June 24, 2008

June 24th, 2008

An interesting bit of NRSRO news today … the Treasury is jumping on the bandwagon, albeit with an afterthought that makes sense:

There must be changes in credit-rating companies’ practices, as well as in the way corporations use those ratings, he said

“The users of their services must rely less on, and appreciate more, the limitations of ratings products,” he said.

Bloomberg’s afraid to admit that the full speech has been posted by the Treasury department … I wish the media would quit these coy little games! He went on to say:

To aid in accomplishing this goal, a second private-sector group is outlining further steps that issuers, underwriters, and credit rating agencies can take to ensure the integrity and transparency of ratings, and to foster the appropriate use of ratings in risk assessment. The Asset Managers’ Group at SIFMA is leading this effort. They are exploring issues including: use and quality of ratings; business models; and credit rating agency independence. We expect their work to be completed by the end of July.

Once identified and assessed, risks must be better managed. During the past year, many financial institutions, money managers, and investors simply failed to appreciate the magnitude and nature of risks on their books. This inability to aggregate risk and transparently address public concerns led to even further uncertainty, volatility, and dislocations. We need improved risk management practices by investors and financial institutions.

Great. Better Living Through More Rules. More box-ticking to do and (inevitably) an increasingly vicious regulatory response towards asset managers unlucky enough to be invested in the cause celebre of the day.

Also on the credit ratings front, Naked Capitalism takes a dim view of the latest (rumoured) rules to decrease blind reliance on ratings in regulation of Money Market Funds.

Bloomberg has picked up on the story.

It’s all craziness. The Portfolio Manager is responsible for Everything. He may, or may not, wish to rely on Credit Rating Agency advice … although, as I have argued, it would be really nice if the Friendly Regulators did not ensure that Credit Rating Agencies have better access to information than us ordinary mortals.

The root of the trouble is this: performance doesn’t matter. Salesmen have taken over the industry and all they need is something to package and sell … whether the package is any good or not is something that really doesn’t enter into the question. If the regulators wish to avoid blow-ups and improve the quality of investment advice, then they must track performance. Anybody with a license to trade with discretion, or who is part of a team of advisors helping the PM to trade with discretion, should be reporting performance versus a benchmark. And that performance should become part of the regulatory record that is published by the regulators forever. No more burying of unsuccessful funds; no more coyness regarding long term results.

The Credit Rating Agencies, for instance, publish their track records going back 20 years. When was the last time any Assiduous Reader saw a stockbroker’s 20-year track record? Or saw a brokerage provide half the self-analysis that the NRSRO’s routinely produce?

When discussing the teleportation of US Municipal ratings to the global scale in Be Careful What You Wish For!, I suggested one flaw in the analysis was the assumption that all newly-indistinguishable credits would trade as if they were top-quality; Accrued Interest points out that there is hazard on the issuer side too:

The high ratings standards for municipals encourages some measure of fiscal conservatism. This is especially true for Aaa-rated credits, where loss of the rating would be politically embarrassing. Of course, municipalities are downgraded all the time, but clearly local politicians would rather maintain their rating than not. If the overwhelming majority of general obligation issuers are going to be rated Aaa anyway, that incentive is greatly reduced. In other words, a state like Georgia (rated Aaa) is currently incented to maintain its austerity. But if they could slide all the way down to California’s level (currently A1) and still be rated Aaa, they’ll probably do it.

But the rating hysteria is regulator/politician driven – neither group is notable for thinking things through.

The recently issued L.PR.A traded 24,250 shares today in a range of 23.00-24.40, closing at 24.00-15, 2×5. Nice range, eh? It does not reflect well on either the market maker or the underwriters. Those who sold today at 23.00 should be writing letters of complaint to the TSX regarding the day’s thoroughly appalling market-making.

Let’s see if these overpaid jokers can get it right tomorrow, when, I suspect, the excitement will be regarding BAM Flambé.

