Archive for June, 2007

CM.PR.C to be Redeemed

Tuesday, June 5th, 2007

Well – I said it was pretty certain and every now and then I get something right! CIBC has announced:

its intention to redeem all of its issued and outstanding Non-cumulative Class A Preferred Shares Series 25 for cash. The redemptions will occur on July 31, 2007. The redemption price is $26.00 per Series 25 share.
    The $0.375 per share quarterly dividend declared on May 31, 2007 will be the final dividend on the Series 25 shares and will be paid on July 27, 2007 to shareholders of record on June 28, 2007, as previously announced.

CM.PR.C closed yesterday at 26.10-24.

June 4, 2007

Monday, June 4th, 2007
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.34% 5.43% 35,578 15.00 2 +0.8195% 962.7
Fixed-Floater 5.60% 5.54% 140,345 14.94 7 -0.2495% 896.4
Floater 4.81% 2.57% 85,715 5.94 3 -0.4453% 1,046.2
Op. Retract 4.80% 3.85% 83,051 3.20 17 +0.0792% 1,023.5
Split-Share 5.03% 4.57% 185,233 4.04 15 +0.0245% 1,040.8
Interest Bearing 6.61% 6.65% 84,890 3.53 4 -0.2175% 1,042.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.36% 5.00% 134,434 7.35 34 -0.0989% 1,026.0
Perpetual-Discount 4.95% 4.98% 563,217 15.54 29 -0.8799% 984.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.9272% Also led the charts (downward) on June 1! New low today of 22.55. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.34% based on a bid of 22.55 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat -2.5641% Exchange/Reset date is 2011-5-1 (exchanges with BCE.PR.H); until then, pays 4.35% of par. New low today of 20.06. Closed at 19.76-34, 5×3; the Hs closed at 22.99-00, 5×10.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -2.3684% New low today of 22.51. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.06% based on a bid of 22.26 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -2.1397% New low today of 22.27. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.06% based on a bid of 22.41 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -2.0131% New low today of 22.40. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 22.39 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.9262% New low today of 23.85. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.23% (!) based on a bid of 23.93 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.6415% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.97% based on a bid of 22.77 and a limitMaturity.
AL.PR.E Floater -1.5742% Still Under Review – Developing by DBRS.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.4687% New low today of 22.81. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.96% based on a bid of 22.81 and a limitMaturity.
CL.PR.B PerpetualPremium -1.4587% New low today of 25.71. Pays $1.5625 and is currently callable at $26.00 … but GWO is still on hold. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.34% based on a bid of 25.67 and a call 2011-1-30 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.3191% New low today of 22.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.90% based on a bid of 23.19 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.2987% New low today of 22.81. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 22.80 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.2609% New low today of 22.52. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 22.71 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat -1.2579% Exchange/Reset date is 2011-10-31 (Exchanges with BAM.PR.E); until then, pays 4.35% of par. Closed at 23.55-85, 18×5; the Es closed at 24.85-05, 13×12.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.2245% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.90% based on a bid of 24.20 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.2092% New low today of 24.50. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.95% based on a bid of 24.51 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.1345% New low today of 23.50. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.92% based on a bid of 23.53 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.0714% New low today of 22.06. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.02% based on a bid of 22.16 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.H FixFloat +1.0549% Exchange/Reset Date is 2011-5-1 (Exchanges with BCE.PR.G, which currently pays 4.35% of Par). The Gs did so poorly today they are mentioned above … and the Hs are up. I love the pref market!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 109,213 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.92% based on a bid of 24.14 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 92,375 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.74% based on a bid of 23.76 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 76,968 New low today of 22.51. GWO’s capital market plans are still on hold. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.06% based on a bid of 22.26 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 56,720 RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.88% based on a bid of 24.82 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualPremium 35,300 Nesbitt crossed 10,000 at 24.95. New low today of 24.89. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.13% based on a bid of 25.10 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty-two other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

PFD.PR.A : Meeting Called

Sunday, June 3rd, 2007

Charterhouse Preferred Share Index Corporation, which I reviewed last year, is introducing a rather odd shareholders’ resolution:

with respect to the Corporation, a special resolution approving an amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to permit the Corporation without obtaining approval of the Securityholders, to issue Securities at a price per Security that is less than the net asset value per Security at such time.

