Canadian ABCP : Almost, But Can't Pay

December 15th, 2007

The National Post has reported:

A group of investors and financial institutions trying to find a way to restructure $33-billion of seized-up asset-backed commercial paper has failed to meet a key deadline for a proposal, setting the stage for a potential legal showdown between frustrated noteholders and investment dealers.

However, in the four months since the strategy was hammered out, credit markets worldwide have deteriorated to the point that many observers worry the new notes may prove just as illiquid as the ABCP they will replace.

Sources close to the negotiations said that the Bank of Canada has been pushing the major domestic banks to play a role in the restructuring by supporting the new longer term notes that would replace the ABCP by creating a market and sharing some of the risk. The banks have also been asked to support collateral calls that could be triggered under the terms of the underlying assets. However, they have yet to agree.

The liquidity thing is a valid concern for the investors, but I don’t see why anybody else cares. I’ve been predicting that – presuming that the paper comes out as advertised, with at least the senior tranche consisting of AAA floating rate paper – that the dealers would make out like bandits, 70-bid, par-offered. I can see no compelling reason why the banks should agree, for instance, to call a continuous two-way market with a 50 cent spread, 5-million up. Unless they’re paid.

The banks have been asked to support collateral calls that could be triggered by the underlying assets? Why should they? Who’s paying them?

I suspect that the investors are still living in a never-never land of zero default risk and easy trades that always win. Perhaps six more months of pain is in order.

Update, 2007-12-17: TD has announced:

“TD is willing to consider measures that support attempts to resolve liquidity issues in the financial markets. However, our position has been that it would not be in the best interest of TD shareholders to assume incremental risk for activities in which we were not involved,” said Ed Clark, President and CEO, TD Bank Financial Group.
    Following on comments made during its third and fourth quarter of 2007 earnings conference calls, TD Bank Financial Group further reiterated that it does not have any exposure to non-bank sponsored Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) products covered by the Montreal Accord. This includes holdings within TD Mutual Funds and other money market funds managed by TD Asset Management Inc. TD also noted that it did not distribute any related products to customers through its systems.
    The Bank noted that markets for TDBFG-sponsored asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) have continued to perform satisfactorily.

Seems perfectly reasonable to me!

December 14, 2007

December 14th, 2007

Headline inflation in the US came in a 4.3% yoy today, powered by Food (+4.8%) and Energy (+21.4%). The core rate, which excludes these two items, was +2.3% yoy. Not a good report, according to economists surveyed by the WSJ – the Fed is now caught between a rock and a hard place on rates. Stagflation, anyone?

On what might possibly be a related note, William C. Dudley, EVP of the Fed, gave a speech on TIPS (hat tip: WSJ Blogs and Economist’s View):

Put simply, I come here to praise TIPS… In my opinion, the benefits of the TIPS program significantly exceed the costs of the program.

we might start by comparing the difference in funding costs to the Treasury of TIPS versus a program of comparable duration nominal Treasuries.

But we should also be careful not to ignore other potential benefits of the TIPS program. As I see it, these potential benefits include:

  • Greater diversification of the Treasury’s funding sources, which presumably has favorable implications for the Treasury’s funding costs.
  • The potential for TIPS issuance to reduce the variability of the U.S. government’s net financial position.
  • Access to a market-determined measure of inflation expectations that can help inform the conduct of monetary policy.
  • The provision of a virtually risk-free investment that provides value to risk-averse investors.

One point that was discussed during Canada’s introduction of RRBs (Real Return Bonds) was that this indexing makes it at least a little bit more difficult for the government to deliberately inflate away the debt – which is also, explicitly, an argument in favour of borrowing in foreign currencies.

Continuing with the inflationary theme, Tommaso Monacelli of the Università Bocconi, Milan has written a very hawkish piece regarding the recent ECB decision to leave policy rates unchanged:

Can the ECB publish inflation forecasts between 2 and 3 percent and decide not to raise interest rates? Given that its explicit mandate is to keep inflation below but close to 2 percent, what type of signal is the Bank sending to the markets, especially as regards its own credibility?

In this mounting inflation context, more than ever, the lack of transparency in the ECB policy points to the need of a more rigorous (arguably “scientific”) framework in which its policy decisions can be rationalized. Much of the recent literature describes the optimal conduct of monetary policy in terms of ‘inflation forecast targeting’. Two are the basic ingredients. First, a numerical target for inflation (as it is well-known from the experience of many countries in the world that have adopted inflation targeting, including emerging-market economies). Second, and more importantly, a management of the path of interest rates such that in each period the inflation forecast at some horizon, and conditional on that same instrument path, are in line with the inflation target.

He also criticizes what he sees as a somewhat circular reasoning process:

Reading carefully through the technical notes in small print (not really an example of transparency), one observes that the staff projections are based on the markets’ expectations of future interest rates. Hence they are conditional not on the future interest rate path that the Bank itself foresees as most likely, but on the interest rate path that the markets foresee as most likely.

The projection for 2008 inflation does indeed note:

The technical assumptions about interest rates and both oil and non-energy commodity prices are based on market expectations, with a cut-off date of 14 November 2007. With regard to short-term interest rates, as measured by the three-month EURIBOR, market expectations are derived from forward rates, reflecting a snapshot of the yield curve at the cut-off date. They imply an average level of 4.9% in the fourth quarter of 2007, falling to 4.5% in 2008 and 4.3% in 2009. The market expectations for euro area ten-year nominal government bond yields imply a flat profile at their mid-November level of 4.3%. The baseline projection also includes the assumption that bank lending spreads will rise slightly over the projection horizon, reflecting the current episode of heightened risk consciousness in financial markets.

… but saying that this is in small print seems to me to be overstating the case a little! The iterative process that leads to the final Euroland forecast has led to the forecast:

On the basis of the information available up to 23 November 2007, Eurosystem staff have prepared projections for macroeconomic developments in the euro area.1 Average annual real GDP growth is projected to be between 2.4% and 2.8% in 2007, between 1.5% and 2.5% in 2008, and between 1.6% and 2.6% in 2009. The average rate of increase in the overall HICP is projected to be between 2.0% and 2.2% in 2007, between 2.0% and 3.0% in 2008, and between 1.2% and 2.4% in 2009.

