Archive for August, 2007

August 14, 2007

Tuesday, August 14th, 2007

I have another barrage of links for you today, so brace yourselves.

First, the obligatory Canadian news: Peter MacKay is no longer the Minister in Charge of Signing Agreements and is now the Minister in Charge of Shooting Off. What his dog thinks of the change was not disclosed.

BCE has filed its proxy statement and disclosed that financing for the takeover is coming from Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, The Royal Bank of Scotland and the Toronto-Dominion Bank. Now, it’s very nice to have financing committments, but they don’t necessarily mean anything. The Sallie Mae takeover is in trouble, with the borrowing buyers attempting to use an escape clause and the salivating sellers trying to slam it shut. Years of litigation ahead on that one, I’ll bet.

One of the financing consortium, Citigroup was in the news today.

Citigroup Inc., the biggest U.S. bank by assets, may forfeit as much as $1 billion of third- quarter profit because of the credit crunch in mortgages and high-yield debt, according to analysts at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. LLC.

“The key question is how the market absorbs deals coming in September, when spreads may widen out to July levels or worse, or may renormalize, with spreads coming in to June levels,” the analysts wrote.

Mason and Howard said mark-to-market losses on leveraged loans in July could have been 15 percent to 20 percent. Lending spreads have tightened so far in August, they said.

Citigroup is the third-ranked provider of leveraged loans in the U.S. this year, behind JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp., according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Conventree is claiming that back-up liquidity providers for its commercial paper programme are refusing to provide back-up liquidity … lawsuits ahead there!

European Central Bank intervention eased off amid hopes that conditions are adjusting. Robert Eisenbeis thinks the ECB was too easy on the market.

It is being argued that central banks should actually make markets in instruments that have suddenly become illiquid … I don’t buy it. That’s the private sector’s job … central banks, as I said yesterday, can and should ensure that the biggest, best capitalized financial market intermediaries can make their decisions without having to get particularly nervous about their financing.

I also don’t buy recommendations that the ceiling on mortgage insurance be increased. The maximum mortgage that the agencies can buy is USD 417,000. Sorry! Anybody who’s taking out a mortgage in excess of USD 417,000 doesn’t need government help, implicit or otherwise. Insuring or providing loans of that size to individuals should be strictly private sector.

There was a comment reported by Bloomberg:

“Something that’s triple-A clearly shouldn’t be this volatile,” David Watts, an analyst at bond research firm CreditSights Inc. in London, said.

It may be that the Bloomberg reporter wrote the story to imply deprecation of the AAA ratings, but I hope the explanation for that remark is that he was deprecating the market. I agree with the other guy:

Ratings are “a measure of risk on a buy-and-hold basis and say nothing about the pricing volatility of an investment,” said Gareth Levington, a senior analyst at Moody’s in London. “The market level isn’t hugely relevant for the rating.”

Now for the really interesting stuff: Fed Funds. Truly one of the wildest and interesting sectors of the market, but not usually. Today Fed Funds Futures for the current month closed at 94.96, indicating that the market feels the average rate on Fed Funds for August will be 5.04%. Given that the Fed Funds target rate is 5.25%, this seems very strange indeed. But there are rumours that an emergency cut is imminent and there are more than just rumours. Federal Reserve Data indicates that the actual average rate so far in August has been about 5.17%; on 8/10 the Effective Rate was 4.68% and on 8/13 the ER was 4.81%. On both those days, the low for the day was 0%. So roll that up and smoke it … the interventions have had some effect! I found another primer on how this works, for those who are interested.

Potential cuts in the Fed Funds rate got a boost from mild US Inflation data which is projected by many to come inside the Fed’s comfort zone. Exports are up, which is logical since emerging nations are the only ones who have any money.

Sub-prime is even affecting national currencies … the Kiwi/Yen carry trade is losing popularity and funds are pouring into the US dollar.

With all this going on, Walmart’s profit warning ushered in every-day discounts on US Equities and financials led the crap-out in Canada.

