Inflation Expectations

February 22nd, 2008

I once heard an explanation of why economics is termed “the dismal science”. It’s because, you see, you can spend ten years of your life, full-time, working on a particular model of something … capturing inputs, backtesting sensitivity, creating theoretically acceptable models of transmission mechanisms … and finally, finally, have something that looks really good.

You walk down the street, show it to the first guy you meet, he says “What about taxes?”

You say “Oh …. bugger!” and go back to your office for another ten years. 

Inflation talk is all the rage now and the following paragraph by James Hamilton on Econbrowser caught my eye:

Greg Ip, Felix Salmon and Greg Mankiw are concerned that the 5-year TIPS-nominal spread has fallen relative to the 10 year, implying that the 5-year forward inflation rate (the so-called 5-year, 5-year break-even rate) has gone up. But I agree with the analysis by knzn and particularly Francisco Torralba that the facts are much less alarming than Ip’s graph might have seemed to suggest, and that the basic impression of stability of longer term expectations that one brings away from the graph I’ve plotted above is the correct one.

Well, let’s have a look at some fresh data:

Fed H.15 Data, Feb 20, 2008
Term Nominal TIPS Breakeven
Rate
5-Year 3.02% 0.77% 2.25%
10-Year 3.93% 1.55% 2.38%
5/5 Breakeven (Approx.: 2*2.38-2.25) 2.51%

So, as of February 20, the 5/5 Breakeven rate was (approximately) 2.51%, which is basically what it was on January 30, according to knzn. So far, so good: we’re getting a relatively constant number for the 5/5 BE. However, compare the data further with knzn’s calculations:

Time Series of 5/5 BE Rate Approx
Date 5-Year BE 10-Year BE 5/5 BE Effective
Fed Funds 
2-Year
Nominal 
Jan 9 2.16% 2.25% 2.35%  4.26%  2.69%
Jan 30 2.12% 2.33% 2.54%  3.26%  2.30%
Feb 20 2.25% 2.38% 2.51%  3.00%  2.14%

I snuck two extra columns into the time-series because they’re important. The 2-Year Nominal is generally accepted as being the market expectation of the average Fed-Funds rate through the period. (I had a quick look for some research regarding just how good a predictor it is, but didn’t see anything. Somebody must have created the spreadsheet at some time! Come on, now! Let’s see a scatter plot of 2-Year Nominal Treasury Yields vs. two-years-following cumulative Fed Fund returns! Anybody?)

Anyway … it seems to me that if we’re to take the 5/5 BE rate as an estimate of inflation expectations, then we are assuming that the market is rational. And if the market is rational, then the two-year Treasury must also be a rational estimate of Fed Funds expectations. So right off the bat, we see that the estimate of 2.5% inflation from 2013-18 is dependent upon a pretty low Fed Funds rate over the next two years.

It should be noted that the argument developed here is very, very approximate. There is a liquidity premium that should be accounted for with investments of different terms (and isn’t); there are segmentation effects (only a few institutions can get the Fed Funds rate directly; anybody can buy a treasury); there are preferred habitat effects (some players will not switch between reals and nominals no matter how many fancy graphs you show them). All of the other caveats noted by Francisco Torralba apply as well.

OK, be patient, I’m getting to the point! As noted on Econbrowser Taylor has used coefficients of 0.5 for output and 1.5 for inflation to determine appropriate policy responses to deviations from ideal conditions.

OK, now here’s where my argument starts getting a little hairy! We will assume that the change in CPI is zero. Based on recent observations, we can be pretty sure inflation is not declining; the argument in Econbrowser that inspired this post is that expectations haven’t changed, either. The hairy part of this is that inflation expectations five years out are not the same thing as currently measured (trailing) inflation and they’re not the same thing as expectations for next year, either! It’s fairly difficult to refute an argument that inflation is expected to do … something … for the next year and then return to normal (due to wise actions by the omniscient Fed) in time for 5/5 BE to be unchanged too.

But I’m making an argument about the consistency of economic models here, so we’ll assume that the (simplified) theory presented here is accurate: there is an expectation that inflation will increase by 20bp over the next five years. The appropriate policy response, therefore (based solely on the inflation term) is to increase Fed Funds 30bp.

But Fed Funds have not been increased by 30bp … they’ve been dropped 125bp. The difference between these two figures, 155bp, must (if we are to assume perfection of our models AND perfection of Fed policy) be due to a Taylor response to the output term, which has a coefficient of 0.5. This only resolves if we have an output gap of 3%.

The situation gets worse if we consider the two-year note to be a good predictor of Fed Funds under the expectations hypothesis: the yield is now 2.14% (it’s been sub-2% recently) so let’s add a tiny term/liquidity/segmentation premium and say the market expects Fed Funds to be 2.00% for the forseeable future, which is a drop of about 2.5% from mid-January, which  resolves to an output gap of 5.6%.

Assume that potential real GDP growth is 3%.

We conclude that one of the following must be true:

  • Inflation expectations have in fact increased far beyond that shown by the simple model, or
  • The two-year note yield is not an reliable forecast of average Fed Funds, or
  • The Taylor rule has stopped working, or
  • Simple models are not capturing all the interelationships, or 
  • We’re going to have one hell of a recession … maybe a depression.

My bet is that both of the first two potential explanations are correct, with maybe a small contribution from natural scatter in Taylor Rule explanations. But I’ll bet a whole lot more on the idea that these models being discussed are just plain too damn simple.

