Menzie Chinn at Econbrowser has reviewed credit and term spreads:
He notes:
It might appear that the two phenomena are unrelated. But the DB article argues that while banks pursued off-balance sheet activities such as “rating transformation” (transmuting assets of one credit default risk category to another category by financial engineering), they moved away from reliance on maturity transformation and taking on credit risk. With the end of the structured credit market, and reorienting of banks’ operations, credit spreads and term spreads will reappear.
Interestingly, as Chart 6 illustrates, term and credit spreads are not back to where they were pre-2005. However, in terms of the latter, they’re close. And, as time on goes on, one might very well expect further curve steepening.
It would certainly be a pleasure to see some actual curve steepening! Preferably a bull steepening (in which the steepening is effected by a decline in shorter-term rates), just to wipe the smug smile off the faces of those who claim to be avoiding risk by shortening term! Bloomberg notes, however, that steepness and fear of inflation are intertwined.
In somewhat related news:
JPMorgan Chase & Co. CEO Jamie Dimon said SIVs, whose assets have dwindled by at least $75 billion since July, will “go the way of the dinosaur.”
“SIVs don’t have a business purpose,” Dimon, 51, said at the Merrill Lynch conference today.
I consider this “somewhat related” because of the term spread; a SIV is nothing more nor less than an unregulated “country bank”, seeking to make money from the term spread (financing long-term assets with short paper) and the credit spread (enhancing the credit quality of its debt by subordination of its senior tranches with equity tranches). What we are seeing now is the unravelling of the business model due to:
- General loss of confidence (equivalent to a bank run)
- Bad quality on their asset side
… which are the same things that will do in any bank.
While I agree that SIVs qua SIVs are dead, I’m not so sure that they served no business purpose; and feel entirely confident that other vehicles – probably better capitalized and not so aggressive with their financing models – will arise to take their place. People want to lend short and borrow long. In the aggregate, short-term money is available for the long term. Banks, SIVs and ABCP conduits all serve the same business purpose in this respect … so I’m not sure what Dimon meant.
I mentioned possible downgrades of bond insurers on November 9. Accrued Interest has continued his educational campaign by analyzing some scenarios for ABS default, insurance and recovery that sheds quite a bit of light on the matter.
The CDOs are tricksy things! Fitch Ratings indulged in a mass downgrade yesterday:
Derivative Fitch–New York–12 November 2007: Derivative Fitch has downgraded $37.2 billion (U.S. dollar and U.S. dollar equivalent) and affirmed $6.9 billion of structured finance collateralized debt obligations (SF CDOs) across 84 transactions. Fitch’s rating actions follow the completion of a review of 55 U.S. and European SF CDOs executed on a synthetic basis, and 29 U.S. and Asian SF CDOs executed on a cash/hybrid basis. Ratings on 66 U.S. cash and hybrid SF CDOs remain on Rating Watch Negative pending resolution on or before Nov. 21, 2007.
A downgrade:affirm ratio in excess of 5:1 is big news, especially since many of the downgrades are multi-level:
more than $14 billion worth of transactions falling from the highest-rated AAA perch to speculative-grade, or junk, status.
The implications can be as scary as you want them to be. Naked Capitalism provides excellent links to some informed discussion. Just to make things even more interesting – for those of you who are bored by mere multi-billion writeoffs – Naked Capitalism also reports on a now somewhat dated (two weeks) judgement refusing foreclosure to Deutsche Bank:
Judge Christopher A. Boyko of the Eastern Ohio United States District Court, on October 31, 2007 dismissed 14 Deutsche Bank-filed foreclosures in a ruling based on lack of standing for not owning/holding the mortgage loan at the time the lawsuits were filed.
Whether this was an isolated SNAFU by Deutsche, or indicative of lack of paper trail maintenance by the various intermediaries, is something regarding which I do not care to speculate at this time.
Naked Capitalism also takes issue with Countrywide funding its operations with Certificates of Deposit, but I can’t see any problem with that … provided that FDIC and Fed is supervising the bank properly and it’s solvent. Otherwise, of course, it would be a Bad Thing. I’m much more concerned about the back-door guarantees via the Federal Home Loan Banks, as I noted on October 30.