There was continued flight to quality and curve-steepening in both Treasuries and Canadas. US Investment-Grade corporates narrowed in a little.

A lot of lower grade credits in the preferred share market got hit today: WN.PR.D, -3.49%; DW.PR.A, -2.46%; WN.PR.C, -1.72%; DC.PR.A, -1.55%; YPG.PR.B, -1.53%; STR.E, -1.35%; IQW.PR.D, -1.19%. This illustrates my theme of minimizing exposure to the Pfd-3-type credits!

Just for fun, I’ll update my recent comparable list:

Pfd-3 Comparables
Issue EPP.PR.A WN.PR.E YPG.PR.B
Quote, 7/25 20.80-20 20.31-68 23.05-15
Quote, 8/14 20.35-65 19.86-00 22.50-84
Return (b/b) for period -2.16% -2.22% -2.39%
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.75% 4.79% 26,199 15.96 1 -0.2051% 1,040.7
Fixed-Floater 5.01% 4.97% 123,815 15.66 8 +0.3194% 1,016.4
Floater 4.91% 2.79% 72,634 8.12 4 -0.3415% 1,042.5
Op. Retract 4.82% 4.05% 81,719 2.89 16 +0.0565% 1,025.1
Split-Share 5.07% 4.80% 99,791 3.89 15 -0.0933% 1,040.7
Interest Bearing 6.23% 6.69% 63,505 4.62 3 -0.4036% 1,035.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.55% 5.28% 99,989 7.19 24 -0.1837% 1,020.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.09% 5.13% 297,401 15.28 39 -0.1788% 974.4
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -1.4778% Asset coverage of nearly 2.3:1 as of August 9, according to Mulvihill, which seems more than adequate given that the underlying security is BNS common. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 10.00 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-01 at 10.00.
BCE.PR.T FixFloat -1.4021%  
POW.PR.C PerpetualPremium -1.3807% Note that although the closing bid was 25.00, the low for the day was 25.30. So don’t panic just yet. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.86% based on a bid of 25.00 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.3684% More oscillations! Asset coverage on August 10 was 1.84:1 according to Brookfield. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.32% (as interest, mostly) based on a bid of 9.37 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.1926% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 22.37 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat +1.9765%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
GWO.PR.F PerpetualPremium 78,282 Desjardins crossed 75,000 at 26.85. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.51% based on a bid of 26.85 and a call 2008-10-30 at 26.00. Somebody’s betting it won’t be called!
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 59,069 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.12% based on a bid of 23.95 and a limitMaturity.
IGM.PR.A OpRet 37,894 Scotia crossed 36,900 at 26.89. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.27% based on a bid of 26.80 and a call 2009-7-30 at 26.00.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 19,200 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.94% based on a bid of 22.96 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 17,550 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.95% based on a bid of 22.92 and a limitMaturity.

There were six other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Indices: August 31, 1999

Tuesday, August 14th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 1999-08-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,549.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,619.8 8 2.00 5.14% 15.2 172M 5.13%
Floater 1,458.9 3 1.68 4.93% 15.4 44M 5.35%
OpRet 1,375.7 30 1.17 4.97% 3.1 65M 6.15%
SplitShare 1,414.4 4 1.50 5.49% 6.7 46M 5.43%
Interest-Bearing 1,458.6 4 2.00 7.61% 4.0 627M 7.98%
Perpetual-Premium 1,197.2 4 1.25 6.59% 0.2 56M 7.24%
Perpetual-Discount 1,254.1 10 1.60 5.72% 14.2 149M 5.67%

Index Constitution, 1999-08-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 1999-08-31, Post-rebalancing

DBRS: IQW.PR.C / IQW.PR.D Under Review Negative

Tuesday, August 14th, 2007

DBRS has announced it has:

placed the BB long-term debt ratings and Pfd-4 preferred share rating of Quebecor World Inc. and its related subsidiaries (Quebecor World or the Company) Under Review with Negative Implications. The Under Review – Negative status reflects DBRS’s concerns over the Company’s near-term liquidity, outcome of negotiations regarding the Company’s bank agreements (the existing waiver for which expires at the end of Q3 2007) and the Company’s strategic review of its European operations – all factors that have been exacerbated by continued weakness in the Company’s operating results. DBRS expects to complete its review after the end of Q3 2007.