And my point is … the markets are not just lacking in omniscience, they’re lacking in rationality. Don’t take the signals too seriously, or spend too much time obsessing over understanding what it’s trying to tell you.

Addendum: I will note, as I did on February 7 that the 5-year corrected market-derived inflation expectations measure is most certainly not flat:

The Cleveland Fed has updated its estimate of inflation expectations from TIPS … very interesting indeed. The breakeven rate is increasing slightly, but the analytical rate – which attempts to incorporate adjustments for the inflation-risk-premium and liquidity-premium – is skyrocketting. This epsiode [sic] will be very useful in determining the validity of these adjustments!

Presumably, a similarly derived correction to the 5/5 BE will have roughly the same size as the correction to the 5-BE. But I don’t know that for sure.

Also, note that segmentation plays a really strong role in some aspects of some markets. I’ll bet there are lots of players who would love to try on the arbitrage of long Fed-Funds / short 2-Year notes … but either can’t, or are scared of the rather special risks of shorting short Treasuries.

RF.PR.A Closes – Will Not Be Tracked by HIMIPref™

February 22nd, 2008

CA Bancorp has announced:

C.A. Bancorp Canadian Realty Finance Corporation (the “Corporation”) has closed its initial public offering (the “Offering”).

Gross Proceeds: At the closing, the Corporation issued 1,440,000 Preferred Shares, Series 1 (the “Preferred Shares”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $36,000,000. The agents have been granted an over-allotment option to purchase up to 216,000 Preferred Shares at any time during the next 30 days.

Trading Information: The Preferred Shares commenced trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) today under the symbol RF.PR.A.

This issue will not be tracked by HIMIPref™ for reasons that have been previously discussed.

Icebergs, Retail & RS

February 22nd, 2008

Assiduous Reader madequota told me in a comment that:

I’ve mentioned the other cloaking device they use as well, the so-called ‘ice-berg” order. Can I strategically advance my cause as a retail investor by using icebergs? NO. Can I mislead other investors by coming into the market anonymously? NO. Does Regulation Services see a conflict in this? NO.

and later that

I’ve dealt with a number of different brokers, and all confirm that “iceberg” orders, and the option of listing orders under broker 1 are institution-only tools, and Regulation Services is the body that is responsible for this. Perhaps the people I have spoken too were misinformed, but they are consistent in their explanations, so I tend to buy into it.

OK … I’ve been in the business for a while. On the inside, and I’ve occasionally had to get the absolute truth of some matter or other. I have learned one thing: Don’t Trust What Anybody Claims About The Rules.

Company policy, tradition and wild guesses will often be confused with The Rules. This applies to operations personnel, traders, compliance people … anybody.

So I asked the horse’s mouth:

I have been advised that retail clients are not permitted to enter iceberg orders on the TSX due to rulings of Regulation Services.

Can you confirm this? Are there any documents on your website pertinent to the discussion or communication of such a ruling?

Here’s how Regulation Services responded to my query:

Thank you for your email inquiring about Iceberg orders and retail clients.

Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS) is not aware of any such restriction. UMIR 6.3 Exposure of Client Orders requires a client order that is less than 50 Standard Trading Units and less than $100,000 value to be immediately disclosed.  There is an exception to that rule that if the client requests that the order not be fully disclosed then the rule does
not apply.

Here is a link to UMIR 6.3. I suggest that clients of discount brokerages should write letters to the Big Bosses of these brokerages politely asking for the capability to be added to the software.

Update: “Wait a minute!” mutters the baffled crowd “What’s an iceberg order?”

They were introduced on the TSX in 2002:

Using compliant access technology provided by one of the Toronto Stock Exchange’s and TSX Venture Exchange’s Order Access Partners, a Participating Organization or Member may enter a large order of several thousand shares, but describe a “disclosed” portion, which may be as few as 2,000 shares. Those disclosed shares will be displayed to traders and the public, but all shares, up to the entire balance, are eligible to trade at any time – albeit after any and all disclosed volume at the same price.

If the Iceberg order is filled in portions, its disclosed portion, which fills first because of its disclosure, may eventually be decremented to zero. At this point, the displayed portion of the Iceberg order will automatically refresh to the original disclosed amount, repeating as necessary until the entire balance is traded. When an Iceberg order refreshes, it receives a new time-stamp, allowing other same-price orders an opportunity to move up in the time queue.

You would use them, for instance, if you wanted to sell 20,000 preferred shares and couldn’t find a block buyer (or didn’t want to ask around, for fear of moving the price). If you put in an order to sell the whole block at 21.50 as a regular order, you’d probably scare away the bids … with that kind of size overhanging the market, many traders will figure the market’s going to move down. And maybe they’ll back off on what bids they do have, hoping that you’ll get desperate.

So with an iceberg, you can just show it 2,000 at a time. Assuming that it’s just a straight sell – nothing to be done on the other side – this would be (slightly) superior to instructing a more complex algorithmic software package to do the same thing. Algorithmic software does have a latency factor … trade #1 would get filled, the TSX would notify the seller’s machine, the software figures out it has to put in another order, it transmits it, the order is checked and accepted by the TSX and then gets displayed. This doesn’t take much time, but it does take some time. If somebody had put in, say a market order to buy 5,000 shares, you would miss the last 3,000 of them, which would get filled at prices worse than yours before you’d even received notification of your fill!

And, of course, doing it manually will take even longer than software, by orders of magnitude.

Update, 2008-7-16 The minimum show for an iceberg is the greater of 500 shares or the Minimum Guaranteed Fill.

