An interesting bit of NRSRO news today … the Treasury is jumping on the bandwagon, albeit with an afterthought that makes sense:
There must be changes in credit-rating companies’ practices, as well as in the way corporations use those ratings, he said
“The users of their services must rely less on, and appreciate more, the limitations of ratings products,” he said.
Bloomberg’s afraid to admit that the full speech has been posted by the Treasury department … I wish the media would quit these coy little games! He went on to say:
To aid in accomplishing this goal, a second private-sector group is outlining further steps that issuers, underwriters, and credit rating agencies can take to ensure the integrity and transparency of ratings, and to foster the appropriate use of ratings in risk assessment. The Asset Managers’ Group at SIFMA is leading this effort. They are exploring issues including: use and quality of ratings; business models; and credit rating agency independence. We expect their work to be completed by the end of July.
Once identified and assessed, risks must be better managed. During the past year, many financial institutions, money managers, and investors simply failed to appreciate the magnitude and nature of risks on their books. This inability to aggregate risk and transparently address public concerns led to even further uncertainty, volatility, and dislocations. We need improved risk management practices by investors and financial institutions.
Great. Better Living Through More Rules. More box-ticking to do and (inevitably) an increasingly vicious regulatory response towards asset managers unlucky enough to be invested in the cause celebre of the day.
Also on the credit ratings front, Naked Capitalism takes a dim view of the latest (rumoured) rules to decrease blind reliance on ratings in regulation of Money Market Funds.
Bloomberg has picked up on the story.
It’s all craziness. The Portfolio Manager is responsible for Everything. He may, or may not, wish to rely on Credit Rating Agency advice … although, as I have argued, it would be really nice if the Friendly Regulators did not ensure that Credit Rating Agencies have better access to information than us ordinary mortals.
The root of the trouble is this: performance doesn’t matter. Salesmen have taken over the industry and all they need is something to package and sell … whether the package is any good or not is something that really doesn’t enter into the question. If the regulators wish to avoid blow-ups and improve the quality of investment advice, then they must track performance. Anybody with a license to trade with discretion, or who is part of a team of advisors helping the PM to trade with discretion, should be reporting performance versus a benchmark. And that performance should become part of the regulatory record that is published by the regulators forever. No more burying of unsuccessful funds; no more coyness regarding long term results.
The Credit Rating Agencies, for instance, publish their track records going back 20 years. When was the last time any Assiduous Reader saw a stockbroker’s 20-year track record? Or saw a brokerage provide half the self-analysis that the NRSRO’s routinely produce?
When discussing the teleportation of US Municipal ratings to the global scale in Be Careful What You Wish For!, I suggested one flaw in the analysis was the assumption that all newly-indistinguishable credits would trade as if they were top-quality; Accrued Interest points out that there is hazard on the issuer side too:
The high ratings standards for municipals encourages some measure of fiscal conservatism. This is especially true for Aaa-rated credits, where loss of the rating would be politically embarrassing. Of course, municipalities are downgraded all the time, but clearly local politicians would rather maintain their rating than not. If the overwhelming majority of general obligation issuers are going to be rated Aaa anyway, that incentive is greatly reduced. In other words, a state like Georgia (rated Aaa) is currently incented to maintain its austerity. But if they could slide all the way down to California’s level (currently A1) and still be rated Aaa, they’ll probably do it.
But the rating hysteria is regulator/politician driven – neither group is notable for thinking things through.
The recently issued L.PR.A traded 24,250 shares today in a range of 23.00-24.40, closing at 24.00-15, 2×5. Nice range, eh? It does not reflect well on either the market maker or the underwriters. Those who sold today at 23.00 should be writing letters of complaint to the TSX regarding the day’s thoroughly appalling market-making.
Let’s see if these overpaid jokers can get it right tomorrow, when, I suspect, the excitement will be regarding BAM Flambé.
Another good day today, although not exceptional. Very good crossing volume in some of the near-term Operating Retractibles.
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30 | |||||||
Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) | Mean YTW | Mean Average Trading Value | Mean Mod Dur (YTW) | Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Ratchet | 4.21% | 4.23% | 51,881 | 16.95 | 1 | +0.1180% | 1,115.5 |
Fixed-Floater | 4.80% | 4.54% | 63,571 | 16.17 | 7 | +0.1884% | 1,044.3 |
Floater | 4.02% | 4.02% | 68,866 | 17.38 | 2 | -0.2407% | 952.9 |
Op. Retract | 4.86% | 3.20% | 86,356 | 2.54 | 15 | -0.1476% | 1,053.6 |
Split-Share | 5.34% | 5.83% | 67,430 | 4.13 | 15 | -0.5931% | 1,043.4 |
Interest Bearing | 6.11% | 3.59% | 47,111 | 2.00 | 3 | -0.2000% | 1,121.1 |
Perpetual-Premium | 5.91% | 4.59% | 349,437 | 9.54 | 13 | +0.2151% | 1,015.3 |
Perpetual-Discount | 5.94% | 6.01% | 221,570 | 13.85 | 59 | +0.2223% | 884.6 |
Major Price Changes | |||
Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
BAM.PR.J | OpRet | -2.8398% | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.00% based on a bid of 23.95 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. |
WFS.PR.A | SplitShare | -1.5625% | Downgraded yesterday … but still Pfd-2(low)! Asset coverage of just under 1.7:1 as of June 19, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.34% based on a bid of 9.45 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00. |
BNA.PR.B | SplitShare | -1.2833% | Asset coverage of just under 3.6:1 as of May 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.64% based on a bid of 20.00 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. |
SBN.PR.A | SplitShare | -1.0891% | Asset coverage of 2.2+:1 as of June 19, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 9.99 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. |