DBRS is concerned with Quebecor World’s near-term liquidity, which continues to be negatively impacted by declining EBITDA and cash flow from operations, pressuring existing financial covenants and significantly restricting the Company’s financial flexibility.

It hasn’t been too long since these issues were downgraded from Pfd-4(high) to Pfd-4.

S&P rates the issues P-5(high) as of Sept 28/06; Watch Negative as of August 9/07. When placing the issues on Watch Negative, S&P stated:

“The CreditWatch placement reflect Quebecor World’s ongoing weak performance and our concerns that the company’s earnings, credit measures, and financial flexibility could weaken further due to a challenging pricing environment, operating losses in its European division, and intense competition,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Lori Harris. “Furthermore, Quebecor World’s waivers from its bank group for certain financial covenants are only approved through to the release of its third-quarter 2007 financial results,”

HIMIPref™ maintains the Quebecor World preferreds in its database. These issues are recorded solely for the sake of continuity and have no influence on the calculation of yield curves.

August 13, 2007

Monday, August 13th, 2007

Link heaven today, since everybody’s talking about interesting stuff! You know things are getting weird when the words “Ruble” and “Safe Haven” are mentioned in the same sentence.

Things were going well until Coventree announced it wasn’t able to roll its commercial paper and was therefore extending the term of their extendible notes. As they explain in a very good promotional essay, written in 2002 and still on their website, Extendible Notes provide liquidity protection for issuers similar to that of having stand-by lines with major banks, while being much less costly to support. Whether or not anybody will be willing to buy these things after seeing all the damage an extension can do in practice, is something we will just have to wait and see.

After Coventree’s announcement, American and Canadian equities tanked, ruining what had been a pretty good day ’till that point. Equities had, until then, been able to laugh off a Goldman Sachs bail-out of one of their funds, to the tune of $3-billion.

The Global Equity fund has about $3.50 in borrowed money, or leverage, for each $1 of client money, down from $6 before the capital infusion announced today, Viniar said. The fund plans to keep leverage at the current level.

When you are levered 7:1, there isn’t much room for zig-zags in market prices! This, I think, is one of those occasions where patient money that isn’t marked to market every single day can find some good bargains. High-quality spread product has been suggested.

There was more central bank intervention on the day and some fast-money is betting that this will turn into rate cuts. I don’t buy that myself … but I can’t deny that the market is expecting cuts. Jim Hamilton wrote a great essay defining a liquidity event and attached a graph of Fed-Intervention-Sizes I can’t help reproducing here:

Wow! The WSJ posted a primer on the mechanics of this. My own homely example of a liquidity crunch is … say you have to sell me your house … maybe you’re moving or something. It’s worth $400,000 – we both agree on that. But I can’t get financing! All the bank is willing to lend me is $300,000! At that point, you might have to swallow hard and sell it to me for the latter figure … and I’ll have to keep my nose clean for the next while so the bank doesn’t foreclose on me.

The central banks are desperately afraid of this type of thing happening … it’s what happened in Japan in the late eighties, and we’ve seen how that story plays out. So they are lending the top-tier banks as much money as they want at the overnight rates, simply to ensure that these banks can then make business decisions based on expected returns relative to the overnight without having to worry about their own financing. With luck, this liquidity will trickle into the marketplace and – since everybody agrees your house is really worth $400,000 – I’ll be able to get financing for the original figure. I’ll have to, since if I don’t somebody else will. But a prolonged liquidity squeeze can lead to deflation – and fighting deflation is like trying to push a rope uphill.

