or liquidity risks, and this seems to have been underappreciated by many investors.

Which isn’t really very close, is it? Ah, well, perhaps someday.

Update: Accrued Interest has some explanations and suggestions for the CDO market.

Publications

Research : Yield from On-Line Calculator

Most readers will know about my article Yield Ahead, which I link in various places with:

In that article – and on this blog, right hand column, under “On-Line Resources” – I recommend Keith Betty’s On-Line Yield Calculator as a method whereby retail investors may quickly and easily calculate the yields to the various call dates for any given preferred issue, once they know its characteristics. I have published characteristics for the issues tracked by HIMIPref™ at PrefInfo.com:

Keith recently received a note from a market practitioner stating that “the formula in U105 should be =((1+((U104+1)^0.25-1))^4)-1 for the quarterly yield”, as opposed to the current formula, =4*((U104+1)^0.25-1) and asked what I thought.

To think about this, we first have to get rid of Excel Spreadsheet cell references. Let’s refer to the existing formula as (A) and the suggested formula as (B). We’ll also let the internal rate of return on the cash flows be “r”. Therefore:

(A) 4*((1+r)^0.25 – 1)

(B) ((1+((1+r)^0.25 -1))^4 – 1

It’s now easier to see that the expression (1+r)^0.25 appears in both expressions; this is the quarterly rate of return; we’ll set that equal to R, so:

(A) 4R

(B) (1+R)^4 – 1

Now we know what we’re talking about, which is always a pleasant state of affairs! Keith’s formula, (A), converts the quarterly value to annual without compounding (many, including myself, will refer to this as a simple yield), while the suggested formula, (B), converts the quarterly value to annual with compounding.

Once I had realized this, I basically shrugged my shoulders and drew my own conclusions, which I’ll explain at the end of this post. But I poked around in some reference material anyway and found, in Choudhry, Analysing and Interpreting the Yield Curve, Wiley Finance 2004, ISBN 9780470821251, page 22:

The market convention is sometimes simply to double the semi-annual yield to obtain the annualized yields, despite the fact that this produces an inaccurate result. It is only acceptable to do this for rough calculations. An annualized yield obtained by multiplying the semi-annual yield by two is known as a ‘bond equivalent yield’.

Well, I haven’t heard that definition of “bond equivalent yield” before, but if Choudhry has and wants to state it as a convention, I won’t complain.

Anyway … Keith’s point is that formula (A) ties in with material he gets from brokerage houses and that (i) he is therefore justified in referring to it as a market convention, and (ii) the spreadsheet will be more valuable to users if it is compatible with calculations shown by brokerages houses.

I agree with him; I also don’t think it matters very much.

All the math on the spreadsheet is accessible to the user; anybody sophisticated enough to ask the question can get the answer very easily and revise the spreadsheet for his own needs very easily. So as a practical matter, I don’t think it matters.

Additionally, it should be noted very carefully that the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) calculation assigns the same yield to every cash flow. This implies that (i) the yield curve is flat and (ii) all cashflows may be reinvested at this yield. Since it is known that these implications are both completely bogus, I take the view that worrying about the difference in presentation between formulae (A) and (B) is basically a waste of time.

And finally, another practical point: the purpose of the spreadsheet is to provide a tool for an apples/apples comparison between two sets of cash-flows. To the limits imposed by the calculation of IRR, that’s exactly what it does.

And, finally finally, I had a look at Bloomberg, on the grounds that nowadays the phrase “market convention” has an identical meaning to “the way Bloomberg does it”. What they refer to as “Actual” yield (as opposed to “S/A Street” yield) is pretty close to that given by formula (A), but not precisely. I looked at it for a while and, frankly, I don’t know how the $%##! they come up with their number.

Update: In looking at this again, I note that there are too many brackets in equation (B). It simplifies to:

= (1+((1+r)^0.25 – 1))^4 – 1

= (1+ (1+r)^0.25 – 1)^4 – 1

= ((1+r)^0.25)^4 – 1

= 1 + r – 1

= r

Update, 2007-10-28: This issue has reared its head again with respect to Modified Duration and is discussed in the post Research : Modified Duration.