“HICP” is the “Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices”. I don’t see anything wrong with the system myself … it seems to me that basing projections on market expectations is as good as any other method and better than most. After having prepared these projections, the output (HICP) may be examined and if it’s outside the desired range then the actual policy decision may be made taking the expectation as a guide.

The most interesting part of all this, however, is that the spectre of inflation is intruding more often into public debate. Should stagflation become a more credible threat than it is now, I suspect policy makers will favour the stag- over the -flation and tighten even faster than they are currently easing … which could have major implications for long-bonds and therefore preferreds.

Mind you, though, the market as represented by LIBOR is ignoring the policy makers … at least for now:

The rates banks charge each other for three-month loans held at seven-year highs for a second day after policy makers in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Switzerland and the euro region agreed to ease the logjam in short-term credit markets. The cost of borrowing in euros stayed at 4.95 percent, the British Bankers’ Association said today, up from last month’s low of 4.57 percent and 3.68 percent a year ago.

“The market clearly doesn’t believe central banks can do anything about this crisis,” said Nathalie Fillet, senior interest-rate strategist at BNP Paribas SA in London. “This is not going to be a magical solution to the problem.”

There has been a certain amount of sensationalism regarding the deal – Accrued Interest doesn’t buy it:

Waldman says it’s a bailout because the Fed is offering loans that other banks wouldn’t be willing to offer. Here again, any bank who went to the discount window would borrow under the same terms. Does the continued existence of the discount window constitute a bailout? Put another way, banks would never use the discount window if financing was available elsewhere at similar costs elsewhere. So any time a bank uses the discount window, it’s a bailout by Waldman’s definition. This is why I am loathe to use that term.

Which brings us to the highly interesting topic of dissing the banks. Moody’s dissed Citibank today:

Moody’s Investors Service downgraded the long-term ratings of Citigroup Inc. (Citigroup) (senior to Aa3 from Aa2) and lowered the Bank Financial Strength Rating (BFSR) of Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) to B from A-. The rating on Citibank for long-term deposits and senior debt was lowered to Aa1 from Aaa. The rating outlook is stable.

The downgrade was prompted by Moody’s view that Citigroup’s capital ratios will remain low. According to Senior Vice President Sean Jones, “this situation is likely because management will need to take sizable write-downs against its subprime RMBS and CDO portfolio.” The bank is also expected to make significant sustained provisions against its residential mortgage book, which is over $200 billion. These charges are likely to occur when Citigroup’s normal earnings power is depressed, particularly in the United States.

“During 2008,” the analyst said, “Citigroup’s weak earnings should prohibit the bank from rapidly restoring capital ratios, despite its recent issuance of $7.5 billion hybrid capital.”

For Citigroup’s ratings to be upgraded, the company would need to rebuild its capital ratios to levels maintained prior to 2007. As well, the firm’s pre-provision earnings power has to return to its previous strong level, while reducing its concentration risks.

The company’s failure to restore its capital ratios in the medium term would possibly lead to a further downgrade

Remember the BCE/Teachers deal? It is not, repeat: not, being renegotiated:

BCE Inc. (TSX, NYSE: BCE) is today issuing a statement in response to certain rumours in the market regarding the status of its definitive agreement to be acquired by an investor group led by Teachers’ Private Capital, the private investment arm of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, Providence Equity Partners Inc. and Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC (the Investor Group).

While it is BCE’s policy not to comment on market rumours or speculation, in the interest of its shareholders, the company is today confirming that neither BCE nor its Board of Directors is involved in any discussions regarding any renegotiation of any of the terms of the definitive agreement entered into on June 29, 2007.

Under the terms of the definitive agreement, the Investor Group has agreed to acquire all of BCE’s outstanding common shares for $42.75 per share in cash and all of BCE’s outstanding preferred shares at prices set out in the definitive agreement.

And you’ll have to parse the significance of that yourselves, because I’m not touching it!

There may be a certain amount of turmoil in the US markets Monday, as the Moody’s announcement on Monolines is digested:

Moody’s Investors Service has updated its evaluation of US mortgage market stress on the ratings of financial guaranty companies, and has considered those companies’ plans for strengthening capitalization, as well as their developing strategies. The following actions are the result of that evaluation. The Aaa ratings of Financial Guaranty Insurance Company and XL Capital Assurance Inc. were placed on review for possible downgrade. The Aaa ratings of MBIA Insurance Corporation and CIFG Guaranty were affirmed, but the rating outlooks changed to negative. The Aaa ratings of Ambac Assurance Corporation, Assured Guaranty Corp, and Financial Security Assurance Inc. and the Aa3 rating of Radian Asset Assurance were all affirmed with a stable outlook.

As a result of these reviews, the Moody’s-rated securities that are “wrapped” or guaranteed by FGIC and XL Capital Assurance are also placed under review for possible downgrade. A full list of these securities will be made available later this evening under “Ratings Lists” on the company’s website at http://www.moodys.com/guarantors

Moody’s will also be hosting a teleconference on Monday, December 17 at 11:00 EST/16:00 GMT/17:00 CET to discuss these actions in further detail. To register for this teleconference, go to www.moodys.com/events.

There was supposed to be an announcement about the Montreal Accord and Canadian ABCP today … after the close … later, but I don’t see anything yet! Apparently, the banks are getting sticky about liquidity guarantees:

Bank of Canada Governor David Dodge and governor designate Mark Carney pushed the bank chief executives on a conference call Thursday night to make commitments for liquidity backup that could be as much as $1-billion for some of the big five banks, said people familiar with the situation.

The liquidity issue is one of the final hurdles in the hoped for re-jig of the frozen short-term debt, which if successful, would help to avoid a meltdown that could have massive ripple effects in financial markets.

I confess, I don’t understand why a liquidity guaranty is important – the entire purpose of the plan is to avoid the necessity for refinancing prior to the new notes’ maturity.

