TD.PR.P Inventory Blow-Out Sale

November 14th, 2007

The underwriters unloaded all (? Well, I don’t know for sure. But a big chunk, anyway!) of their unsold inventory of TD.PR.P today; 819,021 shares (of a 10-million share issue) traded in a range of 24.00-23, closing at 24.10-13, 12×11. I am advised that the blow-out price was $24.00.

I don’t get it. Who, except maybe for those willing to pay up-up-UP for the privilege of buying a big piece, would be willing to buy it at $24.00? Let’s look at a recent comparable – the same comparable I wrote about when I reported on the opening day: TD.PR.O.

TD Comparables
Issue Quote, 11/14 Pre-Tax
bid-YTW
Fair Value
TD.PR.P 24.10-13 5.49%  24.03
TD.PR.O 22.20-23 5.51%  22.75

All I can really do is repeat the following from my previous post:

Yields are basically comparable, although the TD issue looks expensive even on this basis. So:

  • If yields go up and prices go down, old & new will return about the same.
  • If yields are unchanged, old and new will return about the same.
  • If yields go down, the new issues will get called away just as things start to get fun, while the old issues will rack up big gains.

Doesn’t anybody do scenario analysis any more?

If I repeat myself often enough, maybe enough people will listen that we’ll start seeing more preferred shares issued that actually have a concession to market … or maybe I’ll just be dismissed as a crank. You can never be sure…

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : May, 2003

November 14th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2003-5-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,393.1 1 2.00 -0.11% 0.08 233M 3.52%
FixedFloater 2,056.5 9 2.00 3.61% 17.1 78M 5.38%
Floater 1,705.8 7 1.85 3.95% 17.0 85M 4.23%
OpRet 1,664.7 27 1.26 2.86% 2.4 108M 5.14%
SplitShare 1,624.5 9 1.78 1.60% 0.8 54M 5.44%
Interest-Bearing 1,993.1 9 2.00 5.24% 1.3 137M 7.66%
Perpetual-Premium 1,284.9 23 1.43 5.03% 6.7 228M 5.52%
Perpetual-Discount 1,437.5 6 1.83 5.59% 14.3 221M 5.56%

Index Constitution, 2003-05-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2003-05-30, Post-rebalancing

November 13, 2007

November 14th, 2007

Menzie Chinn at Econbrowser has reviewed credit and term spreads

He notes:

It might appear that the two phenomena are unrelated. But the DB article argues that while banks pursued off-balance sheet activities such as “rating transformation” (transmuting assets of one credit default risk category to another category by financial engineering), they moved away from reliance on maturity transformation and taking on credit risk. With the end of the structured credit market, and reorienting of banks’ operations, credit spreads and term spreads will reappear.

Interestingly, as Chart 6 illustrates, term and credit spreads are not back to where they were pre-2005. However, in terms of the latter, they’re close. And, as time on goes on, one might very well expect further curve steepening.

It would certainly be a pleasure to see some actual curve steepening! Preferably a bull steepening (in which the steepening is effected by a decline in shorter-term rates), just to wipe the smug smile off the faces of those who claim to be avoiding risk by shortening term! Bloomberg notes, however, that steepness and fear of inflation are intertwined.

In somewhat related news:

JPMorgan Chase & Co. CEO Jamie Dimon said SIVs, whose assets have dwindled by at least $75 billion since July, will “go the way of the dinosaur.”

“SIVs don’t have a business purpose,” Dimon, 51, said at the Merrill Lynch conference today.

I consider this “somewhat related” because of the term spread; a SIV is nothing more nor less than an unregulated “country bank”, seeking to make money from the term spread (financing long-term assets with short paper) and the credit spread (enhancing the credit quality of its debt by subordination of its senior tranches with equity tranches). What we are seeing now is the unravelling of the business model due to:

  • General loss of confidence (equivalent to a bank run)
  • Bad quality on their asset side

… which are the same things that will do in any bank.

While I agree that SIVs qua SIVs are dead, I’m not so sure that they served no business purpose; and feel entirely confident that other vehicles – probably better capitalized and not so aggressive with their financing models – will arise to take their place. People want to lend short and borrow long. In the aggregate, short-term money is available for the long term. Banks, SIVs and ABCP conduits all serve the same business purpose in this respect … so I’m not sure what Dimon meant.

I mentioned possible downgrades of bond insurers on November 9. Accrued Interest has continued his educational campaign by analyzing some scenarios for ABS default, insurance and recovery that sheds quite a bit of light on the matter.