There is money around, so we needn’t all panic just yet. J&J just came out with a massive bond issue that was sharply increased in size once they realized how much demand there was for triple-A product. There are warnings that the same reception won’t be found by lesser credits, however.

As one might imagine, government bonds had an entirely reasonably good day, with Treasuries up a tad and Canadas up a tad more.

In continuing stories, there is argument that sub-prime is NOT Greenspan’s fault and, having made their point, China backed off the financial Armageddon thing.

The preferred share market was quiet, drifting slightly downward on not much volume.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.74% 4.78% 27,263 15.97 1 -0.0820% 1,042.9
Fixed-Floater 5.03% 5.00% 125,521 15.60 8 -0.1064% 1,013.2
Floater 4.89% 0.08% 72,118 8.13 4 +0.0026% 1,046.1
Op. Retract 4.82% 4.06% 81,126 2.93 16 +0.1121% 1,024.5
Split-Share 5.07% 4.75% 100,383 3.72 15 -0.0314% 1,041.6
Interest Bearing 6.21% 6.62% 63,728 4.63 3 +0.2757% 1,039.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.54% 5.24% 100,421 5.80 24 -0.0592% 1,022.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.08% 5.12% 300,620 15.30 39 -0.0814% 976.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat -1.1638%  
PIC.PR.A SplitShare -1.0918% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.94% based on a bid of 15.40 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00.
CU.PR.A PerpetualPremium -1.0626% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.63% based on a bid of 25.14 and a call 2012-3-31 at $25.00.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +1.0638% I don’t know about anybody else, but I’m getting awfully tired of seeing this issue in the “Major Price Move” list every single day! Can’t it just find a level? Asset coverage on August 10 was 1.84:1 according to Brookfield. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.08% (as interest, mostly) based on a bid of 9.50 and hardMaturity. 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
CM.PR.R OpRet +1.4041% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.85% based on a bid of 26.00 and a call 2008-5-30 at 25.75.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
DFN.PR.A SplitShare 70,568 Desjardins bought 29,700 from “Anonymous” at 10.30 just before the close – a total of 57,800 traded in the last ten minutes of the day, and another 300 in after-hours. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.81% based on a bid of 10.30 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount 14,900 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.00% based on a bid of 24.56 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 13,500 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 24.21 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 12,545 RBC crossed 10,000 at 23.70. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.98% based on a bid of 23.65 and a limitMaturity.
ALB.PR.A SplitShare 11,800 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.25% based on a bid of 24.95 and a call 2008-3-29 at 25.00.

There were five other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

 

HIMIPref™ Indices: July 30, 1999

Monday, August 13th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 1999-07-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,540.7 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,621.7 8 2.00 4.62% 15.7 248M 5.10%
Floater 1,450.7 3 1.69 4.95% 15.5 29M 5.35%
OpRet 1,382.6 31 1.16 4.78% 3.2 81M 6.13%
SplitShare 1,407.4 4 1.49 5.47% 6.8 46M 5.46%
Interest-Bearing 1,439.3 3 2.00 7.80% 11.5 899M 7.96%
Perpetual-Premium 1,200.6 4 1.25 5.37% 0.3 47M 7.18%
Perpetual-Discount 1,253.8 10 1.60 5.60% 14.4 196M 5.66%

Index Constitution, 1999-07-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 1999-07-30, Post-rebalancing

PrefLetter for August, 2007, Released!

Sunday, August 12th, 2007

The August edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the August, 2007 issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the September, 2007 issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close September 14 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on September 17.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

August 10, 2007

Friday, August 10th, 2007

Well, that was a week-and-a-half, that was!

As proof, I offer up the TSX Press Release which states:

There were 707,441 trades today on Toronto Stock Exchange, a new historical high. The previous high was 704,261 trades on August 9, 2007.