It should also be noted that – in complete accordance with the convention that Keith has applied – a new issue preferred priced at $25.00 with an annual dividend of $1.20 paid quarterly is advertised as having a yield of 4.80%. If we were to use the IRR method suggested by Keith’s correspondent, we would be forced to advertise the yield as (1.012)^4 – 1 = 4.887% … and salesmen would be getting a lot of angry calls from clients.

Interesting External Papers

The Panic of 1907

I recently became embroiled in a discussion of the recent Fed Rate cut, in which a casual mention of J.P.Morgan and his role in resolving the Panic of 1907 became a surprisingly controversial issue.

I might put together a short piece at some point regarding the Panic – until then I will content myself with listing references:

Panic of 1907, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Tallman & Moen, 2007, Role of Clearinghouse Certificates

Moen & Tallman, 1999 Differentiation of 1907 Panic from others

Moen & Tallman, 1995, Comparison of New York vs. Chicago Clearinghouses in 1907

Wall Street, A History, Charles R. Geisst 1997, ISBN 0-19-511512-0

Update, 2007-10-15:

Tallman & Moen, 1990, Lessons from the Panic of 1907

The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm, R.F.Bruner & Sean D. Carr, ISBN 978-0-470-15263-8

Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919).  An Autobiography.  1913. (Appendix A deals with the US Steel takeover of Tennessee Coal & Iron, which apparently became a political football).

Update, 2007-10-16:

Football indeed! Richard Jensen claims:

In October 1911, Taft’s Justice Department charged US Steel with antitrust violations in the TCI deal–leaving TR’s integrity under a cloud. That was the last straw for Roosevelt, as he decided to challenge Taft for the Republican nomination for president.

Update, 2010-7-6: Mr Joseph S Tracy, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, suggests that the Credit Crunch be referred to as the “Panic of 2007”, given all the similarities in the trigger.

Market Action

September 21, 2007

More Teachers’ / BCE news! I don’t think anybody will be surprised to learn that:

The arrangement was approved this morning at a Special Meeting of shareholders by more than 97% of the votes cast by holders of common and preferred shares, voting as a single class, greatly exceeding the required 66 2/3% approval. Of the total outstanding common and preferred shares, 62.5% were voted at the meeting either in person or by proxy.

In a sign that things are starting to return to normal, junk bond indices hit a two-month high amidst signs that deals are starting to move off the dealers’ balance sheets. I should stress here that by “normal” I do not mean “good”. What I mean is that we are returning to an environment in which investors are willing to take a look at possible trades and price them according to normal risk/return forecasts, rather than simply sitting on cash, petrified by fear.

In what must be taken as a good sign of this, it looks like the buy-out of Harman International Industries is dead:

Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. abandoned their $8 billion takeover of Harman International Industries Inc., maker of Infinity and JBL audio equipment, citing a decline in the firm’s performance. 

Issuance is, in fact, picking up a bit:

R.H. Donnelley, the biggest independent publisher of Yellow Pages telephone directories, led the biggest week for junk bond sales since July after the Federal Reserve’s rate cut spurred demand for high-yield, high-risk debt.

Speculative-grade borrowers issued $1.83 billion of fixed- income securities, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Corporate bond sales totaled $28.2 billion, compared with $26.6 billion last week and the average this year of $23.4 billion. Cary, North Carolina-based R.H. Donnelley sold $1 billion of bonds to repay debt, increasing the offering from $650 million.

Junk-rated companies sold bonds for the first time in three weeks as the Fed’s half-percentage-point reduction in its benchmark rate on Sept. 18 helped lower the yield premium that companies pay to borrow over similar maturity Treasuries by the most in four years, Merrill Lynch & Co. index data show.

While in signs that nobody really expects a return to frenetic trading levels, RBC fired 40 US bond salesmen and HSBC is closing its sub-prime business, which will throw 750 out of work.

US equities rose, capping a fine week (send a thank-you not to Bernanke) as did those in Canada.