Another good day today, although not exceptional. Very good crossing volume in some of the near-term Operating Retractibles.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.21% 4.23% 51,881 16.95 1 +0.1180% 1,115.5
Fixed-Floater 4.80% 4.54% 63,571 16.17 7 +0.1884% 1,044.3
Floater 4.02% 4.02% 68,866 17.38 2 -0.2407% 952.9
Op. Retract 4.86% 3.20% 86,356 2.54 15 -0.1476% 1,053.6
Split-Share 5.34% 5.83% 67,430 4.13 15 -0.5931% 1,043.4
Interest Bearing 6.11% 3.59% 47,111 2.00 3 -0.2000% 1,121.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.91% 4.59% 349,437 9.54 13 +0.2151% 1,015.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.94% 6.01% 221,570 13.85 59 +0.2223% 884.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet -2.8398% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.00% based on a bid of 23.95 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00.
WFS.PR.A SplitShare -1.5625% Downgraded yesterday … but still Pfd-2(low)! Asset coverage of just under 1.7:1 as of June 19, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.34% based on a bid of 9.45 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00.
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -1.2833% Asset coverage of just under 3.6:1 as of May 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.64% based on a bid of 20.00 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00.
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -1.0891% Asset coverage of 2.2+:1 as of June 19, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 9.99 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
BCE.PR.Z Fixfloat +1.0381%  
BMO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.0989% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.79% based on a bid of 23.00 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.0989% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 23.00 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.1688% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.94% based on a bid of 23.37 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualDiscount +1.1837% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.74% based on a bid of 24.79 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.3158% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.78% based on a bid of 23.10 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +2.4665% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.86% based on a bid of 19.11 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BMO.PR.I OpRet 286,200 CIBC crossed 275,000 at 25.18, then another 10,200 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 1.06% based on a bid of 25.17 and a call 2008-7-24 at 25.00.
ACO.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 217,707 CIBC crossed 217,700 at 26.75. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.10% based on a bid of 26.55 and a call 2008-12-31 at 26.00.
GWO.PR.E OpRet 172,595 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.80% based on a bid of 25.60 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00.
CM.PR.R OpRet 144,950 Nesbitt crossed every single share in three tranches, all at 26.15. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.11% based on a bid of 26.00 and a call 2008-7-24 at 25.75.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualDiscount 29,785 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 24.80. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.74% based on a bid of 24.79 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty-three other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

CIU.PR.A : Analyze as Junior to Series Second

June 24th, 2008

This post arises from inquiries I made subsequent to their debenture issue.

CU Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Canadian Utilities Limited and in turn controls several operating utilities of its own.

Consolidated financial statements therefore bring with them a certain amount of confusion when considering their two series of preferred shares.

The “Series Preferred Shares” currently have only one series outstanding, which is CIU.PR.A. There also exist the “Series Second Preferred Shares”, of which Series U and Series V are outstanding.

Bearing in mind the language from the CIU.PR.A prospectus (bolding added):

In the event of the liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Corporation, or other distribution of assets of the Corporation among its shareholders for the purpose of winding-up its affairs, the holders of the Series 1 Preferred Shares shall be entitled to receive the amount paid up on such shares together with all accrued and unpaid cumulative preferential dividends thereon and, if such liquidation, dissolution, winding-up or distribution is voluntary, a premium of $1.00 per share if such event commences prior to June 1, 2009, and, if such event commences thereafter, a premium equivalent to the premium payable on redemption if such shares were to be redeemed at the date of commencement of any such voluntary liquidation, dissolution, winding-up or distribution, before any amount shall be paid or any property or assets of the Corporation shall be distributed to the holders of any Class A non-voting shares or Class B common shares or other shares ranking junior to the Series 1 Preferred Shares. After payment to the holders of the Series 1 Preferred Shares of the amounts so payable to them, they shall not be entitled to share in any further distribution of the property or assets of the Corporation.

It seems reasonable to ask: are the “Series Second Preferred Shares” junior, senior or parri passu with the Series 1 Preferred Shares?

It turns out – as is not made clear in any financial statements or prospectus that I’ve been able to find – that the “Series Second Preferred Shares” are actually issued by CU Inc.’s subsidiaries and are held by Canadian Utilities (the parent). So what happens if disaster strikes? It’s something of a persnicketty question to be asking of a utility holding company, to be sure … but disaster can strike at any time and as fixed income investors, we seek to ensure it strikes somebody else.

I have been unable to determine just which of CU Inc’s subsidiaries have issued the “Series Second”, so let’s analyze this generically – assume that CU Inc holds all the common equity in SubPref and SubPlain. Canadian Utilities (“Parent”) owns all the common of CU Inc, and all the preferreds issued by SubPref. We – public preferred share holders – hold all the preferreds issued by CU Inc. Let’s look at some scenarios.