Another very active day in the preferred share market, with weak prices. Tax-loss selling? Sheer boneheadism? You tell me. The BAM issues continue to get hurt badly, which seems to me somewhat mysterious.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.08% 5.08% 92,234 15.33 2 -0.1001% 1,043.0
Fixed-Floater 4.86% 5.01% 95,646 15.48 8 +0.1302% 1,024.8
Floater 6.02% 6.03% 111,375 13.89 2 -1.7954% 801.5
Op. Retract 4.90% 3.72% 85,882 3.47 16 -0.4177% 1,030.7
Split-Share 5.31% 5.58% 104,186 4.18 15 -0.5208% 1,025.6
Interest Bearing 6.33% 6.79% 66,863 3.69 4 -0.0100% 1,055.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.80% 4.63% 85,342 4.87 11 -0.1225% 1,015.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.50% 5.55% 380,303 14.34 55 -0.3872% 924.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet -4.0000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.93% based on a bid of 24.00 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. I’m used to BAM issues getting hammered, but this is getting silly! If there’s anything seriously wrong with BAM, the common shareholders didn’t get the memo.
BAM.PR.B Floater -3.6011%  
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -3.0749% Asset coverage of 3.7+:1 as of November 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.11% based on a bid of 21.75 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. Compare to BNA.PR.A (6.18% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.C (7.53% to 2019-1-10).
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.9868% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.64% based on a bid of 22.20 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.9664% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.84% based on a bid of 20.44 and a limitMaturity.
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.9159% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.90% based on a bid of 23.55 and a limitMaturity.
FTN.PR.A SplitShare -1.8609% Asset coverage of just under 2.6:1 as of November 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.14% based on a bid of 10.02 and a hardMaturity 2008-12-1 at 10.00.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.8605% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.82% based on a bid of 21.10 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount -1.8549% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.81% based on a bid of 23.81 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.6701% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.63% based on a bid of 24.14 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.5888% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 21.06 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.I OpRet -1.5748% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.49% based on a bid of 25.00 and a softMaturity 2013-12-30 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -1.5536%  
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.5326% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.49% based on a bid of 20.56 and a limitMaturity.
LBS.PR.A SplitShare -1.1823% Asset coverage of 2.4+:1 as of December 13, according to Brompton Group. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 10.03 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.1060% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.46 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.0638% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 23.75 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.R FixFloat +1.1368%  
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount +1.4273% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 23.45 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.7639% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.65% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +3.0172%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PIC.PR.A SplitShare 671,010 Three Macs bought 120,000 from RBC at 15.08 in two tranches, then Scotia crossed 493,000 at 15.00. Asset coverage of just under 1.7:1 as of December 6, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.93% based on a bid of 15.05 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00.
IQW.PR.C Scraps (Would be OpRet but there are credit concerns) 372,755 TD crossed 62,500 at 16.50, then another 25,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 378.25% based on a bid of 16.25 and a softMaturity 2008-2-29 at 25.00 AND on getting all the coupons. Could be a good equity substitute, but there was more bad news yesterday leading to talk of bankruptcy. Note that the common closed at 1.74, below the minimum conversion price, which simplifies the math but reduces potential returns.
CM.PR.R OpRet 353,150 Nesbitt was active today … the last five trades of the day (between 10:54 and 16:15!) were all Nesbitt crosses totalling 343,000 shares, all at 25.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.49% based on a bid of 25.85 and a softMaturity 2013-4-29 at 25.00.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount 132,769 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 21.15 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 96,235 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 21.87 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount 57,930 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 23.45 and a limitMaturity.

There were fifty-three other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : September 2004

December 14th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2004-09-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,344.4 1 2.00 2.66% 20.6 87M 2.67%
FixedFloater 2,208.7 8 2.00 2.51% 19.2 90M 5.25%
Floater 1,983.6 6 2.00 0.00% 0.08 50M 3.06%
OpRet 1,760.2 21 1.48 3.67% 3.7 98M 4.76%
SplitShare 1,792.6 14 1.79 3.94% 3.8 53M 5.13%
Interest-Bearing 2,184.4 10 2.00 4.66% 2.24 112M 7.03%
Perpetual-Premium 1,378.9 34 1.64 5.01% 5.9 146M 5.51%
Perpetual-Discount 1,638.4 0 0 0 0 0 0

Index Constitution, 2004-09-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2004-09-30, Post-rebalancing

December PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

December 14th, 2007

The markets have closed and the December edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share; the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The December issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”!

December 13, 2007

December 13th, 2007

Well … it looks like yesterday’s shock-and-awe effort to provide liquidity has failed – assuming the point of the exercise was to lower EURIBOR:

The cost to borrow for three months remained at 4.95 percent, the British Bankers’ Association said today. That’s 95 basis points, or 0.95 percentage point, more than the European Central Bank’s benchmark interest rate, compared with 57 basis points a month ago. The difference averaged 25 basis points in the first half of the year, before losses on securities linked to U.S. subprime mortgages contaminated credit markets.

The TED Spread also ignored the theatricals:

Banks remain reluctant to lend to each other. The so-called “TED” spread, the difference between three-month Treasury bill yields and the London interbank offered rate for the same maturity, was 2.21 percentage points, near the highest since August. The increase indicates banks are charging more to lend to each other.

Mind you, Naked Capitalism focusses on the collateral that will be accepted for these loans and concludes:

Most of the CDO and subprime paper held by banks is AAA. Now I have no idea where this stuff is trading, and the fact is that a lot of it is not trading. However, lot of people are using the ABX as a proxy for subprime and other risky mortgage credit risk. So it may not be a price, but it’s a reference point for pricing. And it has AAA credits at 70 cents on the dollar.

So the Fed’s temporary facility could be used, quite legitimately, to mark anything that the Fed would accept as a repo at its collateral value for accounting purposes (you could theoretically have made the same argument for the discount window, but that’s an emergency facility, while this is intended for all comers). That places a very big floor under a lot of now-questionable credit. That move would reduce writedowns, the accompanying loss of confidence, and the need for additional equity well out of proportion to the paltry $40 billion the Fed is throwing into the mix.