Treasuries managed a dead-cat bounce, as did Canadas

The pref market was unable to sustain yesterday’s volume increases, but put in a good solid performance. The perpetuals look a little uncertain – whether that’s worries over inflation or simply noise, I cannot begin to guess.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.78% 4.73% 1,199,037 15.79 1 +0.0816% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.84% 4.76% 99,084 15.81 8 +0.1900% 1,033.2
Floater 4.48% 1.82% 84,779 10.76 3 +0.2204% 1,048.1
Op. Retract 4.83% 3.95% 75,683 3.95 15 +0.0518% 1,029.5
Split-Share 5.14% 4.85% 97,022 3.85 13 +0.1336% 1,044.7
Interest Bearing 6.33% 6.81% 65,781 4.24 3 -0.5426% 1,030.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.49% 5.11% 90,557 6.04 24 -0.0623% 1,030.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.05% 5.09% 244,031 15.34 38 -0.0404% 985.8
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.9868% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of September 14, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.10% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 8.88 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +2.3245% Asset coverage of just over 3.8:1 according to the company. Today’s performance almost wipes out yesterday’s losses. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.86% based on a bid of 22.01 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BPO.PR.I Scraps (would be OpRet, but there are credit concerns) 299,105 Scotia crossed 297,900 at 25.50. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.59% based on a bid of 25.46 and a softMaturity 2010-12-31 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat 110,800 RBC bought 68,200 from MacDougall at 24.65, then crossed 38,200 at the same price.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 51,900 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 22.85. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.89% based on a bid of 22.80 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.H OpRet 51,000 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.88% based on a bid of 26.20 and a call 2008-10-30 at 25.75.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 28,694 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 24.50. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 24.47 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.E OpRet 27,703 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.62% based on a bid of 25.88 and a call 2009-4-30 at 25.50.

There were nine other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : May, 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-05-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,584.4 1 1.00 5.31% 15.1 51M 5.28%
FixedFloater 1,980.0 12 2.0 5.41% 14.6 125M 5.55%
Floater 1,501.9 4 1.75 5.15% 13.4 65M 5.73%
OpRet 1,439.9 34 1.20 5.12% 1.9 70M 6.24%
SplitShare 1,474.0 8 1.87 6.41% 5.5 95M 6.18%
Interest-Bearing 1,670.6 7 2.00 7.31% 3.0 147M 7.88%
Perpetual-Premium 1,095.1 1 1.00 4.99 3.6 56M 6.09%
Perpetual-Discount 1,232.1 12 1.58 5.82% 14.0 113M 5.87%

Index Constitution, 2001-05-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-05-31, Post-rebalancing

Market Action

September 20, 2007

The USD has been hammered to the point where it is at parity with CAD. Fortunately for Americans, however, there is some evidence that import prices remain constant in USD terms:

“Foreign exporters have simply been more willing to vary their margins when selling into the U.S. market. Moreover, this difference in pricing behavior seems, if anything, to have become more pronounced in recent years,” the study says.

Unfortunately:

There is an important caveat to the study’s implications for the dollar’s recent fall. It notes that local-currency profit margins for foreign companies selling to the U.S. peaked in 2002 and have since declined, showing the dollar’s fall is taking a toll on profit margins. “It remains an open issue as to whether profit margins on exports to the United States are now ‘too narrow’ or margins were unusually high several years ago,” they say. Left unsaid: if indeed margins are “too low” now, then exporters may be reaching the limit of their ability to keep prices in the U.S. stable, and the dollar’s drop may be more inflationary in coming years than it has been to date.

The USA will not return to fiscal sanity until forced – the way Canada was forced to get religion in the ’90’s and that wasn’t a whole lot of fun for a lot of people. We’ll see.

US ABCP outstanding declined again this week, as reported by Bloomberg:

The U.S. commercial paper market shrank for a sixth week, extending the biggest slump in at least seven years and signaling Federal Reserve interest rate cuts haven’t yet drawn investors back to short-term debt.