Their rationale for seeking such authority is:

The Manager is of the view, in respect of each Fund and the Corporation, that the issuance of Securities at a price which may be less than the net asset value per Security of the Fund or the Corporation may, in certain circumstances, be in the best interest of the Fund or Corporation and the Securityholders. For example, the ability to take advantage of certain investment opportunities may depend, in part, on the availability of additional capital to employ at opportune times. By providing the Funds and the Corporation with the ability to issue securities at less than net asset value, without the delay and cost of obtaining Securityholder approval, the Funds and the Corporation would have the ability to efficiently raise additional capital through, for instance, a rights offering, allowing the Funds and the Corporation to take advantage of these time-sensitive investment opportunities, thereby capturing additional returns for Securityholders.

Quite frankly, I’m puzzled. PFD.PR.A is an index fund. Just what “investment opportunities” do they expect to see? To quote from their web page:

The Charterhouse Preferred Share Index Corporation provides holders of the Preferred Shares with:

  1. cost-efficient exposure to an indexed portfolio (the “Portfolio”) that is representative of the universe of fixed rate preferred shares and preferred securities of Canadian issuers (“Portfolio Securities”) listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”); and
  2. return of capital distributions, paid quarterly

The meeting is set for June 11, full details and the management circular are available on SEDAR, under “Public Companies” – search for “Charterhouse Preferred Share Index Corporation”. If I were a shareholder, I’d have a lot of questions to ask about these “investment opportunities” and I would be voting against the resolution if I didn’t like the answers. My fear would be a rights offering priced significantly under market …. as of May 31, for instance, the NAV was $22.01 and the trading price was $21.70. Now, I’m not sure exactly what limits the TSX puts on rights offerings, but it seems to me that they could issue rights to shareholders allowing the purchase of more stock at $21.00. Now, in a perfectly efficient capital market, I’m basically indifferent as to whether I sell the rights or exercise them. We are not blessed with perfectly efficient capital markets, however, so commissions on the rights sales could leave me worse off, let alone my market risk on the sale.

Shareholders should be looking for answers on this one.

Hat-tip to a Canadian Moneysaver reader for bringing this to my attention!

May's Worst Performers

Saturday, June 2nd, 2007

Well, I wanted to do a little attribution analysis for my own purposes and now find that I have the same viewpoint as a publish-or-perish academic: publish everything! If you have a good laundry list, publish that!

The worst performers of May (of the issues included in the HIMIPref™ Universe) were:

Ticker Sector Return Probable Cause
AR.PR.B Scraps -29.08% Who cares?
WN.PR.E PerpetualDiscount (begin)
Scraps (end)
-7.70% Credit
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -7.69% Credit
BCE.PR.R FixFloat -7.50% Credit
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -6.96% Rationalization
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -6.63% Rationalization

As of May 31, CM.PR.J was quoted at 22.85-90 with a curvePrice of 23.06; GWO.PR.I was quoted at 22.83-85, curvePrice 22.86. These issues are very similar, having the same annual coupon and the same credit rating. It is because these issues now appear reasonably fairly priced that I have characterized the probable cause as “Rationalization”. However, I could just as easily – and perhaps better – characterized the probable cause as simply “Vanishing Liquidity Premium”.

Let’s have a closer look at those curve Prices:

CM.PR.J Monthly Curve Price Comparison
Component May 31 April 30 Change
Price due to base-rate 22.03  22.36  -0.33
Price due to short-term -0.49  -0.21  -0.28
Price due to long-term 1.78  1.32  +0.46
Price due to Interest Income 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price to to Cumulative Dividends 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to SplitShareCorp 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to Retractibility 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (2) 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to Liquidity 0.39  1.47  -1.08
Price due to Floating Rate 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (3) 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to error 0.08  0.02  +0.06
Price due to Credit Spread (High) 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (Low) -0.74  -0.61  -0.13
Curve Price 23.06  24.35  -1.29
Quote 22.85-90  24.56-71  -1.71 – -1.81