February 21, 2008

February 21st, 2008

Naked Capitalism reprints a WSJ editorial that concludes:

A financial system runs on trust, and the credit crisis is continuing in part because there is so much mistrust about the magnitude of potential losses and where those losses reside. By encouraging bond insurers to unilaterally rewrite their contracts, Messrs. Spitzer and Dinallo are only creating more mistrust and uncertainty. We assume the banks that bought the bond insurance and signed the contracts will take their insurers to court.

Holy smokes, if this thing doesn’t get reasonably resolved, things are going to get messy! I can only assume that Dinallo is simply engaging in brinksmanship, with the actual object being a recapitalization of the monolines. The trouble with brinksmanship, of course, is that if it doesn’t work, things have become worse.

MBIA has announced:

it withdrew from its trade association because of differences over the direction of the industry.

“We believe that the industry must over time separate its business of insuring municipal bonds from the often riskier business of guaranteeing other types of securities,” MBIA’s new Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Jay Brown said in a statement today. The company also disagrees with the Association of Financial Guaranty Insurers’ “positions on the appropriateness of monoline financial guarantors insuring credit default swaps.”

The press release on the MBIA site states:

For one thing, we believe that the industry must over time separate its business of insuring municipal bonds from the often riskier business of guaranteeing other types of securities, such as those linked to mortgages. Additionally, we disagree with AFGI’s positions on the appropriateness of monoline financial guarantors insuring credit default swaps and the ability of U.S. financial guarantors to reinsure U.S. domestic financial guarantee insurance transactions with foreign affiliates without paying U.S. corporate tax rates.

The AFGI has posted a review of the industry dated November 2007 and the website FAQ includes asset backed securities as a field of future growth for monolines. I don’t see anything specific about Credit Default Swaps.

There was a further indication that the CDS market is strange:

Credit markets were thrown into fresh turmoil on Wednesday as the cost of protecting the debt of US and European companies against default surged to all-time highs.

The sharp jump, which rivalled the sell-off at the height of last summer’s credit market turmoil, came as traders rushed to unwind highly leveraged positions in complex structured products.

The sell-off was triggered partly by fears of more unwinding to come as investors rushed to exit before conditions worsen. As losses have snowballed, further unwinding has been triggered.

The cost of insuring the debt of the 125 investment-grade companies in the benchmark iTraxx Europe rose more than 20 per cent to as high as 136.9 basis points, before closing at 126.5bp. That compares with a level of about 51bp at the start of the year, according to data from Markit Group.

In contrast to this, let’s take a quick glance at some recent BoC research into CDS Pricing:

The paper examines three equity-based structural models to study the nonlinear relationship between equity and credit default swap (CDS) prices. These models differ in the specification of the default barrier. With cross-firm CDS premia and equity information, we are able to estimate and compare the three models. We find that the stochastic barrier model performs better than the constant and uncertain barrier models in terms of both in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecasting of CDS premia. In addition, we demonstrate a linkage between the default barrier, jump intensity, and barrier volatility estimated from our models and firm-specific variables related to default risk, such as credit ratings, equity volatility, and leverage ratios.

At best, this study represents a good try – the data for determining the value of a CDS through a cycle simply does not exist. Despite my interest in the asset class, I’m not convinced that the CDS market is ready for prime time. If their main attraction is the ability to lever up a portfolio significantly, then a huge degree of uncertainty is introduced into pricing, in addition to the uncertainty introduced by debt decoupling. I continue to wrestle with the idea, but these twin, undiversifiable uncertainties probably introduce a required risk premium that makes inclusion of these instruments, long or short, in a fixed income portfolio uneconomic.

It’s all very complicated and I’m a simple kind of guy! The complexity was noted in a Financial Times article by Aline Van Duyn and Gillian Tett excerpted by Naked Capitalism:

The fundamental problem is that this decade’s wave of banking innovation has created a financial system that is not just highly complex but also tightly interlinked in ways that policymakers and investors sometimes struggle to understand.

This could result in the businesses of companies such as Ambac, MBIA and FGIC being split into two, to ensure that bond insurers can ringfence the riskier assets (such as mortgages) from the municipal guarantee business.

But although such a split currently seems attractive in political terms – most notably because it would enable policymakers to protect the municipal bond market in an election year – it will not necessarilly prevent further turmoil on Wall Street. On the contrary, as Jeffrey Rosenberg, analyst at Bank of America, says: “A split may limit losses in the municipal market, but it would likely exacerbate losses to structured finance… To the extent that those losses further constrain financial institutions’ balance sheets, broader credit constaint may follow.”

Cowboys, cowboys! Playing with things they don’t really understand, and sometimes doing quite well for several years. I think they’re wonderful … selling them liquidity is a very profitable endeavor.

As I suggested when the news first came out on January 24, Kerviel’s status as a “rogue trader” must forever be preceded by the qualifier “so-called”. A SocGen report on the loss has reported:

“Controls in place were conducted without triggering a strong or persistent enough alert to enable the identification of the fraud,” the e-mailed report said.

It did say that compliance officers rarely went beyond established routine checks.

They “don’t have the reflex to inform their superiors or the front office of anomalies, even if they concern large amounts,” the report said.

There weren’t any follow-up checks on cancelled or modified transactions, and no limits on nominal positions, just on net positions, it found.

While procedures were respected and questions were asked, “no initiative was taken to check JK’s assertions and corrections he suggested, even when they lacked plausibility,” the report said. “When the hierarchy was alerted, it didn’t react.”