I suggest that confidence is an awfully hard thing to regain, once lost. There are a lot of firms dancing close to the edge; a lot of financing is still being done at high rates, with all terms of USD ABCP yielding more than 5% – about half a point more than financial paper. And those, remember are average rates. While the cuts will have put a lot of companies back into positive carry territory, they will be much more risk averse than they were; at the margins, structures will be delevered and terms will be extended into bonds.

My guess is that we’ll see continued delevering at least until Christmas, as the market adjusts to whatever the new paradigm is. But who knows? Pays yer money and take yer chances.

Charles Wyplosz makes an argument at Voxeu in defense of the wholesale liquidity injection, accepting as a necessary evil the fact that ‘bad banks’ will benefit from this injection as much as bad banks. While agreeing with his conclusions, I disagree with his arguments, which are very interventionist –

Once the dust settles, the time of punishment will come. Inquiries should be conducted and those who violated the law must be brought to account.

Let’s start with first principles – Wyplosz states that the root of the problem to be addressed is:

What each financial institution does not know, and should not know, is what is on the books of the other financial institutions with which it trades daily. The old result, which goes under the colourful name of lemon’s markets, is that, suspecting the worst, no financial institution wants to lend to the others. The consequence is that liquidity is plentiful inside most financial institutions, but not available on the interbank market

I take the view that the problem is not so much one of the financial institutions not trusting one another – although that clearly is a factor – as one whereby the banks do not know which of their contingent lines will be drawn on in the near future. Countrywide Credit rather famously drew down USD 11.5-billion in one shot in August; this will not have been an isolated occurance. The banks will, I suspect, be happily engaged in the practice of grossing up their balance sheets by lending to their own customers right now, at penalty rates. This will be consistent with the work of Gatev & Strahan which I quoted on September 14. The banks, wishing to keep their powder dry, will not make term loans to one another (a term loan meaning, in this, ‘longer than overnight’) because their customers might want the lines tomorrow.

In such a case, liquidity injection is the desired policy since as long as there is liquidity then well-capitalized banks will be able to make term loans while at the same time retaining the extra capacity required to meet their commitments. My concern – which I am sure will be explicitly addressed by regulators over the next year – is whether such contingent claims from customers and off-balance sheet entities (e.g., bank controlled ABCP issuers) are adequately reflected in risk-weighted assets.

As far as punishment for excessive risk-taking is concerned … the market is meting that out quite efficiently, as Northern Rock’s shareholders can testify. Coventree’s employees are in a position to confirm this. The ‘real banks’ have bailed out the ‘non-banks’ to a greater or lesser extent, which is their function, at a greater or lesser cost to the non-bank’s shareholders, which is their punishment.

BoE Governor King testified to a parliamentary committee that:

U.K. banking laws prevented the central bank from a covert rescue of Northern Rock Plc, which it would have preferred.

“The bank would have preferred to have acted covertly as lender as last resort, to have lent to Northern Rock without publishing it,” King told a parliamentary committee in London today. “As a result of the market abuses directive (of 2005) we were unable to carry that out.”

This is interesting. Those with long memories will remember the Panic of 1825 and commentary by Larry Neal that:

The first mention of the crisis occurs on December 8, 1825, when “The Governor [Cornelius Buller] acquainted the Court that he had with the concurrence of the Deputy Governor [John Baker Richards] and several of the Committee of Treasury afforded assistance to the banking house of Sir Peter Pole, etc.” This episode is described in vivid detail by the sister of Henry Thornton Jr., the active partner of Pole, Thornton & Co. at the time. On the previous Saturday, the governor and deputy governor counted out £400,000 in bills personally to Henry Thornton, Jr., at the Bank without any clerks present. All this was done to keep it secret so that other large London banks would not press their claims as well. A responsible lender of last resort would have publicized the cash infusion to reassure the public in general. Instead, the run on Pole & Thornton continued unabated, causing the company to fail by the end of the week. Then the deluge of demands for advances by other banks overwhelmed the Bank’s Drawing Office.