It could well be. I argued in the comments to JDH’s Econbrowser post that the problem with credit markets is funding. People have the equity needed to put a floor under the markets – even a position levered up 10:1 has 10% equity in the position – but can’t reliably borrow the funds required to make the effort worthwhile. It may be that the Central Banks are trying to encourage the banks to lend against collateral of, shall we say, non-traditional quality by assuring them that the collateral may be rehypothecated in time of need.

Greg Ip supports this view – that the point of the exercise is to expand the definition of acceptable collateral – in a WSJ post:

Ironically, the Fed for a long time has been unhappy with the fact that it can even accept agencies, seeing it as an implicit subsidy to Fannie and Freddie.

If Fed officials had the same freedom these central banks did, they may not have created the new “term auction facility.” As it is, the facility is a form of legal arbitrage — a way for the Fed to get around the artificial constraints imposed by the Federal Reserve Act. It “gives us a tool that lies somewhere between our open market operations” and the discount window, Mr. Geithner said. “It provides a mechanism for expanding the range of collateral against which we provide funds to the market — in effect to change the composition of our balance sheet — in ways we cannot do through traditional open market operations.”

The Fed, nonetheless, is hopeful (confident would be too strong) its facility will do some good. The 3-month Libor, a key gauge of stress in the bank funding market, was fixed at 4.99% today, down from 5.06% Wednesday. The New York Fed announced today it would redeem all $15.2 billion of the Treasury bills it holds that mature on Thursday. That will cause its balance sheet to shrink, contracting the money supply. To offset the effect, it expects to lend up to $20 billion through the new facility on Monday.

The redemption of T-Bills is significant: it means there is (basically) no net improvement in systemic liquidity. What there is is simply a smearing of the extant Fed-provided liquidity over a broader section of the market. For a while.

In monoline news, Ambac is trying to stay afloat by reinsuring some of its portfolio:

Ambac Financial Group Inc., the world’s second-largest bond insurer, will pass off the risk of $29 billion in securities it guarantees in an effort to convince ratings companies that it still deserves a AAA credit rating.

Assured Guaranty Ltd. will reinsure the securities, New York-based Ambac said today in a statement.

Ambac, whose credit rating stands behind $556 billion of securities, is among seven AAA rated bond insurers under the scrutiny of Moody’s Investors Service, Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poor’s. Moody’s and Fitch said last month that Ambac was “moderately likely” to breach capital requirements because of a deterioration in the credit quality of the securities it guarantees.

“Reinsurance is a valuable, capital-efficient and shareholder-friendly tool for managing risk and capital,” Ambac Chief Executive Officer, Robert Genader said in the statement.

Assured Guaranty has just been affirmed AAA by Fitch:

The affirmation of AGL’s ratings is based on the company’s disciplined underwriting strategy exemplified by minimal exposure to higher-risk structured finance collateralized debt obligations (SF CDOs), improving financial results and sufficient excess capital for its given rating. AGL’s capital position has been further supplemented by today’s announced $300 million equity issuance, with the proceeds to be down-streamed to its reinsurance affiliate, Assured Guaranty Re (AG Re), to provide capital to help fund increasing opportunities to support other ‘AAA’ financial guarantors’ reinsurance needs.

AGL’s capital position remains satisfactory for an ‘AAA’ company, and the additional $300 million capital issuance should help support rapid growth which is taking place in the fourth quarter of 2007. After analyzing AGL’s SF CDO and second lien exposures, Fitch believes that the impact on AGL’s capital cushion is minimal, between $125 and $150 million, which corresponds to a Core Capital Adequacy Ratio of about 1.07x our minimum AAA standard of 1.00x.

In other words, they kept their powder dry, raised capital for expansion rather than to repair damage, and I’ll bet they’re really sticking it to poor old Ambac! Guaranteed, most assuredly.

CIBC made the big-time today, with a Bloomberg story that was picked up by Calculated Risk:

CIBC’s lightly guarded secret is the name of a “U.S. financial guarantor” that faces a possible downgrade on its A credit rating and is “not necessarily rated by both Moody’s & S&P.” That’s how CIBC last week described the company that is insuring $3.47 billion, or about a third, of the collateralized- debt obligations it holds that are tied to U.S. subprime mortgages.

The company’s identity matters because the bank said these hedged CDOs were worth just $1.76 billion at Oct. 31, down almost half from their face amount. If the guarantor goes poof, CIBC loses its hedge on these derivative contracts. And the Toronto-based bank would have to recognize the loss, which is growing.

Analysts watching CIBC, including Darko Mihelic of CIBC World Markets, quickly fingered what they believe is the unlucky backer: ACA Financial Guaranty Corp.

While we’re on the topic of enormous write-offs, how about that Washington Mutual, eh? This was discussed yesterday; they’ve now released a prospectus for a new preferred issue, with some interesting snippets:

As a result of the fundamental shift in the mortgage market and the actions we are taking to resize our Home Loans business, we will incur a fourth quarter after-tax charge of approximately $1.6 billion for the write-down of all the goodwill associated with the Home Loans business. This non-cash charge will not affect our tangible or regulatory capital or our liquidity.

Loan Loss Provision. Continued deterioration in the mortgage markets and declining housing prices have led to increasing fourth quarter charge-offs and delinquencies in our loan portfolio. As a result, we now expect our fourth quarter 2007 provision for loan losses to be between $1.5 and $1.6 billion, approximately twice the level of expected fourth quarter net charge-offs.

We currently expect our first quarter 2008 provision for loan losses to be in the range of $1.8 to $2.0 billion, reflecting an increase in provision which we expect to be well ahead of charge-offs, which are also expected to increase significantly during that quarter. The first quarter 2008 range reflects our current view that prevailing adverse conditions in the credit and housing markets will persist through 2008.

While difficult to predict, we also currently expect quarterly loan loss provisions through the end of 2008 to remain elevated, generally consistent with our expectation for the first quarter of 2008. We anticipate that there may be some additional variation depending on the level of credit card securitization activity during any quarter.