CU Inc dragged down by bankruptcy of SubPref: All the common equity in SubPref has been lost; there is only enough to cover SubPrefs Preferreds. Parent gets paid off for its preferreds; CU Inc gets nothing; it is conceivable that CIU.PR.A holders get nothing. In this case, we may regard the SubPref Preferreds to be at least parri passu and possibly senior to CIU.PR.A

CU Inc dragged down by bankruptcy of SubPlain: All the common equity in SubPlain is gone; this loss could be enough to wipe out CU Inc’s common and Preferred equity, as the value of the SubPref equity is just enough to cover CU Inc’s senior debt. However, Parent still has an interest in the SubPref preferreds. Again, the Series Second is at least parri passu and possibly senior to CIU.PR.A

Even worse bankruptcy of SubPref: All the common AND all the preferred equity of SubPref is wiped out, but SubPlain has enough equity to pay off CIU.PR.A. In this scenario, anyway, CIU.PR.A is at least parri passu and possibly senior to “Series Second”.

So, we look at this … the first two scenarios, at a glance, look more believable than the third, in the absence of any numbers, anyway. In any event, given the absence of deconsolidated statements, we have to believe that the first two scenarios are possible … and since these are the worst-case scenarios, gloomy fixed income investors such as ourselves will assume they’re likely.

Therefore, I suggest that anybody constructing a table of asset coverage ratios for operating company preferreds should assume that CIU.PR.A is junior to “Series Second” and therefore is protected only by the common equity buffer. Drat! The coverage would have been 10% higher if we had comfort that they were, in fact, senior.

This assumption of Junior status can be contradicted at any time that Atco / Canadian Utilities / CU Inc. chooses to make deconsolidated statements available. However, what puzzles me is the question of why this situation exists in the first place. Why is Canadian Utilities Inc. insisting on holding a claim in ultimate subsidiaries that is senior to the claim of an intermediate subsidiary? It doesn’t show a lot of confidence in the viability of the ultimate subsidiaries, and leaves investors in the intermediate subsidiary with the possibility that they will be left holding the baby.

It may be a regulatory thing … it may be a tax thing. The company does not see fit to address the issue.

Please note! This is Finance Geek stuff! CU Inc is rated Pfd-2(high) by DBRS and P-2(high) by S&P and I have no quarrels with these ratings … although I would like to see some of that material non-public information that the company may selectively disclose to these agencies to assist them to a favourable conclusion.

Update: See also previous post for CIU.PR.A

What Constrains Banks?

June 24th, 2008

My interest was piqued by a paper by R. Alton Gilbert, a former VP of the St. Louis Fed; the paper was an advocacy piece, Keep the leverage ratio for large banks to limit the competitive effects of implementing Basel II capital requirements.

The abstract reads:

In October 2005, the agencies that supervise U.S. depository institutions proposed changes in the Basel I capital requirements that will apply to the banks that will not be subject to the new Basel II capital requirements. An objective of the U.S. bank supervisors for proposing changes in Basel I capital requirements is to mitigate any competitive inequalities created by implementing Basel II capital requirements. This paper explains why the proposed changes in Basel I capital requirements would not mitigate such competitive inequalities for many of the banks that will continue to be subject to the Basel I capital requirements. In addition, this paper argues that an important means of limiting competitive effects from implementing Basel II capital requirements is to maintain the leverage ratio as one of the capital requirements for the banks that adopt Basel II capital requirements.

… with the thesis:

This paper argues that the proposed changes in Basel I capital requirements would not mitigate the competitive effects of implementing Basel II for many of the banks that will continue to be subject to Basel I capital requirements. For various reasons some of these banks are not bound by the minimum capital requirements of Basel I, in the sense that they would not reduce their capital if the supervisors reduced the minimum capital requirements. Other banks are bound by the leverage ratio, rather than the risk-based capital requirements of Basel I. The leverage ratio is a minimum ratio of Tier 1 capital to a measure of total assets.