The propriety of the BoE’s actions will surely be debated for decades. If the two views can be reconciled at all, one mechanism is through introduction of the idea that the public no longer trusts public institutions – at least, not to the extent that they did in 1825, when a man’s word was his bond. There have been far too many instances in recent history when those in authority have stated ‘We will not devalue, we will not devalue, we will not devalue, we have just devalued, we will not devalue again, we will not devalue again …’

And they do this, of course, without blushing.

Another way to reconcile the two theses is through introducing the idea of discretion; it may well be that Governor King agrees with the publicity desired by Neal in general, but not in this particular instance, for very well-founded reasons. And it may be that Neal will agree with him. It has always amazed me to see how much money is being paid to people – judges, regulators, high-school principals, whatever – while at the same time their discretion is circumscribed to ludicrous extremes with often ludicrous results. Perhaps Northern Rock was one of these time … perhaps not. The facts will emerge at some time long after public interest has evaporated, and become the topic of discussion in specialized journals.

In sub-prime news, it appears that credit anticipation plays by Goldman Sachs and Bear Stearns were right and wrong, respectively. And … a CDO has blown up, a victim of mark-to-market:

TCW Asset Management, the money manager owned by France’s second-biggest bank, is selling $3.2 billion of mortgage securities backing collateralized debt obligations after the value of the bonds fell.

Fitch Ratings last week said another five Westways Funding CDOs might have to sell assets under the CDOs’ rules.

A $200 million CDO in the Enhanced Mortgage-Backed Securities series of market-value CDOs managed by MassMutual Financial Group’s Babson Capital Management LLC has finished liquidating after failing a similar test, Fitch said yesterday.

Isn’t forced liquidation fun? Boy, the guys who have all their analytical ducks in a row and have some capital available must be making a killing. Unfortunately, these buyers include the US GSE’s, who are able to finance themselves due only to the implicit guarantee of the US Government – the market would never allow them to survive as independent companies with their current capital structure. There is some pressure to reduce this source of false economic signals. Tom Graff has prepared a numerical example of why you need players in the system who are prepared to increase leverage when nobody else will – currently this role is being played largely by the banks and the US GSEs.

US Equities had a bad day, attributed to fears that the Fed Cut – and more like it? – will cause inflation; the excuse for Canadian equities was the fear of expropriation … er … I mean, a fairer royalty sharing scheme in the oil patch. CNR was in the news again …

Canadian National Railway Co. (CNR CN) declined C$1.19, or 2.1 percent, to C$56.65. The country’s largest railroad agreed to sell its Central Station complex in Montreal to Homburg Invest Inc. (HII/B CN) for C$355 million ($350 million). Canadian National will lease back its headquarters and passenger rail facilities from Homburg as part of the agreement, the Montreal-based carrier said in a statement. Homburg shares fell 15 cents, or 2.7 percent, to C$5.50.

Yesterday I mentioned CNR’s new bond issue … they seem to be raising a substantial amount of cash. An answer may – may! – be these notes in their financials:

Revolving credit facility
As at June 30, 2007, the Company had letters of credit drawn on its U.S.$1 billion revolving credit facility of $303 million ($308 million as at December 31, 2006) and had U.S.$442 million (Cdn$471 million) of borrowings under its commercial paper program (nil as at December 31, 2006) at an average interest rate of 5.29%.

Accounts receivable securitization
The Company has a five-year agreement, expiring in May 2011, to sell an undivided co-ownership interest of up to a maximum of $600 million in a revolving pool of freight receivables to an unrelated trust.
At June 30, 2007, the Company had sold receivables that resulted in proceeds of $575 million under this program ($393 million at December 31, 2006). The retained interest in the receivables was approximately 10% of this amount and is recorded in Other current assets. At June 30, 2007, the servicing asset and liability were not significant.

Delevering time! Term Extension Time! Note that I spent a grand total of about 45 seconds looking at their financials … I bring this up as something interesting to be investigated further. If anybody has any (links to) interesting commentary, let me know!

Treasuries had a horrible day, with the ten-year falling in price over a buck, with steepening. Would you like your Fed Cut with a side of inflation? I’m unable to find a good link to Canadian bonds – not surprising, given the pathetic state of Canadian media, and even good old Reuters let me down today – but trust me, Canadas did horribly too. Just not as horribly as Treasuries.