The CDOs are tricksy things! Fitch Ratings indulged in a mass downgrade yesterday:

Derivative Fitch–New York–12 November 2007: Derivative Fitch has downgraded $37.2 billion (U.S. dollar and U.S. dollar equivalent) and affirmed $6.9 billion of structured finance collateralized debt obligations (SF CDOs) across 84 transactions. Fitch’s rating actions follow the completion of a review of 55 U.S. and European SF CDOs executed on a synthetic basis, and 29 U.S. and Asian SF CDOs executed on a cash/hybrid basis. Ratings on 66 U.S. cash and hybrid SF CDOs remain on Rating Watch Negative pending resolution on or before Nov. 21, 2007.

A downgrade:affirm ratio in excess of 5:1 is big news, especially since many of the downgrades are multi-level:

more than $14 billion worth of transactions falling from the highest-rated AAA perch to speculative-grade, or junk, status.

The implications can be as scary as you want them to be. Naked Capitalism provides excellent links to some informed discussion. Just to make things even more interesting – for those of you who are bored by mere multi-billion writeoffs – Naked Capitalism also reports on a now somewhat dated (two weeks) judgement refusing foreclosure to Deutsche Bank:

Judge Christopher A. Boyko of the Eastern Ohio United States District Court, on October 31, 2007 dismissed 14 Deutsche Bank-filed foreclosures in a ruling based on lack of standing for not owning/holding the mortgage loan at the time the lawsuits were filed.

Whether this was an isolated SNAFU by Deutsche, or indicative of lack of paper trail maintenance by the various intermediaries, is something regarding which I do not care to speculate at this time.

Naked Capitalism also takes issue with Countrywide funding its operations with Certificates of Deposit, but I can’t see any problem with that … provided that FDIC and Fed is supervising the bank properly and it’s solvent. Otherwise, of course, it would be a Bad Thing. I’m much more concerned about the back-door guarantees via the Federal Home Loan Banks, as I noted on October 30.

I noted yesterday that Legg Mason was bailing one of its MMFs out of SIV paper – now it appears that Sun Trust is doing the same thing along with Bank of America and at least two others. This is a very worrisome development for the investment industry as a whole … I am currently trying to finish an article on the topic, but there’s a lot going on in the market just now! In an overdue development:

The 10 largest managers of U.S. money funds have about $50 billion in short term debt of SIVs, some issued by vehicles such as Cheyne Finance Plc that defaulted as investors shunned the funds on concerns about losses from securities linked to subprime mortgages, according to reports from the companies.

BlackRock, the largest U.S. publicly traded asset manager, has been in contact with the Treasury, Fink said. BlackRock will raise “multibillion dollars” to invest in distressed securities that are resulting from the “chaos” in the market, Fink said, while declining to elaborate on fund details.

Well, whether Superconduit = Vulture or not, there’s at least one major player stepping up!

If today’s news has been too cheery for you: consider deadly bird flu!

Good volume, poor returns in the preferred share market today.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.84% 4.84% 166,843 15.75 2 0.0000% 1,046.0
Fixed-Floater 4.86% 4.82% 83,487 15.81 8 +0.0242% 1,047.9
Floater 4.49% 3.02% 62,843 10.65 3 -0.1093% 1,045.5
Op. Retract 4.87% 4.02% 76,622 3.39 16 -0.0423% 1,030.3
Split-Share 5.23% 5.29% 88,047 4.16 15 -0.1158% 1,033.2
Interest Bearing 6.29% 6.41% 61,207 3.52 4 +0.1786% 1,052.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.83% 5.32% 79,667 7.01 11 -0.1567% 1,010.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.55% 5.59% 320,104 14.49 55 -0.1907% 910.5
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -3.1818% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.30% based on a bid of 21.30 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.3942% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 20.51 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.1978% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.88% based on a bid of 25.57 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.
LBS.PR.A SplitShare -1.0816% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 10.06 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.0462% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 22.70 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 162,455 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 21.60 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 102,930 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 24.71 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 100,130 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 20.71 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 86,510 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 20.02 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 80,050 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 22.70 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty-three other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

IQW.PR.C to be Redeemed for Cash (Probably)

November 13th, 2007

Well! This is unexpected! Quebecor has announced:

Quebecor World Inc. (TSX: IQW, NYSE: IQW) (the “Company”) announced a refinancing plan today pursuant to which it intends to concurrently:

[Raise a lot of debt & equity money – JH]

The net proceeds of the Senior Note Offering and the Convertible Debenture Offering and a portion of the net proceeds of the Equity Offering will be used to repay indebtedness under the Company’s credit facilities and the Company intends to use the remaining net proceeds of the Equity Offering to redeem its Series 5 Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares for an aggregate redemption price of Cdn$175 million (approximately $185 million) plus accrued and unpaid dividends. The redemption of these preferred shares is conditional upon the completion of each of the elements of the refinancing plan and subject to re-confirmation by the Company’s Board of Directors.