… and:

One way to mitigate competitive inequalities under Basel II is to maintain the leverage ratio for the large banks that will be subject to Basel II. The leverage ratio places a tight limit on the percentage by which the largest U.S. banking organizations would be permitted to increase their assets (for given capital) under Basel II. Chairman Powell of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation recently argued for retaining the leverage ratio for the banks that adopt Basel II. He argued for retaining the leverage ratio on the basis of the degree of risk assumed by the individual banking institutions that will adopt Basel II capital requirement. This paper adds another reason for retaining the leverage ratio for the banks that adopt Basel II. The changes in Basel I capital requirements the at the supervisors proposed in October 2005 will not affect the capital held by many of the banks that will continue to be subject to Basel I capital requirements. For these banks retaining the leverage ratio for the banks that adopt Basel II is a means of mitigating competitive inequalities created by implementing Basel II.

He supports the views of Powell – former FDIC Chairman – but for different reasons. Powell’s views were referenced in PrefBlog in the post Expected Losses and the Assets to Capital Multiple.

So, after reading through his paper, I wondered: what is the constraint on the balance sheets of Canadian Banks. I drew some data from the second quarter summary of Canadian banking capitalization and drilled down back into the supplementary packages reported by the banks to produce:

Big-6 Bank Constraint Summary
2Q08
  Note RY BNS BMO TD CM NA
Equity Capital A 17,527 16,113 13,499 15,069 9,078 3,534
Tier 1 Cap B 23,708 21,073 17,551 16,262 12,175 5,089
Tier 2 Cap C 4,889 5,642 4,124 6,434 6,061 2,667
Total
Capital
D 28,597 25,588 21,675 22,696 17,255 7,353
Tier 1 Ratio E 9.5% 9.6% 9.4% 9.1% 10.5% 9.2%
Total Ratio F 11.5% 11.7% 11.6% 12.7% 14.4% 13.3%
Assets to
Capital
Multiple
G 20.1 17.7 16.2 19.2 19.3 16.7
RWA to
T1R = 4%
H 137% 140% 135% 128% 162% 130%
RWA to
TotR = 8%
I 44% 46% 45% 59% 80% 66%
Assets to
ACM = 20
J -1% 13% 23% 4% 4% 20%
Assets to
ACM = 23
K 14% 30% 42% 20% 19% 38%
A : See Bank Capitalization Summary : 2Q08
B: From Supplementary Packages
C: From Supplementary Packages
D: From Supplementary Packages – will not be sum of B & C due to adjustments
E: From Supplementary Packages
F: From Supplementary Packages
G: See source notes from Note A reference; some are my estimates
H: Percentage increase in Risk Weighted Assets that results in a Tier 1 Ratio of 4%; = (E / 0.04 – 1) %
I: Percentage Increase in Risk Weighted Assets that results in a Total Capital Ratio of 8%; = (F / 0.08 -1) %
J: Percentage Increase in Assets that results in an Assets-to-Capital Multiple of 20x; = ((20 / G) – 1) %
K: Percentage Increase in Assets that results in an Assets-to-Capital Multiple of 23x; = ((23 / G) – 1) %

It should be noted that the percentage increases calculated imply no change in asset mix, which will not be accurate. It may be assumed, for instance, that in the event of credit lines being drawn down, or an unexpected burst of lending activity, other assets will be liquidated to fund them, rather than having them funded by new liabilities. Royal Bank, for instance, reports that as of April 30, securities held that were guaranteed by Canada or a province totalled $27.1-billion. This amount is very close to its total capitalization. Deposits with other regulated financial institutions (other than the Bank of Canada) totalled $15.8-billion. While some of these assets will be held in the ordinary course of business – trading operations and whatnot – a large chunk of these assets could be sold to fund new business expected to be more profitable than government securities. This would increase Risk Weighted Assets without affecting the ACM.

Still – given that Royal Bank is over the 20x ACM limit and had to apply for special permission to achieve this state, it looks to me that the major constraint is the Assets-to-Capital multiple; which is consistent with Powell’s and Gilbert’s assertions with respect to the US. It is not consistent, however, with an assertion by OSFI that “the leverage multiple is not usually the binding constraint for large complex banking organizations”.

I will have to investigate this further!