It’s a $3-billion issue, convertible into common, paying 7.75%; their shareholders’ equity is currently (September 30, 3rd Quarter) $23.9-billion. I found the discussion of taxes fairly entertaining:

Under current law, if a U.S. holder is an individual or other non-corporate holder, dividends received by such U.S. holder generally will be subject to a reduced maximum tax rate of 15% for taxable years beginning before January 1, 2011, after which the rate applicable to dividends is scheduled to return to the tax rate generally applicable to ordinary income. The rate reduction does not apply to dividends received to the extent that U.S. holders elect to treat the dividends as “investment income,” for purposes of the rules relating to the limitation on the deductibility of investment-related interest, which may be offset by investment expense. Furthermore, the rate reduction will also not apply to dividends that are paid to such holders with respect to the Series R Preferred Stock or our common stock that is held by the holder for less than 61 days during the 121-day period beginning on the date which is 60 days before the date on which the Series R Preferred Stock or our common stock become ex-dividend with respect to such dividend. (A 91-day minimum holding period applies to any dividends on the Series R Preferred Stock that are attributable to periods in excess of 366 days.)

Yeah, I could put some adjustments into HIMIPref™ to analyze it properly … but holy smokes, they’d be messy!

In what is probably the death-knell for MLEC/Super-Conduit, Citigroup is taking its SIVs onto its own balance sheet:

  • As assets continue to be sold, Citi’s risk exposure, and the capital ratio impact from consolidation, will be reduced accordingly.
  • Given the high credit quality of the SIV assets, Citi’s credit exposure under its commitment is substantially limited. Approximately 54% of the SIV assets are rated triple-A and 43% double-A by Moody’s, with no direct exposure to sub-prime assets and immaterial indirect sub-prime exposure of $51 million. In addition, the junior notes, which have a current market value of $2.5 billion, are in the first loss position.
  • The commitment is independent of the “Master Liquidity Enhancement Conduit” (“M-LEC”). Citi continues to support the formation of the M-LEC, which is an initiative that involves Citi and other financial institutions.

    Another active day in the preferred share market, with a slight drift downwards.

    Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
    Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
    Ratchet 5.05% 5.05% 93,830 15.38 2 -0.4077% 1,044.0
    Fixed-Floater 4.87% 5.01% 94,398 15.50 8 -0.7592% 1,023.5
    Floater 5.91% 5.92% 105,423 14.06 2 +0.3671% 816.2
    Op. Retract 4.88% 3.78% 84,097 3.34 16 +0.1532% 1,035.0
    Split-Share 5.29% 5.35% 103,316 4.36 15 +0.3631% 1,031.0
    Interest Bearing 6.31% 6.79% 67,743 3.68 4 -0.7289% 1,055.1
    Perpetual-Premium 5.80% 4.58% 84,040 4.71 11 -0.0611% 1,016.6
    Perpetual-Discount 5.48% 5.52% 377,725 14.38 55 -0.1026% 927.7
    Major Price Changes
    Issue Index Change Notes
    BCE.PR.G FixFloat -4.6053%  
    POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -2.5562% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.75% based on a bid of 22.11 and a limitMaturity.
    BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.9088% Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of December 7, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.40% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.25 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
    CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.6973% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.72% based on a bid of 20.85 and a limitMaturity.
    BCE.PR.R FixFloat -1.6970%  
    BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.6522% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 25.00 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00.
    BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -1.5021% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.50% based on a bid of 18.36 and a limitMaturity.
    CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.1934% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.70% based on a bid of 24.01 and a limitMaturity.
    HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.1578% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 23.05 and a limitMaturity.
    BAM.PR.G FixFloat -1.0370%  
    FFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.1156% Asset coverage of just under 2.4:1 as of November 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 9.97 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
    FTN.PR.A SplitShare +1.1893% Asset coverage of just under 2.6:1 as of November 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.10% based on a bid of 10.21 and a hardMaturity 2008-12-1 at 10.00.
    BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.2121% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.24% based on a bid of 21.71 and a limitMaturity.
    PWF.PR.J OpRet +1.2510% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.11% based on a bid of 25.90 and a softMaturity 2013-7-30 at 25.00.
    BNA.PR.C SplitShare +1.8066% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.55% based on a bid of 19.16 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
    BAM.PR.H FixFloat +2.7059%  
    Volume Highlights
    Issue Index Volume Notes
    BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 361,600 Nesbitt crossed 200,000 at 24.92, then another 100,000 at the same price, followed by Scotia crossing 50,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.35% based on a bid of 24.92 and a limitMaturity.
    IQW.PR.C Scraps (Would be OpRet but there are credit concerns) 284,218 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 488.01% based on a bid of 15.00 and a softMaturity 2008-2-29 at 25.00 AND on getting all the coupons. Could be a good equity substitute, but there was more bad news today leading to talk of bankruptcy. Note that at the close of 1.88, the common is below the minimum conversion price, which simplifies the math but reduces potential returns.
    RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 134,905 Scotia crossed 20,000 at 21.40. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 21.37 and a limitMaturity.
    RY.PR.K OpRet 118,191 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.18. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.48% based on a bid of 25.11 and a call 2008-1-12 at 25.00.
    TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount (for now!) 111,750 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 25.04 and a limitMaturity.
    RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 98,300 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 21.17 and a limitMaturity.

    There were forty-six other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

    HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : August 2004

    December 13th, 2007

    All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

    HIMI Index Values 2004-08-31
    Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
    Ratchet 1,341.7 1 2.00 2.52% 21.0 67M 2.54%
    FixedFloater 2,198.9 8 2.00 2.40% 19.7 75M 5.26%
    Floater 1,949.8 6 2.00 2.63% 19.9 51M 2.91%
    OpRet 1,753.3 21 1.48 3.46% 3.7 103M 4.76%
    SplitShare 1,784.2 12 1.75 4.16% 3.8 65M 5.08%
    Interest-Bearing 2,137.9 9 2.00 5.43% 1.0 136M 7.14%
    Perpetual-Premium 1,374.5 32 1.62 4.99% 5.7 142M 5.51%
    Perpetual-Discount 1,625.4 0 0 0 0 0 0

    Index Constitution, 2004-08-31, Pre-rebalancing

    Index Constitution, 2004-08-31, Post-rebalancing

    MUH.PR.A Term Extended (Conditionally)

    December 13th, 2007

    Mulvhill Premium Split Share Corp. has announced:

    its shareholders have approved a reorganization permitting the Company to extend the life of the Company for an additional 5 years to February 1, 2013. As part of the reorganization, the Preferred Shares will be renamed “Priority Equity Shares” and the Company will adopt a portfolio protection plan for the benefit of the holders of such shares. The dividend entitlement of the shares will remain unchanged at 5.50% per annum (on the $15.00 original issue price). Class A Shareholders will continue to benefit from a unique, highly leveraged investment in a blue-chip portfolio, and will receive distributions initially set at approximately 10% per annum on the net asset value of the Class A Shares.

    Holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares will retain their annual and monthly retraction rights originally provided to them. In addition, under the reorganization, shareholders will be given a special retraction right to cause the Company to redeem their Class A Shares at net asset value of a Class A Share and Preferred Shares for $15.00 per share on January 31, 2008. The reorganization will only be implemented if holders of at least 2,000,000 Class A Shares elect not to retract their shares under the special retraction right.

    Note that the Prefs will be renamed Priority Equity Shares and no longer rated by DBRS:

    The change of name of the Preferred Shares to Priority Equity Shares is intended to more accurately describe the attributes of such shares and to more closely align them with similar shares recently offered in the market. The Priority Equity Shares will not be rated by DBRS and the Company will no longer be subject to DBRS’ additional requirements relating to the investments it may acquire and hold.

    The Company proposes to adopt a strategy (the ‘‘Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan’’) to protect holders of the Priority Equity Shares in order to assist the Company to pay in full the original issue price of $15.00 per share (the amount so required to effect such payment from time to time being the ‘‘Priority Equity Share Repayment Amount’’) on the final redemption date of February 1, 2013 (the ‘‘Final Redemption Date’’).

    The Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan provides that if the net asset value of the Company declines below a specific level, the Company will liquidate a portion of its portfolio and use the net proceeds to acquire (i) qualifying debt securities or (ii) certain securities and enter into a forward agreement (collectively, the ‘‘Permitted Repayment Securities’’) in order to cover the Priority Equity Share Repayment Amount in the event of further declines in the net asset value of the Company. To qualify as Permitted Repayment Securities, debt securities must have a remaining term to maturity of less than one year and be issued or guaranteed by the government of Canada or a province or the government of the United States, or be other cash equivalents with a rating of at least R-1 (mid) by DBRS or the equivalent rating from another rating organization.

    The HIMIPref™ database has been updated with a reorgDataEntry reflecting a 1:1 transformation from securityCode A43200 to A43201.

    The new security has the following characteristics representing my interpretation of the current investment terms:

    • listed as “Not Rated”
    • Callable 2008-01-31 at $15
    • Maturity 2013-2-1 at $15.00

    Update: I have uploaded the current SplitShare index after having given effect to the change. Note that MUH.PR.A will remain in the index until the December month-end rebalancing.

    CIBC Still Trying to Cancel Series 28 Prefs

    December 13th, 2007

    CM.PR.G is a bit of a funny issue – the prospectus dated June 4, 2004 offered Series 28 Prefs that came attached to warrants to purchase Series 29 (which is CM.PR.G) after November 1, 2004.

    I don’t know why they did it this way … I’ll have to do some more digging at some point. It may be somewhere in the files!

    If the conversion was not exercised, the dividend dropped to less than 1% of par, so the Series 28 is best thought of as an installment receipt for the “real” issue, CM.PR.G, Series 29, which is exchange traded. Series 28 is not exchange traded.

    Anyway, the 2007 financials disclose (page 115) that there are still 2,500 Series 28 shares outstanding … $25-thousand worth. In 2007, they purchased 558 shares for cancellation.

    But they’re still trying! Got to get this ridiculous item off the books somehow!

    December 12, 2007

    December 12th, 2007

    James Hamilton of Econbrowser took a look at yesterday’s market action and got confused:

    the January fed funds futures contract, which historically has proven to be an excellent predictor of the monthly average fed funds rate. This had been trading at 4.18% prior to the meeting. Since the FOMC is not scheduled to meet again until January 29/30, one might have read this as implying a 30% chance of having seen a 50-basis-point cut from yesterday’s meeting:

    But here’s the curious thing: as of this writing, the price of that contract still has not budged more than half a basis point from where it stood at the close of trading last Friday. Fed funds futures traders seem not to have been surprised in the least by the outcome of Tuesday’s meeting.

    If that’s the case, then why did the stock market appear to be so shocked that the Fed only cut its target yesterday by 25 basis points?Here’s the official Econbrowser answer– Beats me!

    Fitch has placed a monoline insurer on Watch Negative:

    This action follows completion of the updated assessment by Fitch of SCA’s exposure to structured finance collateralized debt obligations (SF CDOs) backed by subprime mortgage collateral, as well as SCA’s exposure to residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). This review indicates that SCA’s capital adequacy under Fitch’s Matrix financial guaranty capital model currently falls below guidelines for an ‘AAA’ IFS rating by more than $2 billion, due to sharp downgrades by Fitch in a number of SCA’s insured SF CDO exposures. Fitch originally announced it was conducting a review of all ‘AAA’ rated financial guarantors’ exposures to subprime-exposed insured transactions on Nov. 5, 2007.

    If within the next 4-6 weeks, SCA is able to obtain firm capital commitments, and/or put in place reinsurance or other risk mitigation measures in order to meet capital guidelines, Fitch would expect to affirm SCA’s ratings with a Stable Rating Outlook. If SCA is unable to meet capital guidelines in the noted timeframe, Fitch would expect to downgrade SCA’s ratings. Based on the result of our updated capital analysis, Fitch would expect the IFS rating to be downgraded to the ‘AA’ rating category, assuming little change to the company’s current capital position. Fitch understands that SCA is actively working to address its current capital shortfall.

    So, in other words, Security Capital has to get $2-billion in equity in the next 4-6 weeks or they’re basically out of business. When your business consists of renting out your credit rating, it can’t have any dents in it.

