BAM / BPP Floater Credit Inversion

May 23rd, 2008

In the last edition of PrefLetter I pointed out a significant inversion in the floating rate sector, with BPO Properties Ltd. Fltg Rate Pr Series “J”, for instance (BPP.PR.J) trading at a higher price than Brookfield Asset Management Inc Cl A Pr Ser 13 (BAM.PR.K), despite the latter’s higher credit rating.

DBRS notes:

BPO’s debt-to-gross book value could increase to closer to 50% to 55% over the next two years from 44% currently. EBITDA interest coverage is likely to decline prior to Bay-Adelaide coming online in mid-2009, but is expected to remain close to 2.5 times including capitalized interest, which is acceptable for the current rating. Fixed-charges coverage should remain manageable at close to two times. Excluding capitalized interest, EBITDA interest coverage should remain above three times.

Over the short term, BPO should continue to benefit from stronger office markets looking forward which could drive growth in cash flows to support EBITDA interest coverage ratios. Net rental rates in Calgary have experienced unprecedented growth of approximately 50% over the past two years to $35 to $40 per square foot. BPO’s in-place rents are on average 25% to 30% below current market net rents, partly due to long-term leases.

The rating also reflects the following factors: (1) BPO has greater diversification with the addition of new markets in Ottawa and Edmonton in recent years that enhance cash flow stability. (2) BPO’s solid tenant profile and average lease maturity of seven years is expected to support cash flow stability.

It’s a nice little company – and according to note 10 of their 2007 Annual Report, all the debt is secured by individual properties and is non-recourse to the company. This is a nice provision; I like this provision. Each property can hurt them, certainly, in the event of disastrous market conditions, but no single property can take out the company.

The problems are the same as with every other property company … rents can go to zero, or negative (you have to pay the janitor!) for years while the mortgage still needs to be paid … and I would be a lot happier if they weren’t so concentrated in Toronto & Calgary. But they do a good job of mitigating these risks with long leases and well-staggered mortgage maturities.

BPO Properties is 89% controlled by Brookfield Asset Management … this sort of subsidiary action can be a chancy thing. In general, it is better to be close to the money (Loblaws is a better credit – slightly – than Weston; Bell Canada preferred were a much better credit than BCE, until the idiot holders gave up their advantage for trivial consideration), but in some cases it’s better to be diversified.

Regarding BAM’s credit, DBRS noted in 2006:

Brookfield has completed the move from cyclical natural resources-based investments to a diversified portfolio of investments focused on stable real estate, power and infrastructure assets. This strategy is supported by Brookfield’s solid balance sheet and good liquidity. Brookfield also continues to develop relationships with large institutional investors, mitigating some of the risks associated with large investments.

Consistent with this overall strategy, Brookfield, along with three large Canadian institutional investors, recently announced plans to acquire HQI Transelec Chile S.A., the largest electricity-transmission company in Chile, for approximately $1.7 billion, of which Brookfield’s share of the equity is expected to be approximately 30%, or $300 million. Also, Brookfield Properties Corporation (Brookfield Properties), which is 50% owned by Brookfield, and The Blackstone Group recently bid to acquire Trizec Canada Inc. and Trizec Properties, Inc. for total consideration of $9.2 billion. The net effective interest of Brookfield Properties is approximately $400 million in equity ($1.74 billion in total value) after reflecting the interest of other large institutional shareholders. This compliments its growing portfolio of investments in stable assets that generate relatively predictable cash flow.

In 2005, Brookfield continued to generate strong free cash flow of $475 million on a remitted basis (adjusted to reflect actual dividends paid by Brookfield Properties and Brookfield Homes Corporation) and coverage ratios remain solid. Although Brookfield recently increased its common dividend by 50%, its substantially larger asset base and stable cash flows are expected to support higher levels of cash outflows. As a result, Brookfield is expected to continue to generate free cash flow after all dividends in 2006 as acquisitions in the power segment in particular contribute to higher cash flows.