I was expecting direct conversion:

The thing that makes this situation so fraught with interest is that IQW.PR.C is currently quoted at $23.35-50 and has actually declined in price recently (it was trading just under $25.00 a month ago). Note that 23.50 is 94% of par value.

We can assume the company will convert to common. They don’t have any money and they don’t want to pay the pref dividends. If I’m wrong on that one and they convert to cash, well, that’s $1.50 profit to today’s buyer, so don’t complain to me.

Given recent prices and Quebecor’s recent downgrade, I don’t think there will be many complaints!

30! 30! 30!

November 13th, 2007

The Montreal Exchange is is launching a futures contract on 30-year Canada bonds.

This is good news for pref-holders; it will increase liquidity at the long end of the market and make perpetuals easier to hedge. It might not have a HUGE effect, but any effect that it does have on the pref market will be positive.

Toronto Star : Preferreds may hold bargains

November 13th, 2007

The Toronto Star published an article today on preferreds, pointing out:

Banks’ preferred shares at current prices are now yielding close to 6 per cent – much more than one can earn on bank deposits. The tax credit on dividend income makes yield even more attractive.

That extra yield does not come without risk, of course. Prices of preferred shares could fall, as happened in May when there was a sudden rise in long-term interest rates.

There wasn’t really a lot of meat on the bones of this story – but I will admit I’m pleased to see media exposure for the asset class! I have to say, though, that “close to 6 per cent” for banks’ preferreds is a little overly enthusiastic.

I should also point out that comparing the yield on bank prefs to bank deposits is a little fishy – bank deposits are not just senior to prefs, they’re insured; and there’s a certain amount of term extension involved when withrawing deposited money to buy a discounted perpetual! Nitpicking, perhaps, but I always get worried when comparisons of this sort are made … there are many retail investors who will figure that if 20% exposure is good, then 40% must be better and 100% is best of all!

Hat tip: Financial Webring Forum.

November 12, 2007

November 12th, 2007

A quiet day, with bond markets closed for Rememberance Day.

There is speculation the Fed will move to explicit inflation targetting … but the WSJ can’t make up its mind. At a Bank of Canada conference in 2006, Alan Blinder, a former Fed Vice Chairman, commented on evolution of Bernanke’s thinking on the subject to that date.

There are some heavy-weight predictions of a US slowdown floating around, linked by both Naked Capitalism and WSJ. Willem Buiter points out that the banks are feeling some strain:

At the end of October 2007, the net worth of commercial banks in the US (as reported by the Fed) stood at just under $ 1.1 trillion (against assets of $10.7 trillion). Tier 1 capital stood approximately at $964 bn. While quite a significant share of the mortgage-related losses will be born by financial institutions other than commercial banks, such as investment banks, commercial banks’ capital will take a significant hit.

The combination of losses and unintended asset accumulation may depress the banks’ capital ratios to the point that dividends and share repurchases are threatened and even rights issues may have to be contemplated. All that does not do much for their willingness to engage in new lending, including to the real economy.

The single best thing that could happen would be for the true magnitude of the losses suffered by banks and other exposed parties to be revealed and put in the P&L. Until what happens, fear of getting stuck with the hot potato makes banks unnaturally unwilling to extend credit against the kind of collateral that they would not have thought about twice accepting at the beginning of the year.

Noriel Roubini, while acknowledging the banks’ problems, considers the wealth effect and increased difficulty of Home Equity Withdrawal to be more important.

Naked Capitalism points out that there is mass confusion over Super-Conduit, what it is supposed to be doing and whether there is economic reason to expect it to work … but quite frankly, I can’t be bothered to discuss the situation much any more. There’s no information – merely rumours. I’ll talk about it when there’s something to talk about.

But there is some related news illustrating the problem. Readers with exceptional memories may remember Ottimo Funding, briefly mentioned here on August 21:

Mortgage companies without any sub-prime on their books, such as Ottimo Funding LLC, are experiencing financing difficulties.

Well, it’s gone bust:

Ottimo Funding Ltd., whose name is Italian for “excellent,” started selling its $2.8 billion of mortgage bonds this week after being unable to raise debt financing in the commercial paper market, according to three people with knowledge of the sale.