I feel a bit sorry for August 9 – setting a new high and only getting one day in the sun! It’s a bit like breaking the world record for something at the Olympic Games, only to find you have to settle for silver.

The number of trades will be a function of the rise of Algorithmic Trading, which should not be confused with Quantitative Investing, which should most definitely not be confused with Technical Analysis.

Algorithmic trading is the practice of feeding a few simple rules into a simple computer programme and having the programme place orders into the market place as required. For instance, you can tell your programme that you want to sell X to buy Y at a take-out of $1.00, up to a limit of 50,000 shares, to stay on the offer and bid, respectively, to the extent that if you get filled on one side you can take market action on the other, as long as you stay within 1,000 shares of equal execution. Or something like that. Such a programme could lead to a huge number of orders, as it executed in pieces over the day. But who cares? It cost you two minutes to input these specifications, five minutes to check up on it through the day and five cents worth of electricity. The Financial Times did a series on it.

Quantitative Investing, on the other hand, is the practice of measuring investment characteristics and making investment decisions on the basis of these numbers. Anybody who has ever compared P/E ratios has invested quantitatively, at least to some extent. Practitioners of Quantitative Investing, known as Quants, make most, if not all, of their investment decision based on such numbers. The programmes used for Quant investing range from moronic six line spreadsheets to things like (cough, cough) HIMIPref™.

Technical Analysis is the practice of making an idiot of yourself through the creative use of graph paper, different colours of ink, sacrificed chickens and dirt taken from a graveyard at midnight. It is not suitable for discussion in polite society, such as, f’rinstance, in this blog. A slightly more favourable description of the process is at Investopedia.

Yeah, so anyway, the TSX had a huge day in terms of trade volume and I hope the tech guys are enjoying a relaxing beer at this point.

The day was wild, both in the US and Canada, as sub-prime worries struggled with confidence-boosting cash from the Central Banks for investors’ hearts and minds.

No hedge funds actually went bust today, as far as I know, but there are reports that Goldman’s Alpha Fund is now down 26% for 2007 to date. Deutsche Bank has disclosed that a fund with no sub-prime exposure has experienced 30% redemptions in August alone.

This scale of redemptions sucks up liquidity like crazy, which is one reason the central banks are stepping up. The CEO of Countrywide Credit thinks it will have a salutary effect on confidence (he’d better hope so!) and even the Bush administration has made a cheerleading effort, although not everybody buys what they’re selling. There’s much more confidence being expressed in the technocrats – e.g. Bernanke. Most comment is favourable.

The Treasury market stopped the panic buying as did Canadas, with the long-end continuing its weakness on fears all this money’s going to cause inflation.

The preferred market had a poor day, with all but one of the HIMIPref™ Preferred indices down on the day. But … that means yields are going up! In keeping with the “flight to quality” theme, there were quite a few lower rated (and non-index-included) issues down substantially on the day: BBD.PR.D, -4.15%; GT.PR.A, -2.93%; SPL.A, -2.87%; DC.PR.A, -2.64%; NTL.PR.F, -2.35%; WN.PR.A, -1.48%; DW.PR.A, -1.46%; WN.PR.E, -1.22%; BBD.PR.B, -1.06%; and finally IQW.PR.D, -1.00%. The two Mulvihill funds in that list, GT.PR.A and SPL.A are showing amazing yields … if they don’t default … which is not as likely as one might wish.