During 2005, Brookfield was successful in reducing its debt levels to 28% on a deconsolidated basis, which is below 2004’s 34%, within its target range of 25% to 30% and acceptable for a holding company. Improved debt levels were largely due to the divestiture of its stake in Falconbridge Limited for net cash proceeds of $1.4 billion (proceeds from the sale were $2.7 billion, including preferred shares and exchangeable debentures). Brookfield remains committed to maintaining a solid credit profile through prudent balance-sheet management. Funds for investment will come from its significant internal free cash flow and liquid investments of more than $2 billion.

Their consolidated debt-to-equity ratio looks scary, but most of this is property-specific; additionally, there is much more diversification than with BPP. If, for instance, the real-estate market in Calgary & Toronto cratered, BAM could simply jettison BPP, taking a large loss, but staying afloat with their timberland and power-generation assets. I have no problem with the idea that BAM is a better credit than BPP.

The market has recently had other ideas, however, with BPP floaters yielding less than BAM floaters. It’s a funny old world. The May edition of PrefLetter included some charts showing the development of this inversion:

The credit inversion continues and encompasses all the floaters of each issuer: BAM.PR.B & BAM.PR.K vs. BPP.PR.G, BPP.PR.J & BPP.PR.M. It should be noted that the BPP floaters are highly illiquid.

May 22, 2008

May 22nd, 2008

Accrued Interest has a good piece today, elaborating his thoughts on the GSEs (which he insists on spelling with an apostrophe).

Did Freddie Mac move their ABS portfolio into Level 3 because they didn’t like the bid indications they were using for valuation? The company says no.

Buddy Piszel, CFO: We made a determination in the first quarter, that given how widely the pricing we were getting on the ABS portfolio, that it no longer made sense to leave that in Level 2…. We were still using the mean price that we were getting from the pricing services and the dealers. So we are not using a model price

So if you believe what he’s saying, that means that the actual valuation would be the same either way. By moving to Level 3, they are saying they no longer believe the valuations represent “observable inputs.”

It seems clear that The Financial Accounting Standards Board is feeling some heat about Level 3, the so-called “Mark to Make-Believe” level of financial assets. They have published an article rather desperately titled Some Facts about Fair Value:

Like the many other estimates used in financial reporting (some of which require complex calculations), Level 3 estimates can be difficult and require the use of significant judgments. However, many investors clearly have indicated that such estimates provide more relevant and useful information than alternatives that ignore current economic conditions and that can introduce management bias into the estimation process (for example, alternatives that involve “smoothing” techniques and predicting recoveries in value).

To increase investor awareness about Level 3 estimates, SFAS 157 requires expanded disclosures about the Level 3 estimates used for financial assets and liabilities that are reported at fair value on an ongoing basis. Those disclosures focus on the effect of the estimates on reported earnings and financial position. More recently, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a letter that encourages public companies to provide additional disclosures about the Level 3 estimates used for financial assets (including asset-backed securities, loans, and derivatives) in their Management Discussion & Analysis. The letter does not, as some have asserted, interpret, amend, or otherwise change the application of SFAS 157.

The SEC letter referred to has been published in generic form by the SEC:

Depending on your circumstances, the following disclosure and discussion points may be relevant as you prepare your MD&A:

  • The amount and reason for any material increase or decrease in Level 3 assets and liabilities resulting from your transfer of assets and liabilities from, or into, Level 1 or Level 2.
  • If you transferred a material amount of assets or liabilities into Level 3 during the period, a discussion of:
    • the significant inputs that you no longer consider to be observable; and
    • any material gain or loss you recognized on those assets or liabilities during the period, and, to the extent you exclude that amount from the realized/unrealized gains (losses) line item in the Level 3 reconciliation, the amount you excluded.

It was Bloomberg that first – I think – broke the story about $157-billion in Level 3 assets, and an example of the kind of comments it has attracted is:

Freddie told investors right to their faces, “We manipulated the numbers,” and investors applauded like a bunch of idiots, pushing Freddie Mac shares up more than 9%. I wish this was the end to the tragic comedy, but Freddie’s conference call was even more ridiculous.

And Freddie Mac just moved its entire Asset-Backed Security [ABS] portfolio to Level 3.

As a result, its Level 3 assets ballooned from $39 billion to over $157 billion in the first quarter. Its reasoning? The pricing the market was giving these securities varied too much. In other words, when the market was responsible for figuring out how much these assets were worth, the price fluctuated dramatically, providing the potential for major losses. So Freddie moved these assets to Level 3, where the market no longer has any say in their value. It’s yet another nail hammered into the coffin of what was supposed to be a capitalist free market.