June 23, 2008

June 23rd, 2008

In one of the year’s easier calls, BCE issues skyrocketted today … now, if only I’d known that while Friday’s market was still trading! As suspected, the broader market followed. Volume was OK, but nothing special … my suspicion is that the Swoon in June was largely retail window dressing (based on the the strange price behaviour and relatively low volume) and that institutional players – such as they are – are looking at all this kerfuffle with an air of bemusement.

But what do I know?

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.21% 4.23% 52,104 16.97 1 -0.0393% 1,114.1
Fixed-Floater 4.81% 4.54% 64,821 16.17 7 +5.2272% 1,042.3
Floater 4.01% 4.01% 69,500 17.40 2 +0.7841% 955.2
Op. Retract 4.85% 2.86% 85,966 2.55 15 -0.2108% 1,055.1
Split-Share 5.30% 5.66% 67,029 4.14 15 +0.1020% 1,049.7
Interest Bearing 6.10% 3.08% 47,609 2.01 3 +0.1674% 1,123.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.92% 4.65% 351,774 9.52 13 +0.6112% 1,013.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.95% 6.02% 222,299 13.84 59 +0.8044% 882.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.E OpRet -1.1262% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.01% based on a bid of 25.46 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.0050% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.01% based on a bid of 20.10 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.0101% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.67% based on a bid of 20.00 and a limitMaturity.
W.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.1995% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.27% based on a bid of 22.78 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.I PerpetualPremium +1.2000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.95% based on a bid of 25.30 and a call 2012-5-30 at 25.00.
SBN.PR.A Splitshare +1.2024% Asset coverage of 2.2+:1 as of June 12 according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.10% based on a bid of 10.10 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.2048% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.99% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.3333% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.85% based on a bid of 22.80 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.3774% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.23% based on a bid of 18.40 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.4263% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.94% based on a bid of 19.20 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.K Floater +1.5702%  
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.5873% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.94% based on a bid of 19.20 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.6000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.06% based on a bid of 24.13 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.7467% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 23.30 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.7653% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.24% based on a bid of 19.60 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +2.0397% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.74% based on a bid of 18.01 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +2.0942% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.80% based on a bid of 19.50 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +2.2727% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.88% based on a bid of 20.25 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +2.3459% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.99% based on a bid of 22.25 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +2.3810% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.04% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +2.4313% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.16% based on a bid of 22.75 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount +2.4719% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 22.80 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +2.5907% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.88% based on a bid of 19.80 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +2.7027% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 19.80 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +2.7027% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.07% based on a bid of 23.90 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat +4.7727%  
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat +4.8526%  
BCE.PR.C FixFloat +5.6000%  
BCE.PR.R FixFloat +5.8296%  
BCE.PR.I FixFloat +7.5455%  
BCE.PR.A FixFloat +8.1818%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 47,200 Nesbitt bought 10,000 from HSBC at 19.20. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.94% based on a bid of 19.18 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat 41,867 CIBC crossed 40,500 at 23.10.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 36,661 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.67% based on a bid of 20.00 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 33,450 CIBC crossed 25,000 at 19.80. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 19.76 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 32,100 Nesbitt bought 28,000 from RBC at 18.00 in five tranches. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.74% based on a bid of 18.01 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-one other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

WFS.PR.A Downgraded to Pfd-2(low)/Trend Negative by DBRS

June 23rd, 2008

DBRS has today:

downgraded the Preferred Shares issued by World Financial Split Corp. (the Company) to Pfd-2 (low) , with a Negative trend, from Pfd-2. The rating has been removed from Under Review with Developing Implications where it was placed on March 19, 2008.

In February 2004, the Company raised gross proceeds of approximately $471 million by issuing 18.85 million Preferred Shares at $10 each and an equal number of Class A Shares at $15 each. The net proceeds from the offering were invested in a portfolio of common shares (the Portfolio) that included the ten largest financial services companies by market capitalization in each of Canada, the United States and the rest of the world (only companies listed on a North American stock exchange). In addition, up to 20% of the net asset value (NAV) of the Company can be invested in financial services companies other than the 30 companies included in the Portfolio. The initial split share structure provided downside protection of approximately 57% to the Preferred Shares (after expenses).