The committee said there were 75 red flags between June, 2006, and the beginning of 2008 that should have alerted managers to Mr. Kerviel’s unauthorized trades. The warning signs included a trade with a maturity date on a Saturday, bets with “pending” counterparties and missing broker names, the report said.

The actual SocGen report contains a marvellous graph of reported vs. actual P&L for Kerviel’s positions (page 11 of the PDF). 

In other words, SocGen risk management is a complete joke. And in response, of course, SocGen and many other firms are requiring complete ignorance of operations, rather than simply preferring it. This will also serve to emphasize to the traders that operations personnel are low-life scum, who may be ingored, lied to and sworn at with impunity. Brace yourselves for more blow-ups!

A very quiet day today, but the market continued strong. PerpetualDiscounts are now up 3.34% on the month-to-date and 3.76% on the year-to-date. They have had exactly two down days this month (so far!), both less than a beep’s worth.

To my astonishment, there have been no new issue announcements this week, in defiance of my February 15 prediction. Well, perhaps tomorrow will salvage my reputation …

I’m of two minds whether or not to write another post devoted to the BNA issues … the BNA.PR.A closed with a ludicrously strong bid, and the yield on BNA.PR.C is now lower than the equal-credit-shorter-term BNA.PR.B.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.51% 5.55% 41,791 14.5 2 -0.0205% 1,081.5
Fixed-Floater 5.01% 5.68% 73,766 14.66 7 -0.0911% 1,023.0
Floater 4.95% 5.01% 70,323 15.42 3 -0.0137% 853.3
Op. Retract 4.80% 2.19% 78,412 2.87 15 +0.1295% 1,047.9
Split-Share 5.29% 5.37% 99,536 4.06 15 -0.0987% 1,042.9
Interest Bearing 6.23% 6.37% 58,665 3.34 4 -0.1000% 1,083.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.71% 4.27% 358,559 4.28 16 +0.1244% 1,032.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.34% 5.38% 279,492 14.84 52 +0.0956% 963.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.G FixFloat -2.6667%  
PWF.PR.I PerpetualPremium -1.2957% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 25.90 and a call 2012-5-30 at 25.00.
LFE.PR.A SplitShare -1.1321% Asset coverage of 2.4+:1 as of February 15, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.21% based on a bid of 10.48 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.I OpRet -1.0062% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.23% based on a bid of 25.58 and a softMaturity 2013-12-30 at 25.00 
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.0688% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 21.75 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.1055% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 21.95 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +1.7128% Asset coverage of 3.3+:1 as of January 31 according the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.91% based on a bid of 20.19 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (3.08% (!) to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (7.25% to 2016-3-25). Assiduous Reader prefhound will be putting on another long/short position if this keeps up!
MFC.PR.A OpRet +1.9714% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.41% based on a bid of 26.38 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00. 
BAM.PR.G FixFloat +2.4378%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium 43,901 TD bought 15,600 from Anonymous at 25.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 25.55 and a call 2017-3-2 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.O PerpetualPremium 39,355 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 25.50 and a call 2017-5-26 at 25.00.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 31,676 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 24.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 24.86 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 29,785 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.40% based on a bid of 18.89 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 27,802 National Bank crossed 20,000 at 21.86. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.22% based on a bid of 21.77 and a limitMaturity.

There were eight other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : May 2006

February 21st, 2008

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2006-05-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,368.7 1 2.00 4.06% 17.4 43M 4.05%
FixedFloater 2,280.6 6 2.00 3.92% 16.8 74M 5.05%
Floater 2,117.1 4 2.00 -16.67% 0.1 42M 4.64%
OpRet 1,887.0 18 1.45 3.13% 2.7 87M 4.68%
SplitShare 1,949.8 18 1.83 3.71% 3.2 51M 5.07%
Interest-Bearing 2,304.1 8 2.00 6.14% 3.0 69M 6.82%
Perpetual-Premium 1,468.8 41 1.54 4.76% 5.1 111M 5.31%
Perpetual-Discount 1,573.4 13 1.33 4.82% 15.9 435M 4.77%

Index Constitution, 2006-05-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2006-05-31, Post-rebalancing

BCE.PR.C / BCE.PR.D Conversion Results Announced

February 21st, 2008

BCE Inc. has announced:

that 10,755,445 of its 20,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AC (“Series AC Preferred Shares”) have been tendered for conversion, on a one-for-one basis, into Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AD (“Series AD Preferred Shares”). Consequently, BCE will issue 10,755,445 new Series AD Preferred Shares on March 1, 2008. The balance of the Series AC Preferred Shares that have not been converted will remain outstanding and will continue to be listed on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol BCE.PR.C.
    The Series AC Preferred Shares will pay on a quarterly basis, for the five-year period beginning on March 1, 2008, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE, a fixed dividend based on an annual dividend rate of 4.60%.
    The Series AD Preferred Shares will pay a monthly floating adjustable cash dividend for the five-year period beginning on March 1, 2008, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE. The Series AD Preferred Shares will be listed on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol BCE.PR.D and should start trading on a when-issued basis at the opening of the market on February 26, 2008.

The press release also reiterates the purchase price for the issues should the Teachers’ bid close: BCE.PR.C = $25.76 and BCE.PR.D = $25.50.