The author is a newsletter writer, not (so far as I can tell) a portfolio manager.

The “smoking gun” in the financials is note 3, page 13 of Financial Statements and Core Tables:

At March 31, 2008, our fair value results were impacted by several changes in our approach for estimating the fair value of certain financial instruments, primarily related to our valuation of our guarantee obligation as a result of our adoption of SFAS 157 on January 1, 2008. These changes resulted in a net increase in the fair value of total net assets of approximately $4.6 billion (after tax).

See update below for more Freddie

Anyway … one man’s pain is another man’s gain! I mentioned the UBS Close-Out Special at about 68 cents on the dollar yesterday … today, Naked Capitalism observes that Bank Hapoalim has done the same:

the second largest bank in Israel, sold its entire portfolio of MBS to Pimco for 75 cents on an already-written-dollar (or in this case, shekel). Note that the previous writedowns were at least $90 million on an portfolio valued before the sale at $3.42 billion.

And the war between the Credit Analysis Department and the Market Price Department continues:

Based on the model supplied by the company, the Bank applied an even more severe scenario in which housing prices in the USA (excluding California and Florida) fell by about 30% from their peak (by 22% when compared with the present price level) and in California and Florida by about 40% from their peak (by 28% when compared with the present price level). Given such an severe scenario and assuming that the rate of default by mortgage takers will be about 47%, the accumulated loss from the portfolio is liable to reach about 340 million US Dollars over the life span of the securities.

The loss on sale was $870-million. I said it about Blackrock … I’ll say it about PIMCO … they’re going to make out like bandits. These well-publicized moves into the asset class by “real money” accounts bode well for normalization of the credit markets – although I will admit that Hapaolim’s 3.5-billion portfolio is a small part of the 1,400-billion problem.

Those who take my encouraging words about normalization as being the ravings of a Pollyanna are reminded that “normal” does not mean “good”. Spreads are still elevated and credit is still relatively scarce … and corporate defaults are rising. By “normalizing”, I mean that the chances of apocalyptic financial meltdown are declining, that’s all.

But real money is big-time sub-prime:

Gross, 64, anticipated the collapse of the U.S. housing market and the Fed’s subsequent interest-rate cuts. He shunned riskier corporate debt in 2006, a call that caused his fund to lag behind peers. Gross’s $128 billion Total Return Fund slipped as much as 4 percent in the first half of 2006.

The decision to sidestep subprime-linked debt has helped the fund surge 12 percent in the past year to beat 95 percent of its rivals, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Earlier this year, Gross started piling back into mortgage bonds to take advantage of slumping prices. In April, he lifted his holdings in mortgage-related debt to the highest since 2000, and lowered his stakes in U.S. Treasuries after calling them “overvalued.”

As of April 30, Gross’s Total Return Fund held 65 percent in mortgage debt, according to data posted on the firm’s Web site. The fund also holds 6 percent of assets in emerging-market debt. This year, Gross’s Total Return Fund has returned 4.1 percent, beating 94 percent of peers, Bloomberg data show.

As expected after the court ruling on BCE / Teachers’, BCE stock got slaughtered today, while Credit Default Swaps came in to 315bp from 595bp. Now, that’s a move! It appears that frenetic trading (over 26-million shares) gave the new Quantum trading system a work-out … BCE was halted in the mid-afternoon … a glitch this morning caused many issues (including CPD) to be temporarily halted. Finally, the TSX announced:

TSX Group has determined the root cause of a service disruption that affected trading on 37 of the more than 2100 issues trading on Toronto Stock Exchange.

The interruption was caused by a trading message protocol issue with one invalid message, and was entirely unrelated to TSX Quantum performance or capacity.

Corrective measures have been implemented.

Shares of BCE Inc. were halted at 2:14 p.m. to address data integrity concerns.

TSX expects trading in shares of BCE Inc. to open as usual tomorrow morning.

Not a lot of detail there, but there never is. It strikes me that if the system was compromised by a single “trading message protocol issue with one invalid message”, then Quantum probably needs a better input editor to prevent these data issues from fouling up the internal engine … but there isn’t enough information to make that conclusion firm.