Volume returned to the preferred share market today, with some nice chunky crosses getting done. The various floating rate indices were dragged down by BCE issues, presumably a reaction to yesterday’s news that the bondholders are going to fight the Teachers’ deal in court.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.80% 4.76% 1,248,908 15.75 1 -0.0816% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.77% 98,445 15.80 8 -0.3903% 1,031.2
Floater 4.49% 1.83% 85,557 10.73 3 -0.4069% 1,045.8
Op. Retract 4.83% 3.99% 75,771 3.99 15 -0.0766% 1,029.0
Split-Share 5.15% 4.87% 97,729 3.84 13 -0.1948% 1,043.3
Interest Bearing 6.30% 6.76% 65,451 4.26 3 +0.0012% 1,036.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.48% 5.06% 90,996 5.27 24 -0.0755% 1,030.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.05% 5.09% 245,888 14.97 38 -0.0003% 986.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.4932% Asset coverage of just over 3.8:1 as of July 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.13% based on a bid of 21.51 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. That’s an interest equivalent of almost 8.6% based on a 1.4x equivalency factor!
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.0799% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 22.90 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.B FixFloat -1.0288%  
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat -1.0221%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
GWO.PR.E OpRet 184,603 TD crossed 21,900 at 25.65. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.86% based on a bid of 25.70 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00.
FBS.PR.B SplitShare 366,750 Nesbitt bought 97,000 from Scotia at 10.05 and crossed 250,000 at the same price. Asset coverage of almost 2.9:1 as of September 13, according to TD. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.31% based on a bid of 10.05 and a call 2008-1-14 at 10.00.
CU.PR.A PerpetualPremium 128,434 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.11% based on a bid of 25.80 and a call 2012-3-31 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualPremium 106,900 Nesbitt crossed 104,000 at 25.45. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.35% based on a bid of 25.40 and a call 2013-3-2 at 25.00.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 104,250 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 23.03. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.92% based on a bid of 22.95 and a limitMaturity.
CCS.PR.C Scraps (would be PerpetualDiscount, but there are credit concerns) 102,250 Scotia crossed 100,000 at 22.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.69% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.F PerpetualPremium 101,086 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 26.95. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.39% based on a bid of 26.90 and a call 2008-10-30 at 26.00.

There were twenty-one other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : April, 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-04-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,592.5 1 1.00 5.34% 15.0 84M 5.31%
FixedFloater 1,991.1 12 2.0 5.30% 4.5 155M 5.51%
Floater 1,505.5 4 1.76 5.42% 13.3 72M 5.92%
OpRet 1,448.5 34 1.23 4.60% 1.9 66M 6.23%
SplitShare 1,474.7 8 1.87 5.81% 5.6 98M 6.16%
Interest-Bearing 1,641.6 7 2.00 7.61% 3.2 166M 8.02%
Perpetual-Premium 1,091.0 1 1.00 4.98 3.7 57M 6.11%
Perpetual-Discount 1,247.2 12 1.58 5.73% 14.3 146M 5.79%

Index Constitution, 2001-04-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-04-30, Post-rebalancing

Market Action

September 19, 2007

Thanks, Rebel Traders (via WSJ)! 

Inflation numbers came out today, with the core rate in the US easing to 2.1% yoy, which some have taken as a validation of the Fed’s rate cut. The core rate in Canada is 2.1% yoy, but there are storm clouds on the horizon:

Signs inflation may pick up include a Sept. 14 Statistics Canada report showing unit labor costs, the cost of paying workers to produce an extra unit of a good, jumped 4.8 percent in the second quarter from a year earlier, the fastest since 1991. Also, average hourly wages rose the fastest in six years in August with the jobless rate at a 33-year low of 6 percent.

There are hopes that the PCE index will also come down – we will see! 

Another interesting trend is the increased linkage between energy and foodstuff prices. We’ve heard about the Italian pasta strike and Mexican tortilla protests. We may well see Canadian Jos. Louis riots if the trend continues.  