I previously recommended conversion to BCE.PR.D, on a balance of risks basis.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : April 2006

February 21st, 2008

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2006-04-28
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,360.6 1 2.00 3.75% 18.0 58M 3.75%
FixedFloater 2,263.1 6 2.00 3.62% 17.7 96M 5.24%
Floater 2,100.0 5 1.80 -7.15% 0.1 34M 4.38%
OpRet 1,874.6 17 1.48 3.20% 2.8 92M 4.68%
SplitShare 1,943.9 18 1.84 3.91% 2.4 50M 5.06%
Interest-Bearing 2,321.1 8 2.00 5.83% 1.2 76M 6.75%
Perpetual-Premium 1,453.9 40 1.55 4.90% 5.2 101M 5.36%
Perpetual-Discount 1,562.0 13 1.31 4.85% 15.8 548M 4.78%

Index Constitution, 2006-04-28, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2006-04-28, Post-rebalancing

February 20, 2008

February 21st, 2008

Monolines, monolines! Accrued Interest muses on an Ambac breakup and concludes:

The challenges of making the split are numerous. There will likely be lawsuits by structured finance holders who logically want to keep the stronger muni business around to support their policies. So we’ll see how it plays out. Since government regulators seem keen on providing aide to the muni market pronto, Ambac may get some legal cover if they manage to push this plan forward.

If they don’t, then a New York imposed plan seems inevitable. I think its time for Ambac (and MBIA) shareholders to start thinking about how to make the best of a bad situation.

While William Ackman, long a gadfly to the monolines as noted on January 31, has proposed an actual structure for such a breakup:

Ackman’s plan has two separate boards of directors, one for the municipal insurer and the other for the structured finance unit. Each board would include policyholders. The municipal insurer would pay dividends to its structured-finance parent only when the board was satisfied the unit could remain AAA rated. The structured finance insurer would send dividends to the holding company only after its board determined the money wasn’t needed to cover claims.

KKR Financial (last mentioned on August 20) continues to experience financing difficulties:

KKR Financial Holdings LLC, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.’s only publicly traded fixed-income fund, delayed repaying debt a second time in six months after failing to find buyers for commercial paper backed by mortgages.

Lenders to the fund agreed to the delay as KKR Financial seeks to restructure, the San Francisco-based company said yesterday in a regulatory filing. KKR Financial, whose stock has fallen 50 percent in the past year, didn’t say how much debt is affected.

Assiduous Reader madequota has remarked on the disconnect between the (government) bond market and preferreds, which echoes the equity/credit disconnect remarked by Naked Capitalism quoting, inter alia, John Dizard of the Financial Times:

At the moment, the most striking “arbitrage” is between the valuation of risk in the credit markets and the equity markets. Credit markets are discounting the end of the world, while equity strategists whose e-mails I spend half the morning deleting are saying that we are forming a tradeable bottom, which sounds faintly obscene.

As far as prefs are concerned, I’m more surprised by the long corporate/perpetual discount disconnect … according to the DEX long term bond indices long corporate yields are now around 6.00%, up 40bp from their bottom in early January, while long governments are now at about 4.60%, up 20bp from January’s bottom. In sharp contrast to this, PerpetualDiscounts are now at their YTD bottom, yielding 5.39% (about 7.55% interest-equivalent). Currently, the long corporate/Perpetual-Discount-Interest-Equivalent (LC/PDIE) spread is about 155bp.

This may be compared to previous LC/PDIE spreads of 113bp at the end 2006, 109 bp at the beginning of May, 2007, and 210bp at the end of October 2007. So, using these three data points to determine value, in the best of all “Look Mummy I Got A Spreadsheet” tradition, we could say (if we were willing to place our reputation on such a thing) that the LC/PDIE spread is simply moving back to a normal level and we’ve still got about 45bp to go – which is about 6.3% price appreciation.

As I’ve noted before, the end is in sight for my preparation of historical HIMIPref™ Preferred Share indices and soon I will be an enthusiastic member of the “Look Mummy I Got A GREAT BIG Spreadsheet” school of securities analysis. Until then (and after then, as well, if you really want to know) I will proudly state that I don’t have a clue where overall prices are going. I just compare risk to expected return as best I can (of the asset classes, through a cycle) and try to outperform my benchmarks. It works for me.

New York’s Auction Rate Securities, regarding which I noted my lack of panic yesterday and which were in the vanguard of a spate of failed municipal auctions on February 13 have now found that headlines are helping:

Interest rates on $100 million of bonds issued by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey were set at 8 percent in a weekly auction after surging to 20 percent on Feb. 12.

Rates had soared from 4.3 percent when too few buyers bid for the so-called auction-rate debt and Goldman Sachs Group Inc., which runs the auction, refused to put up its own capital to buy unwanted securities. That caused the yield to be set at a level predetermined in bond documents. Rates fell yesterday as the prospect of high yields enticed investors, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

It isn’t over, any more than the Great Credit Crunch is over, but at least things are starting to normalize.