…and…

GWO.PR.I Monthly Curve Price Comparison
Component May 31 April 30 Change
Price due to base-rate 21.83  22.34  -0.51
Price due to short-term -0.49  -0.21  -0.28
Price due to long-term 1.78  1.32  +0.46
Price due to Interest Income 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price to to Cumulative Dividends 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to SplitShareCorp 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to Retractibility 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (2) 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to Liquidity 0.39  1.48  -1.09
Price due to Floating Rate 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (3) 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to error 0.08  0.02  +0.06
Price due to Credit Spread (High) 0.00  0.00  0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (Low) -0.74  -0.62  -0.12
Curve Price 22.86  24.34  -1.48
Quote 22.83-85  24.75-79  -1.92 – -1.94

I discussed the yield curve and the collapse of the liquidity premium in the post HIMI Index Performance, May 2007:

One very interesting thing that happened this month is that a lot of the yieldCurvePremiumLiquidity disappeared, as shown in this graph. I interpret the change in the premium as reflecting a desire by some holders, at least, to get out of the sector in size and quickly; such holders might simply sell their most liquid holdings to adjust portfolio exposures; this will affect the prices of these issues; hence, liquidity will become a lot less expensive. The PerpetualDiscount index is the most liquid of all the sub-indices – it’s dominated by recent issues, apart from anything else – and thus a portion of the decline in this index might be attributed to this factor rather than the intrinsic characteristics of the investment.

Such a hypothesis gains some support from examination of the changes in the yield curve, which I found a little surprising. The long-end hasn’t moved by nearly as much as one might have expected. Note that this graph is of the TAXABLE curve and refers to SPOT YIELDS … therefore, the x-axis shows the yield one might expect on a “stripped dividend”, after tax.

Hopefully, the tables above will make my meaning a bit more clear. However, I should advise explicitly that the huge importance of liquidity in the above tables is probably over-stated. It comes out of the math, all right, and I have no problems with the mechanical correctness of the math … but as I’ve re-stated above, liquidity is not distributed homogeneously across the HIMIPref™ universe – it is highly concentrated in the PerpetualDiscount segment and this can lead to a confounding of the analysis.

MAPF Performance, May 2007

Saturday, June 2nd, 2007

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been valued for May, 2007, month-end. The unit value is $9.3259. Returns over various periods are:

MAPF Returns to May 31, 2007
One Month -0.88%
Three Months -1.73%
One Year +5.18%
Two Years (annualized) +5.21%
Three Years (annualized) +6.84%
Four Years (annualized) +10.29%
Five Years (annualized) +9.52%
Six Years (annualized) +10.64%

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not  a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

Well, this month’s returns remind me of the story about the broken-down old gambler, heading to the racetrack with the milk money and telling his buddy “I hope I break even today – I need the money!”.

The total return before fees was -0.88% and I certainly don’t want too many more months in a row of that stuff! However, when it is compared with the various HIMI indices, one realizes that it could have been a lot worse.

When one examines the returns of the passive funds in that last link, one realizes that for most people, it was indeed a lot worse: the Net Asset Value Per Share of CPD was down 2.36% on the month and DPS.UN probably did worse.

The markets will fluctuate. An investor who does not indulge a penchant for market-timing will simply select an appropriate asset allocation and try to outperform within each asset class … and, when looked at from the perspective of such an investor, losing less money in a bad month is just as good as making more money in an up month. I’m very pleased that the fund was fully invested throughout May and yet still managed to lose so little money.

The fund did a fair amount of trading during the month and a fair amount of investment was shifted from the SplitShare sector into the PerpetualPremium sector, as retail scrambled to sell anything with the word “Perpetual” in its description. I have already posted the sectoral characteristics at month-end.

I anticipate a heavy trading volume in June, when the non-engaged segment of retail gets a look at their statements and as the fundcos attempt to beautify their portfolio statements for their semiannual reports. But who knows? Stay tuned!

Update, 2007-6-15: Sentry Select has posted the historical returns for DPS.UN:

DPS.UN Returns to 2007-5-31
Average Annual Compound Returns” 
3 Month -10.5%
6 Month -10.2%
1 Year -4.3%
3 Year +1.1%

LFE.PR.A: Yield-to-Worst, Curve Price & Valuation (sort of)

Saturday, June 2nd, 2007

In the comments to the June 1 Market Action Report, assiduous reader tobyone posted:

RE: 5.25% LFE.PR.A bid @10.26 indicates yield of over 5% according to Globeinvestor and TDW yield calculators vs. your table. I hope this is an error because I hold this one but don’t want it @4.73%

Well, Globeinvestor and TDW are enormous companies, with an excellent record of sticking their brand name on various things, but I’ll see what I can do.