There’s a bit more colour on BCE / Teachers’ … Bloomberg reports that a failure would help unwind the LBO crisis:

The potential cancellation of BCE Inc.’s C$52 billion ($52.9 billion) leveraged buyout may help loan prices recover by removing the largest portion of high- yield, high-risk debt banks need to sell from last year’s deals.

“If BCE is canceled it reduces the amount of debt on bank balance sheets substantially,” Chris Taggert, an analyst at fixed income research firm CreditSights Inc. in New York said in a telephone interview. “It’s the largest piece of the pipeline out there and would be a boost to the market.”

Loan prices have climbed as banks this year found a way to reduce their pipeline of loans promised last year to private- equity firms to $81.6 billion from $156 billion, according to Standard & Poor’s. Loans backing the acquisition of Montreal- based BCE, Canada’s biggest telephone company, comprise $16.8 billion, or 20.6 percent of the backlog.

Prices are up to an average 91.86 cents on the dollar, from a record low of 86.3 cents in February, according to S&P. Private-equity firms including Blackstone Group LP and Apollo Management LP have bought loans from banks, and the risk of financial institutions failing has subsided.

“This is good news for” Toronto-Dominion, Desjardins Securities analyst Michael Goldberg wrote in a note to investors today. “A new deal or no deal would mean that TD would not experience losses on the syndication of its financing.”

The bank has probably marked down its BCE financing commitment by about C$150 million, mostly in the past two quarters, Goldberg said. The bank has said it agreed to finance about 10 percent of the equity portion of the BCE purchase, or about C$3.3 billion.

The excitement of the day was BCE, but the enormous price moves occurred on small volume. Apart from this name, the market was off slightly – not a lot, but enough to notice – on average volume.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.64% 4.68% 51,303 16.13 1 +0.1210% 1,084.1
Fixed-Floater 4.86% 4.76% 67,552 15.89 7 -3.9192% 1,029.7
Floater 4.15% 4.20% 63,264 16.96 2 -0.3960% 909.1
Op. Retract 4.83% 2.62% 91,077 2.47 15 +0.0034% 1,055.8
Split-Share 5.27% 5.56% 70,329 4.17 13 -0.3147% 1,055.9
Interest Bearing 6.09% 6.09% 53,515 3.81 3 +0.1678% 1,112.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.89% 5.73% 134,630 4.69 9 +0.0090% 1,022.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.65% 5.70% 299,921 14.20 63 -0.1229% 926.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.A FixFloat -6.9383%  
BCE.PR.R FixFloat -4.8971%  
BCE.PR.C FixFloat -4.6474%  
BCE.PR.G FixFloat -4.4362%  
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -3.6885%  
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat -2.8992%  
BNA.PR.A SplitShare -2.6984% Asset coverage of just under 3.2:1 as of April 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.08% based on a bid of 24.52 and a hardMaturity 2010-9-30 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.B (6.96% to 2016-3-25) and BNA.PR.C (6.40% to 2019-1-10).
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.2195% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 20.25 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.0732% Asset coverage of 2.0+:1 as of May 15, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 10.14 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.0323% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 23.01 and a limitMaturity.
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.0748% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.88% based on a bid of 23.51 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
FTS.PR.E Scraps (would be OpRet, but there are credit concerns) 100,000 CIBC crossed 100,000 at 25.45 in the day’s only trade. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.67% based on a bid of 25.41 and a softMaturity 2016-8-31 at 25.00.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 84,200 Nesbitt bought 73,300 from National Bank at 21.71. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 21.71 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 79,400 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 20.81. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 20.80 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.R PerpetualDiscount (for now!) 55,500 “Anonymous” bought 10,000 from “Anonymous” at 25.24 … perhaps the same “Anonymous”, perhaps not. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.66% based on a bid of 25.18 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 42,801 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 20.75 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.L PerpetualDiscount (for now!) 37,550 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.86% based on a bid of 25.12 and a limitMaturity.