Another solidly strong day for the preferred market, but volume was light … and if it hadn’t been for Nesbitt, doing yeoman’s work with some crosses, it would have been even lighter. I just wish I understood the prices being paid for some of those operating retractible issues though … it would seem that some players, for one reason or another, are assigning virtually zero probability to pre-last-minute calls. All the negative YTWs really screw up calculation of averages for the index!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.51% 5.55% 42,768 14.59 2 +0.9582% 1,081.7
Fixed-Floater 5.01% 5.67% 75,086 14.68 7 -0.1315% 1,024.0
Floater 4.95% 5.01% 72,059 15.43 3 -0.0303% 853.5
Op. Retract 4.81% 1.77% 78,379 2.87 15 +0.0728% 1,046.6
Split-Share 5.28% 5.47% 98,909 4.10 15 -0.0745% 1,044.0
Interest Bearing 6.22% 6.35% 59,183 3.35 4 +0.2525% 1,084.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.72% 4.53% 361,792 4.96 16 +0.1563% 1,031.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.34% 5.38% 282,681 14.84 52 +0.1519% 962.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.C FixFloat -1.6667%
BAM.PR.G FixFloat -1.6307%
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -1.0531% Went ex-dividend today. Asset coverage of 3.3+:1 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.38% based on a bid of 21.36 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (5.15% to call 2008-10-31 at 25.25) and BNA.PR.C (7.11 to 2019-1-10).
BCE.PR.G FixFloat +1.0101%  
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +1.0643% Went ex-dividend today. See BNA.PR.B, above. 
GWO.PR.F PerpetualPremium +1.0861% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.11% based on a bid of 26.06 and a call 2012-10-30 at 25.00.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.3712% Asset coverage of 2.0+:1 as of February 15 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.72% based on a bid of 10.35 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.5267% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.05% based on a bid of 22.61 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.B Ratchet +1.7995%  
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +2.1945% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 23.75 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PWF.PR.D OpRet 172,400 Nesbitt crossed 172,400 at 26.55. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -14.50% based on a bid of 26.50 and a call 2008-3-21 at 26.00.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 108,400 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 21.50, then another 30,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.48 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.I OpRet 102,100 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.14. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -0.91% based on a bid of 25.10 and a call 2008-3-21 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 57,355 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 21.79 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 35,525 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.15% based on a bid of 21.94 and a limitMaturity.

There were twelve other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

February 19, 2008

February 19th, 2008

A number of continuing stories today …

Accrued Interest reviewed a recent batch of Auction Rate Municipal auctions:

There was absolutely no rhyme or reason to what failed vs. succeeded and what rates resulted. The City of New York (rated Aa3/AA) had three issues auctioned, all three of which were fully tax-exempt. The rates were 5%, 5.25%, and 6%. Energy Northwest, a municipal power provider in Washington State, which is rated Aaa/AA-, had their ARS fail, and got a rate of 6.23%. Meanwhile, at one healthcare institution with a Baa3 rating and Radian insurance had their auction succeed with a 4.67% yield.

Meanwhile, I’ve received many e-mails from people interested in how one can play these ARS failures. One interesting idea is closed-end funds. Most closed-end bond funds are leveraged, usually in the 1.2-1.5x area, and they commonly use auction-rate preferred to create this leverage.

And yet closed-end muni funds are getting hammered, with several falling more than 5% today. I looked at the worst performers on the day, all of which had leverage created with auction-rate preferreds with 7-day auctions. The highest reset number I found was 3.3%. Excuse me if I don’t panic.

In times like these, the baby tends to go out with the bathwater! Naked Capitalism pours scorn over the entire idea of Auction Rates and notes:

The Wall Street Journal reports that organizations facing big funding cost increases are quickly trying to raise money at the longer maturities they should have borrowed at in the first place:
Turmoil in an obscure corner of the credit markets is expected to lead to a wave of refinancing by institutions that are in danger of finding themselves paying abnormally high interest rates on their bonds.

One of the first to queue up is the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, which yesterday announced plans to refinance as much as $430 million of bonds. The medical center offered to buy back $92 million of bonds after market rates on some of its existing auction-rate debt topped 17% last week — threatening the center with extra weekly interest costs of as much as $605,000.

In the comments, Naked Capitalism goes even further and brands the issuers of Auction Rate Securities as speculators:

Municipalities get approval from taxpayers (either directly by approving bond issues or indirectly via who they elect) to enter into certain projects deemed useful for the community. They weren’t authorized to speculate with the public’s money, which is what this sort of thing is.

I cannot agree with such absolutism. Diversification of funding sources for an issuer is just as important as diversification of investments for an investor. I would have enormous reservations if it were suggested that all funding took place via Auction Rates, but I have no problem with a small piece being done that way.

A good example is floating rate mortgages and HELOCs in Canada. Many people have them and I’ve been asked many times about whether floating rate or fixed rate is better. It has been shown – and sorry, I don’t remember the reference – that, usually, floating rate is cheaper. This only makes sense; when you go floating rate then, ceteris paribus you should save money on the term premium. The risk you run is that rates will rise.

The advice I have given people to to imagine that they go for floating rate and immediately the rate doubles on them. If this is going to wipe them out and cost them their home … stick to fixed rate! On the other hand, if they will simply mutter to themselves and say ‘Oh, shoot, this investment didn’t work out’ … then go for floating rate because the odds are with them.

It’s the same with issuers. It would be most interesting to compare the overall cost of the funding over, say, a twenty-year period, and I’ll bet there are all kinds of graphs and figures in the brochures the treasurers get from their underwriters. Naked Capitalism is being more than just a little simplistic in this instance.

This issue is being raised on Bloomberg:

State officials, who are reviewing the $4 billion of auction bonds sold by six different authorities as well as by the state in 2002-2004, said the debt was the least expensive type of debt in the two years ended Sept. 30, according to a Dec. 12 report. Since then, it has become the most expensive.

The auction-rate turmoil represents a reversal for state fiscal officials. As recently as Jan. 22, Louis Raffaele, a chief budget examiner who helps manage New York’s borrowing, said higher rates on auction bonds across the country could benefit the state. “Because of our high ratings and unblemished record,” he said, the state could attract investors fleeing lower-rated issues.

I suggest that Mr. Raffaele’s remarks of Jan. 22 will ultimately be supported by the marketplace … albeit not without a period of dislocation of unknown length.