The securities being auctioned are rated AAA and backed by Alt-A mortgages, a credit class above subprime, according to Standard & Poor’s. The sale probably won’t generate enough cash to fully repay investors who bought short-term debt from the fund, the ratings firm said last week.

As far as I can make out from S&P ratings reports, Ottimo was one of several Extendible asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits with no or partial third-party liquidity support – in other words, it was like a Canadian ABCP issuer, relying on credit enhancement and extendability to avoid liquidity squeezes.

In a fascinating report, the Asset Management firm Legg Mason has disclosed it is bailing one of its MMFs out of ABCP trouble:

Legg Mason Inc. invested $100 million in one of its money-market funds and arranged $238 million in credit for two others as a cushion against potential losses on commercial paper linked to subprime mortgages.

In related problems, E-Trade is in trouble:

Chief Executive Officer Mitchell Caplan’s strategy of building E*Trade’s bank by tripling loans outstanding backfired as borrowers fell behind on payments and U.S. home prices declined.

Bhatia estimated that E*Trade will post a loss in the fourth quarter after setting aside $500 million in extra money for bad loans and writedowns. Clients in the company’s brokerage unit may shift their accounts to rivals, while deposits at the bank could erode, said Bhatia, who cut his rating on the stock to “sell” from “hold.”

Citigroup is downgrading E*Trade “based on the higher probability of a run on the bank,” Bhatia said.

But let’s keep things in perspective. While there is lots of pain, while some people are losing their jobs, others their houses and an overall slowdown in forecast by some … Wall Street is still on track for a great year. They take risks and when it works against them the numbers are huge … but when they work out – as, by and large, they did in the first half of the year – the numbers are even bigger.

At least one Wallaby Street player is doing pretty well too:

Macquarie Group Ltd., Australia’s biggest securities firm, said first-half profit climbed 45 percent to a record on higher trading income and increased fees from mergers and acquisitions.

Net income rose to a record A$1.06 billion ($931 million), or A$4.02 a share, in the six months to Sept. 30, from A$730 million, or A$3.01 a share, a year earlier, the Sydney-based bank said in statement today. That beat the $1.03 billion median estimate of four analysts surveyed by Bloomberg.

It was a quiet day for prefs with relatively light volume … not only were the bond markets closed, but all eyes were on stocks and currencies! It was good to see BAM.PR.N among the volume leaders … but a continuing puzzle to see it among the loss leaders as well!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.85% 4.84% 172,671 15.72 2 0.0000% 1,046.0
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.82% 82,226 15.79 8 +0.1173% 1,047.6
Floater 4.49% 3.01% 63,626 10.67 3 +0.1234% 1,046.7
Op. Retract 4.87% 4.02% 75,512 3.39 16 +0.1131% 1,030.7
Split-Share 5.22% 5.25% 88,030 4.16 15 -0.1132% 1,034.3
Interest Bearing 6.30% 6.52% 61,685 3.53 4 -0.0506% 1,050.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.82% 5.29% 78,988 5.95 11 +0.0896% 1,012.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.54% 5.58% 319,856 14.08 55 -0.0405% 912.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.3605% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.41% based on a bid of 18.85 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -1.0304% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.62% based on a bid of 18.25 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.E OpRet +1.2400% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.52% based on a bid of 25.31 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 26,080 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 22,870 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 20.68 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 21,675 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.62% based on a bid of 18.25 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 18,200 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 21.17 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 18,100 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 21.06 and a limitMaturity.

There were eleven other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : April, 2003

November 12th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2003-4-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,380.6 1 2.00 -0.01% 0.08 317M 3.49%
FixedFloater 2,031.7 9 2.00 3.56% 17.1 86M 5.45%
Floater 1,705.0 7 1.85 3.90% 17.1 87M 4.22%
OpRet 1,624.6 30 1.26 3.98% 2.4 116M 5.36%
SplitShare 1,581.4 9 1.78 4.38% 3.7 50M 5.68%
Interest-Bearing 1,940.9 9 2.00 6.18% 1.4 142M 7.86%
Perpetual-Premium 1,237.7 18 1.39 5.57% 6.6 248M 5.71%
Perpetual-Discount 1,378.8 11 1.73 5.80% 14.1 114M 5.77%

Index Constitution, 2003-04-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2003-04-30, Post-rebalancing

November, 2007, Edition of PrefLetter Released!

November 11th, 2007

The November edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the November, 2007 issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the December, 2007 issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close December 14 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on December 17.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

November PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

November 9th, 2007

The markets have closed and the November edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share; the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The November issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”!