The authorities in general are loosening standards! Do they know something we don’t or what? The Bank of England has reversed its position on loosing loan standards, while the portfolio limits on the US Government Sponsored mortgage lenders are being relaxed. I suspect that James Hamilton will not be pleased. In addition to raising the portfolio limits, there is also pressure to increase the permitted size of each mortgage: Bernanke is not pleased:

“Both the size and composition of the portfolios should be tied to reforms that both reduce the systemic risks posed by the portfolios and also clarify the public purpose,” Bernanke said.

But – look at the situation: record foreclosures:

U.S. home prices fell by a record 3.2 percent in the second quarter, according to the S&P/Case-Shiller Index. Lawrence Yun, chief economist for the Chicago-based National Association of Realtors, has warned that year-over-year prices will fall for the first time since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

And the Congressional Budget Office has adopted a somewhat gloomy tone:

The recent market turmoil and a weakening of consumer confidence could “pose serious economic risks,” and as a result have “heightened” the chance of a recession, Congressional Budget Office Director Peter Orszag says in testimony before the Joint Economic Committee this morning.

The Brookings institution has published a commentary on current economic and regulatory issues – the author concludes, inter alia, that although the Fed wasn’t perfect in the 2004-06 period, they weren’t all that wrong, either. He also agrees with most of Levitt’s credit rating agency recommendations

On September 10 I noted a report of the destabilizing effect of mark-to-market accounting;  Moody’s has produced an interesting commentary:

The world would be a much safer place if all securities were held by “real money” buy-and-hold investors who did not have to mark to market, and who therefore did not have to make forced sales into panicked markets. Unfortunately, literally trillions of dollars of securities are now held by leveraged mark-to-market institutions relying on other people’s money to finance sometimes opaque, complex and risky investments.

CNR had a new bond issue today for USD 550-million that showed a few signs of the times: the purpose of the issue is to repay commercial paper and reduce the size of the accounts receivable securitization programme; and there is a poison put, whereby the bonds are puttable to the company at $101 upon a credit downgrade. While as a bond-guy I like the poison-put feature (and will pay more for the issue than its comparables because of it), as an amateur-economist guy and equity-guy, I’m not so sure. This will have the effect of forcing the bond market’s mark-to-market woes onto the operating company, which will have to find financing (or sweeten the terms of the deal and negotiate their way out of it) at the worst possible time. Hmm …

Other issuers today were Lehman and GE as well as Suncor. Money abounds for solid credits; the market is operating as it should in this, the most perfect of all possible worlds.

Another hedge fund has stopped redemptions, in what seems like a rather complex story in which the portfolio manager quit:

Homm said yesterday he quit after directors declined to follow his lead by turning down bonuses and contributing shares to support the funds during market turmoil. Absolute Capital said today it approved the bonuses Homm recommended.

Homm didn’t answer calls to his mobile phone, and Chief Executive Officer Jonathan Treacher didn’t immediately return calls to his office and mobile phone. In an interview yesterday, Treacher said he was “surprised” by Homm’s departure. “We never discussed him resigning,” he said.

The BCE saga, last reviewed about five weeks ago has taken another twist: the bondholders are going to court:

They want the deal declared a “reorganization” under the terms of the 1976 and 1996 trust indentures, which would require bondholder approval.

BCE bondholders argue the takeover is unfair will see them take “significant losses” since the debentures have lost “hundreds of millions of dollars” in market value since talks of the company going private began earlier this year.

As well, the debt for the leveraged buyout and related interest costs have caused one rating agency to downgrade the debentures from investment grade to junk status, the bonderholders argue.

It’s interesting that a rating agency downgrade should be considered worthy of mention – I thought we weren’t paying attention to them any more. PrefBlog’s crack investigative reporting team has discovered the fact that the issuer, BCE, is paying the credit ratings agencies! Video at 11.