I stand by my calculation of 4.73%. First, the details, in all their glory, from the HIMIPref™ cashFlowDiscountingAnalysisBox:

A3555025 0138
2007-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.995022   0.04
2007-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.991082   0.04
2007-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.987158   0.04
2007-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.983376   0.04
2007-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.979482   0.04
2007-12-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.975729   0.04
2008-01-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.971866   0.04
2008-02-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.968018   0.04
2008-03-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.964433   0.04
2008-04-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.960614   0.04
2008-05-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.956933   0.04
2008-06-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.953145   0.04
2008-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.949493   0.04
2008-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.945733   0.04
2008-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.941989   0.04
2008-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.938380   0.04
2008-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.934664   0.04
2008-12-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.931083   0.04
2009-01-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.927397   0.04
2009-02-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.923725   0.04
2009-03-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.920421   0.04
2009-04-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.916777   0.04
2009-05-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.913264   0.04
2009-06-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.909648   0.04
2009-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.906163   0.04
2009-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.902575   0.04
2009-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.899002   0.04
2009-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.895557   0.04
2009-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.892011   0.04
2009-12-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.888593   0.04
2010-01-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.885075   0.04
2010-02-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.881571   0.04
2010-03-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.878418   0.04
2010-04-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.874940   0.04
2010-05-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.871587   0.04
2010-06-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.868137   0.04
2010-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.864810   0.04
2010-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.861386   0.04
2010-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.857976   0.04
2010-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.854688   0.04
2010-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.851304   0.04
2010-12-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.848043   0.04
2011-01-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.844685   0.04
2011-02-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.841341   0.04
2011-03-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.838331   0.04
2011-04-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.835012   0.04
2011-05-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.831813   0.04
2011-06-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.828520   0.04
2011-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.825345   0.04
2011-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.822077   0.04
2011-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.818822   0.04
2011-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.815685   0.04
2011-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.812455   0.04
2011-12-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.809342   0.04
2012-01-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.806138   0.04
2012-02-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.802946   0.04
2012-03-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.799972   0.03
2012-04-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.796805   0.03
2012-05-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.793752   0.03
2012-06-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.790609   0.03
2012-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.787580   0.03
2012-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.784461   0.03
2012-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.781356   0.03
2012-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.778362   0.03
2012-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.775280   0.03
2012-12-01  FINAL DIVIDEND   0.03   0.773199   0.02
2012-12-01        MATURITY  10.00   0.773199   7.73
Total Cash Flows    12.8739
Total Present Value    10.2597
Discounting Rate 4.7291 % (Annual rate compounded semi-annually)

More simply, I’ll say: OK, this thing pays $0.525 p.a. At a price of $10.26, it will give rise to a $0.26 capital loss on its maturity 2012-12-1. That’s 5.5 years away so call the annual capital loss $0.05 (for the sake of an argument). Therefore, of the $0.525 dividends received every year, $0.475 is income and $0.05 is return of capital. Over the period, my average capital invested is (10.26 + 10.00) / 2 = 10.13. Therefore, my (very roughly calculated) yield is $0.475/$10.13, or 4.69%, which is close enough to my precisely calculated yield of 4.73% that I’m not going to panic.

I’m not familiar with the GlobeInvestor or TDW yield calculators – if you will send me a link, I’ll take a look at them. The most common errors with such things are:

  • Are they calculating current yield = $0.525 / $10.26 = 5.12%? This is wrong, since it ignores the capital loss on maturity.
  • Are all the dividends incorporated? Ex-dates can be a little tricky.
  • Monthly dividends can be a little tricky to jam in to some calculators. Has this been done properly?

I recommend Keith Betty’s Yield Calculator (broken link redirected 2024-2-1).

Now I have another question … you indicated that you didn’t want to own this thing at 4.73%, but you didn’t indicate precisely why. Now, I’m not going to take a public position on the merits of LFE.PR.A as an investment at the current price (and please, don’t spend hours parsing everything I write from here on in trying to decide what I really think!), but the comment makes me suspect that you think a sale at a 4.73% yield is a slam-dunk … and whatever the verdict is, I don’t think it’s a slam-dunk-sell.