The holders of the Preferred Shares receive fixed cumulative quarterly distributions equal to 5.25% per annum. The fixed distributions of dividends on the Preferred Shares are funded from the dividends received on the Portfolio Shares, with covered call option premium income and, if necessary, from the sale of the Portfolio’s shares. Holders of the Class A Shares receive regular quarterly cash dividends targeted to yield 8.0% per annum. The Company is currently required to generate a return of about 8% from sources other than dividend income in order to maintain a stable NAV. However, there is a NAV test that greatly mitigates this grind if the Portfolio value continues to deteriorate as no distributions will be paid to the Class A Shareholders if the asset coverage available to the holders of the Preferred Shares drops below 1.5 times (NAV of $15).

The Company’s NAV has experienced downward pressure over the past year, dropping from $22.48 per share to $16.56, a decline of 28%. The current downside protection available to the Preferred Shareholders is approximately 40% (as of June 12, 2008). The downgrade of the Preferred Shares is primarily based on the reduced level of asset coverage available to cover the Preferred Shares principal. The rating has a Negative trend due to the high hurdle rate currently required in order to avoid further deterioration in the NAV.

The redemption date for both classes of shares issued is June 30, 2011

The DBRS mass review of financial splits has been previously discussed. The issue was removed from the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index effective December with all the other split-shares. WFS.PR.A is a member of the HIMIPref™ Split-Share Index.

Update: See also previous post for WFS.PR.A.

FBS.PR.B Downgraded to Pfd-2(low) by DBRS

June 23rd, 2008

DBRS has today:

downgraded the Class B Preferred Shares (the Preferred Shares) issued by 5Banc Split Inc. (the Company) to Pfd-2 (low), with a Stable trend, from Pfd-2. The rating has been removed from Under Review with Developing Implications where it was placed on March 19, 2008.

In December 2006 and January 2007, the Company raised gross proceeds of $282 million by issuing 14.1 million Preferred Shares at $10 each and an equal number of Capital Shares at $10 each. The net proceeds from the offering were invested in a portfolio of initially equally weighted common shares (the Portfolio) of the top five Canadian chartered banks: Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada and The Toronto-Dominion Bank. The initial split share structure provided downside protection of approximately 48% to the Preferred Shares (after expenses).

The holders of the Preferred Shares receive fixed cumulative quarterly distributions equal to 4.75% per annum. The fixed distributions of dividends on the Preferred Shares are funded from the dividends received on the Portfolio and, if necessary, with proceeds from the sale of the Portfolio’s shares. The current yield on the Portfolio fully covers the Preferred Shares dividend, providing dividend coverage of approximately 1.3 times. Excess dividends net of all expenses of the Company are paid as dividends on the Capital Shares.

The Company’s net asset value (NAV) has experienced downward pressure over the past year, dropping from $19.35 per share to $15.87, a decline of 18%. The current downside protection available to the Preferred Shareholders is approximately 37% (as of June 19, 2008). The downgrade of the Preferred Shares is primarily based on the reduced level of asset coverage available to cover the Preferred Shares principal.

The redemption date for both classes of shares issued is December 15, 2011

The DBRS mass review of financial splits has been previously discussed. FBS.PR.B had a partial call for redemption in November, and was removed from the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index with all the other split-share corporations at the last rebalancing. It is a included in the HIMIPref™ Split-Share Index.

Update: See also previous post for FBS.PR.B.

TXT.PR.A Downgraded to Pfd-3(high) by DBRS

June 23rd, 2008

DBRS has today:

downgraded the Preferred Securities issued by Top 10 Split Trust (the Trust) to Pfd-3 (high) , with a Stable trend, from Pfd-2 (low). The rating has been removed from Under Review with Developing Implications where it was placed on March 19, 2008.

In February and March of 2006, the Trust raised gross proceeds of approximately $70 million by issuing 2.72 million Preferred Securities at $12.50 each and an equal number of Capital Units at $13.10 each. The net proceeds from the offering were invested in a portfolio of common shares (the Portfolio) that included the six largest Canadian chartered banks (Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada and The Toronto-Dominion Bank) and the four largest Canadian life insurance companies (Great-West Lifeco Inc., Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc., Manulife Financial Corporation and Sun Life Financial Inc.). The Portfolio is actively managed by Mulvihill Capital Management Inc., and the Trust will generally invest not less than 5% and not more than 15% of its assets in the securities of each issuer in the Portfolio. The initial split share structure provided downside protection of approximately 48% to the Preferred Securities (after expenses).