Another story that has crept back into the headlines is Structured Investment Vehicles, or SIVs. Standard Chartered’s USD 7-billion vehicle is close to default, while there has been an announcement that Bank of Montreal is committing 12.7-billion to prop up Links Finance.

More happily, Naked Capitalism has toned down the hysteria regarding negative non-borrowed reserves and is now focussing concern where it belongs: on the concept of the TAF itself:

We’ve called the TAF a discount window without stigma (and in fact, the Fed implemented the TAF because banks weren’t using the discount window even when they should have). Banks can post a wide range of collateral, borrow on a non-disclosed basis, and can hold on to the cash for a while (by contrast, the discount window is overnight)

But are things all that rosy? The Financial Times today raises some concerns, noting that banks are indeed using the TAF to use crappy collateral for borrowing,

And note that, with no announcement I can recall, the facility has been increased to $50 billion even though the year end crunch has passed. That too is not a good sign.

Naturally, we cannot let a day go by without a reference to the monolines! The Bank of America has forecast years of litigation if the monolines are split:

“Despite the regulatory interest in separating the exposures, the essential fact remains that all policy holders, whether municipal or structured finance, entered into contracts backed by the entire entity,” analysts led by Jeffrey Rosenberg in New York wrote in a note to investors dated Feb. 15. A breakup is “likely to lead to significant legal challenges holding up the resolution of the monoline issues for years.”…..

“The fact that one group of policy holders’ exposures has imperiled the policies of the other does not mean they should forfeit the value of their claims altogether,” the Bank of America analysts said.

Investors in credit-default swaps based on the bond insurers may also seek damages to compensate for losses, according to the research note.

 Accrued Interest has admitted to complete befuddlement over the question of what will happen to Credit Default Swaps on the pre-split companies. And again, Naked Capitalism provides a good round up of opinion (basically, everybody is saying that a monoline split will unleash the lawyers) and pours scorn on the idea:

Now, Ambac is seeking to raise money. It hopes to split up, but gee, we aren’t certain we can do that, and even if we can, we aren’t exactly sure yet how this will work.

Is any one with any sense going to invest in a proposition like that? You have absolutely no idea what you are getting into. This whole discussion of a breakup plan has increased uncertainty enormously and raised the specter of litigation risk. Those are not exactly comforting to investors.

Microsoft has long used FUD, Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt, to paralyze its competitors. This bunch has managed to introduce a ton of FUD into something they want to move forward. Good luck.

Frankly, I don’t see how one can begin to consider a split ethical prior to bankruptcy and complete wipeout of the monoline’s shareholders. After all, preferential treatment of investors is generally considered a naughtiness. Never-the-less, there are rumours that MBIA is discussing joining the happy throngs.

VoxEU has an interesting article by Levich and Pojarliev on currency trading and the value of active management:

In the last year, both Deutsche Bank and Citibank have introduced several indices that track returns from several well-defined trading strategies.

  • Carry – To reflect the returns on the well-known strategy of borrowing a low interest rate currency and investing in a higher interest rate currency
  • Trend following – To reflect the returns of strategies related to identifiable patterns in currency movements
  • Value – To reflect the returns on taking short positions in overvalued currencies and using the proceeds for long positions in undervalued currencies


While theoreticians may argue over whether currency risk, like equity risk, always deserves a risk-premium, as a practical matter, institutional investors willing to hold currency risk can do so using a variety of simple trading strategies. Many of these strategies have been profitable recently and exchange-traded funds built on those strategies have been launched for the retail market. It is questionable whether professional currency managers can continue to charge higher management and performance fees while delivering cheaper-to-obtain beta returns. However, our results show that even when evaluated against the higher standard, some currency managers show superior performance, and true alpha. How they achieve this may in part be due to superior market-timing ability, trading in emerging market currencies, or some other factors. Whatever their formula, their returns appear unrelated to some conventional simple trading strategies. These true “alpha generators” may deserve their fees after all.

The actual paper costs money and I’m not really that interested … but if anybody does buy the paper, I’d be very interested in learning how the authors corrected for survivor bias. I will also note the critical sentence of the authors’ conclusion:How they achieve this may in part be due to superior market-timing ability, trading in emerging market currencies, or some other factors. Until this question is resolved, any analysis is of the “Look, Mummy, I got a spreadsheet!” variety.

Assiduous Readers will be aware that Naked Capitalism‘s opinions often meet a severe reception on PrefBlog, but as a clipping service, it’s excellent! Northern Rock has been nationalized by the UK government, generating a lot of discussion.

However, the article that most caught my eye on the weekend was a long piece on the Credit Default Swaps market and the fact that it may, ultimately, be dragged down by operational inefficiency:

In a credit default swap, two parties enter a private contract in which the buyer of protection agrees to pay the seller premiums over a set period of time; the seller pays only if a particular credit crisis occurs, like a default. These instruments can be sold, on either end of the contract, by the insurer or the insured.

But during the credit market upheaval in August, 14 percent of trades in these contracts were unconfirmed, meaning one of the parties in the resale transaction was unidentified in trade documents and remained unknown 30 days later. In December, that number stood at 13 percent. Because these trades are unregulated, there is no requirement that all parties to a contract be told when it is sold.

As investors who have purchased such swaps try to cash them in, they may have trouble tracking down who is supposed to pay their claims.

“This is just a giant insurance industry that is underregulated and not very well reserved for and does not have very good standards as a result,” said Michael A. J. Farrell, chief executive of Annaly Capital Management in New York. “I think unregulated markets that overshadow, in terms of size, the regulated ones are a real question mark.”