There were nineteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Update: The specific disclosure of the move to level 3 is in the Supplement:

At March 31, 2008, we measured and recorded on a recurring basis $156.8 billion, or approximately 23% of total assets, at fair value using significant unobservable inputs (Level 3), before the impact of counterparty and cash collateral netting across the levels of the fair value hierarchy. Our Level 3 assets consist of non-agency residential mortgage-related securities and our guarantee asset. We also measured and recorded on a recurring basis $113 million, or less than 1% of total liabilities, at fair value using significant unobservable inputs, before the impact of counterparty and cash collateral netting across the levels of the fair value hierarchy. Our Level 3 liabilities consist of derivative liabilities, net.

During the first quarter of 2008, our Level 3 assets increased because the market for non-agency mortgage-related securities became less liquid, resulting in lower transaction volumes, wider credit spreads and less transparent pricing for these assets. In addition, we have observed more variability in the quotations received from dealers and third-party pricing services. Consequently, we transferred $153.8 billion of Level 2 assets to Level 3 during the first quarter of 2008. These transfers were primarily within non-agency mortgage-related securities backed by subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans where inputs that are significant to their valuation became limited or unavailable. We concluded that the prices on these securities received from pricing services and dealers were reflective of significant unobservable inputs. We recorded $11.2 billion in additional losses primarily in AOCI on these transferred assets during the first quarter of 2008, which were included in our Level 3 reconciliation. See “NOTE 14: FAIR VALUE DISCLOSURES— Table 14.2 —Fair Value Measurements of Assets and Liabilities Using Significant Unobservable Inputs” to our consolidated financial statements for the Level 3 reconciliation. For discussion of types and characteristics of mortgage loans underlying our mortgage-related securities, see “CREDIT RISKS” and “CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS ANALYSIS—Table 15 —Characteristics of Mortgage Loans and Mortgage-Related Securities in our Retained Portfolio.”

Update, 2008-5-23: Split-Share Performance, 2008-5-23

FAL.PR.A & FAL.PR.H to be Redeemed

May 22nd, 2008

Xstrata has announced:

its intention to redeem all of its outstanding Cumulative Preferred Shares, Series H (TSX: FAL.PR.H) and Series 2 (FAL.PR.A) by the end of July 2008. Holders of Series H shares will receive C$25.00 per share in cash and holders of Series 2 shares will receive C$25.50 in cash, in each case plus accrued and unpaid dividends in respect of each share up to, but excluding, the date of redemption. Xstrata Canada intends to use its internal cash resources to fund the aggregate redemption price of approximately C$275 million.

FAL.PR.H is currently in the PerpetualPremium index; it was moved there from Scraps in the 2007-10-31 rebalancing following the DBRS credit upgrade.

FAL.PR.A is currently the only member of the RatchetRate index; it was also moved from Scraps immediately following the upgrade.

Interestingly, FAL.PR.B will not be called. It’s a Fixed-Floater, exchangeable to FAL.PR.A every five years; the next exchange date is 2009-3-1, on which date it may be redeemed at 25.00. Presumably it is not long for this world.

Update, 2008-05-29: Dates have been set:

As previously announced, Xstrata Canada has issued notices to redeem all of its outstanding Cumulative Preferred Shares, Series H (TSX:FAL.PR.H) and Series 2 (FAL.PR.A). The Series H shares will be redeemed on June 30, 2008 and the Series 2 shares will be redeemed on July 10, 2008. Holders of Series H shares will receive C$25.00 per share in cash and holders of Series 2 shares will receive C$25.50 in cash, in each case plus accrued and unpaid dividends in respect of each share up to, but excluding, the date of redemption. Xstrata Canada intends to use its internal cash resources to fund the aggregate redemption price of approximately C$275 million.

Common and Preferred Dividend Cuts: How Well Correlated?

May 22nd, 2008

I was reminded of this topic recently … and reminded some time ago of the perception of relative risks when investing in preferred stock. A stockbroker type was explaining to me that he would never buy bank preferreds due to the risk of default … I pointed out that, while always possible, the banks would surely cut or eliminate their common dividend well in advance of their preferred dividend.

He was flabbergasted … “Do you really think they would cut their dividend? That would be terrible!”

In other words, he very calmly accepted the idea of a default on the perpetuals, but could not conceive of a situation in which a bank would cut its common dividend.