The holders of the Preferred Securities receive fixed quarterly distributions equal to 6.25% per annum. The interest payments on the Preferred Securities are funded from the dividends received from the Portfolio, covered call option premium income and, if necessary, with proceeds from the sale of the Portfolio’s shares. Holders of the Capital Units receive regular quarterly cash dividends targeted to yield 7.5% of the net asset value (NAV) of the Trust per annum. Basing the distributions on the NAV of the Trust reduces the hurdle rate for the Trust and its requirement to write more options in the event of a declining NAV. The Trust is currently required to generate a return of about 5% from sources other than dividend income in order to maintain a stable NAV.

The Trust’s NAV has experienced downward pressure over the past year, dropping from $23.87 per share to $19.61, a decline of about 18%. The current downside protection available to the Preferred Shareholders is approximately 36% (as of June 12, 2008). The downgrade of the Preferred Securities is primarily based on the reduced level of asset coverage available to cover the Preferred Securities principal.

The DBRS mass review of financial splits has been previously discussed. TXT.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

BMO.PR.M Settles without Incident

June 23rd, 2008

The Fixed Reset 5.20%+165bp issue announced on June 12 settled today with good volume and tone. 308,269 shares traded in a range of 24.90-97, closing with a quote of 24.90-92, 14×230.

I have not yet seen a press release regarding the successful closing, which should also indicate how much, if any, of the greenshoe was taken up. There were 10-million shares in the issue, with a greenshoe for an additional 2-million shares exercisable prior to closing.

I still don’t like this issue structure … but with six of them now outstanding, it would appear that many people do! Once we get to ten good sized issues with this type of reset mechanism, I will commence tracking the issues with HIMIPref™ … and who knows, perhaps taking the occasional position when the yields get out of line!

Market Timing?

June 21st, 2008

I received the following eMail from a Reader who is not as Assiduous as he should be:

I haven’t been to your blog for a while but I went there today to get your perspective on what was happening with preferred spreads. Sure looks like a buying opportunity at 6%+ as one of your readers commented (RY, SLF , Pow, Pwf …. do not hesitate , do not be afraid , do not analyse to much , BUY !!). Others would analyze as don’t buy to average down. What’s your (long term) perspective on all this? Are you buying (what would be your top 10 list in this market)? Regards,

P.S. Feel free to post on your blog.

The post being referred to is Party Like It’s 1999!, in which I made the point that the interest-equivalent PerpetualDiscount spread was pretty close to a ten year high; the comment quoted was by Assiduous Reader lafontaine. And as far as a “Top 10 List” is concerned … I offer that service – not precisely ‘Top 10’ but the same idea – through my monthly newsletter, PrefLetter.

I don’t like market timing and I don’t do market timing. Financial Markets are chaotic; things that weren’t important a year ago can become the driving force in the blink of an eye; the Law of Unintended Consequences punishes any policy-maker with the temerity to indulge in central planning (and any portfolio manager with the temerity to overlay his own projections on policy changes); and, perhaps most insidiously, there are a lot of players with a vested interest in confusing the issue.

Journalists need something to write about; Dealers want to change your analysis of a situation so you’ll trade. Financial advisors find it easier to convince clients that the account is being aggressively and pro-actively managed in their best interest if there are a few actual trades to point at.

And every trade costs money – commissions and spread and sometimes market impact.

My philosopy is to be fully invested at all times. Make yourself an asset allocation based on your personal needs and your long-term view of expected risks and returns. Review it once a year. Always ask yourself: ‘What if I’m wrong?’

A disdain for market timing does not mean inactivity. My fund does an awful lot of trading … but this is never because of a view that the market is going to go up or down. It’s simply me telling the cowboys: ‘You want to trade? You want to pay the spread? You want to pay the cost of market impact? OK, you can pay that to me. Twist my arm!’ I’m not always right when I agree to a trade. Fortunately, I don’t have to be right every time to do a good job for my clients. Historically, my assessments of relative value have been accurate enough to outperform the market – although, I must point out, that is no guarantee for the future!

The more similar two instruments, the easier it is to identify the cheap one. Two discounted perps from the same issuer are easy to compare. A PerpetualDiscount and a PerpetualPremium from the same issuer is a little harder. A PerpetualDiscount and cash is … difficult in the extreme.