    What’s a monoline insurer, you ask? Well, S&P has the answer!

    Monoline insurer—An insurer that writes only financial guaranty insurance.

    Multiline insurer—An insurer that writes many types of property and casualty insurance.

    Today’s big news was the Central Bank USD Term Repo Extravaganza:

    The Federal Reserve, European Central Bank and three other central banks moved in concert to alleviate a credit squeeze threatening global growth, in the biggest act of international economic cooperation since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

    For example, the Swiss:

    In addition to its Swiss franc open market operations, the Swiss National Bank will offer a US dollar repo transaction on 17 December 2007. The maximum amount offered will be USD 4 billion. The USD repo transaction against SNB-eligible collateral will be conducted in the form of a variable rate tender auction and will provide funds for 28 days, with settlement on 20 December 2007. This measure is intended to facilitate the US dollar funding of SNB counterparties in the Swiss repo system.

    … the Canadians

    As part of its continuing provision of liquidity in support of the efficient functioning of financial markets, the Bank of Canada announced today that it will enter into term purchase and resale agreements (term PRA) extending over the calendar year-end as follows:

    Amount Transaction and Settlement Maturity
    $2 billion 13 December 2007 10 January 2008
    Minimum of $1 billion 18 December 2007 4 January 2008

    … the Britons

    The Bank of England has already scheduled long-term repo open market operations (OMOs) on 18 December and 15 January. In those operations reserves will, as usual, be offered at 3, 6, 9 and 12-month maturities against the Bank’s published list of eligible collateral. But the total amount of reserves offered at the 3-month maturity will be expanded and the range of collateral accepted for funds advanced at this maturity will be widened.

    The total size of reserves offered in the operations on 18 December and on 15 January will be raised from £2.85 billion to £11.35 billion, of which £10bn will be offered at the 3-month maturity.

    … the Europeans

    The Governing Council of the ECB has decided to take joint action with the Federal Reserve by offering US dollar funding to Eurosystem counterparties.

    The Eurosystem shall conduct two US dollar liquidity-providing operations, in connection with the US dollar Term Auction Facility, against ECB-eligible collateral for a maturity of 28 and 35 days. The submission of bids will take place on 17 and 20 December 2007 for settlement on 20 and 27 December 2007, respectively. The operational details can be obtained from the ECB’s website (www.ecb.europa.eu). The US dollars will be provided by the Federal Reserve to the ECB, up to $20 billion, by means of a temporary reciprocal currency arrangement (swap line).

    It is reminded that the Governing Council previously decided on 8 November 2007 to renew at maturity the two supplementary longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) that were allotted in August and September 2007. As an additional measure, the Governing Council decided on 13 November to lengthen the maturity of the main refinancing operation settling on 19 December 2007 to two weeks, thereby maturing on 4 January 2008 instead of 28 December 2007.

    … all supported by the Fed:

    Actions taken by the Federal Reserve include the establishment of a temporary Term Auction Facility (approved by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) and the establishment of foreign exchange swap lines with the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank (approved by the Federal Open Market Committee). 

    Under the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program, the Federal Reserve will auction term funds to depository institutions against the wide variety of collateral that can be used to secure loans at the discount window.  All depository institutions that are judged to be in generally sound financial condition by their local Reserve Bank and that are eligible to borrow under the primary credit discount window program will be eligible to participate in TAF auctions.  All advances must be fully collateralized.  By allowing the Federal Reserve to inject term funds through a broader range of counterparties and against a broader range of collateral than open market operations, this facility could help promote the efficient dissemination of liquidity when the unsecured interbank markets are under stress.

    Each TAF auction will be for a fixed amount, with the rate determined by the auction process (subject to a minimum bid rate).  The first TAF auction of $20 billion is scheduled for Monday, December 17, with settlement on Thursday, December 20; this auction will provide 28-day term funds, maturing Thursday, January 17, 2008.  The second auction of up to $20 billion is scheduled for Thursday, December 20, with settlement on Thursday, December 27; this auction will provide 35-day funds, maturing Thursday, January 31, 2008.  The third and fourth auctions will be held on January 14 and 28, with settlement on the following Thursdays.  The amounts of those auctions will be determined in January.  The Federal Reserve may conduct additional auctions in subsequent months, depending in part on evolving market conditions.

    If this doesn’t tame the TED Spread, now at its widest levels since the crash of ’87, ain’t nuthin’ gonna do it! Initial reactions are favourable and Naked Capitalism has the news that LIBOR fell immediately:

    Laurent Fransolet at Barclays Capital said Libor rates could be fixed lower in the days ahead by as much as 20 basis points.
    The biggest impact will likely be seen in sterling rates, where higher fixings have had “the strongest, most direct” effect, and the most limited in the euro zone.
    But it will take time for the recent market carnage to heal.
    “While this would still be way above pre-crisis levels, we suspect it will be difficult for the market to fully recover in the near term. After all, the ABCP market in the U.S. is about 30 percent smaller than at its peak and that of the euro area has almost halved, making the combined shrinkage more than $500 billion over the past five months,” he wrote in a note.
    If Libor rates do fall Thursday, it will be the first downward move in three-month euro Libor for over a month. 
    But who’s fault is all this, anyway? The debate continues.        

    On a more local scale, readers who share my fascination with the continuing David Berry saga will doubtless be interested in the actual Berry notice of motion that was heard by RS on December 10. I am advised that factums, etc., submitted to the hearing panel are TOP SECRET. Next time you hear a regulator blather about transparency and disclosure, remember this.

    I am unable to determine how the MUH.PR.A Shareholders Meeting acted regarding the proposed term extension. I hope to have definitive information tomorrow.

    Accrued Interest has serious doubts about whether Washington Mutual can survive (he previously posted about selling his position, and poses the interesting thought:

    WaMu is also likely to test whether a large bank can operate with a below-investment grade bond rating. Many investors, myself included, always assumed that banks were likely to do whatever it took to maintain a high credit rating, because cost of funds is so important to their basic business model. While WaMu does not currently have a junk rating, the cost of any new debt will be at junk-type levels. If WaMu can operate while paying junk-type levels on its debt, that will change many perceptions about banks and the value of a rating.