In your comment, you mentioned CM.PR.J as a possible buying opportunity, given its closing pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03%. Now, this is more than LFE.PR.A, but CM.PR.J is a perpetual and there are other differences besides. In terms of the riskAttributes examined by HIMIPref™, the major differences are:

  • Credit Quality: CM.PR.J is better.
  • Retractible:LFE.PR.A is better.
  • SplitShare: CM.PR.J is better
  • Various Duration & Convexity Measures: Well, they’re different!
  • Cumulative Dividends: LFE.PR.A is better.
  • Liquidity: (not a formal risk measure, but it is important) CM.PR.J is better

Anything you can tell me about how you value LFE.PR.A will, at the very least, give me some ideas regarding what to write about!

 

MAPF : Portfolio Characteristics as of 2007-5-31

Saturday, June 2nd, 2007

There have been a fair number of changes in portfolio composition since the April 30 analysis. With the huge volatility in the market, trading opportunities have been numerous!

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2007-5-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 29.9% 4.60% 6.43
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 60.8% 4.98% 4.59
PerpetualDiscount 3.0% 4.92% 15.63
Scraps 1.0% 4.09% 5.83
Cash 5.4% 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 4.59% 5.23

Sharp-eyed readers will observe that the “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.), and may make their own adjustments to reflect interest. The average YTW on the securities-only portion of the portfolio, for instance, is 4.85%. MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances to facilitate trading.

These sharp-eyed readers will also note, with a certain amount of glee, that the percentages do not add up to exactly 100% in the above or the following tables. This is due to rounding. You know something? Sharp-eyed readers really bug me.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2007-5.31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 18.5%
Pfd-1(low) 46.3%
Pfd-2 27.7%
Pfd-2(low) 2.2%
Cash 5.4%

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2007-5-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 1%
$50,000 – $100,000 28.7%
$100,000 – $200,000 26.7%
$200,000 – $300,000 14.7%
>$300,000 23.6%
Cash 5.4%

Update: I forgot the ad! MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available on the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

June 1, 2007

Saturday, June 2nd, 2007
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.36% 5.43% 35,195 14.96 2 +0.2894% 954.9
Fixed-Floater 5.59% 5.50% 141,295 15.01 7 +0.0191% 898.7
Floater 4.78% -3.64% 85,719 5.9 3 +0.1602% 1,050.9
Op. Retract 4.80% 3.85% 82,948 2.97 17 -0.1688% 1,022.7
Split-Share 5.03% 4.55% 187,553 4.05 15 -0.2839% 1,040.6
Interest Bearing 6.60% 6.54% 85,139 6.14 4 +0.1248% 1,045.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.36% 4.79% 132,692 5.88 34 -0.0909% 1,027.1
Perpetual-Discount 4.90% 4.94% 564,256 15.62 29 -0.4319% 993.3
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -3.0872% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 23.23 and a limitMaturity.
LFE.PR.A SplitShares -2.0992% A recent addition to the SplitShare index, following its April addition to the HIMIPref™ universe. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.73% based on a bid of 10.26 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1.
GWO.PR.E OpRet -1.9985% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.07% based on a bid of 25.50 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00. There is some uncertainty regarding GWO’s capital market plans.
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.7301% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.78% based on a bid of 25.56 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.2719% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.94% based on a bid of 22.51 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.1038% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.97% based on a bid of 22.40 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat -1.0732% Exchange/Reset date is 2011-5-1 (exchanges with BCE.PR.H); until then, pays 4.35% of par. Closed at 20.28-92, 5×7 (new low of 20.25 hit today); the Hs closed at 22.75-94, 20×5.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.0066% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 22.62 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat +1.4894% Exchange/Reset date is 2011-10-31 (exchanges with BAM.PR.E); until then, pays 4.35% of par. Closed at 23.85-00, 5×5; the Es closed at 24.85-00, 13×12. The Es are currently paying $0.09125 monthly = $1.095 p.a = 4.38% of par.
PWF.PR.H PerpetualPremium +1.5288% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.02% based on a bid of 25.90 and a call 2012-1-9 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TD.PR.O PerpetualPremium 70,000 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.79% based on a bid of 25.24 and a call 2014-11-30 at 25.00.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 62,290 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.71% based on a bid of 24.70 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 57,236 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.92% based on a bid of 23.10 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 56,035 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.90% based on a bid of 24.20 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 48,100 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.89% based on a bid of 23.35 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-four other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Index Performance, May 2007