The TSX’s record trade count didn’t get much help from preferreds, as volume was pretty low.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.75% 4.77% 28,367 15.97 1 -0.1228% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 5.02% 5.01% 127,073 14.16 8 -0.6525% 1,014.3
Floater 4.89% 0.26% 73,120 8.14 4 -0.2409% 1,046.1
Op. Retract 4.83% 4.10% 82,480 3.15 16 -0.1018% 1,023.4
Split-Share 5.06% 4.78% 100,290 4.13 15 -0.3757% 1,042.0
Interest Bearing 6.22% 6.64% 64,157 4.63 3 +0.4145% 1,036.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.53% 5.21% 101,808 5.64 24 -0.1354% 1,022.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.07% 5.11% 304,937 15.31 39 -0.0631% 976.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
CFS.PR.A SplitShare -3.8647% On ZERO volume. Asset coverage as of August 3 is about 2.1:1, according to CC&L. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.47% based on a bid of 9.95 and a hardMaturity 2012-1-31 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.8311% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.89% based on a bid of 26.27 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -1.7178%  
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.2898% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.91% based on a bid of 22.96 and limitMaturity.
FTU.PR.A SplitShare -1.0628% Asset coverage is just under 2.1:1 as of July 31, according to Quadravest, although with a name like “US Financial 15 Split Corporation”, it’s entirely possible that the underlying portfolio has been volatile lately! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.78% based on a bid of 10.24 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-01 at 10.00
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +1.2931% Continuing its recent gyrations. Asset coverage is 1.86:1 as of August 3, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.25% (as interest!) based on a bid of 9.40 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
MFC.PR.A OpRet +1.5217% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.63% based on a bid of 26.02 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 26.02. That’s an interest-equivalent of 5.08% … MFC bonds maturing in 2016 are currently yielding about 5.40%.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 31,300 TD crossed 18,500 at 24.43. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.00% based on a bid of 24.25 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.A OpRet 23,100 TD crossed 13,000 at 26.30, and I wish I had the name and number of the client on the buy side! See “Major Price Moves”, above.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 20,165 Nesbitt bought 16,600 from Hampton in two tranches, both at 22.45, 23 minutes apart. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.02% based on a bid of 22.45 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 18,565 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.02% based on a bid of 22.69 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 15,110 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.92% based on a bid of 23.03 and a limitMaturity.

There were five other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

EPE.PR.A to be redeemed

Friday, August 10th, 2007

EPCOR Preferred Equity has announced (and its parent, EPCOR, has confirmed, in case anybody’s worried there’s a rogue treasurer on the loose):

its intention to redeem all of the outstanding Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series I (“the Preferred Shares”) on September 30, 2007 at a redemption price of $25.00 per Preferred Share. The Preferred Shares were issued to investors by EPCOR Preferred Equity Inc. on September 27, 2002.
    EPCOR will fund the redemption from cash balances and funds available under its revolving credit facilities.

Eight-million of these shares were outstanding, rated Pfd-2(low) by DBRS.

According to EPCOR, EPCOR Preferred Equity

was established for the purpose of raising equity capital, on a consolidated basis, for EPCOR Utilities Inc., its parent corporation. In turn, the capital is used to provide loan financing to other subsidiaries of EPCOR Utilities Inc.

This issue has not been included in the HIMIPref™ universe.

Update 2007-09-11: The headline previously referred to this issue as “EPE.PR.E”. This error has now been corrected.

BCE / Teachers: A Review

Friday, August 10th, 2007

BCE closed today on the TSX at $38.85 – down $0.25 after dipping as low as $37.55. This is way below the $42.75 takeover price – just over 9.1% below, in fact – so, given that the takeover is a matter of great pith and moment for preferred share investors, I thought I’d review what’s happened so far.

On June 30, I reported on the takeover and my puzzlement regarding the inclusion of the preferred shares in the offer. The Teachers press release trumpetted:

The purchaser has obtained a debt commitment to finance the transaction subject to usual terms for these types of financings.

It should be noted that the “Purchaser” is not Teachers, but a numbered company set up by it and its partners.

On July 17, the Great Sub-Prime Panic of ’07 got rolling in earnest:

Mind you, a little safety could be just what the doctor ordered down south! Bear Stearns has warned that the smaller of its two famous hedge funds is a total write-off, and the other one isn’t much better. Take this lesson to heart: just because a firm is good at selling investments doesn’t mean that they’re necessarily good at running investments.