Recently, the poster-boy for credit excesses, Citigroup, cut its common dividend 41% while the preferred dividends just kept on chugging along – even increased in total, as they have raised a lot of capital via preferred offerings … presumably to investors who figured they wanted their interim dividends for the next five-years-odd to be preferred!

So anyway, I was thinking about this a little more and did a little digging … through the RBC Annual Report for 2007:

During 2007, we continued to return capital to our shareholders through dividend increases and share buybacks, delivering a total shareholder return of 16 per cent.

For several years, we have made it a management priority to ensure current success was reinvested to fund future growth. This approach allowed us to deliver relatively solid shareholder returns in 2007 while returning capital through increased dividends and share buybacks. We raised dividends twice in 2007 for a total increase of 26 per cent, and we repurchased 11.8 million common shares. Our capital position is strong with a Tier 1 capital ratio of 9.4 per cent, comfortably above our target of greater than 8 per cent.

Share Buybacks are analytically equivalent to dividends – and buyback-suspensions are the easiest way to halt a decline in capital ratios. But what sort of proportion do they make? I’ve had a preliminary look at this via RBC’s Annual Reports for 2001, 2004 and 2007:

RBC Data
Year Income Preferred
Dividends
Common
Dividends
Common
Buy-Backs
1999 1,725 157 588 333
2000 2,208 134 689 660
2001 2,435 135 897 509
2002 2,898 98 1,022 764
2003 3,036 68 1,137 852
2004 2,839 45 1,303 892
2005 3,387 42 1,512 226
2006 4,728 60 1,847 844
2007 5,492 88 2,321 646
Total 11,316 5,726

So, this is all pretty rough, it’s only one bank (a strong one!) and it’s taken over a period in which the bank examined hasn’t had anything particularly horrible happen to it. Still, it’s interesting to find that about 1/3 of the total capital returned to common shareholders has been in the form of buybacks rather than dividends … and, as the experience of 2005 shows, the buybacks can be cut quite easily.

May 21, 2008

May 21st, 2008

The big news today is a Moody’s methodological scandal:

Moody’s Investors Service said it’s conducting “a thorough review” of whether a computer error was responsible for assigning Aaa ratings to debt securities that later fell in value.

Some senior staff at Moody’s were aware in early 2007 that constant proportion debt obligations, funds that used borrowed money to bet on credit-default swaps, should have been ranked four levels lower, the Financial Times said, citing internal Moody’s documents. Moody’s altered some assumptions to avoid having to assign lower grades after it corrected the error, the paper said.

Naked Capitalism is ecstatic. Publication of the official release from Moody’s was delayed, but it there … albeit scooped by FT Alphaville.

Heads will roll. And quite rightly.

An Accrued Interest post on Freddie Mac was referred to yesterday. For those interested-but-not-all-that-much in the issue, Jonathan Weill reviews the accounting issues.

On the sub-prime front there is (via FT Alphavill) that UBS is having a close-out special on some sub-prime

UBS sold positions with a nominal value of approximately USD $22 billion to the new fund for an aggregate sale price of approximately USD $15 billion. Based on UBS categorizations, the vast majority of the positions are Subprime and Alt-A in roughly equal parts and the remainder is Prime. The fund purchased the securities using approximately USD $3.75 billion in equity raised by BlackRock from investors and a multi-year collateralized term loan of approximately USD $11.25 billion provided by UBS.