BCE.PR.Z | Fixfloat | +1.0381% | |
BMO.PR.H | PerpetualDiscount | +1.0989% | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.79% based on a bid of 23.00 and a limitMaturity. |
POW.PR.A | PerpetualDiscount | +1.0989% | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 23.00 and a limitMaturity. |
PWF.PR.E | PerpetualDiscount | +1.1688% | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.94% based on a bid of 23.37 and a limitMaturity. |
TD.PR.Q | PerpetualDiscount | +1.1837% | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.74% based on a bid of 24.79 and a limitMaturity. |
BNS.PR.N | PerpetualDiscount | +1.3158% | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.78% based on a bid of 23.10 and a limitMaturity. |
SLF.PR.C | PerpetualDiscount | +2.4665% | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.86% based on a bid of 19.11 and a limitMaturity. |
Volume Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Volume | Notes |
BMO.PR.I | OpRet | 286,200 | CIBC crossed 275,000 at 25.18, then another 10,200 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 1.06% based on a bid of 25.17 and a call 2008-7-24 at 25.00. |
ACO.PR.A | PerpetualDiscount | 217,707 | CIBC crossed 217,700 at 26.75. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.10% based on a bid of 26.55 and a call 2008-12-31 at 26.00. |
GWO.PR.E | OpRet | 172,595 | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.80% based on a bid of 25.60 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00. |
CM.PR.R | OpRet | 144,950 | Nesbitt crossed every single share in three tranches, all at 26.15. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.11% based on a bid of 26.00 and a call 2008-7-24 at 25.75. |
TD.PR.Q | PerpetualDiscount | 29,785 | Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 24.80. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.74% based on a bid of 24.79 and a limitMaturity. |
There were thirty-three other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.
CIU.PR.A : Analyze as Junior to Series Second
June 24th, 2008This post arises from inquiries I made subsequent to their debenture issue.
CU Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Canadian Utilities Limited and in turn controls several operating utilities of its own.
Consolidated financial statements therefore bring with them a certain amount of confusion when considering their two series of preferred shares.
The “Series Preferred Shares” currently have only one series outstanding, which is CIU.PR.A. There also exist the “Series Second Preferred Shares”, of which Series U and Series V are outstanding.
Bearing in mind the language from the CIU.PR.A prospectus (bolding added):
It seems reasonable to ask: are the “Series Second Preferred Shares” junior, senior or parri passu with the Series 1 Preferred Shares?
It turns out – as is not made clear in any financial statements or prospectus that I’ve been able to find – that the “Series Second Preferred Shares” are actually issued by CU Inc.’s subsidiaries and are held by Canadian Utilities (the parent). So what happens if disaster strikes? It’s something of a persnicketty question to be asking of a utility holding company, to be sure … but disaster can strike at any time and as fixed income investors, we seek to ensure it strikes somebody else.
I have been unable to determine just which of CU Inc’s subsidiaries have issued the “Series Second”, so let’s analyze this generically – assume that CU Inc holds all the common equity in SubPref and SubPlain. Canadian Utilities (“Parent”) owns all the common of CU Inc, and all the preferreds issued by SubPref. We – public preferred share holders – hold all the preferreds issued by CU Inc. Let’s look at some scenarios.
CU Inc dragged down by bankruptcy of SubPref: All the common equity in SubPref has been lost; there is only enough to cover SubPrefs Preferreds. Parent gets paid off for its preferreds; CU Inc gets nothing; it is conceivable that CIU.PR.A holders get nothing. In this case, we may regard the SubPref Preferreds to be at least parri passu and possibly senior to CIU.PR.A
CU Inc dragged down by bankruptcy of SubPlain: All the common equity in SubPlain is gone; this loss could be enough to wipe out CU Inc’s common and Preferred equity, as the value of the SubPref equity is just enough to cover CU Inc’s senior debt. However, Parent still has an interest in the SubPref preferreds. Again, the Series Second is at least parri passu and possibly senior to CIU.PR.A
Even worse bankruptcy of SubPref: All the common AND all the preferred equity of SubPref is wiped out, but SubPlain has enough equity to pay off CIU.PR.A. In this scenario, anyway, CIU.PR.A is at least parri passu and possibly senior to “Series Second”.
So, we look at this … the first two scenarios, at a glance, look more believable than the third, in the absence of any numbers, anyway. In any event, given the absence of deconsolidated statements, we have to believe that the first two scenarios are possible … and since these are the worst-case scenarios, gloomy fixed income investors such as ourselves will assume they’re likely.
Therefore, I suggest that anybody constructing a table of asset coverage ratios for operating company preferreds should assume that CIU.PR.A is junior to “Series Second” and therefore is protected only by the common equity buffer. Drat! The coverage would have been 10% higher if we had comfort that they were, in fact, senior.
This assumption of Junior status can be contradicted at any time that Atco / Canadian Utilities / CU Inc. chooses to make deconsolidated statements available. However, what puzzles me is the question of why this situation exists in the first place. Why is Canadian Utilities Inc. insisting on holding a claim in ultimate subsidiaries that is senior to the claim of an intermediate subsidiary? It doesn’t show a lot of confidence in the viability of the ultimate subsidiaries, and leaves investors in the intermediate subsidiary with the possibility that they will be left holding the baby.
It may be a regulatory thing … it may be a tax thing. The company does not see fit to address the issue.
Please note! This is Finance Geek stuff! CU Inc is rated Pfd-2(high) by DBRS and P-2(high) by S&P and I have no quarrels with these ratings … although I would like to see some of that material non-public information that the company may selectively disclose to these agencies to assist them to a favourable conclusion.
Update: See also previous post for CIU.PR.A
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