Friday, June 1st, 2007

Performance of the HIMI Indices for May was:

Total Return, May 2007
Index Performance
Ratchet -2.05%
FixFloat -4.70%
Floater -1.20%
OpRet -0.78%
SplitShare -0.09%
Interest -0.39%
PerpetualPremium -2.20%
PerpetualDiscount -5.36%

The Claymore Preferred ETF may be viewed, with caution, as a proxy for the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index. Caution is required due to tracking error – the ETF will deliver performance according to what it actually holds and how well it is able to do things like reinvest its dividends, which is not the same thing as an index return. I suspect that tracking error this month will be larger than it will be in the future, since it has issued a great many units. Additionally, the fund’s NAV will be reported after MER of 0.45% p.a.

Be that as it may, the NAV on 5/31 was $19.44; the NAV on 4/30 was $19.91. Therefore, NAV Performance for May 2007 for CPD was -2.36%, net of MER (which will be just under 0.04% monthly).

Diversified Preferred Share Trust, DPS.UN is the main competitor of CPD. It doesn’t publish month-end NAVs, but the May 30 NAV was $22.55, while the May 2 NAV was $23.11, so its performance for this four-week period was -2.42%, net of its MER of about 0.04% for the period. The corresponding figures for CPD are $19.48, $19.90, -2.11%. Ouch! I presume that DPS.UN underperformed due to its greater weight in BCE issues, but that’s merely speculation.

It should also be noted that the HIMI Indices are prepared using the closing bids, which can be a very different thing from the closing price. When averaged over a lot of issues the difference should be minimal, but you can’t tell until you rip apart the data.

Caution should also be used in interpreting the differences between the various HIMI Indices. I will suggest that the lousy performance in Ratchet and FixFloat have a lot more to do with nervousness about BCE’s credit than the intrinsic performance of those investment classes – both of those subindices held entirely BCE for the period.

One very interesting thing that happened this month is that a lot of the yieldCurvePremiumLiquidity disappeared, as shown in this graph. I interpret the change in the premium as reflecting a desire by some holders, at least, to get out of the sector in size and quickly; such holders might simply sell their most liquid holdings to adjust portfolio exposures; this will affect the prices of these issues; hence, liquidity will become a lot less expensive. The PerpetualDiscount index is the most liquid of all the sub-indices – it’s dominated by recent issues, apart from anything else – and thus a portion of the decline in this index might be attributed to this factor rather than the intrinsic characteristics of the investment.

Such a hypothesis gains some support from examination of the changes in the yield curve, which I found a little surprising. The long-end hasn’t moved by nearly as much as one might have expected. Note that this graph is of the TAXABLE curve and refers to SPOT YIELDS … therefore, the x-axis shows the yield one might expect on a “stripped dividend”, after tax.

Attribution analysis is tricky and very implementation dependent. I might return to this topic on the weekend.

HIMI Index Rebalancing: May 31, 2007

Friday, June 1st, 2007

There was a lot of activity this month: a huge migration from PerpetualPremium to PerpetualDiscount; a transfer of all the Weston issues to Scraps due to credit concerns; and a transfer of several issues from Scraps due to increased volume.

The changes are:

HIMI Index Rebalancing, May 31, 2007
Ticker From To Because
WN.PR.C PerpetualPremium Scraps Credit
SLF.PR.B PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount  Price 
MFC.PR.B PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price 
POW.PR.D PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
CM.PR.H PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
WN.PR.A PerpetualPremium Scraps Credit
PWF.PR.D Scraps OpRet Volume
LFE.PR.A Scraps SplitShare Volume
FTU.PR.A Scraps SplitShare Volume
BAM.PR.G Scraps FixFloat Volume
WN.PR.B OpRet Scraps Credit
MST.PR.A Interest Scraps Volume
BMO.PR.J PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
ELF.PR.G PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
RY.PR.B PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
CM.PR.I PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
WN.PR.D PerpetualPremium Scraps Credit
GWO.PR.H PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
PWF.PR.K PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
SLF.PR.A PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
WN.PR.E PerpetualDiscount Scraps Credit