I dispute the notion that the lack of attention to the most basic detail is due to under-regulation … I claim that it is due to the practice of putting know-nothings on the the trading desks; and, what’s worse, promoting these know-nothings to managerial roles. Lack of knowledgeable supervision can, I suspect, also be fingered as the cause of mark-to-market “errors”.

I mentioned on February 13 my distaste for a system in which traders in securities not only boasted of their ignorance of operations, but made such ignorance a condition of entry to the elect. These operational issues with CDSs illustrate the first logical consequence of such ignorance … and I will admit, there is a large part of me that wants to see a big House go bankrupt over these issues, throwing those effete cowboys on welfare where they belong!

BMO has announced another writedown involving preferred shares – I have updated the post regarding preferred performance in 2007. In another update to an old post, I’ve added some information to Seniority of Bankers’ Acceptances … which I find particularly interesting in view of concerns over the monoline business model. Finally, the most recent post re ABK.PR.C has been updated … everything is proceeding as anticipated.

As noted in the comments to Feb 15, bonds got nailed today:

Treasuries fell, pushing the 10-year note’s yield to the highest level in more than a month, on speculation accelerating inflation will prompt the Federal Reserve to be less aggressive in cutting borrowing costs.

The yield on the benchmark 10-year note, more sensitive to inflation than shorter-term debt, was 1.84 percentage points higher than two-year rates. The spread was 1.93 percentage points on Feb. 14, the most since July 2004, reflecting a steepened yield curve.

Consumer prices rose at an annual rate of 4.2 percent in the 12 months through January after a 4.1 percent pace through the previous month, according to the median forecast of 31 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News. Excluding food and energy, prices rose 2.4 percent in the year through January, economists forecast. The Labor Department will release the report tomorrow.

…  and the Fed Funds contract backed off its more dramatic predictions.

Fed funds futures on the Chicago Board of Trade indicated a 100 percent chance policy makers will cut the 3 percent target rate for overnight loans by a half-percentage point at the March 18 meeting, compared with 66 percent odds on Feb. 15. The chance of a three-quarter-point reduction was 34 percent on Feb. 15.

Another good, solid day for the preferred share market, although volume continued light.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.56% 5.61% 42,778 14.5 2 -0.0617% 1,071.5
Fixed-Floater 5.00% 5.66% 76,078 14.70 7 +0.0032% 1,025.3
Floater 4.95% 5.01% 71,830 15.44 3 -0.0763% 853.7
Op. Retract 4.81% 2.51% 78,237 2.79 15 -0.1482% 1,045.8
Split-Share 5.27% 5.41% 99,208 4.09 15 +0.0584% 1,044.7
Interest Bearing 6.24% 6.45% 59,528 3.56 4 +0.5350% 1,081.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.73% 4.44% 369,713 4.34 16 -0.0522% 1,029.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.35% 5.39% 284,212 14.83 52 +0.1689% 960.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
DFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.8095% Asset coverage of just under 2.5:1 as of January 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.79% based on a bid of 10.31 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
PWF.PR.J OpRet -1.7918% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.15% based on a bid of 25.76 and a softMaturity 2013-7-30 at 25.00. 
GWO.PR.F PerpetualPremium -1.6406% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 25.78 and a call 2012-10-30 at 25.00.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.5473% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.13% based on a bid of 22.27 and a limitMaturity.
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -1.4493% Asset coverage of just under 2.2:1 as of February 7 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.93% based on a bid of 10.20 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.I OpRet -1.4122% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.02% based on a bid of 25.83 and a softMaturity 2013-12-30 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.0989%
PWF.PR.I PerpetualPremium +1.0081% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.02% based on a bid of 26.05 and a call at either 25.25 on 2011-5-30, or 25.00 on 2012-5-30 … take your pick.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.1253% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.04% based on a bid of 22.02 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.1898% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.09% based on a bid of 23.25 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +1.3800% Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of February 15, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.07% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.55 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
MFC.PR.A OpRet +1.4112% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.71% based on a bid of 25.87 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.4175% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.13% based on a bid of 23.31 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.4847% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 22.15 and a limitMaturity.
FBS.PR.B SplitShare +1.6461% Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of February 14, according to TD Securities. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 9.88 and a hardMaturity 2011-12-15 at 10.00.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +2.0871% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.04% based on a bid of 22.28 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 102,766 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 22.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.04% based on a bid of 22.02 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 47,475 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.19% based on a bid of 21.88 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 35,710 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.47% based on a bid of 18.68 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.0 PerpetualPremium 32,620 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 25.44 and a call 2017-5-26 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 22,435 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 21.83 and a limitMaturity.

There were fifteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : March 2006

February 19th, 2008

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2006-03-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,358.5 1 2.00 3.81% 17.9 58M 3.81%
FixedFloater 2,296.0 6 2.00 3.28% 1.9 114M 5.13%
Floater 2,086.7 4 2.00 -14.01% 0.1 41M 4.30%
OpRet 1,894.2 18 1.56 2.43% 2.9 80M 4.63%
SplitShare 1,965.3 18 1.84 3.29% 2.2 53M 4.99%
Interest-Bearing 2,327.4 8 2.00 4.65% 1.3 50M 6.74%
Perpetual-Premium 1,487.8 47 1.64 4.35% 5.6 111M 5.15%
Perpetual-Discount 1,622.5 3 1.34 4.55% 16.3 860M 4.55%

Index Constitution, 2006-03-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2006-03-31, Post-rebalancing