    I note that Moody’s downgraded Washington Mutual Bank:

    Moody’s Investors Service downgraded by two notches the long-term ratings of Washington Mutual, Inc. (senior to Baa2 from A3) and its subsidiaries including the lead thrift Washington Mutual Bank (financial strength rating to C- from C+ and long-term deposits to Baa1 from A2). The short-term rating at the thrift was lowered to Prime-2 from Prime-1. Washington Mutual, Inc.’s short-term rating remains unchanged at Prime-2. Moody’s placed a stable rating outlook on all Washington Mutual (WaMu) entities.

    Baa2 isn’t exactly a great rating for a bank. Fitch took them to A- (Long Term Issuer Default Rating), noting:

    The actions announced today are consistent with prudent management during a difficult business environment. Fitch’s Negative Outlook is meant to signal the continuing uncertainty that surrounds this unusual environment and its ultimate impact on WM’s ability to weather through with sustained financial flexibility commensurate with an ‘A-‘ IDR. No doubt, completion of the capital raising efforts together with the dividend reduction is a meaningful positive contributor to WM’s flexibility over the near to intermediate term.

    The rating incorporates the expectation for further, meaningful asset quality deterioration in the residential mortgage portfolio and moderate softening in other consumer exposures, including credit card. These factors will result in notable earnings pressure over the near term, with moderate net losses possible. However, substantial or sustained losses (excluding the GW writedown) would likely translate into a further ratings downgrade.

    But, why worry about a financial melt-down when you can have a real one?

    “Attacking the regulator, taking [it] out of the process, is going to make the problem worse,” deputy Liberal leader Michael Ignatieff said Tuesday, responding to Harper’s assertion that the nuclear watchdog’s legislative authority should take a back seat to the urgent need for radioisotopes.”

    There will be no nuclear accident,” Harper answered in the Commons. “What there will be … is a growing crisis in the medical system here in Canada and around the world if the Liberal party continues to support the regulator obstructing this reactor from coming back on line.”

    Harper’s take-over of the nuclear regulatory function makes me feel all warm and fuzzy. I’m positively glowing!

    An active day in the preferred market, but PerpetualDiscounts fell for the first time since November 27.

    Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
    Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
    Ratchet 5.01% 5.00% 93,741 15.49 2 -0.0205% 1,048.3
    Fixed-Floater 4.83% 4.94% 93,839 15.58 8 -0.2182% 1,031.3
    Floater 5.93% 5.94% 101,722 14.03 2 -4.2273% 813.2
    Op. Retract 4.88% 3.66% 82,185 3.63 16 +0.0230% 1,033.4
    Split-Share 5.30% 6.12% 102,013 4.06 15 -0.0095% 1,027.2
    Interest Bearing 6.26% 6.60% 68,373 3.70 4 +0.0256% 1,062.8
    Perpetual-Premium 5.79% 4.58% 83,495 5.03 11 +0.2549% 1,017.2
    Perpetual-Discount 5.47% 5.52% 371,708 14.39 55 -0.1713% 928.6
    Major Price Changes
    Issue Index Change Notes
    BAM.PR.K Floater -5.4084%  
    BAM.PR.B Floater -3.0842%  
    BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.5375% Asset coverage of 3.7+:1 as of November 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.77% based on a bid of 18.82 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.14% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (6.67% to 2016-3-25).
    CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.5982% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.64% based on a bid of 21.55 and a limitMaturity.
    POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.3478% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 22.69 and a limitMaturity.
    BAM.PR.G FixFloat -1.2677%  
    BCE.PR.R FixFloat -1.0242%  
    NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.0115% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.70% based on a bid of 21.53 and a limitMaturity.
    Volume Highlights
    Issue Index Volume Notes
    GWO.PR.F PerpetualPremium 191,715 TD crossed 183,700 at 26.45. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.92% based on a bid of 26.01 and a call 2012-10-30 at 25.00.
    IQW.PR.C Scraps (Would be OpRet but there are credit concerns) 165,665 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 129.00% based on a bid of 20.50 and a softMaturity 2008-2-29 at 25.00 AND on getting all the coupons. Could be a good equity substitute.
    CM.PR.R OpRet 152,400 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.80, then another 50,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.53% based on a bid of 25.79 and a softMaturity 2013-4-29 at 25.00.
    PIC.PR.A SplitShare 235,959 RBC crossed 200,000 at 15.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.04% based on a bid of 15.00 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00.
    CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 124,419 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 20.42 and a limitMaturity.
    BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 101,325 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.48% based on a bid of 18.40 and a limitMaturity.

    There were forty-eight other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

    EN.PR.A Price Reset

    December 12th, 2007

    In line with the previously noted redemption of EN.PR.A, and the subdivision afterwards:

    Immediately following the redemption of the ROC Preferred Shares and upon the completion of the reorganization, in order to maintain the ratio of Capital Yield Shares to ROC Preferred Shares of two-to-one, the Company will subdivide the remaining 650,131 ROC Preferred Shares such that there will be approximately 1.82 ROC Preferred Shares outstanding following the subdivision for every ROC Preferred Share outstanding immediately prior to the subdivision resulting in a total of 1,183,343 ROC Preferred Shares outstanding after the subdivision. ROC Preferred Shares are currently redeemable for a cash amount equal to the lesser of (i) $25.00 and (ii) Unit Value. After the subdivision, the outstanding ROC Preferred Shares will be redeemable for a cash amount equal to the lesser of (i) $13.74 and (ii) Unit Value and will be entitled to, effective December 16, 2007, quarterly fixed distributions of $0.1718. On an annualized basis, the new fixed distribution would represent a yield of 5.00% on the redemption price of $13.74.

    … the TSE has reset the price to 13.324. They closed today at 12.77-20.99 (!) on zero volume.

    Update, 2007-12-13: The HIMIPref™ database has been adjusted to reflect the change. A reorgDataEntry has been processed to reflect a change in securityCode from A43140 to A43141 at a rate of 182 new for 100 old.