That being said, I think the recent decline in the market is overdone. It has happened without corresponding declines in the broader credit markets; it has happened without particularly horrible news from the issuers [bank common shareholders may well suffer in the coming months. So? I’m buying their prefs on the basis of them being able to (i) continue paying the dividend, and (ii) avoiding a bankruptcy that would impair my capital. I can’t see any but the most infinitesimal changes in the probability of those two outcomes]. Inflation is always a worry, but (a) it appears to be under control, and (b) back on the Central Bankers’ agendas and (c) not considered a major problem by the broader credit markets.

I consider that the extra interest-equivalent yield provided by preferreds handsomely compensates for their additional term risk, liquidity risk and credit risk (provided you don’t overdo it! What if I’m wrong?). As spreads increase without a clear fundamental driver, I suspect that more and more people will eventually agree with me. These people will pile into the market, absorbing spread costs and market impact costs … and I will certainly exert my utmost efforts to put myself in position to say ‘Thank you very much! Ka-Ching!

Monday June 23 will be a most interesting day. We can expect BCE issues to skyrocket, as the chances of the deal closing have increased; to the extent that (i) the money that may be received by BCE preferred shareholders will the reinvested in the preferred market and (ii) the market anticipates this tsunami of money; we may well see a good pop in the broader preferred share market. Will I bet on it? Have I bet on it? No and No.

June 20, 2008

June 20th, 2008

Stop presses! Sit down! Have some smelling salts! The PerpetualDiscount index was actually up today (up almost 42bp, in fact), ending a string of twelve consecutive losses from June 4 to June 19, inclusive. Those twelve consecutive losses took the PerpetualDiscount index down 5.80%.

Average pre-tax bid-YTW for PerpetualDiscounts is now 6.07%, interest-equivalent 8.50%, long corporates .. oh, call it 6.17% and 30-year Canadas at 4.15%.

Work out the spreads and update the graphs yourselves, ya bums! What am I, your maid?

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.20% 4.22% 51,358 17.00 1 -0.0393% 1,114.6
Fixed-Floater 5.06% 4.85% 62,750 15.82 7 -0.8252% 990.6
Floater 4.04% 4.04% 69,487 17.35 2 -0.4349% 947.8
Op. Retract 4.84% 2.43% 86,636 2.44 15 +0.8648% 1,057.4
Split-Share 5.31% 5.67% 68,606 4.15 15 +0.0429% 1,048.6
Interest Bearing 6.11% 3.77% 48,125 2.01 3 -0.2333% 1,121.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.96% 4.61% 360,772 10.27 13 -0.0252% 1,007.0
Perpetual-Discount 6.00% 6.07% 223,135 13.78 59 +0.4181% 875.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -3.7199%  
BCE.PRA FixFloat -2.0481%  
POW.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.6822% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.31% based on a bid of 22.21 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat -1.5625% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.97% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.4500% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.15% based on a bid of 20.39 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.1845% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.18% based on a bid of 21.69 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.1059% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.24% based on a bid of 23.25 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.H PerpetualPremium (for now!) -1.0962% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.99% based on a bid of 24.36 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.0693% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.15% based on a bid of 21.74 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount +1.1364% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.27% based on a bid of 22.25 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.1423% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 21.25 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.1702% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.06% based on a bid of 20.75 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.2168% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 18.30 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.2603% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 23.30 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.3263% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.92% based on a bid of 19.10 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.3966% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.31% based on a bid of 18.15 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.4000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.77% based on a bid of 20.28 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.J OpRet +1.4724% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 24.81 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.H (4.07% to 2008-10-30), BAM.PR.I (5.12% to 2013-12-30) and the new issue (5.02% to 2013-6-29).
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.6427% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.01% based on a bid of 19.80 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.8388% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.04% based on a bid of 21.60 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +2.2263% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.93% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.C FixFloat +2.2727%  
BMO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +2.7273% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.90% based on a bid of 22.60 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 273,166 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.77% based on a bid of 20.28 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount 208,374 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.82% based on a bid of 22.91 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 207,052 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.72% based on a bid of 19.80 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 205,100 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.79% based on a bid of 21.10 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.F PerpetualPremium 100,853 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 25.40 and a call 2012-10-30 at 25.00.

There were twenty-two other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.