UBS is notorious for having an assets-to-capital multiple that was way off the charts. But, holy smokey! Sixty-Eight cents on the dollar? Since UBS is the seller, we may assume that the great bulk of it, if not all, is AAA tranches … and even Greenlaw forecast a mere 18.9% average loss. I think the Blackrock guys – and their investors – are going to make out like bandits on this.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.69% 4.73% 51,544 16.04 1 +0.2020% 1,082.8
Fixed-Floater 4.67% 4.55% 66,824 16.17 7 +0.2123% 1,071.7
Floater 4.14% 4.18% 63,477 17.00 2 -1.6272% 912.7
Op. Retract 4.83% 2.49% 91,589 2.34 15 -0.0192% 1,055.8
Split-Share 5.25% 5.45% 70,516 4.17 13 -0.0008% 1,059.2
Interest Bearing 6.10% 6.11% 53,666 3.81 3 -0.1335% 1,110.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.89% 5.71% 135,724 5.89 9 +0.0178% 1,022.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.65% 5.69% 300,191 14.09 63 +0.0123% 928.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -2.7237%  
W.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.5241% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.95% based on a bid of 23.26 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.H OpRet -1.3894% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 25.55 and a softMaturity 2012-3-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.I (5.03% to 2013-12-30) and BAM.PR.J (5.48% to 2018-3-30).
BNA.PR.B SplitShare +1.9917% Asset coverage of just under 3.2:1 as of April 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.95% based on a bid of 22.02 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (5.79% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.C (6.37% to 2018-1-10).
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TD.PR.R PerpetualDiscount (for now!) 115,125 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.66% based on a bid of 25.20 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 111,400 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 22.75 and a limitMaturity.
NSI.PR.D Scraps (would be OpRet but there are volume concerns) 100,800 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.75% based on a bid of 27.00 and a put 2016-2-14 at 24.75.
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount 91,412 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 24.23 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount 85,000 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.63% based on a bid of 23.50 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat 82,684  

There were forty-two other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

CU Inc. Issues Long Term Debs

May 21st, 2008

CU Inc. has an issue trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange, CIU.PR.A, now bid at 20.50 for a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.64% based on a limitMaturity; this is an interest-equivalent of 7.90% at a conversion factor of 1.4x. These are Series 1 Preferred. The company also has an approximately equal value of “Series Second Preferred” outstanding, all of which are held by the parent company.

Today they issued some 30-year debs at 5.58%.

Mainly I was interested in this because of the 232bp interest-equivalent spread between the prefs and the long debs, but there’s a little twist …

A grossly abbreviated statement of their liabilites is:

CIU Inc. Liabilities
Item Value
CAD Millions
Current Liabilities 250.6
Non-Current Non-Capital 229.6
Long-Term Debt 2,459.4
Series 1 Prefs 115.0
Series 2 Prefs 130.0
Equity 1,675.5
Total 4,860.1

According to the prospectus for CIU.PR.A:

In the event of the liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Corporation, or other distribution of assets of the Corporation among its shareholders for the purpose of winding-up its affairs, the holders of the Series 1 Preferred Shares shall be entitled to receive the amount paid up on such shares together with all accrued and unpaid cumulative preferential dividends thereon and, if such liquidation, dissolution, winding-up or distribution is voluntary, a premium of $1.00 per share if such event commences prior to June 1, 2009, and, if such event commences thereafter, a premium equivalent to the premium payable on redemption if such shares were to be redeemed at the date of commencement of any such voluntary liquidation, dissolution, winding-up or distribution, before any amount shall be paid or any property or assets of the Corporation shall be distributed to the holders of any Class A non-voting shares or Class B common shares or other shares ranking junior to the Series 1 Preferred Shares. After payment to the holders of the Series 1 Preferred Shares of the amounts so payable to them, they shall not be entitled to share in any further distribution of the property or assets of the Corporation.

… which is not entirely satisfactory, because nowhere in the document is the seniority of the “Series Second Preferred Shares” clearly defined relative to the “Series 1 Preferred Shares”.

I have used their contact form to ask the question:

Are the CU Inc. Series 1 Preferred Shares junior, senior, or parri passu to the Series Second Preferred Shares?

Where may I find legal documentation of the relative status?

Update, 2008-5-27: I have received a note from Atco staff denying the existence of Series Second Preferred shares. Further inquiries are in progress.

BCE / Teachers' Deal : Chattering Classes Humiliated

May 21st, 2008

The Canadian Press has reported:

The purchase of BCE Inc. (TSX: BCE.TO) by a group led by the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan hit a snag Wednesday after the Quebec Court of Appeal overturned a lower court’s decision to allow the largest corporate takeover in Canadian history.

The appeal court sided with the company’s bondholders in reversing Quebec Superior Court Justice Joel Silcoff’s decision to allow the takeover of the company in a deal worth $52 billion.

The bondholders had sought to block the proposed leveraged buyout of Canada’s largest telecom company that they say treats them unfairly because it loads the telecom giant up with debt and makes their bonds a much riskier investment.