Brad Setser has reviewed the larger implications of the liquidity crunch:

My wild guess is that some kind of new financial innovation will be necessary to end the (financial) droid wars …

Either that or there may be a lot of CDOs containing some housing exposure may be sitting around on various firms balance sheets for a very long time.

My guess? Hedge funds will arise that are more than happy to take care of the problem at a discount to market. I don’t think the banks will mind – the big losses will have been taken by by the original owners that were forced to sell. Not a big deal, really.

Cleveland Fed researchers have reviewed the slope of the yield curve again and its implications for recession probabilities, but note:

First, probabilities are themselves subject to error, as is the case with all statistical estimates. Second, other researchers have postulated that the underlying determinants of the yield spread today are materially different from the determinants that generated yield spreads during prior decades. Differences could arise from changes in international capital flows and inflation expectations, for example.

I suggest that any such readings taken now will reflect plain and simple panic. Let’s wait until panic has subsided and uncertainty has returned to normal levels before drawing any conclusions from the slope of the government yield curve.

US Equities continued their huge rally, but Canadian equities fell:

Canadian stocks fell, led by Suncor Energy Inc., on concern that a proposed oil and gas royalty increase may cut energy companies’ profits.

The province of Alberta should raise royalty rates to reap the benefits of rising prices, a report from a government-appointed task force said yesterday after markets closed.

The phrase “markets closed” should be read “markets closed Tuesday“, by the way.

Treasuries fell with steepening due to inflation fears.  Canadas followed.

Something of an odd Pref market today, with the PerpetualPremiums down and the PerpetualDiscounts up … given the action in the bond market, with the long end having an awful day, the opposite might have been expected. Assigning reasons to day-to-day fluctuations in any market, let alone the pref market, is something of an exercise in frustration, so we’ll just let that slide, shall we? Volume picked up a little today, a good sign.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.82% 4.77% 1,300,892 15.73 1 +0.0000% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.84% 4.75% 99,969 15.83 8 +0.3184% 1,035.5
Floater 4.47% 1.82% 84,202 10.79 3 +0.1232% 1,050.1
Op. Retract 4.83% 3.86% 76,114 3.86 15 -0.0376% 1,029.8
Split-Share 5.14% 4.88% 95,623 3.86 13 -0.2242% 1,045.4
Interest Bearing 6.30% 6.75% 65,855 4.26 3 -0.3362% 1,036.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.48% 5.09% 90,310 5.28 24 -0.1201% 1,031.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.04% 5.09% 245,066 15.72 38 +0.1156% 986.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.6358% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of September 14, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.82% (mostly interest) based on a bid of 9.02 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.5618% Asset coverage of 3.83:1 as of July 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.83% based on a bid of 22.06 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.0331% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 24.45 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat +1.4015%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
FFN.PR.A SplitShare 110,900 A split share, top of the list! Scotia crossed 96,300 at 10.39. Asset coverage of 2.53:1 as of September 14, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.69% based on a bid of 10.38 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-01 at 10.00.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat 39,700 TD crossed 17,400 at 24.65.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualPremium 24,200 Desjardins crossed 23,400 at 25.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.67% based on a bid of 25.87 and a call 2013-3-27 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 17,650 Closed at 20.20-25, 2×16. The virtually identical BAM.PR.M closed at 20.45-56, 5×1. BAM.PR.N now has a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.91% based on a bid of 20.20 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 17,533 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 23.11 and a limitMaturity.

There were eleven other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : March, 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-03-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,597.3 1 1.00 5.51% 14.7 67M 5.48%
FixedFloater 1,989.1 11 1.90 5.35% 14.4 183M 5.50%
Floater 1,512.3 4 1.75 5.48% 13.0 61M 6.07%
OpRet 1,448.3 35 1.23 4.71% 2.0 69M 6.16%
SplitShare 1,472.3 8 1.87 5.20% 5.3 97M 6.15%
Interest-Bearing 1,656.7 7 2.00 7.03% 3.0 171M 7.95%
Perpetual-Premium 1,177.9 1 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,246.7 11 1.54 5.72% 14.4 170M 5.77%

Index Constitution, 2001-03-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-03-30, Post-rebalancing