On July 26, I had to admit:

I couldn’t resist checking the definitive BCE / Teachers’ Agreement

6.4(9): The Purchaser acknowledges and agrees that its obtaining financing is not a condition to any of its obligations hereunder, regardless of the reasons why financing is not obtained or whether such reasons are within or beyond the control of the Purchaser. For the avoidance of doubt, if any financing referred to in this Section 6.4 is not obtained, the Purchaser will continue to be obligated to consummate the Arrangement, subject to and on the terms contemplated by this Agreement.

On July 27 I reported that:

Citi Investment Research cut its recommendation, citing growing risks to its financing.

Later in that post, I speculated:

I’ve thought the issue in the context of what a massive break-fee-loss would mean to Teachers, and come to the conclusion that I don’t know enough about the issue. It would seem to me reasonable that there might be provisions regarding financing in the consortium agreement, to the effect that, if the deal fails on financing, the loss would be borne by Teachers financial partners, Providence Equity Partners Inc. and Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC. After all, they’re the financial muscle for the deal! It may be that such a provision is why Mr. Lamoureux is so sanguine … but we will just have to sit back and wait and see! In the meantime, I highly doubt that I’ll be throwing chips down on that table!

The plot thickened on July 31:

there are musings that the USD 37.2-billion takeover of TXU is at risk, with the suddenly nervous financiers tempted to pay a billion bucks to get out of the deal. Observant readers will not that both amounts are oddly reminiscent of the BCE / Teachers’ agreement, but the musings are rebutted on another news service. Trial balloon? Chatter from clerks? Who knows? There would be a big reputational hit to take

On August 2, BCE announced:

that all necessary filings have now been made for regulatory approval of the proposed acquisition of BCE by an investor group led by Teachers’ Private Capital, the private investment arm of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, Providence Equity Partners Inc. and Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC. These include filings with Industry Canada, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, the Canadian Competition Bureau, the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Communications Commission and six U.S. states.

On August 3, I reported: 

Speaking of Telus, they released their quarterlies today, and noted:

TELUS in July continued its assessment of whether it should potentially make a competing offer for BCE. TELUS has concluded this assessment and it does not intend to submit a competing offer to acquire BCE.

On August 8, BCE announced:

that a special shareholder meeting will be held on Friday, September 21, 2007, at 9:30 a.m. in Montreal. At the special meeting, holders of common and preferred shares registered at the close of business on August 10, 2007 will be asked to vote on the privatization of BCE by, among others, Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board and affiliates of Providence Equity Partners Inc. and Madison Dearborn Partners, LLP.

Which brings us, basically, to today, with speculation on other buy-outs, the common 9.1% below the take-over price and a press release from Teachers:

In response to media inquires, officials at Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan and their partners Providence Equity Partners Inc. and Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC, stated today that they remain committed to the terms of the definitive agreement reached on June 30, under which the investment partners would acquire BCE. The transaction is subject to shareholder and regulatory approvals.

The press release has been picked up by Reuters and Bloomberg. Bloomberg also reports that

  • Edward Jones & Co. has cut the BCE rating to “Sell” from “Hold”
  • An analyst at Three Macs said BCE “has definitely become higher risk than it was even two weeks ago because of the transaction risk,”
  • A National Bank Financial analyst said “I still think this deal has lower than average risk of breaking” and rates the shares “Sector Perform”

Bloomberg did not disclose long-term track records for any of these analysts.

What do I say? I say BCE Prefs are a crapshoot on credit. I don’t play craps with investment money.

BCE has the following preferred shares outstanding: BCE.PR.A, BCE.PR.C, BCE.PR.E, BCE.PR.F, BCE.PR.G, BCE.PR.H, BCE.PR.I, BCE.PR.R, BCE.PR.S, BCE.PR.T, BCE.PR.Y & BCE.PR.Z

August PrefLetter Now in Preparation

Friday, August 10th, 2007

The markets have closed and the August edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share; the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The August version will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the August issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”!