“BCE never attempted to justify the fairness and reasonableness of an arrangement that results in a significant adverse economic impact on the debentureholders while at that same time it accords a substantial premium to the shareholders,” the five-judge panel ruled.

Mark Meland, one of the lead lawyers for the bondholders, said his clients were pleased by the court’s decision that was widely expected to side with the company.

“The chattering classes were virtually unanimous in stating incorrectly that we had no chance in being successful, but our group, the bondholders that I represent, we always believed we had a good case,” Meland said.

Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa, and profound apologies to Mr. Meland!

But congratulations … the plot thickens!

The last report on this deal was regarding sabre rattling by the banks.

BCE has the following preferred shares outstanding: BCE.PR.A, BCE.PR.C, BCE.PR.D, BCE.PR.E, BCE.PR.F, BCE.PR.G, BCE.PR.H, BCE.PR.I, BCE.PR.R, BCE.PR.S, BCE.PR.T, BCE.PR.Y & BCE.PR.Z

I have no idea what’s going to happen … there are financing jitters and now some legal jitters … I have no expertise, special information or analytical advantage in either area. It’s all speculation.

Update: More on Bloomberg:

Today’s decision “rewrites Canadian law relating to the duty of Canadian boards of directors to maximize value for shareholders,” Martine Turcotte, BCE’s chief legal officer, said in the company’s statement.

Update: BCE is seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Update: The Globe has published the court judgement. Kudos for them! What I’d really like to see is a decision by the relevant authorities that all paperwork filed in all court cases be made publicly available (via Internet) with no charge … but until that happy day, I’ll settle for the press occasionally publishing scraps.

Opinion: Credit Ratings – Investors in a Bind

May 21st, 2008

I mentioned this recent article briefly in the post DeCloet & National Policy 51-201.

Anyway … credit ratings have been in the news, big-time, for the past year. The problem, however, is not so much with the Credit Ratings Agencies themselves, but rather with the regulators and with buck-passing investment managers.

Look for the opinion link!

May 20, 2008

May 20th, 2008

Sorry folks! Today was boring on the news front AND I was busy, so there’s no macro-level commentary. Accrued Interest wrote a good piece on How Safe are the GSEs?.

Strength in the Floating Rate sector continues to astound; they’re really coming back a lot from their extreme depths. I don’t think it has anything to do with the credit, because the BAM perpetuals are still bumping along without any huge gains. PerpetualDiscounts are doing well, but this is simply in line with long corporates, which have returned +1.44% in the month to 5/20.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.75% 4.78% 47,734 15.94 1 -0.2820% 1,080.6
Fixed-Floater 4.69% 4.58% 65,517 16.13 7 -0.6110% 1,069.5
Floater 4.07% 4.11% 61,380 17.14 2 +0.8898% 927.8
Op. Retract 4.83% 2.61% 89,192 2.53 15 -0.0766% 1,056.0
Split-Share 5.25% 5.44% 69,956 4.17 13 +0.2382% 1,059.2
Interest Bearing 6.10% 5.99% 53,940 3.81 3 +0.4044% 1,111.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.89% 5.71% 136,790 5.80 9 +0.0573% 1,021.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.65% 5.69% 298,053 14.03 63 +0.0898% 927.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat -1.4517%  
BNS.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.3878% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 24.16 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +1.0309% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of May 16, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.62% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.80 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.1543% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.25% based on a bid of 19.28 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.B Floater +1.2309%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 79,425 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 22.24. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.66% based on a bid of 22.09 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 75,110 CIBC crossed 50,000 at 24.95. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 24.95 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.R PerpetualDiscount (for now!) 60,650 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.69% based on a bid of 25.05 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.I PerpetualPremium 52,550 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.30. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.80% based on a bid of 25.30 and a call 2012-5-30 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 51,800 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 25.25 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-two other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

RBT.PR.A Partial Call For Redemption

May 20th, 2008

R Split II Corporation has announced:

that it has called 23,250 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on May 30, 2008 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 5.351% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 134,500 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on May 29, 2008 will have approximately 5.351% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $30.50 per share.

The last RBT.PR.A partial call was noted by PrefBlog last year.

RBT.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™