I noted yesterday that Legg Mason was bailing one of its MMFs out of SIV paper – now it appears that Sun Trust is doing the same thing along with Bank of America and at least two others. This is a very worrisome development for the investment industry as a whole … I am currently trying to finish an article on the topic, but there’s a lot going on in the market just now! In an overdue development:
The 10 largest managers of U.S. money funds have about $50 billion in short term debt of SIVs, some issued by vehicles such as Cheyne Finance Plc that defaulted as investors shunned the funds on concerns about losses from securities linked to subprime mortgages, according to reports from the companies.
…
BlackRock, the largest U.S. publicly traded asset manager, has been in contact with the Treasury, Fink said. BlackRock will raise “multibillion dollars” to invest in distressed securities that are resulting from the “chaos” in the market, Fink said, while declining to elaborate on fund details.
Well, whether Superconduit = Vulture or not, there’s at least one major player stepping up!
If today’s news has been too cheery for you: consider deadly bird flu!
Good volume, poor returns in the preferred share market today.
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30 |
Index |
Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Mean YTW |
Mean Average Trading Value |
Mean Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues |
Day’s Perf. |
Index Value |
Ratchet |
4.84% |
4.84% |
166,843 |
15.75 |
2 |
0.0000% |
1,046.0 |
Fixed-Floater |
4.86% |
4.82% |
83,487 |
15.81 |
8 |
+0.0242% |
1,047.9 |
Floater |
4.49% |
3.02% |
62,843 |
10.65 |
3 |
-0.1093% |
1,045.5 |
Op. Retract |
4.87% |
4.02% |
76,622 |
3.39 |
16 |
-0.0423% |
1,030.3 |
Split-Share |
5.23% |
5.29% |
88,047 |
4.16 |
15 |
-0.1158% |
1,033.2 |
Interest Bearing |
6.29% |
6.41% |
61,207 |
3.52 |
4 |
+0.1786% |
1,052.5 |
Perpetual-Premium |
5.83% |
5.32% |
79,667 |
7.01 |
11 |
-0.1567% |
1,010.8 |
Perpetual-Discount |
5.55% |
5.59% |
320,104 |
14.49 |
55 |
-0.1907% |
910.5 |
Major Price Changes |
Issue |
Index |
Change |
Notes |
ELF.PR.F |
PerpetualDiscount |
-3.1818% |
Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.30% based on a bid of 21.30 and a limitMaturity. |
RY.PR.E |
PerpetualDiscount |
-1.3942% |
Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 20.51 and a limitMaturity. |
MFC.PR.A |
OpRet |
-1.1978% |
Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.88% based on a bid of 25.57 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00. |
LBS.PR.A |
SplitShare |
-1.0816% |
Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 10.06 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00. |
BNS.PR.K |
PerpetualDiscount |
-1.0462% |
Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 22.70 and a limitMaturity. |
Volume Highlights |
Issue |
Index |
Volume |
Notes |
MFC.PR.C |
PerpetualDiscount |
162,455 |
Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 21.60 and a limitMaturity. |
CM.PR.G |
PerpetualDiscount |
102,930 |
Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 24.71 and a limitMaturity. |
RY.PR.D |
PerpetualDiscount |
100,130 |
Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 20.71 and a limitMaturity. |
GWO.PR.I |
PerpetualDiscount |
86,510 |
Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 20.02 and a limitMaturity. |
BNS.PR.K |
PerpetualDiscount |
80,050 |
Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 22.70 and a limitMaturity. |
There were thirty-three other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.
TD.PR.P Inventory Blow-Out Sale
November 14th, 2007The underwriters unloaded all (? Well, I don’t know for sure. But a big chunk, anyway!) of their unsold inventory of TD.PR.P today; 819,021 shares (of a 10-million share issue) traded in a range of 24.00-23, closing at 24.10-13, 12×11. I am advised that the blow-out price was $24.00.
I don’t get it. Who, except maybe for those willing to pay up-up-UP for the privilege of buying a big piece, would be willing to buy it at $24.00? Let’s look at a recent comparable – the same comparable I wrote about when I reported on the opening day: TD.PR.O.
bid-YTW
All I can really do is repeat the following from my previous post:
If I repeat myself often enough, maybe enough people will listen that we’ll start seeing more preferred shares issued that actually have a concession to market … or maybe I’ll just be dismissed as a crank. You can never be sure…
Posted in Issue Comments | 3 Comments »